1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:02,400 Speaker 1: Before we jump into today's podcast, We've got a really 2 00:00:02,440 --> 00:00:05,840 Speaker 1: quick ask of you to ensure this podcast remains really 3 00:00:05,880 --> 00:00:09,200 Speaker 1: relevant and useful to everyone listening. We'd love to learn 4 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:12,280 Speaker 1: more about you. We've put a short survey in today's 5 00:00:12,320 --> 00:00:14,600 Speaker 1: show notes, and we'd be so grateful if you could 6 00:00:14,600 --> 00:00:16,800 Speaker 1: fill it out. It'll only take a couple of minutes. 7 00:00:17,079 --> 00:00:20,040 Speaker 1: Thanks in advance for helping TDA. Now let's get into 8 00:00:20,079 --> 00:00:23,840 Speaker 1: it already, and this this is the Daily This is 9 00:00:23,880 --> 00:00:24,600 Speaker 1: the Daily OS. 10 00:00:25,320 --> 00:00:36,440 Speaker 2: Oh, now it makes sense. Good morning, and welcome to 11 00:00:36,479 --> 00:00:39,640 Speaker 2: the Daily OS. It's Thursday, the seventh of August. I'm 12 00:00:39,640 --> 00:00:40,480 Speaker 2: Emma Gillespie. 13 00:00:40,520 --> 00:00:41,520 Speaker 1: I'm Sam Kazlowski. 14 00:00:41,800 --> 00:00:45,239 Speaker 2: More than two years after the implosion of a submersible 15 00:00:45,320 --> 00:00:48,919 Speaker 2: expedition to the Titanic wreck, the US Coast Guard has 16 00:00:48,960 --> 00:00:52,600 Speaker 2: released its final report into what went wrong. According to 17 00:00:52,880 --> 00:00:56,040 Speaker 2: the three hundred and thirty five page document, the disaster, 18 00:00:56,120 --> 00:01:01,080 Speaker 2: which killed five people, was preventable and driven flawed design, 19 00:01:01,440 --> 00:01:06,559 Speaker 2: regulatory avoidance, and a toxic workplace culture. This landmark report 20 00:01:06,600 --> 00:01:10,040 Speaker 2: paints a damning picture of Oceangate, the company behind the mission, 21 00:01:10,160 --> 00:01:14,480 Speaker 2: and of its late CEO, Stockton Rush. Today we are 22 00:01:14,520 --> 00:01:16,840 Speaker 2: going to take you through what happened to the Titan, 23 00:01:17,000 --> 00:01:20,600 Speaker 2: what the report found, its recommendations, and whether anyone could 24 00:01:20,640 --> 00:01:25,320 Speaker 2: still face legal consequences. 25 00:01:26,600 --> 00:01:28,840 Speaker 1: Emma, why don't we go back to revisit this story. 26 00:01:28,880 --> 00:01:30,800 Speaker 1: It was two years ago. It was the biggest story 27 00:01:30,840 --> 00:01:33,160 Speaker 1: in the world for a while there. It's now got 28 00:01:33,240 --> 00:01:36,480 Speaker 1: a documentary on Netflix that has almost brought it back 29 00:01:36,520 --> 00:01:39,880 Speaker 1: into the frame. And now we've got this report. Take 30 00:01:39,920 --> 00:01:42,560 Speaker 1: me back to what the titan sub was and what 31 00:01:42,680 --> 00:01:43,280 Speaker 1: happened to it. 32 00:01:43,520 --> 00:01:47,720 Speaker 2: Yes, so the titan was a deep sea submersible operated 33 00:01:47,720 --> 00:01:50,960 Speaker 2: by this private US company called ocean Gate. Now when 34 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 2: I say submersible, it was a vessel about the size 35 00:01:54,560 --> 00:01:57,200 Speaker 2: of a mini van and for the price of two 36 00:01:57,320 --> 00:02:01,680 Speaker 2: hundred and fifty thousand US dollars per per tourists were 37 00:02:01,720 --> 00:02:05,160 Speaker 2: offered the chance to travel down in the submersible to 38 00:02:05,160 --> 00:02:09,080 Speaker 2: see the wreck of the Titanic, the iconic shipwreck which 39 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:12,840 Speaker 2: lies about three and a half thousand meters underwater in 40 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:16,440 Speaker 2: the North Atlantic. Now, on the eighteenth of June twenty 41 00:02:16,480 --> 00:02:19,799 Speaker 2: twenty three, five people were on board the Titan that 42 00:02:19,840 --> 00:02:23,480 Speaker 2: includes Ocean Gates