WEBVTT - Volatility Suppression Turned The Entire Economy Into One Big Carry Trade

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. So, Tracy, one

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<v Speaker 1>of the things that we've been talking about lately, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>and we really sort of drove it home in the

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<v Speaker 1>last episode was this idea of the entire market kind

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<v Speaker 1>of implicitly looking like it's one trade. So many things

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<v Speaker 1>seemed to go up and down together that while you

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<v Speaker 1>sort of think that, okay, investing should be some search

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<v Speaker 1>for interesting individualized opportunities, everything kind of looks like it's

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<v Speaker 1>it all trades is one. Yeah, that's exactly right. And

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<v Speaker 1>I think there's been quite a lot of discussion at

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<v Speaker 1>this point, including on that last episode, about how the

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<v Speaker 1>market is being generally driven by interest rates a k a.

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<v Speaker 1>The central banks. Right, So, the story that multiple multiple

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<v Speaker 1>guests have told us is that, well, we get into

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<v Speaker 1>this situation, you know, which growth is slow, perhaps due

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<v Speaker 1>to income inequality. That means that asset prices rather than

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<v Speaker 1>sort of actual demand, becomes a key vehicle of what

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<v Speaker 1>drives the economy. That means the central bank then is

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<v Speaker 1>ends up becoming more sensitive to asset prices when it

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<v Speaker 1>comes to easing policy. That few further fuels asset values

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<v Speaker 1>that further exacerbates the inequality problem, that further uh causes

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<v Speaker 1>weakness and growth, that further causes the central banks to

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<v Speaker 1>then act, and that we're like in this spiral that

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<v Speaker 1>you know, by some accounts maybe has gone on four decades.

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<v Speaker 1>And if that's the story, then I would say, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>it really feels like COVID right now is sort of

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<v Speaker 1>a accelerant of that whole process. Yeah, I think that's right,

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<v Speaker 1>And I think it gets to a theme that we

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<v Speaker 1>keep coming back to in all these episodes, which is

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<v Speaker 1>if we are slowly recognizing that the financialization of the

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<v Speaker 1>economy is not a good thing and we're trapped in

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<v Speaker 1>this sort of endless cycle, then how do you actually

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<v Speaker 1>break out of it? And we've had so many of

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<v Speaker 1>those discussions now with proposed solutions ranging from fiscal stimulus

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<v Speaker 1>to full employment policies and that sort of thing, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and you know, it sort of gets to this idea

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<v Speaker 1>or it's like, okay, if you know that every time

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<v Speaker 1>there's going to be a crisis, you know, like I

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<v Speaker 1>were saying before the crisis, and this is something that

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<v Speaker 1>you and I talked about a lot and You've written

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<v Speaker 1>about it a lot, the rise of private sector debt,

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<v Speaker 1>particularly corporate debt, share buy backs, corporate leverage, private equity,

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<v Speaker 1>uh leverage, you know, like people like, okay, but this

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<v Speaker 1>is all fine. But if there's a downturn, then this

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<v Speaker 1>all explode. But of course, if the you know, central

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<v Speaker 1>banks expand credit start buying bonds directly, then you can

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<v Speaker 1>have an economic downturn in theory without the financial market exploding.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's kind of what we saw up and in

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<v Speaker 1>March and then through now. Yeah, exactly, And I think,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, this is one of the reasons why we're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about this right. People intuitively feel a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>uncomfortable about the real economy being in a terrible state

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<v Speaker 1>while financial assets are booming. Well, well they mind. Were

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<v Speaker 1>you going to say that they were booming up until

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<v Speaker 1>a few weeks ago, Yeah, I was. I was trying.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm trying to cave it just in case the market

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<v Speaker 1>crashes further over the next few days. Well, we are

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<v Speaker 1>recording this on Thursday, September. I think the episode will

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<v Speaker 1>be out in a week, so who knows. Either we

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<v Speaker 1>may have had a crash since then, or we may

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<v Speaker 1>be back to all time highs on the sp but

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<v Speaker 1>hopefully whichever way it is, or maybe's be flat hope, hopefully,

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<v Speaker 1>whichever way it is, I suspect that the conversation will

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<v Speaker 1>still be will still be useful, still be relevant. I agree,

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<v Speaker 1>I think so. Today we are joined by three guests

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<v Speaker 1>for all the the co authors of a new book.

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<v Speaker 1>It's called The Rise of Ry, The Dangerous Consequences of Volatility,

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<v Speaker 1>Suppression and the New Financial Order of Decaying Growth, Recurring Crisis.

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<v Speaker 1>That that last line, decaying growth and recurring crisis certainly

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<v Speaker 1>feels like a theme. And I'll do a quick bio,

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<v Speaker 1>quick intro of our guests. So we're going to be

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<v Speaker 1>The three authors are Tim Lee is the founder of

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<v Speaker 1>a PI Economics and has a long time study of

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<v Speaker 1>the field. Jamie Lee he worked for Jeremy Grantham, also

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<v Speaker 1>a long time expert, also an environment and environmental research

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<v Speaker 1>and volatility trading. And then Kevin cold Iron, a lecturer

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<v Speaker 1>in financial engineering at you see, Berkeley's host School of Business.

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<v Speaker 1>So we're gonna see how this goes. We're gonna see

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<v Speaker 1>what the Rise of carry is all about. Before we

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<v Speaker 1>bring them in, I was just you know, reading the

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<v Speaker 1>dust jacket again, and the questions at the beginning feel

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<v Speaker 1>like the questions that I really do think are on

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<v Speaker 1>everyone's mind. Why have markets risen and crashed so suspectacularly

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<v Speaker 1>over the past years. Why is the stock market outpacing

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<v Speaker 1>the growth of the economy. Why do companies buy back stocks?

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<v Speaker 1>And this is a really big one. We should probably

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<v Speaker 1>question ourselves this a lot at the media. Why do

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<v Speaker 1>traders take every utterance of central banks is the word

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<v Speaker 1>of God? These are the questions that their book purports

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<v Speaker 1>to answer. So I think if we can answer all

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<v Speaker 1>of these questions in the next thirty minutes on this podcast,

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<v Speaker 1>listeners will have found a lot of value from that.

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<v Speaker 1>So Tim, Jamie and Kevin, thank you uh so much

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<v Speaker 1>for joining us. Thanks for inviting us our pleasure. Thanks. So,

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<v Speaker 1>why do we take central bankers word uh words is

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<v Speaker 1>the voice of God? That's a great question that I

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<v Speaker 1>think sometimes our listeners and viewers of TV, they're like, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>you guys sort of make such a big deal of

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<v Speaker 1>every random utterance from J Powell or regional Fed president.

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<v Speaker 1>What's the deal with that? So we're arguing in the

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<v Speaker 1>book that um, the main transmission of main transmission mechanisms.

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<v Speaker 1>Central bank policy has really been through at least over

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<v Speaker 1>the last years, has really been much more through their

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<v Speaker 1>actions in suppressing financial volatility. And Joey, you've already kind

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<v Speaker 1>of uh said quite a few things that we would

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<v Speaker 1>agree with in the book, that we seem to be

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<v Speaker 1>trapped in this sort of circle vicious cycle of markets

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<v Speaker 1>that rise for long periods, the economy seems to be

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<v Speaker 1>rather asset price dependent, and then you get these crashes

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<v Speaker 1>and central banks are sort of scrambling to support markets

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<v Speaker 1>and when we go into a news cycle, and and

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<v Speaker 1>we're agreeing with that really and and in the book,

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<v Speaker 1>we're sort of saying that is taking us into this

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<v Speaker 1>what we call it a carry regime, whereby markets have

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<v Speaker 1>become increasingly disconnected with the real economy. And I think

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<v Speaker 1>we've seen that kind of spectacularly this year, which is,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, since we since we finished the book. But

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<v Speaker 1>we're we're we're we're saying it's much less to do

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<v Speaker 1>really with the kind of traditional idea that central banks

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<v Speaker 1>are pumping money into the markets and kind of creating

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<v Speaker 1>this surplus of liquidity that can only go into asset markets. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's it's much more to do with the fact that, um,

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<v Speaker 1>we've come into this what we call a carry regime

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<v Speaker 1>where a lot of financial structures, transactions trades across the

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<v Speaker 1>boarder even even including things like private equity, but certainly

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<v Speaker 1>including things like bier and property or various types of

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<v Speaker 1>structured finance currency carry trades, which is where we start

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<v Speaker 1>the board, because that's some more common type of carry trades.

