WEBVTT - Kopi Time E136 - Drew Thompson on Taiwan from Multiple Perspectives

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, welcome to Copy Time, a podcast series on Markets

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<v Speaker 1>and Economies from DVS Group Research. I'm Tamir Beg, chief economist,

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<v Speaker 1>welcoming you to our 136th episode.

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<v Speaker 1>In the last episode of this podcast, we discussed techno

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<v Speaker 1>nationalism with Alex Capri. And today we will talk about

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<v Speaker 1>Taiwan where tech and nationalism and security all get blended together.

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<v Speaker 1>We will have a keen Taiwan watcher to do that.

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<v Speaker 1>Drew Thompson is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam

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<v Speaker 1>School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. He's also

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<v Speaker 1>a part time senior research scientist at the CN A corporation.

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<v Speaker 1>He's been with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

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<v Speaker 1>Policy at the National University of Singapore in the past

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<v Speaker 1>and from 2011 to 2018, he was the director for

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<v Speaker 1>China Taiwan and Mongolia in the office of the Secretary

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<v Speaker 1>of Defense in the United States where he was responsible

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<v Speaker 1>for supporting the secretary and managing military to military relations.

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<v Speaker 1>Drew Thompson, a warm welcome to Kobe time. Thank you

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<v Speaker 1>for having me. It's great to have you drew. I

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<v Speaker 1>want to talk about Taiwan today with you and let's

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<v Speaker 1>begin with Taiwan's President Lai Chen de

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<v Speaker 1>known also as William Lai. But I think you just

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<v Speaker 1>told me earlier that he doesn't go with you by

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<v Speaker 1>William anymore. So I will refer to him as President

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<v Speaker 1>Lai if I may. Uh President Lai has been in

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<v Speaker 1>power for about four months. In a recent article, I

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<v Speaker 1>think you talked about his 100 days where he said

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<v Speaker 1>that the view and degree of satisfaction with Lai's 100

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<v Speaker 1>days so far differ considerably in Taipei, Beijing and Washington

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<v Speaker 1>walk us through those multiple city of assessments.

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<v Speaker 2>Sure. So actually I was asked by the, by the

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<v Speaker 2>publisher to submit an article because they'd read a piece

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<v Speaker 2>in a Chinese outlet that basically said how bad lies

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<v Speaker 2>1st 100 days were. And, and the editor thought there's

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<v Speaker 2>really more to it than, than Beijing's perspective. So, so

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<v Speaker 2>I really think it does come down to sort of

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<v Speaker 2>president line and is domestic uh contacts as well as

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<v Speaker 2>Beijing and Washington, of course. So,

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<v Speaker 2>so maybe starting with, with President Lai, um I mean,

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<v Speaker 2>I think he's managed his transition pretty well. I mean,

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<v Speaker 2>he hit the ground running, which is the advantage of

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<v Speaker 2>being the former vice president. Um He certainly got an

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<v Speaker 2>advantage in that the Taiwan economy is doing quite well.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, it's in good shape, it's, you know, growth,

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<v Speaker 2>GDP growth is like 3% or so they predict it

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<v Speaker 2>to maybe go up a little, inflation is under 2%

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<v Speaker 2>and unemployment's at 3%. So you've got pretty much full employment.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh And then in, in the sentiment index, you, you've

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<v Speaker 2>got the Taiwan stock market being one of the best

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<v Speaker 2>performing in Asia and it's up over 30% in the

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<v Speaker 2>first half of, of the year. So, so, so things

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<v Speaker 2>are kind of going his way domestically. Um He has

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<v Speaker 2>uh uh a parliament, the legislative yuan that's controlled by

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<v Speaker 2>the opposition party, Guomindang, uh uh the KMT

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<v Speaker 2>and, and they, since they control the legislature that that's

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<v Speaker 2>a potential political challenge for him, um They've thrown a

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<v Speaker 2>couple of shots across his bow and I think he's

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<v Speaker 2>dealt with them pretty effectively so far, but that's going

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<v Speaker 2>to be an ongoing challenge for him,

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<v Speaker 2>but he so far managed it well. I mean, he's,

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<v Speaker 2>he's like any president, you know, certainly very astute about

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<v Speaker 2>his own domestic politics. He's had a long run in

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<v Speaker 2>politics as a, as a former mayor. So, so he

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<v Speaker 2>knows the political field and plays it well. Um He

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<v Speaker 2>has, I think, done something rather unique in that. He's

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<v Speaker 2>really set an agenda that he's been able to push. And,

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<v Speaker 2>and one of the ways he's done that is he's

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<v Speaker 2>formed three presidential level committees similar to what the US

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<v Speaker 2>would have and what we call the interagency, sort of multipart,

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<v Speaker 2>multi multi government agency meetings that he chairs and one

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<v Speaker 2>of them is on climate change, another on health care.

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<v Speaker 2>And the last one is on whole of society resilience.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh, and, and I think the, the whole of society

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<v Speaker 2>resilience campaign is, is, is pretty new and I think

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<v Speaker 2>that makes it, um, uh, pretty potentially impactful and, and

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<v Speaker 2>I think it's worth watching. Um, it, it's, it's intended

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<v Speaker 2>as they said to coordinate government efforts as well as

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<v Speaker 2>mobilize society and it's not just homeland defense against blockades

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<v Speaker 2>or invasions or the threat of natural disasters which they face.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a typhoon currently hitting Taiwan.

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<v Speaker 2>Um But it, it's, it's really about mobilizing civilians to

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<v Speaker 2>be prepared and get basic training for uh like medical

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<v Speaker 2>and emergency responder training. Um And that's an area where

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<v Speaker 2>NGO S in the private sector can, can step in.

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<v Speaker 2>It's also about strengthening critical infrastructure, including the power financial system,

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<v Speaker 2>wartime communications and also reducing their vulnerability to disruptions in

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<v Speaker 2>undersea cables. So, and the last thing I think they're

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<v Speaker 2>really focusing on is stockpiling energy, food and emergency medical

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<v Speaker 2>supplies so that they can withstand either

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<v Speaker 2>prolonged natural disaster or, or a blockade, for example. So,

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<v Speaker 2>so I think, you know, this is a pretty new

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<v Speaker 2>and innovative um and, and potentially game changing approach to

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<v Speaker 2>resilience in Taiwan. Um But I think it also is

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<v Speaker 2>really important because of the signaling aspect. So rather than

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<v Speaker 2>focusing on like how much natural gas uh Taiwan could

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<v Speaker 2>stockpile and who's going to pay for it.

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<v Speaker 2>I think it's going to change the population's mindset and

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<v Speaker 2>probably raise their morale and maybe strengthen the will to resist,

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<v Speaker 2>which is a, which is a big issue. And so

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<v Speaker 2>it's going to give him political support to stand up

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<v Speaker 2>to bullying and protect Taiwan's autonomy in the face of aggression.

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<v Speaker 2>So basically, he's empowering the Taiwan people to take their

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<v Speaker 2>future into their own hands.

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<v Speaker 2>Um That obviously doesn't make Beijing happy. Once

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<v Speaker 1>Drew before we go to Beijing, I just want to

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<v Speaker 1>stay with for one second. Sorry about interrupting. Um So

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<v Speaker 1>how popular is he uh with these uh pivots that

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<v Speaker 1>you just talked about?

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<v Speaker 2>So, I mean, these are fairly new developments. The, the

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<v Speaker 2>first committee meeting he held was last week. Um So,

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<v Speaker 2>so I don't think there's a reflection yet in the

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<v Speaker 2>public polling, he's doing pretty well in public polls. Um

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, as, as good as they are. Um he's,

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<v Speaker 2>he's at around the 50% mark, which is quite good.

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<v Speaker 2>Um in a way the risk is that his, um

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<v Speaker 2>you know, his popularity is going to decrease because there's

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<v Speaker 2>really nowhere else to go.

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<v Speaker 2>Um So, so I think he's got, he's got strong support.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh It's interesting to note that um commentators in Beijing,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, keep pointing out that he only, he only

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<v Speaker 2>got 40% of the vote um in the last election.

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<v Speaker 2>And that's an indication that he's not supported by the, the,

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<v Speaker 2>the public. But, you know, they, they don't often mention

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<v Speaker 2>that it was a three way race. Um And that

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<v Speaker 2>uh and that the vote was split so he didn't

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<v Speaker 2>get an absolute majority. Um but he definitely one handedly

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<v Speaker 2>um uh against the other two candidates.

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<v Speaker 2>Great.

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<v Speaker 2>So Beijing, yes. Um

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<v Speaker 2>Beijing is, is in a way, sort of

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<v Speaker 2>their approach to Taiwan since he's been elected is essentially unchanged.

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<v Speaker 2>Um It, it's very static. Um I mean, Lai is, is,

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, his, his existence is a provocation to Beijing.

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<v Speaker 2>Um when a couple of years ago around 2017, he

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<v Speaker 2>said sort of off the cuff that he called himself

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<v Speaker 2>a pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence.

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<v Speaker 2>And, and I think that that really stuck in Beijing's

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<v Speaker 2>mind and, and as a result, even when Li Jing

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<v Speaker 2>De is trying to be accommodating or trying to be

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<v Speaker 2>uh self restrained, um Chinese commentators will often say, well,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, he's just hiding his true nature. Um or

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<v Speaker 2>you know, he's, he's a die hard, independent separatist and

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<v Speaker 2>he's irredeemable. Um so,

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<v Speaker 2>so so basically he has to face a pretty tense

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<v Speaker 2>and difficult cross strait relationship from, from the day he

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<v Speaker 2>was elected. And, and there's really very little prospect for

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<v Speaker 2>uh cross strait engagement because China positions it as uh

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<v Speaker 2>a precondition that, that he accepts the one China principle.

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<v Speaker 2>Um and, and that pretty much rules out dialogue between

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<v Speaker 2>them because it's not acceptable to, to, to his electorate.

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<v Speaker 2>So

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<v Speaker 2>the other thing is that Beijing really doesn't have any

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<v Speaker 2>assurances to offer Taiwan very few incentives and, and those

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<v Speaker 2>incentives that they do offer are not terribly attractive. Um

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<v Speaker 2>So China has tried to offer economic integration as a

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<v Speaker 2>potential carrot to, to get uh Taiwan closer to the mainland,

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<v Speaker 2>but it becomes less effective when China's economy is not

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<v Speaker 2>doing as well. Taiwan companies are are struggling to be,

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<v Speaker 2>to be profitable and succeed in the market or enter

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<v Speaker 2>the market. Um But more importantly, you know, China has

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<v Speaker 2>used trade as a political coercion tool. Uh more than once,

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<v Speaker 2>including against Taiwan, they've cut off tourists since 2016, 2020.

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<v Speaker 2>There was a pretty dramatic

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<v Speaker 2>incident in 2021 where um you know, China has embargoed

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<v Speaker 2>pineapples from Taiwan. So so suddenly, you know, Taiwan pineapple

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<v Speaker 2>farmers have lost their major market and uh it became

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<v Speaker 2>a rallying cry for uh divestiture from China and, and for,

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<v Speaker 2>for de risks. Um and that's been driving uh Taiwan

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<v Speaker 2>businesses away from the mainland and into places like Southeast Asia.

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<v Speaker 2>So, so that kind of leaves Beijing's main policy tool.

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<v Speaker 2>Um and, and, and sort of go to response to

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<v Speaker 2>deal with policy differences. It's military coercion and, and it's

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<v Speaker 2>just not working on the people of Taiwan. It may

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<v Speaker 2>serve the interests of, you know, leadership in Beijing in

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<v Speaker 2>terms of demonstrating to their people that, that they are,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, resolved to, to oppose Taiwan independence and anything

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<v Speaker 2>that

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<v Speaker 2>goes against Beijing's interest. But the military tool is not

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<v Speaker 2>convincing the people of Taiwan that they should form a

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<v Speaker 2>uh uh uh some sort of confederation with China. In fact,

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<v Speaker 2>it's driving people to be more

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<v Speaker 2>uh supportive of a higher degree of autonomy and resilience

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<v Speaker 2>against the mainland, which is, you know, continually running uh

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<v Speaker 2>uh military missions around Taiwan across the center line in,

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<v Speaker 2>in increasingly complex military maneuvers.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh drew one question on Beijing, it it's uh engagement

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<v Speaker 1>or you know, efforts to coerce or um you know,

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<v Speaker 1>show them with some carrots either way. Uh your your

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<v Speaker 1>point that you know, it's not really has had any

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<v Speaker 1>impact on

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<v Speaker 1>improving the relationship or changing the mind of the Taiwanese

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<v Speaker 1>political leadership. I think that's well taken. But it is

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<v Speaker 1>still the fact that despite all the talk of Deris

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<v Speaker 1>Taiwan remains a very large investor in China and you

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<v Speaker 1>do have many Taiwanese professionals gainfully employed in China.

