WEBVTT - MAMBA 0:00:08.000 --> 0:00:12.920 February nine, members of the National Transportation Safety Board meant 0:00:12.920 --> 0:00:15.760 to review the results of the investigation into the crash 0:00:15.800 --> 0:00:20.320 of the Sikorski s s B. Even good pilots can 0:00:20.560 --> 0:00:23.439 end up in bad situations, and just because something is 0:00:23.680 --> 0:00:27.360 legal doesn't mean that it's always safe. I'm Steve Gregory, 0:00:27.360 --> 0:00:30.360 and this is the death and life of Kobe Bryant. 0:00:34.159 --> 0:00:37.720 Robert Sumwalt is the chair of the NTSB. He convened 0:00:37.760 --> 0:00:41.680 the members of the board, Bruce Landsburg, Michael Graham, Thomas Chapman, 0:00:41.720 --> 0:00:45.080 and Jennifer hammondy Hamandy was the board member on scene 0:00:45.080 --> 0:00:48.000 with a go team in Calabasas the day after the crash. 0:00:48.640 --> 0:00:52.280 The report contains more than sixteen hundred pages of documents 0:00:52.280 --> 0:00:56.080 and evidence related to the investigation. The hearing also includes 0:00:56.160 --> 0:00:59.560 members of the NTSB staff, which sit through the entire 0:00:59.640 --> 0:01:02.640 hearing to answer questions from board members. Now, I will 0:01:02.680 --> 0:01:06.560 introduce the staff for today's meeting. Unless otherwise noted. The 0:01:06.600 --> 0:01:11.560 staff members are from the Office of Aviation Safety. Dana Schultz, 0:01:11.640 --> 0:01:15.679 the director for the Office Office of Aviation Safety, Bill English, 0:01:15.800 --> 0:01:23.520 Investigator in Charge, Mike Richards, Meteorology Fabian Salazar, Operational Factors, 0:01:24.400 --> 0:01:30.200 Dr Duan Civilian Human Performance Kathleen Silba, General Counsel for 0:01:30.280 --> 0:01:34.480 the NTSP, Daulian Hatchett, Director for the Office of Safety, 0:01:34.480 --> 0:01:39.200 Recommendations and Communications, Jim Ritter, Director for the Office of 0:01:39.240 --> 0:01:45.160 Research and Engineering. Brian Soper Air Traffic Control, Chris Babcock 0:01:45.760 --> 0:01:49.400 crash resistant flight recorder Systems from the Office of Research 0:01:49.440 --> 0:01:56.720 and Engineering, Ban McKenny air Worthiness, Adam Horay Airworthiness, Nathan 0:01:56.800 --> 0:02:00.400 Hoyt Safety Recommendations from the Office of Safety, recommen Dations 0:02:00.400 --> 0:02:05.400 and Communications, greg Or Sorry Helicopter Maintenance and Visuals, and 0:02:05.520 --> 0:02:09.000 Kathy Gania Report Writer and NTSB Board hearing is very 0:02:09.000 --> 0:02:12.000 clinical and without emotion. The role of the board is 0:02:12.040 --> 0:02:15.080 to establish a probable cause of an accident and offer 0:02:15.160 --> 0:02:18.919 subsequent safety recommendations to prevent that type of accident from 0:02:18.919 --> 0:02:22.480 ever happening again. Bill English was the lead investigator for 0:02:22.520 --> 0:02:25.040 this incident and kicks off the hearing with his official 0:02:25.120 --> 0:02:32.720 narrative on January at am Pacific Standard time. Sikorski seventy 0:02:33.040 --> 0:02:37.000 B helicopter November seven, two Echo x Ray operated by 0:02:37.040 --> 0:02:40.960 Island Express Helicopters collided with Hilly Terraine near the city 0:02:41.000 --> 0:02:45.120 of Calabasas California. The pilot and eight passengers were fatally injured, 0:02:45.600 --> 0:02:48.440 and the helicopter was destroyed by impact forces and fire. 0:02:49.160 --> 0:02:51.560 The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data or 0:02:51.560 --> 0:02:55.920 cockpit voice recorder, nor was it required to be. The 0:02:55.960 --> 0:02:59.040 flight was an on demand charter operated under the provisions 0:02:59.080 --> 0:03:03.560 of fourteen the Federal Regulations Part One to take the 0:03:03.560 --> 0:03:07.560 passengers from John Wayne, Orange County Airport in Santa Ana, California, 0:03:07.639 --> 0:03:11.640 to the Camario, California Airport for a basketball tournament. The 0:03:11.680 --> 0:03:15.520 weather that morning included a widespread area of coastal clouds 0:03:15.600 --> 0:03:19.280 associated with a marine layer, a stable humid air mass 0:03:19.440 --> 0:03:22.760 about one to two thousand feet thick, often characterized by 0:03:22.800 --> 0:03:25.800 stratus clouds at its top, and the potential for fog 0:03:25.880 --> 0:03:29.720 formation in some areas below. There were no hazardous conditions 0:03:29.760 --> 0:03:33.080 such as icing or thunderstorms. Mr Richards will have further 0:03:33.120 --> 0:03:37.800 details on the meteorological factors in his presentation. The flight 0:03:37.880 --> 0:03:40.880 was operated with a single pilot under visual flight rolls 0:03:41.000 --> 0:03:44.520 or VFR, as Island Express was not authorized to conduct 0:03:44.560 --> 0:03:48.640 passenger carrying flights under instrument flight rolls. This is typical 0:03:48.720 --> 0:03:53.480 for helicopter charter operations. The pilot flying was Island Express. 