Speaker 1: Welcome to COI Time, a podcast series on markets and
Speaker 1: economies from DBS Group Research. I'm Tambe, chief economist, welcoming
Speaker 1: you to our 155th episode. Today, we are delighted to
Speaker 1: have with us David Skilling, founding director of Landfall Strategy Group. Uh,
Speaker 1: David is based out of Amsterdam, but as you will
Speaker 1: realize during the course of this conversation, his scope is global,
Speaker 1: and I have known David from the days he used
Speaker 1: to live in Singapore, so of course, he takes a
Speaker 1: great deal of interest in Asia.
Speaker 1: Um, so the way we will structure the discussion is
Speaker 1: get a sense of, you know, what is David up
Speaker 1: to on a day to day basis, and then we
Speaker 1: will talk about a paper that he recently wrote which
Speaker 1: caught a lot of my attention. So with that in mind,
Speaker 1: David Skilling, welcome to COI time.
Speaker 2: Great, thanks so much. Good to be here.
Speaker 1: Great to have you, David. I've been looking forward to this.
Speaker 1: Your outfit landfall strategy focuses on the intersection of global economics,
Speaker 1: geopolitics and economic policy.
Speaker 1: Well, you certainly have been busy this year. Uh, let's
Speaker 1: begin by getting a sense, David, of the sentiment of
Speaker 1: your clients so far.
Speaker 2: I, I, I think the overall, uh, sense is, uh, overwhelmed, uh,
Speaker 2: just by the, the fire hose, the torrent of developments,
Speaker 2: you know, directionally, not super surprisingly, Mr. Trump did tariffs
Speaker 2: in his first term, he signaled tariffs again. So in
Speaker 2: a sense, some of what he's done is not hugely surprising,
Speaker 2: but I think the, the magnitude, the scale, the reach,
Speaker 2: the tone, the aggression has taken people by surprise. Uh,
Speaker 2: and certainly for those who thought that Trump won, would
Speaker 2: be a good guy.
Speaker 2: Trump too, which wasn't me, but for some, you kind
Speaker 2: of thought that you could calibrate against what we saw
Speaker 2: several years ago. I think they have been taken by surprise.
Speaker 2: You know, Mr. Trump in a second term, a much
Speaker 2: more disruptive, much more consequential, uh, agenda, you know, tariffs
Speaker 2: to the start. But I think there's a sense that
Speaker 2: actually this is going much further than um than tariffs
Speaker 2: to capital flows, exchange rates, geopolitics. I think, you know,
Speaker 2: one is just sort of surprise. Uh, the second, I think, is,
Speaker 2: you know, as you mentioned, I, I
Speaker 2: Work with clients around the world. I think in Europe
Speaker 2: there is a sense of, you know, real pessimism, uh,
Speaker 2: you know, a sense that the sky is falling in,
Speaker 2: or the ground is moving, uh, beneath their feet in
Speaker 2: terms of both on geopolitics or on economics. The US
Speaker 2: is not what they thought that it was, uh, in
Speaker 2: a real sense that the rules of the game are
Speaker 2: being fundamentally rewritten in a way that's not, uh, that's
Speaker 2: not positive, that carries real risk. But when I talk
Speaker 2: to folk in the Middle East, in Asia, I mean, yes,
Speaker 2: that's all true, Singapore.
Speaker 2: Southeast Asia, for example, are exposed to tariffs and the
Speaker 2: trade wars, and so on. But there's also a sense
Speaker 2: of the world is tilting in their direction, right? There,
Speaker 2: there are clouds to be sure, but there are some
Speaker 2: silver linings, there are some opportunities as well. So I think, yeah,
Speaker 2: there is a mixed view, depending on geography, you know, uh,
Speaker 2: Europe quite depressed, uh, quite concerned, uh, Asia, the Middle East,
Speaker 2: I think, a bit less so.
Speaker 1: David, why isn't there a sense of this too shall pass,
Speaker 1: I mean, there was Trump 1.0, but there will be
Speaker 1: Trump 2.0 and at some point Trump will be gone.
Speaker 1: Why is there so much pessimism and why is the
Speaker 1: sentiment that this is structural, not just US political cycle?
Speaker 2: So I think two things, uh, at least. Uh, firstly,
Speaker 2: is that this is Mr. Trump's second go. During Trump
Speaker 2: wonder since, OK, it's 4 years, it's bad, we'll manage
Speaker 2: it through, and then in 4 years, we can kind
Speaker 2: of return to, uh, some sense of normality. But the
Speaker 2: mere fact that Mr. Trump has now been elected twice, uh,
Speaker 2: and obviously more recently on a fairly aggressive, uh, kind
Speaker 2: of agenda, you know, it says that actually there is
Speaker 2: something structural.
Speaker 2: This is not going to go away. It's not simply
Speaker 2: a matter of waiting this out for 4 years and
Speaker 2: hoping for a better outcome in the next election. And
Speaker 2: obviously just the speed at which Mr. Trump is moving
Speaker 2: to kind of rewrite the rules, be it the trade rules, uh,
Speaker 2: be it the geopolitical or security guarantees, be it Ukraine, um, uh,
Speaker 2: East Asia, and the like. You know, I think there
Speaker 2: is a sense that actually there's a lot that is changing,
Speaker 2: and Mr. Trump can actually do quite a lot. You know, but.
Speaker 2: and relatedly, there was, you can draw a fairly coherent
Speaker 2: line in US policy between Trump one, the Biden administration,
Speaker 2: and now Trump too. Different in character, to be sure,
Speaker 2: in rhetoric. Mr. Biden didn't undo very much of what Mr.
Speaker 2: Trump did in terms of tariffs. He became more hawkish
Speaker 2: on China, technology, investment, and other restrictions. And so there
Speaker 2: is a sense that, you know,
Speaker 2: Mr. Trump is reflecting, uh, underlying shift in US sentiment
Speaker 2: as much as he is kind of the cause, if
Speaker 2: you like. This is not simply about Mr. Trump. This
Speaker 2: is about different US attitudes to the world. That's why
Speaker 2: he's been elected now, twice. And I think, you know,
Speaker 2: there is a realization that actually, whoever wins in a
Speaker 2: few years' time, the next presidential election, the US is
Speaker 2: just quite a different proposition.
Speaker 2: Uh, and I think you know it's just a reminder
Speaker 2: that that Europe, Asia, the rest of the world need
Speaker 2: to accommodate themselves to a structurally different US approach to
Speaker 2: the world, both in economics and in terms of geopolitics.