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<v Speaker 2>There's been a dramatic exodus of Taiwanese expats from the

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<v Speaker 2>mainland back to Taiwan and increasingly to other places. Um

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<v Speaker 2>not, not considering the total stock of foreign direct investment.

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<v Speaker 2>But if you look at at new foreign direct investment,

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<v Speaker 2>I think the last year uh two years, the amount

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<v Speaker 2>of Taiwan foreign direct investment going to Southeast Asia and

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<v Speaker 2>South Asia, primarily India um is exceeding what goes to China.

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<v Speaker 2>Um And I think if you add it up with

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<v Speaker 2>what's going to the United States, um there are clear

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<v Speaker 2>indications that there is de risking going on uh in

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<v Speaker 2>the cross strait economic relationship.

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<v Speaker 2>Uh It's also borne out in, in the identity issue.

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<v Speaker 2>We can, we can talk about that some more but,

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<v Speaker 2>but essentially the Taiwanese people increasingly self identify as Taiwanese,

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<v Speaker 2>not as Chinese and they may speak Chinese language. Um

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<v Speaker 2>you know, they, they have a shared history but, but

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<v Speaker 2>that's changing in Taiwan as well.

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<v Speaker 1>Hm. Good point. Uh All right, we'll, we'll come back

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<v Speaker 1>to Beijing a little later but walk us through Washington's

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<v Speaker 1>assessment of like,

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<v Speaker 2>sure. So I mean, Washington is always going nervous about

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<v Speaker 2>cross strait relations when they're tense. Um they uh are

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<v Speaker 2>going to be concerned about the risk of miscalculation. Um

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<v Speaker 2>whether that's uh China miscalculating uh Taiwan miscalculating uh or

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<v Speaker 2>even even Washington itself. So, so I think Washington is, is,

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<v Speaker 2>is going to be concerned about lie, possibly antagonizing Beijing

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<v Speaker 2>um because he'll be pursuing a balance between protecting Taiwan's

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<v Speaker 2>autonomy and their dignity and at the same time showing

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<v Speaker 2>some restraint so that he's not

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<v Speaker 2>overtly antagonizing Beijing. And I think that's an important posture

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<v Speaker 2>that he has to continually manage and calibrate. And I

0:13:16.700 --> 0:13:20.150
<v Speaker 2>think that's the context by which Washington views most of

0:13:20.159 --> 0:13:24.489
<v Speaker 2>Taipei's actions. I mean, obviously there's strong support in Washington

0:13:24.500 --> 0:13:30.619
<v Speaker 2>for human rights self determination, particularly with AAA liberal government

0:13:30.630 --> 0:13:31.419
<v Speaker 2>in Washington.

0:13:31.739 --> 0:13:34.789
<v Speaker 2>Um But, but there are limits to that. It can't

0:13:34.799 --> 0:13:38.069
<v Speaker 2>come at the expense of of, of us interests and

0:13:38.080 --> 0:13:41.859
<v Speaker 2>us interests are stable cross strait relations. So we'll certainly

0:13:41.869 --> 0:13:48.280
<v Speaker 2>see Washington continuing to monitor Lai's behaviors, his speeches in

0:13:48.289 --> 0:13:51.119
<v Speaker 2>a couple of days on October 10th, he'll, he'll

0:13:51.284 --> 0:13:54.234
<v Speaker 2>a National Day speech. And I think there will be

0:13:54.244 --> 0:13:58.455
<v Speaker 2>plenty of, of think tankers in, in Washington and Beijing

0:13:58.465 --> 0:14:02.085
<v Speaker 2>analyzing word by word what he says and scrutinizing it

0:14:02.094 --> 0:14:06.195
<v Speaker 2>for evidence about whether he's diverging from the status quo.

0:14:06.484 --> 0:14:08.585
<v Speaker 2>But I mean, I think, I think Lii Jing de

0:14:08.604 --> 0:14:13.034
<v Speaker 2>will thread that needle well, um Tsai Wen certainly did

0:14:13.044 --> 0:14:15.354
<v Speaker 2>it for, for eight years. And I think at the

0:14:15.364 --> 0:14:17.215
<v Speaker 2>end of the day, you know, Washington is going to

0:14:17.224 --> 0:14:20.034
<v Speaker 2>be satisfied that um

0:14:20.349 --> 0:14:24.380
<v Speaker 2>uh that, that Li Jing De is considering us interests

0:14:24.390 --> 0:14:27.869
<v Speaker 2>as he postures himself and communicates with his own, his

0:14:27.880 --> 0:14:30.690
<v Speaker 2>own people. Uh Beijing is not going to be happy.

0:14:30.809 --> 0:14:33.330
<v Speaker 2>Um You know, and at the end of the day though,

0:14:33.340 --> 0:14:36.830
<v Speaker 2>for Lai Jing De, it's really Washington's continued support, that's

0:14:36.840 --> 0:14:39.989
<v Speaker 2>what really matters the most. And I think importantly, and

0:14:40.000 --> 0:14:42.380
<v Speaker 2>I mentioned this in the, in, in the, the, the

0:14:42.390 --> 0:14:45.119
<v Speaker 2>essay uh Lai Qing has done a pretty good job

0:14:45.130 --> 0:14:49.169
<v Speaker 2>building a rapport and a relationship with Washington and the

0:14:49.179 --> 0:14:50.070
<v Speaker 2>US government.

0:14:50.380 --> 0:14:56.559
<v Speaker 2>Um It started before um before the uh inauguration in May.

0:14:56.570 --> 0:15:00.039
<v Speaker 2>I remember the, it's a very long interregnum in, in,

0:15:00.049 --> 0:15:04.559
<v Speaker 2>in Taiwan between the election in January and inauguration in

0:15:04.570 --> 0:15:10.119
<v Speaker 2>May and the um Biden administration had pretty strong connections

0:15:10.130 --> 0:15:13.090
<v Speaker 2>even before the election with, with all of the political

0:15:13.099 --> 0:15:14.799
<v Speaker 2>parties that were running and that really

0:15:14.895 --> 0:15:18.914
<v Speaker 2>helps build trust and, and a sense of confidence that

0:15:19.265 --> 0:15:23.054
<v Speaker 2>the US interests will be protected that, that Taiwan candidates

0:15:23.065 --> 0:15:25.075
<v Speaker 2>are not going to be reckless. And I think he's

0:15:25.085 --> 0:15:29.155
<v Speaker 2>done a good job developing that trust, but that said

0:15:29.174 --> 0:15:32.044
<v Speaker 2>he never gets a free pass. Uh, he won't get

0:15:32.054 --> 0:15:35.455
<v Speaker 2>a free pass from Washington. So I think Washington DC

0:15:35.465 --> 0:15:37.515
<v Speaker 2>and its perceptions are a risk that he'll have to

0:15:37.525 --> 0:15:39.315
<v Speaker 2>continually manage. Looking ahead,

0:15:40.070 --> 0:15:44.289
<v Speaker 1>the perception from Washington DC is a function of who's

0:15:44.299 --> 0:15:50.609
<v Speaker 1>the president or there's a little more structural beyond political cycle.

0:15:50.619 --> 0:15:52.359
<v Speaker 1>Uh Sort of stands on Taiwan,

0:15:54.859 --> 0:15:55.599
<v Speaker 2>I think,

0:15:56.119 --> 0:15:59.799
<v Speaker 2>I mean, at its best, Washington's foreign policy is based

0:15:59.809 --> 0:16:02.179
<v Speaker 2>on national interests. Uh it tends to be in the

0:16:02.190 --> 0:16:05.119
<v Speaker 2>context of allies and partners, you know, coming as the,

0:16:05.130 --> 0:16:09.960
<v Speaker 2>the primary interest uh as well as access and influence and, and,

0:16:09.969 --> 0:16:13.090
<v Speaker 2>and that's really irregardless of the party in power, both

0:16:13.099 --> 0:16:14.479
<v Speaker 2>in Washington or in Taipei.

0:16:14.950 --> 0:16:18.419
<v Speaker 2>Um It's, uh you know, these are, these are, you know,

0:16:18.429 --> 0:16:22.520
<v Speaker 2>two governments that have long experience dealing with one another,

0:16:22.530 --> 0:16:27.010
<v Speaker 2>you know, very, very experienced bureaucracies and, and professional career,

0:16:27.020 --> 0:16:31.619
<v Speaker 2>civil servants that manage the relationship in multiple administrations as

0:16:31.630 --> 0:16:35.130
<v Speaker 2>the political leaders shift, the managers of the relationship do not.

0:16:35.619 --> 0:16:38.919
<v Speaker 2>Um And, and, and I think it's uh there may

0:16:38.929 --> 0:16:43.630
<v Speaker 2>be an element of risk, but it's basically a manageable one,

0:16:43.739 --> 0:16:48.760
<v Speaker 2>the um uh kmt present presidency. Certainly we saw this

0:16:48.770 --> 0:16:52.690
<v Speaker 2>under Mao had a very different cross straight characteristic than

0:16:52.700 --> 0:16:56.270
<v Speaker 2>the twn administration. But the US can, can deal with

0:16:56.280 --> 0:17:00.440
<v Speaker 2>that just as a Taiwan administration can deal with uh

0:17:00.450 --> 0:17:03.119
<v Speaker 2>shifts in, in Washington politics as well.

0:17:03.510 --> 0:17:05.469
<v Speaker 1>All right. Well, we'll talk about that some more later.

0:17:05.479 --> 0:17:08.329
<v Speaker 1>I'm curious about that issue. Uh but just staying with

0:17:08.339 --> 0:17:12.500
<v Speaker 1>uh President Lai's uh uh you know, performance so far. So, ok,

0:17:12.670 --> 0:17:15.140
<v Speaker 1>100 days, you think that, you know, he has done

0:17:15.150 --> 0:17:20.010
<v Speaker 1>pretty well from Taiwan's perspective. He has not surprised Washington

0:17:20.020 --> 0:17:22.239
<v Speaker 1>and Beijing, of course, is not going to be happy.

0:17:22.359 --> 0:17:25.969
<v Speaker 1>Uh What about the next 3.5 years? What lies ahead?

0:17:29.439 --> 0:17:34.129
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, as Yogi Berra said, right, making predictions is difficult,

0:17:34.140 --> 0:17:35.459
<v Speaker 2>especially about the future.

0:17:35.709 --> 0:17:36.140
<v Speaker 2>Um

0:17:36.829 --> 0:17:39.790
<v Speaker 2>But that said, you know, we, we can monitor trends and,

0:17:39.800 --> 0:17:42.859
<v Speaker 2>and I don't see big paradigm shifts from what we've

0:17:42.869 --> 0:17:46.659
<v Speaker 2>already seen. Um I mean, he's gonna have to manage

0:17:47.079 --> 0:17:51.209
<v Speaker 2>a host of known risks. Um uh some of them

0:17:51.219 --> 0:17:54.709
<v Speaker 2>including demographic risk of a, of an aging shrinking society

0:17:54.719 --> 0:17:57.149
<v Speaker 2>and the impact that has on, on the economy and

0:17:57.160 --> 0:17:58.660
<v Speaker 2>society and security.

0:17:58.949 --> 0:18:02.550
<v Speaker 2>Uh He's got, you know, domestic political and economic risks.

0:18:02.560 --> 0:18:05.750
<v Speaker 2>As I said, managing an opposition party that's quite empowered

0:18:05.760 --> 0:18:08.680
<v Speaker 2>and runs the legislature. Uh He's got to manage cross

0:18:08.689 --> 0:18:11.739
<v Speaker 2>strait risks. He's got to manage Washington. Uh And at

0:18:11.750 --> 0:18:15.089
<v Speaker 2>the same time, he's also looking to strengthen relations with

0:18:15.099 --> 0:18:18.188
<v Speaker 2>Japan and with Europe and those have been trending upwards

0:18:18.199 --> 0:18:21.310
<v Speaker 2>as well. So that's added to his, his workload.

0:18:21.670 --> 0:18:24.629
<v Speaker 2>Um as I mentioned before, his polls are quite high.

0:18:24.640 --> 0:18:27.949
<v Speaker 2>So it's pretty certain his popularity will fall. Um that

0:18:27.959 --> 0:18:30.649
<v Speaker 2>may not be a horrendous thing. Um uh If it

0:18:30.660 --> 0:18:32.489
<v Speaker 2>gives him guidance in terms of, you know, what the

0:18:32.500 --> 0:18:35.219
<v Speaker 2>people of Taiwan wants and how to deliver it. Um

0:18:35.229 --> 0:18:40.359
<v Speaker 2>But I think those are all pretty, pretty well known knowns.

