Speaker 1: February nine, members of the National Transportation Safety Board meant
Speaker 1: to review the results of the investigation into the crash
Speaker 1: of the Sikorski s s B. Even good pilots can
Speaker 1: end up in bad situations, and just because something is
Speaker 1: legal doesn't mean that it's always safe. I'm Steve Gregory,
Speaker 1: and this is the death and life of Kobe Bryant.
Speaker 1: Robert Sumwalt is the chair of the NTSB. He convened
Speaker 1: the members of the board, Bruce Landsburg, Michael Graham, Thomas Chapman,
Speaker 1: and Jennifer hammondy Hamandy was the board member on scene
Speaker 1: with a go team in Calabasas the day after the crash.
Speaker 1: The report contains more than sixteen hundred pages of documents
Speaker 1: and evidence related to the investigation. The hearing also includes
Speaker 1: members of the NTSB staff, which sit through the entire
Speaker 1: hearing to answer questions from board members. Now, I will
Speaker 1: introduce the staff for today's meeting. Unless otherwise noted. The
Speaker 1: staff members are from the Office of Aviation Safety. Dana Schultz,
Speaker 1: the director for the Office Office of Aviation Safety, Bill English,
Speaker 1: Investigator in Charge, Mike Richards, Meteorology Fabian Salazar, Operational Factors,
Speaker 1: Dr Duan Civilian Human Performance Kathleen Silba, General Counsel for
Speaker 1: the NTSP, Daulian Hatchett, Director for the Office of Safety,
Speaker 1: Recommendations and Communications, Jim Ritter, Director for the Office of
Speaker 1: Research and Engineering. Brian Soper Air Traffic Control, Chris Babcock
Speaker 1: crash resistant flight recorder Systems from the Office of Research
Speaker 1: and Engineering, Ban McKenny air Worthiness, Adam Horay Airworthiness, Nathan
Speaker 1: Hoyt Safety Recommendations from the Office of Safety, recommen Dations
Speaker 1: and Communications, greg Or Sorry Helicopter Maintenance and Visuals, and
Speaker 1: Kathy Gania Report Writer and NTSB Board hearing is very
Speaker 1: clinical and without emotion. The role of the board is
Speaker 1: to establish a probable cause of an accident and offer
Speaker 1: subsequent safety recommendations to prevent that type of accident from
Speaker 1: ever happening again. Bill English was the lead investigator for
Speaker 1: this incident and kicks off the hearing with his official
Speaker 1: narrative on January at am Pacific Standard time. Sikorski seventy
Speaker 1: B helicopter November seven, two Echo x Ray operated by
Speaker 1: Island Express Helicopters collided with Hilly Terraine near the city
Speaker 1: of Calabasas California. The pilot and eight passengers were fatally injured,
Speaker 1: and the helicopter was destroyed by impact forces and fire.
Speaker 1: The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data or
Speaker 1: cockpit voice recorder, nor was it required to be. The
Speaker 1: flight was an on demand charter operated under the provisions
Speaker 1: of fourteen the Federal Regulations Part One to take the
Speaker 1: passengers from John Wayne, Orange County Airport in Santa Ana, California,
Speaker 1: to the Camario, California Airport for a basketball tournament. The
Speaker 1: weather that morning included a widespread area of coastal clouds
Speaker 1: associated with a marine layer, a stable humid air mass
Speaker 1: about one to two thousand feet thick, often characterized by
Speaker 1: stratus clouds at its top, and the potential for fog
Speaker 1: formation in some areas below. There were no hazardous conditions
Speaker 1: such as icing or thunderstorms. Mr Richards will have further
Speaker 1: details on the meteorological factors in his presentation. The flight
Speaker 1: was operated with a single pilot under visual flight rolls
Speaker 1: or VFR, as Island Express was not authorized to conduct
Speaker 1: passenger carrying flights under instrument flight rolls. This is typical
Speaker 1: for helicopter charter operations. The pilot flying was Island Express.