CEO and pilot of the vessels stocked 43 00:02:23,480 --> 00:02:27,800 Speaker 2: and Rush, a British billionaire named Hamish Harding, French Titanic 44 00:02:27,919 --> 00:02:32,919 Speaker 2: expert Paul Henri Najalais, and Pakistani businessman Shazada Darwood, who 45 00:02:32,960 --> 00:02:36,360 Speaker 2: was there with his teenage son. The vessel lost contact 46 00:02:36,440 --> 00:02:39,639 Speaker 2: about an hour and forty five minutes into its journey, 47 00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:44,200 Speaker 2: and what followed was, as you would remember, an international 48 00:02:44,240 --> 00:02:47,840 Speaker 2: search and rescue effort that absolutely gripped the world. 49 00:02:48,120 --> 00:02:49,960 Speaker 1: And when they first went missing, there was this hope 50 00:02:49,960 --> 00:02:51,200 Speaker 1: that the crew could still be alive. 51 00:02:51,520 --> 00:02:54,520 Speaker 2: Absolutely so we knew that the crew had four days 52 00:02:54,600 --> 00:02:57,840 Speaker 2: worth of oxygen emergency oxygen, so in the event that 53 00:02:57,880 --> 00:03:00,480 Speaker 2: they got trapped on the ocean floor, there would be 54 00:03:00,520 --> 00:03:04,320 Speaker 2: four days hypothetically for them to survive down there. But 55 00:03:04,600 --> 00:03:08,120 Speaker 2: on the twenty second of June, debris from the sub 56 00:03:08,240 --> 00:03:11,760 Speaker 2: was found near the Titanic site, roughly six hundred k's 57 00:03:11,840 --> 00:03:16,280 Speaker 2: off the coast of Newfoundland in Canada. Now officials confirmed 58 00:03:16,520 --> 00:03:21,200 Speaker 2: pretty much straightaway that the vessel had imploded on its descent, 59 00:03:21,760 --> 00:03:23,720 Speaker 2: killing everyone on board instantly. 60 00:03:24,000 --> 00:03:26,160 Speaker 1: And the reason we're talking about it today is that 61 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:29,920 Speaker 1: the US Coast Guard has released this very lengthy report 62 00:03:30,160 --> 00:03:33,600 Speaker 1: into the incident, trying to break down exactly where things 63 00:03:33,639 --> 00:03:37,040 Speaker 1: went wrong. Before we get into the report itself. Just 64 00:03:37,120 --> 00:03:39,200 Speaker 1: explain to me the role of the US Coast Guard 65 00:03:39,280 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 1: in all of this. 66 00:03:40,120 --> 00:03:43,960 Speaker 2: Yes, so the Coast Guard or the USCG is responsible 67 00:03:44,120 --> 00:03:49,040 Speaker 2: for a whole raft of maritime measures, including leading rescue missions, 68 00:03:49,200 --> 00:03:52,600 Speaker 2: does that in US waters or in international areas under 69 00:03:52,760 --> 00:03:57,480 Speaker 2: US responsibility. It has maritime security responsibilities, and it also 70 00:03:57,560 --> 00:04:00,720 Speaker 2: acts as a regulatory and certificational authority, so it has 71 00:04:00,760 --> 00:04:04,520 Speaker 2: some safety responsibilities. Like in the case of the Titan Sub. 72 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:09,920 Speaker 2: The Coast Guard leads investigations also into marine casualties, So 73 00:04:09,960 --> 00:04:12,760 Speaker 2: where there is loss of life or potential violations of 74 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:16,640 Speaker 2: maritime law, it will lead investigations. Now, in line with that, 75 00:04:16,839 --> 00:04:20,880 Speaker 2: the Coast Guard led the Titan sub investigation because Oceangate 76 00:04:21,000 --> 00:04:24,080 Speaker 2: was a US based company and several of its passengers 77 00:04:24,160 --> 00:04:27,839 Speaker 2: were US citizens, despite the fact that it imploded somewhere 78 00:04:28,120 --> 00:04:29,960 Speaker 2: in international waters off Canada. 