0:18:40.369 --> 0:18:40.849
<v Speaker 2>Um

0:18:41.599 --> 0:18:44.899
<v Speaker 2>There is a risk of, I think some exogenous shocks,

0:18:44.910 --> 0:18:48.849
<v Speaker 2>unexpected ones. Um you know, he'll have to deal with that,

0:18:48.859 --> 0:18:51.859
<v Speaker 2>that are really kind of irrespective of cross strait relations or,

0:18:51.869 --> 0:18:56.459
<v Speaker 2>or maybe Washington. Um you've got global economic downturn risk.

0:18:56.469 --> 0:18:59.689
<v Speaker 2>Uh global rise in inflation would be pretty hard on

0:18:59.699 --> 0:19:02.930
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan because inflation is currently quite low. Uh wages have

0:19:02.939 --> 0:19:06.609
<v Speaker 2>not been increasing dramatically, standard of living is high but

0:19:06.619 --> 0:19:08.989
<v Speaker 2>but wages have not been going up. So a kick

0:19:09.000 --> 0:19:11.209
<v Speaker 2>in global inflation would, would hurt.

0:19:11.609 --> 0:19:15.619
<v Speaker 2>Um if you had additional stress in the global supply

0:19:15.630 --> 0:19:19.989
<v Speaker 2>chain system of trade, I mean, Trump is threatening 60%

0:19:20.359 --> 0:19:23.920
<v Speaker 2>tariffs on, on China if that comes to be, you know,

0:19:23.930 --> 0:19:26.390
<v Speaker 2>that will be difficult on those Taiwan companies that still

0:19:26.400 --> 0:19:31.880
<v Speaker 2>have manufacturing in China. But um that's as I said,

0:19:31.890 --> 0:19:36.109
<v Speaker 2>trending downward and trending outward. So maybe what's more threatening

0:19:36.119 --> 0:19:40.500
<v Speaker 2>would be Trump threat uh in, in, in initiating 10%

0:19:40.510 --> 0:19:43.640
<v Speaker 2>tariffs across the board on every country uh which would

0:19:43.650 --> 0:19:47.339
<v Speaker 2>hurt Taiwanese operating in the mainland Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

0:19:47.579 --> 0:19:51.099
<v Speaker 2>So uh for trade dependent countries like Taiwan, like Singapore,

0:19:51.109 --> 0:19:53.800
<v Speaker 2>this could be a a major risk that that is

0:19:53.810 --> 0:19:57.550
<v Speaker 2>difficult to prepare for. Um it's important to know that

0:19:59.020 --> 0:20:03.250
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan's top export destination is still China, but the US

0:20:03.260 --> 0:20:07.160
<v Speaker 2>is catching up and it's probably going to exceed total

0:20:07.170 --> 0:20:10.199
<v Speaker 2>exports in the near future. And again, I think that's

0:20:10.209 --> 0:20:15.280
<v Speaker 2>a growing trend as manufacturing hubs shift out of China

0:20:15.290 --> 0:20:20.140
<v Speaker 2>into Southeast Asia. Chinese factories are increasingly focused on supplying

0:20:20.150 --> 0:20:21.280
<v Speaker 2>the Chinese market.

0:20:21.599 --> 0:20:24.239
<v Speaker 2>Um You're going to see the importance of the US

0:20:24.250 --> 0:20:30.180
<v Speaker 2>as an export destination rise. It's already Singapore's top export destination.

0:20:30.430 --> 0:20:32.680
<v Speaker 2>Um and it's going to, I think very shortly be

0:20:32.689 --> 0:20:36.160
<v Speaker 2>one for Taiwan as well. So, so I think having

0:20:36.170 --> 0:20:39.379
<v Speaker 2>the US close itself off to imports would certainly hurt,

0:20:39.390 --> 0:20:43.390
<v Speaker 2>hurt Taiwan. Um I I think there's another major risk that,

0:20:43.400 --> 0:20:45.829
<v Speaker 2>you know, everybody has to contend with is, is you

0:20:45.839 --> 0:20:47.260
<v Speaker 2>know what emanates from Beijing.

0:20:47.579 --> 0:20:51.579
<v Speaker 2>Um I mean, we saw, you know, Beijing last week

0:20:51.589 --> 0:20:55.800
<v Speaker 2>uh implement uh stimulus, but that wasn't expected. Uh I

0:20:55.810 --> 0:20:59.639
<v Speaker 2>think that that maybe took longer than most people hoped for.

0:20:59.719 --> 0:21:04.670
<v Speaker 2>Um We saw China very unexpectedly shift away from its

0:21:04.680 --> 0:21:08.410
<v Speaker 2>uh zero COVID stance and, and and just open everything

0:21:08.420 --> 0:21:11.069
<v Speaker 2>up and, and return to normal uh which certainly had

0:21:11.079 --> 0:21:13.719
<v Speaker 2>costs on, on, on the Chinese people as well as

0:21:13.729 --> 0:21:15.869
<v Speaker 2>the society. So there's an unpredictability

0:21:16.140 --> 0:21:19.560
<v Speaker 2>emanating from Beijing that I think um Lai Jing de

0:21:19.569 --> 0:21:21.550
<v Speaker 2>and everyone else is going to have to deal with.

0:21:21.859 --> 0:21:24.859
<v Speaker 2>Um and, and maybe ultimately the mother of all political

0:21:24.869 --> 0:21:28.000
<v Speaker 2>risks is, you know, what happens if Xi Jinping suddenly

0:21:28.010 --> 0:21:32.719
<v Speaker 2>departs the scene. I mean, there's no anointed successor, there's

0:21:32.729 --> 0:21:37.500
<v Speaker 2>no agreed to norms for succession. So I mean, if

0:21:37.520 --> 0:21:39.959
<v Speaker 2>Xi Jinping suddenly uh you know,

0:21:40.599 --> 0:21:43.819
<v Speaker 2>gets called for a meeting with Marx, Um you know,

0:21:43.829 --> 0:21:47.409
<v Speaker 2>Beijing's palace politics could get very sporty and, and we're

0:21:47.420 --> 0:21:48.920
<v Speaker 2>all going to have to deal with that, but Lai

0:21:49.060 --> 0:21:50.420
<v Speaker 2>Jing in particular,

0:21:51.489 --> 0:21:56.010
<v Speaker 1>yes, uh no, no shortage of unpredictability these days. I

0:21:56.020 --> 0:21:59.810
<v Speaker 1>want to stay with this uh US, Taiwan trade and

0:21:59.819 --> 0:22:03.189
<v Speaker 1>investment relationship a little more as you know, uh Drew

0:22:03.199 --> 0:22:08.280
<v Speaker 1>TS MC is a singular point of vulnerability as well

0:22:08.290 --> 0:22:10.649
<v Speaker 1>as opportunity for Taiwan because, you know, no other company

0:22:10.660 --> 0:22:13.419
<v Speaker 1>makes what TS MC makes with the quantity and precision

0:22:13.709 --> 0:22:16.890
<v Speaker 1>and the US administration is very keen on reducing the

0:22:16.900 --> 0:22:19.310
<v Speaker 1>risk of all of those things being made in Taiwan.

0:22:19.500 --> 0:22:21.670
<v Speaker 1>So we've seen under the Ira, you know, lots of

0:22:21.680 --> 0:22:25.000
<v Speaker 1>incentives being given to Taiwanese manufacturers to build in the US.

0:22:25.339 --> 0:22:27.589
<v Speaker 1>So when we talk about the next 3.5 years of

0:22:27.599 --> 0:22:31.760
<v Speaker 1>vice presidency, would he be a cheerleader of Taiwanese companies

0:22:31.770 --> 0:22:35.760
<v Speaker 1>building in Texas or Arizona? Or would he try to

0:22:35.770 --> 0:22:39.500
<v Speaker 1>tread the balance because he does want that core excellence

0:22:39.510 --> 0:22:42.810
<v Speaker 1>to stay in Taiwan? Because that is Taiwan's branding and

0:22:42.819 --> 0:22:44.119
<v Speaker 1>source of power.

0:22:45.060 --> 0:22:48.050
<v Speaker 2>Yeah. Yeah, I mean, between the Ira and the Chips Act,

0:22:48.060 --> 0:22:51.099
<v Speaker 2>the US is suddenly very attractive for, for this type

0:22:51.109 --> 0:22:54.579
<v Speaker 2>of manufacturing. I think it's also important. It's not just

0:22:55.060 --> 0:22:58.000
<v Speaker 2>TS MC, right? I mean, TS MC is, is very

0:22:58.010 --> 0:23:00.829
<v Speaker 2>much a product of its own supply chains. There's a,

0:23:00.979 --> 0:23:05.900
<v Speaker 2>there's a tremendous ecosystem of companies that support TS MC

0:23:05.910 --> 0:23:09.160
<v Speaker 2>and its processes. So, so it's not just TS MC

0:23:09.170 --> 0:23:11.889
<v Speaker 2>setting up a factory, it's the whole supply chain to

0:23:11.900 --> 0:23:12.199
<v Speaker 2>that

0:23:12.819 --> 0:23:17.379
<v Speaker 2>fabrication plant moving with it. And many of those are Taiwanese. So,

0:23:17.390 --> 0:23:21.629
<v Speaker 2>so it, it's potentially AAA pretty massive footprint that that

0:23:21.640 --> 0:23:26.919
<v Speaker 2>will ultimately emerge. Um I don't think La Jinta is

0:23:27.489 --> 0:23:32.680
<v Speaker 2>terribly concerned because Ts MC is committed to keeping the

0:23:32.689 --> 0:23:36.199
<v Speaker 2>most cutting edge of the cutting edge in Taiwan. That's

0:23:36.209 --> 0:23:38.079
<v Speaker 2>where they perform at their highest

0:23:38.579 --> 0:23:41.869
<v Speaker 2>uh their highest efficiency levels. It's where the top top

0:23:41.880 --> 0:23:47.520
<v Speaker 2>engineers are. They definitely see um uh Arizona as an

0:23:47.530 --> 0:23:51.319
<v Speaker 2>important component of their global manufacturing just as they also

0:23:51.329 --> 0:23:54.630
<v Speaker 2>manufacture in China too. So, so I think there's going

0:23:54.640 --> 0:23:58.319
<v Speaker 2>to be diversified footprints. But

0:23:58.920 --> 0:24:02.369
<v Speaker 2>II, I don't think Lai is concerned about the semiconductor

0:24:02.380 --> 0:24:08.079
<v Speaker 2>industry hollowing out from Taiwan itself, partly because that infrastructure

0:24:08.089 --> 0:24:10.849
<v Speaker 2>to support it, not only in the subs suppliers but

0:24:10.859 --> 0:24:14.300
<v Speaker 2>also in the human capital uh uh sector and, and,

0:24:14.310 --> 0:24:18.020
<v Speaker 2>and really the, you know, the, the incredible work ethic

0:24:18.030 --> 0:24:22.380
<v Speaker 2>of Taiwan engineers um who are highly incentivized to work

0:24:22.390 --> 0:24:26.020
<v Speaker 2>incredibly hard. Um In Taiwan plus, you know, pretty good

0:24:26.030 --> 0:24:28.180
<v Speaker 2>standard of living, fairly low cost standard

0:24:28.280 --> 0:24:32.369
<v Speaker 2>of living um makes it pretty competitive. So I don't

0:24:32.380 --> 0:24:35.300
<v Speaker 2>think they're worried about losing that. Um I think there's

0:24:35.310 --> 0:24:41.760
<v Speaker 2>enough semiconductor demand from the highest levels to lower levels that,

0:24:42.030 --> 0:24:43.479
<v Speaker 2>that the TS MC

0:24:44.400 --> 0:24:48.079
<v Speaker 2>position in, in, in Taiwan itself is pretty secure so

0:24:48.089 --> 0:24:51.060
<v Speaker 2>they can afford to diversify. And I think that's Taiwan's

0:24:51.069 --> 0:24:52.899
<v Speaker 2>benefit as well at the end of the day.

