WEBVTT - Surveillance: Businessweek Scoop On China's Microchip Hack

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<v Speaker 1>Ye, Welcome to the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast. I'm Tom Keene

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<v Speaker 1>Jay Leye. We bring you insight from the best in economics, finance, investment,

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<v Speaker 1>and international relations. Find Bloomberg Surveillance on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud,

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot Com, and of course on the Bloomberg. The

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<v Speaker 1>markets are going to be a big part of the

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<v Speaker 1>conversation today, as is a fantastic piece of reporting from

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<v Speaker 1>our colleagues over at Bloomberg Business Week. A special shout

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<v Speaker 1>out to Jordan Robinson and Michael Riley as they reveal

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<v Speaker 1>how China used the smallest of chips in a hack

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<v Speaker 1>that infiltrated some of the biggest companies in America. The

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<v Speaker 1>attack by Chinese spies reaching almost thirty US companies by

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<v Speaker 1>compromising America's technology supply chain. This all according to extensive

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<v Speaker 1>intervie used with government and corporate sources. And I'm pleased

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<v Speaker 1>to say, Tom Keane, we're gonna be talking about this

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit later in the program, So really looking

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<v Speaker 1>forward to doing that a little bit later right here

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<v Speaker 1>on Bloomblock Surveillance to get to the price action and

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<v Speaker 1>what's happening in markets. I'm also pleased to say that

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<v Speaker 1>joining us here in New York is to buys the

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<v Speaker 1>left of its city group, Global Markets Chief US equity strategist,

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<v Speaker 1>Good morning to to Bias, good morning, how are you?

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<v Speaker 1>Let's start with those yields ten years, thirty years, or

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<v Speaker 1>breaking out what does it mean for the equity market. So, look,

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<v Speaker 1>we've been worried about this environment for a while. The

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<v Speaker 1>economy is strong enough for wage pressures are starting to

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<v Speaker 1>grow and probably growth in further based on some of

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<v Speaker 1>our analysis, So this was kind of almost in the cards. However, um,

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<v Speaker 1>how much flexibility is there in the equity market to

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<v Speaker 1>handle this? In our sense is that you've had a

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<v Speaker 1>range on equity ris premium since the financial crisis of

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<v Speaker 1>four to seven percentage points right. We're about four point

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<v Speaker 1>four percent right now, so you have flexibility to get

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<v Speaker 1>you to kind of about three and a half percent,

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<v Speaker 1>offset by less risk premium because you believe the economy

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<v Speaker 1>is growing beyond three and a half percent starts becoming

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<v Speaker 1>more challenging on the tenure yield um, and I think

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<v Speaker 1>that's where the pressure starts to evolve on on on valuation.

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<v Speaker 1>The chapter of the Fed Reserve out with I think

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<v Speaker 1>a really important common in the last twenty four hours

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<v Speaker 1>that he thinks we're a long way away from hitting

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<v Speaker 1>the neutral, right, But the FED, what do you think

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<v Speaker 1>of that? Subus? So look, I wonder how much and

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<v Speaker 1>again I'm trying to get into the motive behind saying that.

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<v Speaker 1>How much of that is moral suation trying to prevent

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<v Speaker 1>um the yield curve going flatter and footing, And how

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<v Speaker 1>how much is that kind of FED speak to to

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<v Speaker 1>force some steepening in the curve. I don't know his motive.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know if that is what he wanted to imply,

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<v Speaker 1>But the FED historically has been able to utilize its

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<v Speaker 1>language to kind of get its way in the market.

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<v Speaker 1>If it didn't, then it can go into the market

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<v Speaker 1>and actually use its toolbox and crowbar kind of forced

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<v Speaker 1>the outcome. Do you care what Indian rupees doing? I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>I know city groups, you know, got branches and bay

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<v Speaker 1>and you're selling toasters and all that. But I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>the day after day John and I are watching e

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<v Speaker 1>M blow up in you know, different ways, in different forms,

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<v Speaker 1>and it seems like we're just rationalizing the revenue stream

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<v Speaker 1>of Amazon or Apple or the other magic stocks. Doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>a guy like you care about the knock on effects

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<v Speaker 1>to e M. We have to worry about. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>one of the things that we watched, for example, is

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<v Speaker 1>the dollar relative to the performance of US markets versus

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<v Speaker 1>e M. And what do you see? It's very tight

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<v Speaker 1>over like thirty years. So anytime the dollar goes up,

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<v Speaker 1>you tend to see outflows from emerging markets UM, and

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<v Speaker 1>it puts meaningful pressure not just on the currencies one

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<v Speaker 1>of the economies as well as that foreign direct investment

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<v Speaker 1>kind of leaves in a often bumpy and an erratic way.

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<v Speaker 1>So do I care about the rupie personally? Maybe if

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<v Speaker 1>I'm planning a trip to the taj mahal Um. Do

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<v Speaker 1>we worry about it? From UM economic knock on effects

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<v Speaker 1>to the US It's fairly small for US cutty markets.

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<v Speaker 1>It's horrible if you're sitting in in the emerging markets

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<v Speaker 1>equity world to bus when you look at US markets

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<v Speaker 1>in a vacuum. And what I mean by that is

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<v Speaker 1>just focusing on domestic issues. America looks great. The DP

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<v Speaker 1>report yesterday was solid. The non manufacturing guy Sam was fantastic,

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<v Speaker 1>and it looks like we're set up for a decent

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<v Speaker 1>payrolls report. As well in a vacuum things look great.

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<v Speaker 1>When you look at things internationally, you just wonder how

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<v Speaker 1>US markets are holding up so well to bias. So

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<v Speaker 1>so I'm getting a lot of those questions actually, like

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<v Speaker 1>why is the US? Yeah, so so one is the

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<v Speaker 1>economy where we you know, keep in mind, probably sent

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<v Speaker 1>of the SMP five revenues are US driven. If it's

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<v Speaker 1>if it's for example, Asian sales of semi conduckers, it

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<v Speaker 1>really isn't. Those are products that are coming back here

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<v Speaker 1>in the form of smartphones, tablets, computers, servers, et cetera,

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<v Speaker 1>some apparently with rice like uh, espionage units on them.

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<v Speaker 1>But the the the economy itself is for that's one thing.

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<v Speaker 1>Number two, technology in particularly which is on the way

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<v Speaker 1>to the SMP five um is phenomenal in terms of demand.

