WEBVTT - Interview With Roger Lowenstein: Masters in Business (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business is brought to you by ex On

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<v Speaker 1>Mobile Energy Lives here. This is Master's in Business with

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<v Speaker 1>Barry Ridholds on Bloomberg Radio Today. On the podcast, I

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<v Speaker 1>have Roger Lowenstein. He is a journalist and author, and

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<v Speaker 1>we spoke for ninety minutes. I'm not gonna make I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not gonna take too much time in this intro because

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<v Speaker 1>there's plenty to hear. The book that I've always adored

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<v Speaker 1>of his uh is When Genius Failed to the story

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<v Speaker 1>of long term capital management, and we do a deep

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<v Speaker 1>dive into that. I use that book extensively in my

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<v Speaker 1>prep work for Bailout Nation, as well as another book

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<v Speaker 1>of Rogers, which was Origins of the Crash, which talked

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<v Speaker 1>about all the factors that led to the two thousand crash.

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<v Speaker 1>We go into a lot of details on some of this.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of this we really just skip over um and

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<v Speaker 1>talked very lightly about. So it's ninety minutes. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>fantastic conversation, and rather than me babil, I'm just gonna

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<v Speaker 1>send you right to the podcast and broadcast without further ado,

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<v Speaker 1>my conversation with Roger Lowenstein. This is Master's in Business

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<v Speaker 1>with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. This week on Masters

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<v Speaker 1>in Business on Bloomberg Radio, I have a special guest author,

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<v Speaker 1>Rock Contour journalist Roger Lowenstein. You probably know him from

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<v Speaker 1>what is actually one of my all time favorite books,

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<v Speaker 1>When Genius Failed, The Rise and Fall of Long Term

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<v Speaker 1>Capital Management. But he is also the author of Buffett,

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<v Speaker 1>Making of an American Capitalist, Origins of the Crash, which

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<v Speaker 1>I thought was a really interesting book that I used

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<v Speaker 1>as part of my research for Bailout Nation, End of

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street, While America Aged, How the pension debts ruins

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<v Speaker 1>General Motors, and his most recent book, An Erica's Bank,

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<v Speaker 1>The epic struggle to create the Federal Reserve. Roger Lowenstein,

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Bloomberg Barry. Always good to be on your show. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>is this the first time we've had you on this

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<v Speaker 1>This will well, you don't know if it's good to

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<v Speaker 1>be always good to be with you, so it's always

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<v Speaker 1>good to be in your company. Roger and I know

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<v Speaker 1>each other for a few years from similar circles. We

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<v Speaker 1>had lunch not too long ago, less lunch outside the library.

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<v Speaker 1>I think that while you were working on that book,

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<v Speaker 1>and we talked about your process and your research, and

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<v Speaker 1>I really want to get into it. But before we

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<v Speaker 1>start talking about America's bank, let's talk a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>about your history. You were at the Wall Street Journal

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<v Speaker 1>for a part of a decade longer. I was at

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<v Speaker 1>the Wall Street Journal for fifteen years. Um, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>I always had loved being at the journal, always had

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<v Speaker 1>kind of books in my veins. And you always knew

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<v Speaker 1>you wanted to be a writer from early on? Or

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<v Speaker 1>how did that evolve? Um? Early on? I can't tell

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<v Speaker 1>you. You You know, when I was a reporter the Cornell

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<v Speaker 1>Daily Son, if I was thinking of books or not,

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<v Speaker 1>But I was always what was called an egghead back

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<v Speaker 1>in the day, and a walk that's right. That word

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<v Speaker 1>didn't exist back in my Cornell days. And I was

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<v Speaker 1>looking for a book, you know, as my career at

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<v Speaker 1>the Journal went on, and I knew something about this

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<v Speaker 1>investor out in Omaha. Who actually at the time we're talking,

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<v Speaker 1>we're talking the early nineties, so no one knew who. Really,

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<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't say no one, but not like not. He

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't the icon. He isn't on their radio and put

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<v Speaker 1>him on them all the time. Well I think he

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<v Speaker 1>put himself from the map. But but I was writing

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<v Speaker 1>the Herd in the Street column for the Journal and

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<v Speaker 1>the song which, by the way, there is a number

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<v Speaker 1>of storied Pulitzer Prize winning journalists who have occupied it

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<v Speaker 1>was a good chair and one was infamous. We won't mentioned,

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<v Speaker 1>but um doing that column, and the Solomon Brothers scandal happened.

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<v Speaker 1>Buffett flies into New York and all of a sudden

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<v Speaker 1>people are very interested in him, and so I pitched

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<v Speaker 1>a book idea and did that book, did very well,

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<v Speaker 1>went back to the General, wrote a column for a

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<v Speaker 1>few years, and since then I've written exclusively books. So

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<v Speaker 1>the Buffet story is kind of fascinating. The Solomon comes in,

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<v Speaker 1>save Solomon Brothers, works them out from their headache, subsequently

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<v Speaker 1>does the same thing with Goldman Sachs in the financial crisis,

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<v Speaker 1>kind of gives them a capital infusion they needed to

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<v Speaker 1>stay liquid. You talked a lot and wrote a lot

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<v Speaker 1>in Origins of the Crash about the previous UH crisis,

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<v Speaker 1>the two thousand dot com crash, But the end of

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<v Speaker 1>Wall Street was really your story, not so much about

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<v Speaker 1>the financial crisis, but what happened with Wall Street during

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<v Speaker 1>that period. Yeah, the end of Wall Street, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>it was about the two thousand and eight mortgage bubble

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<v Speaker 1>and everything that happened after the FED interventions that tarp

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<v Speaker 1>all of that, and the you know the difference between

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<v Speaker 1>that story and the one we're gonna talk about America's

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<v Speaker 1>Bank is this was what a crisis looked like when

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<v Speaker 1>we had a federal reserve and we had a strong

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<v Speaker 1>federal financial presence as opposed to before. Were you just

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<v Speaker 1>krene from your you're on your own crisis to crisis.

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<v Speaker 1>Maybe JP Morgan will organize a loan for you, if

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<v Speaker 1>not Sion our maybe and and by the way, sionar

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<v Speaker 1>to the system as well too, So we're gonna definitely

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<v Speaker 1>spend more time talking about that. I would be remiss

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<v Speaker 1>if I failed to mention your dad. Your father was

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<v Speaker 1>Louis Loan Stein, and he was really a well known

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<v Speaker 1>law professor and corporate executive who pretty much spent three

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<v Speaker 1>decades dissecting the excesses of Wall Street. If if he

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<v Speaker 1>was alive today, he would be active on Twitter, he

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<v Speaker 1>would have a blog, and he would be trashing Wall

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<v Speaker 1>Street on a fairly regular basis. Know, I don't know

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<v Speaker 1>about Twitter, because I remember trying to get a dad,

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<v Speaker 1>um My dear and late father to accept photos and

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<v Speaker 1>texting on his cell phone and and different generation. But

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<v Speaker 1>he seriously he was a law professor who, instead of

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<v Speaker 1>just sticking with um, you know, the standard text that

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<v Speaker 1>other professors were teaching, said hey, there's something going wrong

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<v Speaker 1>in business. I don't care if it's business law or business.

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<v Speaker 1>This is in the era of junk bond sales and

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<v Speaker 1>junk bond excesses. And he really he was a pioneer

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<v Speaker 1>and saying the way the prospectuses are written isn't right,

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<v Speaker 1>disclosures aren't right, the risks that they are being taken

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<v Speaker 1>by mutual funds aren't right. And he was out in

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<v Speaker 1>front very much an investor advocate. Is that a fair statement. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>he was an advocate for good, fair, open, honest disclosure transparency.

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<v Speaker 1>He also warned about the dangers of short term investing

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<v Speaker 1>and in ignoring the long term. The question I want

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<v Speaker 1>to ask is how did your father's philosophy affect your

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<v Speaker 1>your thinking? You know very much. But we both got

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<v Speaker 1>into we sort of both edged into writing careers or

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<v Speaker 1>authorial careers. He was a corporate lawyer for the all

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<v Speaker 1>of my growing up, and I was a journalist and

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<v Speaker 1>you know, at the beginning of my career, I wasn't

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<v Speaker 1>even a business journalist. And then uh, you know, when

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<v Speaker 1>I went to college, I wasn't even interested in business.

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<v Speaker 1>And then at some point I joined the Wall Street

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<v Speaker 1>Journal around uh, nineteen seventy nine. I joined the journal.

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<v Speaker 1>At that time, Uh, he was a chairman to become

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<v Speaker 1>a CEO of one of his clients, path Mark, the

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<v Speaker 1>s GC, the supermarket chain. H. At some point, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>soon after that, he segues into Columbia University become a

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<v Speaker 1>law professor. And by now I'm writing about finance, and

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<v Speaker 1>as a law professor, suddenly he's writing about finance, and

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<v Speaker 1>suddenly we're sort of doing it. Not the same things,

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<v Speaker 1>but similar things just happened almost simultaneous, Almost simultaneously. He

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<v Speaker 1>wrote his his first two books before I wrote any books.

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<v Speaker 1>But I was a financial reporter, and so you know,

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<v Speaker 1>we really really enjoyed. We would add each other's books

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<v Speaker 1>and it was a relationship. Um. There was no tension

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<v Speaker 1>in it, there was no disagreement. It was just it

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<v Speaker 1>was a pure love and also an intellectual connection which

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<v Speaker 1>I treasured. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>My guest this week, author Roger Lowenstein. He has a

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<v Speaker 1>new book out called America's Bank, The Epic Struggle to

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<v Speaker 1>create the Federal Reserve, And it's really very much a

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<v Speaker 1>deep dive into the history and creation of the Federal Reserve.

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<v Speaker 1>And and it's really apparent to me you spent a

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<v Speaker 1>long time doing some really archival research on this. When

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<v Speaker 1>we had launched a couple of summers ago, you were

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<v Speaker 1>already a year or two into the research process, and

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<v Speaker 1>here it is months and months later in the book

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<v Speaker 1>is just coming out recently. What was the research process

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<v Speaker 1>like for digging into the creation of the Federal Reserve.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's a good question. Because my other books were

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<v Speaker 1>mostly contemporary stories. This is a history. Although there is

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<v Speaker 1>some contemporary aspects relative to what just took place, but

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<v Speaker 1>most of it is really a deep historical go back

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<v Speaker 1>and interview wood Row Wilson. You can't interview Carter Glass,

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<v Speaker 1>Paul Warburg, Teddy Roosevelt. These are all big characters in

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<v Speaker 1>the book. So you go to archives, and um, you

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't believe archives all of these famous people either in

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<v Speaker 1>the library Congress or the Woodrow Wilson Library, Like you're

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<v Speaker 1>doing White glove. Original document is white glove. Because you

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<v Speaker 1>go into the say the Library Princeton, and um, they

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<v Speaker 1>almost do a strip search. You can't take in you know,

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<v Speaker 1>I can't take my cappuccino and with me because they

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<v Speaker 1>don't want me spilling my cappuccino one hundred year old

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<v Speaker 1>original pieces of parchment. I can't blame them, can't really

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<v Speaker 1>blame my. I'm not allowed to take cappuccinos, by the way,

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<v Speaker 1>in the living room either at my house. But that's

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<v Speaker 1>for a different reason. All the Bloomberg people in relationists

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<v Speaker 1>the entire places waterproof so's it's quite amazing. So each

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<v Speaker 1>of these and there were about ten different sets of

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<v Speaker 1>archives JP the Morgan Library of different basically bankers and

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<v Speaker 1>politicians at the time. And what you see when you

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<v Speaker 1>get into them is that although you can't to contemporaries interviews,

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<v Speaker 1>there are no emails, people back then really wrote letters,

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<v Speaker 1>and they really bared their souls and give an example

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<v Speaker 1>of of something you can you can learn from then

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<v Speaker 1>you couldn't learn today. Washington, d c. Obviously is a

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<v Speaker 1>very hot, steamy town. Before the ear of air conditioning,

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<v Speaker 1>political spouses would take the summer off. That was true

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<v Speaker 1>in n in the summer when the Federal Reserve Act

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<v Speaker 1>was really reaching a peak in terms of the legislation.

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<v Speaker 1>So Ellen Wilson, the President's rather delicate wife, holds up

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<v Speaker 1>in New Hampshire during the summer. So he's writing her

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<v Speaker 1>virtually every day, and you're seeing in the archives the

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<v Speaker 1>problems he's facing the legislation, which committees and committee congress

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<v Speaker 1>people are giving him trouble, what his strategy is. He's

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<v Speaker 1>telling her, don't worry. The press is writing this. They

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<v Speaker 1>don't know what they're talking about. I'm gonna do an

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<v Speaker 1>end run around him. People bear their souls and letters

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<v Speaker 1>in a way that's more trustworthy than an interview, because

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you go interview somebody, of course they're going

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<v Speaker 1>to tell you what they want you to know. But

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<v Speaker 1>is his Woodrow talking to his wife, or it's Paul

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<v Speaker 1>Warburg talking to his most trusted comrade or something, and

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<v Speaker 1>it just opens up a window into the contemporaneous activities

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<v Speaker 1>back years ago that that sounds like it would have

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<v Speaker 1>normally been dinner table conversation if if the misses was

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<v Speaker 1>in town. But since he doesn't get to come home

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<v Speaker 1>from work, how is your day, honey, here's what happened

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<v Speaker 1>in Congress. He actually wrote specific details. Do these guys

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<v Speaker 1>realize this stuff ends up in archives and libraries or

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<v Speaker 1>is it just Hey, I'll be dead. I don't care.

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<v Speaker 1>What's the thinking that. No, they're saving their letters, they're

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<v Speaker 1>saving duplicates. Carter Glass, who many people may know from

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<v Speaker 1>the Glass Steagel Act, but he's also the father, legislative

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<v Speaker 1>father the Fed Reserve Act, a very fiery guy. He

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<v Speaker 1>goes to the White House one day and Wilson shocks him.

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<v Speaker 1>Glass wants to have on this emergent legislation for this

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<v Speaker 1>new body, the Federal Reserve. He wants to be run

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<v Speaker 1>by bankers, not by federal appointees, not by presidential appointees.

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<v Speaker 1>Lewis Brand, Wilson's adviser, and William Jennings Bryant, his Secretary

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<v Speaker 1>of State, says, uh, this is a new day and

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<v Speaker 1>new a new dawn. This agency is going to run

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<v Speaker 1>the banking system has to be presidential appointees. Wilson lays

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<v Speaker 1>down the line. Glass goes back to his hotel. He's shocked,

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<v Speaker 1>he's outraged. He's a kind of he's a conservative, doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>he can't begins to write letters. You can see them

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<v Speaker 1>today on the Raleigh Hotel stationary. That's where he stayed

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<v Speaker 1>when he was in Washington. Page after page, he's exploding

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<v Speaker 1>off the page, you know he was. He wasn't thinking

0:12:29.640 --> 0:12:32.520
<v Speaker 1>then about his reputation for posterity because he sort of

0:12:32.520 --> 0:12:35.520
<v Speaker 1>embarrasses himself. He's a He's finally says to somebody, I'm

0:12:35.520 --> 0:12:37.240
<v Speaker 1>gonna call the president tomorrow and see if I can

0:12:37.240 --> 0:12:39.440
<v Speaker 1>get him to change his mind. No way, Wilson's gonna

0:12:39.520 --> 0:12:41.920
<v Speaker 1>change his mind. Wilson's made have made up his mind.

0:12:42.280 --> 0:12:46.560
<v Speaker 1>But um, they they they bear themselves in a way

0:12:46.640 --> 0:12:49.400
<v Speaker 1>that that we rarely see today. And it just because

0:12:49.440 --> 0:12:53.240
<v Speaker 1>there's such big characters in history. You know, if if

0:12:53.280 --> 0:12:55.160
<v Speaker 1>you're a nut for that sort of stuff, it's kind

0:12:55.160 --> 0:13:00.319
<v Speaker 1>of fascinating. Let me ask a broader historical question. How

0:13:00.320 --> 0:13:02.960
<v Speaker 1>come in the United States was one of the last

0:13:03.800 --> 0:13:07.600
<v Speaker 1>major industrial countries to get a central bank. You look

0:13:07.640 --> 0:13:10.800
<v Speaker 1>at Europe and Japan and elsewhere, just about everyone else

0:13:10.840 --> 0:13:13.800
<v Speaker 1>at a central bank. Why were we so far behind

0:13:14.520 --> 0:13:17.559
<v Speaker 1>the rest of the civilized world. So the thesis of

0:13:17.600 --> 0:13:20.760
<v Speaker 1>the book is, this is our heritage. We rebel against

0:13:20.840 --> 0:13:23.760
<v Speaker 1>the English king. Uh, we were at rebel against the

0:13:23.800 --> 0:13:27.120
<v Speaker 1>central government. What's the first debate in American history. It's

0:13:27.120 --> 0:13:30.760
<v Speaker 1>Hamilton's against Jefferson. Hamilton wants a central bank. Jefferson says, no,

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:35.240
<v Speaker 1>that's like the English tyranny that as settlers pushed west

0:13:35.240 --> 0:13:39.160
<v Speaker 1>and the pioneers pushed west. They're continually saying, we don't

0:13:39.200 --> 0:13:42.160
<v Speaker 1>want control by New York, we don't want control by Washington.

0:13:42.480 --> 0:13:45.600
<v Speaker 1>This is recreating everything that we rebelled against. And by

0:13:45.600 --> 0:13:48.480
<v Speaker 1>the way, Barry, look today, look to the Tea Party today.