Speaker 1: His chief pilot, and he had been flying in the
Speaker 1: area for ten years and had logged about the flight
Speaker 1: to parted at nine oh seven and proceeded northwesterly across
Speaker 1: the Los Angeles metropolitan area. At the pilot requested to
Speaker 1: transit the Burbank Class Charlie air Space, but a TC
Speaker 1: advised him to hold due to traffic. Weather in this
Speaker 1: area was reported as cloud ceilings one thousand, one hundred
Speaker 1: feet above ground level with visibility two and a half miles.
Speaker 1: About eleven minutes later, a TC provided special VFR clearance
Speaker 1: to proceed through the Burbank and Van Nuys airspace. Throughout
Speaker 1: this segment of flight, the helicopter was maintaining an altitude
Speaker 1: of about five hundred feet above ground level. As the
Speaker 1: flight proceeded to the west out of the San Fernando
Speaker 1: Valley area, a t C advised the pilot that they
Speaker 1: would be too low for flight following and they should
Speaker 1: contact Cameo Tower as they got closer. The pilot acknowledged,
Speaker 1: and the helicopter proceeded to the west, following US or
Speaker 1: out one on one toward an area of rising terrain
Speaker 1: at a speed of about one hundred and forty knots.
Speaker 1: About four minutes later, the pilot contacted a TC again
Speaker 1: and advised them that he was intending to climb to
Speaker 1: go above the cloud layers. A surveillance camera near the
Speaker 1: one oh one captured the helicopter about this time. The
Speaker 1: helicopter had been flying about three hundred and fifty feet
Speaker 1: above ground level, but during the transmission to a TC,
Speaker 1: began climbing at a rate of about fifteen hundred feet
Speaker 1: per minute while generally following the one oh one in
Speaker 1: a slight left turn. During radio communications with a TC,
Speaker 1: the helicopter climbed through an altitude of two thousand feet
Speaker 1: above sea level, or about hundred feet above ground level,
Speaker 1: by which point it was highly unlikely for the pilot
Speaker 1: to be able to maintain visual ground contact. The climb
Speaker 1: reached a maximum altitude of about two thousand, four hundred
Speaker 1: feet above sea level. As the helicopter continued a left
Speaker 1: turn diverging from the highway. The controller asked the pilot's intentions,
Speaker 1: and he said he was climbing to four thousand feet. However,
Speaker 1: by that time the helicopter was in a tightening left
Speaker 1: turn and descending rapidly. This maneuver is consistent with a
Speaker 1: pilot experiencing spatial disorientation in limited visibility conditions. The helicopter
Speaker 1: impacted hilly Terraine on a generally northeasterly bearing at a
Speaker 1: high speed and decent rate. From here, all the subject
Speaker 1: matter experts offer their respective narratives. One of the more
Speaker 1: interesting perspectives comes from Dr duan civilian, an expert on
Speaker 1: human performance and aviation. I will discuss the following human
Speaker 1: performance issues in this accident, pilot decision making, spatial disorientation,
Speaker 1: and safety management systems. Several factors may have influenced the
Speaker 1: pilot to place pressure on himself to complete the flight.
Speaker 1: For example, the pilot was preferred and trusted by the client,
Speaker 1: as was Island Express. The pilot likely took pride in
Speaker 1: these positions of trust with both the client and with
Speaker 1: Island Express. The pilot had a good relationship with the
Speaker 1: client and likely did not want to disappoint him by
Speaker 1: not completing the like this kind of self induced pressure
Speaker 1: can adversely affect pilot decision making and judgment. However, there
Speaker 1: was no evidence that Island Expressed or the client placed
Speaker 1: pressure on the pilot to accept the chartered flight request,
Speaker 1: or complete the flight in adverse weather. The pilot's flight
Speaker 1: in i AMC was inconsistent with his demonstrated judgment and
Speaker 1: decision making. Although conditions were deteriorating en route, an alternative
Speaker 1: course of action was not acted upon by the pilot.