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<v Speaker 1>And then lastly we have massive buyback activity. So that's

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<v Speaker 1>that's kind of keeping us separate from the rest of

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<v Speaker 1>the world. Exacuity, can we do a Surveilla's clarification not

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<v Speaker 1>a correction? Chris from New Jersey emails in and says,

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<v Speaker 1>did Tobias mean the old Trump taj Mahal that is

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<v Speaker 1>now the hard rock cafe in Atlantic city. I haven't

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<v Speaker 1>been many many Exactly I want to go. You want

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<v Speaker 1>to get back there? Okay, I just lose money. Needs

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<v Speaker 1>to worry about the rupeat. If he wants to go

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<v Speaker 1>to New Jersey, tell Chris actually has been replaced. Just

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<v Speaker 1>keep that in minded New Jersey. That's why it time

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<v Speaker 1>to email. Oh god, I think it was a different Chris.

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<v Speaker 1>I guess, but I don't care what. Maybe you don't

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<v Speaker 1>understanding I literally do not understand the appeal of gambling.

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<v Speaker 1>I really don't. Well, let's let's people think what you

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<v Speaker 1>do is gambling. I mean, come on, so let me

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<v Speaker 1>give you so far off? Can I can? I give

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<v Speaker 1>me two very important statistical days. Okay, um, nearly seventy

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<v Speaker 1>eight percent at the time. If you buy equities the

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<v Speaker 1>SMP five hundred, you will be up a year later.

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<v Speaker 1>If you look back over fifty sixty years, if you

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<v Speaker 1>go to a casino, there is a fifty six percent

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<v Speaker 1>probability that you will lose money. Okay, how do you

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<v Speaker 1>respond to the doubt chart? I have from two thousand

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<v Speaker 1>seven that five of the thirty three stocks rather have

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<v Speaker 1>outperformed Amazon, Visa, Nike, and there's two others. I can't

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<v Speaker 1>remember right now, ge on the bottom clearly, but I

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<v Speaker 1>use the SMP five. But if you don't gamble and

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<v Speaker 1>get those five stocks, you don't get elpit, do you.

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<v Speaker 1>But if you bought the index, the Dow Jones Index,

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<v Speaker 1>you would have been fine. If you're trying to I

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<v Speaker 1>think for most individuals trying to pick that wonderful stock

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<v Speaker 1>that's gonna make you ten times your money, you're you're

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<v Speaker 1>probably gonna lose because that probably approach. You know, I

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<v Speaker 1>always shove around with you. I own a few penny stocks.

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<v Speaker 1>They did didn't start out that way. Um, so all

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<v Speaker 1>of us will make a mistake buying stocks. But but

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<v Speaker 1>if you're buying stocks in aggregate, it's it's a winning

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<v Speaker 1>combination over time. The statistics Aretty, thank you for so

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<v Speaker 1>many things, but thank you for joining us this morning

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<v Speaker 1>to bars Left City Group Global Markets chief US. Can

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<v Speaker 1>you see that we're both you are troubled today on

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<v Speaker 1>both of us were watching Leaves Canadians last night. We

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<v Speaker 1>are talking about that one because in the real world,

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<v Speaker 1>least Canadians really matters in certainly in Canada matters. And

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<v Speaker 1>when Toronto beats Montreal, it really hurts us. Montreal or Toronto,

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<v Speaker 1>John Farroll and Tom Keane, And in terms of the

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<v Speaker 1>diplomacy and the international relations of our Bloomberg Business Week

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<v Speaker 1>effort on spying by China by elements of the People's

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<v Speaker 1>Liberation Army by placing microchips on over boards that ended

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<v Speaker 1>up being used by thirty American corporations, and illusions occurse

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<v Speaker 1>over to our defense and intelligence establishment. It is good

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<v Speaker 1>to speak to the eleventh United States Ambassador to China,

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<v Speaker 1>the gentleman from Montana, Max BACKUS Ambassador book is wonderful

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<v Speaker 1>to have you with us up today. Many in government

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<v Speaker 1>have known about these efforts by China for years. Bloomberg

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<v Speaker 1>now publishes the history of this from two thousand fourteen

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<v Speaker 1>and definitely two thousand fifteen bring us to the present

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<v Speaker 1>right now. Is cyber attack, spying whatever you want to

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<v Speaker 1>call it from China? Is it a growing issue or

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<v Speaker 1>is it a stable issue that's a growing issue, Um,

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<v Speaker 1>It's probably one of the biggest issues we have. During

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<v Speaker 1>the time I served UM in China, I pressed the

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<v Speaker 1>government as hard as I could to try to admit

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<v Speaker 1>that that made me a distinction between them for security

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<v Speaker 1>purposes and science for commercial purpose. I couldn't even get

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<v Speaker 1>them agree to that. Finally we got the goods on

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<v Speaker 1>them when we are able to document that one of

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<v Speaker 1>their patriot companies, DTE was Transparent Technology against uh as

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<v Speaker 1>a proliferation statute and that's akin to what they've been doing.

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<v Speaker 1>We also during the OPR investigation found it. So they

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<v Speaker 1>sold about fifty million records of the US citizens, and

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<v Speaker 1>we had the goods on them, and they didn't admit it,

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<v Speaker 1>of course, but they did agree that we started to

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<v Speaker 1>sanction them, that they agreed to the security agreements with

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<v Speaker 1>with with US and which was there's five parts to it,

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<v Speaker 1>namely to them. So that's good to first admit it. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>we're spying, which just something about it. Right within this

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<v Speaker 1>ambassador is the idea of what should be our approach.

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<v Speaker 1>Things move slowly in the legislative body of a wor

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<v Speaker 1>do we have time to go through a slow American

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<v Speaker 1>process to protect our cyber technology or do we do

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<v Speaker 1>we have to speed things up. We're gonna have to

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<v Speaker 1>speed things up. I think this is the biggest problem

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<v Speaker 1>we have, not just with China but frankly the world.

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<v Speaker 1>That is, we are behind the eight ball, we Americans. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>it's just technology that's growing so quickly, and that's good.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh reach a point where countries are going to have

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<v Speaker 1>to realize that they we've got to home reach some

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<v Speaker 1>kind of agreements otherwise it's it's gonna be wild. Wise.

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<v Speaker 1>I think we've got some problems with a line. So

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<v Speaker 1>we'll have to apologize the technical difficulties with us this

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<v Speaker 1>morning that there's an important interview and you could hear

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<v Speaker 1>the heat there in the in the history that the

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<v Speaker 1>ambassador Backus was directly involved in with z T E

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<v Speaker 1>and z T is brought up in the store. Worry

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<v Speaker 1>is sort of iteration one, and now this is iteration too.