0:03:53.520 --> 0:03:55.400 His chief pilot, and he had been flying in the 0:03:55.440 --> 0:03:59.840 area for ten years and had logged about the flight 0:03:59.880 --> 0:04:03.520 to parted at nine oh seven and proceeded northwesterly across 0:04:03.560 --> 0:04:08.680 the Los Angeles metropolitan area. At the pilot requested to 0:04:08.680 --> 0:04:11.680 transit the Burbank Class Charlie air Space, but a TC 0:04:11.800 --> 0:04:14.520 advised him to hold due to traffic. Weather in this 0:04:14.600 --> 0:04:17.679 area was reported as cloud ceilings one thousand, one hundred 0:04:17.720 --> 0:04:20.960 feet above ground level with visibility two and a half miles. 0:04:22.240 --> 0:04:25.920 About eleven minutes later, a TC provided special VFR clearance 0:04:26.200 --> 0:04:29.920 to proceed through the Burbank and Van Nuys airspace. Throughout 0:04:29.960 --> 0:04:32.800 this segment of flight, the helicopter was maintaining an altitude 0:04:33.040 --> 0:04:37.120 of about five hundred feet above ground level. As the 0:04:37.120 --> 0:04:39.479 flight proceeded to the west out of the San Fernando 0:04:39.560 --> 0:04:42.599 Valley area, a t C advised the pilot that they 0:04:42.640 --> 0:04:45.080 would be too low for flight following and they should 0:04:45.120 --> 0:04:48.839 contact Cameo Tower as they got closer. The pilot acknowledged, 0:04:49.040 --> 0:04:52.200 and the helicopter proceeded to the west, following US or 0:04:52.200 --> 0:04:54.760 out one on one toward an area of rising terrain 0:04:55.240 --> 0:04:57.600 at a speed of about one hundred and forty knots. 0:04:58.760 --> 0:05:02.599 About four minutes later, the pilot contacted a TC again 0:05:02.880 --> 0:05:05.520 and advised them that he was intending to climb to 0:05:05.600 --> 0:05:08.919 go above the cloud layers. A surveillance camera near the 0:05:08.920 --> 0:05:13.760 one oh one captured the helicopter about this time. The 0:05:13.800 --> 0:05:16.400 helicopter had been flying about three hundred and fifty feet 0:05:16.400 --> 0:05:19.159 above ground level, but during the transmission to a TC, 0:05:19.440 --> 0:05:22.440 began climbing at a rate of about fifteen hundred feet 0:05:22.440 --> 0:05:24.960 per minute while generally following the one oh one in 0:05:25.000 --> 0:05:28.720 a slight left turn. During radio communications with a TC, 0:05:29.360 --> 0:05:32.240 the helicopter climbed through an altitude of two thousand feet 0:05:32.240 --> 0:05:35.440 above sea level, or about hundred feet above ground level, 0:05:35.760 --> 0:05:37.920 by which point it was highly unlikely for the pilot 0:05:37.960 --> 0:05:42.320 to be able to maintain visual ground contact. The climb 0:05:42.400 --> 0:05:45.279 reached a maximum altitude of about two thousand, four hundred 0:05:45.320 --> 0:05:48.520 feet above sea level. As the helicopter continued a left 0:05:48.560 --> 0:05:54.039 turn diverging from the highway. The controller asked the pilot's intentions, 0:05:54.120 --> 0:05:57.080 and he said he was climbing to four thousand feet. However, 0:05:57.120 --> 0:05:59.520 by that time the helicopter was in a tightening left 0:05:59.600 --> 0:06:03.680 turn and descending rapidly. This maneuver is consistent with a 0:06:03.720 --> 0:06:09.159 pilot experiencing spatial disorientation in limited visibility conditions. The helicopter 0:06:09.240 --> 0:06:12.840 impacted hilly Terraine on a generally northeasterly bearing at a 0:06:12.920 --> 0:06:15.680 high speed and decent rate. From here, all the subject 0:06:15.720 --> 0:06:18.760 matter experts offer their respective narratives. One of the more 0:06:18.800 --> 0:06:22.520 interesting perspectives comes from Dr duan civilian, an expert on 0:06:22.640 --> 0:06:25.920 human performance and aviation. I will discuss the following human 0:06:25.920 --> 0:06:32.360 performance issues in this accident, pilot decision making, spatial disorientation, 0:06:33.040 --> 0:06:38.839 and safety management systems. Several factors may have influenced the 0:06:38.839 --> 0:06:41.479 pilot to place pressure on himself to complete the flight. 