Speaker 1: The pilots continuation of the flight despite deteriorating weather conditions
Speaker 1: was representative planned continuation bias, which strengthens as the pilot
Speaker 1: gets closer to the destination. The pilot statement to the
Speaker 1: air traffic control is that he was initiating. The climb
Speaker 1: occurred about two seconds after the helicopter enter the clouds.
Speaker 1: Data show the climb started at a rate about per minute,
Speaker 1: accompanied by a gradual left bank to the left, generally
Speaker 1: following the US one on one as the helicopter continue
Speaker 1: climbing into the cloud layer. The pious loss of visual
Speaker 1: references would have required him to transition to the flight
Speaker 1: instruments to maintain awareness of the helicopter's attitude and track
Speaker 1: the inner ear since his balance and orientation. We're flying
Speaker 1: an aircraft and there's a lack of outside visual references,
Speaker 1: our inner ear can give us a false sense of
Speaker 1: orientation because our inner ear cannot distinguish between accelerations and tilt.
Speaker 1: If a pilot cannot see outside visual references, he must
Speaker 1: rely on flight instruments. When there are no outside visual references,
Speaker 1: the pilot is more susceptible to inner ear illusions. One
Speaker 1: common illusion that can trigger pilot's perception into believing he
Speaker 1: is flying straight and level but he is in a
Speaker 1: steady turn is called the leans. During the climb, and
Speaker 1: I amc the helicopter earned a steady left turn, conducive
Speaker 1: for the pilot to experience the lanes. The vestibular system
Speaker 1: will usually detect initial rolling and turning movement. However, once
Speaker 1: the aircraft is stabilized in a steady rate of turn
Speaker 1: and angle of bank, the vestibular system will catch up
Speaker 1: with the aircraft and the pilot can believe that the
Speaker 1: aircraft is straight and leveled when it is not. Helicopter
Speaker 1: was in a left bank rapid climb. It's bank increased
Speaker 1: and it entered a tighter left turn that diverged away
Speaker 1: from US one on one. The increasing bank would exacerbate
Speaker 1: the aspects of the lanes. The result of descent and
Speaker 1: acceleration were conducive for the pilot to experience a semidographic
Speaker 1: illusion in which he would incorrectly perceive that the helicopter
Speaker 1: was climbing when it was descending. The pilot was either
Speaker 1: not referencing the helicopter's instruments or having difficulty interpreting or
Speaker 1: believing them due to the compelling vestibular illusions, and he
Speaker 1: did not successfully recover the helicopter coming up. NTSP board
Speaker 1: members began questioning investigators. It becomes clear where the blame's
Speaker 1: gonna land, and we talk with a teammate of Gianna
Speaker 1: Bryant's about their time together. As the death and life
Speaker 1: of Kobe Bryant continues, members of the NTSB have gathered
Speaker 1: to discuss the investigation into the crash of the Sikorski
Speaker 1: s B and it's time for board members to ask
Speaker 1: the ntsb s own investigators and subject matter experts about
Speaker 1: details of the twelve month investigation. At one point, board
Speaker 1: member Michael Graham focused on pilot are as abyans training.
Speaker 1: Graham seemed concerned it's a bayan's decision to fly into
Speaker 1: the clouds using only visual flight rules or VFR. The
Speaker 1: pilot should initiate a straight ahead climb. Straight ahead controlled
Speaker 1: climb to an altitude that will provide obstructive clearance in
Speaker 1: the area of operation. Did he climb straight ahead in
Speaker 1: that case when he penetrated the weather, No, sir, the
Speaker 1: climb was initiated in a subtle left turn. Following the
Speaker 1: subtle left turn, so he didn't follow his training. Do
Speaker 1: you feel he he committed to the instruments? In this case,
Speaker 1: the path and behavior of the helicopter is not consistent
Speaker 1: with committing to the instruments. Exactly. I agree with you
Speaker 1: wholeheartedly there. So um, yeah, I'm just concerned about all
Speaker 1: this as as a as a fellow aviator. He didn't
Speaker 1: even follow the training, so I see, my time's about up.
