WEBVTT - What caused the Titan sub disaster?

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<v Speaker 1>Before we jump into today's podcast, We've got a really

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks in advance for helping TDA. Now let's get into

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<v Speaker 1>it already, and this this is the Daily This is

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<v Speaker 1>the Daily OS.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh, now it makes sense. Good morning, and welcome to

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<v Speaker 2>the Daily OS. It's Thursday, the seventh of August. I'm

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<v Speaker 2>Emma Gillespie.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Sam Kazlowski.

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<v Speaker 2>More than two years after the implosion of a submersible

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<v Speaker 2>expedition to the Titanic wreck, the US Coast Guard has

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<v Speaker 2>released its final report into what went wrong. According to

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<v Speaker 2>the three hundred and thirty five page document, the disaster,

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<v Speaker 2>which killed five people, was preventable and driven flawed design,

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<v Speaker 2>regulatory avoidance, and a toxic workplace culture. This landmark report

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<v Speaker 2>paints a damning picture of Oceangate, the company behind the mission,

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<v Speaker 2>and of its late CEO, Stockton Rush. Today we are

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<v Speaker 2>going to take you through what happened to the Titan,

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<v Speaker 2>what the report found, its recommendations, and whether anyone could

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<v Speaker 2>still face legal consequences.

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<v Speaker 1>Emma, why don't we go back to revisit this story.

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<v Speaker 1>It was two years ago. It was the biggest story

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<v Speaker 1>in the world for a while there. It's now got

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<v Speaker 1>a documentary on Netflix that has almost brought it back

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<v Speaker 1>into the frame. And now we've got this report. Take

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<v Speaker 1>me back to what the titan sub was and what

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<v Speaker 1>happened to it.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, so the titan was a deep sea submersible operated

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<v Speaker 2>by this private US company called ocean Gate. Now when

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<v Speaker 2>I say submersible, it was a vessel about the size

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<v Speaker 2>of a mini van and for the price of two

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<v Speaker 2>hundred and fifty thousand US dollars per per tourists were

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<v Speaker 2>offered the chance to travel down in the submersible to

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<v Speaker 2>see the wreck of the Titanic, the iconic shipwreck which

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<v Speaker 2>lies about three and a half thousand meters underwater in

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<v Speaker 2>the North Atlantic. Now, on the eighteenth of June twenty

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<v Speaker 2>twenty three, five people were on board the Titan that

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<v Speaker 2>includes Ocean Gates CEO and pilot of the vessels stocked

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<v Speaker 2>and Rush, a British billionaire named Hamish Harding, French Titanic

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<v Speaker 2>expert Paul Henri Najalais, and Pakistani businessman Shazada Darwood, who

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<v Speaker 2>was there with his teenage son. The vessel lost contact

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<v Speaker 2>about an hour and forty five minutes into its journey,

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<v Speaker 2>and what followed was, as you would remember, an international

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<v Speaker 2>search and rescue effort that absolutely gripped the world.

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<v Speaker 1>And when they first went missing, there was this hope

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<v Speaker 1>that the crew could still be alive.

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<v Speaker 2>Absolutely so we knew that the crew had four days

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<v Speaker 2>worth of oxygen emergency oxygen, so in the event that

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<v Speaker 2>they got trapped on the ocean floor, there would be

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<v Speaker 2>four days hypothetically for them to survive down there. But

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<v Speaker 2>on the twenty second of June, debris from the sub

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<v Speaker 2>was found near the Titanic site, roughly six hundred k's

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<v Speaker 2>off the coast of Newfoundland in Canada. Now officials confirmed

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<v Speaker 2>pretty much straightaway that the vessel had imploded on its descent,

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<v Speaker 2>killing everyone on board instantly.