0:13:48.720 --> 0:13:50.880
<v Speaker 1>You know they don't want a strong central legency. They

0:13:50.880 --> 0:13:53.160
<v Speaker 1>want to under the Fed right now. So in every

0:13:53.200 --> 0:13:55.920
<v Speaker 1>country in Europe they sort of accepted, we have a

0:13:56.360 --> 0:13:59.040
<v Speaker 1>national government, we have a national monetary system. Of course

0:13:59.080 --> 0:14:01.880
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna have a central bank. But in America, you know,

0:14:02.160 --> 0:14:05.200
<v Speaker 1>a good swath the population remains very touchy about it.

0:14:05.240 --> 0:14:07.840
<v Speaker 1>Ask Rand Paul, this is this is our heritage. And

0:14:07.840 --> 0:14:09.760
<v Speaker 1>if you look one whose last book, by the way,

0:14:09.840 --> 0:14:12.640
<v Speaker 1>was and one of the main opponents of the federal

0:14:12.679 --> 0:14:16.239
<v Speaker 1>reserve legislation is Charles Lindbergh, senior father of the Aviator,

0:14:16.480 --> 0:14:19.360
<v Speaker 1>real populist out in Minnesota, so who held this district

0:14:19.440 --> 0:14:21.240
<v Speaker 1>until a few years ago. In our day and age,

0:14:21.400 --> 0:14:24.680
<v Speaker 1>Michelle Bachman, the Tea Party Report. You know, Crusader, This

0:14:24.720 --> 0:14:27.520
<v Speaker 1>is not a coincidence. This is we have this populist,

0:14:27.800 --> 0:14:31.120
<v Speaker 1>suspicious mindset in much of the country that always feared

0:14:31.320 --> 0:14:34.160
<v Speaker 1>in Andrew Jackson's day, in Woodrow Wilson's day, and today

0:14:34.440 --> 0:14:36.800
<v Speaker 1>that if you have a central bank, Wall Street's gonna

0:14:36.840 --> 0:14:39.360
<v Speaker 1>run it, They're gonna be inco hoots against the common

0:14:39.360 --> 0:14:42.160
<v Speaker 1>man and so on, and that's that's our legacy. There

0:14:42.200 --> 0:14:44.840
<v Speaker 1>are people who wouldn't disagree with with those fears. Let

0:14:44.960 --> 0:14:48.760
<v Speaker 1>let me ask you a question about the most surprising

0:14:48.800 --> 0:14:52.040
<v Speaker 1>thing you found about the FED in your research. What

0:14:52.160 --> 0:14:55.360
<v Speaker 1>really leapt out and surprised you. You know, I was

0:14:55.400 --> 0:14:59.040
<v Speaker 1>surprised at how similar the eras were. People. We had

0:14:59.080 --> 0:15:02.840
<v Speaker 1>a financial cray seven. We had a bank panic, a

0:15:02.920 --> 0:15:04.760
<v Speaker 1>real panic. By the way, I don't mean red lines

0:15:04.760 --> 0:15:06.840
<v Speaker 1>in the computer screen. I mean people running to the

0:15:06.880 --> 0:15:09.560
<v Speaker 1>street corner to take their money for fd I c

0:15:10.360 --> 0:15:16.680
<v Speaker 1>pree really and every any federal supervision control of the currency.

0:15:16.720 --> 0:15:19.600
<v Speaker 1>One guy in Washington. That was it. But people were

0:15:19.880 --> 0:15:22.400
<v Speaker 1>some people wanted deposit insurance, some people were afraid of

0:15:22.440 --> 0:15:26.480
<v Speaker 1>moral hazard. That idea was, you know, very current JP

0:15:26.600 --> 0:15:28.920
<v Speaker 1>Morgan steps in. He's kind of a hero, kind of

0:15:28.960 --> 0:15:32.520
<v Speaker 1>like you know JP Morgan Chase today buying up bear Sterns.

0:15:32.560 --> 0:15:35.320
<v Speaker 1>Six months later, people are accusing JP Morgan of having

0:15:35.360 --> 0:15:38.360
<v Speaker 1>plotting the whole panic, and Teddy Roosevelt says, wait a second,

0:15:38.400 --> 0:15:40.600
<v Speaker 1>this is getting out of hand. People are people are

0:15:40.600 --> 0:15:42.760
<v Speaker 1>starting to say that every bank is something rotten in it.

0:15:43.080 --> 0:15:47.280
<v Speaker 1>Their populous fighting bankers. Uh, there's a people who want

0:15:47.280 --> 0:15:49.360
<v Speaker 1>the goal standard, people who are very upset about it

0:15:49.360 --> 0:15:52.120
<v Speaker 1>because they think it's too deflationary, too tough on the

0:15:52.160 --> 0:15:57.120
<v Speaker 1>average farmer, average worker. The the fights between regions of

0:15:57.160 --> 0:16:02.520
<v Speaker 1>the country Republicans and Democrats sounds just like today. It's

0:16:02.560 --> 0:16:06.240
<v Speaker 1>it's it's hard to I was shocked at how current

0:16:06.400 --> 0:16:09.040
<v Speaker 1>the debates sounded as I read them. You're listening to

0:16:09.120 --> 0:16:12.680
<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My guest today is

0:16:12.840 --> 0:16:16.840
<v Speaker 1>author and journalist Roger Lowenstein. You probably know him from

0:16:16.840 --> 0:16:19.720
<v Speaker 1>such books as When Genius Failed, The Rise and Full

0:16:19.760 --> 0:16:24.440
<v Speaker 1>of Long Term Capital Management, as well as Buffett Making

0:16:24.720 --> 0:16:28.280
<v Speaker 1>of an American Capitalist. I found Origins of the Crash

0:16:28.320 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 1>about the two thousand Crash to be fascinating book, and

0:16:31.600 --> 0:16:37.040
<v Speaker 1>it was tremendously helpful in my own research about compensation

0:16:37.320 --> 0:16:40.720
<v Speaker 1>and stock options. And and I recall you're the first

0:16:40.760 --> 0:16:44.680
<v Speaker 1>person who reported about the Hinz executive who I think

0:16:44.680 --> 0:16:48.760
<v Speaker 1>it was in had gotten a hundred million dollars. Some

0:16:48.880 --> 0:16:53.200
<v Speaker 1>insane that back when a hundred million dollars was real money,

0:16:53.720 --> 0:16:56.320
<v Speaker 1>it was. It was crazy. So let's talk a little

0:16:56.360 --> 0:17:00.160
<v Speaker 1>bit about your your research and your writing process. Us

0:17:00.520 --> 0:17:03.400
<v Speaker 1>walk us through through your process. How do you decide

0:17:03.440 --> 0:17:06.560
<v Speaker 1>on a topic. Where do you begin? Well, if you

0:17:07.240 --> 0:17:10.680
<v Speaker 1>let's look at the recent book America's Bank, it's a

0:17:10.800 --> 0:17:14.000
<v Speaker 1>history of the founding the Federal Reserve. I was interested

0:17:14.000 --> 0:17:16.639
<v Speaker 1>in doing a history. I began that one after the

0:17:16.720 --> 0:17:19.280
<v Speaker 1>last book, which was the End of Wall Street, which

0:17:19.320 --> 0:17:22.240
<v Speaker 1>was a contemporary story about the mortgage crash. I wanted

0:17:22.400 --> 0:17:24.840
<v Speaker 1>something historical. And as my editor and I were talking,

0:17:25.320 --> 0:17:27.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, it was we were very aware of how

0:17:27.680 --> 0:17:31.600
<v Speaker 1>present the Federal Reserve today had been in everything throughout

0:17:31.960 --> 0:17:34.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, throughout this experience in two thousand and two

0:17:34.040 --> 0:17:37.040
<v Speaker 1>thousand and nine. And she said, at one point, you know,

0:17:37.200 --> 0:17:40.399
<v Speaker 1>be interesting to look at what what the country was

0:17:40.440 --> 0:17:43.040
<v Speaker 1>like before we had a FED, How we're crises handled?

0:17:43.880 --> 0:17:45.720
<v Speaker 1>Why was it? The people thought, why didn't we have

0:17:45.760 --> 0:17:48.240
<v Speaker 1>one until so late? Why do they think we needed one?

0:17:48.240 --> 0:17:50.840
<v Speaker 1>How do they get one? And it just seemed it

0:17:50.880 --> 0:17:52.720
<v Speaker 1>just seemed to fit there. Would it would be in

0:17:52.720 --> 0:17:55.200
<v Speaker 1>a sense of great book end to the contemporary history

0:17:55.200 --> 0:17:57.920
<v Speaker 1>we're living today. So you said you were working with

0:17:58.000 --> 0:18:01.640
<v Speaker 1>your editor and she help you shape. I mean, we're

0:18:01.680 --> 0:18:06.520
<v Speaker 1>always throwing ideas back and forth and and she said, um,

0:18:06.600 --> 0:18:10.080
<v Speaker 1>and she's not a financial expert per se. She's and

0:18:10.280 --> 0:18:12.920
<v Speaker 1>got off. She's in my mind, the best editor there is,

0:18:13.840 --> 0:18:17.560
<v Speaker 1>but she's throwing out topic ideas. And then I would

0:18:17.560 --> 0:18:20.080
<v Speaker 1>go back and say, hey, is there something to this idea?

0:18:20.119 --> 0:18:23.720
<v Speaker 1>And started to research, um, what went into the making

0:18:23.720 --> 0:18:26.159
<v Speaker 1>of the Federal Reserve? What else has been written about it?

0:18:26.359 --> 0:18:29.040
<v Speaker 1>How resident is it to today? And you know, it's

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:33.480
<v Speaker 1>just astonished. There's this incredible, mysterious trip that bankers in

0:18:33.560 --> 0:18:35.879
<v Speaker 1>the U. S. Senator take down to a remote island

0:18:35.880 --> 0:18:38.240
<v Speaker 1>in Georgia. Because the thing is so controversial, they got

0:18:38.240 --> 0:18:41.600
<v Speaker 1>to plot it in secret. There's a Wall Street crash

0:18:41.760 --> 0:18:44.600
<v Speaker 1>very much like the crash that um that we just

0:18:44.960 --> 0:18:50.000
<v Speaker 1>lived through. There are great characters, great presidents, um, financial

0:18:50.000 --> 0:18:52.119
<v Speaker 1>tycoons and so on. And at that point I go

0:18:52.200 --> 0:18:54.160
<v Speaker 1>back to her and say, I think we got one here,

0:18:54.480 --> 0:18:56.320
<v Speaker 1>and she says, okay, put it in paper, because you

0:18:56.560 --> 0:19:00.560
<v Speaker 1>until you write a proposal, anything can sound good, uh,

0:19:00.600 --> 0:19:02.800
<v Speaker 1>in a coffee shop or you know, over the dinner table.

0:19:02.840 --> 0:19:04.960
<v Speaker 1>But and you're I think I wrote a proposal about

0:19:06.280 --> 0:19:08.440
<v Speaker 1>is something like that? And at that point she says,

0:19:08.440 --> 0:19:10.479
<v Speaker 1>wow this. You know you've got something here and let's go.

0:19:11.040 --> 0:19:14.880
<v Speaker 1>And then uh, you do a timeline. That's a that's

0:19:14.880 --> 0:19:17.960
<v Speaker 1>a for me, the most important next apt chronology of

0:19:18.000 --> 0:19:21.680
<v Speaker 1>a chronology of the events. What happens, you know, when

0:19:21.680 --> 0:19:24.600
<v Speaker 1>does the book start? And this book has a background period.

0:19:24.720 --> 0:19:27.920
<v Speaker 1>We go into the Gold Silver debates, across a Gold

0:19:27.960 --> 0:19:30.119
<v Speaker 1>Speech and all that stuff in the late nineteenth century.

0:19:30.160 --> 0:19:34.040
<v Speaker 1>To set the table um, Paul Warburger is a major character.

0:19:34.520 --> 0:19:38.760
<v Speaker 1>He this German financier emigrates the US, is astonished that

0:19:38.800 --> 0:19:40.919
<v Speaker 1>our system is so primitive, and you know, and he

0:19:40.960 --> 0:19:43.040
<v Speaker 1>begins to lobby for the federal reserves. So when does

0:19:43.080 --> 0:19:44.800
<v Speaker 1>he come in? When does he come into this country?

0:19:45.000 --> 0:19:47.360
<v Speaker 1>And you go on with a timeline so that as

0:19:47.359 --> 0:19:51.000
<v Speaker 1>you're getting information, you can add, you can fill it

0:19:51.040 --> 0:19:54.000
<v Speaker 1>into the timeline. So things are where you want to

0:19:54.040 --> 0:19:56.080
<v Speaker 1>find them when you go to you go to writing

0:19:56.119 --> 0:19:58.359
<v Speaker 1>the book. So let me talk a little bit about

0:19:58.359 --> 0:20:01.360
<v Speaker 1>some of your other books. Do you have any personal

0:20:01.400 --> 0:20:04.199
<v Speaker 1>favorites as a finished work? Which one of those books

0:20:04.800 --> 0:20:09.600
<v Speaker 1>the finished products are you happiest with? You know, it's

0:20:09.680 --> 0:20:12.639
<v Speaker 1>really for me as a writer, like asking about my

0:20:12.960 --> 0:20:15.720
<v Speaker 1>which one of your children? Of course, so I like

0:20:15.840 --> 0:20:19.400
<v Speaker 1>my three children best. After that, I like my six

0:20:19.440 --> 0:20:24.600
<v Speaker 1>books right right now, I'm very partial to America's Bank.

0:20:25.040 --> 0:20:31.800
<v Speaker 1>You know, it just came out. The history, the historical characters, Um.

0:20:32.080 --> 0:20:35.520
<v Speaker 1>The process of trying to bring them alive, UM, was

0:20:35.760 --> 0:20:39.240
<v Speaker 1>just enriching and fun for me. And UM, so that's

0:20:39.520 --> 0:20:42.320
<v Speaker 1>because it's so new, you know, you're it's not surprising.

0:20:42.359 --> 0:20:46.119
<v Speaker 1>I would say that you mentioned origins of the crash

0:20:46.200 --> 0:20:50.200
<v Speaker 1>the compensation system, and that for me was really fun

0:20:50.240 --> 0:20:53.320
<v Speaker 1>to dig into what's really wrong with the compensation system

0:20:53.359 --> 0:20:55.960
<v Speaker 1>and and to flush it out in a way I

0:20:55.960 --> 0:21:00.240
<v Speaker 1>hope hadn't been done before. Uh, the Pension book. You know,

0:21:00.280 --> 0:21:02.399
<v Speaker 1>in a way that was too early, because the idea

0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:04.920
<v Speaker 1>of that book was, hey, we have a real way,

0:21:05.000 --> 0:21:06.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, we have a problem. But I think it

0:21:06.840 --> 0:21:10.240
<v Speaker 1>still holds up today that these cities and states you

0:21:10.280 --> 0:21:15.240
<v Speaker 1>can't just keep legislating increases saying you know, we'll take

0:21:15.320 --> 0:21:17.280
<v Speaker 1>up we'll take care of it later. And that I mean,

0:21:17.320 --> 0:21:20.200
<v Speaker 1>look around today, you know, Puerto Rico, Illinois, wherever you look,

0:21:20.280 --> 0:21:23.880
<v Speaker 1>all these cities in California, Detroit, it's it's come home

0:21:24.160 --> 0:21:29.439
<v Speaker 1>to roost um. The Buffet book was really fun to

0:21:29.480 --> 0:21:32.639
<v Speaker 1>write because I was sitting in people's living rooms, partically

0:21:32.680 --> 0:21:36.479
<v Speaker 1>in Omaha, asking him about this little, um precocious kid

0:21:36.480 --> 0:21:38.399
<v Speaker 1>they knew named Warren, who was telling everybody he was

0:21:38.440 --> 0:21:40.280
<v Speaker 1>gonna be a millionaire back in the in the middle

0:21:40.280 --> 0:21:42.879
<v Speaker 1>of the depression in Nebraska, when nobody knew what a

0:21:42.880 --> 0:21:47.119
<v Speaker 1>million dollars was. Um, you know, so you liked them

0:21:47.160 --> 0:21:50.800
<v Speaker 1>all in a different way. When Genius Failed was a

0:21:50.840 --> 0:21:56.160
<v Speaker 1>really tough reporting exercise because as much as everybody wants

0:21:56.200 --> 0:21:59.040
<v Speaker 1>to get in on the Warren Buffet story and say, hey,

0:21:59.080 --> 0:22:01.080
<v Speaker 1>it was Warren and me, you know, I helped him

0:22:01.080 --> 0:22:03.399
<v Speaker 1>out on this, nobody wants to be part of the

0:22:03.440 --> 0:22:05.760
<v Speaker 1>when Genius failed story. Nobody wants to be part of

0:22:05.760 --> 0:22:08.640
<v Speaker 1>a hedge fund that went down. I'm Barry Ridults. You're

0:22:08.680 --> 0:22:12.200
<v Speaker 1>listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My guest

0:22:12.240 --> 0:22:17.480
<v Speaker 1>today is author Roger Lowenstein. His latest book is America's Bank,

0:22:17.560 --> 0:22:21.160
<v Speaker 1>the Epic struggle regarding the creation of the Federal Reserve.