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<v Speaker 1>These kind of these kind of trades, which were essentially

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<v Speaker 1>short volatility trades, have come to have come to dominate

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<v Speaker 1>markets and really be the primary drivers of asset prices,

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<v Speaker 1>even if we don't, you know, see that in an

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<v Speaker 1>obvious way they are. And then so that's associated with

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<v Speaker 1>more debt and more leverage, which kind of requires these

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<v Speaker 1>kind of trades because their liquidity providing and these structures

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<v Speaker 1>they provide liquidity to a system that needs liquidity. But

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<v Speaker 1>at some point you end up there's too much leverage

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<v Speaker 1>and there's too great to disconnect if you like, and

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<v Speaker 1>then you get a rapid crash and central banks step

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<v Speaker 1>in with all the measures that they do which suppress

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<v Speaker 1>volatility again and encourage a renewed growth in those same

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<v Speaker 1>sorts of carry trade. So we're sort of in this

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<v Speaker 1>carry regime where the market has become disconnected from from

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<v Speaker 1>the economy. And we argue further than that that as

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<v Speaker 1>you've already touched on you're you're talking, I think about

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<v Speaker 1>how all asset prices could have become seemed to be

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<v Speaker 1>rather the same thing we say in the book that

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<v Speaker 1>really has changed changed, changing the nature of money itself,

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<v Speaker 1>and that the low levels of volatility of a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of financial assets that should really be considered risky assets

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<v Speaker 1>in a normal world, you know, they're included in ETFs

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<v Speaker 1>and things like that, they suddenly seem to be too

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<v Speaker 1>many people much more money like because the central bank

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<v Speaker 1>is is standing behind in some sense, a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>financial assets of effectively become contingent liabilities of the central bank,

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<v Speaker 1>not just money being a liability. And so um. So

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<v Speaker 1>we've had this, this carry regime has been associated with

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<v Speaker 1>a kind of or the whole range of financial assets

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<v Speaker 1>appearing more money like, and then in the crashes that

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<v Speaker 1>those crashes appear as a kind of complete evaporation of

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<v Speaker 1>liquidity across the board. And I mean that central banks

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<v Speaker 1>feel they have no option but to take even more

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<v Speaker 1>drastic measures than he did the last time. Around. This

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<v Speaker 1>is really interesting, but I mean the argument here is basically,

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<v Speaker 1>as I understand that the growth of carry generates easier

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<v Speaker 1>financial conditions because financial assets become more liquid and more

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<v Speaker 1>credit becomes available. And then when the whole thing starts

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<v Speaker 1>to reverse, you see financial conditions tighten. And that's what

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<v Speaker 1>sparks or what encourages central banks to step in and

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<v Speaker 1>prop up the more ket because they don't want to

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<v Speaker 1>see credit and liquidity drying up for the real economy.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm wondering, could you maybe give us a concrete example

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<v Speaker 1>of how you see a particular carry trade generating liquidity

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<v Speaker 1>and credit in the real economy. It sort of walk

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<v Speaker 1>us through the steps of how you see it working. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so currency carry trades are the most obvious case because

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<v Speaker 1>you're you're the currency carry trader is borrowing in a

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<v Speaker 1>you know, very liquid funding markets. Say, well, in the

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<v Speaker 1>case of the dollar funded carry trade, which has become

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<v Speaker 1>the dominant one at a low interest rate and then

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<v Speaker 1>um providing those funds. In a sense, Turkey would be

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<v Speaker 1>the obvious example now because Turkey is kind of liquidity

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<v Speaker 1>deficient if you like, they've been in a continuing kind

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<v Speaker 1>of rolling crisis. Provides those um that that liquidity too

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<v Speaker 1>to the higher interest rate economy. But I mean we're

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<v Speaker 1>we touch on in the book, how you know, it's

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<v Speaker 1>hard to sustinguish sometimes between liquidity in the sense of

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<v Speaker 1>economists use it and liquidity in the sense that financial

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<v Speaker 1>market participants use it, meaning, um, you know, the ease

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<v Speaker 1>of transacting in a financial asset and carry trades are

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<v Speaker 1>particularly important I think for that latter case. And in

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<v Speaker 1>the book we have quite a lot on volatility selling

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<v Speaker 1>trades in the stock markets, say which which those kind

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<v Speaker 1>of those kind of trades simply a simple one would

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<v Speaker 1>just be writing put options, but or you know, you

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<v Speaker 1>have shorting Vicks futures or a whole variety of ways

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<v Speaker 1>ways that you can short volatility in the stock market.

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<v Speaker 1>They essentially provide or buying the dip, as we say,

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<v Speaker 1>to which their equivalent. They essentially kind of kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like market making trades. They make it easier for level

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<v Speaker 1>traders or those are a bit overexposed to exit the trades.

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<v Speaker 1>And you could say the same. And I'm sitting in

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<v Speaker 1>the UK where you know, by to rent properly or

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<v Speaker 1>by to letters we call it. Here has been such

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<v Speaker 1>a big factor in the property market. Bye, let's investors

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<v Speaker 1>in the property market. That's the carry trade too, because

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<v Speaker 1>they make it easier for properties pople want to sell

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<v Speaker 1>to sell their property. Just zooming bag for one second.

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<v Speaker 1>And for people who maybe aren't familiar with the terminology,

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<v Speaker 1>how would you, to an average person, define what a

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<v Speaker 1>carry trade is? And then you know, I still think

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<v Speaker 1>it's probably not intuitive to people, how to say, buying

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<v Speaker 1>the dip in the stock market is sort of economically

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<v Speaker 1>equivalent to buying a house with the intention of renting

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<v Speaker 1>it out to someone. So explain what carry is, and

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<v Speaker 1>then how sort of you cannot you know, sort of

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<v Speaker 1>the logistics of how that ends up being the same

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<v Speaker 1>the same trade to So one definition we given the book,

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<v Speaker 1>which maybe is a bit out of the ordinary, but

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<v Speaker 1>we think it's quite useful, is that carry trades are

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<v Speaker 1>trades that use liquidity to provide liquidity, and so a

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<v Speaker 1>bye to rent house is a very good example. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>anyone who does bite almost anyone is almost certainly going

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<v Speaker 1>to be taking out a mortgage to do it because

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<v Speaker 1>they're enormous tax bunch doing it, and because how it's

0:13:26.080 --> 0:13:30.240
<v Speaker 1>too expensive to buy without leverage. Now, so you're using leverage,

0:13:30.559 --> 0:13:34.120
<v Speaker 1>but you're doing so to become an active participant who'll

0:13:34.120 --> 0:13:38.160
<v Speaker 1>be alp liquidity to future house trade is as as

0:13:38.200 --> 0:13:41.359
<v Speaker 1>Tim was saying. And and also you know you're converting

0:13:41.440 --> 0:13:44.920
<v Speaker 1>the extremely long duration house into a bunch of one

0:13:44.960 --> 0:13:49.480
<v Speaker 1>months or one year short term the sassets. Either way,

0:13:49.520 --> 0:13:52.520
<v Speaker 1>you're liquefying the market, but in the process of doing so,

0:13:52.559 --> 0:13:55.960
<v Speaker 1>you're taking on liquidity risk yourself. You can even think

0:13:56.000 --> 0:13:59.079
<v Speaker 1>of it in a much more simpler way, where it's

0:13:59.080 --> 0:14:03.000
<v Speaker 1>a trade that makes money when nothing happens. Right. So

0:14:03.040 --> 0:14:05.840
<v Speaker 1>the classic example that we've talked about is, you know,

0:14:05.960 --> 0:14:08.480
<v Speaker 1>you you borrow in the end of finance and position

0:14:08.480 --> 0:14:12.079
<v Speaker 1>in the Australian dollar. That's a positive yield trade if

0:14:12.080 --> 0:14:15.439
<v Speaker 1>the if the currency doesn't change, that that makes money.

0:14:15.800 --> 0:14:18.360
<v Speaker 1>And the same thing of um, you know, if you're

0:14:18.640 --> 0:14:21.440
<v Speaker 1>like an insurance type of trade where you're selling puts

0:14:22.120 --> 0:14:25.960
<v Speaker 1>that has an income, a premium income, and as long

0:14:26.000 --> 0:14:27.920
<v Speaker 1>as the market doesn't change, as long as the world

0:14:28.000 --> 0:14:31.880
<v Speaker 1>stays pretty much the same, you're the trades profitable. So

0:14:32.080 --> 0:14:37.640
<v Speaker 1>carry trades in all forms generate kind of this consistent income.