79 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:32,640 Speaker 1: So they've spent two years looking at this incident. What's 80 00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:33,920 Speaker 1: the top line finding here? 81 00:04:34,360 --> 00:04:38,560 Speaker 2: So the biggest finding here is that the deaths of 82 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:42,840 Speaker 2: the five people on board were entirely preventable and that 83 00:04:42,960 --> 00:04:47,440 Speaker 2: Oceangate failed at its leadership level and at every level 84 00:04:47,480 --> 00:04:50,839 Speaker 2: across the board. So the report found that the vessel's 85 00:04:50,920 --> 00:04:55,440 Speaker 2: design was never certified by independent engineers, and if you've 86 00:04:55,440 --> 00:04:57,800 Speaker 2: seen the Netflix stock o that goes into this a 87 00:04:57,839 --> 00:05:03,320 Speaker 2: little bit. Essentially, the vessel constructed and needed the certification 88 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:06,359 Speaker 2: of a third party group to say, yep, this is 89 00:05:06,680 --> 00:05:10,440 Speaker 2: fit to explore the ocean floor to this certain depth, 90 00:05:10,520 --> 00:05:13,520 Speaker 2: and with that certification it would have been able to 91 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:17,000 Speaker 2: sell tickets and operate as a fully legit tourist provider. 92 00:05:17,360 --> 00:05:21,560 Speaker 2: Safety warnings from engineers and staff were repeatedly ignored, the 93 00:05:21,640 --> 00:05:25,360 Speaker 2: report found, and it also said that key safety processes 94 00:05:25,440 --> 00:05:29,360 Speaker 2: were missing or deliberately avoided. One of the biggest red 95 00:05:29,400 --> 00:05:31,599 Speaker 2: flags that we've learned about in this report and over 96 00:05:31,600 --> 00:05:34,320 Speaker 2: the course of the last two years from various whistleblowers 97 00:05:34,839 --> 00:05:37,800 Speaker 2: is the use of carbon fiber for the Titan's main 98 00:05:37,880 --> 00:05:38,520 Speaker 2: pressure hull. 99 00:05:38,560 --> 00:05:41,159 Speaker 1: As in the hull itself was made of carbon fiber. 100 00:05:41,400 --> 00:05:44,080 Speaker 2: Yes, so the part of the sub that keeps the 101 00:05:44,120 --> 00:05:48,880 Speaker 2: passengers alive under extreme pressure at depths of three thousand 102 00:05:48,880 --> 00:05:52,040 Speaker 2: and four thousand meters below the sea level. That material 103 00:05:52,200 --> 00:05:54,800 Speaker 2: had never been used in a deep sea sub like 104 00:05:54,839 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 2: this before, so in the early days of the Titan sub, 105 00:05:57,440 --> 00:05:59,840 Speaker 2: the carbon fiber element was seen as really innovative as 106 00:06:00,360 --> 00:06:03,520 Speaker 2: this big breakthrough because carbon fiber is incredibly light, it's 107 00:06:03,560 --> 00:06:06,040 Speaker 2: a lot cheaper and easier to use, so there were 108 00:06:06,160 --> 00:06:08,320 Speaker 2: a lot of reasons to kind of be excited about 109 00:06:08,400 --> 00:06:10,240 Speaker 2: carbon fiber being in the hull. 110 00:06:10,480 --> 00:06:13,480 Speaker 1: So is that actually in terms of the mechanics of it, 111 00:06:13,560 --> 00:06:17,599 Speaker 1: is that what failed to lead to the implosion? Yep. 112 00:06:17,839 --> 00:06:20,600 Speaker 2: Now to understand this we have to do a little 113 00:06:20,600 --> 00:06:23,520 Speaker 2: bit of quick science talk about carbon fiber. But think 114 00:06:23,560 --> 00:06:27,920 Speaker 2: of carbon fiber like millions of little strands of string, 115 00:06:28,040 --> 00:06:31,840 Speaker 2: all connected, so all of those little strands can break 116 00:06:32,160 --> 00:06:36,160 Speaker 2: or weaken. An analysis of the sub showed that this 117 00:06:36,240 --> 00:06:40,279 Speaker 2: process had begun, called delamination. The layers of the carbon 118 00:06:40,360 --> 00:06:43,880 Speaker 2: fiber had started to separate, so there was evidence of 119 00:06:43,960 --> 00:06:46,839 Speaker 2: stress damage to the hull, and every time one of 120 00:06:46,880 --> 00:06:51,279 Speaker 2: those strings broke or came apart, it weakened the entire structure. 