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<v Speaker 1>So I think traditionally when we think about cyber protection

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<v Speaker 1>at cyber warfare with thinking about the software Tom And

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<v Speaker 1>what's interesting about Bloomberg's reporting today and reporting from our

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<v Speaker 1>colleagues at Business Week, is this is about the hardware.

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<v Speaker 1>And of course, as everyone listening knows, a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>this hardware is made in China, So what can you

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<v Speaker 1>do to national that the hardware is made in But

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<v Speaker 1>you nailed the luxury and I mentioned this on television

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<v Speaker 1>and Kinneth Rogoff of Harvard ten years out front on this.

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<v Speaker 1>We're addicted to the capitalism to the price theory of

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<v Speaker 1>cheap stuff from China, whether it's you know, bow Tizer

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<v Speaker 1>or whatever. Well, guess what. Some of this stuff is

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<v Speaker 1>important and involves espionage and that and my question the

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<v Speaker 1>ambassador was going to be, Okay, if we don't make

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<v Speaker 1>it in China, where do we make it in America?

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<v Speaker 1>Which is President Trump's theme? And you hear a thundering silence,

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<v Speaker 1>And if and if the hardware is compromise, what can

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<v Speaker 1>you do? Tom? You're going to check every single life

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<v Speaker 1>fund that's produced out of China. You're going to check

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<v Speaker 1>every single chip that has produced out of China. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>I want to make clear that within the reporting and

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<v Speaker 1>speaking with Jordan Robertson, that this is not about consumer

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<v Speaker 1>goods and iPhones here, and I'm certainly not trying to

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<v Speaker 1>infer that that's what this is about. What I'm saying, Tom,

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<v Speaker 1>is that much of the hardware is produced there. So

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<v Speaker 1>how on earth do you have some kind of cyber

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<v Speaker 1>protection scheme, initiative policy that protects you from what has

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<v Speaker 1>happened and what our reporting reveals. And and again, as

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<v Speaker 1>Max Park has said, there, we've negotiated and got nowhere

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<v Speaker 1>and sort of you really wonder where it goes. And

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<v Speaker 1>I would suggest that all Democrats, um would give a

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<v Speaker 1>victory lap to the president for at least identifying the

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<v Speaker 1>urgency and immediacy. Was with Secretary Ross about this, but

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<v Speaker 1>I think it makes it very public. It makes it

0:12:58.640 --> 0:13:00.480
<v Speaker 1>very public, and it comes want to day you that

0:13:00.520 --> 0:13:03.080
<v Speaker 1>we're expecting Vice President Mike pens to come. I'm glad

0:13:03.080 --> 0:13:06.360
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned and layout allegations of Chinese election medaling in

0:13:06.400 --> 0:13:09.760
<v Speaker 1>a harshly worded speech to expecting late today um Dan

0:13:09.880 --> 0:13:21.480
<v Speaker 1>in Washington, Tom, so look out for that. One of

0:13:21.480 --> 0:13:24.360
<v Speaker 1>our most popular guests over the years. Luisia Mata joins

0:13:24.440 --> 0:13:28.439
<v Speaker 1>us now from Luisia Mata Technical Research. Louise, I'm just

0:13:28.480 --> 0:13:31.880
<v Speaker 1>going to cut to the chase. You look at consolidation

0:13:32.400 --> 0:13:36.440
<v Speaker 1>and distribution, the minute price changes that are seen in

0:13:36.559 --> 0:13:40.080
<v Speaker 1>point and figure charting. Can you be long equities today?

0:13:41.440 --> 0:13:44.760
<v Speaker 1>We are growing much more cautious. I think I would

0:13:44.800 --> 0:13:48.280
<v Speaker 1>be taking money off the table in the groups and

0:13:48.360 --> 0:13:53.840
<v Speaker 1>stocks that are underperforming and that are showing monthly momentum

0:13:53.880 --> 0:13:56.600
<v Speaker 1>sales signals, and we have more and more. Give us

0:13:56.600 --> 0:14:00.640
<v Speaker 1>an example of those sectors. Does it include banking? Okay, yeah,

0:14:00.679 --> 0:14:04.679
<v Speaker 1>it does include the financials, utilities of course, reads, materials,

0:14:05.120 --> 0:14:10.280
<v Speaker 1>industrials s flirting with the cell signals, financials and staples

0:14:10.320 --> 0:14:12.360
<v Speaker 1>at this moment. And we have to see how the

0:14:13.000 --> 0:14:17.960
<v Speaker 1>new consumer discretionary in the communications groups evolved, because what

0:14:18.160 --> 0:14:22.720
<v Speaker 1>SMP did was not start them new with the the

0:14:22.240 --> 0:14:25.880
<v Speaker 1>news the new sectors. Yeah yeah, yeah, they they encourage

0:14:25.920 --> 0:14:28.400
<v Speaker 1>them and change the devices. We will see over time.

0:14:28.680 --> 0:14:30.360
<v Speaker 1>In folks, I think all of you know that I'm

0:14:30.360 --> 0:14:32.760
<v Speaker 1>in fully on board with point and figure charting, going

0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:36.160
<v Speaker 1>back to and the I have no time function on

0:14:36.200 --> 0:14:39.920
<v Speaker 1>the X axis, Louise. What everybody wants to know is

0:14:40.000 --> 0:14:45.120
<v Speaker 1>can you use traditional technical analysis to benefit on a

0:14:45.200 --> 0:14:49.480
<v Speaker 1>bi hole cell basis with modern stocks like Apple Computer

0:14:49.640 --> 0:14:55.880
<v Speaker 1>and particularly with Amazon of course, yeah, you mean the

0:14:55.880 --> 0:14:58.120
<v Speaker 1>point and figure charts And what do they say then, okay,

0:14:58.160 --> 0:15:00.720
<v Speaker 1>you could use them. What do they say right now? Well,

0:15:00.800 --> 0:15:04.600
<v Speaker 1>the the Apple is continuing in an uptrend just the

0:15:04.600 --> 0:15:06.600
<v Speaker 1>way it is on a bar chart. There. You know

0:15:06.920 --> 0:15:10.240
<v Speaker 1>they have similarities and Amazon as well, so you you're

0:15:10.400 --> 0:15:12.840
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna hold those right now? Can you acquire new

0:15:12.920 --> 0:15:16.760
<v Speaker 1>shares of Apple and Amazon? In particularly the idea that

