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Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brussel from Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 1: Facebook could be looking at scrutiny from federal and state regulators,

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Speaker 1: as well as lawsuits from consumers, after data on more

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Speaker 1: than half a billion users became widely available online. Information

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Speaker 1: said to be exposed includes phone numbers, Facebook I d s,

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Speaker 1: full names, locations, birth dates, bios, and in some cases

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Speaker 1: email addresses. Facebook says that the data which re emerged

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Speaker 1: online over the weekend is from an earlier flaw revealed

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Speaker 1: in which Facebook fixed. My guest is Andream, a twition professor,

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Speaker 1: an Associate Dean of Innovation and Technology at Penn State Law.

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Speaker 1: So was this a dump a redump? What exactly was it?

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Speaker 1: So that's an excellent question. And it's still early enough

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Speaker 1: in the investigations around the forensics that will explain to

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Speaker 1: us the events leading up to this most recent identification

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Speaker 1: of large numbers of user personal identifiable information being available

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Speaker 1: in hat performs. The forensics are really what we need

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Speaker 1: to acquire here because the extent to which this is

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Speaker 1: part of a prior problem, the extent to which this

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Speaker 1: is a new problem, whether things have in fact been

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Speaker 1: corrected at this point, but also to what extent users

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Speaker 1: were notified in accordance with data brenotification obligations. Those are

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Speaker 1: all questions that are going to the contingent um the

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Speaker 1: specifics of those forensics. Additionally, because we have a complicated

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Speaker 1: regulatory relationship between the FTC and Facebook, the date of

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Speaker 1: knowledge by Facebook, but also what exactly they disclosed to

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Speaker 1: the STC in ten at the point of the second

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Speaker 1: round of consent decrees will be operative in whether potentially

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Speaker 1: the data control law will give rise to basis for

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Speaker 1: a new FTC enforcement action under the twelve consent decree.

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Speaker 1: What will the FTC be investigating and I assume they're

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Speaker 1: going to investigate yes. So in twelve, the STC and

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Speaker 1: Facebook agreed to a set of terms that included ongoing

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Speaker 1: self supervision obligations and assessments going forward due to some

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Speaker 1: of facebook prior practices around privacy and data security. So

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Speaker 1: the extent to which those promises that were voluntarily agreed

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Speaker 1: to by Facebook in twelve has been broken for a

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Speaker 1: second time will be on the table for discussions I

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Speaker 1: expect between the FTC and Facebook when the forensics of

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Speaker 1: the particular incidents or maybe more than one incident we

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Speaker 1: don't even know exactly whether it was one set of

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Speaker 1: leagus or multiple scraping. And it's bound up with some

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Speaker 1: other questions, particularly around the phone numbers, because in Facebook

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Speaker 1: publicly acknowledged that they were using phone numbers that users

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Speaker 1: provided for two factor authentication purposes and security as a

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Speaker 1: functionality enhancement to allow for user look up of other users,

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Speaker 1: and so there was a profuscilist of time around that

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Speaker 1: choice by Facebook to repurpose information that for many users

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Speaker 1: would have been provided with an expectation of a narrow

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Speaker 1: security related use, but not necessarily a use repurposing for

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Speaker 1: helping other Facebook users find them. So there are a

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Speaker 1: bundle of various practices that will potentially be implicated in

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Speaker 1: these conversations, as well as the context of what was

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Speaker 1: disclosed by Facebook to the SEC at the time of

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Speaker 1: the June Does Facebook know what happened? I would hope so. Um,

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Speaker 1: but this is the first question. So the issue of

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Speaker 1: the extent of forensic analysis internally and what the company

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Speaker 1: knew when and how much of it was a design choice,

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Speaker 1: how much of it was a well executed incident response,

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Speaker 1: was the point at which they found out about it,

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Speaker 1: or how much of the conduct around this incident was

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Speaker 1: a response that some regulators, for example the EU or

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Speaker 1: Australian regulators may deem to not reflect the expectations that

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Speaker 1: they have for companies in possession of their residents information.

