WEBVTT - Dot Com Part 2

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<v Speaker 1>In text with technology with tech Stuff from stuff works

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<v Speaker 1>dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm a senior writer with how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com and as you guys know, I

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<v Speaker 1>like to talk tech. This is part two of a

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<v Speaker 1>two part episode about the companies that rose and fell

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<v Speaker 1>during the dot com bubble crisis of one and where

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<v Speaker 1>those folks are now, the people who launched those websites,

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<v Speaker 1>what are they doing? And uh, We're going to continue

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<v Speaker 1>on that train. Last episode we looked at web van,

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<v Speaker 1>pets dot com, the search engine Excite, Broadcast dot com,

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<v Speaker 1>and Boo dot com. But there are a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>other companies that made a big name for themselves, at

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<v Speaker 1>least briefly anyway, before burning out during the crash following

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<v Speaker 1>the bubble's deflation. And there are also a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>notable companies that they're the storm that I think we

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<v Speaker 1>can look at and explore how it was that they

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<v Speaker 1>survived when so many other companies didn't. So let's get started,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think a good place to begin is the

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<v Speaker 1>Globe dot com. This was one of the earliest social

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<v Speaker 1>networking platforms on the web, predated the giants that would

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<v Speaker 1>come later, like my Space, which of course isn't really

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<v Speaker 1>a thing anymore, and Facebook, which is very much a

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<v Speaker 1>thing still to this day. And the Globe dot Com

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<v Speaker 1>was the brainchild of two Cornell students, Stefan Pattern and

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<v Speaker 1>Todd Krisselman. The two were interested in computer programming and

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<v Speaker 1>the commercial possibilities of the Worldwide Web, and they had

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<v Speaker 1>also witnessed how compelling online chat rooms were, and they

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<v Speaker 1>felt that there was probably a way they could monetize that.

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<v Speaker 1>The two students raised fifteen thousand dollars from private investors

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<v Speaker 1>and they used that money to buy computer servers and

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<v Speaker 1>computer equipment to build out their idea. They worked on

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<v Speaker 1>the design for several months and they launched the Globe

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<v Speaker 1>dot Com in April nine. They formed a new company

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<v Speaker 1>called web Genesis, and they hired on the staff of

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<v Speaker 1>about a dozen people or so. And the site acted

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<v Speaker 1>as part news aggregator, part message board, and part chat room.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you went to the site, you would see

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<v Speaker 1>a bunch of different categories of types of interests like

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<v Speaker 1>sports and that kind of stuff, and you could go

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<v Speaker 1>and click into that and read up on things. The

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<v Speaker 1>chat room function was easily the most popular. When the

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<v Speaker 1>site launched, they also launched software that could serve up

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<v Speaker 1>polls and quizzes and surveys, so really the two students

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<v Speaker 1>were way ahead of the curve on this one. As

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<v Speaker 1>today those kind of features are wildly popular on social media,

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<v Speaker 1>and they thought ahead to include it on their early

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<v Speaker 1>social networking platform. The site was a success that had

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<v Speaker 1>very passionate users, not an enormous user base, but they

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<v Speaker 1>were very um frequent users, and in ninety the company

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<v Speaker 1>made a decision to hold an i p O or

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<v Speaker 1>initial public offering, is when a private company goes public

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<v Speaker 1>and becomes a publicly traded company, and right around there

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<v Speaker 1>is when things went a little bonkers. The global investment

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<v Speaker 1>bank bear Sterns set the opening price at about nine

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<v Speaker 1>dollars a share when the market opened. The demand for

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<v Speaker 1>shares was such that the actual opening price ended up

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<v Speaker 1>being eighties seven dollars per share, which is crazy, and

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<v Speaker 1>at one point it even hit nine dollars per share. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>by the end of the day, the price settled a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit, but was still way over the opening price.

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<v Speaker 1>It settled it around sixty three dollars fifty cents a

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<v Speaker 1>share on paper, That meant that everyone who worked at

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<v Speaker 1>the Globe dot Com became filthy rich, and some people

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<v Speaker 1>started to behave that way. But as you guys know

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<v Speaker 1>from this topic and the fact that no one has

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<v Speaker 1>ever heard of this website these days, it was not

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<v Speaker 1>meant to be. The site was not making money, and

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<v Speaker 1>while millions of people were using the site, that just

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<v Speaker 1>meant the costs of running the site remained high while

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<v Speaker 1>there was no real way to or generate what revenue.

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<v Speaker 1>So it was a sinking ship. People didn't shy away

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<v Speaker 1>from blowing the whistle on the Globe dot Com. The

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<v Speaker 1>company went public in the fall of A year later,

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<v Speaker 1>The Street published a piece about the Globe dot Com

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<v Speaker 1>that pulled no punches. Here is a direct quote from

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<v Speaker 1>the Street. We're speaking, of course, of the Globe dot

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<v Speaker 1>Com t g l O and essentially worthless business enterprise

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<v Speaker 1>that has lost six of its value in the last

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<v Speaker 1>five months, yet at its current price of barely thirteen dollars,

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<v Speaker 1>still remains grotesquely overvalued. Ouch harsh words, but as it

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<v Speaker 1>turns out, they were not entirely untrue. The Globe dot

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<v Speaker 1>Com stock price continued its downward trend in nine and

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<v Speaker 1>beyond and by January two thousand, pattern Not and Krizzleman

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<v Speaker 1>stepped down from the company. They resigned. Pattern Out walked

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<v Speaker 1>away with about a one and a half million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>after selling off stock, much most of which he reportedly

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<v Speaker 1>later lost in other investments. Krizzleman invested in some other

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<v Speaker 1>companies and helped secure some of his wealth and more

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<v Speaker 1>on those two in just a second. As for the site,

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<v Speaker 1>it sputtered along for a while under new management, and

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<v Speaker 1>in two thousand one the company had to lay off

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<v Speaker 1>about half of its employees and the shares were trading

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<v Speaker 1>at a dismal twenty five cents per share. It transitioned

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<v Speaker 1>into a voice over Internet protocol company for a while,

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<v Speaker 1>or voipe company, and it had some interests in the

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<v Speaker 1>gaming industry as well, but despite those businesses being more

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<v Speaker 1>stable than the initial website, the company ultimately had to

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<v Speaker 1>shut down in two thousand seven for good. It had

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<v Speaker 1>never fully recovered, and honestly, the social networking part of

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<v Speaker 1>the Globe dot com had died around the time that

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<v Speaker 1>the founders stepped down. Today, Todd Krizzleman is the CEO

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<v Speaker 1>and co founder of a company called Media Radar, which

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<v Speaker 1>is an ad sales application company and Stefan pattern Not

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<v Speaker 1>is the chairman and CEO as well as the co

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<v Speaker 1>founder of a company called Slated Incorporated, which is on

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<v Speaker 1>an online film packaging, networking and investment marketplace. So they're

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<v Speaker 1>doing just fine. Now let's stick to the topic of money.

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<v Speaker 1>While we're chatting about these dot com companies, there were

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of companies that rose up to try and

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<v Speaker 1>become leaders in a brand new space, digital currency. So

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<v Speaker 1>you might have thought that bitcoin was relatively new. This

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<v Speaker 1>idea of digital currencies was new. Now, it's been around

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<v Speaker 1>since the nineties. Shortly after the Web became a real entity.

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<v Speaker 1>There were people who were thinking of ways of creating

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<v Speaker 1>virtual online currencies. Now these were not cryptocurrencies. These didn't

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<v Speaker 1>use the blockchain approach the way bitcoin and some other

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<v Speaker 1>cryptocurrencies do, but they were virtual digital currencies. It's so

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<v Speaker 1>back in the late nineties, a couple of different companies

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<v Speaker 1>were trying to get this going. But they're they're really

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<v Speaker 1>in some ways, we're behaving more like gift cards than

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<v Speaker 1>outright currencies. So the two companies I want to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about specifically are Flus and Beans. Flus is spelled f

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<v Speaker 1>L o O Z and beans B e e b

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<v Speaker 1>e e n Z. You started getting to the point

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<v Speaker 1>where you're getting the e sound and you're thinking, have

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<v Speaker 1>I said too many? Ease one, B two ease and

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<v Speaker 1>in in a Z flus and beans. You just can't

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<v Speaker 1>make this stuff up, guys. Oh, I guess technically you can,

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<v Speaker 1>but you don't have to because someone already did it

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<v Speaker 1>years ago. Now. Flus took its name from an Arabic

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<v Speaker 1>word flus, meaning money, and Robert Levitan, who had a

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<v Speaker 1>successful venture with I Village, launched Flus in nine. The

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<v Speaker 1>idea was that customers would be able to buy flues

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<v Speaker 1>credits that could be used at a couple of dozen

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<v Speaker 1>different online retailers, and it was pretty easy to send

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<v Speaker 1>those credits online to other people, like you could email

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<v Speaker 1>essentially a gift certificate to someone else. So the idea

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<v Speaker 1>was that you could buy flus for someone, give them

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<v Speaker 1>the virtual currency which they could go and then spend

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<v Speaker 1>on something they actually wanted rather than just receiving it

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<v Speaker 1>another ugly Christmas sweater or whatever. Based on all the

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<v Speaker 1>articles I looked over for this podcast, Flus may have

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<v Speaker 1>best been known not for its method of business, but

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<v Speaker 1>for its commercials, which kind of reminds me of pets

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<v Speaker 1>dot com. Honestly, the company booked would be Goldberg as

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<v Speaker 1>their spokesperson, and that move alone costs several million dollars. Meanwhile,

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<v Speaker 1>Levitan was finding it challenging to get customers, both on

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<v Speaker 1>the business side with retailers and on the consumers side

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<v Speaker 1>with people who would actually use the product. Unlike many

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<v Speaker 1>of the other companies I have covered in these two episod,

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<v Speaker 1>Flus never held an I p O. It remained a

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<v Speaker 1>privately held company throughout its existence. In two thousand one,

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<v Speaker 1>it started to really struggle as the bubble was deflating

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<v Speaker 1>and there was a report that the company may have

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<v Speaker 1>been the victim of fraud. In addition to that, according

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<v Speaker 1>to the story, there was a group of Russian thieves

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<v Speaker 1>and hackers who were using stolen credit card numbers to

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<v Speaker 1>purchase three hundred thousand dollars worth of FLUS credits. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>if true, this could have been a real issue for

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<v Speaker 1>FLUS because it would be a company left holding the

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<v Speaker 1>bag when it's revealed that the purchases came from illegal sources.