Speaker 1: I just say, you know, as long as we continue
Speaker 1: to have VFR only helicopters continuing to flirt with marginal
Speaker 1: weather and sometimes sub marginal weather um of low altitudes,
Speaker 1: low ceilings, limited visibility, unfortunately, a certain percentage of them
Speaker 1: will stray into inavert in I amc and unfortunately a
Speaker 1: certain percentage of them will not come out alive. Remember,
Speaker 1: Tom Chapman has a different concerns. Certainly, it could be
Speaker 1: that self induced pressure played a role, and it's reasonable
Speaker 1: to discuss that as a possibility. Would you please elaborate
Speaker 1: on the findings of the investigation on this point. The
Speaker 1: relationship between the pilot and the client had turned into
Speaker 1: a friendship over the years, that the client allowed the
Speaker 1: pilot to fly his children UH without him being present,
Speaker 1: and that that type of relationship that they had was
Speaker 1: very close. And when we look at human factor psychology,
Speaker 1: we look at the decisions that people make based off
Speaker 1: of the perception of a situation UH, and in this case,
Speaker 1: the the pilot as he was flying en route, these
Speaker 1: types of this this type of relationship that he had
Speaker 1: with the client can UH leads to self induced pressure
Speaker 1: during the portion of the flight, and so that is
Speaker 1: why it's the objective evidence from the interviews that helped
Speaker 1: us understand that relationship and the effect that it can
Speaker 1: have on pilot decision making. UH. The investigation Also, investigation
Speaker 1: also indicates that the phenomenon of planned continuation bias was
Speaker 1: a factor contributing to the pile decision to continue the flight.
Speaker 1: Is planned continuation bias dependent on an element of self
Speaker 1: induced pressure? So, in other words, is it possible there
Speaker 1: could have been planned continuation bias without any self induced
Speaker 1: pressure of the type that you've described. Well, in this case,
Speaker 1: it was both self induced pressure and planning continuation bias
Speaker 1: UH and the plan continuation bias UH. Portion of it
Speaker 1: was the pilot continuing the flight despite changing conditions. Board
Speaker 1: member Jennifer Hammond he was at the crash site and
Speaker 1: her first round of questioning had more to do with
Speaker 1: risk assessment. She's been asking the chief investigator about a
Speaker 1: checklist at the beginning of the flight. But then she summarizes,
Speaker 1: I guess what I'm asking is why wasn't there an
Speaker 1: alternative plan? An alternative plan and could have helped? At
Speaker 1: the time at eight thirty seven, he had a conversation
Speaker 1: with O C that said that mapped. He pointed to
Speaker 1: a map that said he planned to go north to
Speaker 1: Rogers Stadium in Los Angeles, around Burbank and follow State
Speaker 1: Route one eighteen. At some point after Van Nye he enters,
Speaker 1: I MC around and you and I discussed this ninety
Speaker 1: four and seconds sometime between there and nine and ten seconds.
Speaker 1: That's thirty five seconds. I mean, that's not a lot
Speaker 1: of time. And so would you why wouldn't you have
Speaker 1: wouldn't it have helped if you had an alternative plan
Speaker 1: in mind rather than a quick decision making yes, ma'am
Speaker 1: coming up. The board makes its final determination and we
Speaker 1: meet a teammate of Gianna Bryant's. As the death in
Speaker 1: life of Kobe Bryant continues for about four hours, members
Speaker 1: of the NTSB did rounds of Q and A s
Speaker 1: with investigators. Then it was time to present the final report.
