Speaker 1: From Bloomberg News and I Heart Radio. It's the big take.
Speaker 1: I'm West Cassova today. How Iran's leaders have kept hold
Speaker 1: on power despite intense pressure from inside the country and out.
Speaker 1: Punitive US and European sanctions intended in part to persuade
Speaker 1: Iran to stop its program to develop a nuclear weapon,
Speaker 1: have crippled the country's economy, and now inside Iran we
Speaker 1: see these dramatic scenes of citizens, especially young people, risking
Speaker 1: their lives to protest the government in the streets by
Speaker 1: the thousands. Widespread demonstrations erupted in September over the death
Speaker 1: in police custody of Massa Amini. She was a twenty
Speaker 1: two year old woman, and she was arrested by so
Speaker 1: called morality police for allegedly disobeying around strict dress code
Speaker 1: for women. The protesters demanded, among other things, an end
Speaker 1: to religious laws that require women to cover their heads
Speaker 1: and that deny them some basic rights. The unrest has
Speaker 1: since broadened into a widespread rebuke of the government and
Speaker 1: its leaders. Some protests have called for the dismantling of
Speaker 1: the Islamic nature of the state. The government has responded
Speaker 1: with force. Thousands of protesters have been arrested and some
Speaker 1: have been put to death, and yet even with international
Speaker 1: economic pressure and rising internal discontent, there are a few
Speaker 1: signs that the government is weakening. Bloomberg Senior international affairs
Speaker 1: correspondent Mark Champion joins me from London to explain what
Speaker 1: to make of the turmoil happening now in Iran and
Speaker 1: how long and unpopular regime can remain in power. Mark,
Speaker 1: There's been so much happening inside around divisions within Irammian society,
Speaker 1: the government and especially the leader, like trying to keep
Speaker 1: control of unrest by students, especially young women, who are
Speaker 1: really pushing up against these very strict laws. Can you
Speaker 1: give us a sense of what's happening now in the
Speaker 1: wake of all of these protests, arrests, and prosecutions where
Speaker 1: people are being put to death. I started going to
Speaker 1: Iranovo twenty years ago. It's different from all the iterations
Speaker 1: of upset. Before you know, you can say that he
Speaker 1: has reached a tipping point. There are reports Iranian forces
Speaker 1: are using bullets and tear gas on anti government protesters around.
Speaker 1: The president has said chaos will not be tolerated. Brave
Speaker 1: Iranians of all ages and walks of life, have been
Speaker 1: taking to the streets calling for freedom, equality and the
Speaker 1: end of Islamic rule. The revolution is more than forty
Speaker 1: years old. It's a spent force now. The people who
Speaker 1: were leading the country there in their eighties. For them,
Speaker 1: the revolution was enormously exciting and they were completely committed,
Speaker 1: and they still recall it in those terms. But the
Speaker 1: vast majority of the population was born long after and
Speaker 1: they don't have nothing connecting them to the revolution really,
Speaker 1: and they've come to really hate the regime. There was
Speaker 1: some sort of cohabitation going on, which was kind of
Speaker 1: mechanized by these very managed elections, but they were offered acceptable,
Speaker 1: moderate to conservative candidates that they could vote for who
Speaker 1: offered some sort of improvement from very hardline views on
Speaker 1: things like, you know, wearing a hitch ab and so on.
Speaker 1: And that's gone. With the last election, all choice was removed.