0:14:37.920 --> 0:14:41.800
<v Speaker 1>And then there's these occasional sharp drawdowns and that that's

0:14:41.840 --> 0:14:45.160
<v Speaker 1>quite important because what we're saying is as these trades

0:14:45.240 --> 0:14:49.000
<v Speaker 1>kind of work their way across the financial system, the

0:14:49.840 --> 0:14:53.920
<v Speaker 1>stock market and the overall economy is starting to basically

0:14:53.960 --> 0:14:56.680
<v Speaker 1>show the same characteristics of carry trades, which are steady

0:14:56.720 --> 0:15:00.600
<v Speaker 1>profits but occasional crashes. So it's no accident and that

0:15:00.680 --> 0:15:03.800
<v Speaker 1>we've had these big crashes over the last you know,

0:15:03.880 --> 0:15:07.760
<v Speaker 1>ten years, it's it's because they the underlying nature of

0:15:07.760 --> 0:15:11.880
<v Speaker 1>the risk is is kind of mirroring carry trades, right,

0:15:11.920 --> 0:15:14.400
<v Speaker 1>so this is kind of the picking up pennies in

0:15:14.600 --> 0:15:18.320
<v Speaker 1>front of a steamroller idea. And the example that jumps

0:15:18.360 --> 0:15:21.080
<v Speaker 1>out to me is what happened in the treasury market

0:15:21.320 --> 0:15:23.200
<v Speaker 1>in March of this year, where we had a bunch

0:15:23.240 --> 0:15:27.120
<v Speaker 1>of hedge funds that were arbitraging these tiny differences between

0:15:27.400 --> 0:15:31.520
<v Speaker 1>cash treasuries and the futures contract for treasuries funded in

0:15:31.680 --> 0:15:35.200
<v Speaker 1>overnight market, so they were basically borrowing liquidity and the

0:15:35.280 --> 0:15:39.040
<v Speaker 1>trade worked really well as long as nothing happened in

0:15:39.080 --> 0:15:41.080
<v Speaker 1>the treasury market. But then in March we got a

0:15:41.120 --> 0:15:44.640
<v Speaker 1>bunch of volatility. Everything went haywire, and some of these

0:15:44.680 --> 0:15:49.040
<v Speaker 1>hedge funds suffered really big losses. If one of the

0:15:49.080 --> 0:15:53.800
<v Speaker 1>hallmarks of carry trades is this idea of steady profits

0:15:53.880 --> 0:15:56.720
<v Speaker 1>and then a big blow up. What does it actually

0:15:56.760 --> 0:16:00.520
<v Speaker 1>mean for investors and players in the mark. It doesn't

0:16:00.520 --> 0:16:03.880
<v Speaker 1>mean that the people who are able to continuously survive

0:16:04.000 --> 0:16:07.360
<v Speaker 1>those blow ups and continuously keep tapping liquidity are going

0:16:07.400 --> 0:16:11.440
<v Speaker 1>to be the ones that that keep going. That's so

0:16:11.480 --> 0:16:14.040
<v Speaker 1>we actually talked about that in the book, and there

0:16:14.160 --> 0:16:17.400
<v Speaker 1>there's some people, I mean, ideally without you know, in

0:16:17.440 --> 0:16:19.840
<v Speaker 1>a kind of totally free market, it would be the

0:16:20.080 --> 0:16:24.240
<v Speaker 1>people with the very strong balance sheets who would um

0:16:24.320 --> 0:16:26.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, be natural providers of carry and some some

0:16:26.960 --> 0:16:31.200
<v Speaker 1>level of carriers important. As Jamie said to liquefy markets.

0:16:31.200 --> 0:16:34.640
<v Speaker 1>Part of what we're arguing is that when central banks,

0:16:34.880 --> 0:16:37.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, because of their role as a lender of

0:16:37.560 --> 0:16:41.720
<v Speaker 1>last resort, come in and truncate volatility, they truncate the

0:16:41.800 --> 0:16:45.640
<v Speaker 1>left hand side of distribution, they truncate losses. That does

0:16:45.640 --> 0:16:49.640
<v Speaker 1>two things. One it you know, kind of makes the

0:16:49.880 --> 0:16:52.960
<v Speaker 1>balance sheet of the people who were natural carry traders

0:16:53.000 --> 0:16:56.680
<v Speaker 1>even stronger, so sort of reinforces their existing advantage and

0:16:56.800 --> 0:16:59.960
<v Speaker 1>to it encourages people who maybe don't have the balot

0:17:00.040 --> 0:17:03.520
<v Speaker 1>cheat like the hedge funds you revenue referenced earlier to

0:17:03.800 --> 0:17:07.040
<v Speaker 1>enter the trade, and therefore the carry regime, as we've

0:17:07.040 --> 0:17:11.680
<v Speaker 1>talked about it expands over time because carrie looks more

0:17:11.720 --> 0:17:14.760
<v Speaker 1>profitable than it probably should have been, given the fact

0:17:14.840 --> 0:17:18.639
<v Speaker 1>that central banks kind of truncated the volatility, they suppressed it,

0:17:18.680 --> 0:17:21.960
<v Speaker 1>they stopped some of the losses. So that's not necessarily

0:17:22.000 --> 0:17:26.520
<v Speaker 1>blaming central banks. They're acting to backstop the markets, but

0:17:26.600 --> 0:17:29.480
<v Speaker 1>that has this kind of quite important second order effect

0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:33.600
<v Speaker 1>of encouraging the growth of carry trades through time. So,

0:17:33.960 --> 0:17:36.320
<v Speaker 1>you know, one of the things that people have pointed out,

0:17:36.680 --> 0:17:39.879
<v Speaker 1>and I think there's a corollary between the sort of

0:17:39.880 --> 0:17:42.480
<v Speaker 1>real economy on the market here, which is that we

0:17:42.560 --> 0:17:45.399
<v Speaker 1>used to have like sort of recessions where there will

0:17:45.400 --> 0:17:47.840
<v Speaker 1>be some inventory cycle and the economy would go in

0:17:47.840 --> 0:17:51.600
<v Speaker 1>a downturn, and then companies would maybe layoff workers and

0:17:51.720 --> 0:17:55.320
<v Speaker 1>celter their recessions, celter their inventory, and then over time

0:17:55.920 --> 0:17:57.399
<v Speaker 1>maybe they would need to build it back and re

0:17:57.480 --> 0:17:59.439
<v Speaker 1>higher workers than we'd come out of our recession. And

0:17:59.480 --> 0:18:02.320
<v Speaker 1>we also use to have bear markets where maybe the

0:18:02.359 --> 0:18:04.720
<v Speaker 1>market we just traded sideways or down for a few

0:18:04.800 --> 0:18:07.199
<v Speaker 1>years and then there will be some new regime. And

0:18:07.240 --> 0:18:10.480
<v Speaker 1>it feels like maybe since like two thousand one or so,

0:18:10.600 --> 0:18:13.280
<v Speaker 1>in the last few downturns, we don't really seem to

0:18:13.280 --> 0:18:16.919
<v Speaker 1>have recessions or arguably even bear markets anymore. We just

0:18:16.920 --> 0:18:20.199
<v Speaker 1>seem to have crashes. And I'm curious if sort of

0:18:20.200 --> 0:18:24.480
<v Speaker 1>what we saw with the Great Financial Crisis and then uh,

0:18:24.480 --> 0:18:26.920
<v Speaker 1>sort of what we saw very briefly is sort of

0:18:27.119 --> 0:18:29.399
<v Speaker 1>the new model as long as we're in this regime,

0:18:29.440 --> 0:18:32.440
<v Speaker 1>that we don't have these sort of slow rolling downturns,

0:18:32.800 --> 0:18:35.240
<v Speaker 1>it's just a crash because the moment the income starts

0:18:35.240 --> 0:18:38.480
<v Speaker 1>to dry up, at the moment the asset prices start

0:18:38.560 --> 0:18:42.520
<v Speaker 1>to go down, everything on ravels until very very quickly

0:18:42.640 --> 0:18:45.600
<v Speaker 1>under the carry regime, until the sort of central bank

0:18:45.640 --> 0:18:48.960
<v Speaker 1>steps in. Yeah, I mean, that's that's what we're saying.

0:18:48.960 --> 0:18:50.959
<v Speaker 1>I think perhaps the point we haven't emphasized enough so

0:18:51.000 --> 0:18:54.560
<v Speaker 1>far is that the way we define carry trades in

0:18:54.560 --> 0:18:57.119
<v Speaker 1>the book is that the liquidity providing, as we said that,

0:18:57.520 --> 0:19:00.600
<v Speaker 1>but also the level they're always leveled. You know, they

0:19:00.680 --> 0:19:03.440
<v Speaker 1>involve leverage. If they don't involve leverage, they're not already

0:19:03.480 --> 0:19:06.520
<v Speaker 1>carry trades under our definition, and they have that this

0:19:07.400 --> 0:19:10.160
<v Speaker 1>they they kind of make money if nothing changes, If nothing.