0:15:16.800 --> 0:15:19.320
<v Speaker 1>the market so underweight to Apple that they gotta they

0:15:19.320 --> 0:15:23.120
<v Speaker 1>gotta level up by the end of the year. Well,

0:15:23.160 --> 0:15:25.840
<v Speaker 1>the stock has been doing incredibly well. I mean, if

0:15:25.840 --> 0:15:29.320
<v Speaker 1>you have no positions, I think you could probably nibble

0:15:29.400 --> 0:15:33.120
<v Speaker 1>a little. But things are getting quite extended, and given

0:15:33.160 --> 0:15:36.720
<v Speaker 1>the fact that we're starting to see some underlying um

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:39.520
<v Speaker 1>starting to see over the past months of this year,

0:15:39.560 --> 0:15:42.920
<v Speaker 1>we've been seeing negative divergences in new highs, new lows,

0:15:42.960 --> 0:15:46.120
<v Speaker 1>and volume momentum and stocks above the two hundred day

0:15:46.240 --> 0:15:49.200
<v Speaker 1>moving averages which now for the New York Stock Exchange

0:15:49.200 --> 0:15:53.400
<v Speaker 1>has broken below and is a clear warning for the

0:15:53.480 --> 0:15:57.520
<v Speaker 1>overall market. So the divergences have been going on for

0:15:57.560 --> 0:16:00.680
<v Speaker 1>several years, so we're getting closer and closer. What what

0:16:00.720 --> 0:16:04.120
<v Speaker 1>would happen next? Which would concern us would be uh

0:16:04.360 --> 0:16:08.920
<v Speaker 1>monthly momentum sell signals on our industries. The European industries

0:16:08.960 --> 0:16:11.800
<v Speaker 1>are all on monthly sales. Most of the Asian that

0:16:11.840 --> 0:16:14.880
<v Speaker 1>we follow are, with the exception of Japan and India.

0:16:15.000 --> 0:16:17.360
<v Speaker 1>Luisia Matta. In the last twenty four hours, it's been

0:16:17.360 --> 0:16:22.000
<v Speaker 1>amazing split between large cap and small cap with small

0:16:22.080 --> 0:16:25.480
<v Speaker 1>kept John correct me small cap self right smoke cap

0:16:25.480 --> 0:16:27.720
<v Speaker 1>movie sound What do you mean, this is right in

0:16:27.760 --> 0:16:31.200
<v Speaker 1>the heart of Luisia Mata's research. Note, why do you

0:16:31.320 --> 0:16:35.120
<v Speaker 1>parse small, mid and large cap. Well, the small in

0:16:35.160 --> 0:16:38.160
<v Speaker 1>the meter starting to roll over. They've been under performing,

0:16:38.200 --> 0:16:41.160
<v Speaker 1>but now the prices are actually starting to roll over,

0:16:41.200 --> 0:16:44.080
<v Speaker 1>while the down the SMP have been inching higher. We

0:16:44.160 --> 0:16:47.200
<v Speaker 1>still have upward potential in the down in the SMP.

0:16:47.440 --> 0:16:50.720
<v Speaker 1>But I think one has to be growingly cautious than

0:16:50.760 --> 0:16:54.560
<v Speaker 1>watching one sports individual stocks in the portfolios, because a

0:16:54.560 --> 0:16:57.920
<v Speaker 1>lot of individual stocks around cell signals. Also, he's told

0:16:57.920 --> 0:17:00.320
<v Speaker 1>to me about the sound signals you see abroad and

0:17:00.360 --> 0:17:01.840
<v Speaker 1>the fact that you don't see that trend in the

0:17:01.920 --> 0:17:07.520
<v Speaker 1>United States, and how unique that difference is. Well, you've

0:17:07.560 --> 0:17:10.800
<v Speaker 1>got sell signals on the foot, see the CAC, the docks,

0:17:10.920 --> 0:17:16.359
<v Speaker 1>the Italian market, Spain and Switzerland. Uh so there there

0:17:16.400 --> 0:17:20.240
<v Speaker 1>clearly has been a pattern of distribution in those countries.

0:17:20.640 --> 0:17:22.840
<v Speaker 1>Whether or not they can grip at some point and

0:17:22.880 --> 0:17:27.119
<v Speaker 1>turn up is questionable with those monthly cell signals in place.

0:17:27.160 --> 0:17:31.080
<v Speaker 1>But the US is still in the lead. And uh

0:17:31.280 --> 0:17:35.320
<v Speaker 1>of course the interest rate perspective is also intriguing. If

0:17:35.359 --> 0:17:38.560
<v Speaker 1>you're interested covering that, well, we know we do we

0:17:38.600 --> 0:17:41.240
<v Speaker 1>cover into come on, Louise, we cover interest rates a

0:17:41.280 --> 0:17:44.440
<v Speaker 1>little bit. Do we have a true breakout on tenure

0:17:44.680 --> 0:17:49.160
<v Speaker 1>or thirty year or they within the Yamada range absolutely breakout.

0:17:49.359 --> 0:17:52.960
<v Speaker 1>We've we've been suggesting that a little tick above three

0:17:53.359 --> 0:17:55.840
<v Speaker 1>for the tenure was a breakout. You have eight to

0:17:55.920 --> 0:17:59.240
<v Speaker 1>ten year basing that's taken place in these duh in

0:17:59.359 --> 0:18:04.200
<v Speaker 1>these um treasuries also for the two year. And we

0:18:04.280 --> 0:18:08.480
<v Speaker 1>know that reversals from falling rate cycles to rising rate

0:18:08.520 --> 0:18:13.119
<v Speaker 1>tacles take time because they've all experienced deflationary pressures. Historically

0:18:13.119 --> 0:18:15.800
<v Speaker 1>it's been two to fourteen years, and here we are

0:18:16.000 --> 0:18:18.280
<v Speaker 1>eight to ten years, and I think it's a very

0:18:18.359 --> 0:18:21.760
<v Speaker 1>valid change. We're now in a new rising rate cycle. So, Louise,

0:18:21.760 --> 0:18:23.320
<v Speaker 1>I want to watch you about this because so many

0:18:23.320 --> 0:18:25.640
<v Speaker 1>people have a different level and they plot the thirty

0:18:25.720 --> 0:18:29.800
<v Speaker 1>year bull market in treasuries and they try and identify

0:18:29.880 --> 0:18:31.760
<v Speaker 1>the point where we have a real breakout, where the

0:18:31.760 --> 0:18:34.960
<v Speaker 1>bull market is over. Do you have that point in mind?