0:24:53.979 --> 0:24:57.459
<v Speaker 1>Ok. So speaking of diversification, you, you've touched upon this

0:24:57.469 --> 0:24:59.770
<v Speaker 1>briefly earlier, let's go a little deeper on this, which

0:24:59.780 --> 0:25:03.310
<v Speaker 1>is Taiwan vis A vis Southeast Asia. Uh There's a

0:25:03.319 --> 0:25:06.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of trade and commerce between this region and Taiwan

0:25:06.310 --> 0:25:09.290
<v Speaker 1>and in the context of the risks of supply chains,

0:25:09.729 --> 0:25:13.459
<v Speaker 1>I think there'll be far more going forward. Um What

0:25:13.469 --> 0:25:17.609
<v Speaker 1>do you hear from the president and his administration as

0:25:17.619 --> 0:25:20.000
<v Speaker 1>far as their Southeast Asia strategy is concerned?

0:25:21.329 --> 0:25:21.899
<v Speaker 2>Um

0:25:22.839 --> 0:25:27.589
<v Speaker 2>So the Taiwan Southeast Asian relationship is, is really quite,

0:25:27.599 --> 0:25:31.209
<v Speaker 2>quite interesting. Um I won't get into the history but

0:25:31.219 --> 0:25:34.260
<v Speaker 2>I mean, I've been watching and traveling to Taiwan for,

0:25:34.270 --> 0:25:37.050
<v Speaker 2>for more than 20 years and

0:25:37.699 --> 0:25:40.439
<v Speaker 2>it's intriguing for me to watch the change particularly in

0:25:40.449 --> 0:25:44.040
<v Speaker 2>the last say 10 years, how Southeast Asia is becoming

0:25:44.050 --> 0:25:47.280
<v Speaker 2>much more relevant in and to Taiwan. So, I mean,

0:25:47.290 --> 0:25:50.438
<v Speaker 2>I think the two, the two Taiwan and, and, and

0:25:50.449 --> 0:25:54.399
<v Speaker 2>the Southeast Asian region, they're really becoming very increasingly intertwined.

0:25:54.880 --> 0:25:57.550
<v Speaker 2>Um and maybe I'd describe that as is too

0:25:58.390 --> 0:26:01.020
<v Speaker 2>two trends, right? So call it an inward trend and

0:26:01.030 --> 0:26:05.189
<v Speaker 2>an outward trend. Um So, you know, first of all,

0:26:05.199 --> 0:26:07.988
<v Speaker 2>I remember Taiwan is not small, it's, it's very tempting

0:26:08.000 --> 0:26:09.619
<v Speaker 2>to sit back and say, wow, you know, China is

0:26:09.630 --> 0:26:12.130
<v Speaker 2>so big and Taiwan is so small but, but Taiwan is,

0:26:12.140 --> 0:26:15.760
<v Speaker 2>is neither small nor nor significant. I mean, if you

0:26:15.770 --> 0:26:20.448
<v Speaker 2>group it economically with Southeast Asia, Taiwan would be the

0:26:20.459 --> 0:26:23.409
<v Speaker 2>second largest economy after Indonesia and it would be the

0:26:23.420 --> 0:26:28.149
<v Speaker 2>second wealthiest per capita after Singapore. Um So, so

0:26:28.709 --> 0:26:35.389
<v Speaker 2>as the relationship changes, Taiwan becomes increasingly important uh in

0:26:35.400 --> 0:26:39.010
<v Speaker 2>a way to Southeast Asia. So on that, that outbound side,

0:26:39.300 --> 0:26:43.129
<v Speaker 2>um yeah, we're now seeing Taiwan companies increasingly investing in

0:26:43.140 --> 0:26:46.089
<v Speaker 2>Southeast Asia and South Asia more than they do in China.

0:26:46.099 --> 0:26:48.489
<v Speaker 2>I think that's, that's an inevitable trend here.

0:26:48.839 --> 0:26:52.060
<v Speaker 2>Um We talked about Taiwan companies being sort of central

0:26:52.069 --> 0:26:55.079
<v Speaker 2>to these global supply chains. It's not just semiconductors, it's

0:26:55.089 --> 0:26:59.489
<v Speaker 2>IC T across the board oe impart suppliers. Um uh

0:26:59.510 --> 0:27:03.170
<v Speaker 2>So that electronic sector is really pretty critical and, and

0:27:03.180 --> 0:27:06.260
<v Speaker 2>we saw that during COVID, when everybody began working from

0:27:06.270 --> 0:27:10.020
<v Speaker 2>home and they were buying um uh they were buying new,

0:27:10.030 --> 0:27:11.339
<v Speaker 2>you know, new cameras

0:27:11.415 --> 0:27:15.514
<v Speaker 2>and new monitors and new computers. And Taiwan's exports soared

0:27:15.525 --> 0:27:18.755
<v Speaker 2>during COVID to supply that. So, so I think as

0:27:18.765 --> 0:27:23.025
<v Speaker 2>manufacturers from around the world, including Taiwan shift their production

0:27:23.035 --> 0:27:26.675
<v Speaker 2>to Southeast Asia, you'll see a supply chain from Taiwan

0:27:26.685 --> 0:27:30.405
<v Speaker 2>following those clients. And that's primarily landing in Singapore, Vietnam,

0:27:30.415 --> 0:27:32.145
<v Speaker 2>Indonesia and Thailand. For the most part, I think some

0:27:32.155 --> 0:27:33.875
<v Speaker 2>in Malaysia but, but less,

0:27:34.810 --> 0:27:38.040
<v Speaker 2>but on the inbound side, we'll call it the inbound side.

0:27:38.569 --> 0:27:41.989
<v Speaker 2>You've got more Southeast Asians becoming part of the fabric

0:27:42.000 --> 0:27:46.979
<v Speaker 2>of Taiwanese society. So Taiwan's society is shrinking. Their population

0:27:46.989 --> 0:27:50.020
<v Speaker 2>is shrinking. The fertility rate is like 1.25 which is

0:27:50.030 --> 0:27:52.540
<v Speaker 2>one of the lowest in the world. So basically for

0:27:52.550 --> 0:27:56.750
<v Speaker 2>every couple, you have one and a quarter Children being born,

0:27:57.050 --> 0:27:59.900
<v Speaker 2>uh the sustainment rate for a population is 2.2.

0:28:00.290 --> 0:28:02.819
<v Speaker 2>So, so Taiwan is, is basically running out of people

0:28:02.829 --> 0:28:05.589
<v Speaker 2>and they have been for a fairly long time and

0:28:05.599 --> 0:28:09.000
<v Speaker 2>Southeast Asians are stepping in to fill the gaps in

0:28:09.010 --> 0:28:11.550
<v Speaker 2>the workforce and they're playing a really important role in

0:28:11.560 --> 0:28:15.010
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan's economy. But that also means in their society. So

0:28:15.020 --> 0:28:19.219
<v Speaker 2>the official statistic is that there are about 760,000 Southeast

0:28:19.229 --> 0:28:22.260
<v Speaker 2>Asians living in Taiwan. Uh But there's actually probably a

0:28:22.270 --> 0:28:25.560
<v Speaker 2>sizable number that are not counted. Uh So it's probably

0:28:25.569 --> 0:28:27.109
<v Speaker 2>closer to a million

0:28:27.380 --> 0:28:30.129
<v Speaker 2>and this is in a population of 23 million. So

0:28:30.140 --> 0:28:33.938
<v Speaker 2>it's a pretty big, pretty big chunk. Um And, and

0:28:33.949 --> 0:28:37.448
<v Speaker 2>they primarily come from Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Um and,

0:28:37.459 --> 0:28:39.660
<v Speaker 2>and as I said, it's a big number of people.

0:28:39.739 --> 0:28:43.599
<v Speaker 2>So when you walk around in, you know, downtown Taipei or,

0:28:43.609 --> 0:28:46.560
<v Speaker 2>or a major city, particularly in the affluent areas, you

0:28:46.569 --> 0:28:50.510
<v Speaker 2>see shops catering to Southeast Asians, they're selling, you know,

0:28:50.520 --> 0:28:50.709
<v Speaker 2>some

0:28:50.829 --> 0:28:54.869
<v Speaker 2>ball and Southeast Asian products and services and shipping, you know,

0:28:54.880 --> 0:28:57.969
<v Speaker 2>shipping boxes back to Southeast Asian States. And there's a

0:28:57.979 --> 0:29:01.199
<v Speaker 2>prominent chain called Coco Indo uh that you can find

0:29:01.209 --> 0:29:05.130
<v Speaker 2>in sort of uh back alley. Um um you know,

0:29:05.140 --> 0:29:10.729
<v Speaker 2>neighborhoods and, and, and, and where the domestic helpers and the,

0:29:10.739 --> 0:29:14.130
<v Speaker 2>you know, service workers can, can go and, you know,

0:29:14.989 --> 0:29:17.290
<v Speaker 2>buy their comfort food and ship their boxes home and

0:29:17.300 --> 0:29:22.270
<v Speaker 2>transfer money. And um and you see Indonesian caregivers escorting

0:29:22.579 --> 0:29:25.650
<v Speaker 2>the seniors in the markets, doing, doing their shopping on

0:29:25.660 --> 0:29:28.140
<v Speaker 2>the weekends and, and in the mornings it's, it's an

0:29:28.150 --> 0:29:29.770
<v Speaker 2>increasingly common sight.

0:29:30.060 --> 0:29:33.660
<v Speaker 2>Um So, so you basically got a lot of Southeast

0:29:33.670 --> 0:29:36.540
<v Speaker 2>Asians living in the homes of Taiwanese. So you've got

0:29:36.550 --> 0:29:40.349
<v Speaker 2>some cross cultural uh exchanges going there in the major cities.

0:29:40.359 --> 0:29:43.479
<v Speaker 2>But you're also seeing that in the industrial centers um

0:29:43.489 --> 0:29:47.069
<v Speaker 2>particularly from Indonesia, Vietnam, you've got a lot of factory workers,

0:29:47.079 --> 0:29:50.829
<v Speaker 2>a lot of skilled laborers who are working in these factories,

0:29:50.839 --> 0:29:53.040
<v Speaker 2>particularly down south. So you can just

0:29:53.390 --> 0:29:55.410
<v Speaker 2>go to a shopping center and see a lot of

0:29:55.420 --> 0:29:59.310
<v Speaker 2>signage in, in, in different Southeast Asian languages where they're

0:29:59.319 --> 0:30:03.609
<v Speaker 2>providing services and information. You're also seeing this in the government,

0:30:03.619 --> 0:30:07.689
<v Speaker 2>public facing departments are, are, are communicating in up to

0:30:07.699 --> 0:30:12.119
<v Speaker 2>seven languages. Now, um I was almost surprised that Taiwan

0:30:12.130 --> 0:30:16.050
<v Speaker 2>government's news agency started issuing, uh they started a a

0:30:16.060 --> 0:30:18.839
<v Speaker 2>Bahasa language service uh in, in July.

0:30:19.199 --> 0:30:23.739
<v Speaker 2>So, so it's really changing Taiwan. Um And so even

0:30:23.750 --> 0:30:29.020
<v Speaker 2>though countries don't recognize Taiwan for the most part, diplomatically,

0:30:29.030 --> 0:30:33.780
<v Speaker 2>this labor trend is internationalizing Taiwan in a way. And

0:30:33.790 --> 0:30:37.410
<v Speaker 2>I think there's maybe two big implications for this. Um

0:30:37.770 --> 0:30:40.199
<v Speaker 2>I mean, obviously there's a social impact, 5% of the

0:30:40.209 --> 0:30:43.949
<v Speaker 2>population give or take is, is from Southeast Asia. Um

0:30:43.959 --> 0:30:47.849
<v Speaker 2>and that's going to change Taiwan's identity, right? And, and

0:30:47.859 --> 0:30:51.410
<v Speaker 2>it's Taiwan is increasingly dependent on diversity and that's going

0:30:51.420 --> 0:30:54.988
<v Speaker 2>to make Taiwan even more distinct from China. Then you've

0:30:55.000 --> 0:31:00.790
<v Speaker 2>got political and security implications. Um Taiwan's security interests align

0:31:00.800 --> 0:31:04.109
<v Speaker 2>more closely with Southeast Asia than they ever have before.

0:31:04.390 --> 0:31:04.890
<v Speaker 2>Um

0:31:05.209 --> 0:31:08.869
<v Speaker 2>I was, you know, doing some research on um you know,

0:31:08.959 --> 0:31:13.829
<v Speaker 2>countries opposed, you know, basically which countries had opposed China's

0:31:13.839 --> 0:31:17.930
<v Speaker 2>aggression in the South China Sea. So I Googled, you know, Vietnam,

0:31:17.939 --> 0:31:22.189
<v Speaker 2>Indonesia pick a couple of countries and, and, and Google,

0:31:22.199 --> 0:31:26.630
<v Speaker 2>you know, Indonesia condemns China's coast guard ramming a Philippine vessel.

