Speaker 1: Welcome to Cookie Time, a podcast series on markets and
Speaker 1: economies from DBS Group Research. I'm Tebei, chief economist. Welcome
Speaker 1: you to our 147th episode. Today, we are delighted to
Speaker 1: have Kishore Mahbani back on the show. He's a distinguished
Speaker 1: fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. Mr.
Speaker 1: Mahobani has been privileged to have two distinct and very
Speaker 1: distinguished careers. First, as a diplomat from the 70s all
Speaker 1: the way to the early 2000s, and then in academia.
Speaker 1: He is a prolific writer who has spoken in many
Speaker 1: corners of the world, and his latest book is Living
Speaker 1: the Asian Century An Undiplomatic Memoir. Highly recommended. Kiswani, welcome
Speaker 1: back to Coff Time. Thank you, Timur. It's great to
Speaker 1: have you, and we are recording this in Mumbai, India.
Speaker 1: So I would like to begin our conversation with India.
Speaker 1: Where do you see India sitting here in late January
Speaker 1: 2025 in the geopolitical landscape?
Speaker 2: Uh, first of all, thank you very much for having
Speaker 2: me on again. Uh, I know that our first recording
Speaker 2: had quite a few
Speaker 1: so
Speaker 2: far
Speaker 1: the history of COVID time,
Speaker 2: yes. Um, you know, to understand, uh, India's place in
Speaker 2: this geopolitical moment.
Speaker 2: We have to understand first the geopolitical movement.
Speaker 2: And here it's important to emphasize, we are a very
Speaker 2: unique crossroads.
Speaker 2: In the field of geopolitics.
Speaker 2: So there are fundamental structural take uh structural changes.
Speaker 2: Taking place in the geopolitical order. That's the moment. And
Speaker 2: the question, therefore, is which countries are adapting well to this,
Speaker 2: to these structural changes and which countries are adapting badly?
Speaker 2: To these structural changes. I can give examples of both.
Speaker 2: So clearly, one of the changes that is happening, and
Speaker 2: I've said this over and over and over again, is
Speaker 2: that we're reaching the end of 200 years of Western
Speaker 2: domination of world history, you know. So, clearly the 88%
Speaker 2: of the world's population who live outside the West are
Speaker 2: waking up significantly and people ask me to give one
Speaker 2: simple example of this.
Speaker 2: I just say, look at the uh Ukraine war, even
Speaker 2: though the Russian invasion of Ukraine was clearly illegal, no
Speaker 2: question about that. When the West imposed sanctions on Russia, 85%
Speaker 2: of the world's population didn't join the West in imposing
Speaker 2: sanctions on Russia. So you can see, therefore this bifurcation.
Speaker 2: And uh at the same time also, within the West, uh,
Speaker 2: you have to make a huge distinction between United States
Speaker 2: and Europe. You know, at the beginning of the 21st century,
Speaker 2: they were more or less on par.
Speaker 2: Now, look at the United States is so much bigger, right?
Speaker 2: The EU has shrunk to 2/3 the size of the
Speaker 2: United States and the European Union clearly has also lost
Speaker 2: its way and is floundering in terms of adjusting to
Speaker 2: this new world order, both in the arena of geopolitics
Speaker 2: and their mismanagement of the Ukraine issue and also uh
Speaker 2: in economics and not being able to grow their economies
Speaker 2: and adapt and just to a new world.
Speaker 2: By contrast, by the way, the United States looks very
Speaker 2: robust and strong and and dynamic. So in this setting, uh,
Speaker 2: there will be winners and losers with these structural changes,
Speaker 2: and I predict that India will be a big winner
Speaker 2: because this, this, this, these kinds of structural changes open
Speaker 2: windows of opportunity and clearly India is going to have
Speaker 2: a major window of opportunity because as things change.
Speaker 2: As people try to cultivate the rising powers, India clearly
Speaker 2: is one of the rising powers. The beginning of the
Speaker 2: 20th century wasn't in the top 10 list of world economies. Uh,
Speaker 2: today it is already number 5. By 2030, it will
Speaker 2: be number 3. So India has arrived in that sense.
Speaker 2: So as we move towards a multipolar world order, India
Speaker 2: will be one of the significant poles, and India, therefore,
Speaker 2: can become a huge beneficiary if it plays this game well.
Speaker 1: So let's talk about the playing the game well in
Speaker 1: the context of India-US relationship. We have Donald Trump back
Speaker 1: in the White House. Um, India runs a large trade deficit. Uh,
Speaker 1: the US has a big trade deficit vis a vis India. Uh,
Speaker 1: Trump's key API or key performance indicator seems to be
Speaker 1: narrowing deficit vis a vis nations. Would he impose tariffs
Speaker 1: on India? How will India play that? What's your
Speaker 1: sense?
Speaker 2: Well, I think in the case of Donald Trump.
Speaker 2: Uh, you have to do, uh, you have to switch
Speaker 2: your means of calculating. Uh, you know, in the past,
Speaker 2: you know, things like goodwill, relationships, uh, um, how do
Speaker 2: you say, established history would make a difference. In the
Speaker 2: case of Donald Trump, nothing matters except very simple question,
Speaker 2: what have you done for me lately? That's all he asks.
Speaker 2: And this is where on the one hand, uh, I
Speaker 2: have no doubt that the close personal relationship between Donald
Speaker 2: Trump and the Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a genuine,
Speaker 2: they both get along with each other, will make some
Speaker 2: kind of a difference. But you know, frankly, if you
Speaker 2: look at countries in the world, no country has been
Speaker 2: as loyal to the United States as Canada has been.
Speaker 2: And if you look at the way that Canada has
Speaker 2: been kicked around by Donald Trump, you realize that relationships
Speaker 2: don't matter.
Speaker 2: At the end of the day, what matters is pure
Speaker 2: uh transactional interests, and he will want to see uh
Speaker 2: balanced trade between US and India.
Speaker 2: Uh, he may insist on India opening up, uh, some
Speaker 2: of its markets, uh, to American products. He's going to
Speaker 2: deport illegal Indian immigrants, which is, you know, going to
Speaker 2: be a problem for India because if you look at
Speaker 2: the countries with the number of illegal immigrants in the US,
Speaker 2: number one is Mexico, number 2 is El Salvador, number
Speaker 2: 3 is India.
Speaker 2: So there'll be some friction, you know, in the way
Speaker 2: it's done and so on and so forth. You saw
Speaker 2: it with Colombia and all that, that's right. So there
Speaker 2: are potential issues uh that could complicate uh relations uh
Speaker 2: with the Donald Trump administration, but the biggest complication arises
Speaker 2: from the fact that, you know, in the Biden administration
Speaker 2: which courted India ferociously except except the last year, something
Speaker 2: went wrong in the last year, clearly.