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<v Speaker 1>It would have caused real cash flow crunch at a

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<v Speaker 1>critical time FLUS would have to cover the the expenses

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<v Speaker 1>given to retailers, and meanwhile, it doesn't have any real

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<v Speaker 1>money to hold onto because of the fact that the

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<v Speaker 1>purchases came from criminal sources. Whether the fraud actually happened

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<v Speaker 1>or not is a moot point. FLUS closed up shop

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<v Speaker 1>in the summer of two thousand one, just two years

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<v Speaker 1>after it had launched. People with FLUS credits found themselves

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<v Speaker 1>out of luck just holding useless digital currency. And this

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<v Speaker 1>is a valuable lesson in currency. And I'm talking about

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<v Speaker 1>all currency, not just digital. Remember, your money is only

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<v Speaker 1>worth something for as long as we collectively believe it

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<v Speaker 1>to be. So if tomorrow we all woke up and

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<v Speaker 1>said that dollars are worthless, dollars would be worthless because

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<v Speaker 1>no one would accept them in return for anything. So

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<v Speaker 1>the only reason this money has any value is because

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<v Speaker 1>we have agreed upon it. Well, in the case of FLUS,

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<v Speaker 1>people no longer had confidence in it, and therefore they

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<v Speaker 1>no longer believed in the power of lows to be money,

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<v Speaker 1>and ultimately it failed. Fortunately, most governments are on slightly

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<v Speaker 1>more firm ground than FLUS was in two thousand one.

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<v Speaker 1>Most sometimes you have a country like Greece that gets

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<v Speaker 1>into some difficult economic times and there are a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of tough questions at that point. As for Levitan, he

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<v Speaker 1>went on to work with several other ventures. In two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand four, he co founded Pando Networks. This was a

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<v Speaker 1>peer to peer networking company that used that peer to

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<v Speaker 1>peer approach to distribute software like games and videos. If

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<v Speaker 1>you don't remember what peer to peer networking is, that's

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<v Speaker 1>when you get a bunch of computers that are owned

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<v Speaker 1>by various people out there. You run a specific type

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<v Speaker 1>of peer to peer software and that allows those computers

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<v Speaker 1>to essentially be their own little database network, and you

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<v Speaker 1>can send files across the network. You can you can

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<v Speaker 1>download stuff from multiple sources, which speeds up your download process,

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<v Speaker 1>and it decentralizes it so if one computer goes down,

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<v Speaker 1>there's still other computers on the network you can still

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<v Speaker 1>get the stuff you need. It's a perfectly legitimate way

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<v Speaker 1>to distribute information. It's just that peer to peer networks,

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<v Speaker 1>over the course of the history of them, have often

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<v Speaker 1>been used to pirate software and other material reels, and

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<v Speaker 1>so it's gotten a bad rap. But there's nothing innately

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<v Speaker 1>illegal about peer to peer. It's just the way some

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<v Speaker 1>people have used it. Microsoft would purchase Pando Networks in

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand thirteen, and then Levitan went on to co

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<v Speaker 1>found the company Live in two thousand and fourteen. This

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<v Speaker 1>is a company that is making a real time local

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<v Speaker 1>events search app. I think I tried tracking it down,

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<v Speaker 1>but I didn't actually have much success. I did find

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<v Speaker 1>a web page where you can sign up for more information,

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<v Speaker 1>but it just showed me a video that looked like

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<v Speaker 1>a cross between Mad Max, Beyond Thunderdome and Fight Club,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm not sure I want to find that event

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<v Speaker 1>in the first place. There you go. Uh, The actual

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<v Speaker 1>event showed people riding bicycles and jousting with mops while

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<v Speaker 1>a giant trash puppet was moving around in the background.

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<v Speaker 1>I honestly don't know what it was supposed to tell me,

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<v Speaker 1>apart from the fact that I guess if I had

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<v Speaker 1>the app on my phone, I would know that that

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<v Speaker 1>crazy stuff is going down, and maybe I could go

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<v Speaker 1>the other way. As for Beans, that company was the

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<v Speaker 1>brainchild of Charles Cohen, who's not the billionaire Charles Cohen,

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<v Speaker 1>but a britt entrepreneur. At he was an Oxford graduate,

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<v Speaker 1>he had an idea and he was a former speechwriter

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<v Speaker 1>for the Liberal Democrats in the UK. He launched Beans

0:13:21.600 --> 0:13:25.200
<v Speaker 1>in n and Cohen's approach was similar to Levitans in

0:13:25.240 --> 0:13:28.120
<v Speaker 1>some ways. But beans was a virtual currency you could

0:13:28.120 --> 0:13:31.280
<v Speaker 1>not only purchase with real money. You could also earn

0:13:31.679 --> 0:13:36.240
<v Speaker 1>beans through various activities, so you could be paid in beans.

0:13:37.800 --> 0:13:41.400
<v Speaker 1>I guess if you were selling account perhaps you could

0:13:41.440 --> 0:13:45.079
<v Speaker 1>get paid in beans. For example, you might earn beans

0:13:45.120 --> 0:13:48.520
<v Speaker 1>by clicking a specific link, or reading an article or

0:13:48.559 --> 0:13:51.280
<v Speaker 1>watching a video. So it became an incentive to get

0:13:51.360 --> 0:13:55.760
<v Speaker 1>engagement from users. You probably have encountered something like this

0:13:55.920 --> 0:13:59.880
<v Speaker 1>online at some point, where you are allowed to do

0:14:00.080 --> 0:14:03.120
<v Speaker 1>something like inner sweepstakes, but only after you watch a video.

0:14:03.360 --> 0:14:06.520
<v Speaker 1>It's similar to that in many ways. So it wasn't

0:14:06.600 --> 0:14:09.960
<v Speaker 1>just a gift certificate style program, but an actual currency

0:14:10.000 --> 0:14:13.800
<v Speaker 1>you'd receive as a reward in return for specific actions. Now,

0:14:13.840 --> 0:14:17.760
<v Speaker 1>each unit of beans, which was beans, whether it's plural

0:14:17.880 --> 0:14:21.760
<v Speaker 1>or singular, was worth about half a penny. The idea

0:14:22.280 --> 0:14:25.600
<v Speaker 1>seemed fairly solid. Businesses have been attracting customers and keeping

0:14:25.600 --> 0:14:28.040
<v Speaker 1>them loyal with similar programs for years. I mean, there

0:14:28.040 --> 0:14:31.320
<v Speaker 1>are tons of different companies out there that have loyalty programs.

0:14:31.720 --> 0:14:34.160
<v Speaker 1>You know, you buy ten coffees and you get the

0:14:34.200 --> 0:14:36.960
<v Speaker 1>eleventh one free, that kind of thing. So it's kind

0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:39.200
<v Speaker 1>of along those lines, except it was meant to be

0:14:39.320 --> 0:14:44.040
<v Speaker 1>something that would work across multiple companies. So maybe you

0:14:44.080 --> 0:14:46.880
<v Speaker 1>buy a couple of T shirts at one retailer and

0:14:46.920 --> 0:14:48.600
<v Speaker 1>then you have enough beans to buy a cup of

0:14:48.600 --> 0:14:51.920
<v Speaker 1>coffee at a different retailer, or vice versa. You drink

0:14:51.960 --> 0:14:53.680
<v Speaker 1>a lot of coffee and then you can buy some shirts.