0:31:26.900 --> 0:31:30.040
<v Speaker 2>Um you know, no public statements from any of the

0:31:30.050 --> 0:31:32.810
<v Speaker 2>Southeast Asian States, but the number one hit on Google

0:31:32.819 --> 0:31:37.900
<v Speaker 2>is Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs decries uh China ramming

0:31:37.910 --> 0:31:41.260
<v Speaker 2>Philippine vessel. So, so you have, you know, Taiwan is

0:31:41.270 --> 0:31:42.290
<v Speaker 2>a very vocal

0:31:42.505 --> 0:31:46.165
<v Speaker 2>quarter of, of, of these sorts of, you know, peaceful

0:31:46.175 --> 0:31:50.385
<v Speaker 2>resolution of conflict, international norms and, and that, that, that

0:31:50.395 --> 0:31:53.614
<v Speaker 2>means there's a security alignment of interest. So, you know,

0:31:53.625 --> 0:31:57.954
<v Speaker 2>even though the potential for cross strait conflict is low. Um,

0:31:58.359 --> 0:32:01.810
<v Speaker 2>uh, you know, it's not imminent, it's not inevitable. But,

0:32:01.819 --> 0:32:03.979
<v Speaker 2>you know, you've got a million Southeast Asians living on

0:32:03.989 --> 0:32:08.510
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan who'd be pretty adversely impacted if a conflict occurs. Um,

0:32:08.520 --> 0:32:11.699
<v Speaker 2>and there's, of course, economic consequences too. Right. It's not

0:32:11.709 --> 0:32:14.459
<v Speaker 2>just the remittances but the impact on global trade. And

0:32:14.469 --> 0:32:17.420
<v Speaker 2>I think the polls in Southeast Asia are starting to

0:32:17.430 --> 0:32:20.939
<v Speaker 2>show Southeast Asian elites increasingly opposed

0:32:21.204 --> 0:32:24.515
<v Speaker 2>China using force against Taiwan. Doesn't mean they're willing to

0:32:24.525 --> 0:32:27.744
<v Speaker 2>stand up to Taiwan or denounce them publicly, but they

0:32:27.755 --> 0:32:31.045
<v Speaker 2>definitely have an interest in not having a conflict occur.

0:32:31.055 --> 0:32:34.305
<v Speaker 2>So the question will be what Southeast Asia prepared to

0:32:34.314 --> 0:32:37.844
<v Speaker 2>do to, to deter China from using force. And at

0:32:37.854 --> 0:32:40.665
<v Speaker 2>this point, there's not much, but I think as that

0:32:40.675 --> 0:32:43.535
<v Speaker 2>trend continues, we may see some change.

0:32:44.280 --> 0:32:48.310
<v Speaker 1>So the trend is certainly fascinating and um I actually

0:32:48.319 --> 0:32:51.969
<v Speaker 1>want you to look a little further east from Southeast

0:32:51.979 --> 0:32:56.810
<v Speaker 1>Asia or rather sorry, look West India. Uh I've seen

0:32:56.819 --> 0:33:01.520
<v Speaker 1>recent stories that, you know, Indian Navy have Cooper with

0:33:01.530 --> 0:33:06.170
<v Speaker 1>the Vietnamese Navy or Indian companies are, you know, exploring

0:33:06.180 --> 0:33:09.619
<v Speaker 1>Southeast Asia as part of the supply chain that they

0:33:09.630 --> 0:33:12.170
<v Speaker 1>could take advantage in their pursuit for manufacturing excellence.

0:33:12.469 --> 0:33:17.640
<v Speaker 1>Um Do you see Taiwan India relationship, you know, feature

0:33:17.650 --> 0:33:20.349
<v Speaker 1>in a prominent manner when you read like Taiwanese media,

0:33:20.359 --> 0:33:20.969
<v Speaker 1>for example,

0:33:22.479 --> 0:33:22.959
<v Speaker 2>and there's,

0:33:24.449 --> 0:33:26.790
<v Speaker 2>I mean, hardly, I I would hardly consider myself an

0:33:26.800 --> 0:33:29.869
<v Speaker 2>expert on, you know, the Taiwan India relationship. But, but

0:33:29.880 --> 0:33:34.670
<v Speaker 2>my sense is that it's growing, um there are now

0:33:35.060 --> 0:33:40.859
<v Speaker 2>a number of prominent Indian scholars who are resident in

0:33:40.869 --> 0:33:44.589
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan in academia doing national security research.

0:33:45.180 --> 0:33:50.719
<v Speaker 2>Um The Taiwan government just signed an agreement with India

0:33:50.729 --> 0:33:55.300
<v Speaker 2>to facilitate migrant workers coming to India. I mentioned that,

0:33:55.310 --> 0:33:59.800
<v Speaker 2>you know, you've got potentially a million Southeast Asians. Um

0:33:59.810 --> 0:34:03.189
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan is looking to bring in South Asians as well.

0:34:03.339 --> 0:34:07.670
<v Speaker 2>So I think maybe those are two examples. Um the

0:34:07.900 --> 0:34:12.120
<v Speaker 2>uh you know Indian representative office in Taiwan is, is

0:34:12.129 --> 0:34:15.459
<v Speaker 2>active and you know, meets with officials and and does

0:34:15.469 --> 0:34:22.419
<v Speaker 2>representation and provides facilitation for businesses to, to invest in Taiwan.

0:34:22.429 --> 0:34:25.959
<v Speaker 2>We've certainly seen um uh you know, one of the

0:34:25.969 --> 0:34:30.959
<v Speaker 2>the biggest Taiwan companies hung high precision Foxconn which assembles

0:34:30.969 --> 0:34:34.320
<v Speaker 2>iphones and other apple products, setting up factories

0:34:34.610 --> 0:34:37.600
<v Speaker 2>in, in India. So, so I think the potential for

0:34:37.610 --> 0:34:41.790
<v Speaker 2>that relationship to grow is, is definitely there. Uh but

0:34:41.800 --> 0:34:44.520
<v Speaker 2>it's been starting from what I think is a fairly

0:34:44.530 --> 0:34:48.029
<v Speaker 2>low base. But again, I think Taiwan's interest is on

0:34:48.040 --> 0:34:53.870
<v Speaker 2>is in internationalizing. So if Taiwan businesses um are looking

0:34:53.879 --> 0:34:57.080
<v Speaker 2>for opportunities to invest in India, I'm sure India will

0:34:57.090 --> 0:34:58.590
<v Speaker 2>welcome them. And likewise,

0:34:59.179 --> 0:35:01.419
<v Speaker 2>uh you know, if, if, if you know the big

0:35:01.429 --> 0:35:05.239
<v Speaker 2>Indian companies, the Tatas of the world want to engage

0:35:05.250 --> 0:35:10.199
<v Speaker 2>in Taiwan, the Taiwan Economic Ministries will certainly help them

0:35:10.209 --> 0:35:14.610
<v Speaker 2>find a suitable partner, suitable locations and facilitate their inbound

0:35:14.620 --> 0:35:17.560
<v Speaker 2>investments as well. So I think that's, it's a, it's

0:35:18.070 --> 0:35:20.560
<v Speaker 2>a relationship primed to expand for sure.

0:35:21.629 --> 0:35:24.239
<v Speaker 1>Ok. Since I'm dragging you around the region, uh, Drew,

0:35:24.250 --> 0:35:25.709
<v Speaker 1>I might as well teach you up north a little

0:35:25.719 --> 0:35:29.010
<v Speaker 1>bit now. Quick comments. Uh, Taiwan, Japan, Taiwan Korea.

0:35:31.620 --> 0:35:34.239
<v Speaker 2>Good one. Taiwan Korea,

0:35:36.540 --> 0:35:42.000
<v Speaker 2>smaller, less potential but certainly plenty of overlap. I mean, in,

0:35:42.010 --> 0:35:43.439
<v Speaker 2>in some ways, I think

0:35:44.300 --> 0:35:45.679
<v Speaker 2>painting a broad brush.

0:35:46.449 --> 0:35:50.750
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan companies in many ways, compete with, um, South Korean

0:35:50.760 --> 0:35:54.949
<v Speaker 2>ones in, in places like Southeast Asia. Um certainly the,

0:35:54.959 --> 0:35:55.580
<v Speaker 2>the

0:35:56.419 --> 0:36:00.600
<v Speaker 2>the South South Korean companies like Samsung are quite prominent.

0:36:00.850 --> 0:36:02.810
<v Speaker 2>Uh And at the same time, I'm sure they have

0:36:02.820 --> 0:36:07.229
<v Speaker 2>plenty of Taiwanese suppliers who contribute to their assembly work in,

0:36:07.239 --> 0:36:10.080
<v Speaker 2>in Vietnam and elsewhere. So I think it's both symbiotic

0:36:10.370 --> 0:36:15.860
<v Speaker 2>but certainly politically. Um South Korea hasn't had much interest

0:36:15.870 --> 0:36:18.520
<v Speaker 2>in Taiwan or the cross strait relationship.

0:36:18.850 --> 0:36:22.610
<v Speaker 2>Um South Korea has been very focused on its security

0:36:22.620 --> 0:36:25.549
<v Speaker 2>issues with the North Koreans and China's support for North

0:36:25.560 --> 0:36:30.149
<v Speaker 2>Korea as well as the survival of South Korean businesses

0:36:30.159 --> 0:36:33.159
<v Speaker 2>in China. So, so I think that's been primarily the

0:36:33.169 --> 0:36:37.750
<v Speaker 2>focus and there hasn't been, for instance, you know, not

0:36:37.760 --> 0:36:42.370
<v Speaker 2>expecting to hear news that, that South Korean arms manufacturers

0:36:42.379 --> 0:36:46.300
<v Speaker 2>are preparing to provide platforms or munitions to Taiwan.

0:36:46.580 --> 0:36:51.870
<v Speaker 2>Um uh you rarely hear South Korean politicians talk about Taiwan,

0:36:52.000 --> 0:36:56.110
<v Speaker 2>but Japan is a completely different matter. Um When Tsai

0:36:56.330 --> 0:37:00.219
<v Speaker 2>Wen was elected in 2016 and Prime Minister Abe was

0:37:00.229 --> 0:37:04.199
<v Speaker 2>in office, you had really a confluence of interest um

0:37:04.219 --> 0:37:06.000
<v Speaker 2>where uh

0:37:06.659 --> 0:37:09.810
<v Speaker 2>Prime Minister Abe had a very close relationship with Taiwan,

0:37:09.820 --> 0:37:13.109
<v Speaker 2>had an affinity for them. And likewise, the, the, the

0:37:13.120 --> 0:37:16.429
<v Speaker 2>President Thai and her party, the DPP and, and President

0:37:16.439 --> 0:37:20.040
<v Speaker 2>Lai's party have, have, have an affinity for Japan. I

0:37:20.050 --> 0:37:22.919
<v Speaker 2>think there's been an awakening in Japan about the security

0:37:22.929 --> 0:37:27.790
<v Speaker 2>risks that China presents to the Japanese homeland. Um And

0:37:27.800 --> 0:37:31.040
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan is a very important part of that. Uh Japanese

0:37:31.050 --> 0:37:34.399
<v Speaker 2>politicians will sometimes say that if you stand on the

0:37:34.409 --> 0:37:36.030
<v Speaker 2>southernmost parts of,

0:37:36.370 --> 0:37:40.560
<v Speaker 2>of Japan, you can see Taiwan from Yonaguni Island. Um

0:37:40.570 --> 0:37:44.520
<v Speaker 2>So Japan is concerned about the security of the Southwest

0:37:44.530 --> 0:37:48.590
<v Speaker 2>Islands and, and therefore, um there's been a lot of

0:37:48.600 --> 0:37:54.529
<v Speaker 2>investment in building uh military infrastructure around the, the,

0:37:55.419 --> 0:37:59.469
<v Speaker 2>the Ryuu chain and, and as a result, um you know,

0:37:59.479 --> 0:38:03.879
<v Speaker 2>from Okinawa down to, to, to Yonaguni, you've, you've got

0:38:04.040 --> 0:38:09.760
<v Speaker 2>uh an increasingly aware and prepared and postured uh Japan

0:38:09.770 --> 0:38:13.459
<v Speaker 2>self defense force. Um I mentioned, you know, socially, I

0:38:13.469 --> 0:38:16.000
<v Speaker 2>think there's a lot, you know, Japanese culture is very

0:38:16.010 --> 0:38:21.340
<v Speaker 2>popular in, in, in, in Taiwan. Um People can forget,

0:38:21.350 --> 0:38:21.879
<v Speaker 2>you know, that,

0:38:22.590 --> 0:38:25.310
<v Speaker 2>that Taiwan is not the home of, of Hello, Kitty,

0:38:25.320 --> 0:38:27.949
<v Speaker 2>not the birthplace of, hello Kitty, but you wouldn't know it.