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Speaker 1: So the details and the forensics here are going to

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Speaker 1: be this positive. So that's a little bit of a

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Speaker 1: wait and see right now. But EU regulators have already

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Speaker 1: announced that they will be conducting further inquiries. I would

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Speaker 1: expect the FT set of fellow suits in the US,

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Speaker 1: and it's possible that the spec will take a look

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Speaker 1: depending on what the nature of the disclosures were by

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Speaker 1: the company and the relevant tent case statements, because there

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Speaker 1: are securities to exchange Commission guidance documents around disclosure of

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Speaker 1: security incidents and um. Obviously, public companies have reporting duties

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Speaker 1: around material risks to business and material litigation risks on

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Speaker 1: an ongoing basis under thirty four. Book has made privacy

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Speaker 1: settlements with the FTC twice once in and once in.

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Speaker 1: In light of that, how much credibility do they have

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Speaker 1: when they say they want to protect users privacy? Critics

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Speaker 1: of Facebook have certainly raised that point. UH that in

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Speaker 1: UH this point in the history of the company. Critics

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Speaker 1: would argue there has been so many sequential problems that

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Speaker 1: there is a broader story potentially being told of a

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Speaker 1: company that is very interested in public face and statements,

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Speaker 1: but not necessarily interested in creating a culture of data

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Speaker 1: protection and stewardship. And critics haven't founding this alarms since

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Speaker 1: really the UH creation of the company, UH, particularly circa

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Speaker 1: two thousands seven two D they're started to be material

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Speaker 1: modifications and the privacy default and Facebook um, and so

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Speaker 1: there's been a constant UH set of concerns raised by

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Speaker 1: privacy advocates, m consumers as well UM, dating back to

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Speaker 1: the early days of the company. So your point is

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Speaker 1: well taken. Well state attorneys general look into this, It's

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Speaker 1: entirely possible that state attorneys general will also inquire as

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Speaker 1: to the specifics of these incidents. State attorneys general would

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Speaker 1: have authority to potentially engage in state love enforcement action

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Speaker 1: under the Mini FTC Acts, meaning the state specific Unfair

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Speaker 1: and Deceptive Trade Practices statutes that are a matter of

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Speaker 1: state law and generally tend to parallel the structure of

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Speaker 1: the FTC Act Section five on the federal level, So

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Speaker 1: it would be entirely unsurprising if some state regulators who

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Speaker 1: already have Facebook in their cross hairs from previous incidents

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Speaker 1: of data stewardships, UM suboptimal incidents, and the concerns over

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Speaker 1: tech concentration and competition hindrance that are in the ether

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Speaker 1: now both on the state and the federal level, as

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Speaker 1: well as UH formal legal proceedings in some cases against

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Speaker 1: large technology companies. That environment is one of greater regulatory

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Speaker 1: and state attorneys general scrutiny. So I would not at

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Speaker 1: all be surprised if the more tech savvy tech engage

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Speaker 1: to state attorneys general do indeed have some tough questions

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Speaker 1: on this point. What about class action lawsuits? What kind

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Speaker 1: of class action lawsuits could we see? So depending on

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Speaker 1: the extent to which data Breach no Applications statutes were

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Speaker 1: UH complied with or potentially not fully UH followed, there

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Speaker 1: may be an individual level positive action in the state

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Speaker 1: with more aggressively drafted data breach notifications statutes and Massachusetes

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Speaker 1: being one of the UM California potentially giving rise to

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Speaker 1: individual level suits. At least some of these cases may

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Speaker 1: end up being class actions, and the jurisdictions that are

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Speaker 1: more friendly to class actions. In particular, the nature of

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Speaker 1: the data that was released will be relevant because some

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Speaker 1: of those data breach notification statutes are contingent in the

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Speaker 1: rights that they grant based on the nature of the

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Speaker 1: information that was disclosed about consumers residing in their states.