0:22:21.640 --> 0:22:24.959
<v Speaker 1>And we were talking earlier about one of my not

0:22:25.080 --> 0:22:27.520
<v Speaker 1>just favorite Lowenstein books, but one of my all time

0:22:27.520 --> 0:22:32.240
<v Speaker 1>favorite finance books is When Genius Failed. And not just

0:22:32.400 --> 0:22:36.920
<v Speaker 1>because it's such a fascinating story and it is an

0:22:36.920 --> 0:22:41.000
<v Speaker 1>epic story of of hubrist and failure and and Nobel

0:22:41.080 --> 0:22:47.000
<v Speaker 1>laureates and people being blind blindsided by their own failings

0:22:47.000 --> 0:22:51.080
<v Speaker 1>and shortcomings, but the characters are so vivid and the

0:22:51.200 --> 0:22:55.960
<v Speaker 1>story is so amazing, and really it was the last

0:22:56.200 --> 0:23:02.680
<v Speaker 1>great opportunity for Wall Street to learn a lesson about risk,

0:23:03.359 --> 0:23:06.159
<v Speaker 1>and that was really a great missed opportunity. I recall

0:23:06.240 --> 0:23:11.720
<v Speaker 1>you ending the book UM and ending UH the discussion

0:23:12.000 --> 0:23:15.760
<v Speaker 1>of origins of the crash with a reference back to, Hey,

0:23:15.800 --> 0:23:20.040
<v Speaker 1>if the FED didn't bail out Wall Street with the

0:23:20.080 --> 0:23:23.600
<v Speaker 1>collapse of long term capital management, what lessons might the

0:23:23.640 --> 0:23:26.760
<v Speaker 1>Street have learned? So I said it in the end

0:23:26.800 --> 0:23:29.320
<v Speaker 1>of the book. Uh. Two things at the end of

0:23:29.320 --> 0:23:32.080
<v Speaker 1>but one was I thought that the Fed on balance

0:23:32.480 --> 0:23:35.760
<v Speaker 1>UM was wrong to organize the rescue because it was

0:23:35.800 --> 0:23:38.159
<v Speaker 1>a private sector rescue. So no dollars went into it.

0:23:38.200 --> 0:23:39.879
<v Speaker 1>But you know, when you have the New York Federal

0:23:39.880 --> 0:23:43.520
<v Speaker 1>Reserve Bank calling in the sixteen because Wall Street firms,

0:23:43.680 --> 0:23:46.520
<v Speaker 1>that's some pretty heavy pressure. You can't say, I have

0:23:46.560 --> 0:23:49.199
<v Speaker 1>a busy calendar. I can't make you cannot tell the

0:23:49.200 --> 0:23:51.760
<v Speaker 1>New Federals or if you have busy calendar, your chief regulator.

0:23:51.880 --> 0:23:55.119
<v Speaker 1>And I really thought at the time that as dire

0:23:55.160 --> 0:23:58.720
<v Speaker 1>as the crisis was, that Wall Street and the economy

0:23:58.760 --> 0:24:02.199
<v Speaker 1>would have worked its way through um. And look, you

0:24:02.200 --> 0:24:05.320
<v Speaker 1>don't want the government to come in unless they really

0:24:05.359 --> 0:24:08.920
<v Speaker 1>really really have to judgment call. But that was my judgment.

0:24:08.920 --> 0:24:10.000
<v Speaker 1>And the other thing I said at the end of

0:24:10.000 --> 0:24:12.520
<v Speaker 1>the book was I made a reference to the dot

0:24:12.600 --> 0:24:15.480
<v Speaker 1>com bubble, which was riding high at the time, and

0:24:15.480 --> 0:24:17.879
<v Speaker 1>and this might have let air out of the bubble

0:24:17.920 --> 0:24:20.840
<v Speaker 1>before it inflated so much so much larger. But of

0:24:20.880 --> 0:24:24.280
<v Speaker 1>course the real comparison, you know, and people have said

0:24:24.320 --> 0:24:27.119
<v Speaker 1>this to me later on, was that when Genius failed

0:24:27.280 --> 0:24:30.840
<v Speaker 1>about this collapse, his hedge fun was really a dry

0:24:30.960 --> 0:24:34.119
<v Speaker 1>run and a mislesson for the mortgage crisis. For the

0:24:34.160 --> 0:24:36.280
<v Speaker 1>bubble that you know so much seems similar. If you

0:24:36.280 --> 0:24:39.360
<v Speaker 1>look at a firm like Bear Stearns, these seemingly well

0:24:39.440 --> 0:24:44.240
<v Speaker 1>capitalized Wall Street firms with seemingly safe assets, you know,

0:24:44.560 --> 0:24:49.919
<v Speaker 1>mortgage securities, triple a uh, you know, low risk rating,

0:24:50.600 --> 0:24:54.160
<v Speaker 1>all of that, and suddenly nobody wants them. All correlations

0:24:54.200 --> 0:24:57.040
<v Speaker 1>go to one. Nobody wants any kind of these assets,

0:24:57.080 --> 0:24:58.960
<v Speaker 1>and just in so many. In fact, I did a

0:24:59.000 --> 0:25:02.240
<v Speaker 1>piece in the spring of two thousand and eight, the

0:25:02.280 --> 0:25:05.200
<v Speaker 1>tenth anniversary of when ltc M began to get into trouble,

0:25:05.600 --> 0:25:08.000
<v Speaker 1>uh and right around the time of Bear Sterns, because

0:25:08.000 --> 0:25:13.400
<v Speaker 1>the comparisons uh were so close to the level of leverage. Well,

0:25:13.600 --> 0:25:16.600
<v Speaker 1>LTCM a hundred to one, bear Sterns thirty five or

0:25:16.640 --> 0:25:19.440
<v Speaker 1>forty five to one, that's still a tremendous amount of

0:25:19.480 --> 0:25:25.960
<v Speaker 1>average dicey assets. Ltc M was backwater Russian paper as

0:25:25.960 --> 0:25:29.919
<v Speaker 1>amongst other stuff. Who really knew what securitized sub prime

0:25:29.960 --> 0:25:34.240
<v Speaker 1>mortgages were pre crisis. That's really something we all kind

0:25:34.240 --> 0:25:37.040
<v Speaker 1>of learned it once. And correlation is going to one

0:25:37.119 --> 0:25:39.919
<v Speaker 1>when nobody wants when the when the proverbially, you know

0:25:39.960 --> 0:25:43.120
<v Speaker 1>what hit the fan. Not only did nobody want Russian debt,

0:25:43.440 --> 0:25:46.520
<v Speaker 1>nobody wanted any kind of debt other than US treasuries,

0:25:46.560 --> 0:25:48.960
<v Speaker 1>and the same thing happened. You know, look in in

0:25:49.160 --> 0:25:52.400
<v Speaker 1>the fall of two thousand and eight, General Electric could

0:25:52.440 --> 0:25:56.040
<v Speaker 1>not sell its paper. Nobody wanted commercial debt, nobody wanted

0:25:56.160 --> 0:25:59.480
<v Speaker 1>risky paper with even this until of risk. And just

0:25:59.800 --> 0:26:03.080
<v Speaker 1>like General Electric or that's just like that point general

0:26:03.359 --> 0:26:08.400
<v Speaker 1>everything is a real example. You know, Goldman Sachs, which

0:26:08.480 --> 0:26:11.240
<v Speaker 1>on paper was completely solvent, was running off to Warren

0:26:11.240 --> 0:26:13.679
<v Speaker 1>Buffett to get capital because he was sort of the

0:26:13.680 --> 0:26:16.760
<v Speaker 1>only place that they could get capital from. And these

0:26:16.760 --> 0:26:19.920
<v Speaker 1>examples are just you it was just one firm and

0:26:19.960 --> 0:26:22.440
<v Speaker 1>a few firms around it. In two thousand and eight

0:26:22.760 --> 0:26:26.200
<v Speaker 1>it was all of Wall Street, so that was really

0:26:26.240 --> 0:26:30.760
<v Speaker 1>a missign And in terms of limits on leverage, reliance

0:26:30.920 --> 0:26:35.160
<v Speaker 1>on on arithmetic risk measures, which is really a big

0:26:35.240 --> 0:26:39.240
<v Speaker 1>theme in when Genius failed. These these you know, computerized

0:26:39.320 --> 0:26:42.240
<v Speaker 1>value at risk measures tell you you can only you're

0:26:42.280 --> 0:26:44.560
<v Speaker 1>only gonna lose so much. Why because the computer says

0:26:44.600 --> 0:26:47.600
<v Speaker 1>that's that's how much you've lost in every every previous day.

0:26:47.840 --> 0:26:50.400
<v Speaker 1>What about if tomorrow is different and they didn't learn

0:26:50.480 --> 0:26:53.640
<v Speaker 1>that lesson in what do you know suddenly in two

0:26:53.680 --> 0:26:56.800
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight tomorrow was different. So you had a

0:26:56.800 --> 0:26:59.280
<v Speaker 1>firm bear Stearns was trading what a hundred and seventy

0:26:59.280 --> 0:27:03.720
<v Speaker 1>bucks I think peaked around that and and a year

0:27:03.800 --> 0:27:06.320
<v Speaker 1>later it's sold for two dollars two dollars, but they

0:27:06.359 --> 0:27:09.360
<v Speaker 1>did lobby it back up to ten dollars. My favorite

0:27:09.400 --> 0:27:12.399
<v Speaker 1>picture of the entire crisis, some wise guy took a

0:27:12.400 --> 0:27:15.760
<v Speaker 1>two dollar bill taped it to the front glass door

0:27:15.760 --> 0:27:19.480
<v Speaker 1>of the new beautiful bear Sterns building over on Vanderbilt

0:27:19.480 --> 0:27:22.080
<v Speaker 1>and forty and there's a picture of the two dollar

0:27:22.119 --> 0:27:25.600
<v Speaker 1>bill with the bear Sterns logo that that is now

0:27:25.840 --> 0:27:28.520
<v Speaker 1>the JP Morgan building which they got as part of

0:27:28.520 --> 0:27:31.120
<v Speaker 1>the deal, that that might be one of the best

0:27:31.160 --> 0:27:34.880
<v Speaker 1>assets they picked up in that deal for pennies literally

0:27:34.920 --> 0:27:40.879
<v Speaker 1>pennies on the dollar. So lost opportunity to um prevent

0:27:40.920 --> 0:27:46.280
<v Speaker 1>a little moral hazard, inject a little normal risk management.

0:27:46.680 --> 0:27:49.560
<v Speaker 1>What other lessons do we pick up from from lt

0:27:49.720 --> 0:27:54.119
<v Speaker 1>CM that are applicable not to oh eight but today. Well,

0:27:54.240 --> 0:27:58.560
<v Speaker 1>one lesson is that when interest rates are very low, uh,

0:27:58.600 --> 0:28:00.800
<v Speaker 1>there's a particularly strong ten and see to look for

0:28:00.920 --> 0:28:03.840
<v Speaker 1>yield elsewhere and to reach to reach you know, how

0:28:03.880 --> 0:28:07.240
<v Speaker 1>often what is it hogs get fat, pigs get slaughter?

0:28:07.359 --> 0:28:10.000
<v Speaker 1>Is it the diverse but reaching for a little bit,

0:28:12.800 --> 0:28:16.680
<v Speaker 1>reaching for extra yield. Uh, when the safe stuff isn't

0:28:16.880 --> 0:28:19.600
<v Speaker 1>isn't paying off? Why do you think it's safe? Why

0:28:19.640 --> 0:28:22.159
<v Speaker 1>do you think the other stuff is paying more yield?

0:28:22.200 --> 0:28:24.640
<v Speaker 1>And the way to invest if you want to buy

0:28:24.680 --> 0:28:27.600
<v Speaker 1>the risky stuff, buy it when it's down by it,

0:28:27.600 --> 0:28:31.680
<v Speaker 1>when it's thirty cents in the dollars, or at least

0:28:32.080 --> 0:28:33.919
<v Speaker 1>when it's being this when you're getting paid for it.

0:28:34.280 --> 0:28:36.560
<v Speaker 1>That way. If you're wrong, yes you're wiped out. But

0:28:36.600 --> 0:28:39.160
<v Speaker 1>if you're right, you really get paid for it. But

0:28:39.160 --> 0:28:41.880
<v Speaker 1>but to buy a piece of potentially really risky paper

0:28:42.160 --> 0:28:44.320
<v Speaker 1>to make um, you know, a couple of a hundred

0:28:44.320 --> 0:28:47.320
<v Speaker 1>extra basis points, you know that, I think that's really lesson.

0:28:47.360 --> 0:28:50.160
<v Speaker 1>And to think that an asset that everyone regards as

0:28:50.200 --> 0:28:55.920
<v Speaker 1>safe therefore makes it safe. Look at these um mortgage securities. Okay,

0:28:55.960 --> 0:28:59.440
<v Speaker 1>so standard pors moody is, you know, Fitch. They all

0:28:59.480 --> 0:29:01.640
<v Speaker 1>said their trip bal a rated. But how many people

0:29:01.680 --> 0:29:04.400
<v Speaker 1>really looked at the Did anyone look at the securities

0:29:04.400 --> 0:29:06.680
<v Speaker 1>behind them? Did anyone look at the homes behind them?

0:29:06.760 --> 0:29:10.560
<v Speaker 1>The quality of mortgages so painfully few, you know, do

0:29:10.680 --> 0:29:14.560
<v Speaker 1>your own research, look at within those securities the fact

0:29:14.600 --> 0:29:17.320
<v Speaker 1>that everyone's in them might tell you, in fact that

0:29:17.360 --> 0:29:20.040
<v Speaker 1>they're selling for a pretty a high price, that they're

0:29:20.040 --> 0:29:22.280
<v Speaker 1>selling it a premium, and you should be extra wary.

0:29:22.360 --> 0:29:25.360
<v Speaker 1>And that that was a lesson that was just skated over.

0:29:25.960 --> 0:29:28.959
<v Speaker 1>And I think the other lesson is the over reliance

0:29:29.120 --> 0:29:33.440
<v Speaker 1>on the I mentioned this before, Uh, the arithmetics, the

0:29:33.480 --> 0:29:37.280
<v Speaker 1>computerization of Wall Street. Um, don't get fooled by these

0:29:37.280 --> 0:29:41.040
<v Speaker 1>spreadsheets and these you know, thirty page printouts. Look at

0:29:41.080 --> 0:29:44.880
<v Speaker 1>the underlying asset. You know, release your inner war and buffet,

0:29:44.920 --> 0:29:48.360
<v Speaker 1>so to speak. Beneath every security, there's an asset on

0:29:48.400 --> 0:29:51.280
<v Speaker 1>Main Street? What are the houses really worth? Don't look

0:29:51.280 --> 0:29:54.320
<v Speaker 1>at the trading patterns. The trading patterns don't tell you anything.

0:29:54.520 --> 0:29:56.160
<v Speaker 1>All they do is tell you what somebody else is

0:29:56.200 --> 0:29:59.280
<v Speaker 1>willing to pay for it yesterday. Because when liquidity drives up,

0:29:59.360 --> 0:30:01.360
<v Speaker 1>that's a meaning. This number, you know, there was there

0:30:01.400 --> 0:30:05.200
<v Speaker 1>was an embedded red flag in the whole proposition. And

0:30:05.240 --> 0:30:08.000
<v Speaker 1>I heard this repeatedly in oh four, oh five or six.

0:30:08.560 --> 0:30:11.400
<v Speaker 1>This is as safe as treasuries. It's rated triple A,

0:30:11.760 --> 0:30:15.200
<v Speaker 1>but it pays two fifty bases points more. Someone should

0:30:15.200 --> 0:30:19.120
<v Speaker 1>have turned around and said, isn't that economically impossible. Either

0:30:19.320 --> 0:30:22.880
<v Speaker 1>it's riskier and paying more, or it's not paying more

0:30:23.160 --> 0:30:25.320
<v Speaker 1>and it's the same risk. How do you get this

0:30:25.480 --> 0:30:30.920
<v Speaker 1>wildly disparate spread between two triple A rated things. Everybody

0:30:31.040 --> 0:30:34.360
<v Speaker 1>ignored that in the Reach for You. Barbara Reguez at

0:30:34.440 --> 0:30:36.960
<v Speaker 1>f p A, the Great Mutual Fund Investor, was one

0:30:37.000 --> 0:30:39.280
<v Speaker 1>of the few people who didn't ignore it. And I

0:30:39.280 --> 0:30:42.200
<v Speaker 1>think two thousand and six or seven he went to

0:30:42.240 --> 0:30:44.120
<v Speaker 1>the one of the meetings of one of the big

0:30:44.280 --> 0:30:47.479
<v Speaker 1>credit rating houses and he said, he asked him a question,

0:30:47.920 --> 0:30:51.960
<v Speaker 1>what happens what's the assumption behind your your your risk

0:30:52.080 --> 0:30:54.920
<v Speaker 1>ratings on real estate? And they said, our our assumption

0:30:55.040 --> 0:30:57.560
<v Speaker 1>is that the increase in real estate values is going

0:30:57.600 --> 0:31:00.560
<v Speaker 1>to taper off. And he said, well, what happens to

0:31:00.600 --> 0:31:02.920
<v Speaker 1>your assumptions if they don't taper off? But if real

0:31:03.040 --> 0:31:05.600
<v Speaker 1>estate prices are flat And they said, well, the models

0:31:05.600 --> 0:31:07.640
<v Speaker 1>will be a little off then. And then he said,

0:31:07.760 --> 0:31:10.400
<v Speaker 1>what happens to your models if in fact, real estate

0:31:10.440 --> 0:31:12.920
<v Speaker 1>prices in the US fall by say two percent a

0:31:13.000 --> 0:31:19.000
<v Speaker 1>year And they said, this is this is documented in

0:31:19.040 --> 0:31:20.760
<v Speaker 1>the book at the end of Wall Street. They said,

0:31:20.760 --> 0:31:23.920
<v Speaker 1>then the model completely breaks down. So here's a model

0:31:24.360 --> 0:31:27.160
<v Speaker 1>one of the three big rating agencies on which you

0:31:27.160 --> 0:31:31.800
<v Speaker 1>know thousands of investors are relying. And the assumption is

0:31:32.120 --> 0:31:34.440
<v Speaker 1>that there can't even be a two percent per year

0:31:34.480 --> 0:31:38.480
<v Speaker 1>decline in real estate prices, and before the next season comes,

0:31:38.680 --> 0:31:44.880
<v Speaker 1>we're having a five. That's what kind of uberses that.