0:06:42.279 --> 0:06:46.080 For example, the pilot was preferred and trusted by the client, 0:06:46.520 --> 0:06:49.880 as was Island Express. The pilot likely took pride in 0:06:49.880 --> 0:06:52.719 these positions of trust with both the client and with 0:06:52.800 --> 0:06:55.960 Island Express. The pilot had a good relationship with the 0:06:56.000 --> 0:06:59.000 client and likely did not want to disappoint him by 0:06:59.200 --> 0:07:02.919 not completing the like this kind of self induced pressure 0:07:03.520 --> 0:07:08.880 can adversely affect pilot decision making and judgment. However, there 0:07:08.960 --> 0:07:13.360 was no evidence that Island Expressed or the client placed 0:07:13.360 --> 0:07:16.240 pressure on the pilot to accept the chartered flight request, 0:07:17.360 --> 0:07:21.400 or complete the flight in adverse weather. The pilot's flight 0:07:21.440 --> 0:07:25.240 in i AMC was inconsistent with his demonstrated judgment and 0:07:25.280 --> 0:07:30.760 decision making. Although conditions were deteriorating en route, an alternative 0:07:30.800 --> 0:07:33.880 course of action was not acted upon by the pilot. 0:07:35.200 --> 0:07:39.000 The pilots continuation of the flight despite deteriorating weather conditions 0:07:39.280 --> 0:07:44.080 was representative planned continuation bias, which strengthens as the pilot 0:07:44.080 --> 0:07:47.240 gets closer to the destination. The pilot statement to the 0:07:47.240 --> 0:07:49.920 air traffic control is that he was initiating. The climb 0:07:50.240 --> 0:07:53.680 occurred about two seconds after the helicopter enter the clouds. 0:07:54.720 --> 0:08:00.000 Data show the climb started at a rate about per minute, 0:08:00.240 --> 0:08:03.280 accompanied by a gradual left bank to the left, generally 0:08:03.320 --> 0:08:06.360 following the US one on one as the helicopter continue 0:08:06.360 --> 0:08:09.360 climbing into the cloud layer. The pious loss of visual 0:08:09.400 --> 0:08:12.840 references would have required him to transition to the flight 0:08:12.880 --> 0:08:17.000 instruments to maintain awareness of the helicopter's attitude and track 0:08:20.720 --> 0:08:24.680 the inner ear since his balance and orientation. We're flying 0:08:24.680 --> 0:08:28.240 an aircraft and there's a lack of outside visual references, 0:08:28.240 --> 0:08:30.960 our inner ear can give us a false sense of 0:08:31.000 --> 0:08:37.000 orientation because our inner ear cannot distinguish between accelerations and tilt. 0:08:37.800 --> 0:08:41.160 If a pilot cannot see outside visual references, he must 0:08:41.160 --> 0:08:45.640 rely on flight instruments. When there are no outside visual references, 0:08:46.200 --> 0:08:50.720 the pilot is more susceptible to inner ear illusions. One 0:08:50.800 --> 0:08:54.120 common illusion that can trigger pilot's perception into believing he 0:08:54.200 --> 0:08:56.640 is flying straight and level but he is in a 0:08:56.679 --> 0:09:01.679 steady turn is called the leans. During the climb, and 0:09:01.800 --> 0:09:06.559 I amc the helicopter earned a steady left turn, conducive 0:09:06.559 --> 0:09:11.080 for the pilot to experience the lanes. The vestibular system 0:09:11.080 --> 0:09:15.959 will usually detect initial rolling and turning movement. However, once 0:09:16.000 --> 0:09:19.520 the aircraft is stabilized in a steady rate of turn 0:09:19.640 --> 0:09:23.280 and angle of bank, the vestibular system will catch up 0:09:23.280 --> 0:09:26.439 with the aircraft and the pilot can believe that the 0:09:26.480 --> 0:09:30.560 aircraft is straight and leveled when it is not. Helicopter 0:09:30.640 --> 0:09:34.640 was in a left bank rapid climb. It's bank increased 0:09:35.120 --> 0:09:38.680 and it entered a tighter left turn that diverged away 0:09:38.720 --> 0:09:43.040 from US one on one. The increasing bank would exacerbate 0:09:43.120 --> 