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Speaker 1: So this is another situation where the specifics of the

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Speaker 1: Facebook response at the time that they found out whenever

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Speaker 1: that was, and the extent of the data loss of

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Speaker 1: control and the extent of response, forensic analysis and overall

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Speaker 1: conduct around the incident response will be in play. So

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Speaker 1: I would not be surprised to see class actions UM

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Speaker 1: they are becoming increasingly frequent in parallel situations to this one.

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Speaker 1: It is also possible that, depending on the nature of

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Speaker 1: the disclosure in the ten K annual reports that I

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Speaker 1: mentioned previously, where Facebook has an obligation under the thirty

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Speaker 1: four Acts file periodic reports with the SEC, if the

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Speaker 1: disclosure did not extend with um adequate specificity and notice

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Speaker 1: in the opinion of securities litigators UH, there is an

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Speaker 1: active securities class action bar. It is possible that we

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Speaker 1: may see class action attempted based on the tent K

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Speaker 1: disclosures or lack thereof. Particularly if this does result in

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Speaker 1: a new fine from the FTC, the EU or another

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Speaker 1: national regulator. Do the fines effect Facebook at all? Their

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Speaker 1: massive fines but there are just a drop in the

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Speaker 1: bucket compared to what Facebook is worth it makes. This

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Speaker 1: is a critique that has been the topic of discussion,

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Speaker 1: certainly the STCs last fine, which was in the neighborhood

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Speaker 1: of five billion dollars. The approach that the US regulators

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Speaker 1: take is a more constrained one than European regulators. The

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Speaker 1: amounts of any subsequent finds may be more aggressive under

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Speaker 1: a g d PR based approach because g d p

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Speaker 1: R authorizes sign that are contingent on corporate earnings. So

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Speaker 1: this question of the proper construction of signs in a

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Speaker 1: way to send a message companies is one that that

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Speaker 1: has been definitely discussed. It's a fair critique if you can,

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Speaker 1: in essence plan and to your business model the amount

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Speaker 1: of the fine and the fine is maturely less than

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Speaker 1: the revenue generated in UH, say a single quarter, then

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Speaker 1: the business incentives UH, some whould argue, are to simply

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Speaker 1: view that fine as the cost of doing business, particularly

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Speaker 1: when you have waivers by enforcers of finding any personal

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Speaker 1: responsibility on the part of officers and directors for oversight failures,

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Speaker 1: you set up potentially a situation where that kind of

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Speaker 1: cost benefit calculation is more likely, and particularly if a

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Speaker 1: company does tend to have a history of repeating kinds

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Speaker 1: of problems, you may not be some whould argue creating

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Speaker 1: the incentive for an ethical internal self evaluation as to

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Speaker 1: whether the current management structures are optimally calibrated to identify

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Speaker 1: these kinds of problems early enough in the process and

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Speaker 1: correct them quickly enough. Some of the data sharing decisions

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Speaker 1: that were made internally may have facilitated the aggregation and

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Speaker 1: availability of data that then create a more attractive target

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Speaker 1: for attackers. So, assuming that there was a malicious intrusion,

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Speaker 1: which we don't know, then the way that you build

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Speaker 1: and design your products makes them more or less attractive targets.

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Speaker 1: And if there was no intrusion, but instead this was

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Speaker 1: the aggressive use of an API or or an interface

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Speaker 1: of other sorts that's designed to share information, for example,

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Speaker 1: allowing for data scraping, then the question again comes back

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Speaker 1: to products design and whether the threat modeling was done

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Speaker 1: in a way that accurately legally modeled the risk down

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Speaker 1: the road in terms of regulatory action and loss of

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Speaker 1: consumer truck arising from problems that may happen because of

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Speaker 1: the design choices in the way that the products works.

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Speaker 1: And is this data breach particularly problematic in that in

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Speaker 1: the amount of information that was given out on person

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Speaker 1: you know, for example, you mentioned the phone number that's

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Speaker 1: related to two fact authentication. In particular, could that disclosure

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Speaker 1: of the phone number be problematic for consumers depending on

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Speaker 1: whether the consumer volunteers the phone number or limited purpose,

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Speaker 1: or whether it was a generally shared phone number. Those

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Speaker 1: specifics I think are relevant to regulators determinations business conduct.