Speaker 2: Uh, saw India as a natural ally against China.
Speaker 2: Uh, Trump doesn't see allies as assets.
Speaker 2: Trump sees allies as liabilities.
Speaker 2: Seriously, so all he's asking you is, how much are
Speaker 2: you paying me and what have you done for me lately?
Speaker 2: And so even uh he's not going to see India
Speaker 2: necessarily as an important ally, uh counterbalancing uh China, for example.
Speaker 2: In fact, one of the problems that India may have
Speaker 2: is that since Donald Trump is a big deal maker,
Speaker 2: he may come to some kind of deal with China.
Speaker 2: And if relations between US and China settle down, then
Speaker 2: the value of India as a geopolitical card goes down.
Speaker 2: And so India, therefore has got to adjust and therefore
Speaker 2: try to see how we can take advantage of these
Speaker 2: changes to ensure that its interests are protected.
Speaker 1: I want to talk about India-China relationship momentarily, but just
Speaker 1: want to stick with in the US, uh, briefly before
Speaker 1: we do that. The US is, or rather Donald Trump's
Speaker 1: team is keen on getting a deal done between Ukraine
Speaker 1: and Russia, but the first step in that direction seems
Speaker 1: to be tightening the screw on Russia and easing the screw, including.
Speaker 1: Access to Russian oil, you know, heavy discount that both
Speaker 1: India and China have been benefiting. So how does India
Speaker 1: calibrate its still fairly deep relationship with Russia while dealing
Speaker 1: with the US with this transactional?
Speaker 2: Well, I think for India it's a matter of vital
Speaker 2: national security interests to preserve its relationship with Russia.
Speaker 2: Because at the end of the day, you know, when
Speaker 2: you go through a crisis, we all go through crisis.
Speaker 2: You have to ask yourself, who can you rely upon
Speaker 2: in a crisis. So for example, that if India has
Speaker 2: a problem that appears in the UN Security Council of
Speaker 2: the five permanent members, United States, UK, France, China, Russia,
Speaker 2: the only dependable ally or friend that India has is Russia.
Speaker 2: If you, if India asked Russia to veto something on
Speaker 2: India's behalf, Russia is likely to do so. So you
Speaker 2: watch even the body language and the meetings between uh
Speaker 2: Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Putin, President Putin within Prime
Speaker 2: Minister Narendra Modi and Sergey Lavrov, you can see there's
Speaker 2: a lot of trust that's been built up over there.
Speaker 2: So India is not going to give up its relationship
Speaker 2: with Russia.
Speaker 2: And for India as a net importing oil country, to
Speaker 2: give up access to cheap Russian oil will be a
Speaker 2: huge economic price to pay, and I don't see how
Speaker 2: why Indian should pay that economic price. So I think
Speaker 2: they will definitely resist any moves to um ah have
Speaker 2: get by the US to try and get them to
Speaker 2: cut off their ties with Russia.
Speaker 2: And you know, going, you since you want to discuss
Speaker 2: the USIndia relationship. I think it's also important to emphasize
Speaker 2: why why did things go some a bit rough in
Speaker 2: the last year, the Biden administration. Things seem to be,
Speaker 2: you know, going so well.
Speaker 2: And then you had at least 3 points of friction
Speaker 2: that emerged. First was, of course, the, uh, I think
Speaker 2: India was surprised how Canada went full blast on going
Speaker 2: after India.
Speaker 2: About the purported assassination of a Canadian citizen.
Speaker 2: And you know, traditionally, Canada would listen to hints from
Speaker 2: Washington DC.
Speaker 2: Didn't the Biden administration tell Canada, go easy, you know,
Speaker 2: India is an important friend. That question must be on
Speaker 2: Indian minds. And then, of course, the sudden removal of
Speaker 2: Sheikh Hasina from Bangladesh was also a bit of a
Speaker 2: shock for India, because Sheikh Hasina was a reliable friend
Speaker 2: of India and right now, as you know, she's in India.
Speaker 2: Uh, and that also, frankly, was encouraged uh by the
Speaker 2: United States that we know it's a matter of fact.
Speaker 2: And then thirdly, the other thing that surprised me was
Speaker 2: the decision of the Justice Department of uh the Biden
Speaker 2: administration to go after Adani.
Speaker 2: I mean, surely enough people in Washington DC knew that,
Speaker 2: you know, Mr. Adani is very close to Prime Minister Modi.
Speaker 2: So suddenly you find a relationship that you thought was
Speaker 2: a good one.
Speaker 2: Uh, got a lot of sand was thrown into the gearbox.
Speaker 2: And so that's why I think India has got to
Speaker 2: really decide, uh, how it balances, it's still, it's still
Speaker 2: going to have good relations with the US, by the way,
Speaker 2: there's no question whatsoever, but how you balance the, how
Speaker 2: you play the balance within US and China. You got
Speaker 2: to recalibrate now.
Speaker 1: Speaking
Speaker 1: of recalibration, let's talk about India and China relationship.
Speaker 2: Yeah, well, I think in the case of the India-China relationship,
Speaker 2: clearly some degree of rethinking is going on. I mean, I,
Speaker 2: I was surprised to learn from you this morning.
Speaker 2: That India has allowed the resumption of direct flights between
Speaker 2: India and China. That was a major anomaly. I mean,
Speaker 2: a major anomaly. I mean, the two biggest.
Speaker 2: Uh, uh, I mean, apart from Japan, the two biggest
Speaker 2: economies in Asia have no direct flights to each other.
Speaker 2: That doesn't make sense, you know. So clearly there was
Speaker 2: a big move and it's part of a gradual recalibration
Speaker 2: driven partly by the fact you by realization you can't
Speaker 2: put all your eggs in the American basket. You can't
Speaker 2: just rely on the
Speaker 2: Uh, United States and at the same time, uh, if
Speaker 2: India's goal is to become a manufacturing economy, no country
Speaker 2: in the world, anywhere, by the way, including United States, Germany, uh,
Speaker 2: UK can advance their manufacturing agenda without in one way
Speaker 2: or another getting inputs from China. I mean, the most
Speaker 2: stunning statistic of the 21st century.
Speaker 2: Is that when the 21st century opened in the year 2000.
Speaker 2: Uh, China's share of global manufacturing was 5%.