0:09:47.480 the aspects of the lanes. The result of descent and 0:09:47.600 --> 0:09:52.200 acceleration were conducive for the pilot to experience a semidographic 0:09:52.320 --> 0:09:56.880 illusion in which he would incorrectly perceive that the helicopter 0:09:56.960 --> 0:10:01.440 was climbing when it was descending. The pilot was either 0:10:01.600 --> 0:10:07.240 not referencing the helicopter's instruments or having difficulty interpreting or 0:10:07.280 --> 0:10:11.760 believing them due to the compelling vestibular illusions, and he 0:10:11.840 --> 0:10:17.920 did not successfully recover the helicopter coming up. NTSP board 0:10:17.920 --> 0:10:22.200 members began questioning investigators. It becomes clear where the blame's 0:10:22.200 --> 0:10:25.880 gonna land, and we talk with a teammate of Gianna 0:10:25.960 --> 0:10:29.080 Bryant's about their time together. As the death and life 0:10:29.080 --> 0:10:52.440 of Kobe Bryant continues, members of the NTSB have gathered 0:10:52.480 --> 0:10:55.359 to discuss the investigation into the crash of the Sikorski 0:10:55.600 --> 0:10:58.880 s B and it's time for board members to ask 0:10:58.920 --> 0:11:02.240 the ntsb s own investigators and subject matter experts about 0:11:02.280 --> 0:11:08.839 details of the twelve month investigation. At one point, board 0:11:08.840 --> 0:11:12.360 member Michael Graham focused on pilot are as abyans training. 0:11:12.840 --> 0:11:15.960 Graham seemed concerned it's a bayan's decision to fly into 0:11:16.000 --> 0:11:19.400 the clouds using only visual flight rules or VFR. The 0:11:19.480 --> 0:11:23.440 pilot should initiate a straight ahead climb. Straight ahead controlled 0:11:23.440 --> 0:11:27.440 climb to an altitude that will provide obstructive clearance in 0:11:27.480 --> 0:11:31.440 the area of operation. Did he climb straight ahead in 0:11:31.480 --> 0:11:35.160 that case when he penetrated the weather, No, sir, the 0:11:35.600 --> 0:11:38.120 climb was initiated in a subtle left turn. Following the 0:11:38.280 --> 0:11:42.400 subtle left turn, so he didn't follow his training. Do 0:11:42.480 --> 0:11:45.040 you feel he he committed to the instruments? In this case, 0:11:47.040 --> 0:11:50.280 the path and behavior of the helicopter is not consistent 0:11:50.360 --> 0:11:53.920 with committing to the instruments. Exactly. I agree with you 0:11:54.320 --> 0:11:59.320 wholeheartedly there. So um, yeah, I'm just concerned about all 0:11:59.360 --> 0:12:02.960 this as as a as a fellow aviator. He didn't 0:12:03.000 --> 0:12:06.200 even follow the training, so I see, my time's about up. 0:12:06.520 --> 0:12:09.600 I just say, you know, as long as we continue 0:12:09.600 --> 0:12:14.080 to have VFR only helicopters continuing to flirt with marginal 0:12:14.120 --> 0:12:19.520 weather and sometimes sub marginal weather um of low altitudes, 0:12:19.559 --> 0:12:24.960 low ceilings, limited visibility, unfortunately, a certain percentage of them 0:12:25.120 --> 0:12:29.160 will stray into inavert in I amc and unfortunately a 0:12:29.240 --> 0:12:32.520 certain percentage of them will not come out alive. Remember, 0:12:32.600 --> 0:12:35.840 Tom Chapman has a different concerns. Certainly, it could be 0:12:36.040 --> 0:12:39.160 that self induced pressure played a role, and it's reasonable 0:12:39.200 --> 0:12:43.880 to discuss that as a possibility. Would you please elaborate 0:12:43.920 --> 0:12:47.160 on the findings of the investigation on this point. The 0:12:47.240 --> 0:12:51.800 relationship between the pilot and the client had turned into 0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:56.400 a friendship over the years, that the client allowed the 0:12:56.440 --> 0:13:01.840 pilot to fly his children UH without him being present, 0:13:02.920 --> 0:13:07.920 and that that type of relationship that they had was 0:13:08.080 --> 0:13:13.280 very close. And when we look at human factor psychology, 0:13:13.320 --> 0:13:16.960 we look at the decisions that people make based off 0:13:17.040 --> 0:13:21.080 of the perception of a situation UH, and in this case, 0:13:22.000 --> 0:13:28.160 the the pilot as he was flying en route, these 0:13:28.160 --> 0:13:31.079 types of this this type of relationship that he had 0:13:31.120 --> 0:13:35.760 with the client can UH leads to self induced pressure 0:13:37.000 --> 0:13:40.200 during the portion of the flight, and so that is 0:13:40.240 --> 0:13:43.520 why it's the objective evidence from the interviews that helped 0:13:43.640 --> 0:13:48.280 us understand that relationship and the effect that it can 0:13:48.360 --> 0:13:53.720 have on pilot decision making. UH. The investigation Also, investigation 0:13:53.840 --> 0:13:57.960 also indicates that the phenomenon of planned continuation bias was 0:13:58.000 --> 0:14:02.000 a factor contributing to the pile decision to continue the flight. 