0:18:35.080 --> 0:18:37.520
<v Speaker 1>And how far through it are we? It was three

0:18:38.119 --> 0:18:41.560
<v Speaker 1>three percent has been the the threshold for the thirty

0:18:41.680 --> 0:18:44.520
<v Speaker 1>and for the ten and you're clearly through it. I

0:18:44.560 --> 0:18:47.240
<v Speaker 1>think you have our report from this month and there's

0:18:47.280 --> 0:18:50.719
<v Speaker 1>a very interesting study showing that we've now put in

0:18:50.760 --> 0:18:55.680
<v Speaker 1>the first lower lower in price, higher low in field,

0:18:56.040 --> 0:18:59.720
<v Speaker 1>and that signifies to us the point which the trend

0:18:59.760 --> 0:19:02.000
<v Speaker 1>has change. John, we gotta be careful because lose your

0:19:02.000 --> 0:19:04.560
<v Speaker 1>model will hang up on us. If that's the case.

0:19:05.080 --> 0:19:06.960
<v Speaker 1>And if you take and you're gonna love this, John,

0:19:07.240 --> 0:19:09.960
<v Speaker 1>if you take a three box horizontal account and you

0:19:09.960 --> 0:19:13.160
<v Speaker 1>get to some high yield of Louisia Mada two yields

0:19:13.200 --> 0:19:16.959
<v Speaker 1>finally compete with dividends. Forget about Louisia model Louise if

0:19:17.000 --> 0:19:20.399
<v Speaker 1>you're a fundamental person, is higher yields finally going to

0:19:20.480 --> 0:19:24.359
<v Speaker 1>compete with dividend and the assumption of dividend growth. Well,

0:19:24.400 --> 0:19:27.480
<v Speaker 1>I certainly think at this point that a conservative investor

0:19:27.560 --> 0:19:31.399
<v Speaker 1>could move into a two year note, if not a

0:19:31.480 --> 0:19:34.679
<v Speaker 1>one year bill where you're getting two point five, and

0:19:34.880 --> 0:19:37.160
<v Speaker 1>compare that to some of the yields, and then think

0:19:37.160 --> 0:19:40.280
<v Speaker 1>about whether or not your stockings having difficulties. I would

0:19:40.359 --> 0:19:42.679
<v Speaker 1>rather move to the safety of a short end. You

0:19:42.720 --> 0:19:45.280
<v Speaker 1>don't want to go long end when you're moving into

0:19:45.280 --> 0:19:48.560
<v Speaker 1>a rising interest rate cycle. You don't want the ten yere,

0:19:48.640 --> 0:19:51.119
<v Speaker 1>you don't want the thirty year because if you go

0:19:51.240 --> 0:19:54.040
<v Speaker 1>with a one year or a two year and they come,

0:19:54.119 --> 0:19:58.199
<v Speaker 1>do you can roll that money into a higher yield

0:19:58.240 --> 0:20:01.200
<v Speaker 1>at that point in time in tense Consluisia Mata thumb

0:20:01.280 --> 0:20:07.320
<v Speaker 1>up on gold or down down? Okay, there you go, Okay,

0:20:07.320 --> 0:20:09.840
<v Speaker 1>neutral best but down that's fair. Luisa Manta, Thank you

0:20:09.880 --> 0:20:13.840
<v Speaker 1>so much. Louisa Manta Technical service. We're really just brilliant.

0:20:14.240 --> 0:20:17.240
<v Speaker 1>Were brilliant. No, we protect the copyright John of our notes.

0:20:17.320 --> 0:20:21.879
<v Speaker 1>But she's like old school, like the old trends distribution.

0:20:21.960 --> 0:20:25.720
<v Speaker 1>She said, an eight year base in the tenure yield.

0:20:27.160 --> 0:20:41.600
<v Speaker 1>Spend the whole day talking about fundamentals. It's nice. John

0:20:41.600 --> 0:20:44.000
<v Speaker 1>Farrell and Tom came from her studios in New York.

0:20:44.200 --> 0:20:48.720
<v Speaker 1>We said, good morning FM Washington, where Jordan Robertson is

0:20:48.760 --> 0:20:51.600
<v Speaker 1>taking a victory lap with Michael Reiley. He is an

0:20:51.640 --> 0:20:57.360
<v Speaker 1>author of a forever changing article on cyber attacks America

0:20:57.560 --> 0:21:01.200
<v Speaker 1>in our naivete of the Chinese Jordan. There's about eight

0:21:01.200 --> 0:21:03.520
<v Speaker 1>ways to go here. John Farrell has three or four

0:21:03.560 --> 0:21:06.400
<v Speaker 1>of them's own. I want to focus on one thing.

0:21:07.119 --> 0:21:10.520
<v Speaker 1>You have a pregnant sentence early in your Business Week

0:21:10.680 --> 0:21:15.440
<v Speaker 1>article where you basically say operatives of part of the

0:21:15.480 --> 0:21:19.439
<v Speaker 1>People's Liberation Army. The p l A to me is

0:21:19.440 --> 0:21:23.199
<v Speaker 1>in a museum display up at the met in ninety eight,

0:21:23.320 --> 0:21:27.120
<v Speaker 1>like Red Guardish and all that. Obviously I'm wrong. Who

0:21:27.240 --> 0:21:32.480
<v Speaker 1>are operatives of the People's Liberation Army? Sure as uh yeah,

0:21:32.520 --> 0:21:35.000
<v Speaker 1>as the story shows, you know, U S Intelligence agencies

0:21:35.000 --> 0:21:38.800
<v Speaker 1>have attributed this attack, the hardware modification attack, to a

0:21:38.880 --> 0:21:42.160
<v Speaker 1>unit of the p l A that specializes in hardware modification.