Speaker 2: Uh, by 2030, it will be 45%. Now that's stunning. Now,
Speaker 2: virtually every product in the world that is manufactured, I think,
Speaker 2: in one way or another contains some kind of Chinese
Speaker 2: uh component because that's how indispensable the Chinese manufacturing economy
Speaker 2: has begun. And if you, if you closed your eyes, OK, you, you,
Speaker 2: you scrub out the word India, put economy X.
Speaker 2: And you scrub out the word China, you put economy Y.
Speaker 2: And you did a simple cost-benefit calculation. Would economy X
Speaker 2: benefit from closer cooperation in manufacturing economy Y or would
Speaker 2: it be would it be better off doing less with
Speaker 2: economy Y? And any kind of basic cost-benefit calculation will
Speaker 2: show you that India will benefit a lot more by
Speaker 2: not necessarily cooperating.
Speaker 2: But taking advantage of China's manufacturing capabilities to enhance its
Speaker 2: own manufacturing uh in India. And so to give a
Speaker 2: simple and obvious example, India wants to become a big
Speaker 2: manufacturer of iPhones. There is no way you can manufacture
Speaker 2: an iPhone without Chinese components. No way, absolutely no way.
Speaker 2: And I can tell you that Apple's reliance.
Speaker 2: Everybody thinks that because of the US China friction.
Speaker 2: Apple has reduced its reliance on Chinese components. If you
Speaker 2: studied carefully, it has actually increased.
Speaker 2: Because the, the products in China have become cheaper and
Speaker 2: more competitive, and Apple is all about profits. So clearly, you, you,
Speaker 2: if you really want to enhance your manufacturing capability, and
Speaker 2: I think as you know, some people within the Prime
Speaker 2: Minister Modi's government are coming to realize that they have
Speaker 2: to in one way or another collaborate with China too.
Speaker 1: It is encouraging, uh, absolutely. Uh, you mentioned Apple. My
Speaker 1: understanding is that when Foxconn was initially nudged into assembling
Speaker 1: iPhones in India, the fear, even among Indians was that,
Speaker 1: you know, it may not match the efficiency of Chinese
Speaker 1: manufacturing plants. But now we can see that there's a
Speaker 1: win-win there. You be part of the Chinese supply chain,
Speaker 1: bring in the inputs, bring in Indian labor, train them,
Speaker 1: and now my understanding is that the Apple's yield in
Speaker 1: India is almost as good as it is in China. Uh, so.
Speaker 1: There is a mutually beneficial dynamic there in place. Foxconn
Speaker 1: is happy, India is happy, Chinese components remain in place, uh,
Speaker 1: but
Speaker 2: it has increased India's trade deficit with China.
Speaker 1: It will probably do the same, yes, indeed. Um, so
Speaker 1: that's the irony that India's fear about Chinese trade deficit
Speaker 1: probably got in the way of India joining regional companies
Speaker 1: of economic partnership with.
Speaker 1: Uh, now, again, there's some rethink that maybe that was
Speaker 1: an opportunity lost. You can't just fixate on a bilateral deficit.
Speaker 1: You have to sort of think about your own export
Speaker 1: prowess and how you build it with cooperation, joint ventures,
Speaker 1: if you will, with others. Like you sure I see,
Speaker 1: for example, uh, MG cars on the roads of India.
Speaker 1: It's a joint venture between an Indian company and Chinese SAIC.
Speaker 1: So that's the Chinese model in the past worked very
Speaker 1: well for China, and I think India with this recalibration
Speaker 1: is beginning to head in that direction. I think that's
Speaker 1: a welcome development. Yeah,
Speaker 2: but I'm glad you mentioned RCEP because I think all the, again,
Speaker 2: objective econometric studies show that if India joins the RCEP,
Speaker 2: you'll be a net beneficiary.
Speaker 2: And India's GNP will gain a boost. I mean, there
Speaker 2: was already a very powerful geopolitical argument uh for India
Speaker 2: to join the RCEP because, you know, if India stays
Speaker 2: out of RCEP, it will lose its ability to integrate
Speaker 2: better with the ASEAN region. And you know, Southeast Asia, uh,
Speaker 2: for only for 2000 years.
Speaker 2: Has been trying to balance China and India, right? And overall,
Speaker 2: Indian influence in Southeast Asia has always been very strong
Speaker 2: because out of the 10 countries in Southeast Asia, 9
Speaker 2: have an indic base. Only 1 Vietnam has a scenic base.
Speaker 2: So there's a natural affinity, natural, how do you say,
Speaker 2: complementarity between Southeast Asia and India.
Speaker 2: But what RCEP does is in with India not joining
Speaker 2: is that India cuts itself off from Southeast Asia. There's
Speaker 2: a manufacturing ecosystem there, very powerful one. And in Southeast Asia,
Speaker 2: of course, by then, uh, by default gets closer uh
Speaker 2: to China. So there's real political argument for India to
Speaker 2: join RCP, but more importantly, you know, in the long run, uh,
Speaker 2: India is going to make a vital strategic decision.
Speaker 2: And this is a big strategic decision that only someone
Speaker 2: as strong as Prime Minister Narendra Modi can make that
Speaker 2: do you, in the long run, will the Indian economy
Speaker 2: succeed by being more protectionist or being by being more open?
Speaker 2: And frankly, the main reason why China has succeeded as
Speaker 2: an economy so well is that the Chinese made a
Speaker 2: big strategic decision that the only reason why they suffered.
Speaker 2: The century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949, and the
Speaker 2: reason why they became so weak is because they closed
Speaker 2: their economy and not integrated with the rest of the world.
Speaker 2: And as you know, the Chinese have decided, OK, now
Speaker 2: we'll do the opposite. As Xi Jinping said in Davos
Speaker 2: in 2017, we'll be plunge into the ocean of globalization,
Speaker 2: we struggle to swim, we drank water, but we became
Speaker 2: stronger as a result.
Speaker 2: And so now Chinese economy by integrating it with the
Speaker 2: rest of the world, has become a remarkably robust and
Speaker 2: strong economy, you know.
Speaker 2: And I think India can do the same because India,
Speaker 2: Indians are naturally competitive. I mean, you look at every
Speaker 2: country in the world, the Indians have migrated to, and
Speaker 2: I can say this with some confidence as aindi. I
Speaker 2: have first cousins, you know, children of my mother's and
Speaker 2: father's siblings all over the world living in Guyana, uh, Suriname, Texas, London, Florida.
Speaker 2: Uh, Nigeria, Ghana, Mumbai, Kolkata, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, every
Speaker 2: corner of the world. I have first cousins and Kyoto, yeah,
Speaker 2: and you know what, they, they're all doing very well.