Speaker 1: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
Speaker 1: of this accident was the pilot's decision to continue flight
Speaker 1: under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted
Speaker 1: in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control. Contributing
Speaker 1: to the accident was the pilot's likely self induced pressure
Speaker 1: and the pilot's plan continued continuation bias, which adversely affected
Speaker 1: his decision making. And Island Express Helicopters inadequate review and
Speaker 1: oversight of its safety management process, and, as with all
Speaker 1: NTSB hearings, safety recommendations follow. As a result of this investigation,
Speaker 1: staff proposes the following four new safety recommendations due to
Speaker 1: the Federal Aviation Administration. One, require the use of appropriate
Speaker 1: simulation devices during initial and recurrent pilot training for Title
Speaker 1: fourteen Code of Federal Regulations, Part one thirty five Helicopter
Speaker 1: Operations two convene a multidisciplinary panel of aircraft performance, human factors,
Speaker 1: and aircraft operations specialists to evaluate spatial disorientation simulation technologies
Speaker 1: to determine which applications are most effective for training pilots
Speaker 1: to recognize the onset of spatial disorientation and successfully mitigated,
Speaker 1: and to two Island Express Helicopters, Inc. Three participate in
Speaker 1: the Federal Aviation Administration's Safety Management System Voluntary program, and
Speaker 1: number four install flight data recording devices capable of supporting
Speaker 1: a flight data Monitoring FDM program on each helicopter in
Speaker 1: your fleet. Now it's time for Chairman Bob some Walt
Speaker 1: to call for a vote. No further discussions or Vice
Speaker 1: Chairman Landsburg. Your vote is I shareman votes. I remember Hamedymember,
Speaker 1: Hamedy votes, Remember Graham Imber Graham votes on. Remember Chapman,
Speaker 1: I remember Chapman votes on. The chairman votes. Uh. The
Speaker 1: report has been adopted as revised unanimously. Minutes after the hearing,
Speaker 1: some Walt takes questions from the media in a virtual
Speaker 1: press conference. Stephen Gregory, thank you, Chairman. Stone Walt, You
Speaker 1: have made these statements all throughout, not only hearing it
Speaker 1: with my colleague here about good pilots make bad decisions.
Speaker 1: You talked about Island Express being a potential I'm safe operator,
Speaker 1: after all, they were the ones that this crash happened with. Also,
Speaker 1: you talked about the previous owners of the helicopter had
Speaker 1: CFR but Island Express did not. It was almost sort
Speaker 1: of this subtle hint along the way that you were
Speaker 1: you were sending out messages to either Part one thirty
Speaker 1: five operators or to Island Express that they're this. There
Speaker 1: was a series of bad choices along the way. Is
Speaker 1: that correct? I think so. As you pointed out, they
Speaker 1: had a flight data recorder when they received the helicopter,
Speaker 1: they removed the I'm sorry as a CVR. Maybe it
Speaker 1: was an FDR. They'll have to look which wasn't It
Speaker 1: was a it was a cockpit MORS recorder. They removed
Speaker 1: it when they got the got the helicopter. Uh. I
Speaker 1: personally believe that you can certainly operate a helicopter like
Speaker 1: this single pilot, and you can do it very safely
Speaker 1: until something happens, like you inadvertently flying to the clouds,
Speaker 1: or until your pilot gets distracted and something happens. So
Speaker 1: I feel like UM has mentioned in the board meeting,
Speaker 1: the oil and gas industry has pretty much exclusively gone
Speaker 1: to two pilot operations in aircraft of this of this
Speaker 1: similar size. UM. Why are they doing that, UM to
Speaker 1: enhance the safety margin? And I feel like, uh, that's
Speaker 1: a question. That I have this same exact helicopter, same
Speaker 1: exact ship. UM. When Chevron used it, they had to
Speaker 1: have to two pilots. UM. Wonder while Island Express did
Speaker 1: not elect to operate that way when they were chartering
Speaker 1: to other clients. There are a lot of corporate operators
Speaker 1: that I've checked with over the last few weeks that
Speaker 1: operate this same type of aircraft exclusively with two pilots. Again,