Speaker 1: Uh, David, I couldn't agree with you more. I think
Speaker 1: that many recoil at certain actions of Trump, but I
Speaker 1: think that reactions should be seen in the context of
Speaker 1: the fact that half of America does support a lot
Speaker 1: of the things that Donald Trump is doing, and and
Speaker 1: that support is going to outlast Trump becoming president again
Speaker 1: and again.
Speaker 1: Or or his successor. David, I was in Denmark last week.
Speaker 1: I went to grocery stores where they put little stars
Speaker 1: next to Made in America products because there is a
Speaker 1: product boycott going on in Denmark. I mean, there's of
Speaker 1: course the Iceland issue, uh, the Greenland issue is certainly
Speaker 1: catching people's imagination, but again, it doesn't feel like a fad,
Speaker 1: it seems.
Speaker 1: Seems like, uh, in some ways, uh, Trump may have
Speaker 1: done it in an aggressive manner, but the uh events
Speaker 1: of this year seem to be more of a symptom
Speaker 1: than an underlying uh uh cause itself, underlying causes that
Speaker 1: the US is stretched and it is looking inward and
Speaker 1: uh we will have to sort of deal with that
Speaker 1: independent of the political cycle.
Speaker 1: OK, so let's not wallow in the despondency, um, your
Speaker 1: job certainly is to look for opportunities for your clients. So, um,
Speaker 1: you're based in Europe, but you've spent a lot of your, uh,
Speaker 1: life in Asia. Is Donald Trump inadvertently bringing these two
Speaker 1: regions together?
Speaker 2: I mean, yes and yes and no, the, the kind
Speaker 2: of the obvious answer, I suppose, is yes. I mean
Speaker 2: Europe is now looking for kind of additional friends, as
Speaker 2: is Asia for that matter.
Speaker 2: You know, kind of like-minded countries that want to trade,
Speaker 2: that want to invest, that want to hold on to
Speaker 2: what remains of a kind of a rules-based open order.
Speaker 2: So for Europe's part, you know, they are more aggressively
Speaker 2: looking for free trade agreements, uh, both in Asia, with India,
Speaker 2: notably developing relationships with Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries,
Speaker 2: also with Latin America, uh, doing an FTA with, with
Speaker 2: the Mercosur group, Mr. Macron.
Speaker 2: Uh, was at the Shangri-La Dialogue recently in Singapore talking up,
Speaker 2: you know, Europe-Asia relationships, uh, in, in its case, uh,
Speaker 2: in the security and geopolitical realm. But I think more broadly,
Speaker 2: you know, Europe is looking for options. Uh, it wants
Speaker 2: to reduce its exposure to the US both economically and
Speaker 2: on other dimensions, uh, and developing relations with Japan, with
Speaker 2: South Korea, with Southeast Asia, with Australasia, with India, you know, I,
Speaker 2: I think is very much top of the agenda. There
Speaker 2: are lots of shared interests between.
Speaker 2: Between the two. But I think the elephant in the
Speaker 2: room on this is China. I mean, China is a
Speaker 2: big part of Asia. Europe's relationships with China remain tense.
Speaker 2: They are not what they were 56 years ago. You know,
Speaker 2: there are an accumulating series of trade tensions, um, you know,
Speaker 2: tariffs being imposed on Chinese electric vehicles, uh, rare earth
Speaker 2: restrictions being imposed in the other directions, uh, recently restrictions
Speaker 2: on things like medical technology. So there's a raft of
Speaker 2: kind of trade disputes and frictions.
Speaker 2: That will constrain the extent of, uh, you know, the
Speaker 2: European pivot, if you like, uh, towards China. It's not
Speaker 2: going to move away from the US towards China. We'll
Speaker 2: be pragmatic, to be sure, but it's not going to
Speaker 2: pivot markedly. And I think on a geopolitical realm, there's
Speaker 2: a sense that China is a rival, is a competitor.
Speaker 2: It is supporting Russia, which is a direct threat to Europe.
Speaker 2: So I think there are going to be limits, if
Speaker 2: you like, to how far Europe can maintain.
Speaker 2: cordial relations with China. But for Asia, China, I think
Speaker 2: certainly there is going to be increased European interest, investment,
Speaker 2: both at a government level and at a firm level
Speaker 2: in developing relations with like-minded countries in Asia.
Speaker 1: David, last year, Mario Draghi's paper on competitiveness certainly caught
Speaker 1: a lot of eyes, and I feel that it had
Speaker 1: a lot of resonance within Europe even before Trump's election,
Speaker 1: and I think that
Speaker 1: Even rings truer today that Europe really needs to invest
Speaker 1: on improving its productivity performance. Do you think that there
Speaker 1: is a sense that the fact that China is going
Speaker 1: through a bit of a techs search, uh, all sorts
Speaker 1: of new technologies of the future are coming out of China,
Speaker 1: that there is a degree of symbiosis that could happen
Speaker 1: in an amiable world without the US meddling too much
Speaker 1: into the China-Europe relationship where Europe can both provide as
Speaker 1: well as benefit from Chinese technology.
Speaker 2: I mean, yes, I mean you already see just a
Speaker 2: prosaic example, you know, a lot more Chinese EVs on
Speaker 2: European roads still fairly small in absolute numbers, but, but growing, uh,
Speaker 2: quite quickly. You know, China obviously is fundamentally important to
Speaker 2: the green transition, uh, in Europe, a provider of cheap
Speaker 2: solar panels and batteries and
Speaker 2: Uh, parts, wind turbines, uh, and the like. So there
Speaker 2: is complementarity between what China offers, what Europe needs. The
Speaker 2: challenge from a European perspective is that China has progressively
Speaker 2: eroded the market share, uh, the competitive edge of lots
Speaker 2: of
Speaker 2: European industries. Obviously, the auto industry, Europe 1015 years back
Speaker 2: had a very strong solar industry that's pretty much been
Speaker 2: decimated by China. So yes, you can, at one level
Speaker 2: see strong sort of complementarities between the two economies in
Speaker 2: both directions. Europe has a lot, but China still wants also.
Speaker 2: Uh, but there's also a real competitive tension. There's concern
Speaker 2: in Europe about dumping, uh, around Chinese subsidies, around Chinese mercantilism, uh,
Speaker 2: and the like, which is why Europe has been imposing
Speaker 2: various tariffs, and I think there is more to come,
Speaker 2: you know, in concern about, uh, sort of goods that
Speaker 2: can't go into the US because of tariffs being diverted
Speaker 2: into into Europe. We're already seeing that in terms of steel.