0:21:42.359 --> 0:21:43.879
<v Speaker 1>And you know the n s A. Here in the

0:21:43.920 --> 0:21:45.600
<v Speaker 1>U S. We we have units that do these kinds

0:21:45.600 --> 0:21:47.760
<v Speaker 1>of things too, but the differences in China, you know,

0:21:47.880 --> 0:21:50.640
<v Speaker 1>you have the manufacturing base for the for the worldwide

0:21:50.920 --> 0:21:55.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, the global computer supply chain, computer equipment and

0:21:55.080 --> 0:21:57.600
<v Speaker 1>supply chain. So from what we understand, this is a

0:21:57.680 --> 0:22:00.080
<v Speaker 1>very specialized unit of the p l A. Uh that,

0:22:00.160 --> 0:22:03.720
<v Speaker 1>in addition to doing cyber you know, having cyber capabilities, uh,

0:22:03.760 --> 0:22:08.679
<v Speaker 1>you know, specializes in manipulating hardware. So the cyber hardware synthesis,

0:22:08.720 --> 0:22:10.680
<v Speaker 1>I mean, other than the fact that John Farrell looks

0:22:10.680 --> 0:22:13.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot like Daniel Craig, I mean it's out of

0:22:13.320 --> 0:22:15.480
<v Speaker 1>a Bond movie or it's what's his name, Keno Reeves

0:22:15.520 --> 0:22:19.800
<v Speaker 1>as I pronounced it right, the guy in the matrix question.

0:22:19.840 --> 0:22:23.560
<v Speaker 1>But come on, it's science fiction. Are these guys in uniform?

0:22:23.920 --> 0:22:27.119
<v Speaker 1>Are they peeky engineers who went where at Caltech? But

0:22:27.560 --> 0:22:29.360
<v Speaker 1>I want to last you about that, just how difficult

0:22:29.359 --> 0:22:33.040
<v Speaker 1>it is to access the manufacturing process of some of

0:22:33.080 --> 0:22:36.440
<v Speaker 1>these goods, and at one point they infiltrate it that

0:22:36.480 --> 0:22:39.880
<v Speaker 1>process to get this chip into the hardware. Yeah. One

0:22:39.920 --> 0:22:41.840
<v Speaker 1>of the things that we've encountered in reporting this story

0:22:41.920 --> 0:22:44.439
<v Speaker 1>is people here are reporting, they say, why would you

0:22:44.480 --> 0:22:47.600
<v Speaker 1>go to those lengths And the answer is if you're China. Well,

0:22:47.640 --> 0:22:49.640
<v Speaker 1>the answer is because you can. You know, if you're

0:22:49.720 --> 0:22:52.840
<v Speaker 1>China and you're trying to infiltrate highly sensitive, highly secured

0:22:53.160 --> 0:22:56.000
<v Speaker 1>government or corporate networks, you know, that's really the only

0:22:56.040 --> 0:22:58.240
<v Speaker 1>justification for going to these lengths. I mean, just to

0:22:58.280 --> 0:23:01.080
<v Speaker 1>be clear, the Chinese government has no incentive to do this.

0:23:01.520 --> 0:23:04.119
<v Speaker 1>For your mass market consumer devices, they would get caught,

0:23:04.640 --> 0:23:06.600
<v Speaker 1>it wouldn't be targeted. But if you're trying to infiltrate

0:23:06.680 --> 0:23:09.680
<v Speaker 1>highly sensitive, highly secure facilities, that's really the only thing

0:23:09.720 --> 0:23:12.359
<v Speaker 1>that justifies the time and effort. To one example in

0:23:12.480 --> 0:23:15.080
<v Speaker 1>Lockeed Martin, I believe is not in your reporting, correct me?

0:23:15.119 --> 0:23:18.960
<v Speaker 1>If I'm wrong to go to the lockeed Martin website

0:23:19.080 --> 0:23:21.040
<v Speaker 1>and John, they've got a thing called the F thirty

0:23:21.080 --> 0:23:24.480
<v Speaker 1>five Lightning Do which is a jet. So if you

0:23:24.600 --> 0:23:28.359
<v Speaker 1>got a little microchip on a board at any given company, John,

0:23:28.359 --> 0:23:30.320
<v Speaker 1>aren't you going to get the blueprints the radar of

0:23:30.359 --> 0:23:34.280
<v Speaker 1>the electronics that we're talking about access? They've got the acts, Jordan,

0:23:34.320 --> 0:23:36.640
<v Speaker 1>they've got the access. Just in terms of a story

0:23:36.640 --> 0:23:38.639
<v Speaker 1>and how this plays out, what did they do with

0:23:38.680 --> 0:23:40.320
<v Speaker 1>that access? Do we have any idea what they did

0:23:40.400 --> 0:23:42.440
<v Speaker 1>with that access? Sure? Yeah, well we know what they

0:23:42.440 --> 0:23:44.800
<v Speaker 1>wanted to clarify. We know what they wanted to do

0:23:44.840 --> 0:23:47.200
<v Speaker 1>with the access from some of the government sources we

0:23:47.280 --> 0:23:49.159
<v Speaker 1>talked to. And the idea is this. You know, one

0:23:49.160 --> 0:23:51.040
<v Speaker 1>of the things we encounter in this reporting is people say,

0:23:51.040 --> 0:23:53.800
<v Speaker 1>why would you land on a commodity server? Super Micro

0:23:53.880 --> 0:23:57.199
<v Speaker 1>makes ordinary blade servers, the pizza box sized servers that

0:23:57.320 --> 0:23:59.560
<v Speaker 1>just processed data their commodities. Why would you want to

0:23:59.600 --> 0:24:01.479
<v Speaker 1>land on those avers? And we've had intelligence folks tell

0:24:01.520 --> 0:24:06.160
<v Speaker 1>us a server is actually the perfect staging area for reconnaissance, probing,

0:24:06.560 --> 0:24:09.800
<v Speaker 1>uh and you know, and evaluating a network because because

0:24:09.800 --> 0:24:12.639
<v Speaker 1>it's a commodity because nobody really looks there for a

0:24:12.680 --> 0:24:15.600
<v Speaker 1>sophisticated attack. They look at the high value targets like

0:24:15.800 --> 0:24:17.720
<v Speaker 1>a network switch and network we're out of the places

0:24:17.760 --> 0:24:20.080
<v Speaker 1>that hackers really love to be. So the ideas this

0:24:20.119 --> 0:24:23.280
<v Speaker 1>is a staging area to perform reconnaissance on target networks,

0:24:23.320 --> 0:24:25.720
<v Speaker 1>to have kind of a stealth access point in and out.

0:24:25.960 --> 0:24:28.040
<v Speaker 1>You know, especially if it's an Internet data center like

0:24:28.080 --> 0:24:30.719
<v Speaker 1>Apple and Amazon run tons and tons of traffic are

0:24:30.720 --> 0:24:33.000
<v Speaker 1>being pumped through those machines every every man of the day,

0:24:33.520 --> 0:24:35.879
<v Speaker 1>so you can hide in that traffic. And the idea

0:24:35.960 --> 0:24:38.200
<v Speaker 1>is you've got a backdoor. You've got multiple backdoors. You've

0:24:38.200 --> 0:24:41.200
<v Speaker 1>gotten you know, dozens or potentially more ways into these networks.