0:19:10.200 --> 0:19:11.560
<v Speaker 1>You know, if you don't have a lot of volatility,

0:19:11.640 --> 0:19:13.280
<v Speaker 1>you don't have a problem. They make money, then you

0:19:13.320 --> 0:19:15.720
<v Speaker 1>do have a problem they suddenly lose, and I think

0:19:15.720 --> 0:19:18.520
<v Speaker 1>they also carry trade also always has a kind of

0:19:18.520 --> 0:19:21.040
<v Speaker 1>target asset at the back of it, a currency carry trade. Obviously,

0:19:21.040 --> 0:19:22.760
<v Speaker 1>if you kind of borrow U S dollars now and

0:19:23.000 --> 0:19:25.080
<v Speaker 1>put it into a Turkish mirror bond or something, your

0:19:25.119 --> 0:19:28.639
<v Speaker 1>target assets are Turkish lirror and and and the bond.

0:19:29.040 --> 0:19:31.200
<v Speaker 1>And you're saying, you know, by to buy to let

0:19:31.200 --> 0:19:34.159
<v Speaker 1>property I was talking about earlier here, although they're aimed

0:19:34.600 --> 0:19:39.600
<v Speaker 1>um ostensibly at at extracting income the yield pick up

0:19:39.680 --> 0:19:43.240
<v Speaker 1>or the premium for the volatility short you know, writing

0:19:43.280 --> 0:19:45.440
<v Speaker 1>insurance to also is another form of carry trading, and

0:19:45.760 --> 0:19:47.760
<v Speaker 1>credited fault swaps. These kinds of things your ain't your

0:19:48.040 --> 0:19:50.000
<v Speaker 1>The primary aim is to pick up the income, but

0:19:50.720 --> 0:19:53.280
<v Speaker 1>the the if there's an effect on the asset price

0:19:53.320 --> 0:19:58.240
<v Speaker 1>which which will rise generally, and then the rise in

0:19:58.280 --> 0:20:04.040
<v Speaker 1>the asset price creates as an economist I would call imbalances.

0:20:04.160 --> 0:20:06.439
<v Speaker 1>You know, Turkey was a very good example of that,

0:20:06.480 --> 0:20:09.119
<v Speaker 1>which we discussed in the book, where you have capital

0:20:09.119 --> 0:20:12.280
<v Speaker 1>flows going into Turkey that were lever to some extent,

0:20:12.480 --> 0:20:16.440
<v Speaker 1>and often those were actually Turkish entities, you know, Turkish

0:20:16.520 --> 0:20:21.760
<v Speaker 1>businesses borrowing dollars overseas to invest locally rather than hedge

0:20:21.760 --> 0:20:24.840
<v Speaker 1>funds or something. But that made the Turkish leery become

0:20:24.880 --> 0:20:27.480
<v Speaker 1>progressively overvalued over time, and so Turkey had a huge

0:20:27.480 --> 0:20:29.800
<v Speaker 1>current account deficit when you have a debt. Once you

0:20:29.800 --> 0:20:33.480
<v Speaker 1>have that deficit between spending and income, you need continued

0:20:33.560 --> 0:20:36.600
<v Speaker 1>carry trades to keep the whole thing going. So you

0:20:36.640 --> 0:20:41.119
<v Speaker 1>get the double effect of imbalances very often and also

0:20:41.200 --> 0:20:44.440
<v Speaker 1>the growth in leverage, and at some point that becomes unsustainable,

0:20:44.960 --> 0:20:46.840
<v Speaker 1>and then you get the you know what you might

0:20:46.880 --> 0:20:50.360
<v Speaker 1>call the margin call effect. That, yeah, the as Tracey said,

0:20:50.359 --> 0:20:52.520
<v Speaker 1>picking up pennies in front of steam rollers. The steamroller

0:20:52.640 --> 0:20:54.760
<v Speaker 1>arrives and everyone has to get out at the same time.

0:20:54.800 --> 0:20:57.880
<v Speaker 1>And as we you know, we we try to explain

0:20:57.920 --> 0:21:02.320
<v Speaker 1>that the liquefying nature of carry trade. When when you

0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:06.960
<v Speaker 1>get that the crash, it means liquidity evaporates, and as

0:21:07.000 --> 0:21:10.400
<v Speaker 1>surprises crash liquidity evaporates, all asset prices seem to become

0:21:10.440 --> 0:21:12.600
<v Speaker 1>highly correlated. They all seem to become the same thing.

0:21:13.240 --> 0:21:16.840
<v Speaker 1>And because the economy, the U s economy particularly, but

0:21:17.080 --> 0:21:20.160
<v Speaker 1>British economy, other economies to have become very as surprise dependent.

0:21:20.280 --> 0:21:23.960
<v Speaker 1>You then end up with an economic crash. Two. That's

0:21:24.240 --> 0:21:26.600
<v Speaker 1>what we argue that, And I think Kevin said that

0:21:26.600 --> 0:21:29.879
<v Speaker 1>that the pattern of the economy has become like the

0:21:29.960 --> 0:21:32.720
<v Speaker 1>pattern of the classic carry trade pattern of the saw

0:21:32.760 --> 0:21:37.520
<v Speaker 1>tooth pattern of the steady rise and then the sudden crash.

0:21:37.680 --> 0:21:41.360
<v Speaker 1>But over time it's still being profitable, partly because central

0:21:41.359 --> 0:21:46.240
<v Speaker 1>banks have you know, truncated the crashes, and so carry

0:21:46.280 --> 0:21:49.800
<v Speaker 1>traders over time have the crash wipes out quite a

0:21:49.800 --> 0:21:52.320
<v Speaker 1>few carry traders, but central banks rescue a lot of them,

0:21:52.359 --> 0:21:57.080
<v Speaker 1>and particularly the big guys, and they make money over time.

0:21:57.119 --> 0:22:00.399
<v Speaker 1>But there's also an awareness of the risk. So you

0:22:00.520 --> 0:22:03.320
<v Speaker 1>kind of get that's the the carry trade itself becomes

0:22:03.320 --> 0:22:06.879
<v Speaker 1>sort of higher risk and high return because the carry trader,

0:22:08.359 --> 0:22:13.919
<v Speaker 1>a carry trader not only provides liquidity is levied and

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:16.520
<v Speaker 1>provides liquidity, but the carry trader has to accept the

0:22:16.520 --> 0:22:20.080
<v Speaker 1>crash risk to some degree and and relies ultimately on

0:22:20.119 --> 0:22:39.480
<v Speaker 1>the central banks. So I want to ask, I guess

0:22:39.800 --> 0:22:42.680
<v Speaker 1>the big question, which we already touched upon in the intro,

0:22:42.960 --> 0:22:46.880
<v Speaker 1>but if we recognize that we are in this cycle,

0:22:47.560 --> 0:22:49.399
<v Speaker 1>then how do we break out of it? How do

0:22:49.440 --> 0:22:52.720
<v Speaker 1>you actually break out of the carry regime, given that

0:22:52.800 --> 0:22:55.160
<v Speaker 1>it's gone on for quite some time at this point,

0:22:55.640 --> 0:22:59.840
<v Speaker 1>and if anything seems to be intensifying in We're a

0:22:59.840 --> 0:23:05.600
<v Speaker 1>bit pessimistic in the book, Really we needed we We

0:23:05.720 --> 0:23:08.440
<v Speaker 1>kind of suggest at the end that maybe we've gone,

0:23:08.600 --> 0:23:10.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, we've gone past the point of no return,

0:23:10.680 --> 0:23:15.520
<v Speaker 1>and unultimately we will see the demese of central banking

0:23:15.520 --> 0:23:17.879
<v Speaker 1>in one way or another, either a crash that cannot

0:23:17.880 --> 0:23:20.000
<v Speaker 1>be contained like sort of two thousand and eight, but

0:23:20.119 --> 0:23:24.280
<v Speaker 1>even worse, or m m T type measures which perhaps

0:23:24.320 --> 0:23:26.920
<v Speaker 1>we could argue have already been happening, that that will

0:23:27.000 --> 0:23:29.719
<v Speaker 1>ultimately create a lot of inflation and lead to the

0:23:29.800 --> 0:23:32.800
<v Speaker 1>kind of demise of feat money and then and then

0:23:32.800 --> 0:23:37.479
<v Speaker 1>the appearance of alternative forms of money. And you know,

0:23:38.040 --> 0:23:41.080
<v Speaker 1>perhaps some people point to cryptocurrencies, where we argue that

0:23:41.280 --> 0:23:43.639
<v Speaker 1>current cryptocurrencies, we only touch on them briefly and not

0:23:43.720 --> 0:23:48.400
<v Speaker 1>really not really kind of legitimate enough perhaps to become

0:23:48.400 --> 0:23:50.679
<v Speaker 1>a new form of money now, but something similar or

0:23:50.840 --> 0:23:53.000
<v Speaker 1>some improved form could become a new form of money.