Speaker 2: So I mean, I think yes, there is an answer,
Speaker 2: and that's certainly been the European.
Speaker 2: view over the last 1015 years. China's a big export market,
Speaker 2: China's an important source of cheap manufactured goods. But I
Speaker 2: think there is a sense that Europe's strategic autonomy, uh,
Speaker 2: the ability for it to control its supply chains to
Speaker 2: maintain a critical mass in core strategic industries, be they energy,
Speaker 2: be they defense, be it tech, is being undermined by China.
Speaker 2: So I think Europe is going to be pragmatic. It
Speaker 2: understands the importance of China.
Speaker 2: Uh, it's not going to do a US in terms
Speaker 2: of trying to cut itself off from China, but I
Speaker 2: think there's also growing awareness, certainly post Ukraine, but you
Speaker 2: don't want to become overly exposed in terms of energy, uh,
Speaker 2: in terms of tech, in terms of auto to a
Speaker 2: particular market, particularly one with whom you're not fully values aligned.
Speaker 2: So there are going to be, there are going to
Speaker 2: be limits.
Speaker 1: Yeah, absolutely. David, one anecdote I'll share with you last
Speaker 1: week when I was in Denmark, I met with representatives
Speaker 1: of a large uh biotech company and they had an
Speaker 1: additional sort of, you know, wrinkle on this conversation. They
Speaker 1: said that the reason they remain heavily invested in China,
Speaker 1: of course, market access, B, they do a lot of
Speaker 1: exporting out of China from the products that they manufacture
Speaker 1: in China.
Speaker 1: But third is that they felt that in the life
Speaker 1: sciences area where they sort of stand at the frontier,
Speaker 1: some of the real big breakthroughs are coming from China
Speaker 1: and therefore they need to be in China to watch
Speaker 1: that develop and seize that technology from a very close
Speaker 1: proximity as opposed to being in Europe and just saying, well,
Speaker 1: you know, that's a different world. I felt that that
Speaker 1: conversation I would have not heard 57 years ago. It's
Speaker 1: a new development, uh, that some of these breakthroughs coming
Speaker 1: from China and then
Speaker 1: It behooves on enlightened companies to be in China just
Speaker 1: for that proximity. Um, so I I I've come back
Speaker 1: from Europe with a new appreciation of China to some extent. Now, David,
Speaker 1: we were talking about, you know, Asia and Europe. Uh,
Speaker 1: one thing that Asia and Europe have in common is
Speaker 1: that both are capital surplus economies, uh, both have been
Speaker 1: more prudent.
Speaker 1: Their American counterparts in terms of savings and have racked
Speaker 1: up large surpluses and they've exported quite happily a large
Speaker 1: part of the capital to the US over the years
Speaker 1: and decades, allowing the US current account deficit to be financed.
Speaker 1: Things are changing and you have been thinking about this.
Speaker 1: You recently wrote an article telling the entitled Capital Wars,
Speaker 1: and one of your arguments in that paper is that
Speaker 1: a structural change to cross-border capital inflows is in the making.
Speaker 1: Let's expand on that.
Speaker 2: Sure, so it's two parts. So if you think about
Speaker 2: kind of demand for capital and supply for capital. So
Speaker 2: on the supply side, as you say, China, many other
Speaker 2: East Asian economies, Japan, most notably, but also the ASEAN economies,
Speaker 2: also the Gulf countries have been saving for many years, consistent, persistent,
Speaker 2: fairly large current account surpluses that have in the main
Speaker 2: been invested in the US. The US is on the
Speaker 2: demand side, the large demander of capital. It's run.
Speaker 2: Consistent current account deficits for a long period of time.
Speaker 2: The UK also, but the US is the, uh, is
Speaker 2: the large game in town. So you've had a, you know,
Speaker 2: a picture where you've got persistent current account surpluses, exporting
Speaker 2: capital into uh, into the US. But if you look
Speaker 2: at the surplus countries, you know, there are dynamics that
Speaker 2: suggest that the extent of those surpluses is going to
Speaker 2: reduce over the next 5, 10 years.
Speaker 2: In Europe, Germany is the major moving part here, the
Speaker 2: new government and change German attitudes. It's going to be
Speaker 2: more fiscal spending, more investment, be it military, be it energy,
Speaker 2: other forms of infrastructure. The same is going to be
Speaker 2: true to a lesser extent across most European countries. There
Speaker 2: is an understanding that defense expenditure has to increase, and
Speaker 2: so we are going to see reduced government.
Speaker 2: saving. I think also reduced household saving as well, but
Speaker 2: government saving is going to be the big thing that shifts.
Speaker 2: And so I think we can expect reasonably for the
Speaker 2: size of the European current account surplus to reduce as
Speaker 2: savings comes down as investment in Europe comes up. Similarly,
Speaker 2: in the Gulf, oil prices down, increased investment at home.
Speaker 2: So again, Gulf surpluses are going to constrain, Japan. Interest
Speaker 2: rates are normalizing during the rise, like they have repatriation
Speaker 2: of capital for various reasons, I think also Japanese surpluses
Speaker 2: reduced and over time, possibly China as well as China
Speaker 2: moves to a more an economic model where domestic demand
Speaker 2: is a more important component of final demand. So on
Speaker 2: all of the big current account surplus countries for various reasons, uh,
Speaker 2: you see.
Speaker 2: dynamics that I think are going to shrink the size
Speaker 2: of capital, the capital pool that is exported. And then
Speaker 2: you've got the US on the other side. The US
Speaker 2: has said run very large deficits, largely due to its
Speaker 2: large and expanding fiscal deficit, and as we know from
Speaker 2: the last few weeks, that seems to be moving up.
Speaker 2: The budget working its way through the House at the moment,
Speaker 2: or the House and Senate at the moment, looks to
Speaker 2: be expanding that deficit.