0:24:41.440 --> 0:24:43.240
<v Speaker 1>And that's that's not a it's it's a means to

0:24:43.280 --> 0:24:45.400
<v Speaker 1>an end. It's it's a staging area. It's the first

0:24:45.440 --> 0:24:47.560
<v Speaker 1>stage of the attack and the goal then is to

0:24:47.600 --> 0:24:50.640
<v Speaker 1>get to more sensitive networks and to create a pathway

0:24:50.720 --> 0:24:53.080
<v Speaker 1>into you know, places where sensitive corporate I p. S

0:24:53.280 --> 0:24:56.440
<v Speaker 1>Is is stored, uh you know, or where there are

0:24:56.440 --> 0:24:58.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, Elemental, one of the companies in the story

0:24:58.359 --> 0:25:01.120
<v Speaker 1>that that found these chips. You know, they they their

0:25:01.280 --> 0:25:04.399
<v Speaker 1>equipment helps run the CIA drone program they process and

0:25:04.400 --> 0:25:07.040
<v Speaker 1>this is on their website. They process real time drone

0:25:07.040 --> 0:25:10.119
<v Speaker 1>footage for the CIA and the Defense Department. Like you know,

0:25:10.160 --> 0:25:11.920
<v Speaker 1>if you're China, you can land on one of those

0:25:11.920 --> 0:25:14.440
<v Speaker 1>servers and get any little bit of data out of them.

0:25:14.840 --> 0:25:16.639
<v Speaker 1>We don't have evidence that they landed on the CIA

0:25:16.680 --> 0:25:19.600
<v Speaker 1>program servers, but that is a supplier. Elemental is a

0:25:19.600 --> 0:25:22.920
<v Speaker 1>supplier to that program. That's a jackpot. That's the holy grail.

0:25:22.880 --> 0:25:25.679
<v Speaker 1>It's worth taking the road. It's a fantastic piece of

0:25:25.680 --> 0:25:27.760
<v Speaker 1>reporting that understand took you more than a year to

0:25:27.760 --> 0:25:30.560
<v Speaker 1>put together. For our listeners that haven't been following this

0:25:30.640 --> 0:25:32.679
<v Speaker 1>through the morning, there's some pretty strong denounced by the

0:25:32.680 --> 0:25:36.840
<v Speaker 1>companies involved. Amazon, Apple, You've been very transparent about it,

0:25:36.880 --> 0:25:39.800
<v Speaker 1>You've published those denials for our listeners that are skeptical.

0:25:39.880 --> 0:25:42.080
<v Speaker 1>What do you say about the sourcing of your story

0:25:42.440 --> 0:25:44.800
<v Speaker 1>and why you did publish it even with those really

0:25:44.840 --> 0:25:47.480
<v Speaker 1>strong denials. Sure, thanks for the questions, A very good questions,

0:25:47.560 --> 0:25:52.040
<v Speaker 1>very relevant. Yeah, Apple is the principal actors in our story. Apple, Amazon,

0:25:52.119 --> 0:25:54.800
<v Speaker 1>super Micro, They've all denied the reporting very strongly. Now,

0:25:54.880 --> 0:25:57.440
<v Speaker 1>as journalists, as Bloomber journalists, we take that very seriously,

0:25:58.080 --> 0:26:00.680
<v Speaker 1>We've you know, circled back the sources. We've recircle back

0:26:00.720 --> 0:26:03.119
<v Speaker 1>with sources. We've gotten more sources. And the reason we

0:26:03.160 --> 0:26:05.399
<v Speaker 1>feel comfortable publishing this story is this is about a

0:26:05.440 --> 0:26:09.440
<v Speaker 1>constellation of sources throughout the U S. Government and inside

0:26:09.440 --> 0:26:12.880
<v Speaker 1>those victim companies, very senior insiders in those victim companies,

0:26:12.920 --> 0:26:16.600
<v Speaker 1>Amazon and Apple both as well as across the US government,

0:26:16.600 --> 0:26:19.399
<v Speaker 1>that corroborate this information. So we can't tell why a

0:26:19.400 --> 0:26:22.159
<v Speaker 1>company chooses to deny, what the thinking behind it is.

0:26:22.400 --> 0:26:23.840
<v Speaker 1>But you know, all we can do is present them

0:26:23.880 --> 0:26:26.119
<v Speaker 1>with our facts and if they choose to deny, we

0:26:26.160 --> 0:26:30.600
<v Speaker 1>waited for ponderance of evidence, and seventeen senior, highly placed

0:26:30.640 --> 0:26:35.080
<v Speaker 1>sources throughout the government and these companies very highly, highly incredible,

0:26:35.160 --> 0:26:42.160
<v Speaker 1>highly corroborated. Jordan Robertson regards to Michael Riley, congratulations. Look

0:26:42.240 --> 0:26:44.760
<v Speaker 1>for a cover with a finger with a little baby

0:26:44.800 --> 0:26:49.679
<v Speaker 1>microchip on it. It is from China. This is Bloomberg.

0:27:00.880 --> 0:27:03.480
<v Speaker 1>One of our themes today, the journalism of Bloomberg Business

0:27:03.520 --> 0:27:08.080
<v Speaker 1>Week of Jordan Robertson and Michael O'Reilly and their important

0:27:08.160 --> 0:27:12.440
<v Speaker 1>story of other people's liberation. Army of China attached micro

0:27:12.600 --> 0:27:17.240
<v Speaker 1>chips to motherboards on servers for thirty American corporations. With

0:27:17.400 --> 0:27:20.480
<v Speaker 1>all of the illusions over to the Pentagon, the CIA,

0:27:21.040 --> 0:27:24.640
<v Speaker 1>and our defense establishment, there is no one Pim Fox

0:27:24.720 --> 0:27:27.359
<v Speaker 1>and I would rather speak to than Adam Siegel. He

0:27:27.480 --> 0:27:31.440
<v Speaker 1>is with the Council and Foreign Relations. It's his cottage industry.

0:27:31.880 --> 0:27:36.240
<v Speaker 1>The definitive book is The Hecked World Order. Adam thrilled

0:27:36.320 --> 0:27:38.160
<v Speaker 1>to have you with us on this important day. I'm

0:27:38.160 --> 0:27:42.080
<v Speaker 1>sure Jordan Robertson and Michael Reilly agree with me. Buried

0:27:42.119 --> 0:27:47.080
<v Speaker 1>in your book. Traditional war is in military jargon primarily connectic.