0:23:53.040 --> 0:23:55.159
<v Speaker 1>So we could just be going to we may not

0:23:55.280 --> 0:23:57.520
<v Speaker 1>there may not be a solution other than the end

0:23:57.760 --> 0:24:01.320
<v Speaker 1>of the monetary regime that we've become used to just

0:24:01.520 --> 0:24:04.399
<v Speaker 1>on the mm T think we've been as we've been

0:24:04.440 --> 0:24:07.879
<v Speaker 1>seeing obviously massive deficits and a lot of inflation bears,

0:24:07.920 --> 0:24:10.440
<v Speaker 1>at least in market commentary, if not in the markets themselves.

0:24:11.000 --> 0:24:14.080
<v Speaker 1>We you know, we explicitly identify the carry regime with

0:24:14.200 --> 0:24:18.919
<v Speaker 1>deflationary pressure for various reasons. But the one I like

0:24:19.040 --> 0:24:22.919
<v Speaker 1>post is to do with the linking of options selling

0:24:22.960 --> 0:24:26.560
<v Speaker 1>strategies and market making as the kind of basic form

0:24:26.600 --> 0:24:29.080
<v Speaker 1>of carrying. You know, the world in which which was

0:24:29.119 --> 0:24:31.639
<v Speaker 1>inflating very heavily is a world in which there's tons

0:24:31.640 --> 0:24:34.320
<v Speaker 1>of cash on the sidelines, and in which people are

0:24:34.320 --> 0:24:36.280
<v Speaker 1>willing to sit on the bidding ask and willing to

0:24:36.320 --> 0:24:38.560
<v Speaker 1>sell options for free or less than free. So in

0:24:38.560 --> 0:24:42.639
<v Speaker 1>in and in a highly inflationary world, volatility buyers rather

0:24:42.640 --> 0:24:46.000
<v Speaker 1>than sellers will systematically make money. And of course perhaps

0:24:46.040 --> 0:24:48.040
<v Speaker 1>we've already been seeing over the last couple of years.

0:24:48.440 --> 0:24:51.320
<v Speaker 1>So talk a little bit about this further. Let's say,

0:24:51.400 --> 0:24:55.520
<v Speaker 1>from the perspective of a financial professional or someone who's

0:24:55.560 --> 0:24:59.320
<v Speaker 1>a trader, how has the rise of the carry regime

0:25:00.200 --> 0:25:04.040
<v Speaker 1>just changed, say to the day to day nature of

0:25:04.080 --> 0:25:07.400
<v Speaker 1>the job of an investor of a trader. Um, how

0:25:07.520 --> 0:25:10.240
<v Speaker 1>is this sort of this the way this is version

0:25:10.359 --> 0:25:14.120
<v Speaker 1>sort of essentially changed the way people have to approach

0:25:14.160 --> 0:25:18.400
<v Speaker 1>their roles. One thing, it's done and I actually want

0:25:18.480 --> 0:25:20.560
<v Speaker 1>this kind of goes back to a question that Tracy

0:25:20.600 --> 0:25:24.040
<v Speaker 1>asked earlier, like what are the implications for investors. It's

0:25:24.119 --> 0:25:28.200
<v Speaker 1>made it very clear that there's much more skewness and

0:25:28.359 --> 0:25:32.879
<v Speaker 1>asset prices, asset returns and than people expected. So and

0:25:32.920 --> 0:25:35.439
<v Speaker 1>there's what we're saying in the book is there's compensation

0:25:35.520 --> 0:25:38.320
<v Speaker 1>for that skewness. That skewness risk is compensated. So one

0:25:38.359 --> 0:25:42.400
<v Speaker 1>of the reasons the SMP has UM done so well

0:25:42.680 --> 0:25:44.919
<v Speaker 1>is that you're you're kind of collecting some of this

0:25:45.520 --> 0:25:48.440
<v Speaker 1>liquidity premium that's built into it, but at the same

0:25:48.480 --> 0:25:52.840
<v Speaker 1>time you have to accept this uh skewness risk. And

0:25:53.160 --> 0:25:56.600
<v Speaker 1>UM that probably should mean that people allocate less to

0:25:56.760 --> 0:26:00.480
<v Speaker 1>the SMP five they kind of normally would so that

0:26:00.520 --> 0:26:03.760
<v Speaker 1>they can survive. I think it's also increased the demand

0:26:03.800 --> 0:26:06.600
<v Speaker 1>for protection, which is why the skew and options prices

0:26:06.720 --> 0:26:11.840
<v Speaker 1>is has gotten more extreme over time. UM and again

0:26:11.880 --> 0:26:14.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, like I I ran a you know, a

0:26:14.359 --> 0:26:18.520
<v Speaker 1>levered hedge fund strategy for many years, and and that

0:26:18.520 --> 0:26:21.360
<v Speaker 1>that skewness and that liquidity risk should mean that kind

0:26:21.400 --> 0:26:24.240
<v Speaker 1>of overall leverage levels you know, should be lower. But

0:26:24.359 --> 0:26:26.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't actually think that that's happened. I think people

0:26:26.760 --> 0:26:31.040
<v Speaker 1>have just relied more on kind of dynamically managing their

0:26:31.119 --> 0:26:35.919
<v Speaker 1>risk and portfolios, which kind of actually reinforces the demand

0:26:35.960 --> 0:26:40.280
<v Speaker 1>on the other side for liquidity provision. So I think

0:26:40.359 --> 0:26:43.360
<v Speaker 1>that that's why you get these much more sudden drawdowns

0:26:43.400 --> 0:26:46.280
<v Speaker 1>in hedge fund strategies than we saw before. So instead

0:26:46.320 --> 0:26:50.720
<v Speaker 1>of running and kind of structurally lower leverage, they're managing

0:26:50.720 --> 0:26:56.080
<v Speaker 1>their leverage um much more aggressively day to day um,

0:26:56.119 --> 0:26:58.120
<v Speaker 1>which puts more prices on the on the people who

0:26:58.119 --> 0:27:00.680
<v Speaker 1>are on the other side of that trade, or pressure

0:27:00.680 --> 0:27:03.040
<v Speaker 1>on people on the other side that tally. So I

0:27:03.080 --> 0:27:06.120
<v Speaker 1>forget which one of you mentioned it before, but it's

0:27:06.160 --> 0:27:09.680
<v Speaker 1>sort of a common dictum and market that in crisis

0:27:09.800 --> 0:27:13.560
<v Speaker 1>all correlations go to one. Things are bad, you gotta

0:27:13.600 --> 0:27:16.160
<v Speaker 1>sell everything, whether it's the chair that you're sitting on,

0:27:16.280 --> 0:27:18.879
<v Speaker 1>or stock or a bond or whatever. Are we in

0:27:18.920 --> 0:27:21.520
<v Speaker 1>the in the carrier regime are we seeing the same

0:27:21.560 --> 0:27:25.080
<v Speaker 1>thing apply except to booms, where essentially in the good

0:27:25.119 --> 0:27:28.120
<v Speaker 1>times all correlations go to one in the same way,

0:27:28.160 --> 0:27:31.520
<v Speaker 1>in a way that wasn't really the case in previous

0:27:31.600 --> 0:27:35.439
<v Speaker 1>up cycles. You know, the part of the suppression of volatility.

0:27:35.600 --> 0:27:39.920
<v Speaker 1>We're arguing that central bank suppressing volatility is ultimate driving

0:27:39.960 --> 0:27:42.840
<v Speaker 1>force of some of these increasingly strange features. Were saying,

0:27:43.359 --> 0:27:45.320
<v Speaker 1>but one of the ways in which you can get

0:27:45.880 --> 0:27:48.879
<v Speaker 1>kind of market wide volatility down is by increasing dispersion,

0:27:49.560 --> 0:27:53.000
<v Speaker 1>by by decreasing correlation. It should be the case that

0:27:53.119 --> 0:27:56.280
<v Speaker 1>the boom periods of extremely low volatility are marked by

0:27:56.520 --> 0:28:00.879
<v Speaker 1>relatively low correlation most of the times. So I have

0:28:00.960 --> 0:28:03.800
<v Speaker 1>a weird question. But every once in a while I

0:28:03.840 --> 0:28:08.639
<v Speaker 1>see analysts make the connection between suppressed volatility in markets

0:28:08.760 --> 0:28:15.679
<v Speaker 1>and social instability or discontent in wider society. So this

0:28:15.760 --> 0:28:19.080
<v Speaker 1>idea of chaos and populist anger and things like that.