0:31:45.480 --> 0:31:49.360
<v Speaker 1>Forget the Great Depression where real estate prices, depending on

0:31:49.440 --> 0:31:53.520
<v Speaker 1>what data you want to use, fell fifty. Back then,

0:31:53.640 --> 0:31:56.239
<v Speaker 1>mortgages were three or five year interest only you had

0:31:56.280 --> 0:31:59.400
<v Speaker 1>to roll them over. But just go back to the

0:31:59.440 --> 0:32:02.000
<v Speaker 1>early nine indies and you had a big real estate

0:32:02.440 --> 0:32:05.440
<v Speaker 1>pulled back from the peak of the late eighties. It

0:32:05.560 --> 0:32:09.120
<v Speaker 1>wasn't unthinkable to see flat real estate here in New

0:32:09.200 --> 0:32:11.440
<v Speaker 1>York City. You bought something in eighty nine, you didn't

0:32:11.480 --> 0:32:14.239
<v Speaker 1>get back to break even until ninety eight or so.

0:32:14.720 --> 0:32:17.400
<v Speaker 1>How could that not be? There was this myth that

0:32:17.520 --> 0:32:20.280
<v Speaker 1>real estate doesn't go down, And as you say, there

0:32:20.360 --> 0:32:24.360
<v Speaker 1>was a terrible real estate depression in basically nine to

0:32:25.440 --> 0:32:27.720
<v Speaker 1>It hit Texas, it hit the Midwest, it hit New

0:32:27.720 --> 0:32:31.240
<v Speaker 1>England and hit New York, hit Atlanta, hit Florida, um

0:32:31.280 --> 0:32:35.120
<v Speaker 1>everywhere where Moody's in SMP actually operated. Yeah, so I

0:32:35.160 --> 0:32:37.160
<v Speaker 1>don't know how this you know it was a sort

0:32:37.160 --> 0:32:39.560
<v Speaker 1>of at this time. It's different. Uh, same thing with

0:32:39.600 --> 0:32:41.760
<v Speaker 1>the tech bubble. Uh, you know, this is different new

0:32:41.800 --> 0:32:44.320
<v Speaker 1>economy all that stuff. Um. Look, it happened with the

0:32:44.400 --> 0:32:48.200
<v Speaker 1>railroads in the in the eighteen sixties, seventies and eighties. Um,

0:32:48.360 --> 0:32:50.560
<v Speaker 1>we have a lot of railroads today. But those original

0:32:50.600 --> 0:32:54.400
<v Speaker 1>securities aren't worth anything, most of them. Uh, there's this

0:32:54.560 --> 0:32:59.360
<v Speaker 1>fiber optic, television, automobiles crossing right name and industry. There

0:32:59.400 --> 0:33:01.200
<v Speaker 1>was a boom and bust, and then you building on

0:33:01.280 --> 0:33:05.120
<v Speaker 1>the on the survivors. Virtually all of the early computer makers,

0:33:05.120 --> 0:33:07.720
<v Speaker 1>the Tandi's and so on, they're gone. Computers are here,

0:33:07.920 --> 0:33:10.520
<v Speaker 1>Both those early manufacturers aren't here. People who want to

0:33:10.560 --> 0:33:15.080
<v Speaker 1>find your work outside of Amazon and Roger Lowenstein dot com.

0:33:15.120 --> 0:33:18.040
<v Speaker 1>Where else can they see what you've done? You know,

0:33:18.120 --> 0:33:21.800
<v Speaker 1>Barnes and Noble, Amazon, the website, Roger Lowenstein dot com,

0:33:21.880 --> 0:33:23.960
<v Speaker 1>and the indie bookstores. I love to sell books in

0:33:23.960 --> 0:33:27.120
<v Speaker 1>indie bookstores. There you go in independent bookstores. We've been

0:33:27.160 --> 0:33:30.800
<v Speaker 1>speaking with Roger Lowenstein. Be sure and hang around for

0:33:30.880 --> 0:33:33.240
<v Speaker 1>the rest of our conversation. That will put up on

0:33:33.280 --> 0:33:38.360
<v Speaker 1>the web and on Apple, iTunes, SoundCloud, and Bloomberg dot com.

0:33:38.520 --> 0:33:42.480
<v Speaker 1>Check out my daily column on Bloomberg View dot com.

0:33:42.680 --> 0:33:46.920
<v Speaker 1>Follow me on Twitter at rid Halts. I'm Barry rid Holts.

0:33:47.120 --> 0:33:50.440
<v Speaker 1>You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

0:33:51.200 --> 0:33:54.200
<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business is brought to you by x On

0:33:54.280 --> 0:33:59.000
<v Speaker 1>Mobile Energy Lives Here. Welcome back to the podcast. My

0:33:59.160 --> 0:34:03.360
<v Speaker 1>guest this week is Roger Lowenstein, who is actually an

0:34:03.360 --> 0:34:06.320
<v Speaker 1>author I've been reading for quite a while and I've

0:34:06.320 --> 0:34:09.040
<v Speaker 1>been a huge fan of his work. His his books

0:34:09.080 --> 0:34:13.200
<v Speaker 1>are um, how do I say this and not embarrass him?

0:34:14.160 --> 0:34:18.360
<v Speaker 1>They are the standard by which all financial writing is measured.

0:34:18.640 --> 0:34:21.680
<v Speaker 1>There aren't a lot of people who can take a

0:34:21.880 --> 0:34:24.840
<v Speaker 1>relatively dry topic and make it come to life the

0:34:24.840 --> 0:34:31.440
<v Speaker 1>way you can. And you seem to pensions, uh, complex

0:34:31.600 --> 0:34:36.320
<v Speaker 1>financial instruments that crash on an obscure hedge funds stop

0:34:36.360 --> 0:34:40.080
<v Speaker 1>and think about, and the Federal Reserve. These are terrible,

0:34:40.280 --> 0:34:43.920
<v Speaker 1>terrible topics that you had to make a compelling pitch

0:34:44.280 --> 0:34:47.600
<v Speaker 1>for a publisher to say that sounds like a great idea,

0:34:48.320 --> 0:34:51.840
<v Speaker 1>and you described the pitch for America's Bank. I remember

0:34:51.840 --> 0:34:55.680
<v Speaker 1>when Genius Fail came out that was relatively soon after

0:34:55.760 --> 0:34:58.760
<v Speaker 1>everything kind of hit the fan, wasn't it? How deep

0:34:58.880 --> 0:35:02.440
<v Speaker 1>and long was that after the collapse. That was a

0:35:02.520 --> 0:35:05.319
<v Speaker 1>real rushed pace because that it was so tied to

0:35:05.400 --> 0:35:09.360
<v Speaker 1>one event. Um they that rush paste suits you because

0:35:09.360 --> 0:35:12.239
<v Speaker 1>that book is so readable you don't even need an

0:35:12.280 --> 0:35:16.000
<v Speaker 1>interest in finance. It's a great narrative thing of itself.

0:35:16.040 --> 0:35:18.719
<v Speaker 1>That book came out excuse that they imploded in the

0:35:18.760 --> 0:35:21.560
<v Speaker 1>full of course, and the book came out exactly two

0:35:21.640 --> 0:35:24.799
<v Speaker 1>years later. So that's a story search it. You got

0:35:24.800 --> 0:35:26.919
<v Speaker 1>to write it. The publisher needs, you know, a good

0:35:26.920 --> 0:35:28.880
<v Speaker 1>eight months to turn around, so it was it was

0:35:28.920 --> 0:35:31.480
<v Speaker 1>a very fast You should get Brad Pitt to do

0:35:31.520 --> 0:35:34.080
<v Speaker 1>a movie version of you know, he should call my agent.

0:35:34.560 --> 0:35:37.880
<v Speaker 1>All right, well, I think Michael Lewis has him lockdown

0:35:38.080 --> 0:35:41.480
<v Speaker 1>for money. Bull was not only a great book, but

0:35:41.520 --> 0:35:44.240
<v Speaker 1>a fabulous movie. Everything I hear about The Big Short

0:35:44.600 --> 0:35:46.759
<v Speaker 1>is that it's a great movie. But I think I

0:35:46.760 --> 0:35:49.440
<v Speaker 1>would actually like you to play, you know, a lead role. Okay,

0:35:49.640 --> 0:35:52.280
<v Speaker 1>no wants to see my fat behind on screen. This

0:35:53.160 --> 0:35:58.319
<v Speaker 1>when Genius failed. It's such a great story. It's it's

0:35:58.360 --> 0:36:01.160
<v Speaker 1>from a purely let me gush a bit, from a

0:36:01.320 --> 0:36:07.880
<v Speaker 1>purely financial perspective. It's a fascinating tale about Nobel Laurel

0:36:07.880 --> 0:36:11.880
<v Speaker 1>its and complexity and value at risk and all the

0:36:11.960 --> 0:36:15.960
<v Speaker 1>other we talked about, all the mathematical um illusions that

0:36:16.040 --> 0:36:19.839
<v Speaker 1>create a full sense of certainty that lead people to say, yeah,

0:36:19.880 --> 0:36:21.920
<v Speaker 1>we could buy this obscure paper at a hundred and one.

0:36:22.239 --> 0:36:27.719
<v Speaker 1>But the narrative about all the people is absolutely fascinating. Well,

0:36:27.800 --> 0:36:31.120
<v Speaker 1>thank you the narrative people. Really, I mean you you

0:36:31.200 --> 0:36:33.680
<v Speaker 1>opened up by saying you know you're right about boring topics,

0:36:33.680 --> 0:36:37.360
<v Speaker 1>but you you don't make them boring. That's the people wrote,

0:36:37.560 --> 0:36:41.120
<v Speaker 1>not boring, right, So that's always the key. So you know,

0:36:41.200 --> 0:36:44.280
<v Speaker 1>this America's Bank about the FED, but it's not about

0:36:44.280 --> 0:36:46.560
<v Speaker 1>the FED. It's about Woodward Wilson and Paul Warburg and

0:36:46.680 --> 0:36:50.279
<v Speaker 1>JP Morgan and Teddy Roosevelt. These people are fun in

0:36:50.520 --> 0:36:55.279
<v Speaker 1>um and when genius failed, the narrative in way I

0:36:55.280 --> 0:36:58.160
<v Speaker 1>think it was almost a template narrative for financial crisis.

0:36:58.200 --> 0:37:01.080
<v Speaker 1>You had these guys who were considered the smartest guys

0:37:01.120 --> 0:37:02.960
<v Speaker 1>on Earth or on Wall Street. So let's go over

0:37:03.040 --> 0:37:05.960
<v Speaker 1>some of the list. You have John mer John Merryweather,

0:37:06.520 --> 0:37:10.239
<v Speaker 1>who was head of Solomon Brothers, or the head of

0:37:10.239 --> 0:37:14.759
<v Speaker 1>the risk arbitrage that the risk arbitrage, the UH, the

0:37:14.840 --> 0:37:18.239
<v Speaker 1>trading the high powered trading group at Solomn Brothers did

0:37:18.280 --> 0:37:22.120
<v Speaker 1>this in house, left with a few of his guys

0:37:22.120 --> 0:37:26.440
<v Speaker 1>such as Eric Rosenfeld, Larry hillibrand Victor Gatti Uh to

0:37:26.560 --> 0:37:30.680
<v Speaker 1>start their own head shoes Stacks development in that group.

0:37:30.840 --> 0:37:33.080
<v Speaker 1>I can't remember where shoes stack came from. So um

0:37:33.239 --> 0:37:36.160
<v Speaker 1>but then we also had not one, but two Nobel Laureates.

0:37:36.360 --> 0:37:40.080
<v Speaker 1>Of course they became Nobel Prize winners during um uh

0:37:40.360 --> 0:37:43.160
<v Speaker 1>during the period in which LTCM was up and running.

0:37:43.640 --> 0:37:48.520
<v Speaker 1>Uh well it wasn't wasn't um right? But what uh

0:37:49.520 --> 0:37:52.480
<v Speaker 1>Myron Shoals didn't he win previous to No, they both won.

0:37:54.480 --> 0:37:57.960
<v Speaker 1>So but look they were acclaimed to claim they had

0:37:58.000 --> 0:38:02.360
<v Speaker 1>invented along with fish are black the black shows option

0:38:02.400 --> 0:38:05.040
<v Speaker 1>pricing theory. So you know who could this is like

0:38:05.040 --> 0:38:08.279
<v Speaker 1>getting Jonas Salt to prescribe penicillin. You know they are

0:38:08.719 --> 0:38:12.000
<v Speaker 1>you know who who could better trade risk? These guys

0:38:12.040 --> 0:38:14.719
<v Speaker 1>that had amaze invented if they created the method for

0:38:14.760 --> 0:38:19.160
<v Speaker 1>evaluating risky they created the modern method for evaluating a

0:38:19.280 --> 0:38:22.960
<v Speaker 1>risk in an arithmetic sense, which is different, by the way,

0:38:22.960 --> 0:38:27.000
<v Speaker 1>than risk the notion of uncertainty. If you look at,

0:38:27.360 --> 0:38:29.880
<v Speaker 1>for instance, if you're standing at the edge of the cliff,

0:38:30.760 --> 0:38:34.279
<v Speaker 1>and and you see maybe tend people the edge of

0:38:34.280 --> 0:38:35.920
<v Speaker 1>the cliff, and you say, I wonder what the odds

0:38:36.000 --> 0:38:37.759
<v Speaker 1>are that one of those people are going to fall

0:38:37.760 --> 0:38:42.000
<v Speaker 1>off the cliff. That's uncertainty, not risk. You can't calculate

0:38:42.040 --> 0:38:45.040
<v Speaker 1>the odds. You know that the closer they get to

0:38:45.040 --> 0:38:48.480
<v Speaker 1>the cliff, the higher degree of likelhood is, but there's

0:38:48.520 --> 0:38:51.600
<v Speaker 1>no way of measuring it. However, if someone said to you,

0:38:52.080 --> 0:38:54.759
<v Speaker 1>what's if I roll dice, what's the odds I'm gonna

0:38:54.800 --> 0:38:56.759
<v Speaker 1>roll snakeheads snake guys, I can tell you it's one

0:38:56.760 --> 0:39:00.560
<v Speaker 1>out of thirty six. That's the difference between how regulated

0:39:00.800 --> 0:39:04.760
<v Speaker 1>arithmetic risk and uncertainty. Most things that happen in financial

0:39:04.800 --> 0:39:08.600
<v Speaker 1>markets really are given over to uncertainty. What's the risk

0:39:08.680 --> 0:39:10.560
<v Speaker 1>that some company is going to have a terrible quarter?

0:39:10.880 --> 0:39:12.399
<v Speaker 1>Is it one out of three, one out of four,

0:39:12.520 --> 0:39:16.279
<v Speaker 1>one out of eight? Hard to measure. The conceit of

0:39:16.320 --> 0:39:20.160
<v Speaker 1>these risk managers, of of of these scholars was to

0:39:20.360 --> 0:39:24.279
<v Speaker 1>think that they could turn financial markets from uncertainty to risk,

0:39:24.360 --> 0:39:26.839
<v Speaker 1>that it could be calculable, that they could determine down

0:39:26.920 --> 0:39:30.000
<v Speaker 1>to the penny what their risk exposure was, and it

0:39:30.040 --> 0:39:33.359
<v Speaker 1>turned out to be dead wrong. Isn't that the underlying

0:39:33.480 --> 0:39:37.160
<v Speaker 1>issue with all models? You know? The statistician George Box

0:39:37.560 --> 0:39:40.560
<v Speaker 1>has a wonderful quote, all models are wrong, but some

0:39:40.680 --> 0:39:44.120
<v Speaker 1>are useful. Once we forget that this is merely a

0:39:44.239 --> 0:39:48.319
<v Speaker 1>useful model and start thinking it's true, it's reality, not

0:39:48.400 --> 0:39:51.359
<v Speaker 1>just a depiction of reality, doesn't that lead us down

0:39:51.360 --> 0:39:56.160
<v Speaker 1>the road to increasing the possibility of of some implosion? Yes,

0:39:56.239 --> 0:39:58.440
<v Speaker 1>because you you bet on. Look, if if you had

0:39:58.440 --> 0:40:01.200
<v Speaker 1>been if you'd ask some uh, some guy with a

0:40:01.239 --> 0:40:04.279
<v Speaker 1>computer model in the year two thousand, what are the

0:40:04.280 --> 0:40:06.920
<v Speaker 1>odds that we would have a cataclysmic breakdown of the

0:40:06.920 --> 0:40:09.520
<v Speaker 1>economic system and then unemployment would go to ten percent?