Speaker 1: The turnout was absolutely minimal, So all pretense having some
Speaker 1: sorts of connection with the population is has gone. And
Speaker 1: I think that really is a tipping point. Now that's
Speaker 1: a completely separate question as to whether that means that
Speaker 1: the regime's days are numbered, and that is you know,
Speaker 1: much much less clear that that's the case. I've spoken
Speaker 1: to a few different sort of diplomats and officials about
Speaker 1: this and sort of just asking them here, so what
Speaker 1: would it take for there to be a collapse of
Speaker 1: the regime, and general view seems to be and I
Speaker 1: think it's probably right that a big mistake made by
Speaker 1: the security forces, where in one instance they kill large
Speaker 1: numbers of people, so a big mistake that's simply the
Speaker 1: lid just kind of comes off, and they seem to
Speaker 1: have avoided doing that, and the protests have subsided. They've
Speaker 1: kind of gone more online, more into sort of daily life,
Speaker 1: which again is very dangerous for the regime because it
Speaker 1: just says that their idea of how we ran should
Speaker 1: be is just completely separate from how people want to
Speaker 1: live their lives. But it's safer in terms of the
Speaker 1: regime's immediate survive And the other possibility is, you know,
Speaker 1: it's a dangerous moment for the regime when the Supreme
Speaker 1: Leader passes away. He's an older man and you know
Speaker 1: he won't live forever. There is no obvious candidate who
Speaker 1: would be acceptable for the vast majority of the population,
Speaker 1: and a lot of the legitimacy of the revolution and
Speaker 1: the regime is embedded in the supreme leader. So it's
Speaker 1: a dangerous moment for them when that happens and how
Speaker 1: they handle it. If they can handle that, if they
Speaker 1: can avoid the big mistakes, this could go on for
Speaker 1: some time, and it's just a tragic reality. This has
Speaker 1: been true for quite some time, this disconnect, and we've
Speaker 1: seen over the years the strict enforcement ebb and flow
Speaker 1: where it would be relaxed for a while and then
Speaker 1: suddenly cracked down. What made the government become so forceful
Speaker 1: in its enforcement of these rules? I think really the
Speaker 1: best answer is hubris the it they had finally got
Speaker 1: rid of President Ruhani and his team. They were those
Speaker 1: kind of conservative moderates that had been elected some time before,
Speaker 1: and they had kept the lid on some of the
Speaker 1: proclivities of the real heartliners. With them swept away, you
Speaker 1: then have you know a new president I see who
Speaker 1: is you know a true heartliner. Over the years, he's
Speaker 1: played this game in order to keep people on board
Speaker 1: and give them a little bit of what they want.
Speaker 1: But now he's swung back to the hardline side. You
Speaker 1: know he did with Ahmadinijad before Honey, and now he
Speaker 1: swung back again. We see a lot of young people
Speaker 1: who are risking a lot by going out into the
Speaker 1: streets to protest. But is that true also of the
Speaker 1: vast majority of the population. You describe most people as
Speaker 1: having little connection to the old revolution and that spirit,
Speaker 1: and yet most of the population doesn't seem to be
Speaker 1: rising up, even if they're sympathetic to a cause. That's
Speaker 1: the key, right that, so long as the government avoids
Speaker 1: some really massive mistake and then really large bloodshed that
Speaker 1: ignites the necessary level of outrage to get ordinary people
Speaker 1: out into the street, ordinary people who wouldn't normally take
Speaker 1: that risk, And that's what would be a desperate threat
Speaker 1: to the regime and what they've tried and so far
Speaker 1: succeeded to avoid. But you're right, much of the population
Speaker 1: is not willing to come out. That the risks are
Speaker 1: extremely high, and that is why the regime can survive.
Speaker 1: One way to kind of understand how the regime has
Speaker 1: bought this very fine line in order to impose their
Speaker 1: view of the revolution and the Islamic state while keeping
Speaker 1: people from sort of boiling over. The first time I
Speaker 1: went to run, I was left like ten days, and
Speaker 1: I went to various cities and there was something that
Speaker 1: really just sort of niggled, and I couldn't figure out
Speaker 1: what it was until the day I left, And it
Speaker 1: was that in all those ten days that didn't hear
Speaker 1: the call to prayer. Anytime you're in the Middle East,
Speaker 1: you know, you could Istanbul and it's so overwhelming, right
Speaker 1: you just you'll never miss it. And it certainly struck
Speaker 1: me that I hadn't heard it in all that time.