0:28:19.800 --> 0:28:21.600
<v Speaker 1>And I think it was a week or two ago

0:28:21.680 --> 0:28:24.800
<v Speaker 1>there was a Deutsche Bank note where they touched on

0:28:24.800 --> 0:28:27.720
<v Speaker 1>this topic, and I actually have it in front of

0:28:27.720 --> 0:28:30.200
<v Speaker 1>me because I thought it was relevant to this conversation.

0:28:30.840 --> 0:28:34.880
<v Speaker 1>They wrote that quote, asset price volatility is a powerful

0:28:35.000 --> 0:28:37.600
<v Speaker 1>energy and when it is suppressed in the market due

0:28:37.600 --> 0:28:40.280
<v Speaker 1>to central bank liquidity or buy backs, it needs to

0:28:40.320 --> 0:28:43.160
<v Speaker 1>find a home, and that can be outside the market

0:28:43.240 --> 0:28:47.800
<v Speaker 1>in society, especially in a very inequitable society. The vicious

0:28:47.840 --> 0:28:51.440
<v Speaker 1>loot can then turn back into asset prices. So I

0:28:51.480 --> 0:28:53.400
<v Speaker 1>remember when that note out, quite a few people were

0:28:53.400 --> 0:28:55.960
<v Speaker 1>making fun of it, saying it's crazy how central banks

0:28:55.960 --> 0:29:00.960
<v Speaker 1>get blamed for everything nowadays, even populous content and things

0:29:01.000 --> 0:29:04.000
<v Speaker 1>like that. But I'd be curious to get your take

0:29:04.120 --> 0:29:08.440
<v Speaker 1>on this. Can the suppression of volatility in financial markets

0:29:08.440 --> 0:29:12.200
<v Speaker 1>and financial asset prices have an impact not just on

0:29:12.240 --> 0:29:16.320
<v Speaker 1>the broader economy but society as a whole. Yeah, well,

0:29:16.320 --> 0:29:17.880
<v Speaker 1>maybe I'll start on that. I think we probably could

0:29:17.880 --> 0:29:19.479
<v Speaker 1>all speak on that, But I mean we we very

0:29:19.520 --> 0:29:21.200
<v Speaker 1>much say that in the book. I mean, the last

0:29:21.200 --> 0:29:24.600
<v Speaker 1>part of the book is on that on that topic,

0:29:25.160 --> 0:29:29.400
<v Speaker 1>we were very much in agreement with that that this

0:29:29.600 --> 0:29:35.440
<v Speaker 1>whole we call carry regime, that um that we that

0:29:35.440 --> 0:29:42.280
<v Speaker 1>we're describing is associated with rising inequality and deteriorating real growth.

0:29:42.360 --> 0:29:45.880
<v Speaker 1>So the wealthy benefit of the expense of those those

0:29:45.920 --> 0:29:50.680
<v Speaker 1>who are not and um that does translate into we

0:29:51.040 --> 0:29:52.680
<v Speaker 1>say in the book, I think at the very beginning

0:29:52.760 --> 0:29:57.240
<v Speaker 1>undermining the social fabric, you know. But the question is

0:29:58.040 --> 0:30:01.000
<v Speaker 1>we do we do lean towards blay central banks, But

0:30:01.480 --> 0:30:05.720
<v Speaker 1>we rather say that in some sense, it's really all

0:30:05.760 --> 0:30:09.880
<v Speaker 1>about the structure of power in society, and central banks

0:30:10.240 --> 0:30:12.880
<v Speaker 1>put it. To put it in its simplest forms, central

0:30:12.880 --> 0:30:17.160
<v Speaker 1>banks are really agents of that structure of power. So

0:30:17.200 --> 0:30:21.840
<v Speaker 1>we are we are height say, but we are basically

0:30:21.880 --> 0:30:24.240
<v Speaker 1>saying that central banks put it very bluntly. May think

0:30:24.240 --> 0:30:28.040
<v Speaker 1>they're acting on behalf of America or Britain or wherever

0:30:28.080 --> 0:30:29.920
<v Speaker 1>they are, but they're really not. They're acting on behalf

0:30:29.920 --> 0:30:33.000
<v Speaker 1>of the wealthy and the powerful and the influential. It's

0:30:33.040 --> 0:30:35.880
<v Speaker 1>curious we think that the carriage and yeah, it's inherently

0:30:35.960 --> 0:30:39.800
<v Speaker 1>inequalizing because the wealthy benefit from it much much more.

0:30:39.840 --> 0:30:42.520
<v Speaker 1>They have the balance sheets which enable them do things

0:30:42.560 --> 0:30:46.600
<v Speaker 1>like I buy to let roperties or short volatility, you know,

0:30:47.120 --> 0:30:50.000
<v Speaker 1>just one last thing or what one last sort of

0:30:50.200 --> 0:30:52.600
<v Speaker 1>thought I have that I'm curious about. It's sort of

0:30:52.680 --> 0:30:55.520
<v Speaker 1>when I listened to this discussion, particularly when people think

0:30:55.520 --> 0:31:00.640
<v Speaker 1>about housing, or when people think about say, make buying, uh,

0:31:00.800 --> 0:31:03.680
<v Speaker 1>the dip and the stock market. People don't think of

0:31:03.720 --> 0:31:07.080
<v Speaker 1>themselves as like participating in a carry trade per se.

0:31:07.120 --> 0:31:10.080
<v Speaker 1>They don't think of themselves as doing the same thing

0:31:10.320 --> 0:31:14.240
<v Speaker 1>as say someone borrowing in and investing in Turkish lyraor

0:31:14.320 --> 0:31:17.239
<v Speaker 1>or Australian dollars. And sort of I'm curious off, like,

0:31:17.280 --> 0:31:19.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, thinking about like the millions of sort of

0:31:19.800 --> 0:31:23.040
<v Speaker 1>unwilling or or carry traders that don't know it in

0:31:23.080 --> 0:31:26.160
<v Speaker 1>the way like to the degree to which asset prices

0:31:26.680 --> 0:31:31.000
<v Speaker 1>become a societal value, because so many people livelihoods and

0:31:31.040 --> 0:31:36.160
<v Speaker 1>lives essentially become more tied to asset values than um

0:31:36.360 --> 0:31:40.840
<v Speaker 1>than their income. Yeah, exactly, And we try to towards

0:31:40.880 --> 0:31:44.040
<v Speaker 1>the end of the book also we try to discuss

0:31:44.120 --> 0:31:47.840
<v Speaker 1>that kind of the the kind of evolutionary aspects, if

0:31:47.840 --> 0:31:50.080
<v Speaker 1>you like, in a financial sense of the carry regime,

0:31:50.160 --> 0:31:53.120
<v Speaker 1>the fact that it's sort of change the way that

0:31:53.280 --> 0:31:55.240
<v Speaker 1>really people think a little bit, if you you know,

0:31:55.320 --> 0:31:59.200
<v Speaker 1>compared to say forty years ago that we've become used

0:31:59.240 --> 0:32:02.720
<v Speaker 1>to um, you know, particularly here in the UK again,

0:32:02.720 --> 0:32:04.480
<v Speaker 1>we're by to let property such a big thing. By

0:32:04.520 --> 0:32:07.040
<v Speaker 1>to rent property is such a big thing. People assume

0:32:07.120 --> 0:32:09.280
<v Speaker 1>their house prices will always be rising over time, and

0:32:09.320 --> 0:32:12.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, you they don't really, they don't see themselves

0:32:12.120 --> 0:32:14.800
<v Speaker 1>as being doing a similar thing to people who write

0:32:14.840 --> 0:32:18.280
<v Speaker 1>put options or or or do things in you know,

0:32:18.320 --> 0:32:20.400
<v Speaker 1>the credit default swap market or something they don't, but

0:32:21.120 --> 0:32:24.800
<v Speaker 1>it's it's and and we we argued that really the

0:32:24.840 --> 0:32:28.120
<v Speaker 1>way that even financial analysts or those involved in in

0:32:28.280 --> 0:32:31.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, the financial industry think has been changed because

0:32:31.600 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 1>this is changed to kind of accommodate this idea of

0:32:36.480 --> 0:32:39.840
<v Speaker 1>the Carrey regime becoming the sort of normal and the

0:32:39.880 --> 0:32:42.240
<v Speaker 1>way things are the sort of the norm. I think

0:32:42.280 --> 0:32:45.400
<v Speaker 1>that we see that in you know, a much greater

0:32:45.920 --> 0:32:49.800
<v Speaker 1>acceptance in the conventional wisdom in financial markets, you know,