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Speaker 1: The question of, say a phone number being published, some

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Speaker 1: consumers would certainly view it as at least a material

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Speaker 1: inconvenience that their phone numbers are now available for public use,

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Speaker 1: potentially leading some consumers to want to change their phone number.

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Speaker 1: The consequences of sharing a phone number are potentially less

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Speaker 1: direct in some ways than sharing, say birthday or other

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Speaker 1: put a personally and unifiable information that can't be changed.

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Speaker 1: You can change your phone number, but you can't change

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Speaker 1: your birthday. So the nature of the information that is

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Speaker 1: included in these exposed databases will be relevant. The way

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Speaker 1: that the information was shared originally by consumers will be

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Speaker 1: relevant as a matter of privacy. The extent of security practices,

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Speaker 1: the product design and data stewardship choices as a matter

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Speaker 1: of security will be relevant to the security increase that

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Speaker 1: regulators will undertake. Uh So, you know, again, the specifics

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Speaker 1: here of what exactly happens and which ss of data

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Speaker 1: and how they're integrated will become very relevant. Thanks Andrea.

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Speaker 1: That's Professor Andrea ma Tuition, Associate Dean of Innovation and

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Speaker 1: Technology at Penn State Law. This week, the Supreme Court

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Speaker 1: denied the US Solicitor General's request to argue in an

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Speaker 1: upcoming case, something the Court has done just three times

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Speaker 1: in the past two decades, but twice now in under

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Speaker 1: a year. Joining me is Bloomberg Law. Supreme Court reporter

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Speaker 1: Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson explain the Solicitor General's role and how

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Speaker 1: this listener general requests to argue in cases where the

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Speaker 1: government is not a party. Well, the Solicitor General is

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Speaker 1: the federal government's top lawyer at the U s. Supreme Court,

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Speaker 1: and while they do some work in the lower appellate

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Speaker 1: courts as well, really their focus is on the Supreme Court,

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Speaker 1: and they have a really unique place as a litigant.

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Speaker 1: They're they're not only the most frequent litigant in the

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Speaker 1: Supreme Court by far, but they also hold a special

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Speaker 1: place of trust within the Supreme Court. And the office

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Speaker 1: is sometimes known as the tenth Justice because of that

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Speaker 1: special role. And so we can see that play out

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Speaker 1: in many different ways that the Solicitor General interact with

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Speaker 1: the justices. But one that we noticed recently is when

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Speaker 1: the Solicitor General requests to argue in the case and

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Speaker 1: which is not really a party, but in which there's

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Speaker 1: some kind of federal interests. So this is what it

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Speaker 1: requests argue as a friend of the court rather than

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Speaker 1: as a party. And do the justices always honor this

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Speaker 1: listener general's request to argue? Well in modern history, yes,

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Speaker 1: there's a forthcoming law review article out that looked at

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Speaker 1: a period of ten years starting in uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: the two thousand and tents that said that when other

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Speaker 1: organizations requested argument time as a friend of the court,

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Speaker 1: the court only granted it, uh, you know, less than

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Speaker 1: half of the time, fourteen out of forty one time.

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Speaker 1: But when it was the federal government asking they granted

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Speaker 1: it three hundred and eleven, three hundred and twelve times,

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Speaker 1: so basically every time. But that's you know, something that's

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Speaker 1: very small when they deny it, and so it really

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Speaker 1: makes court watchers notice when the justices actually rebuffs a

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Speaker 1: solicitor general in this way. So the solicitor General was

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Speaker 1: delta rejection recently tell us about that, Well, recently the

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Speaker 1: Justices did just that. They told the Solicitor General, no,

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Speaker 1: thank you, we don't uh want to give you precious

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Speaker 1: argument time in a case about a pellet cost. And