Speaker 1: I went back the next time and I tried to,
Speaker 1: you know, find out why that was. And the reason
Speaker 1: was that as people sort of became disenchanted with the regime,
Speaker 1: they kind of you know, identified that with the call
Speaker 1: to prayer and the molsons on and they complain, and
Speaker 1: eventually the Ministry for Religion issued a funk while saying
Speaker 1: that accepting certain very holy sites like in the very
Speaker 1: center of Terran and so on, they were not allowed
Speaker 1: to amplify the call to prayer. It's so striking because
Speaker 1: it gives you this idea of how, you know, long
Speaker 1: this disenchantment has been going on, They've managed to secularize
Speaker 1: society in Iran in a way that isn't true in
Speaker 1: most other Middle Eastern countries. I suppose One reason why
Speaker 1: most people in run have not risen up despite their
Speaker 1: own dissatisfaction is that the security forces are so efficient
Speaker 1: at enforcing these laws, and the regime makes very public
Speaker 1: the way in which they punish people, torture and other
Speaker 1: forms of brutal punishment. What role does that play in
Speaker 1: both the ability of the regime to hang on despite
Speaker 1: discontent and the unwillingness of people to rise up despite discontent.
Speaker 1: It plays a huge role. It becomes at a certain
Speaker 1: point very very dangerous to go out and protest. You're
Speaker 1: likely to be imprisoned, and at the same time you
Speaker 1: can't really see how you're going to achieve your goal,
Speaker 1: so it becomes quite quickly dispiriting. We should really remember
Speaker 1: that these kinds of regimes, they tend to be able
Speaker 1: to survive long long after they've lost popularity and legitimacy,
Speaker 1: and they conduce for as long as the security forces
Speaker 1: around them are willing to use violence to suppress. When
Speaker 1: you say one circumstance under which the government might fall
Speaker 1: would be that they make a mistake on a scale
Speaker 1: so large that many more people rise up, is that
Speaker 1: a case of them being able to overwhelm the security
Speaker 1: forces exactly what does it look like to overthrow that government. Well,
Speaker 1: at a certain point and the security force has just
Speaker 1: done enough because the crowds are just so large. Each
Speaker 1: country has its that that limit will be in a
Speaker 1: different place, but you know, we haven't seen that reached
Speaker 1: in Iran. Yet another pressure on the government that is
Speaker 1: being felt by the people are the international sanctions against Iran,
Speaker 1: which has isolated the country even more than it was
Speaker 1: before and has really squeezed its economy. Do you think
Speaker 1: that those sanctions are having an effect or has they
Speaker 1: just hardened people against the West despite not liking their
Speaker 1: own government. They have an effect in the sense that
Speaker 1: they make the country much poorer and therefore the government
Speaker 1: has less money, et cetera. But the government will follow,
Speaker 1: you know, prioritize what it feels necessary. And for this regime,
Speaker 1: the top priority is going to be the security forces,
Speaker 1: their foreign policy, and all those things will come before
Speaker 1: what normal Western politicians might prioritize in terms of healthcare
Speaker 1: or whatever. They will retain the money to carry on. Weirdly,
Speaker 1: the isolation of the economy has forced more and more
Speaker 1: of the economy into the hands of the I r
Speaker 1: g C. The Iranian Revolutionary God Corps has more control
Speaker 1: over the economy now than it did before the sanctions.
Speaker 1: The sanctions of work in the sense that damage the economy,
Speaker 1: but they don't necessarily work in terms of disempowering the regime.
Speaker 1: You won't find the sanctions popular, so people don't say
Speaker 1: bring it on. But you are seeing a lot of unrest,
Speaker 1: and some of that unrest not in these particular protests,
Speaker 1: but previous ones. They were clearly about the economy, and
Speaker 1: they were held by in smaller towns and cities, poorer people.
Speaker 1: Quite different from these are the ones in in two
Speaker 1: thousand nine. You have seen a lot of unrest. Now,
Speaker 1: whether you can say that's because of the sanctions, it's
Speaker 1: it's almost impossible to draw that line. Nobody's protesting against
Speaker 1: the government because they have followed policies that induce sanctions.