Speaker 2: Uh, but that's going to become tricky. Uh, you know,
Speaker 2: if the pool of capital from overseas is shrinking, the
Speaker 2: US is going to have to work harder, if you like,
Speaker 2: or find it more difficult to attract that capital at
Speaker 2: a minimum, we're gonna, we're seeing interest rates move up
Speaker 2: to make the US more attractive, which we are already seeing. Um,
Speaker 2: the dollar will probably come off, which again is what
Speaker 2: we're seeing. But this is happening as we know, at
Speaker 2: a time where people are questioning the risk profile of
Speaker 2: the US. Is the US an unambiguous safe haven? You know,
Speaker 2: what sort of
Speaker 2: risk premium do we need to attach to the US? Uh,
Speaker 2: and so, you know, the US is in a much
Speaker 2: more intense competition for capital because the pool of available
Speaker 2: global capital is shrinking. Now at the same time as
Speaker 2: we're seeing, uh, some question marks. So capital wars, it's
Speaker 2: partly a sense of, you know, there are, there's just
Speaker 2: going to be an intense competition for capital. We're also
Speaker 2: going to see, I think, more capital nationalism, you know,
Speaker 2: countries wanting to kind of hold on to their national savings, uh,
Speaker 2: to finance, uh, strategic investment, be it defense or energy
Speaker 2: or infrastructure, and the like.
Speaker 2: Uh, and so trade wars, I think, are very much, uh,
Speaker 2: kind of a precursor to some of the, the international
Speaker 2: cross-border conflict we'll see in terms of, uh, attracting, uh,
Speaker 2: and retaining capital, and these, I think, will be at
Speaker 2: least as consequential, uh, as the, uh, as the trade
Speaker 2: wars that we're beginning to see.
Speaker 1: So David, I want to sort of do a little
Speaker 1: tour of the world, region by region in the context
Speaker 1: of capital war. So let's start with the US. To
Speaker 1: your point, the US is not really heading in the
Speaker 1: direction of lower fiscal and current account deficit, but at
Speaker 1: the same time, the world seems to be assigning higher
Speaker 1: risk premium to the US and therefore you expect interest
Speaker 1: rates to be higher. Do you also expect the US
Speaker 1: to do some of the things that Stephen Moran wants
Speaker 1: to do, which is force the world to buy US
Speaker 1: Treasuries in return for getting US security protection.
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think we need to be open to, if
Speaker 2: you like, unorthodox, uh, measures. Uh, you know, the US
Speaker 2: has a major imbalance that it needs to, uh, correct
Speaker 2: in terms of external account. It's got a clearly unsustainable
Speaker 2: fiscal path, and international investors in particular are worried about
Speaker 2: the US. So market forces will take you a bit
Speaker 2: of a way. Bond vigilantes doing their thing, trying to
Speaker 2: curb some of the fiscal excesses.
Speaker 2: You know, uh, uh, just given the politics in the US,
Speaker 2: I'm not sure that is going to be, uh, enough.
Speaker 2: And so, you know, I, I think we are going
Speaker 2: to see a sort of unorthodox measures being, uh, investigated,
Speaker 2: at least, so you mentioned Stephen Moran's paper.
Speaker 2: You know, I would be very surprised if in the
Speaker 2: context of the current tariff or trade negotiations that the
Speaker 2: US are underway with countries like Japan and South Korea
Speaker 2: and others, that as part of those negotiations, there weren't
Speaker 2: some sense of, look, if you want to, you know,
Speaker 2: have lower tariffs, if you want to continue to benefit
Speaker 2: from the US kind of security guarantee.
Speaker 2: Uh, be it East Asia or elsewhere, uh, then we
Speaker 2: are expecting you to buy, you know, $100 billion of
Speaker 2: US Treasury, perhaps on the market, but we expect you
Speaker 2: not to be selling these down, um, and probably to,
Speaker 2: to buying more. So in a sense you're trying to
Speaker 2: expand the pool of demand, uh, for US Treasuries, you know,
Speaker 2: not by, and it's essentially a kind of a coerced
Speaker 2: or kind of.
Speaker 2: The duress, uh, purchase, you know, we'll tariff you, we'll
Speaker 2: remove US troops if you don't do this. So I
Speaker 2: would be very surprised if we didn't see some pressure
Speaker 2: in that regard. for countries like China, it's more problematic,
Speaker 2: but for allies like Japan, like South Korea and others,
Speaker 2: I'd be very surprised if we didn't see that. And
Speaker 2: then one step further than that, beyond this kind of
Speaker 2: international government to government negotiation.
Speaker 2: You know, if that's not sufficient to do the trick
Speaker 2: in terms of raising demand for US Treasuries, you know, I,
Speaker 2: I think that, you know, issues around financial repression, requiring
Speaker 2: commercial banks, uh, or households, or the Fed, uh, to
Speaker 2: buy more government debt issuance, the type of thing we
Speaker 2: haven't really seen at scale for, for many decades, you know,
Speaker 2: I think.
Speaker 2: on the table. So this is, you know, just the
Speaker 2: fiscal math is very difficult to resolve unless you begin
Speaker 2: to contemplate some of these other measures. I mean, ideally,
Speaker 2: markets and fiscal discipline in the Congress would be enough.
Speaker 2: I'm not sure what it is. Uh, and so I
Speaker 2: think bracing ourselves for some more unorthodox measures, you know,
Speaker 2: those sort of things are not, are not off the table.
Speaker 1: I mean, OK, so in terms of domestic policies, you'll
Speaker 1: make it sound like the US is about to become
Speaker 1: like India in the 1980s and 1990s, um, but let
Speaker 1: me stay on the external side, uh for a moment. uh, David,
Speaker 1: the US has tried this before, uh Plaza Accord in
Speaker 1: the 80s, they sort of course both Japan and Germany
Speaker 1: to appreciate the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark and
Speaker 1: Japan's had all sorts of voluntary restraint on exports, they
Speaker 1: moved or they nudged Toyota Honda to move.
Speaker 1: to the US to increase their manufacturing. All of that happened.
Speaker 1: I really didn't see any, at least I don't see
Speaker 1: in the data was there a market improvement in the
Speaker 1: US fiscal balances uh till uh Clinton came in uh
Speaker 1: years later and, and went for a fiscal consolidation.
Speaker 1: So, and and and the upshot of all that was
Speaker 1: that Japan entered a massive bubble and which had a
Speaker 1: ruminous impact on its economy for the subsequent decades. So yes,
Speaker 1: the Japanese are allies of the US and yes, they
Speaker 1: do rely a lot on US security umbrella. Would they
Speaker 1: sing the same song in response to US?
Speaker 1: this time as they did in the
Speaker 1: 1980s?