0:32:50.160 --> 0:32:53.680
<v Speaker 1>much greater acceptance of large scale intervention than there would

0:32:53.720 --> 0:32:56.200
<v Speaker 1>have been, you know, thirty forty years ago. I mean,

0:32:56.240 --> 0:32:58.480
<v Speaker 1>I remember very well when I and my formative period

0:32:58.480 --> 0:33:01.200
<v Speaker 1>of the nineteen eight is when the dollar at the

0:33:01.200 --> 0:33:03.480
<v Speaker 1>beginning beginning of the nine, when the dollar was in

0:33:03.480 --> 0:33:06.040
<v Speaker 1>a big bubble, you know, the dollar was getting overly strong,

0:33:06.520 --> 0:33:09.200
<v Speaker 1>and the Bunder's bank, uh, you know, try to do

0:33:09.240 --> 0:33:11.560
<v Speaker 1>a bit of intervention. And I was kind of learning

0:33:11.560 --> 0:33:15.400
<v Speaker 1>the learning at that at that time, and people, I think,

0:33:15.440 --> 0:33:17.200
<v Speaker 1>I think they were kind of intervening in a scale

0:33:17.280 --> 0:33:19.120
<v Speaker 1>like two to three billion and it seemed a lot,

0:33:19.200 --> 0:33:21.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, and I remember being told by my mentors that,

0:33:21.880 --> 0:33:24.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's hopeless. They can't defeat the market. The

0:33:24.040 --> 0:33:26.480
<v Speaker 1>markets are much more powerful than any central bank. But

0:33:26.600 --> 0:33:29.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, people then we're thinking in terms of central banks, yeah,

0:33:29.800 --> 0:33:32.400
<v Speaker 1>being a little part of the market and being kind

0:33:32.400 --> 0:33:34.880
<v Speaker 1>of trivial, trivial in that respect in the in the

0:33:35.160 --> 0:33:38.280
<v Speaker 1>bigger picture, now there's a kind of the conventional wisdom

0:33:38.320 --> 0:33:40.880
<v Speaker 1>is really that central banks pretty much control the market

0:33:40.920 --> 0:33:44.240
<v Speaker 1>if they want to. It's very very different mindset that

0:33:44.360 --> 0:33:47.800
<v Speaker 1>people who are involved in markets. Oh, I would say

0:33:47.800 --> 0:33:53.040
<v Speaker 1>beyond that and generally have um And I think that

0:33:53.200 --> 0:33:56.360
<v Speaker 1>is that this kind of this rise that you know

0:33:56.480 --> 0:33:58.480
<v Speaker 1>the books called the rise of carry, is the rise

0:33:58.520 --> 0:34:00.720
<v Speaker 1>of carry has changed the way that people think without

0:34:00.760 --> 0:34:03.520
<v Speaker 1>people even realizing it, and it goes beyond financial markets.

0:34:03.560 --> 0:34:05.440
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's a big part of what we're trying

0:34:05.440 --> 0:34:08.360
<v Speaker 1>to say at the end of the book. To step

0:34:08.360 --> 0:34:10.279
<v Speaker 1>back a little, I mean, obviously the world is a

0:34:10.280 --> 0:34:12.160
<v Speaker 1>lot older than before, at least in the West. There

0:34:12.160 --> 0:34:14.480
<v Speaker 1>are a lot more people who are at retirement or

0:34:14.520 --> 0:34:18.320
<v Speaker 1>near retirement and dependent on the assets or the living

0:34:18.600 --> 0:34:21.600
<v Speaker 1>than they ever have been in the past Joe. If

0:34:21.600 --> 0:34:24.319
<v Speaker 1>you're if you're looking for a an example of just

0:34:24.400 --> 0:34:28.680
<v Speaker 1>how far buying the dip is spread. I was, I've

0:34:28.680 --> 0:34:30.920
<v Speaker 1>got a sixteen year old son, and a couple of

0:34:30.920 --> 0:34:33.160
<v Speaker 1>months ago, it's eleven at night to go into his room.

0:34:33.239 --> 0:34:35.520
<v Speaker 1>I say, you know, time to go to bed, and

0:34:35.520 --> 0:34:37.560
<v Speaker 1>he said, well, just one second, I gotta put my

0:34:37.600 --> 0:34:40.600
<v Speaker 1>limit orders in for tomorrow morning. And I was like,

0:34:41.040 --> 0:34:44.359
<v Speaker 1>you're what he said, yeah, limit orders. You I've got

0:34:44.360 --> 0:34:47.239
<v Speaker 1>a couple of core positions, but you know, um, if

0:34:47.239 --> 0:34:49.279
<v Speaker 1>they fall a couple of percent, I'd buy the dip.

0:34:49.960 --> 0:34:52.680
<v Speaker 1>And you know, I've never told him that where he

0:34:53.400 --> 0:34:56.040
<v Speaker 1>figured it out, you know, buying the dip. You asked

0:34:56.120 --> 0:34:58.200
<v Speaker 1>this earlier. And you know, if I've got a lever

0:34:58.360 --> 0:35:02.600
<v Speaker 1>position in the market right and the market falls, then um,

0:35:02.640 --> 0:35:06.080
<v Speaker 1>I need to adjust my position or else, Um, you know,

0:35:06.120 --> 0:35:09.120
<v Speaker 1>my leverage gets away from me. So people who are

0:35:09.160 --> 0:35:13.719
<v Speaker 1>buying the dip, they're providing liquidity to to leverage traders.

0:35:13.840 --> 0:35:16.239
<v Speaker 1>And so that that's why we draw the equivalence of

0:35:16.880 --> 0:35:19.640
<v Speaker 1>buying the dip as as being like a you know,

0:35:19.719 --> 0:35:22.200
<v Speaker 1>capturing some of the short volatility premium, being like a

0:35:22.280 --> 0:35:27.759
<v Speaker 1>Carrie trade by delta hedging arguments. We argue that you know,

0:35:27.760 --> 0:35:30.759
<v Speaker 1>whole forms, whether you're short fixed futures, short options, or

0:35:31.080 --> 0:35:33.759
<v Speaker 1>even yes, just physically say buying the SMP every time

0:35:33.840 --> 0:35:36.160
<v Speaker 1>is down over the last twenty four hours. All of

0:35:36.200 --> 0:35:41.120
<v Speaker 1>these trades are highly analogous and highly correlated to actually

0:35:41.160 --> 0:35:44.960
<v Speaker 1>market making, actually running a continuous h frequency trade market making.

0:35:45.200 --> 0:35:52.200
<v Speaker 1>Trust you, well, you know, that was a fascinating conversation, Tim,

0:35:52.320 --> 0:35:55.680
<v Speaker 1>Jamie and Kevin. Really appreciate the three of you coming on.

0:35:55.680 --> 0:35:57.960
<v Speaker 1>One thing I just want to say before you guys go,

0:35:58.920 --> 0:36:00.920
<v Speaker 1>is that, you know, one thing it's really interesting to

0:36:01.000 --> 0:36:04.320
<v Speaker 1>me is how much what some of you the themes

0:36:04.360 --> 0:36:06.840
<v Speaker 1>of what you're talking about, they're not that different in

0:36:07.200 --> 0:36:09.200
<v Speaker 1>a sense from a lot of the sort of MMT

0:36:09.400 --> 0:36:12.880
<v Speaker 1>friendly people that we often have on this podcast about

0:36:12.920 --> 0:36:16.840
<v Speaker 1>the sort of destructive nature of an economy that's so

0:36:16.960 --> 0:36:20.600
<v Speaker 1>driven by asset prices, so need for central banks. So

0:36:21.000 --> 0:36:23.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, there there's some there's some synthesis out there

0:36:24.160 --> 0:36:27.160
<v Speaker 1>that like between the sort of slightly more like fiscally

0:36:27.239 --> 0:36:32.319
<v Speaker 1>oriented view and this view. You know, we'll we'll find it.