Speaker 1: That's not what happens. What happens is they go out
Speaker 1: when they're unhappy. If the sanctions create an environment in
Speaker 1: which they are unhappy, then you could argue that they've contributed,
Speaker 1: But it's extremely difficult to draw lines. Mark, please stay
Speaker 1: with me. Will continue our conversation after the break. Given
Speaker 1: how much of the unrest in the protests are being
Speaker 1: carried out by young people. Is it just a matter
Speaker 1: of time that we see a generational shift that causes
Speaker 1: a much different Iran to take shape? You mentioned the
Speaker 1: supreme leader is old and won't be around forever. What
Speaker 1: happens next? I think the answer, you know is yes,
Speaker 1: but how much time? So I remember again first trip
Speaker 1: to Iran in two thousands three four, going to visit
Speaker 1: one of the embassies and getting a briefing there where
Speaker 1: they were making exactly this argument that the regime is
Speaker 1: it's days and numbered because the demography is just all
Speaker 1: against them. And they weren't wrong that the demography was
Speaker 1: working against the regime. It's just that twenty years later,
Speaker 1: they're still there, and it's difficult to say when it
Speaker 1: becomes untenable and when the regime can't continue. True, the
Speaker 1: eight year old who conducted the revolution that they will
Speaker 1: be gone pretty soon. But the sixties seventy old too,
Speaker 1: we're also grew up in or join the revolution, and
Speaker 1: it's on it. They still have a connection. It's not
Speaker 1: black and white. Question is how long? And it's not
Speaker 1: really very easy to answer that, Mark Champion, thanks for
Speaker 1: talking with me. Thank you. Let's take a closer look
Speaker 1: now at IRUN from a national and international security perspective.
Speaker 1: Olive Ayaz is here with me in Washington. He's the
Speaker 1: Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, but think
Speaker 1: tank that tracks global conflicts Alive. For many years, the
Speaker 1: US has tried every form of pressure to get around
Speaker 1: to change really to change the government in a run,
Speaker 1: and nothing has worked. If you were to advise President Biden,
Speaker 1: what would you suggest an alternative path to what the
Speaker 1: US is doing now? There is a ticking bomb which
Speaker 1: is around nuclear program that is advancing very quickly, and
Speaker 1: at some stage there needs to be a solution. Now,
Speaker 1: that solution could be something less than the restoration of
Speaker 1: the two thousand and fifty nuclear agreement, under which the
Speaker 1: regime will get wholesale sanctions relief. It could be a
Speaker 1: narrower deal, kind of a freeze agreement that would provide
Speaker 1: them with partial sanctions relief that it's easier to defend politically,
Speaker 1: but would diffuse this potential crisis because the last thing
Speaker 1: the West ones at a time that it's dealing with
Speaker 1: the crisis in Ukraine, with the potential crisis with China,
Speaker 1: is a nuclear nonproliferation crisis in the Middle East. I
Speaker 1: think the Western general and the United States in particular
Speaker 1: would have to come to a point psychologically to call
Speaker 1: this regime an evil empire and yet do deals with
Speaker 1: them that would limit the greatest threats that they pose
Speaker 1: to Western interests and security. By that, I mean replicating
Speaker 1: the experience that the United States had with the Soviet Union.
Speaker 1: You know, it was possible for the United States to
Speaker 1: stand up against human rights violations in the Soviet Union,
Speaker 1: to try to contain the Soviet unions problematic foreign policy
Speaker 1: and role in proxy conflicts around the world, but at
Speaker 1: the same time sign onto arms control agreements. This is
Speaker 1: the point that the West should eventually get to with
Speaker 1: Iran as well, understanding that political change in Iran comes
Speaker 1: not because of what the West will do, but what
Speaker 1: because of what they running people would want and will do.