Speaker 2: Well, in Japan and many other East Asian economies who
Speaker 2: know the Japanese experience well, I think, uh, you know, reluctant. So,
Speaker 2: you know, I think for for for most countries, both
Speaker 2: for in Asia, both for economic and for security reasons,
Speaker 2: they want to avoid a rupture, uh, with the US,
Speaker 2: they're prepared to kind of accommodate some pain, some asks,
Speaker 2: be it, you know, owning US Treasuries, allowing for some
Speaker 2: appreciation of your exchange rates.
Speaker 2: Whatever it is, uh, if that's the price that needs
Speaker 2: to be paid for maintaining some kind of baseline level
Speaker 2: of relationship with the US, but there comes a point
Speaker 2: at which the ask just becomes too much. Uh, and
Speaker 2: obviously the ask is more difficult again with China. Um,
Speaker 2: but for allies, there will be some things I'll go
Speaker 2: along with, but in terms of anything approaching kind of
Speaker 2: plaza accord style.
Speaker 2: Kind of recalibration, I find that very difficult to see.
Speaker 2: You know, that said, I think there is a reasonable
Speaker 2: case for, you know, if you like, a, a fairly
Speaker 2: broad appreciation of many East Asian currencies. I mean current
Speaker 2: account surpluses are persistently large. There is a reasonable argument
Speaker 2: that there are some grounds for appreciation of those currencies.
Speaker 2: The issue is how you do that. Uh, do you
Speaker 2: do it at the, at gunpoint?
Speaker 2: Uh, so to speak, you know, how does that process, uh,
Speaker 2: how does that process happen? So I think, you know, there,
Speaker 2: there are going to be some moving parts in terms of,
Speaker 2: you know, sort of ownership of treasury's, um, uh, exchange rates,
Speaker 2: but I think there is going to be real nervousness
Speaker 2: about going too far, too fast, uh, and also an
Speaker 2: awareness again from the Plaza experience, uh, that, you know,
Speaker 2: any time these things start to move, you are likely
Speaker 2: to get overshooting. It's likely to go much further than
Speaker 2: you want it to. So I think there's gonna be,
Speaker 2: you know, a good deal of, um, of caution.
Speaker 1: Right, I think that if somehow this becomes policy and
Speaker 1: it becomes a one-way bet, I think the risk is
Speaker 1: substantial for Asian markets to have overshooting.
Speaker 1: Asset bubbles and so on, and I think the Asian
Speaker 1: authorities would be very keen on preventing that. I think
Speaker 1: they can probably agree to not intervening on the exchange
Speaker 1: rate if there's a lot of inflows, but for them
Speaker 1: to sort of actively sell dollars to weaken the dollar
Speaker 1: and appreciate the currency, I would think that that would
Speaker 1: be a bridge too far, um, but you know, um,
Speaker 1: countries like Korea, Japan have shown a proclivity to really,
Speaker 1: really want to be in the US.
Speaker 1: Umbrella, maybe they'll do more things than I think they would.
Speaker 1: Uh look, even in Southeast Asia, look at the example
Speaker 1: of Vietnam, once the reciprocal tariffs were announced, there was
Speaker 1: no question of Vietnam being part of the ASEAN bloc.
Speaker 1: They ran to Washington to do a trade deal. They
Speaker 1: were disappointed, it didn't work out, but uh but I
Speaker 1: can see that a lot of countries are basically looking
Speaker 1: after themselves. Now, in the case of Europe, David, there's
Speaker 1: the European Union. The region should be speaking in one
Speaker 1: voice against or vis a vis the US. Is that
Speaker 1: the case?
Speaker 2: For for the most part, yes, and I think you
Speaker 2: see real frustration coming out of Washington that the Europeans
Speaker 2: are hard to deal with, but the Europeans are purposefully,
Speaker 2: you know, hard to deal with. That's their thing. You've
Speaker 2: got a bunch of, for the most part, small countries
Speaker 2: coming together realizing they have much more leverage if they
Speaker 2: negotiate as one. So yes, different parts of Europe will
Speaker 2: have different interests, and some, like Italy, for example, have communicated, look,
Speaker 2: we'd like to do a deal with the US, we
Speaker 2: would like to kind of avoid tariffs, whereas you've got
Speaker 2: some other more hawkish countries that say like France, for example,
Speaker 2: let's say, no, no.
Speaker 2: But I think, you know, attempts to play divide and
Speaker 2: conquer uh in Europe and kind of try and engineer
Speaker 2: cleavages in negotiating position with the US have not been
Speaker 2: successful so far, nor do I think they will be successful.
Speaker 2: I think Europeans know that if they start getting kind
Speaker 2: of peeled off from each other, then they will get
Speaker 2: run over.
Speaker 2: Uh, by Washington. The same has been true for China.
Speaker 2: I mean, China has been trying to play divide and
Speaker 2: conquer across Europe, with a measure of success, but not really.
Speaker 2: Europe has really hung together reasonably well. I think that will, uh,
Speaker 2: that will continue. But that said, that, that creates tension
Speaker 2: and conflict because Mr. Trump wants easy wins. You know,
Speaker 2: he wants to do deals like he did with the UK,
Speaker 2: which is, you know, literally a few sheets of paper,
Speaker 2: some kind of provisional deals. That's not going to happen
Speaker 2: with the EU because, you know, it's very rules-based, you've
Speaker 2: got
Speaker 2: Get clearance among all 27 members. It's just by design,
Speaker 2: a much slower process. And so I think Mr. Trump
Speaker 2: is going to find Europe quite difficult to negotiate with.
Speaker 2: He's not going to get easy deals. Uh, he can't
Speaker 2: just declare victory and walk away. So I think there
Speaker 2: are going to be ongoing trade frictions between the US
Speaker 2: and the EU for the duration of the Trump term,
Speaker 2: at least, at least 10% tariffs, which is a floor,
Speaker 2: but possibly higher.
Speaker 2: Uh, for some goods, uh, he's threatened 50%, obviously, which
Speaker 2: I think is unlikely, but this is not going to be, uh,
Speaker 2: an easy fix. Um, and that's, as I said, by design,
Speaker 2: Europe is holding together, and I think that will persist.
Speaker 1: You incidentally mentioned the UK, so let me ask you
Speaker 1: a couple of question in the UK. First of all,
Speaker 1: those few sheets of paper on the trade agreement, do
Speaker 1: you find that the UK US agreement a substantive one?
Speaker 2: No, no, I mean, I, and I think, you know,
Speaker 2: just the way that it was done, you know, Mr.