0:38:28.290 --> 0:38:32.030
<v Speaker 2>Um uh So, so I think Japanese culture very, very

0:38:32.040 --> 0:38:36.509
<v Speaker 2>popular in Taiwan. Um the economy, the economic relationship also

0:38:36.520 --> 0:38:41.729
<v Speaker 2>quite close. Uh and the security relationship is is increasing.

0:38:41.739 --> 0:38:46.860
<v Speaker 2>Um They don't have diplomatic recognition. But uh the Japanese

0:38:46.870 --> 0:38:50.620
<v Speaker 2>uh defense Ministry has posted a serving official for the

0:38:50.629 --> 0:38:52.209
<v Speaker 2>first time to Taiwan,

0:38:52.530 --> 0:38:56.060
<v Speaker 2>um not retired officials and retired officers as they had

0:38:56.070 --> 0:38:59.000
<v Speaker 2>in the past. So that's a very small upgrade. Uh

0:38:59.159 --> 0:39:03.610
<v Speaker 2>But it's important for the Japanese Defense Ministry to understand

0:39:04.040 --> 0:39:08.550
<v Speaker 2>um what's going on in Taiwan and Taiwan's military and,

0:39:08.560 --> 0:39:11.870
<v Speaker 2>and have an open channel that, that they, they can

0:39:11.879 --> 0:39:12.629
<v Speaker 2>count on.

0:39:12.899 --> 0:39:17.040
<v Speaker 2>So, uh I think Japan has a very heightened concern

0:39:17.050 --> 0:39:21.360
<v Speaker 2>about the military threat from China and the prospect for

0:39:21.370 --> 0:39:25.360
<v Speaker 2>a cross strait conflict and, and that's, that's becoming apparent in,

0:39:25.370 --> 0:39:27.120
<v Speaker 2>in Japan's posture towards Taiwan.

0:39:28.030 --> 0:39:32.209
<v Speaker 1>Ok. Drew, you're nudging me into the next segue uh very,

0:39:32.219 --> 0:39:38.250
<v Speaker 1>very seamlessly. Um In a recent article you wrote, I quote,

0:39:38.260 --> 0:39:43.189
<v Speaker 1>China's steadily increasing coercive measures against Taiwan, but they remain

0:39:43.199 --> 0:39:46.029
<v Speaker 1>to date below the threshold of military conflict

0:39:46.669 --> 0:39:50.939
<v Speaker 1>essentially. When does coercion end and conflict begin? Question mark,

0:39:50.949 --> 0:39:53.169
<v Speaker 1>end quote. All right, let's be clear, you're not making

0:39:53.179 --> 0:39:55.820
<v Speaker 1>a prediction for a war here, but your objective is

0:39:55.830 --> 0:40:00.089
<v Speaker 1>to deepen the understanding of the risks of conflict. So

0:40:00.100 --> 0:40:03.859
<v Speaker 1>with that context, please walk us through the threshold scenario.

0:40:03.870 --> 0:40:04.109
<v Speaker 1>Dr

0:40:05.530 --> 0:40:09.239
<v Speaker 2>So yeah, I appreciate the caveat. I mean, when, when

0:40:09.250 --> 0:40:13.649
<v Speaker 2>one is engaged in defense planning, um it can be

0:40:13.659 --> 0:40:16.909
<v Speaker 2>a somewhat dark, dark place. Um You know, you, you're

0:40:16.919 --> 0:40:21.479
<v Speaker 2>thinking about the worst possible outcomes, you know, the failure

0:40:21.489 --> 0:40:25.739
<v Speaker 2>of diplomacy and, and the prosecution of a war. Uh

0:40:25.750 --> 0:40:30.260
<v Speaker 2>and and that's, that's, that's hard. Um So, so just

0:40:30.270 --> 0:40:33.189
<v Speaker 2>because you're planning for it doesn't mean you want it.

0:40:33.620 --> 0:40:35.939
<v Speaker 2>Um it, it, what it really means is you want

0:40:35.949 --> 0:40:37.859
<v Speaker 2>to avoid it, you want to prevent it, you want

0:40:37.870 --> 0:40:41.439
<v Speaker 2>to deter it. So, one of the things I've been

0:40:41.449 --> 0:40:45.899
<v Speaker 2>thinking about for a very long time is and particularly as,

0:40:46.090 --> 0:40:52.080
<v Speaker 2>as I mentioned, China's military coercion against Taiwan has increased

0:40:52.090 --> 0:40:57.479
<v Speaker 2>very steadily, especially since August 2022. And Speaker Pelosi visited

0:40:57.659 --> 0:41:01.239
<v Speaker 2>um that coercion has become normalized.

0:41:01.560 --> 0:41:06.459
<v Speaker 2>Um you know, Chinese navy regularly sails ships around Taiwan,

0:41:06.469 --> 0:41:12.429
<v Speaker 2>including aircraft carriers, they fly surveillance planes, bombers regularly, all

0:41:12.439 --> 0:41:15.259
<v Speaker 2>around Taiwan. Fighter planes cross the center line on an

0:41:15.270 --> 0:41:19.620
<v Speaker 2>almost daily basis. Um You know, it it looks quite

0:41:20.860 --> 0:41:23.600
<v Speaker 2>touchy. Um And, and I think

0:41:24.739 --> 0:41:30.469
<v Speaker 2>as we become normalized to that regular steady military coercion,

0:41:30.780 --> 0:41:34.060
<v Speaker 2>you also recognize there's a lot of other coercion going

0:41:34.070 --> 0:41:41.179
<v Speaker 2>on diplomatic, economic informational. Sometimes the Taiwanese call that cognitive warfare.

0:41:41.219 --> 0:41:45.649
<v Speaker 2>It's all designed to impose political pressure on Taiwan oftentimes

0:41:45.659 --> 0:41:49.069
<v Speaker 2>it's called gray zone below the threshold of conflict, any

0:41:49.080 --> 0:41:51.000
<v Speaker 2>of these activities. So

0:41:51.620 --> 0:41:56.020
<v Speaker 2>the question for me is as it increases, is there

0:41:56.030 --> 0:41:59.000
<v Speaker 2>a tipping point at what point does it become war? And,

0:41:59.010 --> 0:42:03.459
<v Speaker 2>and it's pretty, pretty critical moment to consider because if

0:42:03.469 --> 0:42:07.629
<v Speaker 2>you've got tensions rising and, and a conflict is becoming

0:42:07.889 --> 0:42:10.439
<v Speaker 2>increasingly apparent

0:42:10.889 --> 0:42:13.080
<v Speaker 2>at what point do you cross that threshold? And I

0:42:13.090 --> 0:42:16.070
<v Speaker 2>think it's important for businesses as well as governments and

0:42:16.080 --> 0:42:19.570
<v Speaker 2>militaries to, to sort of recognize this because that normalization

0:42:19.580 --> 0:42:23.218
<v Speaker 2>of military coercion makes people complacent. Um And you may not,

0:42:23.709 --> 0:42:27.209
<v Speaker 2>you may not be aware of the indications of the

0:42:27.219 --> 0:42:30.739
<v Speaker 2>change in, in the phase. And, and I think that

0:42:31.510 --> 0:42:35.010
<v Speaker 2>also has really important implications for how the US responds.

0:42:35.310 --> 0:42:39.770
<v Speaker 2>So there's a very natural tension within the US government

0:42:39.780 --> 0:42:43.239
<v Speaker 2>between the civilians. Um you know, the diplomats, the White

0:42:43.250 --> 0:42:47.540
<v Speaker 2>House who really want to use diplomatic means to avoid conflict.

0:42:47.790 --> 0:42:51.629
<v Speaker 2>Um and that bumps up against military officials who also

0:42:51.639 --> 0:42:54.049
<v Speaker 2>want to avoid a conflict for sure, but they need

0:42:54.060 --> 0:42:57.010
<v Speaker 2>to move forces to prepare for the start of the war.

0:42:57.270 --> 0:43:00.169
<v Speaker 2>Um They need to move forces from the US mainland,

0:43:00.179 --> 0:43:03.590
<v Speaker 2>from Guam, from Hawaii towards the conflict and they need

0:43:03.600 --> 0:43:07.439
<v Speaker 2>to posture themselves to be able to take advantage of

0:43:07.449 --> 0:43:10.310
<v Speaker 2>the opening phases from a position of strength, right? The

0:43:10.320 --> 0:43:14.899
<v Speaker 2>first movers advantage, uh some military officers might might advocate

0:43:14.909 --> 0:43:17.330
<v Speaker 2>for a show of force as a means to deter China.

0:43:18.110 --> 0:43:22.649
<v Speaker 2>But the diplomats that are looking for negotiated solutions don't

0:43:22.659 --> 0:43:26.959
<v Speaker 2>want to do anything to provoke Beijing because they're looking

0:43:26.969 --> 0:43:31.370
<v Speaker 2>for an off ramp from the road to war and

0:43:31.379 --> 0:43:35.419
<v Speaker 2>that's going to be a natural tension because diplomats, the

0:43:35.429 --> 0:43:38.810
<v Speaker 2>White House are not necessarily going to want the military

0:43:38.820 --> 0:43:44.129
<v Speaker 2>to move forces very visibly closer to a potential conflict

0:43:44.139 --> 0:43:47.610
<v Speaker 2>because it might hurt their chances for a negotiated peaceful solution.

0:43:48.129 --> 0:43:50.659
<v Speaker 2>And you, you run a risk and I think we

0:43:50.669 --> 0:43:54.279
<v Speaker 2>saw that a little bit in Ukraine. Um uh We,

0:43:54.290 --> 0:43:57.850
<v Speaker 2>we've seen it in past historic cases where negotiations tend

0:43:57.860 --> 0:44:02.370
<v Speaker 2>to supplant military preparations. So, um so I think that,

0:44:02.379 --> 0:44:02.839
<v Speaker 2>that

0:44:03.330 --> 0:44:05.469
<v Speaker 2>that's a pretty key tipping point that we have to

0:44:05.479 --> 0:44:08.879
<v Speaker 2>understand so that we're not behind the curve and that,

0:44:09.250 --> 0:44:13.060
<v Speaker 2>and that we're not showing restraint when the other side

0:44:13.070 --> 0:44:15.549
<v Speaker 2>is preparing for a conflict and ready to move or

0:44:15.560 --> 0:44:20.290
<v Speaker 2>potentially even using diplomatic negotiations as a ruse as a

0:44:20.300 --> 0:44:23.750
<v Speaker 2>means to, to obscure and, and prevent,

0:44:24.439 --> 0:44:27.959
<v Speaker 2>prevent the adversary from, from using their military to their

0:44:27.969 --> 0:44:28.819
<v Speaker 2>own advantage.

0:44:29.199 --> 0:44:36.149
<v Speaker 1>Your view on the US Taiwan policy under Trump versus Harris,

0:44:36.159 --> 0:44:38.919
<v Speaker 1>you've already talked about this a bit, but just specifically

0:44:38.929 --> 0:44:40.949
<v Speaker 1>under Trump or under Harris, how do you see us

0:44:40.959 --> 0:44:41.239
<v Speaker 1>Taiwan

0:44:41.250 --> 0:44:42.060
<v Speaker 1>policy evolve?

0:44:44.229 --> 0:44:46.449
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, as, as I mentioned, I'm also reluctant to make

0:44:46.459 --> 0:44:48.929
<v Speaker 2>predictions about the future. Um

0:44:49.790 --> 0:44:52.149
<v Speaker 2>I, I think there's very little to go on. I mean,

0:44:52.159 --> 0:44:52.659
<v Speaker 1>they haven't said

0:44:52.669 --> 0:44:53.609
<v Speaker 1>much, yeah,

0:44:53.620 --> 0:44:57.709
<v Speaker 2>us elections are, and, and the rhetoric that accompanies them

0:44:57.719 --> 0:45:02.770
<v Speaker 2>are primarily domestic. Um That's what the, the voters care about.

0:45:02.989 --> 0:45:06.239
<v Speaker 2>Um So we really can just speculate on what either

0:45:06.250 --> 0:45:08.370
<v Speaker 2>administration will do. Um

0:45:09.110 --> 0:45:13.370
<v Speaker 2>So I, I think let's make the assumption that Washington's

0:45:13.379 --> 0:45:16.070
<v Speaker 2>China Taiwan Asia policy is part of sort of an

0:45:16.080 --> 0:45:21.299
<v Speaker 2>overarching approach uh to Asia. Um The relationship with treaty

0:45:21.310 --> 0:45:22.689
<v Speaker 2>allies will take precedent.