Speaker 1: As we saw in the recent experience, the political leadership
Speaker 1: in Iran is still cohesive, still has the will to
Speaker 1: fight and remain in power. That could potentially change down
Speaker 1: the road. There might be cracks when the supreme leader
Speaker 1: is not there anymore, if there are more differences within
Speaker 1: the system that emerge, if their defections and at that
Speaker 1: point they running people might have a better chance of
Speaker 1: achieving a more open society. The question that I think
Speaker 1: is often overlooked in the West is what will this
Speaker 1: pressure policy that the West is entirely focused on due
Speaker 1: to the Iranian people, They're already on the brink. Another
Speaker 1: five to ten years of pressure and isolation will weaken
Speaker 1: this society even further in a way that even if
Speaker 1: a tipping point is reached, it might not necessarily result
Speaker 1: in the kind of transition to a democratic system that
Speaker 1: the West wishes to see. So although the West cannot,
Speaker 1: I think midwife a positive outcome necessarily in Iran, this
Speaker 1: is not South Africa that you know, the West had
Speaker 1: a lot of leverage against that could use, in which
Speaker 1: there was Nelson Mandela, that could lead the democratic transition,
Speaker 1: in which there was William f the clerk who was
Speaker 1: willing to compromise and hand over the power. All I
Speaker 1: think the West can do is to try to get
Speaker 1: into the kind of arrangements that will image the threat
Speaker 1: around proses on the nuclear front, the threat around poses
Speaker 1: in the region, and all of those have different solutions,
Speaker 1: and eventually also trying to empower the Iranian people through
Speaker 1: allowing the kind of sanctions relief that would benefit them
Speaker 1: the most. Just to use your analogy between the United
Speaker 1: States and the Soviet Union, one of the differences is
Speaker 1: that at the time the Soviet Union was a major
Speaker 1: nuclear power, as of course was the U. S. And
Speaker 1: so that was the basis of the relationship. Whereas Around
Speaker 1: is trying to become a nuclear power and the rest
Speaker 1: of the world is trying to stop it. Do you
Speaker 1: think that ultimately Around will achieve its goal of gaining
Speaker 1: a nuclear weapon or the efforts by the West to
Speaker 1: stop it will succeed in keeping it from getting one.
Speaker 1: Any country historically that has been determined enough to go
Speaker 1: for a nuclear weapon has been able to achieve that objective,
Speaker 1: and I don't think Iran will be an exception to
Speaker 1: that rule. But in the Irani in case, I don't
Speaker 1: think there is a scenario in which they can weaponize
Speaker 1: without going through a conflict first, because this is a
Speaker 1: program that is so deeply penetrated by Western and Israeli intelligence,
Speaker 1: as we have seen by repeated covert operations against Iran
Speaker 1: over the years. Iran has blamed Israel for what it
Speaker 1: called an active terrorism on its Naton's nuclear facility. According
Speaker 1: to State TV, Irani and Foreign Minister Mohammed Jabads a
Speaker 1: Reef vowed revenge. So once the decision, the political decision
Speaker 1: to go for a weapon is made, I think you
Speaker 1: will probably see in a US led attack on Iran's
Speaker 1: nuclear program. But having said that, although there is a
Speaker 1: military option for setting back Irun's nuclear program, there's no
Speaker 1: military solution to prevent Iran in a sustainable fashion from
Speaker 1: achieving that objective. And that is why the diplomatic solution remains,
Speaker 1: in the perspective of the Biden administration, the best and
Speaker 1: most sustainable solution for curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. We'll be
Speaker 1: right back. Do you think that the risk of a
Speaker 1: military confrontation rather than diplomatic economic confrontation as we've seen
Speaker 1: between the West and Iran is high? Oh? Absolutely. The
Speaker 1: problem right now is that the head space for escalation
Speaker 1: on the Iranian side is shrinking by the day. You know,
Speaker 1: the US has basically maxed itself out of sanctions leverage.