Speaker 1: the previous owner of this preview of this helicopter always
Speaker 1: operated with two pilots. I want to make darn sure
Speaker 1: that somebody doesn't think that I'm blaming the client for
Speaker 1: electing not to operate with two pilots. UM. I think
Speaker 1: that sometimes the consumers. I want the consumers to be
Speaker 1: aware and just because something is legal doesn't mean that
Speaker 1: it's always safe. At Mamba Sports, Academy. We embraced the
Speaker 1: Mamba mentally on the morning of the accident. The Mamba
Speaker 1: Sports Academy was the intended destination for Bryant, Bryant's daughter, Gianna,
Speaker 1: Gianna's two teammates and parents of her teammates, as well
Speaker 1: as the girls assistant coach. Mamba Sports Academy is where
Speaker 1: we evolved and have fun. I did know G first
Speaker 1: time I met her. She was really nice. Isabella Escribano
Speaker 1: says she was one of G's teammates and recalls how
Speaker 1: she became a member of the Mamba Sports Academy. I
Speaker 1: started playing for Team Mamba by well the Lakers assistant
Speaker 1: coach Phil Handy. He invited me to a workout and
Speaker 1: with j R. Smith and basically Kobe saw that video
Speaker 1: me working out with NBA player, which no ordinary eleven
Speaker 1: and ten year old would work out with the NBA player,
Speaker 1: And to me, it was really surprising and you like
Speaker 1: you never like you never see like a girl working
Speaker 1: out with NBA player. Phil trained Kobe and he knew
Speaker 1: Kobe physically and um he basically asked Phil and said
Speaker 1: how old is this girl and what great is she?
Speaker 1: And invited over to practice with us, I go over
Speaker 1: and this is my first time meeting Kobe Bryant. Like ever,
Speaker 1: I never met him. I never took a picture with
Speaker 1: him because actually my first time meeting him, and it
Speaker 1: was just he looked kind of like a god to me,
Speaker 1: like a Hercules, and it was just so cool meeting him,
Speaker 1: Um and just being right next to him was just
Speaker 1: a blessing. The first practice, Gigi, his daughter Gianna was
Speaker 1: on the eighth grade girls team and I was a
Speaker 1: sixth grader, which was a big difference an age gap,
Speaker 1: but um, he had another girl was sixth sixth grade,
Speaker 1: and he wanted to make a se a great team,
Speaker 1: and he wanted me to play for a seventh grade team.
Speaker 1: So basically I was just going to practice with the
Speaker 1: eighth graders until we started playing basket, like when we
Speaker 1: started playing art, like when we started getting into our
Speaker 1: actual tournaments. But interacting with him was such a blessing
Speaker 1: getting advice from him. Um. I remember the first time
Speaker 1: I met him, he told me, Um, brick by brick,
Speaker 1: which meant is that you can't build your house and
Speaker 1: one day it's gonna take day by day. And he
Speaker 1: told me it's like cutting down a tree. It's going
Speaker 1: to take piece by piece by piece, and just like
Speaker 1: hearing those words is like okay. So he wants me
Speaker 1: to take it day by day and he wants me
Speaker 1: to like take my time learning all the all of
Speaker 1: like this knowledge he's giving me, says. She remembers where
Speaker 1: she was and what she was doing the morning she
Speaker 1: heard about the helicopter crash. Me and my brother were
Speaker 1: at Target. The game didn't start until like thirty minutes later,
Speaker 1: and we were right there, like literally, I'm gonna say,
Speaker 1: twelve minutes, fifteen minutes from the sports Accati. My brother
Speaker 1: gets a call from as one of his friends and says,
Speaker 1: did you hear the news? My brother's like, what news.
Speaker 1: He's like, cold, we just crashed his helicopter. My brother
Speaker 1: starts crying and I'm like, why are you crying? And
Speaker 1: he says that your coach just died. I wasn't shocked.
Speaker 1: I didn't like I didn't start crying until we got there.
Speaker 1: The whole team. Like if you saw, if you were
Speaker 1: in like the room where the team was, you would
Speaker 1: have like like burst of tears because the girls were
Speaker 1: like literally crying so much. It was just really sad
Speaker 1: to be in there, and that's when I started like
Speaker 1: thinking to myself, wait, did he really die or is
Speaker 1: this like fake? Like I didn't know if it was
Speaker 1: a dream or not or reality. To me, it wasn't real.