121 00:06:51,680 --> 00:06:55,880 Speaker 2: Engineers and staff had reportedly raised concerns about the design 122 00:06:56,240 --> 00:06:59,240 Speaker 2: on several occasions over the course of many years, but 123 00:06:59,320 --> 00:07:02,880 Speaker 2: according to the report from the Coast Guard oceangate created 124 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:07,159 Speaker 2: a quote culture of fear and retaliation that silenced employees. 125 00:07:07,480 --> 00:07:11,120 Speaker 2: One employee was even fired after raising safety concerns and 126 00:07:11,400 --> 00:07:14,880 Speaker 2: multiple employees left the company during the development of the 127 00:07:14,920 --> 00:07:18,480 Speaker 2: sub and prior to that fatal journey in June twenty 128 00:07:18,480 --> 00:07:18,960 Speaker 2: twenty three. 129 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:21,239 Speaker 1: And I think what really strikes me about this report 130 00:07:21,280 --> 00:07:23,720 Speaker 1: is that it doesn't seem to be one factor just 131 00:07:23,800 --> 00:07:26,640 Speaker 1: in isolation. It's the conflation of factors. It's the idea 132 00:07:26,680 --> 00:07:30,520 Speaker 1: that you can have a material that wasn't seaworthy, but 133 00:07:30,640 --> 00:07:34,920 Speaker 1: then the concerns raised not being heard because of company 134 00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:38,920 Speaker 1: culture exactly. Either one of those by itself perhaps wouldn't 135 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:41,440 Speaker 1: have led to this outcome. Tell me about the role 136 00:07:41,480 --> 00:07:44,320 Speaker 1: of the CEO, Stockton Rush in all of this, because 137 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:47,040 Speaker 1: he was on board when the sub imploded, right. 138 00:07:47,040 --> 00:07:49,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, so he died with the four other passengers. But 139 00:07:50,440 --> 00:07:53,960 Speaker 2: the findings against him in this report are incredibly scathing. 140 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:58,040 Speaker 2: So the overarching theme or all of the findings kind 141 00:07:58,040 --> 00:08:01,440 Speaker 2: of trace back to this common finding that he had 142 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:07,800 Speaker 2: this intense influence over everything and almost a narcissistic arrogance 143 00:08:07,880 --> 00:08:12,080 Speaker 2: about achieving the goal of taking the sub to the Titanic, 144 00:08:12,160 --> 00:08:15,640 Speaker 2: regardless of any safety risks. So he was the CEO, 145 00:08:15,840 --> 00:08:18,760 Speaker 2: the lead designer, the pilot, and the report says he 146 00:08:18,880 --> 00:08:23,240 Speaker 2: pursued innovation and speed as in speed to achieve the 147 00:08:23,320 --> 00:08:28,840 Speaker 2: expedition over safety and skipped established testing procedures. In fact, 148 00:08:29,200 --> 00:08:31,400 Speaker 2: the report says, and I think this is really critical 149 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:33,040 Speaker 2: and what a lot of people have been waiting for, 150 00:08:33,360 --> 00:08:36,080 Speaker 2: that if he had survived, he would have likely faced 151 00:08:36,120 --> 00:08:39,200 Speaker 2: criminal charges for his role in the disaster and for 152 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:41,280 Speaker 2: contributing to the deaths of the passengers. 153 00:08:41,559 --> 00:08:45,000 Speaker 1: The report was really detailed about the way in which 154 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:49,439 Speaker 1: he influenced company culture and his leadership style. Give me 155 00:08:49,480 --> 00:08:53,319 Speaker 1: a quick sense of the specifics there about that culture piece. 