0:14:54.400 --> 0:14:56.440
<v Speaker 1>That was the idea, and it seemed like a pretty

0:14:56.440 --> 0:14:59.840
<v Speaker 1>good one, and to this day we see multiple implementations

0:15:00.040 --> 0:15:02.520
<v Speaker 1>of this idea, though they tend to be specific to

0:15:02.600 --> 0:15:06.280
<v Speaker 1>a particular vendor or merchant. So in other words, you

0:15:06.360 --> 0:15:08.960
<v Speaker 1>might have a Starbucks app that allows you to get

0:15:09.040 --> 0:15:12.000
<v Speaker 1>loyalty points whenever you buy coffee from Starbucks, but you

0:15:12.000 --> 0:15:15.040
<v Speaker 1>can't necessarily convert that into anything else, Like you can't

0:15:15.520 --> 0:15:18.640
<v Speaker 1>use those credits to go and buy books at a

0:15:18.680 --> 0:15:23.000
<v Speaker 1>bookstore or music or anything like that. Cohen ended up

0:15:23.080 --> 0:15:25.560
<v Speaker 1>raising a great deal of money from investors in those

0:15:25.600 --> 0:15:29.000
<v Speaker 1>early days. Articles give amounts in the eighty to one

0:15:29.080 --> 0:15:33.280
<v Speaker 1>hundred million dollar range. That's a lot of cheddar and

0:15:33.400 --> 0:15:37.720
<v Speaker 1>investors included Larry Ellison of Oracle fame. The tech of

0:15:37.800 --> 0:15:41.040
<v Speaker 1>Beans depended pretty heavily on Oracle as well. Cohen wanted

0:15:41.040 --> 0:15:44.600
<v Speaker 1>a currency that would work across borders, which meant that

0:15:44.640 --> 0:15:47.200
<v Speaker 1>it had to take into account exchange rates, which are

0:15:47.200 --> 0:15:52.320
<v Speaker 1>incredibly complex and change frequently. So the software that would

0:15:52.400 --> 0:15:56.120
<v Speaker 1>allow for this kind of conversion lived on Oracle database

0:15:56.200 --> 0:15:59.840
<v Speaker 1>servers and Sun Microsystems computers. It was pretty serious tech

0:16:00.240 --> 0:16:02.280
<v Speaker 1>to run this in the background to make sure that

0:16:02.320 --> 0:16:06.720
<v Speaker 1>you had the right prices uh converted into beans. Despite

0:16:06.720 --> 0:16:09.640
<v Speaker 1>having the same problems that Flus did, which namely was

0:16:09.720 --> 0:16:12.640
<v Speaker 1>getting online retailers to participate in the strategy in the

0:16:12.680 --> 0:16:16.040
<v Speaker 1>first place, Beans chugged along for a short while. In

0:16:16.160 --> 0:16:19.000
<v Speaker 1>July two thousand, Beans was big enough news to get

0:16:19.040 --> 0:16:23.240
<v Speaker 1>extensive coverage and Info World magazine the articles pretty interesting.

0:16:23.640 --> 0:16:27.080
<v Speaker 1>Cohen proclaimed that beans would become the universal currency of

0:16:27.080 --> 0:16:30.160
<v Speaker 1>the future. There was even a partnership struck up with

0:16:30.200 --> 0:16:34.360
<v Speaker 1>the credit card MasterCard. They had a thing called rewards

0:16:34.160 --> 0:16:38.640
<v Speaker 1>the card with a Z after reward and it's all

0:16:38.680 --> 0:16:42.120
<v Speaker 1>one word, so rewards the card from MasterCard, which would

0:16:42.200 --> 0:16:44.760
<v Speaker 1>let you shift those beans to real life cash in

0:16:44.840 --> 0:16:47.160
<v Speaker 1>businesses that accept master Card as a form of payment

0:16:47.800 --> 0:16:50.560
<v Speaker 1>so you could earn Beans then use your credit card

0:16:50.600 --> 0:16:54.120
<v Speaker 1>with Beans credits on it to make purchases. Everything seemed

0:16:54.120 --> 0:16:56.080
<v Speaker 1>to be going really well for the company, and they

0:16:56.120 --> 0:17:01.160
<v Speaker 1>scaled up to global operations with offices and numerous countries

0:17:01.200 --> 0:17:05.639
<v Speaker 1>and cities cities like New York or Stockholm, Sydney, Hong Kong,

0:17:06.119 --> 0:17:09.520
<v Speaker 1>and at its height they had about two fifty employees.

0:17:10.240 --> 0:17:14.840
<v Speaker 1>And then things took a pretty sharp turn. Despite its

0:17:14.880 --> 0:17:19.520
<v Speaker 1>presence and its heavy marketing campaigns, Beans failed to generate revenue.

0:17:19.880 --> 0:17:22.080
<v Speaker 1>It would take a few more years before people began

0:17:22.119 --> 0:17:25.239
<v Speaker 1>to use the Internet to really make purchases on a

0:17:25.280 --> 0:17:28.760
<v Speaker 1>regular basis. There was this trust issue people had to

0:17:28.800 --> 0:17:32.119
<v Speaker 1>get past. They were all worried about making, you know,

0:17:32.280 --> 0:17:36.119
<v Speaker 1>purchases online and then having their identity stolen or money

0:17:36.119 --> 0:17:38.320
<v Speaker 1>stolen from them, or maybe they would never get the

0:17:38.359 --> 0:17:41.440
<v Speaker 1>thing they wanted to buy. No one was really eager

0:17:41.480 --> 0:17:44.600
<v Speaker 1>to jump on the internet as a way of buying

0:17:44.680 --> 0:17:48.160
<v Speaker 1>stuff yet, and most people still preferred to do their

0:17:48.160 --> 0:17:50.400
<v Speaker 1>shopping in brick and mortar stores. For the most part,

0:17:50.560 --> 0:17:53.640
<v Speaker 1>Beans just wasn't bulling in the beans as it were.

0:17:55.000 --> 0:17:57.760
<v Speaker 1>According to c Net, Beans also ran into trouble with

0:17:57.840 --> 0:18:00.800
<v Speaker 1>the law. Not all countries were cool with a company

0:18:00.800 --> 0:18:04.200
<v Speaker 1>inventing its own global currency, and it got so serious

0:18:04.240 --> 0:18:07.200
<v Speaker 1>that at one point the u K's Financial Service Authority

0:18:07.280 --> 0:18:11.600
<v Speaker 1>Task Force rated Bean's offices in the UK. By two

0:18:11.640 --> 0:18:14.720
<v Speaker 1>thousand one, the writing was on the wall. The company

0:18:14.760 --> 0:18:17.879
<v Speaker 1>began to scale down, shutting down many of the thirteen

0:18:18.040 --> 0:18:21.240
<v Speaker 1>offices across the world and laying off employees left and right.

0:18:21.840 --> 0:18:25.840
<v Speaker 1>By May two thousand, employees had shrunk down to thirty

0:18:25.960 --> 0:18:28.280
<v Speaker 1>and Beans was clearly trying to squeeze out as much

0:18:28.280 --> 0:18:30.720
<v Speaker 1>money from its assets to pay back investors as it

0:18:30.760 --> 0:18:34.640
<v Speaker 1>possibly could. By August two thousand one, it was all over.

0:18:35.119 --> 0:18:38.399
<v Speaker 1>The company was finished. Charles Cohen went on to become

0:18:38.440 --> 0:18:42.880
<v Speaker 1>the CEO of a company called Probability Plc, which designed

0:18:42.880 --> 0:18:46.600
<v Speaker 1>and published gambling games for mobile devices. He left that

0:18:46.680 --> 0:18:49.560
<v Speaker 1>company in May two thousand fourteen and became a vice

0:18:49.600 --> 0:18:52.800
<v Speaker 1>president of Mobile at I G T for their North

0:18:52.800 --> 0:18:57.600
<v Speaker 1>America Sporting Sports Betting division, and he works out of

0:18:57.600 --> 0:19:01.719
<v Speaker 1>the Bay Area. I think Beings and Flus weren't necessarily

0:19:01.760 --> 0:19:04.280
<v Speaker 1>bad ideas for the record, but I do think they

0:19:04.280 --> 0:19:06.680
<v Speaker 1>were ahead of their time, and perhaps in another five

0:19:06.800 --> 0:19:09.679
<v Speaker 1>or ten years they might have flourished, so it may

0:19:09.720 --> 0:19:12.040
<v Speaker 1>have just been a case of a great idea at

0:19:12.080 --> 0:19:14.919
<v Speaker 1>the wrong time. It's kind of sad because I actually

0:19:14.920 --> 0:19:17.960
<v Speaker 1>like the idea of getting rewards points that are applicable

0:19:18.000 --> 0:19:21.800
<v Speaker 1>across multiple vendors. I don't know how you make that

0:19:21.920 --> 0:19:25.119
<v Speaker 1>arrangement so that not, you know, no single vendor gets

0:19:27.000 --> 0:19:29.680
<v Speaker 1>harmed by this. I mean, if everyone is making their

0:19:29.720 --> 0:19:32.560
<v Speaker 1>purchases at certain vendors and they're all cashing in their

0:19:32.560 --> 0:19:37.120
<v Speaker 1>rewards points at another vendor, the rewards points vendors having

0:19:37.160 --> 0:19:39.280
<v Speaker 1>a rough time of it, unless there's some other money

0:19:39.320 --> 0:19:43.520
<v Speaker 1>exchange on the back end between the agency and the

0:19:43.520 --> 0:19:47.640
<v Speaker 1>the the vendor. I don't know, but I would love

0:19:47.680 --> 0:19:51.520
<v Speaker 1>it because it would really simplify all those loyalty cards.