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<v Speaker 1>And the reason we're talking about it today is that

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<v Speaker 1>the US Coast Guard has released this very lengthy report

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<v Speaker 1>into the incident, trying to break down exactly where things

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<v Speaker 1>went wrong. Before we get into the report itself. Just

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<v Speaker 1>explain to me the role of the US Coast Guard

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<v Speaker 1>in all of this.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, so the Coast Guard or the USCG is responsible

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<v Speaker 2>for a whole raft of maritime measures, including leading rescue missions,

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<v Speaker 2>does that in US waters or in international areas under

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<v Speaker 2>US responsibility. It has maritime security responsibilities, and it also

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<v Speaker 2>acts as a regulatory and certificational authority, so it has

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<v Speaker 2>some safety responsibilities. Like in the case of the Titan Sub.

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<v Speaker 2>The Coast Guard leads investigations also into marine casualties, So

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<v Speaker 2>where there is loss of life or potential violations of

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<v Speaker 2>maritime law, it will lead investigations. Now, in line with that,

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<v Speaker 2>the Coast Guard led the Titan sub investigation because Oceangate

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<v Speaker 2>was a US based company and several of its passengers

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<v Speaker 2>were US citizens, despite the fact that it imploded somewhere

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<v Speaker 2>in international waters off Canada.

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<v Speaker 1>So they've spent two years looking at this incident. What's

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<v Speaker 1>the top line finding here?

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<v Speaker 2>So the biggest finding here is that the deaths of

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<v Speaker 2>the five people on board were entirely preventable and that

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<v Speaker 2>Oceangate failed at its leadership level and at every level

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<v Speaker 2>across the board. So the report found that the vessel's

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<v Speaker 2>design was never certified by independent engineers, and if you've

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<v Speaker 2>seen the Netflix stock o that goes into this a

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<v Speaker 2>little bit. Essentially, the vessel constructed and needed the certification

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<v Speaker 2>of a third party group to say, yep, this is

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<v Speaker 2>fit to explore the ocean floor to this certain depth,

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<v Speaker 2>and with that certification it would have been able to

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<v Speaker 2>sell tickets and operate as a fully legit tourist provider.

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<v Speaker 2>Safety warnings from engineers and staff were repeatedly ignored, the

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<v Speaker 2>report found, and it also said that key safety processes

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<v Speaker 2>were missing or deliberately avoided. One of the biggest red

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<v Speaker 2>flags that we've learned about in this report and over

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<v Speaker 2>the course of the last two years from various whistleblowers

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<v Speaker 2>is the use of carbon fiber for the Titan's main

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<v Speaker 2>pressure hull.

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<v Speaker 1>As in the hull itself was made of carbon fiber.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, so the part of the sub that keeps the

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<v Speaker 2>passengers alive under extreme pressure at depths of three thousand

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<v Speaker 2>and four thousand meters below the sea level. That material

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<v Speaker 2>had never been used in a deep sea sub like

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<v Speaker 2>this before, so in the early days of the Titan sub,

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<v Speaker 2>the carbon fiber element was seen as really innovative as

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<v Speaker 2>this big breakthrough because carbon fiber is incredibly light, it's

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<v Speaker 2>a lot cheaper and easier to use, so there were

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of reasons to kind of be excited about

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<v Speaker 2>carbon fiber being in the hull.

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<v Speaker 1>So is that actually in terms of the mechanics of it,

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<v Speaker 1>is that what failed to lead to the implosion? Yep.

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<v Speaker 2>Now to understand this we have to do a little

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<v Speaker 2>bit of quick science talk about carbon fiber. But think

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<v Speaker 2>of carbon fiber like millions of little strands of string,

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<v Speaker 2>all connected, so all of those little strands can break

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<v Speaker 2>or weaken. An analysis of the sub showed that this

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<v Speaker 2>process had begun, called delamination. The layers of the carbon

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<v Speaker 2>fiber had started to separate, so there was evidence of

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<v Speaker 2>stress damage to the hull, and every time one of

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<v Speaker 2>those strings broke or came apart, it weakened the entire structure.