0:14:02.720 --> 0:14:06.800 Is planned continuation bias dependent on an element of self 0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:09.839 induced pressure? So, in other words, is it possible there 0:14:09.840 --> 0:14:14.160 could have been planned continuation bias without any self induced 0:14:14.160 --> 0:14:17.440 pressure of the type that you've described. Well, in this case, 0:14:17.679 --> 0:14:21.520 it was both self induced pressure and planning continuation bias 0:14:22.200 --> 0:14:27.320 UH and the plan continuation bias UH. Portion of it 0:14:27.400 --> 0:14:32.680 was the pilot continuing the flight despite changing conditions. Board 0:14:32.680 --> 0:14:34.720 member Jennifer Hammond he was at the crash site and 0:14:34.760 --> 0:14:36.920 her first round of questioning had more to do with 0:14:37.040 --> 0:14:40.680 risk assessment. She's been asking the chief investigator about a 0:14:40.760 --> 0:14:43.880 checklist at the beginning of the flight. But then she summarizes, 0:14:44.080 --> 0:14:46.920 I guess what I'm asking is why wasn't there an 0:14:46.920 --> 0:14:51.680 alternative plan? An alternative plan and could have helped? At 0:14:51.680 --> 0:14:54.320 the time at eight thirty seven, he had a conversation 0:14:54.360 --> 0:14:57.920 with O C that said that mapped. He pointed to 0:14:57.960 --> 0:14:59.720 a map that said he planned to go north to 0:15:00.040 --> 0:15:03.400 Rogers Stadium in Los Angeles, around Burbank and follow State 0:15:03.520 --> 0:15:09.200 Route one eighteen. At some point after Van Nye he enters, 0:15:09.240 --> 0:15:13.560 I MC around and you and I discussed this ninety 0:15:13.640 --> 0:15:19.200 four and seconds sometime between there and nine and ten seconds. 0:15:19.280 --> 0:15:24.400 That's thirty five seconds. I mean, that's not a lot 0:15:24.440 --> 0:15:28.320 of time. And so would you why wouldn't you have 0:15:28.760 --> 0:15:31.360 wouldn't it have helped if you had an alternative plan 0:15:31.440 --> 0:15:35.600 in mind rather than a quick decision making yes, ma'am 0:15:35.600 --> 0:15:39.160 coming up. The board makes its final determination and we 0:15:39.240 --> 0:15:41.960 meet a teammate of Gianna Bryant's. As the death in 0:15:42.040 --> 0:16:02.360 life of Kobe Bryant continues for about four hours, members 0:16:02.360 --> 0:16:04.680 of the NTSB did rounds of Q and A s 0:16:04.760 --> 0:16:08.320 with investigators. Then it was time to present the final report. 0:16:08.520 --> 0:16:12.120 The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause 0:16:12.200 --> 0:16:15.680 of this accident was the pilot's decision to continue flight 0:16:15.760 --> 0:16:20.960 under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted 0:16:21.000 --> 0:16:25.800 in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control. Contributing 0:16:25.880 --> 0:16:29.520 to the accident was the pilot's likely self induced pressure 0:16:30.120 --> 0:16:35.160 and the pilot's plan continued continuation bias, which adversely affected 0:16:35.360 --> 0:16:40.520 his decision making. And Island Express Helicopters inadequate review and 0:16:40.720 --> 0:16:44.080 oversight of its safety management process, and, as with all 0:16:44.240 --> 0:16:48.720 NTSB hearings, safety recommendations follow. As a result of this investigation, 0:16:49.560 --> 0:16:54.760 staff proposes the following four new safety recommendations due to 0:16:54.800 --> 0:17:00.000 the Federal Aviation Administration. One, require the use of appropriate 0:17:00.120 --> 0:17:05.000 simulation devices during initial and recurrent pilot training for Title 0:17:05.080 --> 0:17:09.760 fourteen Code of Federal Regulations, Part one thirty five Helicopter 0:17:09.880 --> 0:17:16.800 Operations two convene a multidisciplinary panel of aircraft performance, human factors, 0:17:17.240 --> 0:17:23.640 and aircraft operations specialists to evaluate spatial disorientation simulation technologies 0:17:24.240 --> 0:17:28.000 to determine which applications are most effective for training pilots 0:17:28.080 --> 0:17:33.359 to recognize the onset of spatial disorientation and successfully mitigated, 0:17:34.320 --> 0:17:39.560 and to two Island Express Helicopters, Inc. Three participate in 0:17:39.560 --> 0:17:44.840 the Federal Aviation Administration's Safety Management System Voluntary program, and 0:17:44.920 --> 0:17:49.560 number four install flight data recording devices capable of supporting 0:17:49.640 --> 0:17:54.080 a flight data Monitoring FDM program on each helicopter in 0:17:54.080 --> 0:17:56.760 your fleet. Now it's time for Chairman Bob some Walt 0:17:56.800 --> 0:17:59.080 to call for a vote. No further discussions or Vice 0:17:59.160 --> 0:18:05.520 Chairman Landsburg. Your vote is I shareman votes. I remember Hamedymember, 0:18:05.520 --> 0:18:09.920 Hamedy votes, Remember Graham Imber Graham votes on. Remember Chapman, 0:18:10.440 --> 0:18:13.919 I remember Chapman votes on. The chairman votes. Uh. The 0:18:14.160 --> 0:18:19.200 report has been adopted as revised unanimously. Minutes after the hearing, 0:18:19.280 --> 0:18:21.840 some Walt takes questions from the media in a virtual 0:18:21.880 --> 0:18:26.120 press conference. Stephen Gregory, thank you, Chairman. Stone Walt, You 0:18:26.200 --> 0:18:28.760 have made these statements all throughout, not only hearing it 0:18:28.880 --> 0:18:32.480 with my colleague here about good pilots make bad decisions. 0:18:32.760 --> 0:18:37.479 You talked about Island Express being a potential I'm safe operator, 0:18:37.520 --> 0:18:41.080 after all, they were the ones that this crash happened with. Also, 0:18:41.520 --> 0:18:44.040 you talked about the previous owners of the helicopter had 0:18:44.080 --> 0:18:47.080 CFR but Island Express did not. It was almost sort 0:18:47.080 --> 0:18:49.960 of this subtle hint along the way that you were 0:18:49.960 --> 0:18:53.000 you were sending out messages to either Part one thirty 0:18:53.080 --> 0:18:56.920 five operators or to Island Express that they're this. There 0:18:56.960 --> 0:19:00.119 was a series of bad choices along the way. Is 0:19:00.119 --> 0:19:04.320 that correct? I think so. As you pointed out, they 0:19:04.440 --> 0:19:07.840 had a flight data recorder when they received the helicopter, 0:19:08.080 --> 0:19:11.240 they removed the I'm sorry as a CVR. Maybe it 0:19:11.320 --> 0:19:13.560 was an FDR. They'll have to look which wasn't It 0:19:13.720 --> 0:19:18.160 was a it was a cockpit MORS recorder. They removed 0:19:18.200 --> 0:19:22.439 it when they got the got the helicopter. Uh. I 0:19:22.600 --> 0:19:27.760 personally believe that you can certainly operate a helicopter like 0:19:27.840 --> 0:19:31.200 this single pilot, and you can do it very safely 0:19:31.760 --> 0:19:36.320 until something happens, like you inadvertently flying to the clouds, 0:19:37.200 --> 0:19:42.480 or until your pilot gets distracted and something happens. So 0:19:43.000 --> 0:19:46.520 I feel like UM has mentioned in the board meeting, 0:19:46.560 --> 0:19:51.119 the oil and gas industry has pretty much exclusively gone 0:19:51.119 --> 0:19:55.280 to two pilot operations in aircraft of this of this 0:19:55.520 --> 0:20:00.080 similar size. UM. Why are they doing that, UM to 0:20:00.280 --> 0:20:03.840 enhance the safety margin? And I feel like, uh, that's 0:20:03.840 --> 0:20:07.960 a question. That I have this same exact helicopter, same 0:20:08.000 --> 0:20:12.399 exact ship. UM. When Chevron used it, they had to 0:20:12.400 --> 0:20:16.359 have to two pilots. UM. Wonder while Island Express did 0:20:16.440 --> 0:20:22.640 not elect to operate that way when they were chartering 0:20:22.680 --> 0:20:26.080 to other clients. There are a lot of corporate operators 0:20:26.080 --> 0:20:28.639 that I've checked with over the last few weeks that 0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:33.840 operate this same type of aircraft exclusively with two pilots. Again, 0:20:33.920 --> 0:20:37.720 the previous owner of this