0:40:10.080 --> 0:40:12.600
<v Speaker 1>He would say, we haven't had a real breakdown since

0:40:12.640 --> 0:40:15.719
<v Speaker 1>the Great Depression. Unemployment hasn't been ten percent since the

0:40:15.760 --> 0:40:18.400
<v Speaker 1>early nineteen eighties. You know, I would say, the odds are,

0:40:18.680 --> 0:40:21.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, one and a hundred if this happens. If

0:40:21.160 --> 0:40:25.080
<v Speaker 1>you asked him now, he'd say, even money, even money,

0:40:25.160 --> 0:40:27.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, isn't that? Isn't that like the hundred year floods.

0:40:28.120 --> 0:40:31.440
<v Speaker 1>They always show these houses washed away on the banks

0:40:31.440 --> 0:40:33.520
<v Speaker 1>of the missiles we're getting every two years. Yeah, you're right,

0:40:33.520 --> 0:40:36.360
<v Speaker 1>it's maybe we need to rename the hundred of your flood.

0:40:36.480 --> 0:40:39.120
<v Speaker 1>That's very different than if you're at Las Vegas. You

0:40:39.200 --> 0:40:41.120
<v Speaker 1>know what the odds are at black check and they

0:40:41.160 --> 0:40:45.160
<v Speaker 1>don't change, so you can make an intelligent mathematical bet

0:40:45.600 --> 0:40:50.240
<v Speaker 1>at Black Chack. Securities are different, to say the very least.

0:40:50.640 --> 0:40:55.240
<v Speaker 1>So UM. John Corzine is mentioned in Long Time Capital

0:40:55.239 --> 0:40:59.680
<v Speaker 1>Management in One Genius Failed. What was his involvement in

0:41:00.120 --> 0:41:04.480
<v Speaker 1>uh in the hedge Fund? He had a very significant

0:41:04.520 --> 0:41:08.520
<v Speaker 1>involvement in that story. And um, this is the former

0:41:09.040 --> 0:41:12.399
<v Speaker 1>CEO of Goldman Sachs and then governor and senator from

0:41:12.440 --> 0:41:17.320
<v Speaker 1>New Jersey who ultimately ended up running UM. What was

0:41:17.360 --> 0:41:19.319
<v Speaker 1>the company that we had a little Jersey company with

0:41:19.320 --> 0:41:22.799
<v Speaker 1>a little sniff, Yeah, oh, dear lord, you'll plug it in,

0:41:22.840 --> 0:41:25.360
<v Speaker 1>but pop in. We were talking about the reading glasses.

0:41:25.600 --> 0:41:29.760
<v Speaker 1>This is another So he m global, m F global,

0:41:29.840 --> 0:41:32.120
<v Speaker 1>very good. So I liked John a lot, and um

0:41:32.120 --> 0:41:34.040
<v Speaker 1>he was a very helpful source to me when I

0:41:34.080 --> 0:41:37.920
<v Speaker 1>was researching the book. He had UM a large involvement

0:41:37.960 --> 0:41:42.680
<v Speaker 1>in some ways the tragic involvement with LTCM LTCM needed

0:41:43.120 --> 0:41:45.560
<v Speaker 1>this is the hedge fund. Of course. John Murraywether's hedge

0:41:45.560 --> 0:41:49.680
<v Speaker 1>fund needed strong financial backers, people who would fund its trades,

0:41:49.719 --> 0:41:52.560
<v Speaker 1>and they basically went to the main Wall street firms,

0:41:52.719 --> 0:41:59.200
<v Speaker 1>so Mol Goldman and so Goldman was very very involved

0:41:59.680 --> 0:42:04.560
<v Speaker 1>in UM backing LTC. M uh core design at the

0:42:04.640 --> 0:42:09.000
<v Speaker 1>time was co chief coc Co Ceo. I believe the

0:42:09.000 --> 0:42:13.600
<v Speaker 1>title was with a guy named John, Hank Paulson, UM

0:42:13.640 --> 0:42:16.640
<v Speaker 1>and Goldman. Believe it or not, it is hard to

0:42:16.640 --> 0:42:20.240
<v Speaker 1>believe because it seems so Reacon was then a private firm.

0:42:20.280 --> 0:42:23.480
<v Speaker 1>That's right. Everybody forgets most of these banks were private

0:42:23.480 --> 0:42:26.360
<v Speaker 1>firms prior to twenty years ago. So that makes a

0:42:26.400 --> 0:42:31.120
<v Speaker 1>big difference because you know, Merrill Lynch is UM lending

0:42:31.160 --> 0:42:34.920
<v Speaker 1>some of their credit over to LTCM, so is Morgan Stanley.

0:42:35.040 --> 0:42:36.960
<v Speaker 1>Uh So, why does it make a difference that they're

0:42:36.960 --> 0:42:39.680
<v Speaker 1>a partnership and not a public because doesn't Merrill go

0:42:39.760 --> 0:42:42.600
<v Speaker 1>home at night and don't worry about it when the

0:42:42.600 --> 0:42:45.560
<v Speaker 1>guys go home from Goldman. It's their capital in the line.

0:42:45.600 --> 0:42:49.480
<v Speaker 1>It's a partnership. It's owned by John Corsign and Hank

0:42:49.520 --> 0:42:52.960
<v Speaker 1>Paulson and the other you know senior bankers. A joint

0:42:53.000 --> 0:42:56.719
<v Speaker 1>and several liability means that if the firm collapses, they

0:42:56.719 --> 0:43:00.920
<v Speaker 1>don't just lose their stock options, they lose their entire everything.

0:43:00.960 --> 0:43:04.720
<v Speaker 1>They are on the hook as partners untill every partner's

0:43:04.760 --> 0:43:08.320
<v Speaker 1>assets are exciting. And look, let's let's you know, at

0:43:08.400 --> 0:43:12.080
<v Speaker 1>Meryl Today or at at at any public securities firm.

0:43:12.920 --> 0:43:15.560
<v Speaker 1>The people who are called partners aren't really partners. Their

0:43:15.600 --> 0:43:19.000
<v Speaker 1>managing directors or whatever shareholders. They own a small scintilla

0:43:19.120 --> 0:43:23.160
<v Speaker 1>of the firm, but their liability is limited to that ownership.

0:43:23.200 --> 0:43:25.759
<v Speaker 1>But the partners at Goldman owned it all. So the

0:43:25.760 --> 0:43:29.640
<v Speaker 1>exposure to ltc M was their exposure. So what happens

0:43:29.680 --> 0:43:33.759
<v Speaker 1>as lt cm UH starts to go down UH is

0:43:34.120 --> 0:43:37.759
<v Speaker 1>they're scrambling around for money and they're turning to the

0:43:37.800 --> 0:43:41.200
<v Speaker 1>big Wall Street firms. John Corsign is very involved in

0:43:41.280 --> 0:43:45.280
<v Speaker 1>trying to get um UH big folks on Wall Street,

0:43:45.280 --> 0:43:48.759
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett, others to put up money. Goldman thinks about

0:43:48.800 --> 0:43:53.359
<v Speaker 1>whether it should recapitalize UM ltc M. At the same

0:43:53.360 --> 0:43:57.319
<v Speaker 1>time his partners are getting UH core designs. Partners at

0:43:57.360 --> 0:43:59.520
<v Speaker 1>Goldman are getting more and more upset with him because

0:44:00.200 --> 0:44:02.480
<v Speaker 1>they don't want more of their capital risk. And to

0:44:02.560 --> 0:44:06.960
<v Speaker 1>make matters worse, Goldman has an I P. O scheduled. Okay,

0:44:07.080 --> 0:44:08.759
<v Speaker 1>right in the middle of this, what do you want

0:44:08.760 --> 0:44:10.640
<v Speaker 1>to do? You know, when you have an I p O.

0:44:11.000 --> 0:44:12.400
<v Speaker 1>You want to have a road show. You want to

0:44:12.400 --> 0:44:15.040
<v Speaker 1>direct dress yourself up, you want to look pretty. We're

0:44:15.040 --> 0:44:17.359
<v Speaker 1>a great firm. We've been around since uh you know

0:44:17.400 --> 0:44:20.080
<v Speaker 1>Sam Sacks in nine ten or whatever it was. You

0:44:20.080 --> 0:44:22.840
<v Speaker 1>don't really want to go on the road and say, oh,

0:44:23.000 --> 0:44:26.320
<v Speaker 1>we got major exposure to the worst hedge fund implosion

0:44:26.960 --> 0:44:30.800
<v Speaker 1>in history, in history. And as this is going down,

0:44:31.640 --> 0:44:34.600
<v Speaker 1>core Design is battling his partners. As the FED is

0:44:34.640 --> 0:44:37.359
<v Speaker 1>telling all the Wall Street banks you gotta go in.

0:44:37.680 --> 0:44:40.000
<v Speaker 1>You each got to put up a few hundred million

0:44:40.080 --> 0:44:44.000
<v Speaker 1>dollars to bail out this firm, Core Design is getting

0:44:44.000 --> 0:44:47.120
<v Speaker 1>it from his partners, and he really, um, he really

0:44:47.200 --> 0:44:50.719
<v Speaker 1>lays his own backside on the line. At the end

0:44:50.719 --> 0:44:53.920
<v Speaker 1>of the day, Goldman does join the consortium. Uh, they

0:44:53.960 --> 0:44:59.000
<v Speaker 1>do bail out LTCM. Uh. The I p O is

0:44:59.560 --> 0:45:02.919
<v Speaker 1>post owned, but at the moment it's canceled that nobody knows.

0:45:03.080 --> 0:45:06.839
<v Speaker 1>Goldman is itself uh suffering huge losses because they owned

0:45:06.880 --> 0:45:09.600
<v Speaker 1>some of the security same securities the LTCM does. Everybody's

0:45:09.600 --> 0:45:13.080
<v Speaker 1>getting everybody's Piggy the same Meryl takes a terrific loss

0:45:13.080 --> 0:45:16.799
<v Speaker 1>to UH and John Corzyne is sacked and loses his

0:45:16.920 --> 0:45:20.480
<v Speaker 1>loses his job, he goes into politics, and goes into politics,

0:45:20.560 --> 0:45:23.440
<v Speaker 1>and and um, you know, I think we we talked

0:45:23.440 --> 0:45:27.200
<v Speaker 1>about MF Global, and I wondered after that went down

0:45:27.360 --> 0:45:30.560
<v Speaker 1>if some of that over reaching there was an attempt

0:45:30.600 --> 0:45:35.239
<v Speaker 1>to regain some of the rehability loss luster at at

0:45:35.800 --> 0:45:39.120
<v Speaker 1>the unfortunate way his career ended at Goldman. But I

0:45:39.560 --> 0:45:42.399
<v Speaker 1>really think, um, he was being a citizen of Wall

0:45:42.400 --> 0:45:44.160
<v Speaker 1>Street and a citizen of the country when he said

0:45:44.160 --> 0:45:46.600
<v Speaker 1>we we got to participate in this, We got to

0:45:46.640 --> 0:45:48.480
<v Speaker 1>see this thing through. So he fell on his sword.

0:45:49.400 --> 0:45:52.839
<v Speaker 1>Quite fascinating. There's a footnote to the rescue of Long

0:45:52.920 --> 0:45:56.240
<v Speaker 1>Term Capital Management. Of all the banks on Wall Street,

0:45:56.800 --> 0:46:00.560
<v Speaker 1>one refused to participate, That's right. So that was bear

0:46:00.600 --> 0:46:05.440
<v Speaker 1>sterns Uh. They were the prime book broker of of LTCM.

0:46:05.520 --> 0:46:09.240
<v Speaker 1>So they said, we have too much exposure to LTCM already.

0:46:09.600 --> 0:46:11.480
<v Speaker 1>We can't bail them out. We're already on in the

0:46:11.480 --> 0:46:13.920
<v Speaker 1>hook as a counter party, and we have holdings and

0:46:14.000 --> 0:46:15.880
<v Speaker 1>we have this, and we have that. What were the

0:46:15.920 --> 0:46:19.640
<v Speaker 1>repercussions of that a decade later. Well, so that's a

0:46:19.719 --> 0:46:23.680
<v Speaker 1>great you know, Wall Street parlor discussion. Jimmy Caine didn't

0:46:23.680 --> 0:46:26.399
<v Speaker 1>want any more exposure than it came time to help

0:46:26.400 --> 0:46:28.680
<v Speaker 1>out Bear. Was anybody going to help them? And so on?

0:46:29.480 --> 0:46:32.440
<v Speaker 1>Um uh, you know, at the end of the day,

0:46:32.880 --> 0:46:36.000
<v Speaker 1>JP Morgan Chase did come in to buy them at

0:46:36.040 --> 0:46:41.080
<v Speaker 1>two dollars, at two bucks, but down from almost right

0:46:41.120 --> 0:46:43.160
<v Speaker 1>and with the Fed's backing. Let's not forget it was

0:46:43.200 --> 0:46:48.640
<v Speaker 1>only agreed to guarantee. You know, Carl con said it,

0:46:49.040 --> 0:46:50.960
<v Speaker 1>you want a friend on Wall Street by a dog.

0:46:51.600 --> 0:46:55.319
<v Speaker 1>I think if someone had thought Bear Stearns was worth uh,

0:46:55.400 --> 0:46:58.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, twenty bucks, they would have paid twenty bucks

0:46:58.239 --> 0:47:01.239
<v Speaker 1>and everyone was terrified. No one want to step back. Yeah. So,

0:47:01.320 --> 0:47:04.960
<v Speaker 1>although it certainly seemed to be poetic justice, I think

0:47:04.960 --> 0:47:07.240
<v Speaker 1>that's the point you're arriving at it, and I agree

0:47:07.239 --> 0:47:10.600
<v Speaker 1>with you. You know, suddenly the tables returned. I don't

0:47:10.640 --> 0:47:13.520
<v Speaker 1>think that's the reason that that they came a cropper.

0:47:13.560 --> 0:47:16.000
<v Speaker 1>I I you know, people in Wall Street, we're gonna

0:47:16.080 --> 0:47:18.719
<v Speaker 1>offer whatever they thought Bear Stearns was worth, not a

0:47:18.760 --> 0:47:21.040
<v Speaker 1>penny more, not a penny less on account of what

0:47:21.200 --> 0:47:24.640
<v Speaker 1>they had or hadn't done for LTCM. Wall Street just doesn't.

0:47:24.960 --> 0:47:28.120
<v Speaker 1>It's it's too cold blooded, right, it's too bloodless for

0:47:28.160 --> 0:47:30.120
<v Speaker 1>that to have happened. But it's still there's a touch

0:47:30.160 --> 0:47:34.480
<v Speaker 1>of irony in that. Here, here's the one firm that

0:47:34.520 --> 0:47:38.160
<v Speaker 1>didn't participate in that. It's very ironic. That's right to

0:47:38.200 --> 0:47:42.960
<v Speaker 1>say the least um so Lehman participated didn't do them

0:47:43.000 --> 0:47:44.960
<v Speaker 1>a lot of good ten years later. Now, now my

0:47:45.000 --> 0:47:47.800
<v Speaker 1>favorite footnote with Lehman. Since you brought up the gentleman

0:47:47.880 --> 0:47:50.960
<v Speaker 1>name Warren Buffett, and not a lot of people knew this,

0:47:51.160 --> 0:47:54.440
<v Speaker 1>I dropped this into bail outmation. I've mentioned that many times.

0:47:54.600 --> 0:47:57.279
<v Speaker 1>People say, I don't I never heard that before. Is

0:47:57.280 --> 0:48:01.839
<v Speaker 1>that true? When Lehman was spending the summer looking for

0:48:01.880 --> 0:48:04.840
<v Speaker 1>financing and we have the Korean finances amidst Bank of

0:48:04.920 --> 0:48:09.640
<v Speaker 1>Mitsubishi and all these people who ultimately fell through, Buffett

0:48:10.000 --> 0:48:14.719
<v Speaker 1>made a very credible multibillion dollar offer to Dick Fold

0:48:14.800 --> 0:48:19.080
<v Speaker 1>of Lehman brothers, including and and by the time we

0:48:19.120 --> 0:48:25.040
<v Speaker 1>got to oh eight, Berkshire Hathaway was essentially the Wall

0:48:25.040 --> 0:48:29.120
<v Speaker 1>Street equivalent of the Good Housekeeping Seal of approval, and

0:48:29.360 --> 0:48:33.600
<v Speaker 1>Fold said, look at this terrible deal. Uncle Warren is

0:48:33.680 --> 0:48:38.840
<v Speaker 1>offering us. This is awful. He's trying to steal the company.

0:48:39.320 --> 0:48:41.359
<v Speaker 1>It turns out that that was a much better deal

0:48:41.440 --> 0:48:44.920
<v Speaker 1>that he ultimately ended up doing with Goldman Sachs, a

0:48:45.000 --> 0:48:49.440
<v Speaker 1>much bigger, better, stronger bank. Goldman got better, worse terms

0:48:49.520 --> 0:48:53.160
<v Speaker 1>than Dick Fold rejected. Yes, because the when he when

0:48:53.160 --> 0:48:56.640
<v Speaker 1>Buffett did the Goldman deal, although Goldman's obviously stronger firm,

0:48:56.960 --> 0:48:59.239
<v Speaker 1>the conditions on Wall Street by then had become so

0:48:59.360 --> 0:49:02.439
<v Speaker 1>much more die or that. But that was three months later.