Speaker 2: They they compete very well, uh, in, in, in, in
Speaker 2: a competitive uh economic uh environment. You can see in
Speaker 2: the United States, which is the most competitive human laboratory
Speaker 2: in the world, uh, the ethnic community with the highest
Speaker 2: per capita income are the Indians.
Speaker 2: So, you know, India, therefore needs to make a very
Speaker 2: powerful strategic decision that India can and will compete. Now,
Speaker 2: of course, when you open up the economy, there will
Speaker 2: be disruptions, there will be difficulties, you know, it's it's,
Speaker 2: it's the same thing that happens when a woman gives birth, right? You,
Speaker 2: you go through labor pains. After the labor pains, you
Speaker 2: end up with a beautiful uh baby.
Speaker 2: So and and that beautiful baby could be a much
Speaker 2: more dynamic competitive Indian economy.
Speaker 1: Sure, uh, we are two Singaporeans sitting here in India.
Speaker 1: So let's talk a little bit about Singapore-India relationship.
Speaker 2: Sure. Well, I think we are, we are very blessed.
Speaker 2: Uh, that early on, uh, all the leaders of, uh,
Speaker 2: Singapore decided that they had to make long-term investments in India. And,
Speaker 2: you know, it, it happened under Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.
Speaker 2: I actually personally accompanied Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, uh, when
Speaker 2: he visited India, and I, all I remember is that
Speaker 2: at that time, I think the Prime Minister was Murai Jayai.
Speaker 2: And, uh, Indira Gandhi was in opposition, so you can
Speaker 2: more or less figure out what year it was. So
Speaker 2: it regularly, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yeww used to come here,
Speaker 2: come here, but the man who triggered what you call
Speaker 2: the India fever, uh, in Singapore was Prime Minister Goh
Speaker 2: Chok Tong. And you, you mentioned my, uh, memoirs, Living
Speaker 2: the Asian Century. I think I also talk about how
Speaker 2: Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong.
Speaker 2: Uh, you know, worked hard to get India admitted into
Speaker 2: the ASEAN Regional Forum, you know. So over the years,
Speaker 2: a lot of trust has been built up between the
Speaker 2: Indian leaders and, and Singapore. So I think that, uh,
Speaker 2: that long term trust means that we have a very stable, uh,
Speaker 2: long term relationship.
Speaker 2: Uh, between India and Singapore. But at the same time,
Speaker 2: I think it's important for Singapore to realize.
Speaker 2: That the competition for attention of India is growing more
Speaker 2: intense because all you have to do is do a
Speaker 2: count of all the leaders coming to Delhi now to
Speaker 2: court India. It's, it's gone up like this, right? Clearly,
Speaker 2: India's influence is grown. So you cannot take for granted
Speaker 2: that just because we were close relation, have close relations
Speaker 2: in the past, we have close relations in the future,
Speaker 2: we have to reinvent ourselves.
Speaker 2: And continue to work hard to get closer because you
Speaker 2: can see already in the past, uh, relations between Indonesia
Speaker 2: and India were not close, but just a few days ago, uh,
Speaker 2: President Prabowo was invited as the chief guest, uh, of
Speaker 2: the Indian government. So that, that's an example of how
Speaker 2: the competition for India's attention.
Speaker 2: Will grow in the coming years.
Speaker 1: this is a very critical point. Uh, last year, uh,
Speaker 1: several members of Indian Chamber of Commerce were in Singapore,
Speaker 1: and they seem to suggest, I mean, there was a
Speaker 1: push back to what they said, but they seem to
Speaker 1: think that Singapore lacks a credible, coherent strategy, vis a
Speaker 1: vis India, especially with all these um competition for attention,
Speaker 1: if you will. Um, so what should be Singapore's strategy
Speaker 1: in this time when India is being quartered by the
Speaker 1: whole world?
Speaker 2: Well, I think the important thing is to continue working
Speaker 2: in the relationship, and I'm very glad that uh President
Speaker 2: Thaman Shamugratnam came on a state visit to India. I think, uh, probably, uh,
Speaker 2: apart from the two former prime ministers, uh, Mr. Goh
Speaker 2: Chok Tong and Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, uh, I think
Speaker 2: the the third most respected Singaporean figure in, uh, India
Speaker 2: is Thaman Chamratnam.
Speaker 2: There's a lot of uh reverence for him and trust
Speaker 2: in him. So it's good that he came and re-established.
Speaker 2: The close relations, but we also have to keep on
Speaker 2: sending uh visitors and also working hard to find concrete
Speaker 2: areas of uh cooperation and collaboration between India and Singapore.
Speaker 2: And I hope that we can at least work with
Speaker 2: India slowly to try and persuade India to reconsider your
Speaker 2: decision not to join the RCEP.
Speaker 2: Because I think once India joins the RCP and benefits
Speaker 2: from joining RCEP, uh, then the ties, uh, not just
Speaker 2: within India and Singapore, but India and Southeast Asia will
Speaker 2: become much stronger.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I fully concur. Um, let's, uh, put India aside
Speaker 1: for the time being and talk about what you and
Speaker 1: I discussed at length in the previous podcast, the China-US relationship.
Speaker 1: How do things look from Beijing's perspective, including the last
Speaker 1: 4 years of Biden administration and the coming 4 years
Speaker 1: of Trump administration here again,
Speaker 2: it's very important to make a distinction between the structural
Speaker 2: changes and the short term developments.
Speaker 2: Excuse me.
Speaker 2: Um,
Speaker 2: Structurally, the relationship between US and China.
Speaker 2: is shifting
Speaker 2: I mean, the.
Speaker 2: Americans are obviously trying to stop China's development.
Speaker 2: They think to some extent they have done so.
Speaker 2: But if you take a 10 year time horizon, no way,
Speaker 2: they're going to stop China.
Speaker 2: So the Chinese still feel confident.
Speaker 2: That the long run, the long run, they are, they'll
Speaker 2: be better off. The Chinese economy, as you know, is
Speaker 2: having some real short term challenges. The next 2 to
Speaker 2: 3 years will be difficult. The real estate market is
Speaker 2: still in the dumps.
Speaker 2: Uh, consumer sentiment is down.
Speaker 2: Business sentiment is down, so they're struggling to get their 5%
Speaker 2: growth rate. So over the next 2 to 3 years,
Speaker 2: Chinese economy is going to be struggling. But if you
Speaker 2: look at China decade by decade.
Speaker 2: At the end of each decade, they look so much
Speaker 2: stronger and I, and I, I gave the statistic how
Speaker 2: their share of global manufacturing has gone from 5% in
Speaker 2: 2000 and will reach 45% in 2030. That's an example
Speaker 2: of how this look decade by decade and and certainly
Speaker 2: if you look at, you ask yourself a very simple question.