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<v Speaker 2>Engineers and staff had reportedly raised concerns about the design

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<v Speaker 2>on several occasions over the course of many years, but

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<v Speaker 2>according to the report from the Coast Guard oceangate created

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<v Speaker 2>a quote culture of fear and retaliation that silenced employees.

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<v Speaker 2>One employee was even fired after raising safety concerns and

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<v Speaker 2>multiple employees left the company during the development of the

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<v Speaker 2>sub and prior to that fatal journey in June twenty

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<v Speaker 2>twenty three.

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<v Speaker 1>And I think what really strikes me about this report

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<v Speaker 1>is that it doesn't seem to be one factor just

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<v Speaker 1>in isolation. It's the conflation of factors. It's the idea

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<v Speaker 1>that you can have a material that wasn't seaworthy, but

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<v Speaker 1>then the concerns raised not being heard because of company

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<v Speaker 1>culture exactly. Either one of those by itself perhaps wouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>have led to this outcome. Tell me about the role

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<v Speaker 1>of the CEO, Stockton Rush in all of this, because

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<v Speaker 1>he was on board when the sub imploded, right.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so he died with the four other passengers. But

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<v Speaker 2>the findings against him in this report are incredibly scathing.

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<v Speaker 2>So the overarching theme or all of the findings kind

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<v Speaker 2>of trace back to this common finding that he had

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<v Speaker 2>this intense influence over everything and almost a narcissistic arrogance

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<v Speaker 2>about achieving the goal of taking the sub to the Titanic,

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<v Speaker 2>regardless of any safety risks. So he was the CEO,

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<v Speaker 2>the lead designer, the pilot, and the report says he

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<v Speaker 2>pursued innovation and speed as in speed to achieve the

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<v Speaker 2>expedition over safety and skipped established testing procedures. In fact,

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<v Speaker 2>the report says, and I think this is really critical

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<v Speaker 2>and what a lot of people have been waiting for,

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<v Speaker 2>that if he had survived, he would have likely faced

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<v Speaker 2>criminal charges for his role in the disaster and for

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<v Speaker 2>contributing to the deaths of the passengers.

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<v Speaker 1>The report was really detailed about the way in which

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<v Speaker 1>he influenced company culture and his leadership style. Give me

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<v Speaker 1>a quick sense of the specifics there about that culture piece.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, so there's a strong link between Rush and these

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<v Speaker 2>findings of a toxic work environment. The report states that

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<v Speaker 2>for several years preceding the incident, Oceangate cut corners, quote,

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<v Speaker 2>leveraged intimidation tactics and what the report called the company's

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<v Speaker 2>favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny. So this reputation of

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<v Speaker 2>being a really innovative company doing something exciting and different,

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<v Speaker 2>and that they took advantage of that. The finding stated

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<v Speaker 2>that by strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges,

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<v Speaker 2>Oceangate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of

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<v Speaker 2>the established deep sea protocols, which had historically contributed to

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<v Speaker 2>a strong safety record for commercial submersibles.

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<v Speaker 1>And what about the other passengers in all of this,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, were they aware of all of these risks

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<v Speaker 1>and perhaps regulatory missing pieces before they jumped into that vessel.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's a question that has come up a lot

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<v Speaker 2>over the last couple of years. And the report found

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<v Speaker 2>ultimately that the passengers were misled by the company. The

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<v Speaker 2>report says Oceangate called the passengers mission special and this

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<v Speaker 2>was a sort of loophole to get around the fact

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<v Speaker 2>that they were not certified to run the expedition with

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<v Speaker 2>paying tourists. But by bringing these people on as mission specialists,

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<v Speaker 2>they could argue that each person on board had a

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<v Speaker 2>particular role so served a purpose in that way, and

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<v Speaker 2>the contracts that they were made to sign really downplayed

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<v Speaker 2>the risks. In some cases, they overstated how tested and

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<v Speaker 2>safe the vessel really was. And to quote the report quote,

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<v Speaker 2>there was a systematic pattern of misrepresentation in how Oceangate

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<v Speaker 2>described for Titan's capabilities and testing history to clients and

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<v Speaker 2>to the public.