0:45:23.270 --> 0:45:27.280
<v Speaker 2>Um And, and strengthening partnerships is kind of an instinct

0:45:27.290 --> 0:45:30.699
<v Speaker 2>or perpetual foreign policy goal for, for Washington, that's kind

0:45:30.709 --> 0:45:34.169
<v Speaker 2>of left to its own devices the way Washington would go.

0:45:34.179 --> 0:45:38.158
<v Speaker 2>So I think those are us constants and you can say, well,

0:45:38.169 --> 0:45:41.169
<v Speaker 2>Trump is hard on allies or not Trump. Trump is

0:45:41.179 --> 0:45:45.159
<v Speaker 2>very crude uh when he's talking about allies. But what if,

0:45:45.469 --> 0:45:46.959
<v Speaker 2>if you're gonna be

0:45:48.159 --> 0:45:53.250
<v Speaker 2>kind uh what he's essentially pushing for is, is reciprocity and,

0:45:53.260 --> 0:45:57.000
<v Speaker 2>and what's sometimes referred to as burden sharing, basically trying

0:45:57.010 --> 0:46:01.580
<v Speaker 2>to establish the, the value to the United States of

0:46:01.590 --> 0:46:05.388
<v Speaker 2>a bilateral relationship in, in a security treaty. Um And

0:46:05.399 --> 0:46:08.299
<v Speaker 2>I think that's, that's healthy. Uh I think the way

0:46:08.310 --> 0:46:11.280
<v Speaker 2>Trump maybe approaches it isn't necessarily healthy but, but let's

0:46:11.290 --> 0:46:14.219
<v Speaker 2>get back to the constant, you've got the alliances, you've

0:46:14.229 --> 0:46:17.300
<v Speaker 2>got us interests in access, influence markets.

0:46:17.669 --> 0:46:22.080
<v Speaker 2>Um The desire to strengthen partnerships. Um You've got the

0:46:22.090 --> 0:46:25.120
<v Speaker 2>other major constant in Xi Jinping. Um he's going to

0:46:25.129 --> 0:46:28.290
<v Speaker 2>affect either administration equally. So you have to take that

0:46:28.300 --> 0:46:31.649
<v Speaker 2>into account. Um I think Xi Jinping's foreign policy and

0:46:31.659 --> 0:46:36.270
<v Speaker 2>national security objectives are, are not always aligned with us interests.

0:46:36.550 --> 0:46:39.729
<v Speaker 2>Um Xi Jinping can be very um

0:46:40.560 --> 0:46:44.709
<v Speaker 2>uncompromising in his approaches. I mean, he set a goal for, for,

0:46:44.719 --> 0:46:47.729
<v Speaker 2>for China, whether it's the China Dream or, or, or,

0:46:48.260 --> 0:46:52.299
<v Speaker 2>or his economic policies that, that don't take into account

0:46:52.310 --> 0:46:53.860
<v Speaker 2>us interests necessarily.

0:46:54.120 --> 0:46:57.029
<v Speaker 2>So, so I don't think there's a lot of room for,

0:46:57.050 --> 0:47:01.020
<v Speaker 2>for negotiation or somehow fundamentally changing the paradigm. The us

0:47:01.030 --> 0:47:04.459
<v Speaker 2>isn't just going to surrender and neither is China. So,

0:47:04.590 --> 0:47:07.729
<v Speaker 2>so I mentioned that Xi Jinping can also be unpredictable.

0:47:07.739 --> 0:47:10.979
<v Speaker 2>So throw everything out that I say. Um and we,

0:47:10.989 --> 0:47:14.830
<v Speaker 2>we don't have visibility into the policy making process, but

0:47:14.840 --> 0:47:17.669
<v Speaker 2>I think it's a fairly low probability that he's going

0:47:17.679 --> 0:47:17.699
<v Speaker 2>to

0:47:17.745 --> 0:47:19.714
<v Speaker 2>wake up one morning and say, you know, I've misread

0:47:19.725 --> 0:47:22.763
<v Speaker 2>the United States, they're not an ideological and security threat

0:47:22.774 --> 0:47:25.445
<v Speaker 2>to us, you know, let's be friends. Um I, I

0:47:25.455 --> 0:47:28.854
<v Speaker 2>don't think he's headed there. Um So, so I think

0:47:28.864 --> 0:47:32.114
<v Speaker 2>competition is, is going to be a feature for the

0:47:32.125 --> 0:47:35.864
<v Speaker 2>next administration, not only because of how Xi Jinping sees

0:47:35.875 --> 0:47:40.145
<v Speaker 2>the relationship between the Communist Party and everything outside the party,

0:47:40.155 --> 0:47:42.125
<v Speaker 2>including the West. Um

0:47:42.659 --> 0:47:46.339
<v Speaker 2>Competition is also deeply ensconced in the US political agenda.

0:47:46.350 --> 0:47:49.509
<v Speaker 2>It's a bipartisan issue and that's very evident in Congress.

0:47:49.520 --> 0:47:54.158
<v Speaker 2>So I think either political candidate falls in on that

0:47:54.169 --> 0:47:56.908
<v Speaker 2>scenario as president. Uh I mean,

0:47:57.629 --> 0:48:00.388
<v Speaker 2>uh Vice President Harris doesn't have a lot of experience

0:48:00.399 --> 0:48:03.689
<v Speaker 2>in foreign policy unlike President Biden who has very strong

0:48:03.699 --> 0:48:08.020
<v Speaker 2>interests and preferences. Um So I think she doesn't to

0:48:08.030 --> 0:48:12.299
<v Speaker 2>my knowledge yet have clearly designated foreign policy advisor with

0:48:12.310 --> 0:48:18.029
<v Speaker 2>Deep Asia experience. Um certainly not on East Asia, China Taiwan. So,

0:48:18.040 --> 0:48:21.070
<v Speaker 2>so it's questionable whether they would be in her inner

0:48:21.080 --> 0:48:24.270
<v Speaker 2>circle once they are brought in. Um uh

0:48:25.590 --> 0:48:27.689
<v Speaker 2>I, I would assume their outlook is going to likely

0:48:27.699 --> 0:48:31.419
<v Speaker 2>conform to past democratic administrations, but that doesn't necessarily tell

0:48:31.429 --> 0:48:36.250
<v Speaker 2>you anything if you compare, say President Biden to President Obama, right?

0:48:36.260 --> 0:48:38.359
<v Speaker 2>And again, that may be as much about the changes

0:48:38.370 --> 0:48:41.719
<v Speaker 2>in China as it is in Washington. So so Beijing

0:48:41.729 --> 0:48:45.709
<v Speaker 2>thought that President Obi President Biden would, would return to

0:48:45.719 --> 0:48:49.159
<v Speaker 2>a more accommodating policy like the Obama administration after four

0:48:49.169 --> 0:48:53.408
<v Speaker 2>years of Trump and and all of his assertiveness and disruption.

0:48:53.780 --> 0:48:56.149
<v Speaker 2>So, so I think Beijing was quite surprised and in

0:48:56.159 --> 0:49:00.560
<v Speaker 2>some cases, very disappointed with Biden when he retained the

0:49:00.570 --> 0:49:05.560
<v Speaker 2>tariffs that Trump initiated. Um he strengthened the alliance um

0:49:05.570 --> 0:49:10.199
<v Speaker 2>network strength, strengthen the quad, he established Aus. Uh he

0:49:10.209 --> 0:49:13.959
<v Speaker 2>restricted and expanded the restriction of high tech exports. Um

0:49:13.969 --> 0:49:18.419
<v Speaker 2>And he's also actively encouraged reshoring French shoring to, to

0:49:18.429 --> 0:49:22.379
<v Speaker 2>derisk and supply supply chains, the Chips Act, the Ira.

0:49:22.760 --> 0:49:23.419
<v Speaker 2>So

0:49:24.199 --> 0:49:27.339
<v Speaker 2>Harris may not recycle the Biden playbook, but she can

0:49:27.350 --> 0:49:31.520
<v Speaker 2>build on that already. So it's probably unrealistic for Beijing

0:49:31.530 --> 0:49:34.090
<v Speaker 2>to think that the Harris administration is somehow going to

0:49:34.100 --> 0:49:36.620
<v Speaker 2>be a different path. Uh And we will suddenly start

0:49:36.629 --> 0:49:39.908
<v Speaker 2>accommodating China, right? Saying, oh yeah, we should cooper and

0:49:39.919 --> 0:49:43.300
<v Speaker 2>not worry about competition. I don't think that's going to happen. So,

0:49:43.699 --> 0:49:47.459
<v Speaker 2>so I think Taiwan faces a slightly different risk. Um

0:49:47.469 --> 0:49:51.340
<v Speaker 2>And that's the Harris administration is, is overly deliberative

0:49:51.760 --> 0:49:55.699
<v Speaker 2>um uncertain about how China will respond um to, to

0:49:55.709 --> 0:49:59.859
<v Speaker 2>actions that support Taiwan that basically the calculus for deterring

0:49:59.919 --> 0:50:03.110
<v Speaker 2>China is different. Um And I think there's a risk

0:50:03.120 --> 0:50:06.310
<v Speaker 2>that Washington self deters. Right. And that there, there's a

0:50:06.320 --> 0:50:08.489
<v Speaker 2>fear that whatever they do to support

0:50:09.320 --> 0:50:14.729
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan might elicit a response from Beijing. That's, that's, um, uh,

0:50:14.739 --> 0:50:18.320
<v Speaker 2>particularly violent, uh, or impactful. And I, and I think

0:50:18.330 --> 0:50:21.360
<v Speaker 2>that's a risk that, that Taipei is probably aware of,

0:50:21.959 --> 0:50:27.270
<v Speaker 2>um, Trump. I mean, Trump is the essence of uncertainty. Um, he,

0:50:27.280 --> 0:50:30.469
<v Speaker 2>he fosters that intentionally, he takes a lot of risks.

0:50:30.479 --> 0:50:34.100
<v Speaker 2>He ignores a lot of conventions. Um, In some cases,

0:50:34.110 --> 0:50:36.799
<v Speaker 2>I think that can be virtuous. I mean, Trump, Trump

0:50:36.810 --> 0:50:40.589
<v Speaker 2>made an effort to normalize the relationship with North Korea.

0:50:40.790 --> 0:50:41.379
<v Speaker 2>Um

0:50:41.669 --> 0:50:43.989
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, and if you think about the Biden administration, you

0:50:44.000 --> 0:50:47.729
<v Speaker 2>think about the Obama administration, neither one took a risk to, to,

0:50:47.739 --> 0:50:51.169
<v Speaker 2>to address North Korea. Trump was all about risk. Um And,

0:50:51.179 --> 0:50:53.419
<v Speaker 2>and I think it was a genuine approach to change

0:50:53.429 --> 0:50:56.409
<v Speaker 2>the status quo and change the paradigm to offer him

0:50:56.419 --> 0:51:00.689
<v Speaker 2>a very alternative future and it ultimately failed. Um But,

0:51:00.699 --> 0:51:03.120
<v Speaker 2>but I think that that was indicative of what we

0:51:03.129 --> 0:51:04.889
<v Speaker 2>might see. Um

0:51:05.199 --> 0:51:08.540
<v Speaker 2>Now again, Kim was open to it, there was support

0:51:08.550 --> 0:51:11.370
<v Speaker 2>from South Korea. Um I'm not sure you have the

0:51:11.379 --> 0:51:15.610
<v Speaker 2>same factors at play with China. So I don't think

0:51:15.889 --> 0:51:19.270
<v Speaker 2>uh you know Xi Jinping is able to cut some

0:51:19.280 --> 0:51:23.379
<v Speaker 2>sort of grand bargain modus vivendi deal with, with Trump.

0:51:23.389 --> 0:51:26.500
<v Speaker 2>I I don't think either one are prepared for it. So,

0:51:26.639 --> 0:51:29.120
<v Speaker 2>so again, you've got the risk of uncertainty, the risk

0:51:29.129 --> 0:51:32.350
<v Speaker 2>of how Trump communicates um you also have, of course,

0:51:32.360 --> 0:51:34.138
<v Speaker 2>the risk of the, the, the,

0:51:34.479 --> 0:51:38.520
<v Speaker 2>the conflation of his personal and, and national interests. Um

0:51:39.209 --> 0:51:44.070
<v Speaker 2>um, but for Taiwan, you've got maybe a different calculation.