156 00:08:53,520 --> 00:08:56,440 Speaker 2: Yes, so there's a strong link between Rush and these 157 00:08:56,480 --> 00:08:59,200 Speaker 2: findings of a toxic work environment. The report states that 158 00:08:59,240 --> 00:09:03,400 Speaker 2: for several years preceding the incident, Oceangate cut corners, quote, 159 00:09:03,559 --> 00:09:07,640 Speaker 2: leveraged intimidation tactics and what the report called the company's 160 00:09:07,679 --> 00:09:12,679 Speaker 2: favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny. So this reputation of 161 00:09:12,760 --> 00:09:16,000 Speaker 2: being a really innovative company doing something exciting and different, 162 00:09:16,040 --> 00:09:18,520 Speaker 2: and that they took advantage of that. The finding stated 163 00:09:18,559 --> 00:09:23,680 Speaker 2: that by strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, 164 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:28,440 Speaker 2: Oceangate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of 165 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:32,600 Speaker 2: the established deep sea protocols, which had historically contributed to 166 00:09:32,720 --> 00:09:36,040 Speaker 2: a strong safety record for commercial submersibles. 167 00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:38,559 Speaker 1: And what about the other passengers in all of this, 168 00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:41,480 Speaker 1: I mean, were they aware of all of these risks 169 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:46,960 Speaker 1: and perhaps regulatory missing pieces before they jumped into that vessel. 170 00:09:47,120 --> 00:09:49,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's a question that has come up a lot 171 00:09:49,559 --> 00:09:51,720 Speaker 2: over the last couple of years. And the report found 172 00:09:51,800 --> 00:09:56,120 Speaker 2: ultimately that the passengers were misled by the company. The 173 00:09:56,160 --> 00:10:00,760 Speaker 2: report says Oceangate called the passengers mission special and this 174 00:10:00,880 --> 00:10:03,240 Speaker 2: was a sort of loophole to get around the fact 175 00:10:03,240 --> 00:10:05,520 Speaker 2: that they were not certified to run the expedition with 176 00:10:05,600 --> 00:10:09,319 Speaker 2: paying tourists. But by bringing these people on as mission specialists, 177 00:10:09,679 --> 00:10:11,920 Speaker 2: they could argue that each person on board had a 178 00:10:11,960 --> 00:10:15,600 Speaker 2: particular role so served a purpose in that way, and 179 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 2: the contracts that they were made to sign really downplayed 180 00:10:18,960 --> 00:10:23,200 Speaker 2: the risks. In some cases, they overstated how tested and 181 00:10:23,400 --> 00:10:26,840 Speaker 2: safe the vessel really was. And to quote the report quote, 182 00:10:26,880 --> 00:10:30,520 Speaker 2: there was a systematic pattern of misrepresentation in how Oceangate 183 00:10:30,559 --> 00:10:34,600 Speaker 2: described for Titan's capabilities and testing history to clients and 184 00:10:34,800 --> 00:10:35,439 Speaker 2: to the public. 185 00:10:35,880 --> 00:10:37,960 Speaker 1: So this large report has come out. Have we heard 186 00:10:38,200 --> 00:10:41,560 Speaker 1: from Oceangate in response to the report, and are they 187 00:10:41,600 --> 00:10:43,760 Speaker 1: still actually operating as a company. 188 00:10:43,880 --> 00:10:48,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's worth noting the company essentially ceased operations after 189 00:10:48,280 --> 00:10:52,440 Speaker 2: the disaster just weeks after, so it hasn't responded directly 190 00:10:52,520 --> 00:10:55,280 Speaker 2: to the report at the time of recording. The website's 191 00:10:55,320 --> 00:10:58,679 Speaker 2: been taken down, and Oceangate hasn't made any public statements 192 00:10:58,720 --> 00:11:01,360 Speaker 2: for over a year. I don't think anyone is really 193 00:11:01,440 --> 00:11:04,920 Speaker 2: expecting to hear from anyone affiliated with Oceangate. A lot 194 00:11:04,960 --> 00:11:07,040 Speaker 2: of the people that worked for them have tried really 195 00:11:07,080 --> 00:11:10,040 Speaker 2: hard to distance themselves from that period of their careers. 