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<v Speaker 1>So this large report has come out. Have we heard

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<v Speaker 1>from Oceangate in response to the report, and are they

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<v Speaker 1>still actually operating as a company.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's worth noting the company essentially ceased operations after

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<v Speaker 2>the disaster just weeks after, so it hasn't responded directly

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<v Speaker 2>to the report at the time of recording. The website's

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<v Speaker 2>been taken down, and Oceangate hasn't made any public statements

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<v Speaker 2>for over a year. I don't think anyone is really

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<v Speaker 2>expecting to hear from anyone affiliated with Oceangate. A lot

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<v Speaker 2>of the people that worked for them have tried really

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<v Speaker 2>hard to distance themselves from that period of their careers.

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<v Speaker 1>Have we heard much from the families of the passengers

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<v Speaker 1>who died.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, some of the families have spoken out this week,

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<v Speaker 2>in particular the Darwood family, so that's the father and

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<v Speaker 2>son who died on board. They released a statement saying

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<v Speaker 2>no report could ease their loss, but they're hopeful that

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<v Speaker 2>it will lead to accountability and prevent future tragedies.

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<v Speaker 1>I was really interested by that note that you raised

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<v Speaker 1>around the fact that it was likely that the CEO

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<v Speaker 1>would face criminal charges had he not been part of

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<v Speaker 1>the group that died. Are they going to be any

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<v Speaker 1>legal consequences for this? Obviously not surrounding him, but surrounding

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<v Speaker 1>other personnel in the company or the company itself.

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<v Speaker 2>It is possible. So while we know Oceangate no longer

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<v Speaker 2>exists as a company, the Coast Guard has referred the

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<v Speaker 2>case to US federal prosecutors, and that could then open

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<v Speaker 2>the door to civil lawsuit or even criminal charges for

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<v Speaker 2>anyone else involved. But in terms of criminal proceedings, Stocked

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<v Speaker 2>and Rush, the CEO really is at the center of

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<v Speaker 2>all of the negligence that can be traced back to

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<v Speaker 2>human decision makingper interesting, but on a broader level, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>we could see civil suits from the families. And the

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<v Speaker 2>report calls for really significant change to how submersibles like

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<v Speaker 2>this are regulated, and particularly how private companies operate them,

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<v Speaker 2>because right now it's a pretty unregulated space.

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<v Speaker 1>And one quote that really stood out to me in

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<v Speaker 1>those recommendations and that sense of discussing, you know, this

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<v Speaker 1>isn't the last time that we're going to see people

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<v Speaker 1>try and push the barriers of exploration, be it in

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<v Speaker 1>space or under the ocean or on land. That line

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<v Speaker 1>around innovation must never come at the cost of safety. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>tell me about the recommendations to kind of wrap this

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<v Speaker 1>all up, how does the US Coast Guard think that

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<v Speaker 1>we should all move forward in this space.

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<v Speaker 2>So there are seventeen recommendations, a lot focused on safety

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<v Speaker 2>and certification. So the fact that that third party certification

0:13:04.920 --> 0:13:08.480
<v Speaker 2>never happened for the Titan, ultimately the Coastguard wants to

0:13:08.600 --> 0:13:10.800
<v Speaker 2>ensure that never happens again. So there's a series of

0:13:10.840 --> 0:13:15.719
<v Speaker 2>regulations there. There are recommendations for stronger whistle blower protections

0:13:15.840 --> 0:13:20.439
<v Speaker 2>because we know that several employees really tried to raise

0:13:20.440 --> 0:13:23.640
<v Speaker 2>the alarm on this before the tragedy happened. And there's

0:13:23.679 --> 0:13:29.120
<v Speaker 2>recommendations around clearer oversight of deep sea exploration, so frameworks

0:13:29.240 --> 0:13:33.559
<v Speaker 2>around international waters tourism in that space and who should

0:13:33.600 --> 0:13:37.599
<v Speaker 2>be responsible for kind of global safety and safety frameworks.