0:49:02.880 --> 0:49:05.359
<v Speaker 1>It's not like it was years later, four months later.

0:49:05.400 --> 0:49:09.240
<v Speaker 1>It was. Yes, it was after Lehman said no to Warren,

0:49:09.360 --> 0:49:12.280
<v Speaker 1>and ultimately, now it turned out at that point Goldman

0:49:12.760 --> 0:49:15.200
<v Speaker 1>was you know, everybody was saying, o our Morgan Stanley

0:49:15.200 --> 0:49:17.120
<v Speaker 1>and Goldman going to be the next martl the next Lehman.

0:49:17.200 --> 0:49:20.120
<v Speaker 1>At that point, Goldman was not in a position to negotiate. Obviously,

0:49:20.160 --> 0:49:23.640
<v Speaker 1>had Dick Fold cut that deal, it's very unlikely that

0:49:23.760 --> 0:49:26.200
<v Speaker 1>Lehman would have gone down, because you know what that

0:49:26.200 --> 0:49:29.080
<v Speaker 1>would have done for its confidence. But Dick Fold, you know,

0:49:29.520 --> 0:49:31.759
<v Speaker 1>you get a better deal, and he got wrong. You know,

0:49:31.800 --> 0:49:35.320
<v Speaker 1>the amazing thing is Folded Buffett a favor because between

0:49:35.360 --> 0:49:39.120
<v Speaker 1>REPO one oh five and everything else. Who news knows

0:49:39.360 --> 0:49:42.680
<v Speaker 1>how long it would have taken for Buffett to make

0:49:42.680 --> 0:49:44.799
<v Speaker 1>his money back. Maybe he never makes it. Maybe he

0:49:44.840 --> 0:49:49.200
<v Speaker 1>never makes it back. That's correct, that's correct, And so

0:49:49.280 --> 0:49:52.719
<v Speaker 1>we end up with a situation that Fold, being not

0:49:53.040 --> 0:49:58.240
<v Speaker 1>especially smart or or let's just say, especially arrogant about

0:49:58.320 --> 0:50:01.759
<v Speaker 1>the deal, rejects Buffett. Sends Buffett a few months later

0:50:01.840 --> 0:50:05.160
<v Speaker 1>into the arms of a much better deal, which ultimately

0:50:05.200 --> 0:50:08.640
<v Speaker 1>made him what was in a nine percent ten percent

0:50:08.680 --> 0:50:11.640
<v Speaker 1>coupon plus a nice slug of equity that was a

0:50:11.680 --> 0:50:14.279
<v Speaker 1>home run for Yes, I heard Buffett talking about it

0:50:15.080 --> 0:50:17.440
<v Speaker 1>at Berkshire's annual meeting. I can't recall his last year

0:50:17.480 --> 0:50:20.000
<v Speaker 1>the year before, but he started to talk about how

0:50:20.000 --> 0:50:22.000
<v Speaker 1>it was ten percent and he said, you know, uh,

0:50:22.200 --> 0:50:24.640
<v Speaker 1>we get paid even when we're sleeping. Ten percent tick

0:50:24.760 --> 0:50:28.600
<v Speaker 1>tick tick with the deal made him very happy, to

0:50:28.640 --> 0:50:30.359
<v Speaker 1>say the least. So let's talk a little bit about

0:50:30.400 --> 0:50:33.920
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett. And you wrote a book on him before

0:50:34.280 --> 0:50:37.719
<v Speaker 1>he was the legend he is today. What was it

0:50:37.760 --> 0:50:42.560
<v Speaker 1>like researching Buffett in Omaha? What was that process like?

0:50:43.120 --> 0:50:46.120
<v Speaker 1>It was a lot of fun because, um, you know,

0:50:46.200 --> 0:50:48.720
<v Speaker 1>some people are famous because of one thing that happens

0:50:48.719 --> 0:50:52.560
<v Speaker 1>in their career or because they're successful. But um, if

0:50:52.600 --> 0:50:55.840
<v Speaker 1>you went back, um earlier in their career, you know,

0:50:55.960 --> 0:51:00.400
<v Speaker 1>in their childhood, you wouldn't necessarily see that. You know,

0:51:00.440 --> 0:51:03.360
<v Speaker 1>young Michael Eisner was going to be in the entertainment business.

0:51:03.719 --> 0:51:06.719
<v Speaker 1>There are very few people. You know, Steve Jobs is

0:51:06.760 --> 0:51:09.799
<v Speaker 1>obviously Steve Jobs from the moment. You know, he was

0:51:09.840 --> 0:51:12.120
<v Speaker 1>different from the beginning, from when they were hacking phone

0:51:12.360 --> 0:51:16.359
<v Speaker 1>and and most Mozart was writing symphonies. You know, from

0:51:16.360 --> 0:51:20.200
<v Speaker 1>the time he was four. Uh, Buffett was like that.

0:51:20.520 --> 0:51:24.319
<v Speaker 1>He was thinking about making money, fascinated by it. Uh,

0:51:24.560 --> 0:51:26.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, from the age he could talk. He walked

0:51:26.280 --> 0:51:28.640
<v Speaker 1>around with a little change person you know, you know,

0:51:28.800 --> 0:51:31.080
<v Speaker 1>like a Triluman's change personally, you know, strapped to his

0:51:33.560 --> 0:51:36.319
<v Speaker 1>he was you know, he was selling cokes, he was

0:51:36.320 --> 0:51:39.360
<v Speaker 1>selling lemonades. He was going to the race track looking

0:51:39.400 --> 0:51:41.520
<v Speaker 1>for use tickets. Every so often you found one that

0:51:41.560 --> 0:51:44.719
<v Speaker 1>someone had arrently discarded. It was worth something. He was

0:51:45.000 --> 0:51:48.080
<v Speaker 1>telling people as a uh, you know, a twelve year

0:51:48.080 --> 0:51:49.799
<v Speaker 1>old boy, he was going to be a millionaire by

0:51:49.800 --> 0:51:51.480
<v Speaker 1>the time he was thirty, or he's going to jump

0:51:51.480 --> 0:51:54.560
<v Speaker 1>off the tallest building in Omaha, which I guess was

0:51:54.560 --> 0:51:56.759
<v Speaker 1>tall enough to do some damage and which horrified people.

0:51:57.200 --> 0:52:00.800
<v Speaker 1>But so this it wasn't by accident that he became,

0:52:01.440 --> 0:52:05.000
<v Speaker 1>if you. Um. When I talked to his former fraternity brothers,

0:52:05.360 --> 0:52:08.000
<v Speaker 1>they said that they would have this game at at

0:52:08.040 --> 0:52:12.240
<v Speaker 1>fraternity nights. They would gather around a semicircle and listen

0:52:12.320 --> 0:52:14.920
<v Speaker 1>and ask him questions. They lobb him questions. They just

0:52:15.000 --> 0:52:17.640
<v Speaker 1>like to hear him talk. He was such a good talker,

0:52:17.920 --> 0:52:20.000
<v Speaker 1>such a good explainer. And then I thought of that,

0:52:20.320 --> 0:52:23.080
<v Speaker 1>this is the guy who would have people come to

0:52:23.120 --> 0:52:25.000
<v Speaker 1>his annual meeting because people have to hear him talk,

0:52:25.080 --> 0:52:29.360
<v Speaker 1>the great explainer. Um. There was just something intrinsic and

0:52:29.400 --> 0:52:32.520
<v Speaker 1>inherent about the person, uh that that has come out

0:52:32.560 --> 0:52:35.480
<v Speaker 1>in his career. So it was just fun to uncover

0:52:35.560 --> 0:52:38.239
<v Speaker 1>these steps all along the way. It was all of

0:52:38.280 --> 0:52:42.680
<v Speaker 1>a piece. Um. The Warren Buffett who hangs onto his

0:52:42.719 --> 0:52:46.520
<v Speaker 1>stocks for so long, you know, forever being his favorite

0:52:46.520 --> 0:52:48.960
<v Speaker 1>holding period. As he says, and and and often lives by.

0:52:49.560 --> 0:52:52.880
<v Speaker 1>He's the guy who never changes his foods, never changes

0:52:52.960 --> 0:52:56.160
<v Speaker 1>his restaurants, still lives in the same house he lived

0:52:56.280 --> 0:52:59.040
<v Speaker 1>fifty years ago, still works on that street in Omaha.

0:52:59.760 --> 0:53:04.719
<v Speaker 1>So the biography was a there's no Warren Buffet at

0:53:04.719 --> 0:53:06.960
<v Speaker 1>work and Warren Buffett at home. It's just warn Buffett.

0:53:07.000 --> 0:53:09.919
<v Speaker 1>There's one guy. There's one guy, and you know, you'd

0:53:09.960 --> 0:53:13.200
<v Speaker 1>hear about him and his wife going out to dinner

0:53:13.600 --> 0:53:16.279
<v Speaker 1>and the couple of good friends are entertaining them, and

0:53:16.760 --> 0:53:19.760
<v Speaker 1>after twenty minutes, Warren's often aside room reading an annual report.

0:53:20.000 --> 0:53:24.320
<v Speaker 1>That's his dinner. What now today, I think Charlie Munger

0:53:24.400 --> 0:53:28.080
<v Speaker 1>has really come into his own. He's really regarded as

0:53:28.160 --> 0:53:30.359
<v Speaker 1>an equal partner to Buffet, although I don't know how

0:53:31.160 --> 0:53:35.399
<v Speaker 1>widespread that belief either is today or certainly was ten

0:53:35.520 --> 0:53:39.400
<v Speaker 1>or twenty years ago. What was your thought process with

0:53:39.680 --> 0:53:43.960
<v Speaker 1>Munger as his partner when you were researching? Uh, Buffett,

0:53:44.320 --> 0:53:47.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't think Munger is or was an equal partner

0:53:47.520 --> 0:53:50.560
<v Speaker 1>in the sense that overwhelmingly the bulk of the ideas

0:53:51.080 --> 0:53:53.520
<v Speaker 1>that end up in the Berkshire, and I'm a shareholder,

0:53:53.520 --> 0:53:58.040
<v Speaker 1>I should say full disclosure. Uh, overwhelmingly they come from Warren.

0:53:58.560 --> 0:54:01.920
<v Speaker 1>But um, Charlie is unique ability and it is unique

0:54:01.920 --> 0:54:04.399
<v Speaker 1>with regard to Warren is he can tell him he's

0:54:04.440 --> 0:54:06.920
<v Speaker 1>fully you know what, not a lot of people can

0:54:07.160 --> 0:54:11.000
<v Speaker 1>he is fearless. I mean Warren used to call him.

0:54:11.000 --> 0:54:12.640
<v Speaker 1>I think I use this line in the book The

0:54:12.680 --> 0:54:17.240
<v Speaker 1>Abominable no Man. But Charlie's not afraid to say Warren,

0:54:17.360 --> 0:54:20.000
<v Speaker 1>you're full of it. This is wrong, this is crazy.

0:54:20.440 --> 0:54:22.920
<v Speaker 1>I don't like this. And so they just have this,

0:54:23.320 --> 0:54:26.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, freewheeling relationship like you and I are talking.

0:54:26.280 --> 0:54:30.400
<v Speaker 1>You know, we're not afraid. And whereas it may be

0:54:30.520 --> 0:54:33.279
<v Speaker 1>one of the longest running partnerships I'm aware of, they've

0:54:33.320 --> 0:54:36.560
<v Speaker 1>been working together for how long they've been working together

0:54:36.719 --> 0:54:40.919
<v Speaker 1>since the mid seventies, So you're talking forty plus years. Yeah,

0:54:40.920 --> 0:54:43.680
<v Speaker 1>you're talking forty plus years? Um, how many? And they

0:54:43.680 --> 0:54:46.280
<v Speaker 1>were and they were good friends from the late sixties.

0:54:46.840 --> 0:54:49.759
<v Speaker 1>Uh Monger was a blue Chip Stamps at some point,

0:54:50.000 --> 0:54:52.560
<v Speaker 1>I believe in the early seventies blue Chip merges into

0:54:53.000 --> 0:54:55.520
<v Speaker 1>UH to Berkshire Hathaway. So they had a sort of

0:54:55.520 --> 0:54:58.279
<v Speaker 1>an unofficial partnership going on, and then at some point

0:54:58.280 --> 0:55:00.800
<v Speaker 1>they're in the same company and it's an official relationship.

0:55:01.880 --> 0:55:04.400
<v Speaker 1>How many people are you know? Warren's now run Brookshire.

0:55:04.400 --> 0:55:07.480
<v Speaker 1>This is the fiftieth anniversary. Monger has been there for

0:55:07.560 --> 0:55:10.600
<v Speaker 1>virtually all of it. You know, so the record of

0:55:10.600 --> 0:55:15.239
<v Speaker 1>management consistency is unheard of, probably never to be replicated.

0:55:15.760 --> 0:55:20.320
<v Speaker 1>But Monger himself is scarily bright. He has terrific instincts

0:55:20.320 --> 0:55:25.240
<v Speaker 1>about business. Uh. He has a BS monitor or detector,

0:55:25.640 --> 0:55:28.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, that is second to none. Great instincts, great

0:55:28.560 --> 0:55:32.719
<v Speaker 1>perspective instincts. And he's not so diplomatic. In fact, he's

0:55:32.719 --> 0:55:35.399
<v Speaker 1>not diplomatic at all. That that's the beauty. He's just

0:55:35.520 --> 0:55:39.400
<v Speaker 1>says what he thinks. And Warren is not like. Warren

0:55:39.480 --> 0:55:43.280
<v Speaker 1>doesn't like conflict, doesn't want to hurt people's feelings. Central

0:55:44.520 --> 0:55:47.520
<v Speaker 1>cent Charlie at that had given the bad news. Um.

0:55:47.640 --> 0:55:51.040
<v Speaker 1>But so that that's the dynamic. There's a little Lenin

0:55:51.080 --> 0:55:55.160
<v Speaker 1>and McCartney there. There each different, two geniuses in their

0:55:55.160 --> 0:55:58.040
<v Speaker 1>own way. Yeah, but I I don't think it's right

0:55:58.120 --> 0:56:03.040
<v Speaker 1>to look at them as um. Warren is the executive operator.

0:56:03.160 --> 0:56:06.160
<v Speaker 1>He's the guy who's coming up uh with most of

0:56:06.160 --> 0:56:10.040
<v Speaker 1>the ideas. When one of the units wants to say

0:56:10.080 --> 0:56:13.719
<v Speaker 1>invest more capital, that Warren's making that decision. Yes, that

0:56:13.760 --> 0:56:16.319
<v Speaker 1>sounds like a good project or no, uh, you can

0:56:16.360 --> 0:56:18.040
<v Speaker 1>dive it in that money back to Omaha, thank you.

0:56:18.040 --> 0:56:20.040
<v Speaker 1>We'll find something better to do. With it. Those are

0:56:20.040 --> 0:56:24.200
<v Speaker 1>Warren's decisions, but the tough decisions he's They have a

0:56:24.280 --> 0:56:27.440
<v Speaker 1>running conversation and so Charlie is going to be in

0:56:27.600 --> 0:56:30.520
<v Speaker 1>on all those. He took Sees Candy to Warren. That

0:56:30.600 --> 0:56:33.879
<v Speaker 1>was because California Candy, it was an early company He's taking.

0:56:33.920 --> 0:56:36.520
<v Speaker 1>You know, plenty of others over the years, but this

0:56:37.520 --> 0:56:41.240
<v Speaker 1>he was very influential. Also early on when Warren made

0:56:41.600 --> 0:56:45.759
<v Speaker 1>something of a switch, not in his philosophy but in

0:56:45.840 --> 0:56:49.640
<v Speaker 1>his approach in being willing to pay up more for

0:56:49.800 --> 0:56:52.799
<v Speaker 1>good business as this think from paying as this think

0:56:52.880 --> 0:56:55.720
<v Speaker 1>from only paying really low prices for businesses and naturally

0:56:56.200 --> 0:57:01.480
<v Speaker 1>once so good and Monger's discussed that philosophy as a

0:57:01.560 --> 0:57:06.120
<v Speaker 1>good business has a value that it's very hard to

0:57:06.640 --> 0:57:10.520
<v Speaker 1>um either recognize or or easy to underestimate the value

0:57:10.920 --> 0:57:13.560
<v Speaker 1>of a really good business that even a terrible management

0:57:13.600 --> 0:57:16.840
<v Speaker 1>team can't message the gift that keeps on giving. Uh.

0:57:16.920 --> 0:57:20.080
<v Speaker 1>So you know what is it worth to be Sees

0:57:20.160 --> 0:57:23.600
<v Speaker 1>Candy and Airport in those stands? Uh? Would you pay

0:57:23.640 --> 0:57:26.800
<v Speaker 1>more for it than you know, Joe's candy, someone's never

0:57:26.840 --> 0:57:28.720
<v Speaker 1>heard of. You would pay more for it? Now? How

0:57:28.800 --> 0:57:31.760
<v Speaker 1>much more? That? That's an open question? But Munger really worked.

0:57:31.800 --> 0:57:34.520
<v Speaker 1>And now Phil Fisher, the Great Investor, was another person

0:57:34.600 --> 0:57:38.640
<v Speaker 1>who worked on Buffett, who stuff Buffett read and influenced

0:57:38.680 --> 0:57:41.680
<v Speaker 1>him in that regard and moved him away from the

0:57:41.720 --> 0:57:44.880
<v Speaker 1>strict Ben Graham buying stuff for you know, just less

0:57:44.880 --> 0:57:46.640
<v Speaker 1>in the cash value of the scurity and so on.