0:51:44.379 --> 0:51:47.389
<v Speaker 2>Um One way to think of it is, you know, the, the,

0:51:47.399 --> 0:51:50.979
<v Speaker 2>the fat tail concept, right, the curve that, that lengthens

0:51:50.989 --> 0:51:53.919
<v Speaker 2>at the ends. And, uh, and, and I, I think

0:51:53.929 --> 0:51:56.239
<v Speaker 2>the fat tail for Trump is really quite large at

0:51:56.250 --> 0:51:59.100
<v Speaker 2>both of the ends. Um So

0:51:59.830 --> 0:52:02.760
<v Speaker 2>there's huge risks with Trump, but there's also potentially very

0:52:02.770 --> 0:52:06.040
<v Speaker 2>big rewards if you can get him on your side

0:52:06.280 --> 0:52:09.729
<v Speaker 2>and give him what he wants. I mean, Trump is,

0:52:09.739 --> 0:52:13.560
<v Speaker 2>I think almost undoubtedly going to be surrounded by advisers

0:52:13.570 --> 0:52:17.560
<v Speaker 2>that are very positive towards Taiwan and quite negative towards China,

0:52:17.570 --> 0:52:22.000
<v Speaker 2>quite skeptical of China and the Communist Party. Um I mean,

0:52:22.010 --> 0:52:22.719
<v Speaker 2>we've seen

0:52:23.870 --> 0:52:27.699
<v Speaker 2>several of Trump's former advisor, you know, call for, for

0:52:27.709 --> 0:52:31.489
<v Speaker 2>recognizing Taiwan. I mean, that would be a huge coup for, for,

0:52:31.500 --> 0:52:33.909
<v Speaker 2>for Taiwan. So, so that's the positive end of the

0:52:33.919 --> 0:52:36.259
<v Speaker 2>fat tail. Of course, there is a big risk at

0:52:36.270 --> 0:52:38.669
<v Speaker 2>the other side. Um I think there's a risk that

0:52:38.679 --> 0:52:42.489
<v Speaker 2>there will be some in, in the conservative side of

0:52:42.500 --> 0:52:45.169
<v Speaker 2>the political agenda who see value in

0:52:45.429 --> 0:52:49.060
<v Speaker 2>supporting Taiwan because it's a good way to antagonize China

0:52:49.070 --> 0:52:52.399
<v Speaker 2>and that's their ultimate goal. Um And I personally don't

0:52:52.409 --> 0:52:55.040
<v Speaker 2>think that's a very good approach. It's not consistent with

0:52:55.050 --> 0:52:58.439
<v Speaker 2>us national interests. Uh But there, there are possibly some

0:52:58.449 --> 0:53:02.649
<v Speaker 2>who would. So it's, it's difficult to see how either

0:53:02.659 --> 0:53:06.879
<v Speaker 2>administration will be good from Beijing's perspective, what they want.

0:53:07.219 --> 0:53:10.889
<v Speaker 2>Um It's difficult to, to, to,

0:53:11.699 --> 0:53:14.320
<v Speaker 2>to determine, you know, whether Trump is going to be

0:53:14.330 --> 0:53:20.179
<v Speaker 2>truly disruptive or simply ineffective. Um From Tai Taiwan's perspective,

0:53:20.189 --> 0:53:23.299
<v Speaker 2>I think Taipei is, is very experienced, dealing with transitions

0:53:23.310 --> 0:53:26.510
<v Speaker 2>from one US administration to the next. They have a

0:53:26.520 --> 0:53:32.029
<v Speaker 2>playbook for keeping those channels of communication open. Um And,

0:53:32.040 --> 0:53:36.439
<v Speaker 2>and Taiwan's also particularly good at making its case for

0:53:36.750 --> 0:53:39.879
<v Speaker 2>obtaining us support and they're also good at rolling, rolling

0:53:39.889 --> 0:53:41.500
<v Speaker 2>with the punches, rolling with the brakes.

0:53:41.810 --> 0:53:45.989
<v Speaker 2>So, so Taipei faces different risks from either administration um

0:53:46.000 --> 0:53:48.270
<v Speaker 2>but they're accustomed to it and I think they are

0:53:48.280 --> 0:53:52.179
<v Speaker 2>resilient um and they're resourceful. So I'm pretty confident Taiwan

0:53:52.189 --> 0:53:56.310
<v Speaker 2>will make the best of whichever uh situation it encounters.

0:53:57.520 --> 0:54:00.310
<v Speaker 1>Super, super interesting. OK. So drew the things that you

0:54:00.320 --> 0:54:03.520
<v Speaker 1>just talked about are in the context of the near term,

0:54:03.600 --> 0:54:07.600
<v Speaker 1>a year, two years out. Uh Would you sort of

0:54:07.610 --> 0:54:12.359
<v Speaker 1>change your assessment or prediction if you will as much

0:54:12.370 --> 0:54:14.229
<v Speaker 1>as you hate that word? Uh If I were to

0:54:14.239 --> 0:54:16.659
<v Speaker 1>ask you to look into the region a decade from now,

0:54:18.989 --> 0:54:24.770
<v Speaker 2>a decade from now? So where are we in 2034 35?

0:54:25.719 --> 0:54:29.060
<v Speaker 2>Um So Xi Jinping will be Biden's age

0:54:30.290 --> 0:54:33.510
<v Speaker 2>today. Um Is he still in power or not? I

0:54:33.520 --> 0:54:36.850
<v Speaker 2>think that's an important question to ask. What does his

0:54:36.860 --> 0:54:40.299
<v Speaker 2>successor look like and how did that succession take place?

0:54:41.040 --> 0:54:44.580
<v Speaker 2>Um So I think that's an important trend to map if,

0:54:44.590 --> 0:54:45.610
<v Speaker 2>if we see

0:54:46.489 --> 0:54:53.469
<v Speaker 2>Taiwan, uh if we see China as, as inevitably consistently revenge,

0:54:54.840 --> 0:54:55.699
<v Speaker 2>angry

0:54:56.419 --> 0:55:02.639
<v Speaker 2>insecure, censoring all information within its borders, um

0:55:03.590 --> 0:55:08.810
<v Speaker 2>unable to let go of century of humiliation and, and

0:55:09.340 --> 0:55:14.570
<v Speaker 2>you know, Japanese history in World War Two, if, if,

0:55:14.580 --> 0:55:18.949
<v Speaker 2>if all of its relationships are still antagonistic um which

0:55:18.959 --> 0:55:23.120
<v Speaker 2>is part part Marxism, right? Marx was all about antagonism, right?

0:55:23.129 --> 0:55:26.080
<v Speaker 2>Relationships between the superstructure of the base, you know,

0:55:26.530 --> 0:55:29.229
<v Speaker 2>between you know, labor and capital, you know, I I

0:55:29.239 --> 0:55:32.229
<v Speaker 2>think the Chinese see the world in very adversarial terms

0:55:32.239 --> 0:55:35.340
<v Speaker 2>between the Communist Party and those outside of it. And

0:55:35.350 --> 0:55:39.468
<v Speaker 2>I think if that continues, then what we see today

0:55:40.189 --> 0:55:41.929
<v Speaker 2>continues and perhaps

0:55:42.620 --> 0:55:49.509
<v Speaker 2>the risks increase, commensurate with China's economic success, its expansion

0:55:49.520 --> 0:55:54.439
<v Speaker 2>of military power, um possibility that its soft power becomes

0:55:54.449 --> 0:55:57.459
<v Speaker 2>more attractive though, I think that may be antithetical to,

0:55:57.469 --> 0:56:00.760
<v Speaker 2>to increasing Marxism in, in Beijing.

0:56:01.590 --> 0:56:03.169
<v Speaker 2>Um Taiwan

0:56:04.139 --> 0:56:08.290
<v Speaker 2>demographics work against it. It needs to figure out you know,

0:56:08.300 --> 0:56:09.600
<v Speaker 2>how is it going to

0:56:10.760 --> 0:56:13.370
<v Speaker 2>protect itself, feed itself clothe itself

0:56:14.449 --> 0:56:17.659
<v Speaker 2>if, if its population is shrinking at a at a

0:56:17.669 --> 0:56:21.699
<v Speaker 2>steady rate, so either turn around your birth rates or

0:56:22.370 --> 0:56:25.169
<v Speaker 2>figure out how do you assimilate some of these Southeast

0:56:25.179 --> 0:56:28.729
<v Speaker 2>Asian migrants who are coming to, to, to live in Taiwan,

0:56:28.739 --> 0:56:31.489
<v Speaker 2>a path to citizenship. And I think that's perhaps a

0:56:31.500 --> 0:56:34.489
<v Speaker 2>little difficult for them to think about today, it's going

0:56:34.500 --> 0:56:36.709
<v Speaker 2>to be increasingly necessary

0:56:37.290 --> 0:56:39.310
<v Speaker 2>uh in 10 years. And of course, that puts it

0:56:39.320 --> 0:56:42.820
<v Speaker 2>even farther at odds as, as Taiwan would effectively be

0:56:42.830 --> 0:56:47.629
<v Speaker 2>moving closer to Southeast Asia than to, to mainland China. So,

0:56:47.669 --> 0:56:50.520
<v Speaker 2>so 10 years from now, that could be uh part

0:56:50.530 --> 0:56:56.250
<v Speaker 2>of the paradigm, uh an increasingly internationalized Southeast Asian Taiwan.

0:56:56.719 --> 0:56:59.820
<v Speaker 2>Um So the US,

0:57:00.800 --> 0:57:03.179
<v Speaker 2>the US just exists, right? I mean, it's, it's a

0:57:03.189 --> 0:57:07.850
<v Speaker 2>country that thrives on chaos in many ways. Um It, it,

0:57:07.860 --> 0:57:11.739
<v Speaker 2>you know, people who want small government, you see, you

0:57:11.750 --> 0:57:16.139
<v Speaker 2>see cycles of, of, you know, strength and weakness. Um

0:57:16.389 --> 0:57:18.620
<v Speaker 2>you know, you, you talk to folks older than me

0:57:18.629 --> 0:57:20.580
<v Speaker 2>who have been around and they think, you know, the

0:57:20.590 --> 0:57:22.620
<v Speaker 2>US is full of chaos, but it's nothing like the

0:57:22.629 --> 0:57:26.860
<v Speaker 2>19 sixties um the civil rights movement in Vietnam. So

0:57:26.949 --> 0:57:30.139
<v Speaker 2>the US has a, has a way of rejuvenating itself,

0:57:30.459 --> 0:57:35.149
<v Speaker 2>maybe, you know, two election cycles from now, we, we

0:57:35.159 --> 0:57:41.530
<v Speaker 2>have two very capable candidates for president who can articulate

0:57:41.580 --> 0:57:45.110
<v Speaker 2>a inspiring vision to the American people to pull together

0:57:45.120 --> 0:57:48.439
<v Speaker 2>and continue to, you know, follow its values and, and,

0:57:48.449 --> 0:57:50.870
<v Speaker 2>and lead the free world it could happen

0:57:51.169 --> 0:57:54.489
<v Speaker 2>um or the cycles could deepen and strengthen. So I

0:57:54.520 --> 0:57:58.550
<v Speaker 2>think I like to think of trends as being fairly consistent.

0:57:58.719 --> 0:58:01.540
<v Speaker 2>Um It's just a question of their, their velocity

0:58:03.110 --> 0:58:06.060
<v Speaker 1>fair enough, uh very good. Uh We'll come back in

0:58:06.070 --> 0:58:08.570
<v Speaker 1>2034 and look back at what you said. Uh Drew.

0:58:08.899 --> 0:58:12.590
<v Speaker 1>Uh Thank you so much for your time and insight.

0:58:12.600 --> 0:58:18.520
<v Speaker 1>Drew Thompson. Thanks for our listeners and viewers for their

0:58:18.530 --> 0:58:20.969
<v Speaker 1>time as well. Kobe Time was produced by Ken Dub

0:58:21.189 --> 0:58:25.010
<v Speaker 1>at Fly Studios, Violet Lee and Daisy Sherman provided additional assistance.

0:58:25.370 --> 0:58:27.729
<v Speaker 1>It is for information only and does not represent any

0:58:27.739 --> 0:58:32.570
<v Speaker 1>trade recommendations. All 136 episodes of the podcast are available

0:58:32.580 --> 0:58:36.590
<v Speaker 1>on youtube and on all major podcast platforms including Apple

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<v Speaker 1>and Spotify. As for our research publications, webinars and live streams,

0:58:40.560 --> 0:58:43.219
<v Speaker 1>you can find them all by Googling D BS Research Library.

0:58:43.320 --> 0:58:44.590
<v Speaker 1>Have a great day.