0:13:38.120 --> 0:13:41.560
<v Speaker 2>And it's recommended to ban or strictly limit the use

0:13:41.679 --> 0:13:46.480
<v Speaker 2>of unproven materials like carbon fiber for primary hold pressure

0:13:46.520 --> 0:13:51.120
<v Speaker 2>vessels until they can be independently validated in deep ocean conditions.

0:13:51.640 --> 0:13:54.280
<v Speaker 1>It really gives me the sense that they're trying to

0:13:54.280 --> 0:13:59.439
<v Speaker 1>strike a balance between preserving that space for deep sea exploration,

0:14:00.400 --> 0:14:03.080
<v Speaker 1>the natural human desire to figure out what's out there

0:14:03.160 --> 0:14:06.120
<v Speaker 1>and what's deeper than we've ever gone before. But also

0:14:06.160 --> 0:14:08.280
<v Speaker 1>make sure that things are happening safely.

0:14:08.480 --> 0:14:11.280
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and you don't want to over regulate this space

0:14:11.480 --> 0:14:14.920
<v Speaker 2>to limit scientific exploration. But I guess there's a divide

0:14:14.960 --> 0:14:21.240
<v Speaker 2>between tourism versus valid scientific exploration and research. I think

0:14:21.440 --> 0:14:24.640
<v Speaker 2>to wrap it up, it's all about kind of correcting

0:14:24.960 --> 0:14:29.360
<v Speaker 2>failures and plugging regulatory gaps. But as the report said,

0:14:29.880 --> 0:14:34.480
<v Speaker 2>Oceangate strategy was to circumvent regulatory frameworks rather than engage

0:14:34.480 --> 0:14:37.440
<v Speaker 2>with them in good faith. So hopefully this is a

0:14:37.440 --> 0:14:40.080
<v Speaker 2>turning point for how deep sea tourism is regulated.

0:14:40.360 --> 0:14:42.640
<v Speaker 1>All right, m So, right now the Coast Guard will

0:14:42.640 --> 0:14:44.800
<v Speaker 1>hand this to prosecutors and we'll wait to see if

0:14:44.840 --> 0:14:47.880
<v Speaker 1>some of those more formal criminal charges or civil cases

0:14:48.040 --> 0:14:50.200
<v Speaker 1>are laid. Thank you so much for taking us through that,

0:14:50.400 --> 0:14:52.520
<v Speaker 1>Thanks for having me, and thank you for joining us

0:14:52.560 --> 0:14:54.240
<v Speaker 1>on the Daily Ods this morning. We're going to be

0:14:54.240 --> 0:14:56.800
<v Speaker 1>back in your headphones with those headlines in the afternoon.

0:14:56.920 --> 0:14:59.440
<v Speaker 1>Until then, have a fantastic dame. We'll speak to you later.

0:15:03.560 --> 0:15:05.920
<v Speaker 1>My name is Lily Maddon and I'm a proud Arunda

0:15:06.120 --> 0:15:10.920
<v Speaker 1>Bungelung Calkatin woman from Gadighl Country. The Daily oz acknowledges

0:15:11.000 --> 0:15:13.120
<v Speaker 1>that this podcast is recorded on the lands of the

0:15:13.160 --> 0:15:16.800
<v Speaker 1>Gadighl people and pays respect to all Aboriginal and torrest

0:15:16.840 --> 0:15:19.680
<v Speaker 1>Rate island and nations. We pay our respects to the

0:15:19.680 --> 0:15:22.480
<v Speaker 1>first peoples of these countries, both past and present.