0:19:51.560 --> 0:19:54.800
<v Speaker 1>Instead of having to have multiple apps or multiple cards,

0:19:55.760 --> 0:19:59.320
<v Speaker 1>you would have just one. Google. Google Wallet has tried

0:19:59.400 --> 0:20:02.719
<v Speaker 1>something similar in the past, so maybe we'll see that

0:20:02.960 --> 0:20:05.680
<v Speaker 1>rise up again in the future. I got a lot

0:20:05.720 --> 0:20:08.680
<v Speaker 1>more to talk about with dot com companies that went

0:20:08.760 --> 0:20:11.159
<v Speaker 1>belly up, but first let's take a quick break to

0:20:11.280 --> 0:20:21.520
<v Speaker 1>thank our sponsor. Rolling right along, let's take a look

0:20:21.560 --> 0:20:25.520
<v Speaker 1>at Cosmo dot com investment bankers Joseph Park and Yong

0:20:25.720 --> 0:20:29.800
<v Speaker 1>Kang launched the company in n It was a fast

0:20:29.840 --> 0:20:33.280
<v Speaker 1>delivery service. The company's pitch was that it could deliver

0:20:33.440 --> 0:20:36.800
<v Speaker 1>lots of stuff like small stuff like coffee or DVDs

0:20:36.880 --> 0:20:40.000
<v Speaker 1>or other small items in under an hour and there

0:20:40.000 --> 0:20:43.600
<v Speaker 1>were no additional delivery charges. Cosmo landed a deal with

0:20:43.640 --> 0:20:46.119
<v Speaker 1>Starbucks early on, and from a consumer side, it all

0:20:46.119 --> 0:20:48.880
<v Speaker 1>looked really promising a man that you no longer had

0:20:48.920 --> 0:20:52.600
<v Speaker 1>to wait. Whenever you ordered something online, you could get

0:20:52.680 --> 0:20:55.720
<v Speaker 1>near instant gratification because within an hour it would show

0:20:55.800 --> 0:20:59.560
<v Speaker 1>up at your door. Cosmo delivery agents rode around New

0:20:59.640 --> 0:21:03.919
<v Speaker 1>York the first Cosmo market, on bicycles, and the service

0:21:03.960 --> 0:21:07.040
<v Speaker 1>was gaining ground with consumers, but the company was losing

0:21:07.080 --> 0:21:10.399
<v Speaker 1>money on every delivery. Now. Their hope was that they

0:21:10.400 --> 0:21:12.960
<v Speaker 1>would be able to stay afloat in the early phases

0:21:13.000 --> 0:21:15.840
<v Speaker 1>as they gathered a customer base before turning on some

0:21:15.920 --> 0:21:19.879
<v Speaker 1>revenue generation generating streams. And it was a risky bet

0:21:19.920 --> 0:21:23.720
<v Speaker 1>and it very nearly paid off. It. It wasn't like

0:21:23.760 --> 0:21:27.679
<v Speaker 1>it was a bad idea. It almost worked. Cosmo was

0:21:27.760 --> 0:21:30.199
<v Speaker 1>growing and by the end of nineteen it was in

0:21:30.280 --> 0:21:33.879
<v Speaker 1>six markets in six locations, and by early two thousand

0:21:34.280 --> 0:21:38.040
<v Speaker 1>it grew to eleven cities and twenty two locations, and

0:21:38.080 --> 0:21:42.000
<v Speaker 1>after eighteen months in business they had three hundred thousand customers.

0:21:42.720 --> 0:21:45.600
<v Speaker 1>By mid two thousand, that was up to four hundred

0:21:45.600 --> 0:21:49.879
<v Speaker 1>thousand customers, and they employed more than twenty six hundred people,

0:21:50.160 --> 0:21:55.480
<v Speaker 1>and all those employees were called Cosmo knots cute. Around

0:21:55.520 --> 0:21:58.720
<v Speaker 1>that same time, publications such as Forbes were warning that

0:21:58.760 --> 0:22:02.359
<v Speaker 1>Cosmo might be expanded too quickly and they didn't have

0:22:02.480 --> 0:22:06.880
<v Speaker 1>enough revenue generation to keep this sustainable. It was going

0:22:06.920 --> 0:22:09.359
<v Speaker 1>to end up collapsing in on itself if they weren't careful.

0:22:09.720 --> 0:22:11.919
<v Speaker 1>An article in June two thousand and Forbes said that

0:22:11.920 --> 0:22:14.840
<v Speaker 1>Cosmo had spent more than twenty six million dollars in

0:22:16.440 --> 0:22:19.160
<v Speaker 1>and they only generated three and a half million dollars

0:22:19.240 --> 0:22:22.520
<v Speaker 1>in revenue, so obviously that can't go on forever. The

0:22:22.560 --> 0:22:26.280
<v Speaker 1>privately held company prepared to launch an initial public offering,

0:22:26.400 --> 0:22:29.320
<v Speaker 1>but between the lead up and the launch, the dot

0:22:29.359 --> 0:22:33.280
<v Speaker 1>com market began to crash, and the company also found

0:22:33.320 --> 0:22:36.360
<v Speaker 1>that it was harder to penetrate some markets, such as Houston,

0:22:36.800 --> 0:22:39.280
<v Speaker 1>which the company had abandoned after trying to make an

0:22:39.320 --> 0:22:42.040
<v Speaker 1>impact there for five months. They just couldn't get enough

0:22:42.080 --> 0:22:44.760
<v Speaker 1>of a customer base to justify the expense of operating

0:22:44.760 --> 0:22:46.600
<v Speaker 1>in Houston, and so they pulled out of the city.

0:22:47.760 --> 0:22:50.639
<v Speaker 1>While Cosmo operated at a profit in four of the

0:22:50.640 --> 0:22:53.439
<v Speaker 1>cities that had a presence in that wasn't enough to

0:22:53.520 --> 0:22:57.080
<v Speaker 1>satisfy ANTSI investors who were watching the world crumble around

0:22:57.119 --> 0:23:00.360
<v Speaker 1>them with every other dot com company falling left right,

0:23:00.880 --> 0:23:03.840
<v Speaker 1>and those profits that they were generating were not enough

0:23:03.920 --> 0:23:06.200
<v Speaker 1>to keep the company going on its own while trying

0:23:06.200 --> 0:23:11.240
<v Speaker 1>to make other locations become profitable. So Cosmo withdrew from

0:23:11.320 --> 0:23:13.840
<v Speaker 1>the I p O. They canceled it, and by April

0:23:13.880 --> 0:23:17.240
<v Speaker 1>two thousand one, all their money had run out and

0:23:17.240 --> 0:23:20.600
<v Speaker 1>the company had to shut down. As for the founders,

0:23:20.840 --> 0:23:23.600
<v Speaker 1>they went on to work on other big projects. Joseph

0:23:23.640 --> 0:23:27.200
<v Speaker 1>Park founded a social networking platform called Askville, in which

0:23:27.200 --> 0:23:30.120
<v Speaker 1>people could post questions to a community and they would

0:23:30.160 --> 0:23:33.800
<v Speaker 1>get answers from other community members, and in two thousand nine,

0:23:34.119 --> 0:23:39.080
<v Speaker 1>Amazon acquired Askville. Park then went on to join HarperCollins Publishers,

0:23:39.320 --> 0:23:41.560
<v Speaker 1>and he became a senior vice president with the company

0:23:41.600 --> 0:23:45.440
<v Speaker 1>and the president of their Bible Gateway division. In two

0:23:45.480 --> 0:23:48.440
<v Speaker 1>thousand eleven, he left to become the CEO of blue Fly,

0:23:48.840 --> 0:23:53.359
<v Speaker 1>a fashion apparel e commerce company. Another company called pe

0:23:53.400 --> 0:23:56.840
<v Speaker 1>Firm scooped up blue Fly, So then Park goes on

0:23:56.880 --> 0:23:59.720
<v Speaker 1>to become the VP of Global e Commerce at Forever

0:23:59.760 --> 0:24:02.320
<v Speaker 1>To he won another fashion company and he stayed there

0:24:02.359 --> 0:24:05.400
<v Speaker 1>for a couple of years. These days, he's the global

0:24:05.480 --> 0:24:12.800
<v Speaker 1>Chief e Commerce Officer of Mattel Incorporated. Busy Guy Young Kang,

0:24:12.880 --> 0:24:15.680
<v Speaker 1>the other co founder, worked at City Banks as an

0:24:15.720 --> 0:24:18.800
<v Speaker 1>investment banking associate for a while, and he was vice

0:24:18.840 --> 0:24:22.120
<v Speaker 1>president at Lehman Brothers for two years, then a director

0:24:22.160 --> 0:24:25.600
<v Speaker 1>at Barclays Capital for another four years, and he founded

0:24:25.600 --> 0:24:30.720
<v Speaker 1>a company called KPK Capital LLC, and equity and real

0:24:30.840 --> 0:24:34.000
<v Speaker 1>estate company. These days, he's the VP of Finance and

0:24:34.000 --> 0:24:37.080
<v Speaker 1>Business Development at Homer Logistics, which is a company that

0:24:37.119 --> 0:24:40.720
<v Speaker 1>looks at last mile logistics, which makes sense. Cosmo was

0:24:40.720 --> 0:24:43.199
<v Speaker 1>all about trying to solve that last mile problem of

0:24:43.240 --> 0:24:47.600
<v Speaker 1>getting a product into consumers hands, and their logistics worked great.