preview of this helicopter always 0:20:37.720 --> 0:20:40.600 operated with two pilots. I want to make darn sure 0:20:41.240 --> 0:20:44.960 that somebody doesn't think that I'm blaming the client for 0:20:45.560 --> 0:20:51.120 electing not to operate with two pilots. UM. I think 0:20:51.160 --> 0:20:54.560 that sometimes the consumers. I want the consumers to be 0:20:54.640 --> 0:20:58.800 aware and just because something is legal doesn't mean that 0:20:58.840 --> 0:21:05.439 it's always safe. At Mamba Sports, Academy. We embraced the 0:21:05.480 --> 0:21:09.960 Mamba mentally on the morning of the accident. The Mamba 0:21:10.000 --> 0:21:14.240 Sports Academy was the intended destination for Bryant, Bryant's daughter, Gianna, 0:21:14.359 --> 0:21:17.720 Gianna's two teammates and parents of her teammates, as well 0:21:17.760 --> 0:21:21.520 as the girls assistant coach. Mamba Sports Academy is where 0:21:21.560 --> 0:21:27.840 we evolved and have fun. I did know G first 0:21:27.840 --> 0:21:31.080 time I met her. She was really nice. Isabella Escribano 0:21:31.200 --> 0:21:33.920 says she was one of G's teammates and recalls how 0:21:33.920 --> 0:21:36.439 she became a member of the Mamba Sports Academy. I 0:21:36.480 --> 0:21:40.760 started playing for Team Mamba by well the Lakers assistant 0:21:40.760 --> 0:21:45.119 coach Phil Handy. He invited me to a workout and 0:21:45.320 --> 0:21:49.760 with j R. Smith and basically Kobe saw that video 0:21:50.040 --> 0:21:55.680 me working out with NBA player, which no ordinary eleven 0:21:55.720 --> 0:21:58.080 and ten year old would work out with the NBA player, 0:21:58.800 --> 0:22:02.479 And to me, it was really surprising and you like 0:22:02.560 --> 0:22:06.200 you never like you never see like a girl working 0:22:06.200 --> 0:22:09.920 out with NBA player. Phil trained Kobe and he knew 0:22:09.960 --> 0:22:15.439 Kobe physically and um he basically asked Phil and said 0:22:16.040 --> 0:22:17.919 how old is this girl and what great is she? 0:22:18.760 --> 0:22:22.200 And invited over to practice with us, I go over 0:22:22.600 --> 0:22:26.240 and this is my first time meeting Kobe Bryant. Like ever, 0:22:26.720 --> 0:22:28.679 I never met him. I never took a picture with 0:22:28.760 --> 0:22:31.479 him because actually my first time meeting him, and it 0:22:31.600 --> 0:22:34.520 was just he looked kind of like a god to me, 0:22:34.680 --> 0:22:39.240 like a Hercules, and it was just so cool meeting him, 0:22:39.359 --> 0:22:41.600 Um and just being right next to him was just 0:22:41.640 --> 0:22:47.320 a blessing. The first practice, Gigi, his daughter Gianna was 0:22:47.400 --> 0:22:49.439 on the eighth grade girls team and I was a 0:22:49.480 --> 0:22:53.879 sixth grader, which was a big difference an age gap, 0:22:54.240 --> 0:22:58.520 but um, he had another girl was sixth sixth grade, 0:22:58.960 --> 0:23:00.800 and he wanted to make a se a great team, 0:23:00.840 --> 0:23:03.320 and he wanted me to play for a seventh grade team. 0:23:03.400 --> 0:23:06.280 So basically I was just going to practice with the 0:23:06.320 --> 0:23:10.080 eighth graders until we started playing basket, like when we 0:23:10.119 --> 0:23:12.680 started playing art, like when we started getting into our 0:23:12.720 --> 0:23:17.920 actual tournaments. But interacting with him was such a blessing 0:23:18.359 --> 0:23:21.360 getting advice from him. Um. I remember the first time 0:23:21.359 --> 0:23:24.639 I met him, he told me, Um, brick by brick, 0:23:24.920 --> 0:23:27.800 which meant is that you can't build your house and 0:23:27.880 --> 0:23:30.879 one day it's gonna take day by day. And he 0:23:31.040 --> 0:23:32.840 told me it's like cutting down a tree. It's going 0:23:32.880 --> 0:23:35.720 to take piece by piece by piece, and just like 0:23:35.920 --> 0:23:39.080 hearing those words is like okay. So he wants me 0:23:39.160 --> 0:23:41.439 to take it day by day and he wants me 0:23:41.480 --> 0:23:44.960 to like take my time learning all the all of 0:23:45.119 --> 0:23:48.760 like this knowledge he's giving me, says. She remembers where 0:23:48.800 --> 0:23:50.960 she was and what she was doing the morning she 0:23:51.040 --> 0:23:53.800 heard about the helicopter crash. Me and my brother were 0:23:53.840 --> 0:23:57.399 at Target. The game didn't start until like thirty minutes later, 0:23:57.720 --> 0:24:00.159 and we were right there, like literally, I'm gonna say, 0:24:00.240 --> 0:24:03.359 twelve minutes, fifteen minutes from the sports Accati. My brother 0:24:03.400 --> 0:24:05.680 gets a call from as one of his friends and says, 0:24:06.080 --> 0:24:08.440 did you hear the news? My brother's like, what news. 0:24:08.760 --> 0:24:11.600 He's like, cold, we just crashed his helicopter. My brother 0:24:11.640 --> 0:24:14.479 starts crying and I'm like, why are you crying? And 0:24:14.520 --> 0:24:18.000 he says that your coach just died. I wasn't shocked. 