0:57:47.120 --> 0:57:49.880
<v Speaker 1>So when you were researching this, you spend a lot

0:57:49.920 --> 0:57:52.600
<v Speaker 1>of time in in Omaha, Nebraska, a lot of time.

0:57:53.160 --> 0:57:55.680
<v Speaker 1>What was that like and what was it like speaking

0:57:55.720 --> 0:57:59.600
<v Speaker 1>to all these local families who had known young Warren

0:57:59.640 --> 0:58:02.040
<v Speaker 1>as a it The first thing that was interesting me

0:58:02.040 --> 0:58:03.960
<v Speaker 1>about Omaha was if you come from the East, and

0:58:03.960 --> 0:58:06.880
<v Speaker 1>I came from New York, you think of Omaha as

0:58:06.880 --> 0:58:10.120
<v Speaker 1>a complete hay seed place. Uh, you know, I think

0:58:10.120 --> 0:58:12.480
<v Speaker 1>of Mutual of Omaha's the first thing that pops into

0:58:12.560 --> 0:58:15.120
<v Speaker 1>my head. But I'm of the age where that show

0:58:15.240 --> 0:58:17.840
<v Speaker 1>was on Sunday nights when I was a kid, and

0:58:17.920 --> 0:58:20.959
<v Speaker 1>so that's been drilled into my head for however many

0:58:21.120 --> 0:58:23.320
<v Speaker 1>years of my youth. So I thought of as purely

0:58:23.360 --> 0:58:26.280
<v Speaker 1>the sticks, and what I saw was it's a real city,

0:58:26.520 --> 0:58:29.520
<v Speaker 1>a real downtown. Warren Buffett was not a farmer. His

0:58:29.560 --> 0:58:33.520
<v Speaker 1>father was. His father was a stockbroker. And I say

0:58:33.560 --> 0:58:36.280
<v Speaker 1>that because there was this tendency to to say that

0:58:36.360 --> 0:58:38.800
<v Speaker 1>the street Warren Buffett is some savant who you know,

0:58:38.880 --> 0:58:41.840
<v Speaker 1>wizard of oz who emerged on the planes or something.

0:58:42.200 --> 0:58:43.760
<v Speaker 1>But he was not a farm boy. He was not

0:58:43.800 --> 0:58:46.680
<v Speaker 1>a hay seed stockbroker's son. Grew up in an urban

0:58:46.760 --> 0:58:49.720
<v Speaker 1>area or not too far from a completely an urban area,

0:58:50.160 --> 0:58:52.640
<v Speaker 1>and he roamed the streets of Omaha. He went to

0:58:52.680 --> 0:58:55.240
<v Speaker 1>his father's you know, stockbroker in office. He was not

0:58:55.960 --> 0:59:01.160
<v Speaker 1>uh uh some you know Carlos Castanada, uh, you know,

0:59:01.520 --> 0:59:05.320
<v Speaker 1>a grarian savant or something. Um. And that was that

0:59:05.400 --> 0:59:07.960
<v Speaker 1>was the thing that struck me about Omaha was and

0:59:08.000 --> 0:59:10.000
<v Speaker 1>for you know, if you're in Nebraska, it's a big city.

0:59:10.120 --> 0:59:14.360
<v Speaker 1>You know. He was following the baseball teams and so on, um,

0:59:14.560 --> 0:59:17.920
<v Speaker 1>following the stock market and so as a kid, uh,

0:59:18.120 --> 0:59:21.680
<v Speaker 1>the research in Omaha just all these people who knew him,

0:59:21.680 --> 0:59:24.280
<v Speaker 1>and the story never changed. He thought about nothing but

0:59:24.440 --> 0:59:27.240
<v Speaker 1>making money morning, noon and night. And he had this

0:59:27.360 --> 0:59:32.880
<v Speaker 1>infectious enthusiasm so that everybody he knew at every stage

0:59:32.880 --> 0:59:34.880
<v Speaker 1>of his life got caught up in it. And I

0:59:35.320 --> 0:59:37.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, for instance, this idea to you know, to

0:59:38.440 --> 0:59:40.800
<v Speaker 1>to drum home, the point how it was there all along.

0:59:41.320 --> 0:59:43.720
<v Speaker 1>He used to say that he liked his favorite business

0:59:43.720 --> 0:59:46.720
<v Speaker 1>would be a monopoly toll bridge. Okay, so because you

0:59:46.760 --> 0:59:48.760
<v Speaker 1>know monopoly toll bridge, you gotta get over the bridge.

0:59:48.920 --> 0:59:51.440
<v Speaker 1>He's the only one they can set the toll. So

0:59:51.680 --> 0:59:54.480
<v Speaker 1>he's sitting pretty right. So it turns out I was interviewing.

0:59:54.560 --> 0:59:56.880
<v Speaker 1>I'll never forget this his He had a friend named

0:59:56.920 --> 0:59:59.800
<v Speaker 1>Bob Russell he grew up with. They were friends, particularly

0:59:59.800 --> 1:00:02.840
<v Speaker 1>when he was ten twelve round there. Bob Russell's mother

1:00:02.880 --> 1:00:04.959
<v Speaker 1>was still living when I when I was researching the book,

1:00:05.440 --> 1:00:08.120
<v Speaker 1>and she said, and they had a house that overlooked

1:00:08.120 --> 1:00:12.160
<v Speaker 1>a main thoroughfare in Omaha where trolley went by, and

1:00:12.200 --> 1:00:13.880
<v Speaker 1>they had a porch and they'd sit on the porch

1:00:13.920 --> 1:00:17.000
<v Speaker 1>drink lemonades and watch the trolley. And Mrs Russell said,

1:00:17.000 --> 1:00:19.080
<v Speaker 1>he used to sit there and say, if only you

1:00:19.120 --> 1:00:22.480
<v Speaker 1>could set up a toll booth. Mrs Russell judge the trolley?

1:00:22.640 --> 1:00:25.320
<v Speaker 1>What what? Twelve year old thanks of this? You know,

1:00:25.360 --> 1:00:28.120
<v Speaker 1>it's more like give me another lemonade. But not Warren Buffett.

1:00:28.320 --> 1:00:30.160
<v Speaker 1>He's thinking of setting up a toll booth on a

1:00:30.200 --> 1:00:33.400
<v Speaker 1>busy street. Uh you know when he's twelve years old,

1:00:33.880 --> 1:00:37.439
<v Speaker 1>and so that that was just something in him that

1:00:37.440 --> 1:00:40.080
<v Speaker 1>that that you know, And so I as I wrote

1:00:40.080 --> 1:00:42.800
<v Speaker 1>the book, I sort of thought that regardless of what

1:00:42.880 --> 1:00:46.120
<v Speaker 1>society he had been born into, um, you know, he

1:00:46.120 --> 1:00:48.520
<v Speaker 1>would have been the numbers guy, the financial guy. He

1:00:48.560 --> 1:00:50.880
<v Speaker 1>was born to do it. So before I get into

1:00:50.920 --> 1:00:54.800
<v Speaker 1>some of my favorite questions, I'm compelled to ask, what's

1:00:54.840 --> 1:00:56.640
<v Speaker 1>the next book we're going to see from you? The

1:00:56.640 --> 1:00:58.800
<v Speaker 1>next book will be a history. I'm going over a

1:00:58.800 --> 1:01:02.480
<v Speaker 1>few ideas I am not in a position to tell

1:01:02.520 --> 1:01:06.040
<v Speaker 1>you which we enjoyed this sort of deep diving. I

1:01:06.120 --> 1:01:09.919
<v Speaker 1>really loved UM late nineteenth century, early twentieth century. There's

1:01:09.920 --> 1:01:13.840
<v Speaker 1>a sort of a larger than life equality, Gilded Age,

1:01:13.880 --> 1:01:18.560
<v Speaker 1>progressive era, UM because really everything else I've read of

1:01:18.600 --> 1:01:22.160
<v Speaker 1>yours was sort of teared right off the headlines, so

1:01:22.440 --> 1:01:24.840
<v Speaker 1>very tell. If you look at those books, there's there's

1:01:24.880 --> 1:01:26.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot of history and all of them, if you

1:01:26.680 --> 1:01:30.360
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of context, which requires understanding the history

1:01:30.560 --> 1:01:33.520
<v Speaker 1>of the history of markets, the history of pension funds,

1:01:33.560 --> 1:01:36.360
<v Speaker 1>the history of Warren Buffets goes back to Ben Graham,

1:01:36.440 --> 1:01:38.720
<v Speaker 1>goes back to his father in the nineteen thirties. But

1:01:38.760 --> 1:01:42.040
<v Speaker 1>you can only put so much history in these books. Um,

1:01:42.080 --> 1:01:45.400
<v Speaker 1>if you go back to the early nineteen hundreds, they're

1:01:45.400 --> 1:01:48.880
<v Speaker 1>worried about inequality, you know, they're worried about big corporations,

1:01:48.880 --> 1:01:52.440
<v Speaker 1>about America becoming a sterile soul is place run by

1:01:52.640 --> 1:01:56.000
<v Speaker 1>far off, remote corporations. Well, thank goodness, we avoided that faith,

1:01:56.200 --> 1:01:59.760
<v Speaker 1>thank god. So sound familiar. So there's something about in

1:01:59.800 --> 1:02:02.320
<v Speaker 1>the old age, they're horrified all of a sudden they're millionaires,

1:02:02.560 --> 1:02:06.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, never used to have those. So these periods

1:02:07.320 --> 1:02:09.480
<v Speaker 1>both hold a fascination for me, and I think they're

1:02:09.480 --> 1:02:11.640
<v Speaker 1>particularly resident today. So it'll be something in that area

1:02:11.640 --> 1:02:14.760
<v Speaker 1>again that sounds interesting. Let me go, because I know

1:02:14.920 --> 1:02:17.280
<v Speaker 1>I can't keep you forever, although you and I could

1:02:17.320 --> 1:02:20.600
<v Speaker 1>keep chatting about this stuff for a long time. Let's

1:02:20.640 --> 1:02:23.360
<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about these are questions I asked

1:02:23.760 --> 1:02:27.240
<v Speaker 1>all my guests, and I always get some fascinating answers.

1:02:27.720 --> 1:02:30.720
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned your father was an influence on you. Who

1:02:30.800 --> 1:02:36.240
<v Speaker 1>are some of your other early mentors hm Um, I

1:02:36.400 --> 1:02:42.120
<v Speaker 1>had some very good editors, you know along the way

1:02:42.440 --> 1:02:46.480
<v Speaker 1>in newspapers, um both um, Norm pearl Stein at the Journal,

1:02:47.240 --> 1:02:51.200
<v Speaker 1>and Paul Steiger. So you had some real terrific rock

1:02:51.280 --> 1:02:56.760
<v Speaker 1>star legends, terrific, terrific editors at the Journal. I'm hesitating

1:02:56.760 --> 1:02:59.440
<v Speaker 1>that I don't want to forget anybody. You'll get an

1:02:59.440 --> 1:03:04.440
<v Speaker 1>angry man. Um. You know, Warren Buffett letters were an

1:03:04.520 --> 1:03:07.720
<v Speaker 1>education in business. You know, I went to grad school

1:03:07.760 --> 1:03:11.040
<v Speaker 1>with Lawrence Cunningham, who wrote that book, The Essays of

1:03:11.040 --> 1:03:14.360
<v Speaker 1>Warren Buffett, which was amazing that I was in grad

1:03:14.400 --> 1:03:17.960
<v Speaker 1>school saying, what why are you publishing on this? This

1:03:18.040 --> 1:03:21.000
<v Speaker 1>is a law school, this is a and yet it

1:03:21.040 --> 1:03:24.960
<v Speaker 1>turned out to be tremendously insightful idea before there were

1:03:25.000 --> 1:03:28.560
<v Speaker 1>really a lot of that was back before you couldn't

1:03:28.600 --> 1:03:31.120
<v Speaker 1>go on to Edgar and pulled down or the website

1:03:31.480 --> 1:03:35.760
<v Speaker 1>and pulled down the actual letters. He bound, had them

1:03:35.760 --> 1:03:38.480
<v Speaker 1>bound published and there were a huge success. So when

1:03:38.480 --> 1:03:42.440
<v Speaker 1>I was reading those letters, the contrast reading those letters

1:03:42.440 --> 1:03:44.600
<v Speaker 1>and writing the herd on the street every day and

1:03:44.640 --> 1:03:48.000
<v Speaker 1>being involved in how you know, the average company was

1:03:48.040 --> 1:03:49.880
<v Speaker 1>doing things. And then I go back and read the

1:03:49.960 --> 1:03:53.920
<v Speaker 1>letters and the contrast was such that, Um, that was

1:03:53.960 --> 1:03:57.480
<v Speaker 1>also an education. I saw um that what he was

1:03:57.560 --> 1:04:01.880
<v Speaker 1>preaching was so unusual in Wall Street that you know,

1:04:01.920 --> 1:04:05.600
<v Speaker 1>most annual reports, they're written by consultants. Uh, they're full

1:04:05.600 --> 1:04:11.000
<v Speaker 1>of malarkey. They're spinning everything. Um. And he's just outlanded

1:04:11.080 --> 1:04:12.880
<v Speaker 1>the way it is. You know, they're they're trying to

1:04:12.920 --> 1:04:17.040
<v Speaker 1>game their earnings. Uh. There was just so much that

1:04:17.160 --> 1:04:21.560
<v Speaker 1>was different. And and the combination of reading those letters

1:04:21.600 --> 1:04:24.919
<v Speaker 1>and being involved in the everyday work a day Wall

1:04:24.960 --> 1:04:27.360
<v Speaker 1>Street experience was an educational Did you get to speak

1:04:27.400 --> 1:04:31.840
<v Speaker 1>to Buffett for the book? Very little? Um. Buffett didn't cooperate. Um.

1:04:32.080 --> 1:04:34.640
<v Speaker 1>He said in the beginning that he said that he

1:04:34.680 --> 1:04:37.040
<v Speaker 1>didn't stop people or discourage them or encourage him. He

1:04:37.120 --> 1:04:38.960
<v Speaker 1>just said, that's you know, you do what you can do.

1:04:39.520 --> 1:04:41.360
<v Speaker 1>He said, it will work better for me, and it

1:04:41.360 --> 1:04:44.560
<v Speaker 1>will work better for you too. Huh. And that's interesting

1:04:44.640 --> 1:04:46.920
<v Speaker 1>with interesting And do you think that was right? I

1:04:46.920 --> 1:04:49.200
<v Speaker 1>didn't at the time. I thought thanks a lot. I

1:04:49.200 --> 1:04:51.080
<v Speaker 1>thought thanks a lot, war And he actually said, Um,

1:04:51.520 --> 1:04:54.439
<v Speaker 1>he said he didn't want to give me his own

1:04:54.480 --> 1:04:56.240
<v Speaker 1>stuff because he was saving it for his book and

1:04:56.280 --> 1:05:00.919
<v Speaker 1>I would cut into his sales. Come on, warrened, that's hilarious.

1:05:00.920 --> 1:05:03.640
<v Speaker 1>But by the way, many a truth is spoken in jest,

1:05:03.800 --> 1:05:06.760
<v Speaker 1>and he is only half joking when he says that

1:05:06.840 --> 1:05:09.280
<v Speaker 1>I don't. I don't doubt it. But but to answer

1:05:09.320 --> 1:05:11.720
<v Speaker 1>to your other question, I did come to agree with

1:05:11.800 --> 1:05:14.600
<v Speaker 1>him because I think had had I sat down for

1:05:14.680 --> 1:05:17.640
<v Speaker 1>interview after interview with him, the book would have come

1:05:17.640 --> 1:05:20.120
<v Speaker 1>out in his words and with his take, and it

1:05:20.120 --> 1:05:24.200
<v Speaker 1>would have been his conception of his life. And by

1:05:24.240 --> 1:05:26.400
<v Speaker 1>not talking to him and talking to everyone else around him,

1:05:26.400 --> 1:05:28.560
<v Speaker 1>I got to tell the story as I would tell it,

1:05:29.080 --> 1:05:31.600
<v Speaker 1>and so yes, in the end, I think it was

1:05:31.720 --> 1:05:34.040
<v Speaker 1>worked best for both of us. I'm gonna have to

1:05:34.040 --> 1:05:36.840
<v Speaker 1>get you as get from you his email address and

1:05:36.840 --> 1:05:38.760
<v Speaker 1>and invite him to do the show the next time

1:05:38.760 --> 1:05:40.880
<v Speaker 1>he's in New York, because I know he's got two

1:05:40.880 --> 1:05:45.400
<v Speaker 1>hours to kill any time, any time he wants. Um.

1:05:45.400 --> 1:05:47.960
<v Speaker 1>What are some of your favorite books? And I'm referring

1:05:48.000 --> 1:05:50.440
<v Speaker 1>to ones that you didn't write. What other books have

1:05:50.560 --> 1:05:55.040
<v Speaker 1>you enjoyed? Uh? Finance books, boy, I'm gonna could be finance,

1:05:55.120 --> 1:05:58.320
<v Speaker 1>could be other books, but just not by Roger Loans. Yeah,

1:05:58.680 --> 1:06:01.800
<v Speaker 1>I'll start with you know the G eight Crash by

1:06:01.880 --> 1:06:05.800
<v Speaker 1>John Kenneth galbrand Um is a book that I've always loved.