0:24:47.720 --> 0:24:51.639
<v Speaker 1>Their supply chain strategy was working very well. It was

0:24:51.680 --> 0:24:54.199
<v Speaker 1>the revenue side that was the problem, not the supply

0:24:54.280 --> 0:24:58.679
<v Speaker 1>side in this case. So let's contrast that last story

0:24:59.119 --> 0:25:03.680
<v Speaker 1>with one phil with allegations of incompetence. Cosmo may well

0:25:03.800 --> 0:25:06.760
<v Speaker 1>have been able to survive if it hadn't been for

0:25:06.800 --> 0:25:08.919
<v Speaker 1>the fact that all the other dot com companies were

0:25:08.920 --> 0:25:12.679
<v Speaker 1>starting to crumble because it made investors scared and they

0:25:12.720 --> 0:25:16.520
<v Speaker 1>all started to pull out. And that was the rug

0:25:16.520 --> 0:25:18.800
<v Speaker 1>getting pulled out from under cosmos feet. And while they

0:25:18.840 --> 0:25:21.840
<v Speaker 1>had become profitable in four cities, they had yet to

0:25:21.880 --> 0:25:24.240
<v Speaker 1>become profitable and the other ones, and they've never got

0:25:24.280 --> 0:25:27.640
<v Speaker 1>the chance to change that. Meanwhile, you've got other stories

0:25:28.480 --> 0:25:33.439
<v Speaker 1>where you've got all this crazy shenanigans going on. Like

0:25:33.480 --> 0:25:36.639
<v Speaker 1>I said, there are allegations of incompetence, hubris, and mishandling

0:25:36.640 --> 0:25:40.040
<v Speaker 1>of funds. And I'm talking about gov Works go O

0:25:40.119 --> 0:25:44.439
<v Speaker 1>v W O r k S. I was founded by

0:25:44.440 --> 0:25:49.280
<v Speaker 1>a former investor named is Saza Tusman. He was originally

0:25:49.320 --> 0:25:53.280
<v Speaker 1>from Columbia, came over graduated Harvard magnum cum laude. He

0:25:53.359 --> 0:25:58.160
<v Speaker 1>was a very very uh intelligent guy, still is very

0:25:58.160 --> 0:26:02.199
<v Speaker 1>intelligent guy. We're to Goldman Sachs as an investor for

0:26:02.280 --> 0:26:05.880
<v Speaker 1>quite some time. But he came up with the idea

0:26:06.280 --> 0:26:09.760
<v Speaker 1>with for gov works after having a really irritating experience

0:26:10.000 --> 0:26:12.920
<v Speaker 1>he got a parking ticket and he forgot to pay

0:26:12.960 --> 0:26:16.119
<v Speaker 1>it and as a result, the eighty dollar fine that

0:26:16.160 --> 0:26:18.399
<v Speaker 1>was on the original parking ticket bulked up to a

0:26:18.480 --> 0:26:21.600
<v Speaker 1>five dred and forty dollar fine due to late fees.

0:26:22.119 --> 0:26:25.280
<v Speaker 1>Tusman was talking with a former high school classmate named

0:26:25.280 --> 0:26:29.840
<v Speaker 1>Tom Herman about this experience, and they began to brainstorm

0:26:29.880 --> 0:26:33.080
<v Speaker 1>about a new business one if you build a business

0:26:33.119 --> 0:26:37.160
<v Speaker 1>that would, for a small processing fee, pay customer parking

0:26:37.280 --> 0:26:41.000
<v Speaker 1>fines for them, sort of like a line waiting service,

0:26:41.040 --> 0:26:44.600
<v Speaker 1>but for government fines, so you, as a customer would

0:26:44.600 --> 0:26:46.760
<v Speaker 1>actually pay the full fine. It's not like the company

0:26:46.760 --> 0:26:51.800
<v Speaker 1>would pay the fine just out of altruistic love of you.

0:26:51.800 --> 0:26:54.560
<v Speaker 1>You would pay the money for the fine, and on

0:26:54.640 --> 0:26:56.439
<v Speaker 1>top of that you would have a processing fee you

0:26:56.440 --> 0:26:59.040
<v Speaker 1>would add, but the company would take care of everything.

0:26:59.800 --> 0:27:02.560
<v Speaker 1>For this idea, the idea got bigger, So why just

0:27:02.920 --> 0:27:05.639
<v Speaker 1>stop at parking fines. The new company could act on

0:27:05.680 --> 0:27:10.080
<v Speaker 1>behalf of citizens in several government citizen transactions, such as

0:27:10.119 --> 0:27:13.399
<v Speaker 1>applying for a fishing license, or paying property taxes, or

0:27:13.400 --> 0:27:17.119
<v Speaker 1>getting a building permit, or any of another another number

0:27:17.200 --> 0:27:21.440
<v Speaker 1>of government activities you might have to engage in as

0:27:21.440 --> 0:27:25.639
<v Speaker 1>a citizen, pretty much any mundane activity that would require

0:27:25.720 --> 0:27:27.800
<v Speaker 1>someone to go in person to a government office could

0:27:27.840 --> 0:27:31.359
<v Speaker 1>be handled by this service instead, with some obvious exceptions.

0:27:31.359 --> 0:27:32.880
<v Speaker 1>You're not going to be able to get a driver's

0:27:32.920 --> 0:27:36.199
<v Speaker 1>license this way or vote, but you'd be able to

0:27:36.240 --> 0:27:38.600
<v Speaker 1>do a lot of other things. And that's how gov

0:27:38.680 --> 0:27:42.040
<v Speaker 1>works was born. Tusman was able to get some really

0:27:42.080 --> 0:27:46.399
<v Speaker 1>big investors on board early on, and in v works

0:27:46.440 --> 0:27:50.720
<v Speaker 1>became a company. Before long, they started running into big problems, however,

0:27:50.800 --> 0:27:54.840
<v Speaker 1>and according to CNN Money, many of those problems were

0:27:54.880 --> 0:27:58.520
<v Speaker 1>the company's own fault. One of those problems was that

0:27:58.560 --> 0:28:02.480
<v Speaker 1>Tusman really liked and restive strategy for entering into markets,

0:28:03.160 --> 0:28:06.920
<v Speaker 1>so on more than one occasion, gov Works published notices

0:28:06.960 --> 0:28:09.760
<v Speaker 1>that it would soon be working with various cities before

0:28:09.800 --> 0:28:13.560
<v Speaker 1>any official agreements had actually been signed, and that rubbed

0:28:13.680 --> 0:28:16.800
<v Speaker 1>some city officials the wrong way. On top of that,

0:28:17.080 --> 0:28:20.040
<v Speaker 1>the marketing campaigns for gov works portrayed government as a

0:28:20.119 --> 0:28:24.120
<v Speaker 1>hassle and it's inefficient and run by jerks, and that

0:28:24.200 --> 0:28:27.240
<v Speaker 1>didn't help. When the company was trying to form relationships

0:28:27.280 --> 0:28:32.879
<v Speaker 1>with various government entities, Tusman's team were concentrating on potential customers.

0:28:32.880 --> 0:28:35.400
<v Speaker 1>They were looking to get people who would want to

0:28:35.520 --> 0:28:38.280
<v Speaker 1>use the service, but they learned a little too late.

0:28:38.320 --> 0:28:42.040
<v Speaker 1>That they also needed to get the trust and cooperation

0:28:42.400 --> 0:28:46.080
<v Speaker 1>of government officials. So if you spend all your efforts

0:28:46.080 --> 0:28:49.920
<v Speaker 1>winning over one group at the expense of alienating another group,

0:28:50.040 --> 0:28:51.920
<v Speaker 1>and it turns out you need to depend on both

0:28:51.920 --> 0:28:54.440
<v Speaker 1>of them at the same time for your business to succeed,

0:28:55.400 --> 0:28:58.960
<v Speaker 1>that's not great. And that's kind of what one of

0:28:59.000 --> 0:29:02.000
<v Speaker 1>the first problems of works right into Now. In that

0:29:02.120 --> 0:29:04.760
<v Speaker 1>CNN Money piece, it sounds as though gov Works was

0:29:04.800 --> 0:29:08.520
<v Speaker 1>a difficult client as well. The article states that Fallon

0:29:08.600 --> 0:29:12.240
<v Speaker 1>New York, which was an advertising agency, walked away from

0:29:12.240 --> 0:29:17.080
<v Speaker 1>a lucrative forty million dollar contract after producing a single

0:29:17.120 --> 0:29:20.640
<v Speaker 1>TV spot for gov Works. So, in other words, they

0:29:20.640 --> 0:29:26.080
<v Speaker 1>were hired to be the the advertising firm for this company,

0:29:26.120 --> 0:29:28.720
<v Speaker 1>they produced one TV spot and then they say, yeah,

0:29:29.000 --> 0:29:33.080
<v Speaker 1>we're kind of done here, despite a forty million dollar contract. Now,

0:29:33.120 --> 0:29:37.080
<v Speaker 1>that same piece does cite a Fallon employee who said

0:29:37.080 --> 0:29:41.800
<v Speaker 1>that it wasn't a bad parting, it wasn't on bad terms. Still,

0:29:42.160 --> 0:29:44.640
<v Speaker 1>forty million dollars that's a big chunk of cash to

0:29:44.680 --> 0:29:47.120
<v Speaker 1>back out of, so I'm curious what the full story

0:29:47.280 --> 0:29:50.840
<v Speaker 1>is there. Meanwhile, over at gov Works, big chunks of

0:29:50.920 --> 0:29:54.280
<v Speaker 1>cash were really running out pretty quickly. Several sources say

0:29:54.320 --> 0:29:57.400
<v Speaker 1>that the company burned through close to sixty million dollars

0:29:57.400 --> 0:30:01.240
<v Speaker 1>in venture capital without being able to become the profitable business.

0:30:01.600 --> 0:30:05.120
<v Speaker 1>At one point, the company had two hundred fifty employees,

0:30:05.560 --> 0:30:07.880
<v Speaker 1>and like many other dot com startups in this era,

0:30:08.000 --> 0:30:10.320
<v Speaker 1>it ended up having to close down and start selling

0:30:10.360 --> 0:30:13.280
<v Speaker 1>off assets. The rise and fall of the company was

0:30:13.320 --> 0:30:17.200
<v Speaker 1>the focus of an independent film called Startup dot Com.