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Speaker 1: it's notable because it is one of these rare times

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Speaker 1: where they were turned away, but also because it's happened

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Speaker 1: twice now in just under a year or something that

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Speaker 1: you know, if you look over three hundred and eleven

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Speaker 1: out of three hundred and twelve time versus something happening

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Speaker 1: twice in one year, you know, that's that's a noticeable

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Speaker 1: up chick. Of course, it's too small of a sample

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Speaker 1: size to really say that, you know, it's an increasing trend,

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Speaker 1: but it's something to watch for sure. Is there something

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Speaker 1: similar in the two cases that were denied, Well, you know,

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Speaker 1: all we can really do is speculate I've said before

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Speaker 1: um on the show that the Supreme Court, you know,

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Speaker 1: doesn't really explain a lot. It's a very kind of

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Speaker 1: secretive institution. And so it didn't tell us why it

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Speaker 1: turned away the solicitor general here, but we can guess that.

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Speaker 1: You know, normally the cases where the Solicitor General is

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Speaker 1: seeking to argue as a friend of the court, there's

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Speaker 1: a pretty strong federal interest. And so there was a

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Speaker 1: case earlier this term where we saw a regulated party

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Speaker 1: challenging a state law that's that it was preempted by

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Speaker 1: another federal law. And you can see, you know, the

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Speaker 1: federal interests there and sending, uh, what the federal law means.

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Speaker 1: It is pretty strong, and so the Solicitor General was

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Speaker 1: allowed to argue in that case. In these other cases,

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Speaker 1: the solicitor general stated interest is is really one as

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Speaker 1: kind of like a general litigant. Um. So one was

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Speaker 1: about jurisdiction and state courts, and this current latest one

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Speaker 1: is about appellate cost and so there really isn't an

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Speaker 1: explanation about how the United States is situated any differently,

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Speaker 1: um than any other litigant would be. So you talked

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Speaker 1: to several experts, what did they say about this. Do

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Speaker 1: they see it as the courts sending a message to

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Speaker 1: the s G. Well, again, it's too few instances right

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Speaker 1: now to make any generalized terms. I think, you know,

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Speaker 1: with just this, before we had this latest rebuff, you know,

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Speaker 1: there was some speculation that the justices are just going

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Speaker 1: to do this every once in a while. It's a

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Speaker 1: token measure to remind the Solicitor generals that they don't

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Speaker 1: get to argue as of course, but you know, there

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Speaker 1: is some idea um that perhaps the justices are picking

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Speaker 1: up this practice because the Solicitor General has is really

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Speaker 1: asking to argue in more cases, uh than it ever

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Speaker 1: has before. And so we see them, I think it

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Speaker 1: was last term they were in you know, something like

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Speaker 1: eighty of the cases. And you know that can really

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Speaker 1: skew the you know, the policy arguments that are put

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Speaker 1: in front of the justices and ultimately the way that

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Speaker 1: they come out. So that's right now a lot of

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Speaker 1: speculation and something to watch. But it could be a

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Speaker 1: signal that the justices are sending to the Solicitor General

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Speaker 1: to kind of be more cautious about when you asked

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Speaker 1: for time. Does giving the Solicitor General time cut into

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Speaker 1: the time of the other parties who are arguing. It can,

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Speaker 1: but it really depends on a case by case basis.

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Speaker 1: And and so you know, we saw sometimes the solicitor

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Speaker 1: General will be given uh, you know, ten of the

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Speaker 1: thirty minutes that decides that they're arguing on it has

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Speaker 1: to make their argument. In in a case, the same

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Speaker 1: day that they turned away the solicitor general in that

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Speaker 1: appellate cost case, they actually granted the solicitor general ten

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Speaker 1: extra minutes on top of us thirty minutes that the

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Speaker 1: party who they're supporting has. So it really depends. But yes,

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Speaker 1: typically it does actually take away from the party's time.