Speaker 2: Which leading economy in the world?
Speaker 2: Has invested the most in the industries of the future.
Speaker 2: I mean, no question is China, EVs, solar panels, wind turbines,
Speaker 2: battery technology, robots, you go on, right?
Speaker 2: And uh if there's one economy that's really prepared for
Speaker 2: the future, preparing itself for the future, is China, and
Speaker 2: it's causing structural changes around the world. I mean, if
Speaker 2: you and I had had this interview 10 years ago,
Speaker 2: and I told you.
Speaker 2: 10 years ago, I told in 2015.
Speaker 2: 10 years from now, Mercedes Benz, BMW, Audi, uh, Toyota, Nissan, oh,
Speaker 2: we so scared of Chinese automobiles. You would have laughed
Speaker 2: at me. Everybody would have laughed. You must be joking.
Speaker 2: I remember as recently as 34 years ago, Elon Musk said,
Speaker 2: who the hell is going to buy a Chinese automobile?
Speaker 2: Look where we are today. All the companies I mentioned
Speaker 2: are shit scared.
Speaker 2: Of Chinese automobiles. So, you know, this is and, and
Speaker 2: just to mention an event that happened last few days.
Speaker 2: Look at how much value Nasdaq has lost.
Speaker 2: Because of a company I never heard of called Deep.
Speaker 2: Where did this Chinese company come from?
Speaker 2: And how does a hedge fund manager create a world
Speaker 2: beating AI company? It doesn't make sense. So, you know, therefore,
Speaker 2: What, what we have, the biggest lesson, and this is
Speaker 2: what I, you know, I, I'm a friend of the
Speaker 2: United States. My goal is to help the United States
Speaker 2: adapt intelligently to the rise of the Chinese. And I
Speaker 2: always keep telling my American friends, it's, it's very dangerous
Speaker 2: for you to underestimate China. It's safer for you to
Speaker 2: overestimate China and to be fair to me, I've been
Speaker 2: saying this for 2030 years, consistently.
Speaker 2: And so if the structural changes happening, the rebalancing between
Speaker 2: US and China will continue. Now over the short term, uh,
Speaker 2: I think China is probably going to have a rough
Speaker 2: time initially, uh, with Donald Trump because Donald Trump is,
Speaker 2: you know, only believes in working through threats and uh
Speaker 2: tariffs and so on and so forth. So there'll be
Speaker 2: some rockiness in the US China relationship, but at the
Speaker 2: same time,
Speaker 2: If there's one man who can make a deal with China,
Speaker 2: comprehensive deal with China, it is certainly Donald Trump. You know,
Speaker 2: you know, Joe Biden and his administration were so frightened
Speaker 2: of being seen to be soft on China, they didn't
Speaker 2: dare to do even the obvious things they could have
Speaker 2: done to improve ties with China. Donald
Speaker 2: Trump has got the advantage. They say only, you know,
Speaker 2: they say only Richard Nixon could go to China, only
Speaker 2: Donald Trump can make a deal with China. And at
Speaker 2: some point in time, if they reach a deal of
Speaker 2: some kind and stabilize the US-China relationship, that wouldn't be
Speaker 2: surprised either. So, and this means that all the other
Speaker 2: people around the world, like the Europeans.
Speaker 2: Who are counting on an adversarial US China relationship will
Speaker 2: suddenly find themselves marginalized.
Speaker 2: So this is the sort of thing that you got
Speaker 2: to be very geopolitics is a very cruel business. You
Speaker 2: got to think very hard about how you could, on
Speaker 2: the one hand, enhance your position, and on the other hand,
Speaker 2: how your position could be seriously suffer if other changes happen.
Speaker 1: Like sure, the mercurial nature of Trump is really something else.
Speaker 1: To your point of the Biden administration being petrified of
Speaker 1: being seen soft on China, they basically co-opted all the
Speaker 1: measures that Trump had put in place, and they intensified them,
Speaker 1: including the ban on TikTok, and then Trump comes back
Speaker 1: and he says, yeah, maybe we shouldn't ban it. Um,
Speaker 1: so what was the point of trying to look even
Speaker 1: holier than thou for the Biden administration, it didn't really
Speaker 1: amount to anything.
Speaker 1: Um, but just saying it,
Speaker 2: just a quick point, the bigger problem with the Biden administration.
Speaker 2: Is that they didn't have long term strategic thinkers in
Speaker 2: the administration. I can tell you that in my last, uh,
Speaker 2: one on one conversation, uh, with Henry Kissinger in October 2022,
Speaker 2: about a year before he died, he more or less, uh,
Speaker 2: suggested that, you know, they're not thinking long term and
Speaker 2: competing with China, you got to ask yourself where you
Speaker 2: want to be 10 years, 20 years from now, forget
Speaker 2: the next quarter.
Speaker 2: Forget the tariffs and all that. Where, what is your
Speaker 2: end goal? And the Biden administration never specified what his
Speaker 2: end goal is going to be 10 years, 20 years
Speaker 2: down the road. And, and, and what it shocked me
Speaker 2: even more is that not a single member of the
Speaker 2: Biden administration.
Speaker 2: Consulted Henry Kissinger.
Speaker 2: And the least they could have done, at least I
Speaker 2: mean to show some courage.
Speaker 2: It allowed Henry Kissinger to go back to China in
Speaker 2: 2021 to mark the 50th anniversary of the opening up
Speaker 2: with China, but they were so scared, they didn't even
Speaker 2: allow Kissinger to go to China. So that's an example
Speaker 2: of cowardice that unfortunately plagued the Biden administration.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I've I've looked at various speeches that Jake Sullivan
Speaker 1: and Anthony Blinken gave over the last 4 years.
Speaker 1: And I felt that it was a continuation of whatever
Speaker 1: they thought the Trump administration had done that we're going
Speaker 1: to be even tougher than that of wide yard and
Speaker 1: high fence and those sort of analogy. It was all
Speaker 1: about looking at China as an existential adversary, as opposed
Speaker 1: to looking at the gains from a win-win relationship of openness.
Speaker 2: And and the Biden administration especially.
Speaker 2: Because it genuinely, the biggest compliment I can pay the
Speaker 2: Biden administration is that they understood that climate change was
Speaker 2: a real threat and it is a real threat, come on.
Speaker 2: Like climate change is a real threat and you really
Speaker 2: want to focus on saving planet Earth.