0:30:17.320 --> 0:30:20.200
<v Speaker 1>Tusman went on to become the president of a company

0:30:20.240 --> 0:30:24.080
<v Speaker 1>called Jump TV, which was an Internet TV venture. Later,

0:30:24.200 --> 0:30:26.840
<v Speaker 1>he founded and became the managing partner of a company

0:30:26.840 --> 0:30:30.200
<v Speaker 1>called Kit Capital k I T, and he went on

0:30:30.280 --> 0:30:33.640
<v Speaker 1>to become the CEO of Kit Digital Incorporated until two

0:30:33.680 --> 0:30:37.840
<v Speaker 1>thousand twelve. The company created a video asset management system

0:30:37.880 --> 0:30:40.200
<v Speaker 1>that was cloud based, and it was in business in

0:30:40.240 --> 0:30:42.720
<v Speaker 1>two thousand seven, although back then it was called the

0:30:42.880 --> 0:30:46.760
<v Speaker 1>Rue Group r OO, and it stayed in business until

0:30:46.800 --> 0:30:50.480
<v Speaker 1>two when it declared bankruptcy. So a year after Tusman

0:30:50.640 --> 0:30:55.560
<v Speaker 1>left the company and these days Tusman's awaiting trial. Wait

0:30:55.560 --> 0:30:59.040
<v Speaker 1>what Well, First of all, this has nothing to do

0:30:59.080 --> 0:31:05.920
<v Speaker 1>with gov Works but rather Kit Digital. Basically, Tusman has

0:31:05.960 --> 0:31:12.400
<v Speaker 1>been charged with some cases of conspiracy and fraud. In fact,

0:31:12.440 --> 0:31:15.440
<v Speaker 1>he and some other executives at Kit Digital have been

0:31:15.560 --> 0:31:19.080
<v Speaker 1>charged with inflating the value of the company by purchasing

0:31:19.120 --> 0:31:23.480
<v Speaker 1>company shares with the company's own money, so essentially using

0:31:23.520 --> 0:31:25.880
<v Speaker 1>the profits of a company to purchase shares in the

0:31:25.920 --> 0:31:30.160
<v Speaker 1>company and drive up the share price. That money was

0:31:30.840 --> 0:31:35.880
<v Speaker 1>allegedly flowing through an investment platform controlled by Tusman. In

0:31:35.960 --> 0:31:39.880
<v Speaker 1>two thousand fifteen, a hedge fund manager named Stephen Maiden

0:31:40.080 --> 0:31:43.800
<v Speaker 1>connected to these charges was sentenced to seven years in

0:31:43.880 --> 0:31:48.560
<v Speaker 1>prison for securities fraud. Tuzman was arrested in twenty sixteen

0:31:48.600 --> 0:31:52.280
<v Speaker 1>in Colombia. He was working on a luxury hotel project

0:31:52.320 --> 0:31:55.800
<v Speaker 1>at the time, and apparently the conditions in that Colombian

0:31:55.840 --> 0:32:00.360
<v Speaker 1>prison were notoriously awful um and it took some time,

0:32:00.400 --> 0:32:03.640
<v Speaker 1>but he was then extradited to the United States in July.

0:32:05.200 --> 0:32:07.880
<v Speaker 1>As of this recording, he has not yet gone to trial,

0:32:08.000 --> 0:32:11.720
<v Speaker 1>but it is scheduled to start in early October. Seen

0:32:12.080 --> 0:32:14.600
<v Speaker 1>he has entered a plea of not guilty. Two of

0:32:14.680 --> 0:32:18.360
<v Speaker 1>his colleagues have pled guilty to the charges, so it'll

0:32:18.360 --> 0:32:21.760
<v Speaker 1>be interesting to see where this goes. Now. I've got

0:32:21.800 --> 0:32:24.800
<v Speaker 1>more to say about some of these dot com companies.

0:32:25.040 --> 0:32:27.880
<v Speaker 1>But before I do, let's take another quick break and

0:32:27.920 --> 0:32:37.520
<v Speaker 1>thank our sponsor. Hey, since we just talked about crime,

0:32:37.840 --> 0:32:41.920
<v Speaker 1>how about we talk about an online crime news site

0:32:42.560 --> 0:32:44.920
<v Speaker 1>that was the pitch of a p B news as

0:32:44.960 --> 0:32:48.520
<v Speaker 1>an all points bulletin a p B news dot com.

0:32:48.680 --> 0:32:51.360
<v Speaker 1>It was to serve up articles covering crime beats around

0:32:51.440 --> 0:32:55.440
<v Speaker 1>the world. Two investment bankers named Matthew Cohen and Marshall

0:32:55.520 --> 0:32:59.760
<v Speaker 1>Davidson partnered with a former investigative reporter and a captain

0:32:59.760 --> 0:33:03.200
<v Speaker 1>in the army named Mark Salter on this venture. They

0:33:03.280 --> 0:33:06.720
<v Speaker 1>raised more than a hundred million dollars in investments and

0:33:06.720 --> 0:33:10.080
<v Speaker 1>they hired a lot of people, including a Pulitzer Prize

0:33:10.120 --> 0:33:14.120
<v Speaker 1>winning reporter named Sidney Schanberg. The company took about two

0:33:14.200 --> 0:33:18.920
<v Speaker 1>years to burn through all of that cash. Two years

0:33:18.960 --> 0:33:22.680
<v Speaker 1>to burn through a hundred million dollars, it's incredible. So

0:33:22.960 --> 0:33:26.640
<v Speaker 1>this company launched in and by mid two thousand it

0:33:26.720 --> 0:33:29.720
<v Speaker 1>was done. It went dark. It was seven million dollars

0:33:29.720 --> 0:33:32.520
<v Speaker 1>in debt and only had fifty thousand dollars in the bank.

0:33:33.120 --> 0:33:36.280
<v Speaker 1>The company went bankrupt and eventually another company called safety

0:33:36.280 --> 0:33:39.120
<v Speaker 1>Tips dot Com purchased a PB news dot com for

0:33:39.160 --> 0:33:44.120
<v Speaker 1>the princely sum of five hundred seventy five thousand dollars.

0:33:45.080 --> 0:33:47.920
<v Speaker 1>Now this was after safety tips dot Com had already

0:33:47.960 --> 0:33:51.920
<v Speaker 1>looked to acquire the assets outright. They bought it at auction,

0:33:52.120 --> 0:33:54.760
<v Speaker 1>but originally they were just looking to purchase a p

0:33:54.920 --> 0:33:58.600
<v Speaker 1>B News straight without having it go to auction. It

0:33:58.600 --> 0:34:01.520
<v Speaker 1>was gonna be a nine fifty thousand dollar price tag,

0:34:02.440 --> 0:34:05.520
<v Speaker 1>and also they were going to back alone to allow

0:34:05.600 --> 0:34:09.359
<v Speaker 1>the site to continue operating through the bankruptcy proceedings and

0:34:09.440 --> 0:34:13.440
<v Speaker 1>perhaps emerge on the other side. But then before they

0:34:13.480 --> 0:34:17.000
<v Speaker 1>could actually sign this n dollar deal, they got a

0:34:17.040 --> 0:34:20.160
<v Speaker 1>look at the books of a p B news dot

0:34:20.200 --> 0:34:23.960
<v Speaker 1>Com and they said, whoa, this is a total dumpster

0:34:24.160 --> 0:34:30.000
<v Speaker 1>fire piece. I might be paraphrasing a little here, anyway,

0:34:30.000 --> 0:34:32.040
<v Speaker 1>if you go to the u r L today, you'll

0:34:32.080 --> 0:34:36.120
<v Speaker 1>see not much. As it turns out, that really isn't

0:34:36.160 --> 0:34:40.480
<v Speaker 1>anything anymore. Mark Salter, the former reporter, went on to

0:34:40.560 --> 0:34:45.560
<v Speaker 1>become the CEO of the Chesapeake Innovation Center, business accelerator

0:34:45.600 --> 0:34:48.800
<v Speaker 1>firm focused on homeland security. He then became the managing

0:34:48.800 --> 0:34:53.000
<v Speaker 1>director of Legend Merchant Group, another defense firm. These days,

0:34:53.000 --> 0:34:56.520
<v Speaker 1>he's the president of or Or Sinus or or a

0:34:56.600 --> 0:35:00.560
<v Speaker 1>Keenness Solutions O r C I n U S and

0:35:00.600 --> 0:35:02.840
<v Speaker 1>I honestly don't know how I'm supposed to pronounce that,

0:35:03.400 --> 0:35:05.520
<v Speaker 1>but this is a company that consults with many clients,

0:35:05.520 --> 0:35:09.160
<v Speaker 1>including you guessed it, homeland security. He's also the managing

0:35:09.200 --> 0:35:12.600
<v Speaker 1>director of Pickwick Capital Partners LLC, which is an invest

0:35:12.760 --> 0:35:16.279
<v Speaker 1>investment firm. So a lot of these people, after they

0:35:16.320 --> 0:35:20.880
<v Speaker 1>got out of building companies that didn't last, ended up

0:35:20.920 --> 0:35:25.560
<v Speaker 1>becoming investors themselves. Marshall Davidson, one of the two investment

0:35:25.560 --> 0:35:28.640
<v Speaker 1>bankers who co founded APB news dot com, is the

0:35:28.719 --> 0:35:32.880
<v Speaker 1>operations manager of Avison Young, a real estate company. I

0:35:32.920 --> 0:35:35.600
<v Speaker 1>have no idea where Matthew Cohen ended up, as my