Speaker 2: Trump literally calling out Mr. Starmer while he was watching
Speaker 2: a football game to say, look, this is the deal.
Speaker 2: I mean, the UK, you know, wants to, uh, you know, maintain,
Speaker 2: you know, tariff-free access or minimal tariff-free access. It wants
Speaker 2: to kind of prove that it can, you know, do
Speaker 2: deals with Mr. Trump. It works for the UK government, uh,
Speaker 2: domestically to be able to establish, uh, that.
Speaker 2: Uh, and so what do you say? No, but there's
Speaker 2: no real, there's no enforceability. There's a lot of vagueness.
Speaker 2: They're still trying to hammer out the details. Now that's
Speaker 2: going to take them months, if not longer, to, to
Speaker 2: do that. The UK has already been negatively surprised in
Speaker 2: terms of the steel and aluminum tariffs. You know, actually
Speaker 2: didn't provide much protection. So I don't, as with many
Speaker 2: of Mr. Trump's deals, you know, they look good as
Speaker 2: a press release, but once you kind of get into
Speaker 2: the detail, there's actually not.
Speaker 2: there, and I think that's the case for the UK
Speaker 2: as well. So for a time, you know, the UK
Speaker 2: could say, look, we're doing better than the EU. We've
Speaker 2: got better access to the US because, you know, we're
Speaker 2: kind of we're outside the EU machinery in our kind
Speaker 2: of post-Brexit incarnation, but I actually don't think that it's
Speaker 2: brought the UK, um, it hasn't actually bought the UK
Speaker 2: very much. I don't think the UK is in a
Speaker 2: much better position, to be honest.
Speaker 2: Uh, than is the case, uh, with the EU. The
Speaker 2: one thing that the UK does have is a royal family. Mr.
Speaker 2: Trump likes the royal family, that does sound silly, but
Speaker 2: it does buy them, uh, it does buy them something,
Speaker 2: and I think US UK relations will remain more cordial, uh,
Speaker 2: on the surface. Mr. Stan will get a better hearing
Speaker 2: in the, in the Oval Office than Mr. von der Leyen,
Speaker 2: for example, but concretely, I'm not sure that it buys
Speaker 2: the UK that much.
Speaker 1: I, I remember when Prime Minister Starmer went for his
Speaker 1: first visit to see Donald Trump, the first thing he
Speaker 1: said was that he has, he had a letter with
Speaker 1: him from King Charles inviting him to the White House,
Speaker 1: and I, I, you could see in the body language
Speaker 1: of Trump, he was very pleased with, with that letter, um,
Speaker 1: but what about UK, Europe, uh, UK, what it's been
Speaker 1: like 89 years now, walked away with Brexit.
Speaker 1: clearly a lot of, you know, remorse on many parts
Speaker 1: of UK society from that, uh, expectation is the Labour
Speaker 1: government would normalize some of these, uh, damage done through
Speaker 1: the Brexit process with vis a Europe. What's your sense?
Speaker 2: It's going to be very, very gradual. Uh, I mean,
Speaker 2: all of the polls in the UK say that most
Speaker 2: people will regret Brexit. They think it was a mistake. Uh,
Speaker 2: but the government just doesn't want to open Brexit as
Speaker 2: a political issue. Uh, and so there are ongoing negotiations,
Speaker 2: there are things like veterinary agreements and some cross-border mobility
Speaker 2: for young people that are being negotiated, but it's all
Speaker 2: fairly kind of on the margin. Yeah, it's not nothing,
Speaker 2: and it's good to see things being, uh, normalized in
Speaker 2: a more constructive professional tone being taken.
Speaker 2: But there's no kind of at scale or material kind
Speaker 2: of improvement in relationships, uh, and so you see in
Speaker 2: the trade numbers between the UK and the EU, you know, the,
Speaker 2: the growth in trade is not what you'd expect.
Speaker 2: Uh, so it's, it's, it's still a drag on the
Speaker 2: UK economy. There's going to be some improvement, but it's
Speaker 2: not going to go anywhere close to kind of unwinding Brexit,
Speaker 2: at least not for the next decade or so. It's just, uh,
Speaker 2: despite the regret, it's not a political issue. No one
Speaker 2: wants to expend political capital on it because you think
Speaker 2: that you'll just get hammered. And the EU for its
Speaker 2: most part regrets it, to be sure, but it's got.
Speaker 2: Any other issues to worry about, be it Ukraine, be
Speaker 2: it Mr. Trump, be it China, the UK, sure, it's
Speaker 2: on the list, but it's not a high priority issue.
Speaker 2: So I think we'll see kind of ongoing marginal improvements
Speaker 2: in relationship. Defense is one issue, obviously, with the UK
Speaker 2: and not the EU per se, but kind of Europe
Speaker 2: more broadly, are going to cooperate because the Europeans need
Speaker 2: the UK.
Speaker 2: So there there are openings, it is more constructive, but
Speaker 2: from an economic perspective, I wouldn't imagine there's going to be,
Speaker 2: you know, enormous upside, uh, in terms of improving the relationship.
Speaker 1: You mentioned earlier in the context of the US about
Speaker 1: its deficit, but you also had touched up at that point.
Speaker 1: The UK is also a current account deficit economy. So
Speaker 1: let's go back to that context of wars. Who funds
Speaker 1: going forward? How will they make their economy attractive and
Speaker 1: draw in capital?
Speaker 2: Well, as Mr. Carney said when he was at the
Speaker 2: Bank of England, you know, the reliant on the kindness
Speaker 2: of strangers. It's run a persistent account deficit for a
Speaker 2: long time.
Speaker 2: Uh, it's government debt is circa 100% of GDP.
Speaker 2: Uh, and ever since Liz Truss's, you know, infamous budget, uh,
Speaker 2: in 2022, you know, the UK has paid, you know,
Speaker 2: an additional risk premium on its borrowing. People just don't
Speaker 2: give the UK the benefit of the doubt, uh, to
Speaker 2: the same extent. So the UK is between a rock
Speaker 2: and a hard place, you know, structurally low growth rates.
Speaker 2: You know, the, the government was hoping that it could
Speaker 2: grow its way out of the fiscal constraint, uh, but
Speaker 2: there's no evident sign of that at the moment. It's
Speaker 2: got all sorts of investment needs, uh, energy, infrastructure, transport, defense,
Speaker 2: that it needs to fund.