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Speaker 1: And you know that's pretty significant when you consider that

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Speaker 1: often the solicitor General they're coming down on the side

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Speaker 1: of that party, but they're making for an argument and

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Speaker 1: putting forth different ways that the justices should decide the case.

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Speaker 1: In your story, you talk about a case involving California's

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Speaker 1: rule requiring charities to disclose the biggest donors, and in

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Speaker 1: that case, the court is refusing to divide the argument

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Speaker 1: time among the petitioners. So these are actually two cases

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Speaker 1: that have the same issue, but they involved different parties. UH.

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Speaker 1: And the Supreme Court has consolidated those cases for just

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Speaker 1: one hour of argument since they involved you know, the

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Speaker 1: same legal issues, and the parties had asked if they

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Speaker 1: could divide the time between you know, both sets of

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Speaker 1: petitioners and then give you know, additional time to the respondent,

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Speaker 1: but the Supreme Court notably said no, YouTube petitioners have

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Speaker 1: to decide one attorney to represent both of your arguments.

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Speaker 1: And at the same time it allowed the Solicitor General

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Speaker 1: to step in as a friend of the court um.

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Speaker 1: So you can see how, you know, there are really

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Speaker 1: small differences between the arguments that the petitioners are making,

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Speaker 1: but that's pretty significant that the justices told them no,

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Speaker 1: they can't have separate time, but at the same time

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Speaker 1: gave extra time to the Solicitor General and has the

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Speaker 1: SGS record in arguments last term, well, the Solicitor General

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Speaker 1: has a pretty good record as a friend of the court.

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Speaker 1: That was a pretty good record um in general, even

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Speaker 1: including cases whereas a party, you know, the Supreme Court

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Speaker 1: usually takes cases to reverse them, so you don't see

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Speaker 1: a lot of repeat players coming up with a lot

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Speaker 1: of winning streaks at the court. But the Sluicitor General's

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Speaker 1: office did prevail in, you know, more than the cases

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Speaker 1: in which it was a party, But when you look

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Speaker 1: at when it's a friend of the court, those numbers

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Speaker 1: are really skewed. Last term, it won twenty two of

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Speaker 1: the cases where it weighed in as a friend of

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Speaker 1: the court as opposed to a party, saying, so, you know,

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Speaker 1: that's pretty significant given that you know, they're not really

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Speaker 1: officially a party in the case. Had the justices really

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Speaker 1: lean on what they have to say? There's an acting

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Speaker 1: solicitor general right now, Is there any word about when

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Speaker 1: or who Joe Biden my name as the next listener general.

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Speaker 1: I have been paying sources and I haven't heard any

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Speaker 1: word on who may be the next solicitor general. The

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Speaker 1: only thing that I really heard from the people that

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Speaker 1: I've talked to is that they think that the acting

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Speaker 1: Solicitor General Solicita's prologar and is doing a great job,

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Speaker 1: and they hope that the Biden administration might actually nominate

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Speaker 1: her to the top spot, something that's not really unheard of.

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Speaker 1: Um that happened with Trump's acting solicitor general. But no,

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Speaker 1: that's just I think speculationist point and the Biden administrations

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Speaker 1: keeping that s G position. Um, pretty quiet, right. Now,

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Speaker 1: let's turn to a Texas judge who has gotten a

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Speaker 1: lot of attention over the years. Judge Reid O'Connor. First

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Speaker 1: of all, tell us a little bit about him. So,

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Speaker 1: Judge O'Connor is really the go to Republican appointed judge

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Speaker 1: um for states who want to challenge Democratic administration policies. Um.