196 00:11:10,200 --> 00:11:13,479 Speaker 1: Have we heard much from the families of the passengers 197 00:11:13,480 --> 00:11:13,920 Speaker 1: who died. 198 00:11:14,240 --> 00:11:16,920 Speaker 2: Yeah, some of the families have spoken out this week, 199 00:11:17,000 --> 00:11:20,040 Speaker 2: in particular the Darwood family, so that's the father and 200 00:11:20,200 --> 00:11:23,199 Speaker 2: son who died on board. They released a statement saying 201 00:11:23,400 --> 00:11:26,200 Speaker 2: no report could ease their loss, but they're hopeful that 202 00:11:26,240 --> 00:11:29,359 Speaker 2: it will lead to accountability and prevent future tragedies. 203 00:11:29,720 --> 00:11:32,600 Speaker 1: I was really interested by that note that you raised 204 00:11:32,600 --> 00:11:35,320 Speaker 1: around the fact that it was likely that the CEO 205 00:11:35,400 --> 00:11:38,920 Speaker 1: would face criminal charges had he not been part of 206 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:41,560 Speaker 1: the group that died. Are they going to be any 207 00:11:41,640 --> 00:11:45,360 Speaker 1: legal consequences for this? Obviously not surrounding him, but surrounding 208 00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:47,520 Speaker 1: other personnel in the company or the company itself. 209 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:50,720 Speaker 2: It is possible. So while we know Oceangate no longer 210 00:11:50,800 --> 00:11:54,320 Speaker 2: exists as a company, the Coast Guard has referred the 211 00:11:54,400 --> 00:11:58,320 Speaker 2: case to US federal prosecutors, and that could then open 212 00:11:58,360 --> 00:12:01,679 Speaker 2: the door to civil lawsuit or even criminal charges for 213 00:12:01,720 --> 00:12:05,480 Speaker 2: anyone else involved. But in terms of criminal proceedings, Stocked 214 00:12:05,480 --> 00:12:09,160 Speaker 2: and Rush, the CEO really is at the center of 215 00:12:09,360 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 2: all of the negligence that can be traced back to 216 00:12:12,600 --> 00:12:15,800 Speaker 2: human decision makingper interesting, but on a broader level, you know, 217 00:12:15,840 --> 00:12:18,480 Speaker 2: we could see civil suits from the families. And the 218 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:22,520 Speaker 2: report calls for really significant change to how submersibles like 219 00:12:22,600 --> 00:12:26,840 Speaker 2: this are regulated, and particularly how private companies operate them, 220 00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:29,600 Speaker 2: because right now it's a pretty unregulated space. 221 00:12:29,880 --> 00:12:32,400 Speaker 1: And one quote that really stood out to me in 222 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:36,439 Speaker 1: those recommendations and that sense of discussing, you know, this 223 00:12:36,480 --> 00:12:38,800 Speaker 1: isn't the last time that we're going to see people 224 00:12:38,800 --> 00:12:41,920 Speaker 1: try and push the barriers of exploration, be it in 225 00:12:41,960 --> 00:12:45,480 Speaker 1: space or under the ocean or on land. That line 226 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:48,800 Speaker 1: around innovation must never come at the cost of safety. Yeah, 227 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:51,240 Speaker 1: tell me about the recommendations to kind of wrap this 228 00:12:51,360 --> 00:12:53,880 Speaker 1: all up, how does the US Coast Guard think that 229 00:12:53,880 --> 00:12:55,960 Speaker 1: we should all move forward in this space. 