Speaker 1: I don't feel like it's still real. And then later
Speaker 1: on we found out that you was in there and
Speaker 1: our teammates were in there as well. I was younger
Speaker 1: than Gianna, but that didn't stop them from hanging out
Speaker 1: on and off the court. First time I met her,
Speaker 1: she was really nice. She introduced me, she asked where
Speaker 1: I lived. Day by day. I started like talking to her,
Speaker 1: getting to know her a little bit more. Um, she
Speaker 1: actually is the reason why I got onto TikTok. And
Speaker 1: I was like, let's TikTok and she's like, oh, you
Speaker 1: don't know what TikTok is. And I did my first,
Speaker 1: I think, my first dancing TikTok with her. Um, it
Speaker 1: was really cool. I was like really serious in the
Speaker 1: in the video, but there's a reason I didn't know,
Speaker 1: like what the dance was. We had to do I
Speaker 1: think three times that video. She was really nice. She
Speaker 1: was a really kind girl. The stuff I could tell
Speaker 1: you about g G is she was really determined she
Speaker 1: really wanted to be better. Yeah, and she really loved basketball.
Speaker 1: When we would practice together, you know, like when we
Speaker 1: got on the court, we're like, we're not friends anymore,
Speaker 1: but when we're off the court, we are friends. So
Speaker 1: you know, I would put my effort in, She'll put
Speaker 1: her effort in. Looking back now, Arbano says she was
Speaker 1: truly blessed be coached by Kobe Bryant. It's like the
Speaker 1: best feeling, like nobody, no, no coach is better than
Speaker 1: Kobe Bryant. To me, having a coach Kobe Bryant, you
Speaker 1: can never say that you had Kobe Bryant as your coach.
Speaker 1: I was just so blessed to be coached by Kobe
Speaker 1: Bryan because I knew I was gonna learn so much
Speaker 1: from him, and I was gonna know so much knowledge.
Speaker 1: And I was like, I remember, he told me that
Speaker 1: he didn't want me to be the number one eleven
Speaker 1: year old. He wanted me to be the number one
Speaker 1: fifteen sixteen year old, and he wanted me to like
Speaker 1: progress every day. What he was trying to do is
Speaker 1: that woman's sports, well, woman's sports is a big deal,
Speaker 1: but woman's basketball isn't really a big deal. It's more
Speaker 1: than the men's game. What he was trying to do
Speaker 1: is make the woman's game more expand and he was
Speaker 1: trying to make the woman's game more big. And I
Speaker 1: felt like that was just like the best feeling that
Speaker 1: Kobe Bryant was trying to get girls out there that
Speaker 1: are good, that girls could play basketball, and that girls
Speaker 1: are like fun to walk. And I feel like he
Speaker 1: wanted to do that. He wanted to expand the girls
Speaker 1: use the basketball, and um, after he was gone, I
Speaker 1: wanted to finish that job for him. The Sports Academy
Speaker 1: opened in It was Decemberen that Kobe Bryant announced the
Speaker 1: renaming of the facility to the Mamba Sports Academy. Four
Speaker 1: months after the tragic accident, the academy's CEO, Chad Faulkner
Speaker 1: would announce that they would drop the name Mamba and
Speaker 1: simply go back to the original name of the Sports Academy.
Speaker 1: Faulkner said, out of respect for Bryant, our beliefs and
Speaker 1: thoughts are Kobe is one of one. Mamba is one
Speaker 1: of one. Coming up in episode six, you know, it's
Speaker 1: it's really emotional some of these murals that I see
Speaker 1: and still see to this day, Bryant would become an
Speaker 1: inspiration in the most unlikely ways, and still to come
Speaker 1: in future episodes Bryant's quiet and unknown contributions to charity.
Speaker 1: The Death and Life of Kobe Bryant is a production
Speaker 1: of k FI News at iHeartMedia, Los Angeles for the
Speaker 1: iHeart podcast network.