Speaker 1: It has sanctioned almost everything that moves in Iran. It
Speaker 1: can increase the pressure by enforcing the existing sanctions. But
Speaker 1: if the dial of sanctions is eight out of ten,
Speaker 1: it will go to nine out of ten, and that
Speaker 1: is probably not going to result in significant change in
Speaker 1: the Iranian economic situation. They have survived. There are obviously thriving,
Speaker 1: but I think from the Iranian perspective, the worst of
Speaker 1: the sanctions is already behind them. Plus they now have
Speaker 1: these growing ties with China and Russia, and they have
Speaker 1: this club of sanctioned nations to try to circumvent US
Speaker 1: and Western sanctions, and so their perspective is that they
Speaker 1: can survive economically. But the problem is if there is
Speaker 1: a covert operation against the run zunclear facilities, which has
Speaker 1: not happened since the last time Prime Minister in Antony
Speaker 1: who was in office, that's Israel's prime minister. The only
Speaker 1: thing that Iran can potentially due to respond is to
Speaker 1: enrich to which could potentially cross US and Israel's redlines.
Speaker 1: Iranians are of course also itching to retaliate against some
Speaker 1: of the covert operations Israel is conducting on their soil
Speaker 1: against their military facilities. That too could potentially push the
Speaker 1: two countries over into a conflict, whether it's inadvertent or deliberate,
Speaker 1: and so the risks are high. I would argue they've
Speaker 1: never been higher. And there's also now a political motivation
Speaker 1: inside Iran for an embattled regime to try to get
Speaker 1: into some sort of a conflagration that could potentially serve
Speaker 1: as a distraction from troubles at home, that people would
Speaker 1: rally around the government even if they dislike it, simply
Speaker 1: because they're defending their country. Absolutely, And this happened in
Speaker 1: the nineteen eighties. The younger revolutionary system in Iran went
Speaker 1: into the Irani Rock War for eight years and instead
Speaker 1: of undermining it, that consolidated it. So they've had this
Speaker 1: experience before. What would military conflict between the Western Iran
Speaker 1: look like. I don't think we're talking about Western troops
Speaker 1: moving into Iran, but something different. Well, it would be
Speaker 1: certainly surgical strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, and there is
Speaker 1: this view even within Iran that it could be something
Speaker 1: similar to the tit fitat that happened between Iran and
Speaker 1: the United States in January over the link of Irani
Speaker 1: in general, Gossam sole money and I Run's retaliation the
Speaker 1: form of shooting a barrage of holistic missiles into US
Speaker 1: bass in Iraq. It is true that that tip for
Speaker 1: Tad remained contained. But of course wars always start on
Speaker 1: assumptions that they're quick, they could be contained, and they're predictable,
Speaker 1: and almost always those assumptions turn out to be wrong.
Speaker 1: A conflict over I runs unclear program is easy to start,
Speaker 1: but it's probably going to be difficult to finish. A
Speaker 1: year from now, five years from now, where do you
Speaker 1: expect will be when it comes to both Iruns government
Speaker 1: and its relationship with the rest of the world. It's
Speaker 1: a very dangerous business to predict developments in the Middle
Speaker 1: East and especially in Iran, But I don't expect fundamental
Speaker 1: changes in the short run. What I think should be
Speaker 1: the focus in the immediate term should be on trying
Speaker 1: to put a band aid on this situation that could
Speaker 1: easily battle out of control. We are really at the
Speaker 1: mercy of a single incident between Iran and Israel, or
Speaker 1: you know, some kind of a provocative decision by the
Speaker 1: Iranians to enrich the weapons grade for instance, that could
Speaker 1: potentially provoke a conflict, and that kind of conflict can
Speaker 1: counterintuitively add to the regime's shelf life because it would
Speaker 1: change the subject domestically. It would allow them to further
Speaker 1: securitize and militarize the domestic sphere. So if in the
Speaker 1: short run the focus is on preventing a conflict and
Speaker 1: on trying to empower the Irani middle class, then I
Speaker 1: think there is hope that in the medium term, with
Speaker 1: the top of the political system starting to crack in
Speaker 1: the Islamic Republic, we might see transition to something better.
Speaker 1: Everybody is thanks so much for being here, great pleasure.
Speaker 1: You can read more reporting from Mark Champion at Bloomberg
Speaker 1: dot com. Thanks for listening to us here at The
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