Speaker 2: Uh, but the borrowing space for the UK is very,
Speaker 2: very limited, you know, so you know, if you were
Speaker 2: in the, uh, in the eurozone, you've got the ECB
Speaker 2: as a kind of a, as a backstop. There is
Speaker 2: an extent to which you can kind of, uh, uh,
Speaker 2: you can borrow to invest because the ECB is kind
Speaker 2: of there as a, as a bit of a backstop,
Speaker 2: as an independent country.
Speaker 2: Uh, the UK does not, uh, does not have that.
Speaker 2: And so, you know, Ms. Reeves, the Chancellor is very
Speaker 2: constrained in terms of what she can do, uh, public
Speaker 2: spending wise. Markets are watching her like a hawk, uh,
Speaker 2: and they are attaching a risk premium. So the UK
Speaker 2: is in a very difficult position. It's not growing. It's
Speaker 2: got limited fiscal space. It's got huge investment needs. You
Speaker 2: need to attract private capital, um, but there are many
Speaker 2: other parts, including continental Europe, but also have, you know,
Speaker 2: massive demands of that private capital. It is a more
Speaker 2: competitive world.
Speaker 2: The UK needs to be much, much better, I think,
Speaker 2: at providing a very strong value proposition. Yeah, come to
Speaker 2: the UK, in addition to the rule of law, we've
Speaker 2: got higher returning opportunities, and they haven't done that as
Speaker 2: much as you would, um, as much as you would like.
Speaker 2: So the UK, I think, is still in fairly significant
Speaker 2: structural difficulty, uh, both economic and also in terms of
Speaker 2: attracting capital.
Speaker 1: If I, if I were in a position of power
Speaker 1: in the UK, I would go all in on Asia
Speaker 1: and the Middle East. I think the Middle East, particularly,
Speaker 1: have no shortage of surplus capital, some of it goes
Speaker 1: into funding football teams in the UK, uh, but I
Speaker 1: think that they can do more for that, uh, and,
Speaker 1: and certainly with respect to whether it's a green transition
Speaker 1: or other tech, you know, I think Asia would be great.
Speaker 1: OK, so speaking of Asia, uh, let's let's bring this
Speaker 1: conversation back to Asia and its need for capital and
Speaker 1: where it manages China on one side and US on
Speaker 1: the other side, and somewhere in there, there is also Europe.
Speaker 2: Yeah, so I think, you know, Asia, I mean speaking
Speaker 2: very broadly, you know, is a capital exporter, you know,
Speaker 2: it has savings that it can deploy, be it Japan
Speaker 2: or China. So a lot of this is around kind
Speaker 2: of policy framework, policy structure, notably in China, but also elsewhere,
Speaker 2: the extent to which you, um, pivot your growth model
Speaker 2: towards domestic demand, domestic investment, um, supporting private consumption, and
Speaker 2: the like. I think one thing.
Speaker 2: That we are going to see as a consequence of
Speaker 2: the second Trump administration policies and the frictions on accessing
Speaker 2: the US market, is a more pronounced rotation towards kind
Speaker 2: of intra-Asia trade, investment and the life that it's not new,
Speaker 2: but I think it's going to be accelerated. And so
Speaker 2: I think we can reasonably expect increased investment opportunities across ASEAN.
Speaker 2: Um, also India as well. And so I think it's
Speaker 2: going to be capital within Asia is going to be
Speaker 2: a lot stickier, a lot more of that is going
Speaker 2: to stay within Asia. It's going to be less likely
Speaker 2: to be exported to the US and other advanced economies.
Speaker 2: And so I think we could reasonably expect, fairly robust
Speaker 2: growth in investment as that savings is if you like redirected.
Speaker 1: Europe has been trying to work out an FTA with India.
Speaker 1: European companies seem to be, you know, keen to invest
Speaker 1: in India. What has been the general sort of report
Speaker 1: card over the last 10 years? I mean, we all
Speaker 1: know that the headlines are very flashy and India is
Speaker 1: certainly the flavor of the decade as far as EM
Speaker 1: investment is concerned, but by and large, I mean, what
Speaker 1: do you hear from European investors with respect to their
Speaker 1: experience in investing in India?
Speaker 2: Uh, difficult, uh, right, so as you say, on paper
Speaker 2: it looks good. You just look at the demographics or
Speaker 2: GDP growth rates sort of like it looks, uh, great,
Speaker 2: and even for people playing the long game.
Speaker 2: You know, taking a, a very long kind of view
Speaker 2: on the size of the market, the experience has not
Speaker 2: been straightforward. Uh, you know, domestic regulatory and tax environment
Speaker 2: is challenging, obviously infrastructure and the like is not what
Speaker 2: is the case in China. So I mean, yes, there are,
Speaker 2: you know, some points of attraction. There is also kind
Speaker 2: of the de-risking play, which is, you know, as Apple
Speaker 2: and others have done, but also you see European firms,
Speaker 2: you know, we want to be less exposed to China.
Speaker 2: We're going to bring some of our.
Speaker 2: manufacturing capacity and located in India. There is some of
Speaker 2: that happening, but the numbers are not not fantastic in
Speaker 2: terms of magnitudes of investment. The returns have not been
Speaker 2: often what has been desired. And you see that even
Speaker 2: in government to government relationships, India is seen as a
Speaker 2: great prize, kind of non-aligned, if you like, within Asia,
Speaker 2: a counterweight to Asia, be it in terms of trade
Speaker 2: agreements or security relationships, there's a desire to do more,
Speaker 2: but it's all
Speaker 2: always pretty hard going. I mean, free trades take decades to, to, to,
Speaker 2: to sign in the UK has made some progress, but
Speaker 2: in general, it's just, it's, it's hard yards. So people
Speaker 2: will continue to invest. India is a big prize, so
Speaker 2: to speak. It is a very large economy. It matters
Speaker 2: for many reasons. So people are not going to give
Speaker 2: up on India, but I think there's just an awareness
Speaker 2: that it is a, at best, a long-term play requiring
Speaker 2: of long-term horizons.
Speaker 1: So, India is a big prize, China is super consequential,
Speaker 1: Taiwan makes chips that nobody else can make. What about Indonesia,
Speaker 1: you live in the Netherlands, a country with long historical
Speaker 1: ties with Indonesia, do you hear any?
Speaker 1: Marginal increase in excitement, enthusiasm about the most populous Southeast
Speaker 1: Asian country?
Speaker 2: The short answer to that is no. Um, in Indonesia
Speaker 2: still floats a bit below the investor radar, uh, and
Speaker 2: I'd say just the kind of the public radar. I mean,
Speaker 2: people know the number.