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Speaker 1: He's based in Texas, and you know, we've seen Texas

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Speaker 1: really lead a lot of red states, uh, red state

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Speaker 1: coalitions challenging things like Obamacare, challenging immigration policies under Obama

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Speaker 1: and now under Biden. Um. And he's really the judge

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Speaker 1: and his court is really the court where Texas has

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Speaker 1: filed those cases. Now, I want to be clear that

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Speaker 1: this is not something that only red states do. Of course,

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Speaker 1: blue states do it. Um. It's not just uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: political groups that do it. We see even international plaintiffs

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Speaker 1: seeking to you know, find a plaintiff friendly judge here

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Speaker 1: in the United States. So this idea, what we call

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Speaker 1: form shopping, is not anything specific to this judge. Um,

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Speaker 1: But this is the judge that's really the to judge

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Speaker 1: for challenging democratic policies. And tell us about some a

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Speaker 1: few of the cases that um, he drew a lot

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Speaker 1: of attention for, particularly the Obamacare decision. That's right. So

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Speaker 1: the Obamacare case, which I'm sure your listeners are familiar with,

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Speaker 1: is one that's actually in front of the Supreme Court

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Speaker 1: right now. It's the case that looks at, you know,

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Speaker 1: kind of a tweak that the Republican led Congress made

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Speaker 1: to the Affordable Care Act, and the argument is that

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Speaker 1: with that tweak, it kind of makes the whole Affordable

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Speaker 1: Care Acts fall apart. And this judge actually agreed with

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Speaker 1: that argument, struck down the entire Affordable Care Act. And

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Speaker 1: that's the decision that the justices are considering right now. Really,

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Speaker 1: that decision has got a lot of criticism, not just

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Speaker 1: from those on the left, but also those on the right.

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Speaker 1: We people who filed in the original Affordable Care Act

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Speaker 1: case on the side of those challenging UM that acts

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Speaker 1: saying that it was unconstitutional, saying that that ruling now

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Speaker 1: just really doesn't follow the law, and it's a really outlier. UM.

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Speaker 1: And I think most people expect after oral arguments that

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Speaker 1: the Supreme Court is going to reverse that decision. UM.

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Speaker 1: So it's decisions like that, you know, where we see

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Speaker 1: a lot of criticism on both the right and the

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Speaker 1: left that Judge O'Connor is known for. Explain this tweet,

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Speaker 1: and you know the whole context of this tweet, how

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Speaker 1: it came about. Well, you know, the administrative offices of

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Speaker 1: the U. S. Court, they are kind of the policy

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Speaker 1: making arm of the judiciary. They often put out, you know,

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Speaker 1: historical information on their tweets and social media sites. They

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Speaker 1: put out a lot of educational information, and they just

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Speaker 1: so fus small clips of Judge O'Connor saying that, you know,

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Speaker 1: a judge's role is simply to interpret the law and

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Speaker 1: if they have any disagreements with public policy, you know,

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Speaker 1: that's not for a judge to say. It's something pretty innocuous,

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Speaker 1: and I think it's something that most people learn about, um,

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Speaker 1: you know, an elementary of middle school, the role of judges. Um.

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Speaker 1: But it was not well received, given that it was

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Speaker 1: this particular judge making that statement. These tweets don't normally

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Speaker 1: get very many responses, but this did. It did, and

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Speaker 1: with a lot of mockery from academia and those who

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Speaker 1: practice in the federal courts saying, regardless of whether or

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Speaker 1: not that's true for some judges. That's not particularly credible

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Speaker 1: from Judge O'Connor, you know, whether that's fair or not,

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Speaker 1: or criticism that people can wield at other judges, I think,

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Speaker 1: you know, the point has taken that this particular judge

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Speaker 1: doesn't always follow that rule, and that's something we can

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Speaker 1: see not just in you know, our own personal opinions,

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Speaker 1: but also the times that he's been reversed by the

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Speaker 1: Supreme Court and higher appellate Court. That's Bloomberg Law Supreme

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Speaker 1: Court reporter Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson and that's it for the

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Speaker 1: edition of the Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always

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Speaker 1: the latest legal news by subscribing to our Bloomberg Law podcasts.

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Speaker 1: You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at

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Speaker 1: www dot Bloomberg dot com slash podcast Slash Law. I'm

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Speaker 1: June Grosso. Thanks so much for listening, and please tune

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Speaker 1: into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten pm

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Speaker 1: Eastern right here on Bloomberg Radio.