230 00:12:56,240 --> 00:13:01,080 Speaker 2: So there are seventeen recommendations, a lot focused on safety 231 00:13:01,120 --> 00:13:04,800 Speaker 2: and certification. So the fact that that third party certification 232 00:13:04,920 --> 00:13:08,480 Speaker 2: never happened for the Titan, ultimately the Coastguard wants to 233 00:13:08,600 --> 00:13:10,800 Speaker 2: ensure that never happens again. So there's a series of 234 00:13:10,840 --> 00:13:15,719 Speaker 2: regulations there. There are recommendations for stronger whistle blower protections 235 00:13:15,840 --> 00:13:20,439 Speaker 2: because we know that several employees really tried to raise 236 00:13:20,440 --> 00:13:23,640 Speaker 2: the alarm on this before the tragedy happened. And there's 237 00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:29,120 Speaker 2: recommendations around clearer oversight of deep sea exploration, so frameworks 238 00:13:29,240 --> 00:13:33,559 Speaker 2: around international waters tourism in that space and who should 239 00:13:33,600 --> 00:13:37,599 Speaker 2: be responsible for kind of global safety and safety frameworks. 240 00:13:38,120 --> 00:13:41,560 Speaker 2: And it's recommended to ban or strictly limit the use 241 00:13:41,679 --> 00:13:46,480 Speaker 2: of unproven materials like carbon fiber for primary hold pressure 242 00:13:46,520 --> 00:13:51,120 Speaker 2: vessels until they can be independently validated in deep ocean conditions. 243 00:13:51,640 --> 00:13:54,280 Speaker 1: It really gives me the sense that they're trying to 244 00:13:54,280 --> 00:13:59,439 Speaker 1: strike a balance between preserving that space for deep sea exploration, 245 00:14:00,400 --> 00:14:03,080 Speaker 1: the natural human desire to figure out what's out there 246 00:14:03,160 --> 00:14:06,120 Speaker 1: and what's deeper than we've ever gone before. But also 247 00:14:06,160 --> 00:14:08,280 Speaker 1: make sure that things are happening safely. 248 00:14:08,480 --> 00:14:11,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, and you don't want to over regulate this space 249 00:14:11,480 --> 00:14:14,920 Speaker 2: to limit scientific exploration. But I guess there's a divide 250 00:14:14,960 --> 00:14:21,240 Speaker 2: between tourism versus valid scientific exploration and research. I think 251 00:14:21,440 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 2: to wrap it up, it's all about kind of correcting 252 00:14:24,960 --> 00:14:29,360 Speaker 2: failures and plugging regulatory gaps. But as the report said, 253 00:14:29,880 --> 00:14:34,480 Speaker 2: Oceangate strategy was to circumvent regulatory frameworks rather than engage 254 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:37,440 Speaker 2: with them in good faith. So hopefully this is a 255 00:14:37,440 --> 00:14:40,080 Speaker 2: turning point for how deep sea tourism is regulated. 256 00:14:40,360 --> 00:14:42,640 Speaker 1: All right, m So, right now the Coast Guard will 257 00:14:42,640 --> 00:14:44,800 Speaker 1: hand this to prosecutors and we'll wait to see if 258 00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,880 Speaker 1: some of those more formal criminal charges or civil cases 259 00:14:48,040 --> 00:14:50,200 Speaker 1: are laid. Thank you so much for taking us through that, 260 00:14:50,400 --> 00:14:52,520 Speaker 1: Thanks for having me, and thank you for joining us 261 00:14:52,560 --> 00:14:54,240 Speaker 1: on the Daily Ods this morning. We're going to be 262 00:14:54,240 --> 00:14:56,800 Speaker 1: back in your headphones with those headlines in the afternoon. 263 00:14:56,920 --> 00:14:59,440 Speaker 1: Until then, have a fantastic dame. We'll speak to you later. 264 00:15:03,560 --> 00:15:05,920 Speaker 1: My name is Lily Maddon and I'm a proud Arunda 265 00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:10,920 Speaker 1: Bungelung Calkatin woman from Gadighl Country. The Daily oz acknowledges 266 00:15:11,000 --> 00:15:13,120 Speaker 1: that this podcast is recorded on the lands of the 267 00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:16,800 Speaker 1: Gadighl people and pays respect to all Aboriginal and torrest 268 00:15:16,840 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: Rate island and nations. We pay our respects to the 269 00:15:19,680 --> 00:15:22,480 Speaker 1: first peoples of these countries, both past and present.