Speaker 2: Then you've got to press the pause button on the
Speaker 2: geopolitical contest with China and tell China, hey, they are
Speaker 2: both two cabins on one boat, the boat is sinking,
Speaker 2: let's work together. But the Biden administration, even though it
Speaker 2: realized that climate change is real, didn't have the courage
Speaker 2: to tell the American people, hey, we really got to
Speaker 2: save the planet, and the only way we can save
Speaker 2: the planet if all of us come together, and we
Speaker 2: must bring China on board.
Speaker 2: That's a very simple, obvious thing the Biden administration could
Speaker 2: have said, but all they wanted to show is that
Speaker 2: they were tougher on China than the Trump administration, and
Speaker 2: it was a losing game, I
Speaker 1: agree. Um, let's go back to the point you made
Speaker 1: about Xi Jinping's speech about China, you know, jumping into
Speaker 1: the rough waters of globalization and coming out stronger.
Speaker 1: If we assume that the narrative of fragmentation continues in
Speaker 1: the US and Europe, they see China as an adversary
Speaker 1: and they restrict market access, technology access, and so on.
Speaker 1: What is China's strategy vis a vis the other 85%
Speaker 1: of the world?
Speaker 2: Well, I think that China's strategy vis a vis the
Speaker 2: other 85% of the world started more than 10 years ago.
Speaker 2: I mean, with things like the Belt and Road Initiative,
Speaker 2: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, you know,
Speaker 2: and you know, uh, a Brazilian diplomat told me that
Speaker 2: in the year 2000, it took Brazil one year.
Speaker 2: To export $1 billion to China.
Speaker 2: Today it take Brazil 60 to 70 hours to export
Speaker 2: $1 billion to China. So, you know, remember, Brazil is
Speaker 2: in theory in the American sphere of influence, and Brazil
Speaker 2: is covered by the Monroe Doctrine and so on and
Speaker 2: so forth. So here is a country that has developed
Speaker 2: extensive ties with China. It's not going to sacrifice, uh,
Speaker 2: it ties with China just because of uh the United States.
Speaker 2: So, what what the Chinese have done, therefore vis a
Speaker 2: vis the 85%, is to enhance their substantive ties with
Speaker 2: these countries. And another give you another example, Indonesia, you know,
Speaker 2: when after Indonesia made a decision.
Speaker 2: To, uh, build a fast train with China between Jakarta
Speaker 2: and Bandung, the Biden administration sent a team and said,
Speaker 2: you know, be careful, be careful. And the Indonesian response was, OK,
Speaker 2: why don't you, America, come and build a fast train
Speaker 2: in Indonesia. You'll be happy if you did so. But
Speaker 2: you know, again, the US couldn't compete with China on that. So, I,
Speaker 2: I think therefore, the Chinese have, in the Chinese have
Speaker 2: had
Speaker 2: As I, as I explained in my book as China One,
Speaker 2: a consistent long term strategy on how to manage pressures
Speaker 2: from China, from United States and China, and the best
Speaker 2: way to do so is to ensure that the rest
Speaker 2: of the world uh has a vested interest in not
Speaker 2: cutting off China. That's a strategic decision they made ages ago,
Speaker 2: when you see this in ASEAN.
Speaker 2: Uh, for example, in the year 2000, China ASEAN trade
Speaker 2: was only $40 billion US dollars. In 2022, it hit
Speaker 2: $975 billion you know, almost $1 trillion. So all this
Speaker 2: interdependency between China and the rest of the world means
Speaker 2: that they have preemptively, China has preemptively killed any containment strategy.
Speaker 2: Uh, by the United States and see, by contrast, the
Speaker 2: United States doesn't have a long term policy that can counterbalance, uh, uh, China,
Speaker 2: and actually what the United States has now with the
Speaker 2: Trump administration is the exact opposite.
Speaker 2: Because Trump is actually in one way or another, going
Speaker 2: to alienate a lot of countries in the world. I'm
Speaker 2: sure Canada is mad as hell. I'm sure Mexico is
Speaker 2: mad as hell. Colombia, I'm sure is not mad as hell,
Speaker 2: even though it.
Speaker 2: In the end, you know, when people have to cut out,
Speaker 2: they get mad, of course. Uh, so, uh, you ironically,
Speaker 2: if Trump goes systematically threatening country by country systematically, including
Speaker 2: friends like Japan and South Korea, then frankly, the Trump
Speaker 2: could be a real gift to China that keeps on giving.
Speaker 1: But in terms of China, so nobody contest the fact that,
Speaker 1: you know, China has deepened economic symbalances with vast parts
Speaker 1: of the global South, but is it doing the prudent
Speaker 1: thing in South China Sea, for example, we see Philippines,
Speaker 1: China friction, sometimes Vietnam, China friction, and of course we
Speaker 1: have the Taiwan, Korea, Japan uh situation uh vis a
Speaker 1: vis China as well.
Speaker 1: So what's your assessment of China's sort of the wool
Speaker 1: for your past or is it sort of being a
Speaker 1: little more pragmatic and dealing with his immediate neighbors?
Speaker 2: Well, I mean, uh, the key point I always emphasize
Speaker 2: about when you deal with great power, great powers, always
Speaker 2: remember that the phrase benevolent great power is an oxymoron.
Speaker 2: No great power is is is benevolent. I mean, the
Speaker 2: United States was in some ways benevolent after World War
Speaker 2: 2 and so on and so forth with the Marshall
Speaker 2: Plan and all that. But as you can see, in
Speaker 2: the long run, every great power will put its interests
Speaker 2: first and sacrifice others. As you know, the Europeans are terrified.
Speaker 2: Uh, are being abandoned in Ukraine now. Uh, so in
Speaker 2: the same way, China is also not a benevolent great power.
Speaker 2: It has to put its own, uh, interests first. And
Speaker 2: there's no question that as China becomes more and more powerful, uh,
Speaker 2: it is going to become more and more assertive. I mean,
Speaker 2: you know, if I give a simple analogy, if you
Speaker 2: and I having this conversation for an hour, we started
Speaker 2: off by having a cat in the room, sitting in
Speaker 2: the corner.
Speaker 2: You and I will be talking very comfortably. What a
Speaker 2: lovely cat, you know, you can look at it. But
Speaker 2: after an hour, suddenly the cat becomes a tiger. I
Speaker 2: think you and I would sit here very uncomfortably looking
Speaker 2: at the tiger, you know. So China, to put it simply,
Speaker 2: I mean, mathematically, this is true, has gone from being
Speaker 2: a cat to becoming a tiger, right? Look at how
Speaker 2: much the economy has exploded. And so you can no
Speaker 2: longer assume.
Speaker 2: That the china that behave like a cat.