Speaker 2: Of course, it's it's a very large economy by uh
Speaker 2: by population. Uh, certainly, headline growth rates are interesting, but it's, it's,
Speaker 2: it's not quite clear what Indonesia is, you know what's
Speaker 2: its value proposition compared to other markets in uh in
Speaker 2: the region, outside of outside of direct resources.
Speaker 2: Uh, you know, there's a bit of understanding of Indonesia's
Speaker 2: role in the green transition. But outside of that, Indonesia,
Speaker 2: I'd say punches below its weight in terms of investor interest,
Speaker 2: and the new administration, in my judgment at least, hasn't
Speaker 2: done very much to to shift that. There's no kind
Speaker 2: of uptick, if you like, uh, in investor interest. Um, yeah,
Speaker 2: so Asia in general is is really increasing in kind
Speaker 2: of mindshare, but I'd say Indonesia plays a pretty small, um,
Speaker 2: a pretty small part of that.
Speaker 1: And finally, my little red dot, Singapore, um, Singapore, of course,
Speaker 1: is not as large as any of these countries that
Speaker 1: we just talked about, but as you mentioned earlier, we
Speaker 1: had the Shangri-La dialogue here, we had the different secretaries
Speaker 1: around the world come to this.
Speaker 1: Country and uh this country sort of stands for rule
Speaker 1: of law, open trade and so on, is Singapore in
Speaker 1: danger of becoming old fashioned, not capturing the zeitgeist of
Speaker 1: inward looking nativist policies around the world?
Speaker 2: Well, I, I would say, you know, I'm not sure
Speaker 2: what small countries should absorb that zeitgeist. I don't think
Speaker 2: that's the, um, the learning. And certainly the, the rhetoric from,
Speaker 2: you know, political leadership from the Prime Minister on down
Speaker 2: over the last few months in the run up to
Speaker 2: the the recent election has been, you know, kind of danger, risk,
Speaker 2: the world is turning upside down. We can't rely on
Speaker 2: the US and for small countries like Singapore, that's problematic,
Speaker 2: all of which is, you know, obviously, uh, true. Um,
Speaker 2: but I'd also say that Singapore has seen this movie before. Uh,
Speaker 2: you know, there's been many kind of
Speaker 2: Shocks to the system from the Asian financial crisis, the
Speaker 2: GFC of a pandemic, where there's a sense that kind
Speaker 2: of Singapore as a very small, very open economy is
Speaker 2: kind of deeply challenged either because foreign demand is reducing
Speaker 2: or kind of various areas of fragmentation of the global economy. Yeah,
Speaker 2: but Singapore is able to re-engineer itself to accommodate itself
Speaker 2: to new realities and often to be the first cab
Speaker 2: off the rank, if you like, in terms of redesigning
Speaker 2: its value propositions. So as I said earlier,
Speaker 2: You know, I think that one implication of the uh
Speaker 2: of the Trump administration policies is going to be, you know,
Speaker 2: a greater focus on Asia, uh, as an Asian economy.
Speaker 2: Uh, it's going to be, uh, growing perhaps in different ways,
Speaker 2: you know, uh, domestic final demand is going to be
Speaker 2: a more important component. And so, you know, Singapore's been,
Speaker 2: you know, pivoting, if you like, towards the greater ASEAN
Speaker 2: focus over the last, you know, maybe decade, several years,
Speaker 2: you know, I think we're going to see that supercharged,
Speaker 2: you know, Singapore has strengths in AI, uh, in tech, uh,
Speaker 2: that are, you know, increasingly, um, uh.
Speaker 2: increasingly important and dominant. So I think that Singapore shouldn't
Speaker 2: look around the world and saying fragmentation, friction, inward looking
Speaker 2: and replicate that playbook. And I think the Singapore playbook,
Speaker 2: which is, yes, open, but intelligently open, positioning itself for
Speaker 2: new growth opportunities, new growth markets, figuring out where those
Speaker 2: opportunities are in overseas markets will serve it well. And
Speaker 2: so my money.
Speaker 2: Remains very much on on Singapore. I think it's going
Speaker 2: to be one of the better performing ASEAN economies, um,
Speaker 2: you know, into the indefinite future because it is able
Speaker 2: to re-engineer itself. So yes, frictions and risks, to be sure,
Speaker 2: but Singapore has proved repeatedly over time, you know, that
Speaker 2: it can adjust in a fairly flexible, agile way, and
Speaker 2: I expect it will do the same again.
Speaker 1: Indeed, uh, when I look at FDI numbers, I certainly
Speaker 1: see resonance in your points, uh, it's been, it's been
Speaker 1: basically a golden age of investment as far as Singapore
Speaker 1: is concerned in the last three years, don't think that
Speaker 1: is abating in any meaningful manner, even in 2025.
Speaker 1: Uh, I was recently invited to go attend the British
Speaker 1: High Commission ceremony where their big carrier fleet is coming
Speaker 1: to Singapore, of course, the US aircraft carriers and other
Speaker 1: big naval ships come to Singapore as well. So militarily,
Speaker 1: Singapore seem to be very well aligned with the West,
Speaker 1: but at the same time, economic ties with China is substantial.
Speaker 1: I haven't really detected even with Defense Secretary Heet who
Speaker 1: was a very hawkish gentleman, didn't really come to Singapore
Speaker 1: and give a lecture like you are.
Speaker 1: With us or you're not with a sort of
Speaker 1: Thing, so yeah, my fingers are crossed and I do
Speaker 1: think that Singapore is probably doing a pretty job of
Speaker 1: balancing both, not forsaking one for the other, but at
Speaker 1: the same time not being captured by one either. Um, David, uh,
Speaker 1: very illuminating conversation, I can't thank you enough. Thanks so
Speaker 1: much for your time and insights.
Speaker 2: My absolute
Speaker 2: pleasure.
Speaker 1: Uh, thanks to our listeners as well. Copy Time was
Speaker 1: produced by Ken Delbridge at Spy Studios. Daisy Sarma and
Speaker 1: Violet Lee provided additional assistance. All 155 episodes of Copy
Speaker 1: Time are available on YouTube as well as on Apple, Google,
Speaker 1: and Spotify. Mind you, this is for information only and
Speaker 1: does not constitute any trade advice. The research of DBS
Speaker 1: are available all for public consumption, just Google DBS Research Library.
Speaker 1: Have a great day, everybody.