0:36:32.400 --> 0:36:36.360
<v Speaker 1>Between these conversations. There's I believe that there's less daylight

0:36:36.680 --> 0:36:39.560
<v Speaker 1>than perhaps people think from your framework, and I really

0:36:39.600 --> 0:37:00.400
<v Speaker 1>enjoyed listening to Thanks. Thanks a lot, Thanky Thanks. You know,

0:37:00.480 --> 0:37:02.560
<v Speaker 1>like I said there at the end, you know, I

0:37:02.600 --> 0:37:08.000
<v Speaker 1>think that this sort of description volatility suppression sort of

0:37:08.040 --> 0:37:11.600
<v Speaker 1>bottling up a potential crisis. It's a different way of

0:37:11.640 --> 0:37:14.799
<v Speaker 1>talking about a problem that I think a lot of

0:37:14.800 --> 0:37:18.120
<v Speaker 1>people are recognizing, even who I come at the market

0:37:18.160 --> 0:37:21.920
<v Speaker 1>from multiple angles. Yeah, I think that's right, and I

0:37:21.920 --> 0:37:25.400
<v Speaker 1>think our previous guest, Jared Woodard, he spoke about this

0:37:25.480 --> 0:37:28.520
<v Speaker 1>as well. But it's that notion that when you are

0:37:28.560 --> 0:37:31.520
<v Speaker 1>in a sluggish growth environment, you kind of have to

0:37:31.600 --> 0:37:36.680
<v Speaker 1>engineer profits in different or more creative ways, and I

0:37:36.680 --> 0:37:39.680
<v Speaker 1>think that's often where the carry trades come in. The

0:37:39.719 --> 0:37:42.160
<v Speaker 1>other thing I was thinking about was the mention of,

0:37:42.680 --> 0:37:47.080
<v Speaker 1>or the discussion of, the change in investor behavior, which

0:37:47.120 --> 0:37:50.279
<v Speaker 1>I think is really striking. So we spoke about by

0:37:50.320 --> 0:37:53.279
<v Speaker 1>the dip or this idea that whenever stocks go down,

0:37:53.400 --> 0:37:56.160
<v Speaker 1>people eventually come in and start buying on the assumption

0:37:56.200 --> 0:37:59.239
<v Speaker 1>that the central bank is going to come in and

0:37:59.280 --> 0:38:03.640
<v Speaker 1>stabilize everything. But I was also thinking about remember that

0:38:03.920 --> 0:38:07.480
<v Speaker 1>that other saying from around the same time, which was

0:38:07.840 --> 0:38:11.200
<v Speaker 1>bad news is good news, bad news is good news

0:38:11.280 --> 0:38:14.160
<v Speaker 1>meant that whenever you had bad economic news, the central

0:38:14.160 --> 0:38:18.080
<v Speaker 1>bank was going to step in with additional liquidity. So actually,

0:38:18.080 --> 0:38:21.239
<v Speaker 1>if you had bad economic data, sometimes you'd see risk

0:38:21.280 --> 0:38:24.919
<v Speaker 1>assets go up. And if you think about it, it's

0:38:25.000 --> 0:38:28.720
<v Speaker 1>just such a perverse way of looking at the overall

0:38:28.760 --> 0:38:32.839
<v Speaker 1>economy and the financial markets relationship to it. The fact

0:38:32.840 --> 0:38:36.200
<v Speaker 1>that people are thinking that that bad news can be

0:38:36.239 --> 0:38:39.520
<v Speaker 1>good news, bad economic news can be good news for

0:38:39.719 --> 0:38:43.280
<v Speaker 1>risk assets, that should be a huge red flag that

0:38:43.280 --> 0:38:47.040
<v Speaker 1>that something is off in that relationship. I think it's

0:38:47.080 --> 0:38:50.759
<v Speaker 1>super interesting too, exactly that coming from the perspective of

0:38:50.880 --> 0:38:52.919
<v Speaker 1>like say, even the US home owner they were talking

0:38:52.920 --> 0:38:55.600
<v Speaker 1>about by the lent and the idea of buying a

0:38:55.640 --> 0:38:58.480
<v Speaker 1>house with the idea of immediately turning into a rental property.

0:38:59.200 --> 0:39:02.120
<v Speaker 1>But think about, Okay, in the US, for decades, we've

0:39:02.160 --> 0:39:05.880
<v Speaker 1>prized homeownership as being really important, right, And you know

0:39:05.960 --> 0:39:10.719
<v Speaker 1>the implication of that is like, obviously, as mortgage rates

0:39:10.840 --> 0:39:14.319
<v Speaker 1>go down, which tends to happen every time there's an

0:39:14.360 --> 0:39:18.040
<v Speaker 1>economic downturn with this sort of ongoing multi decade decline

0:39:18.040 --> 0:39:21.719
<v Speaker 1>and more, you know, people can refinance their mortgages and

0:39:21.800 --> 0:39:24.160
<v Speaker 1>that sort of like turns into a win for them

0:39:24.239 --> 0:39:26.240
<v Speaker 1>in some sense, Like there are a lot of people

0:39:26.719 --> 0:39:28.880
<v Speaker 1>who like it's been there's been a massive year for

0:39:29.320 --> 0:39:32.319
<v Speaker 1>refives of the last several years. So, you know, I

0:39:32.360 --> 0:39:34.400
<v Speaker 1>think there is like this sort of like very weird

0:39:34.520 --> 0:39:39.000
<v Speaker 1>thing where we turn a bunch of people into economic actors.

0:39:39.560 --> 0:39:42.239
<v Speaker 1>One of the big things that will sort of drive

0:39:42.280 --> 0:39:44.799
<v Speaker 1>their economic well being is the decline of interest rates,

0:39:45.800 --> 0:39:49.320
<v Speaker 1>right absolutely, And of course we haven't seen significant wage

0:39:49.320 --> 0:39:52.600
<v Speaker 1>growth either. So you're basically telling people that one of

0:39:52.640 --> 0:39:55.279
<v Speaker 1>the few ways to get wealthy at the moment is

0:39:55.360 --> 0:39:58.239
<v Speaker 1>to invest in the stock market or some sort of

0:39:58.360 --> 0:40:01.840
<v Speaker 1>financial asset like how purchase that you would expect to

0:40:01.840 --> 0:40:05.600
<v Speaker 1>go up in value. And again, it seems to me

0:40:05.640 --> 0:40:10.239
<v Speaker 1>it's almost inevitable that that impacts how policymakers think and

0:40:10.280 --> 0:40:13.240
<v Speaker 1>how they view the real economy. This idea that maybe

0:40:13.280 --> 0:40:16.360
<v Speaker 1>the stock market is the economy at least for people

0:40:16.520 --> 0:40:20.000
<v Speaker 1>who have a significant proportion of their wealth tied up

0:40:20.040 --> 0:40:24.680
<v Speaker 1>in financial assets. Yeah, totally, no, I think you know,

0:40:24.800 --> 0:40:27.360
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot here and this sort of question of

0:40:27.560 --> 0:40:30.040
<v Speaker 1>is there a way out maybe through more aggressive fiscal

0:40:30.080 --> 0:40:32.560
<v Speaker 1>policy probably the best hope, but something like that to

0:40:32.680 --> 0:40:35.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of get out of the cycle in which not

0:40:35.800 --> 0:40:40.040
<v Speaker 1>only is policy supersensitive it seems to financial assets, but

0:40:40.640 --> 0:40:44.719
<v Speaker 1>each cycle sort of perpetuates the cycle and it gets bigger. Yeah,

0:40:44.840 --> 0:40:49.359
<v Speaker 1>fiscal policy or I guess in this case, after this

0:40:49.400 --> 0:40:52.920
<v Speaker 1>particular discussion, you could also be thinking about macro prudential

0:40:53.000 --> 0:40:57.320
<v Speaker 1>policy and ways to plant down on particular carry trading

0:40:57.360 --> 0:41:00.560
<v Speaker 1>behavior in the market. Right. That sort of what they

0:41:00.600 --> 0:41:03.120
<v Speaker 1>were getting at with the market structure argument. But yes,

0:41:03.719 --> 0:41:08.839
<v Speaker 1>really interesting discussion, I think. Okay, shall we leave it there? Yep?

0:41:09.320 --> 0:41:12.719
<v Speaker 1>This has been another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.

0:41:12.840 --> 0:41:15.640
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:41:15.680 --> 0:41:18.680
<v Speaker 1>Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wisn't Though. You can follow

0:41:18.719 --> 0:41:21.640
<v Speaker 1>me on Twitter at the Stalwart and check out our

0:41:21.640 --> 0:41:25.640
<v Speaker 1>guest book, The Rise of Carry, The Dangerous Consequences of Volatility,

0:41:25.680 --> 0:41:28.640
<v Speaker 1>Suppression and the New Financial Order of the Cane Growth

0:41:28.680 --> 0:41:32.480
<v Speaker 1>and Recurring Crises. Are the authors. Our guests were Tim Lee,

0:41:32.920 --> 0:41:35.800
<v Speaker 1>Jamie Lee, and Kevin cold Iron. And be sure to

0:41:35.840 --> 0:41:39.960
<v Speaker 1>follow our producer Laura Carlson at Laura and Carlton, follow

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<v Speaker 1>the Bloomberg head of podcast Francesco Leavy at Francesco Today,

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<v Speaker 1>and check out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg Onto

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<v Speaker 1>the handle at podcasts. Thanks for listening to