Speaker 2: It's going to continue behaving like a cat when it
Speaker 2: becomes a tiger. That's so unrealistic. It's going to become
Speaker 2: more assertive. But at the same time, there's a huge
Speaker 2: difference between two English words. One is assertive and the
Speaker 2: other is aggressive. So China can become more assertive without
Speaker 2: necessarily becoming aggressive. Now, you mentioned the South China Sea.
Speaker 2: Just go and read uh Graham Allison's book Destined for
Speaker 2: War on US-China relations, where he says Americans keep wishing,
Speaker 2: why can't China be like us? He said Americans should
Speaker 2: stop wishing that China be like us because China today.
Speaker 2: In the 2020s is where the United States was in
Speaker 2: the 1890s and the president then, by the way, was McKinley,
Speaker 2: whom Trump reveres. What did he do? Once you got
Speaker 2: the muscles.
Speaker 2: You declare war in Spain. You seize Philippines, you seize
Speaker 2: uh Puerto Rico, you, you seize Guam, you, you, you, you,
Speaker 2: you seize Cuba and so on and so forth. I mean,
Speaker 2: that's what great powers do. Now, I can tell you this,
Speaker 2: there are lots of features in the South China Sea.
Speaker 2: If tomorrow China decided that it should occupy all of them,
Speaker 2: it could do so in 24 hours. Everyone knows that,
Speaker 2: no question whatsoever.
Speaker 2: And the question therefore is why hasn't China done that
Speaker 2: on the South China Sea?
Speaker 2: And the here.
Speaker 2: When you look, look at all the discussions on the
Speaker 2: South China Sea, in theory, the problems are within China
Speaker 2: and the four ASEAN countries, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei.
Speaker 2: All the discussion of South China Sea in the Anglo-Saxon media.
Speaker 2: The South China Sea, the ASEAN countries are keeping very
Speaker 2: quiet because they know they have to in some ways
Speaker 2: or another get along and work with China and find
Speaker 2: adjustments with them. And it doesn't mean that they kowtow
Speaker 2: to China, but they also know that you got to
Speaker 2: stand up with China, which Vietnam is doing all the time,
Speaker 2: but you don't have to do so publicly, right? And
Speaker 2: the problem with the Philippines is that you notice that
Speaker 2: when you deal with the rising power as a neighbor.
Speaker 2: The most important thing every country in Southeast Asia should
Speaker 2: have is a consistent long term policy in managing your
Speaker 2: big neighbor. When you vaccinate, you create confusion and, and,
Speaker 2: and uncertainty, and the Philippines has gone from uh Maloria
Speaker 2: Macapagal Arrayo pro-China to Akino pro US to Duterte, pro-China,
Speaker 2: to now Marcos, pro-S. Now that inconsistency.
Speaker 2: Uh, becomes a challenge in, in geopolitics. You know, you're creating,
Speaker 2: you're creating unnecessary problems. So my, I, I've told my
Speaker 2: Filipino friends, sit down.
Speaker 2: And work out a consistent long-term policy on China where
Speaker 2: you defend your interest, but make it bipartisan and stick
Speaker 2: to it over the long term. And don't flip and
Speaker 2: switch every 4 to 5 years because it's not healthy.
Speaker 2: At the end of the day, Philippines has got to
Speaker 2: find a way of living with your big neighbor. and
Speaker 2: and and the rule of history is that if you
Speaker 2: have a big neighbor, uh, you adjust to the big neighbor.
Speaker 2: And the big neighbor doesn't adjust to you. By the way, in,
Speaker 2: in just to, just for, just to confirm this, a
Speaker 2: good friend of mine was a champion sailor.
Speaker 2: And she says when you're, when you're on a sailboat.
Speaker 2: And you see a big boat, right?
Speaker 2: Even if in theory you have the right of way
Speaker 2: and the big boat has to give way, there's something
Speaker 2: called the big boat rules. The big boat rules, you,
Speaker 2: you move aside, because if you ram into the big boat,
Speaker 2: the big boat carries on and your yacht is sunk. Yes, so,
Speaker 2: you know, so it's a reality of life and, and,
Speaker 2: and to pretend that you, you can deal with the
Speaker 2: power that is so much more powerful.
Speaker 2: Uh, as an equal, it's a very dangerous geopolitical illusion.
Speaker 2: But it doesn't mean, I want to emphasize, it doesn't
Speaker 2: mean you cut out, give way, and so on and
Speaker 2: so forth, but you manage the great power in such
Speaker 2: an intelligent way. You persuade them that it's in their
Speaker 2: interest to work with you and you're not hostile to them,
Speaker 2: and yet at the same time you tell them very clearly,
Speaker 2: these are my core interests and please don't touch them.
Speaker 1: I experienced the rule of big boats recently I was
Speaker 1: canoeing from Palau went back to Singapore. When the big
Speaker 1: tugboats come, it doesn't matter whether you have the right
Speaker 1: of way, you get out of their way because they
Speaker 1: cannot stop for you. But sure, I want to stay
Speaker 1: with the tiger analogy for a second. US has been
Speaker 1: a big tiger in the global neighborhood for a century
Speaker 1: or so, um, and the US soft power has been
Speaker 1: so powerful in keeping the rest of the world at
Speaker 1: ease with the US. The recent experience notwithstanding Hollywood.
Speaker 1: Books, US companies and their brands. So isn't it in
Speaker 1: China's interest to project soft power in a more benign way,
Speaker 1: so that even if the benevolent superpower oxymoron is true,
Speaker 1: there's a little more adaptability and a little more uh
Speaker 1: positivity associated with dealing with China.
Speaker 2: Well, I think uh there's no question that the US
Speaker 2: has a lot of soft power.
Speaker 2: I mean, uh, if you ask the brightest young people
Speaker 2: in any corner of the world.
Speaker 2: In Latin America, in Africa, in South Asia, in Southeast Asia.
Speaker 2: Uh, even in East Asia, you know, if you're bright, young, ambitious,
Speaker 2: which country do you want to go to and where
Speaker 2: can you make this become enormously successful?
Speaker 2: You can't do that in China. I mean, Brazilian, Nigerian, Indonesian,
Speaker 2: very rarely can succeed in in China, but you can
Speaker 2: succeed in uh United States and exhibit A, people like
Speaker 2: Elon Musk, Satya Nadella, Sundar Pichai, and so on and
Speaker 2: so forth. So in that sense, the United States has
Speaker 2: real soft power in terms of attracting the brightest and
Speaker 2: the best to come to the United States.
Speaker 2: But you got to make soft power is going to
Speaker 2: be dissected, OK?