0:24:18.000 --> 0:24:21.040 I didn't like I didn't start crying until we got there. 0:24:21.680 --> 0:24:25.040 The whole team. Like if you saw, if you were 0:24:25.119 --> 0:24:28.040 in like the room where the team was, you would 0:24:28.040 --> 0:24:30.920 have like like burst of tears because the girls were 0:24:31.000 --> 0:24:34.680 like literally crying so much. It was just really sad 0:24:34.720 --> 0:24:37.040 to be in there, and that's when I started like 0:24:37.200 --> 0:24:40.080 thinking to myself, wait, did he really die or is 0:24:40.119 --> 0:24:41.920 this like fake? Like I didn't know if it was 0:24:41.960 --> 0:24:46.000 a dream or not or reality. To me, it wasn't real. 0:24:46.640 --> 0:24:49.520 I don't feel like it's still real. And then later 0:24:49.560 --> 0:24:51.800 on we found out that you was in there and 0:24:51.840 --> 0:24:54.960 our teammates were in there as well. I was younger 0:24:55.000 --> 0:24:57.320 than Gianna, but that didn't stop them from hanging out 0:24:57.359 --> 0:24:59.440 on and off the court. First time I met her, 0:24:59.480 --> 0:25:03.040 she was really nice. She introduced me, she asked where 0:25:03.040 --> 0:25:05.960 I lived. Day by day. I started like talking to her, 0:25:06.280 --> 0:25:09.040 getting to know her a little bit more. Um, she 0:25:09.280 --> 0:25:12.879 actually is the reason why I got onto TikTok. And 0:25:12.920 --> 0:25:15.119 I was like, let's TikTok and she's like, oh, you 0:25:15.119 --> 0:25:18.760 don't know what TikTok is. And I did my first, 0:25:19.400 --> 0:25:22.240 I think, my first dancing TikTok with her. Um, it 0:25:22.359 --> 0:25:24.879 was really cool. I was like really serious in the 0:25:25.119 --> 0:25:27.399 in the video, but there's a reason I didn't know, 0:25:27.760 --> 0:25:29.719 like what the dance was. We had to do I 0:25:29.760 --> 0:25:33.280 think three times that video. She was really nice. She 0:25:33.359 --> 0:25:36.080 was a really kind girl. The stuff I could tell 0:25:36.560 --> 0:25:39.920 you about g G is she was really determined she 0:25:40.040 --> 0:25:43.720 really wanted to be better. Yeah, and she really loved basketball. 0:25:44.200 --> 0:25:48.240 When we would practice together, you know, like when we 0:25:48.280 --> 0:25:51.040 got on the court, we're like, we're not friends anymore, 0:25:51.119 --> 0:25:53.600 but when we're off the court, we are friends. So 0:25:53.920 --> 0:25:56.200 you know, I would put my effort in, She'll put 0:25:56.200 --> 0:25:59.040 her effort in. Looking back now, Arbano says she was 0:25:59.040 --> 0:26:02.679 truly blessed be coached by Kobe Bryant. It's like the 0:26:02.720 --> 0:26:06.600 best feeling, like nobody, no, no coach is better than 0:26:06.680 --> 0:26:09.520 Kobe Bryant. To me, having a coach Kobe Bryant, you 0:26:09.560 --> 0:26:12.280 can never say that you had Kobe Bryant as your coach. 0:26:12.760 --> 0:26:14.800 I was just so blessed to be coached by Kobe 0:26:14.800 --> 0:26:16.480 Bryan because I knew I was gonna learn so much 0:26:16.560 --> 0:26:18.840 from him, and I was gonna know so much knowledge. 0:26:18.880 --> 0:26:21.200 And I was like, I remember, he told me that 0:26:21.359 --> 0:26:23.600 he didn't want me to be the number one eleven 0:26:23.640 --> 0:26:25.800 year old. He wanted me to be the number one 0:26:25.840 --> 0:26:29.560 fifteen sixteen year old, and he wanted me to like 0:26:29.840 --> 0:26:33.840 progress every day. What he was trying to do is 0:26:34.000 --> 0:26:37.120 that woman's sports, well, woman's sports is a big deal, 0:26:37.240 --> 0:26:40.760 but woman's basketball isn't really a big deal. It's more 0:26:40.840 --> 0:26:43.320