0:35:35.640 --> 0:35:38.680
<v Speaker 1>research couldn't definitively point me to the right person. I

0:35:38.719 --> 0:35:41.160
<v Speaker 1>found a lot of Matthew Cohen's, but no one who

0:35:41.239 --> 0:35:44.000
<v Speaker 1>was specifically the Matthew Cohen of a p B news

0:35:44.040 --> 0:35:46.799
<v Speaker 1>dot com. So if you know what happened to Matthew Cohen,

0:35:47.160 --> 0:35:49.839
<v Speaker 1>let me know. I'm kind of curious what turned how

0:35:49.920 --> 0:35:52.319
<v Speaker 1>it turned out for him. And we've talked a lot

0:35:52.360 --> 0:35:54.360
<v Speaker 1>about companies that went under as a result of the

0:35:54.400 --> 0:35:56.920
<v Speaker 1>market instability of the dot com bubble crash, But what

0:35:57.000 --> 0:35:59.239
<v Speaker 1>about the few that made it through. What makes them

0:35:59.280 --> 0:36:03.160
<v Speaker 1>so special? Well, probably one of the biggest is Amazon,

0:36:04.000 --> 0:36:06.120
<v Speaker 1>and it's one of the most high profile dot com

0:36:06.200 --> 0:36:08.600
<v Speaker 1>companies of that era, and it was able to weather

0:36:08.680 --> 0:36:11.840
<v Speaker 1>the storms of the dot com bubble, and Amazon itself

0:36:11.880 --> 0:36:14.880
<v Speaker 1>was on shaky ground for a long time. Like other companies,

0:36:14.920 --> 0:36:17.640
<v Speaker 1>it became clear that scaling a business and managing a

0:36:17.719 --> 0:36:21.520
<v Speaker 1>large infrastructure is an expensive undertaking, and that finding the

0:36:21.600 --> 0:36:24.879
<v Speaker 1>right balance of attracting and retaining customers while making sure

0:36:24.880 --> 0:36:28.239
<v Speaker 1>you have sufficient inventory is not an easy task. It's

0:36:28.320 --> 0:36:33.080
<v Speaker 1>a huge logistics problem now. Jeff Bezos founded Amazon in

0:36:34.200 --> 0:36:39.680
<v Speaker 1>ur and the company debuted its online bookstore model. In

0:36:39.719 --> 0:36:41.960
<v Speaker 1>these days, you can buy pretty much anything on Amazon,

0:36:42.120 --> 0:36:45.320
<v Speaker 1>but at the heart of the company was its book business.

0:36:46.320 --> 0:36:50.480
<v Speaker 1>Amazon held its initial public offering in May nine seven,

0:36:50.560 --> 0:36:53.640
<v Speaker 1>just two years after it had gone live, and it

0:36:53.719 --> 0:36:56.799
<v Speaker 1>had an opening price of eighteen dollars per share. That

0:36:56.880 --> 0:36:59.279
<v Speaker 1>price rose up to more than one hundred dollars per

0:36:59.280 --> 0:37:03.040
<v Speaker 1>share before the will burst. Once that happened, the price

0:37:03.120 --> 0:37:06.440
<v Speaker 1>dropped down to less than ten dollars per share. The

0:37:06.480 --> 0:37:08.799
<v Speaker 1>story here is that even companies that were big and

0:37:08.840 --> 0:37:12.759
<v Speaker 1>had sold uh lots of stuff. They had a really

0:37:12.800 --> 0:37:16.319
<v Speaker 1>solid revenue plan in place, They knew what their business was.

0:37:16.400 --> 0:37:18.640
<v Speaker 1>They could tell you what their business was. Some of

0:37:18.680 --> 0:37:21.440
<v Speaker 1>these companies, if you were to ask them, what is

0:37:21.480 --> 0:37:25.400
<v Speaker 1>it that you actually do, people struggled to come up

0:37:25.440 --> 0:37:27.800
<v Speaker 1>with an answer. Not the case with Amazon. It was

0:37:27.840 --> 0:37:31.960
<v Speaker 1>pretty simple. Uh. But even a company like that wasn't

0:37:32.120 --> 0:37:34.400
<v Speaker 1>was not immune to the effects of the dot com bubble.

0:37:34.560 --> 0:37:37.200
<v Speaker 1>Investors had really lost confidence in the tech sector in

0:37:37.239 --> 0:37:40.160
<v Speaker 1>general and anything connected to the web in particular. But

0:37:40.239 --> 0:37:43.120
<v Speaker 1>Amazon was able to tough it out. They had not

0:37:43.239 --> 0:37:45.600
<v Speaker 1>yet turned a profit when the dot com bubble burst,

0:37:46.040 --> 0:37:48.520
<v Speaker 1>but that changed in the fourth quarter of two thousand one.

0:37:48.560 --> 0:37:50.759
<v Speaker 1>That was the first time the company managed to turn

0:37:50.760 --> 0:37:54.319
<v Speaker 1>a profit. While other companies were rapidly disappearing from our

0:37:54.360 --> 0:37:58.200
<v Speaker 1>collective memory, Amazon kept plugging away to convert brand recognition

0:37:58.239 --> 0:38:02.000
<v Speaker 1>strategies into revenue generating ones. And for one thing, Amazon

0:38:02.040 --> 0:38:04.879
<v Speaker 1>had a really solid mission statement as to be the

0:38:04.880 --> 0:38:09.000
<v Speaker 1>Earth's most customer centric company to build a place where

0:38:09.000 --> 0:38:11.759
<v Speaker 1>people can come to find and discover anything they might

0:38:11.840 --> 0:38:16.160
<v Speaker 1>want to buy online. That's a direct quote of Amazon's

0:38:16.160 --> 0:38:19.279
<v Speaker 1>mission statement back in the day. The scaling process for

0:38:19.320 --> 0:38:22.560
<v Speaker 1>Amazon meant that it didn't burn out of investment money

0:38:22.600 --> 0:38:25.440
<v Speaker 1>before turning a profit, and so it succeeded where so

0:38:25.480 --> 0:38:28.959
<v Speaker 1>many other companies failed. And not to get too warm

0:38:28.960 --> 0:38:31.439
<v Speaker 1>and fuzzy here. Amazon was also able to secure its

0:38:31.440 --> 0:38:34.319
<v Speaker 1>place because it became one of the leading authorities on

0:38:34.400 --> 0:38:39.080
<v Speaker 1>customer behavior. They could track customer purchases and customer browsing,

0:38:39.360 --> 0:38:42.120
<v Speaker 1>and the company could fine tune how it presented products

0:38:42.120 --> 0:38:45.360
<v Speaker 1>to people, and it could provide helpful suggestions to shoppers

0:38:45.400 --> 0:38:47.799
<v Speaker 1>and up sell them on additional items they didn't even

0:38:47.840 --> 0:38:50.680
<v Speaker 1>know they needed. Like if you buy something that takes

0:38:50.680 --> 0:38:52.960
<v Speaker 1>batteries and suddenly you get a suggestion, Hey, maybe you

0:38:52.960 --> 0:38:58.239
<v Speaker 1>should buy some batteries. That's clever and it works. It's

0:38:58.239 --> 0:39:00.400
<v Speaker 1>also kind of creepy in a way, but it really

0:39:00.440 --> 0:39:05.680
<v Speaker 1>illustrates how we as human beings are predictable creatures. Maybe

0:39:05.719 --> 0:39:07.600
<v Speaker 1>we have a little less free will than we thought.

0:39:08.800 --> 0:39:11.200
<v Speaker 1>Another dot com that managed to make it through the

0:39:11.280 --> 0:39:14.799
<v Speaker 1>chaos of the bubble was eBay. eBay launched in nine

0:39:15.719 --> 0:39:19.120
<v Speaker 1>out of Pierre Almadyar's living room, and the original site

0:39:19.160 --> 0:39:22.360
<v Speaker 1>was called auction Web. The whole concept was pretty simple.

0:39:22.600 --> 0:39:26.719
<v Speaker 1>eBay was a platform for online auctions. Mark Frasier was

0:39:26.800 --> 0:39:29.959
<v Speaker 1>the first person to buy anything on eBay, So here's

0:39:29.960 --> 0:39:34.040
<v Speaker 1>your trivia. Mark Frasier, out of Canada bought a broken

0:39:34.120 --> 0:39:37.920
<v Speaker 1>laser pointer on eBay as the first purchase ever across

0:39:37.960 --> 0:39:42.560
<v Speaker 1>the site. By nine, goods were valued at seven point

0:39:42.640 --> 0:39:46.120
<v Speaker 1>two million dollars that had been sold on auction Web,

0:39:46.760 --> 0:39:49.440
<v Speaker 1>So that's a pretty incredible and Pierre ended up quitting

0:39:49.440 --> 0:39:52.280
<v Speaker 1>his day job and brought on Jeff Scroll to become

0:39:52.280 --> 0:39:56.160
<v Speaker 1>the president of the company. Auction Web would eventually become eBay.