1:06:06.680 --> 1:06:09.680
<v Speaker 1>Read it again and again. Boy, it reads like just

1:06:09.720 --> 1:06:11.520
<v Speaker 1>a lemon drop of a book. Melts in your mouth

1:06:11.560 --> 1:06:13.840
<v Speaker 1>and it and it could have been written yesterday. That's

1:06:13.880 --> 1:06:17.720
<v Speaker 1>the thing that's amazing, could have been written yesterday. Um.

1:06:17.760 --> 1:06:19.640
<v Speaker 1>You know there's a book. I read a lot of

1:06:19.640 --> 1:06:23.240
<v Speaker 1>business books, and usually because I review them, most of

1:06:23.280 --> 1:06:25.280
<v Speaker 1>them don't go on the small shelf of ones I'd

1:06:25.280 --> 1:06:30.120
<v Speaker 1>recommend by Italian economist Pietra Rivoli, The Travels of a

1:06:30.160 --> 1:06:35.080
<v Speaker 1>T Shirt, The Travels of anybody anybody wants to. Um,

1:06:35.280 --> 1:06:39.240
<v Speaker 1>have fun with a book on trade on cotton. I

1:06:39.280 --> 1:06:42.800
<v Speaker 1>mean really have fun. It opens up a world you

1:06:42.880 --> 1:06:46.760
<v Speaker 1>never thought was there. I just just love the book.

1:06:47.600 --> 1:06:51.919
<v Speaker 1>I love John Brooks's books on Wall Street. Um, well

1:06:52.000 --> 1:06:54.280
<v Speaker 1>give me a title. Uh, let's see the one the

1:06:54.280 --> 1:06:58.720
<v Speaker 1>go go years about there about the sixties and once

1:06:58.720 --> 1:07:03.120
<v Speaker 1>in Galconda. That on my bookshelf. Unread waiting in my

1:07:03.320 --> 1:07:09.680
<v Speaker 1>que about um the nineteen thirties. Um the rob The

1:07:09.760 --> 1:07:13.440
<v Speaker 1>Robber Barons by Matthew Um who what's the last name

1:07:13.480 --> 1:07:15.760
<v Speaker 1>of that author? I've seen that book. I've never read

1:07:15.840 --> 1:07:18.440
<v Speaker 1>that either. That's you're you're giving me homework to do.

1:07:18.600 --> 1:07:22.000
<v Speaker 1>You know that's kind of a populist take, but it'll

1:07:22.120 --> 1:07:26.440
<v Speaker 1>it'll be residant today. Um, I love Roncher Now's the

1:07:26.440 --> 1:07:28.720
<v Speaker 1>House of Morgan and Hamilton's and his other books My

1:07:28.800 --> 1:07:31.920
<v Speaker 1>head or Research. Mike bat Nick just finished that and

1:07:32.040 --> 1:07:35.200
<v Speaker 1>cannot stop raving. He's working his way through all of

1:07:35.280 --> 1:07:39.960
<v Speaker 1>Churnhouse book. He's just thrilled to death. Um, so there's

1:07:39.960 --> 1:07:43.520
<v Speaker 1>a you know, a starting list for for Christmas Byes

1:07:43.800 --> 1:07:47.400
<v Speaker 1>House of Morgan and of course America's Bank. By the way,

1:07:47.400 --> 1:07:49.880
<v Speaker 1>did you ever get around? So when I'm working on something,

1:07:50.600 --> 1:07:52.760
<v Speaker 1>I try not to read a book on the same

1:07:52.800 --> 1:07:58.040
<v Speaker 1>top title because topic, because it influences your perspective, you're

1:07:58.160 --> 1:08:00.960
<v Speaker 1>you're you want to stay away from it. But I

1:08:01.160 --> 1:08:04.000
<v Speaker 1>adored Lords of Finance, and I'm wondering if you read

1:08:04.040 --> 1:08:07.600
<v Speaker 1>that when you would? Is a great book. This book

1:08:07.680 --> 1:08:12.400
<v Speaker 1>is like one of the so that's involves four central bankers,

1:08:13.000 --> 1:08:16.080
<v Speaker 1>and this is like one bank of the four. Like

1:08:16.160 --> 1:08:20.120
<v Speaker 1>this is a giant digression from Lords of the AQUITAMDS

1:08:20.120 --> 1:08:24.080
<v Speaker 1>Pults Prize winner, amazing, every bit deserving of a Pulletzer Prize.

1:08:24.120 --> 1:08:26.760
<v Speaker 1>It is a terrific book. And talk about a guy

1:08:26.800 --> 1:08:28.759
<v Speaker 1>who can tell a story and make it come to life.

1:08:29.200 --> 1:08:33.040
<v Speaker 1>You should be on any Financial Readers shortlist. Really just

1:08:33.360 --> 1:08:36.439
<v Speaker 1>a tremendous, tremendous book. Let me keep going through my

1:08:36.520 --> 1:08:41.879
<v Speaker 1>last few questions. Um, so you've been writing professionally for

1:08:42.560 --> 1:08:46.760
<v Speaker 1>thirty years? Is that right? Well, I started out at

1:08:46.800 --> 1:08:52.519
<v Speaker 1>the Newport News Times Herald in seventies. Sixty years next year.

1:08:52.840 --> 1:08:55.880
<v Speaker 1>So let me ask you a question. What has changed

1:08:56.760 --> 1:08:59.400
<v Speaker 1>in three hours or less since you've become a writer

1:09:00.200 --> 1:09:04.719
<v Speaker 1>for for better or worse? Well, Um, finance and business

1:09:04.760 --> 1:09:09.559
<v Speaker 1>are much hotter topics and the much bigues much. You know,

1:09:10.280 --> 1:09:12.519
<v Speaker 1>there were no finance sections when I started. There was

1:09:12.560 --> 1:09:14.640
<v Speaker 1>a Wall Street Journal and basically nothing else. There were

1:09:14.640 --> 1:09:18.880
<v Speaker 1>no financial shows, there was no Bloomberg. Um, so that's

1:09:18.920 --> 1:09:22.400
<v Speaker 1>just become much more central to the way we live

1:09:22.479 --> 1:09:27.200
<v Speaker 1>and work. Um. Obviously, the news business itself has become

1:09:27.360 --> 1:09:30.799
<v Speaker 1>way more challenged, for you know, by the Internet. You know,

1:09:31.360 --> 1:09:35.200
<v Speaker 1>listeners don't need an education that when Wren Buffett went

1:09:35.240 --> 1:09:39.080
<v Speaker 1>into the business, newspapers were so called monopoly toll bridge

1:09:39.080 --> 1:09:41.320
<v Speaker 1>and the only way to get to advertisers now is

1:09:41.360 --> 1:09:43.800
<v Speaker 1>he is he still part of part of the Washington Post?

1:09:44.280 --> 1:09:48.760
<v Speaker 1>Is that now? That still still owns Buffalo Eeping News

1:09:48.800 --> 1:09:51.439
<v Speaker 1>and he owns a local paper and Omaha, so he's

1:09:51.439 --> 1:09:54.520
<v Speaker 1>still in the in the business local paper and Oma. Yeah, yeah,

1:09:55.040 --> 1:09:59.240
<v Speaker 1>that's the world, the world, Harold, so m uh but um,

1:09:59.360 --> 1:10:01.920
<v Speaker 1>those are the those are the biggest. I mean, the

1:10:01.920 --> 1:10:05.720
<v Speaker 1>the number of news venues, the extent of the competition.

1:10:05.760 --> 1:10:07.400
<v Speaker 1>You know, when I started at the Journal, which was

1:10:07.400 --> 1:10:10.000
<v Speaker 1>in seventy nine, you could spend a long time with

1:10:10.080 --> 1:10:14.439
<v Speaker 1>a story. Now the more competition is just so out there,

1:10:14.560 --> 1:10:18.439
<v Speaker 1>and it's that that's a lot different things. I find

1:10:18.479 --> 1:10:21.400
<v Speaker 1>when I'm writing something to just do a blog post,

1:10:21.439 --> 1:10:25.280
<v Speaker 1>a little throwaway two D word blog posts. I used

1:10:25.320 --> 1:10:28.519
<v Speaker 1>to schedule stuff around a certain rhythm. I like this

1:10:28.600 --> 1:10:31.320
<v Speaker 1>sort of thing on Tuesday nights, and I like this

1:10:31.400 --> 1:10:34.120
<v Speaker 1>on Friday mornings. And I find if I do that,

1:10:35.280 --> 1:10:37.519
<v Speaker 1>it's in the ether. Somebody is going to write about

1:10:37.520 --> 1:10:40.439
<v Speaker 1>it beforehand, and so you can't. You have to just

1:10:40.479 --> 1:10:43.320
<v Speaker 1>publish some more choices about what to read. You can't

1:10:43.320 --> 1:10:45.880
<v Speaker 1>read every blog, you can't read it. Possibly there's an

1:10:45.880 --> 1:10:49.439
<v Speaker 1>overwhelming amount of stuff. So that's historically what's changed. What

1:10:49.479 --> 1:10:53.200
<v Speaker 1>do you see going forward for media and journalism and

1:10:53.320 --> 1:10:57.200
<v Speaker 1>book publishing in the future. You know, I think they'll

1:10:57.200 --> 1:11:01.160
<v Speaker 1>be around for longer than than the word. The most

1:11:01.240 --> 1:11:06.439
<v Speaker 1>pessimistic prognosticators say in indie bookstores, are you know, making

1:11:06.439 --> 1:11:09.679
<v Speaker 1>a comeback? The percentage of books that are being read

1:11:09.680 --> 1:11:12.960
<v Speaker 1>in print as this thing from digitally has actually leveled off,

1:11:13.000 --> 1:11:17.400
<v Speaker 1>and I think as ticked up pretty smartly. Um, you know,

1:11:17.560 --> 1:11:20.439
<v Speaker 1>newspapers I don't know about I think Charlie Munger has

1:11:20.479 --> 1:11:22.880
<v Speaker 1>said that that the newspaper is most loyal readers, are

1:11:22.960 --> 1:11:24.599
<v Speaker 1>you know, to be found in the cemeteries or something

1:11:24.920 --> 1:11:29.280
<v Speaker 1>some something like that. Newspapers are obviously evolving, people like

1:11:29.360 --> 1:11:31.680
<v Speaker 1>Jeff Bezos behind the Washington Post trying to be a

1:11:31.720 --> 1:11:34.439
<v Speaker 1>few vanity projects that all so you'll have the Times,

1:11:34.439 --> 1:11:38.160
<v Speaker 1>the Journal, the Post and a handful of others. Public

1:11:38.439 --> 1:11:41.920
<v Speaker 1>is a nonprofit formula, and I think the person who

1:11:41.960 --> 1:11:44.800
<v Speaker 1>took the Herd on the Street column after you, jesse eisener.

1:11:46.360 --> 1:11:50.760
<v Speaker 1>So I think the formulas are still you know, it's

1:11:50.760 --> 1:11:53.960
<v Speaker 1>still we're still experimenting with that, and we don't I

1:11:54.000 --> 1:11:55.960
<v Speaker 1>don't as culainly don't know. And I don't think anyone

1:11:56.000 --> 1:11:59.240
<v Speaker 1>knows what the news universe will look like, except to

1:11:59.280 --> 1:12:01.679
<v Speaker 1>say that people we're still hungry, very hungry for news.

1:12:01.720 --> 1:12:03.360
<v Speaker 1>A lot of people want to go on the news business.

1:12:03.920 --> 1:12:06.559
<v Speaker 1>It'll exist. We just don't know the form. We don't

1:12:06.560 --> 1:12:08.800
<v Speaker 1>know what it's gonna look like. So a millennial or

1:12:08.800 --> 1:12:11.360
<v Speaker 1>a recent college graduate is beginning in their career and

1:12:11.360 --> 1:12:13.800
<v Speaker 1>they want to be a writer or a journalist, what

1:12:13.920 --> 1:12:15.800
<v Speaker 1>sort of advice would you give them? The advice I

1:12:15.840 --> 1:12:18.160
<v Speaker 1>give I get asked that a lot is have a

1:12:18.200 --> 1:12:21.240
<v Speaker 1>specialty these days. I think it's very important not just

1:12:21.280 --> 1:12:24.960
<v Speaker 1>to be a journalist. You know, no all you can

1:12:25.040 --> 1:12:28.040
<v Speaker 1>about finance, know all you can about sports, know all

1:12:28.080 --> 1:12:31.759
<v Speaker 1>you can about ballet, know all you can about energy

1:12:31.840 --> 1:12:34.599
<v Speaker 1>or global warming or whatever it is. But be someone

1:12:34.680 --> 1:12:37.120
<v Speaker 1>who whatever the news venue is, is going to say

1:12:37.200 --> 1:12:40.519
<v Speaker 1>we need an expert in whatever that is, and they'll

1:12:40.560 --> 1:12:43.080
<v Speaker 1>be a place for you. I don't think the you know,

1:12:43.320 --> 1:12:46.120
<v Speaker 1>these days, it's tough to go in and say, you know,

1:12:46.200 --> 1:12:48.720
<v Speaker 1>Johnny Apple used to say the times, you've got to

1:12:48.720 --> 1:12:51.400
<v Speaker 1>be able to ride a five car fatal and and

1:12:51.400 --> 1:12:53.240
<v Speaker 1>and that's true. But these days you've got to be

1:12:53.240 --> 1:12:56.320
<v Speaker 1>able to do more than that. Last question, what is

1:12:56.320 --> 1:12:59.280
<v Speaker 1>it you know about Wall Street and finance today that

1:12:59.360 --> 1:13:02.080
<v Speaker 1>you wish you knew when you started forty years ago?

1:13:04.800 --> 1:13:06.920
<v Speaker 1>You know, I don't think, I mean I know now

1:13:06.960 --> 1:13:09.800
<v Speaker 1>how repetitive. It is, how how how cyclical is how

1:13:09.920 --> 1:13:12.759
<v Speaker 1>everything we talked about before, how the lessons don't get learned.

1:13:12.760 --> 1:13:16.840
<v Speaker 1>But there's no way. It's not like you can transport

1:13:17.000 --> 1:13:20.600
<v Speaker 1>that experience and and you know, put it into some

1:13:20.720 --> 1:13:22.800
<v Speaker 1>pill and and give it to a twenty two year

1:13:22.840 --> 1:13:25.519
<v Speaker 1>old and he will absorb it. On the other hand,

1:13:25.800 --> 1:13:27.280
<v Speaker 1>that's what makes it fun. You know, he or she

1:13:27.280 --> 1:13:28.920
<v Speaker 1>will go out and learn from the cells. And that's

1:13:29.520 --> 1:13:33.320
<v Speaker 1>so UM. But what have you learned that you wish

1:13:33.320 --> 1:13:36.200
<v Speaker 1>you knew when you started? What little tidbit of knowledge

1:13:36.240 --> 1:13:38.120
<v Speaker 1>would have made your life easier? I guess I'm a

1:13:38.160 --> 1:13:43.200
<v Speaker 1>little more cynical. I'm surprised at how often, UM, to

1:13:43.280 --> 1:13:47.080
<v Speaker 1>avoid using a three letter word, people don't tell the truth. UM.

1:13:47.760 --> 1:13:53.160
<v Speaker 1>Uh surprised at how often people will spin. You know,

1:13:53.720 --> 1:13:56.639
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of slippery characters out there, and UM,

1:13:56.800 --> 1:14:00.200
<v Speaker 1>I tend to be trustworthy and sometimes naive, and I'm

1:14:00.240 --> 1:14:04.560
<v Speaker 1>surprised at how often, uh, people would take advantage of that.

1:14:04.880 --> 1:14:06.320
<v Speaker 1>And it it would have been nice to know that starting

1:14:06.360 --> 1:14:09.400
<v Speaker 1>your career. Roger, this has been great. Thank you so

1:14:09.479 --> 1:14:13.360
<v Speaker 1>much for being so generous with your time. UM. We've

1:14:13.360 --> 1:14:15.880
<v Speaker 1>been speaking with Roger Lowenstein. He is the author of

1:14:15.880 --> 1:14:20.599
<v Speaker 1>the new book America's Bank, The Epic Struggle to create

1:14:20.680 --> 1:14:23.679
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve, which you can find at Amazon, Bornes

1:14:23.680 --> 1:14:27.720
<v Speaker 1>and Noble and independent booksellers everywhere. You can read more

1:14:27.760 --> 1:14:33.080
<v Speaker 1>of Roger's work at Roger Lowenstein dot com. Um check

1:14:33.120 --> 1:14:35.720
<v Speaker 1>out my daily column Bloombergview dot com. Follow me on

1:14:35.720 --> 1:14:38.600
<v Speaker 1>Twitter at Ridholts. The blog is Ridhults dot com. I

1:14:38.640 --> 1:14:41.720
<v Speaker 1>want to thank Charlie Vohmer, my producer, and Mike bat Nick,

1:14:41.800 --> 1:14:45.400
<v Speaker 1>my head of research. If you enjoy this conversation, be

1:14:45.479 --> 1:14:48.879
<v Speaker 1>sure and look up or down an inch on Apple

1:14:48.920 --> 1:14:53.120
<v Speaker 1>iTunes and you can see all seventy something or sixty

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<v Speaker 1>something previous shows we've done. They're all available for download,

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<v Speaker 1>and they're all commercial free and free. Uh. Thank you

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<v Speaker 1>for listening. You've been listening to Masters in Business on

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio. Masters in Business is brought to you by

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<v Speaker 1>Exxonmobile Energy lives here.