Speaker 2: In the past, the United States had a lot of
Speaker 2: soft power with the mass populations and also with the
Speaker 2: governments of the world. Most governments of the world in
Speaker 2: one way, especially during the Cold War, and I can
Speaker 2: say this because I worked very, very closely with American diplomats,
Speaker 2: with American diplomats in the Cold War. Government to government
Speaker 2: relations were also very close. You could trust the United States.
Speaker 2: And the United States will always try to listen to
Speaker 2: you and deal with you and understand your concerns and
Speaker 2: all that. Uh, and you know, the height of that
Speaker 2: I saw when Mr. Lee Kuan Yew went to United
Speaker 2: States in 1985 and gave a speech at the joint
Speaker 2: session of the US Congress saying thank you, United States
Speaker 2: for creating a rules-based order whereby you guarantee us that
Speaker 2: small states can grow and thrive and do well, right?
Speaker 2: So you, they have soft powered individuals and soft power
Speaker 2: with governments. Now I would say the soft power with
Speaker 2: individuals still remains. Uh, people still believe, still dream of
Speaker 2: going to the United States to live and work in.
Speaker 2: But I would say the soft power with governments is
Speaker 2: at an all-time low.
Speaker 2: Because especially, and this is where Donald Trump is going
Speaker 2: to do the biggest amount of damage, because Donald Trump's
Speaker 2: message to every country is, I don't care what you've
Speaker 2: done for me in the past. That's irrelevant to me.
Speaker 2: What have you done for me lately?
Speaker 2: And also in a more fundamental way, the rules that Mr.
Speaker 2: Lee Kuan Yeww praised the United States for creating, one
Speaker 2: of the rules is you respect the territorial integrity of
Speaker 2: sovereign states. Trump is overthrowing. He's telling Panama, your canal
Speaker 2: belongs to me. He's telling Denmark, Greenland belongs to me.
Speaker 2: Now, I can tell you that every government around the
Speaker 2: world is asking.
Speaker 2: What happens if Trump comes and says, I want a
Speaker 2: slice of this from you?
Speaker 2: How are you going to
Speaker 2: Uh, tell him no, right?
Speaker 2: And, and, you know, he's doing this to, not to
Speaker 2: erstwhile adversaries.
Speaker 2: Uh, of the United States. I mean, if he was
Speaker 2: doing this to North Korea or Iran, uh, you can
Speaker 2: understand this. He's doing, I mean, I can't think of
Speaker 2: two countries.
Speaker 2: That reveal the United States as much as the Canadian
Speaker 2: and Danish governments that would have been the two governments
Speaker 2: that would have revealed the United States. Now, United States.
Speaker 2: Basically he's saying, excuse me.
Speaker 2: You've been to my will, right? And just imagine if
Speaker 2: China did the same thing with the Philippines, there will
Speaker 2: be this huge uproar in the Anglo-Saxon media.
Speaker 2: But the US is doing it.
Speaker 1: So, finally, Yushu, um maybe we move away from China
Speaker 1: um and come back to our little island of Singapore. Um,
Speaker 1: Singapore's role in this world where China US relationships sometimes evolve,
Speaker 1: sometimes deal making, but it is a challenging one. Singapore
Speaker 1: wants to be open to everyone and uh it is conceivable,
Speaker 1: not guaranteed, but conceivable that at some point Donald Trump
Speaker 1: makes it difficult for Singapore to keep its open relationship
Speaker 1: with China and others.
Speaker 1: Um, what is Singapore's strategy in situations like this?
Speaker 2: Well, I think the Singapore's strength, uh, is that is
Speaker 2: the exact opposite of the Philippines. It's very consistent over
Speaker 2: the long term.
Speaker 2: Doesn't switch. So Prime Minister after Prime Minister after prime
Speaker 2: minister has said, we want to be good friends with
Speaker 2: the United States and we want to be good friends
Speaker 2: with China. But it wasn't a problem when the United
Speaker 2: States and China were getting along, but the first leader
Speaker 2: in the world to come out openly to say that
Speaker 2: we will not take sides.
Speaker 2: In the in between United States and China was the
Speaker 2: then Prime Minister, uh, Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, who said
Speaker 2: at the Shangri-La Dialogue and who followed up with an
Speaker 2: article in the magazine Foreign Affairs saying Singapore will be
Speaker 2: friends with the US and Singapore be friends with China.
Speaker 2: But at the same time, you see, Singaporeans are realistic
Speaker 2: enough to know that it will not be easy, that
Speaker 2: things will get more difficult.
Speaker 2: Uh, especially with, uh, you know, a leader like Donald
Speaker 2: Trump who doesn't care what you, what you did for
Speaker 2: him many years ago. So I would say, therefore, that
Speaker 2: Singapore has to be very, very careful.
Speaker 2: Uh, and make sure that no event happens that triggers,
Speaker 2: you know, uh, uh, a situation where you're, uh, forced
Speaker 2: to take sides. So you got to be very, very
Speaker 2: vigilant and make sure that nothing comes close to your shores,
Speaker 2: which affects you having to make a choice between uh
Speaker 2: US and China. But of course, at the same time,
Speaker 2: you got to step up your substantive ties with both countries.
Speaker 2: And, and here I must say that the good news
Speaker 2: is that the United States doesn't have a trade deficit
Speaker 2: with Singapore. See that being flagged in the media, it
Speaker 2: has a trade surplus with Singapore. And fortunately for us,
Speaker 2: Donald Trump knows a little bit about Singapore and admire
Speaker 2: Singapore because when somebody asked him, why did you bring
Speaker 2: Kim Jong-un to Singapore to meet him.
Speaker 2: And he's uh.
Speaker 2: His answer was that I wanted Kim Jong-un to see
Speaker 2: a successful country like Singapore so that he could model
Speaker 2: North Korea and Singapore. And, and that frankly, uh, is
Speaker 2: worth something, the fact that Donald Trump respects uh and
Speaker 2: admire Singapore, but in the event of uh something coming up,
Speaker 2: don't count on uh loyalty from Donald Trump. Uh, he
Speaker 2: doesn't know what the word loyalty means at all.
Speaker 1: So, on that very realistic sober note, Kiswa Mahawai, thank
Speaker 1: you so much for your time and insights. My pleasure.
Speaker 1: It's great to have you and thanks to our listeners
Speaker 1: as well. Copy Time was produced by Martin Delrich.
Speaker 1: Uh, ballad Lee and Daisy Sherma provided additional assistance. All
Speaker 1: 147 episodes of the podcast are available on YouTube, also
Speaker 1: on Apple, Google, and Spotify. As for our research publications, webinars,
Speaker 1: and live streams, you can find them all by Googling
Speaker 1: Devious Research Library. Have a great day.