0:39:56.440 --> 0:40:01.319
<v Speaker 1>In September, the company had grown to the point that

0:40:01.360 --> 0:40:03.440
<v Speaker 1>the two co founders felt they needed to bring in

0:40:03.480 --> 0:40:06.359
<v Speaker 1>an expert in business and branding, and they hired Meg

0:40:06.440 --> 0:40:10.719
<v Speaker 1>Whitman as president and CEO. Whitman led the company and

0:40:10.760 --> 0:40:16.400
<v Speaker 1>attracted executives from multiple high profile organizations, including Disney. In September,

0:40:17.640 --> 0:40:20.560
<v Speaker 1>eBay held its I p O, with initial shares trading

0:40:20.600 --> 0:40:24.000
<v Speaker 1>at eighteen dollars. The price rose to fifty three dollars

0:40:24.000 --> 0:40:26.000
<v Speaker 1>and fifty cents at one point on that first day

0:40:26.040 --> 0:40:30.120
<v Speaker 1>of trading. Throughout nine and into two thousand, the company

0:40:30.120 --> 0:40:33.520
<v Speaker 1>expanded into new offices across the world. So why did

0:40:33.560 --> 0:40:37.800
<v Speaker 1>eBay survive the turmoil? Well, according to Whitman, it wasn't

0:40:37.840 --> 0:40:39.880
<v Speaker 1>that they were able to see what was coming and

0:40:39.880 --> 0:40:42.920
<v Speaker 1>then prepare for it. Instead, it was that the company

0:40:42.960 --> 0:40:45.520
<v Speaker 1>wanted to keep a close eye on what customers wanted,

0:40:45.840 --> 0:40:47.759
<v Speaker 1>and they worked hard to make sure that they were

0:40:47.800 --> 0:40:51.680
<v Speaker 1>able to provide it quickly to those customers. Later, in

0:40:51.719 --> 0:40:55.480
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eight, eBay would change dramatically. The company leadership

0:40:55.560 --> 0:40:57.880
<v Speaker 1>was trying to head off this problem of people moving

0:40:57.920 --> 0:41:01.160
<v Speaker 1>away from the site and a decline and online auctions,

0:41:01.640 --> 0:41:04.480
<v Speaker 1>so the company reached out to foreign partnerships with retailers

0:41:04.520 --> 0:41:08.279
<v Speaker 1>and created an online marketplace for those retailers products. Now

0:41:08.320 --> 0:41:11.320
<v Speaker 1>that move upset some longtime eBay users, but it helped

0:41:11.440 --> 0:41:14.560
<v Speaker 1>keep the site solvent. So I think the lesson there

0:41:14.840 --> 0:41:18.120
<v Speaker 1>is sometimes you've got to really explore options you hadn't

0:41:18.200 --> 0:41:22.200
<v Speaker 1>thought of in order to stay in business, and sometimes

0:41:22.280 --> 0:41:25.560
<v Speaker 1>those decisions might be a little unpopular with your customer base.

0:41:26.160 --> 0:41:29.000
<v Speaker 1>So you have to balance that out how much can

0:41:29.080 --> 0:41:32.960
<v Speaker 1>you do to ensure that you stay in business versus

0:41:33.000 --> 0:41:35.440
<v Speaker 1>how much are you going to alienate your customer base?

0:41:35.760 --> 0:41:37.560
<v Speaker 1>Because if you do it too much, then you've shut

0:41:37.600 --> 0:41:40.480
<v Speaker 1>yourself in the foot. So these are some of the

0:41:40.520 --> 0:41:43.520
<v Speaker 1>interesting stories. I mean, Google obviously also survived the dot

0:41:43.560 --> 0:41:47.319
<v Speaker 1>com bubble. Google in those days was already on its

0:41:47.320 --> 0:41:50.040
<v Speaker 1>way to becoming a powerful search engine, but it wouldn't

0:41:50.040 --> 0:41:53.280
<v Speaker 1>be until the early two thousand's that it truly began

0:41:53.440 --> 0:41:56.400
<v Speaker 1>to become a juggernaut. And when it started in the

0:41:56.440 --> 0:41:59.279
<v Speaker 1>mid two thousand's to become a publicly traded company, it

0:41:59.320 --> 0:42:01.640
<v Speaker 1>became a force to be reckoned with. It was almost

0:42:01.760 --> 0:42:04.239
<v Speaker 1>just small enough and nimble enough to survive the dot

0:42:04.239 --> 0:42:09.480
<v Speaker 1>com bubble bursting to get away without being tanked by

0:42:09.480 --> 0:42:12.000
<v Speaker 1>it the way so many other companies were. And there,

0:42:12.040 --> 0:42:14.959
<v Speaker 1>of course tons of other companies that rose and fell

0:42:15.120 --> 0:42:17.400
<v Speaker 1>during this time. I just touched on some of the

0:42:17.400 --> 0:42:20.120
<v Speaker 1>ones that I thought had some of the most interesting stories,

0:42:20.920 --> 0:42:24.080
<v Speaker 1>ones that often are associated with the dot com bubble burst.

0:42:24.120 --> 0:42:27.960
<v Speaker 1>There are others that rose, fell and then re emerged

0:42:28.000 --> 0:42:31.160
<v Speaker 1>as something else, and I didn't include those because in

0:42:31.200 --> 0:42:34.239
<v Speaker 1>some ways I feel like it's just misleading, because the

0:42:34.280 --> 0:42:36.320
<v Speaker 1>company that came out of it on the other side,

0:42:37.040 --> 0:42:39.520
<v Speaker 1>is so different from the company that went into it

0:42:39.920 --> 0:42:42.360
<v Speaker 1>that it's almost like two different entities in the first place.

0:42:43.200 --> 0:42:46.440
<v Speaker 1>But this was fun, uh, you know, it's looking at

0:42:46.480 --> 0:42:49.120
<v Speaker 1>companies that fail can never be fun. But it was

0:42:49.200 --> 0:42:51.759
<v Speaker 1>interesting to go back and look at the past and

0:42:51.840 --> 0:42:57.960
<v Speaker 1>see how these different companies uh grew, how they fell apart,

0:42:58.040 --> 0:43:01.120
<v Speaker 1>and what happened to the people afterward. Because frequently you

0:43:01.200 --> 0:43:03.560
<v Speaker 1>just hear the names of the companies, you don't really

0:43:03.640 --> 0:43:07.600
<v Speaker 1>understand that most in most cases, the people who founded

0:43:07.600 --> 0:43:11.759
<v Speaker 1>those companies are still very influential people, most of whom

0:43:11.800 --> 0:43:14.840
<v Speaker 1>are still in the tech sector. There their leaders of

0:43:14.920 --> 0:43:21.840
<v Speaker 1>various industries, and they continue to provide leadership. In many cases,

0:43:21.880 --> 0:43:24.840
<v Speaker 1>you could argue that they perhaps learned some very valuable

0:43:24.920 --> 0:43:29.760
<v Speaker 1>lessons from the dot com experience, painful lessons, but valuable ones,

0:43:30.400 --> 0:43:32.800
<v Speaker 1>and that as a result they might be better leaders

0:43:32.840 --> 0:43:35.280
<v Speaker 1>today than they would have been had they not gone

0:43:35.320 --> 0:43:37.960
<v Speaker 1>through that experience. It's kind of hard to say. Obviously,

0:43:38.000 --> 0:43:40.759
<v Speaker 1>we only have the one timeline to work with. We

0:43:40.800 --> 0:43:42.879
<v Speaker 1>can't duck our heads in a parallel universe and see

0:43:42.880 --> 0:43:45.719
<v Speaker 1>if it worked out some other way elsewhere. But I

0:43:45.760 --> 0:43:49.400
<v Speaker 1>find it really fascinating to look at these types of companies.

0:43:49.600 --> 0:43:52.120
<v Speaker 1>If there are any in that list that you specifically

0:43:52.120 --> 0:43:55.320
<v Speaker 1>would like to hear a full episode about, maybe a

0:43:55.360 --> 0:43:58.759
<v Speaker 1>deep dive on the history of eBay, for example, let

0:43:58.800 --> 0:44:01.600
<v Speaker 1>me know it's send me a message. The email address

0:44:01.680 --> 0:44:04.400
<v Speaker 1>is tech stuff at how stuff works dot com, or

0:44:04.480 --> 0:44:07.280
<v Speaker 1>draw me a line on Twitter or Facebook the handle

0:44:07.280 --> 0:44:11.120
<v Speaker 1>at both of those tech stuff hs W. Remember I

0:44:11.320 --> 0:44:14.400
<v Speaker 1>stream live when I am podcasting. You can go to

0:44:14.520 --> 0:44:17.520
<v Speaker 1>Twitch dot tv slash tech stuff and you can look

0:44:17.560 --> 0:44:20.239
<v Speaker 1>at the schedule there. Join me when I'm streaming. I'm

0:44:20.239 --> 0:44:22.799
<v Speaker 1>not doing it today, but that's because, as I record this,

0:44:23.000 --> 0:44:27.120
<v Speaker 1>Twitch is actually experiencing technical difficulties. So it's not my

0:44:27.200 --> 0:44:30.319
<v Speaker 1>fault this time. But most Wednesdays and Fridays you'll find

0:44:30.360 --> 0:44:33.239
<v Speaker 1>me streaming live on Twitch dot tv. I'd love for

0:44:33.280 --> 0:44:35.279
<v Speaker 1>you to join me. You can pop in the chat room.

0:44:35.280 --> 0:44:37.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm happy to chat with you guys and learn about

0:44:38.080 --> 0:44:41.080
<v Speaker 1>what you find interesting and what you want to hear about.

0:44:42.080 --> 0:44:45.960
<v Speaker 1>And uh, that's all for today. I'll talk to you

0:44:46.000 --> 0:44:55.719
<v Speaker 1>again really soon for more on this and thousands of

0:44:55.719 --> 0:45:01.439
<v Speaker 1>other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com? Who

0:45:03.239 --> 0:45:03.640
<v Speaker 1>wonder