0:27:47.520 --> 0:27:49.800
<v Speaker 1>The point is to kill people and blow things up,

0:27:50.240 --> 0:27:54.000
<v Speaker 1>while cyber attacks are often framed as part of cyber

0:27:54.119 --> 0:27:58.800
<v Speaker 1>wars by the media. You cannot hold territory. What is

0:27:58.840 --> 0:28:05.320
<v Speaker 1>the territory? Know? Once? Well, they are trying to gain

0:28:05.520 --> 0:28:09.920
<v Speaker 1>information for competitive advantage and for political and military advantage,

0:28:09.960 --> 0:28:13.879
<v Speaker 1>and so by being in hardware and software, they have

0:28:14.000 --> 0:28:16.560
<v Speaker 1>gained access to all of that information. Do they have

0:28:16.680 --> 0:28:21.240
<v Speaker 1>blueprints from ut X just to pick a company? Well,

0:28:21.320 --> 0:28:23.720
<v Speaker 1>I don't. I think we're all gonna We're gonna question

0:28:23.800 --> 0:28:26.920
<v Speaker 1>all of that now. Um. I mean, the the importance

0:28:27.000 --> 0:28:29.520
<v Speaker 1>of the story is that people have been talking about

0:28:29.560 --> 0:28:32.880
<v Speaker 1>the vulnerability of supply chain for a long time UM,

0:28:33.200 --> 0:28:35.840
<v Speaker 1>and now here is just clear evidence that it seems

0:28:35.880 --> 0:28:39.320
<v Speaker 1>to be happening. So any US tech company that has

0:28:39.400 --> 0:28:42.000
<v Speaker 1>its supply chain in China, which is almost all of them,

0:28:42.640 --> 0:28:45.440
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna have to seriously question if the Chinese have

0:28:45.720 --> 0:28:49.120
<v Speaker 1>gained access to Adam Siegel, as the author of the

0:28:49.200 --> 0:28:53.440
<v Speaker 1>Hacked World Order, how nations fight, trade, maneuver, and manipulate

0:28:53.680 --> 0:28:57.800
<v Speaker 1>in the digital age. Can you draw an analogy between

0:28:57.920 --> 0:29:00.440
<v Speaker 1>the use of the Internet and the u of the

0:29:00.600 --> 0:29:07.600
<v Speaker 1>high seas in previous centuries. Well, I think for both

0:29:07.680 --> 0:29:10.720
<v Speaker 1>there was a period when they were completely open to

0:29:10.840 --> 0:29:17.040
<v Speaker 1>piracy and thest um and nation states often used privateers

0:29:17.160 --> 0:29:21.000
<v Speaker 1>or pirates to pursue their goals. And China has certainly

0:29:21.120 --> 0:29:23.720
<v Speaker 1>taken advantage of the fact that there are no international

0:29:23.800 --> 0:29:27.720
<v Speaker 1>rules for cyber um and that you can use the

0:29:27.800 --> 0:29:30.600
<v Speaker 1>People's Liberation Army or the Ministry of State Security, and

0:29:30.680 --> 0:29:33.520
<v Speaker 1>they can often use criminal or underground hackers and and

0:29:33.640 --> 0:29:37.600
<v Speaker 1>have possible deniability. So we are in a similar age

0:29:37.800 --> 0:29:41.680
<v Speaker 1>where it has been very hard to control UM and

0:29:41.800 --> 0:29:44.800
<v Speaker 1>where people have thought about cyberspace as a kind of

0:29:44.840 --> 0:29:48.320
<v Speaker 1>a commons like the ocean, but it's one where there's

0:29:48.320 --> 0:29:52.200
<v Speaker 1>a huge amount of conflict. UM that defines the space.

0:29:52.800 --> 0:29:56.200
<v Speaker 1>You've written about how the government and the private sector

0:29:56.320 --> 0:30:01.400
<v Speaker 1>need to enhance their current defenses, for example, two factor

0:30:01.560 --> 0:30:06.840
<v Speaker 1>authorization to log into different systems, also to things such

0:30:06.960 --> 0:30:13.440
<v Speaker 1>as absolute secure communications. Can we ever get there? Well,

0:30:13.560 --> 0:30:15.920
<v Speaker 1>it's been slow going, UM, And you can see in

0:30:15.960 --> 0:30:20.520
<v Speaker 1>the Bloomberg reporting UM that the private sector did cooperate

0:30:20.720 --> 0:30:26.040
<v Speaker 1>in some cases with the federal government in helping unraveled

0:30:26.160 --> 0:30:30.600
<v Speaker 1>this UM spy trail, but in other cases UM didn't

0:30:30.600 --> 0:30:34.080
<v Speaker 1>share as much information and has kind of denied the accusation.

0:30:34.280 --> 0:30:38.000
<v Speaker 1>So there's still different incentives in place, UM, and we

0:30:38.160 --> 0:30:40.800
<v Speaker 1>certainly need to move faster to get the two sides

0:30:40.880 --> 0:30:44.920
<v Speaker 1>to work to work better together, Adam. Within the reporting

0:30:45.280 --> 0:30:47.120
<v Speaker 1>UH that Bloomberg did on this, and I'm going to

0:30:47.120 --> 0:30:49.880
<v Speaker 1>assume to a pro like you, this is not new news.

0:30:50.120 --> 0:30:53.760
<v Speaker 1>What exactly did the story confirm within the visibility of

0:30:53.920 --> 0:30:56.560
<v Speaker 1>going back three and four years to the Obama administration

0:30:56.600 --> 0:30:59.479
<v Speaker 1>and the Trump administration, the length of time of all

0:30:59.560 --> 0:31:02.360
<v Speaker 1>this to a guy like you when you saw that article,

0:31:02.800 --> 0:31:07.440
<v Speaker 1>what was new? Well, just the fact that we now

0:31:07.600 --> 0:31:11.320
<v Speaker 1>can spit point to a specific case, a specific company

0:31:11.440 --> 0:31:13.600
<v Speaker 1>and a and the and the actual chip that was

0:31:13.720 --> 0:31:17.600
<v Speaker 1>doing the buying. Uh. As you said, the people in

0:31:17.600 --> 0:31:20.240
<v Speaker 1>the cybersecurity community have been warning about this threat for

0:31:20.320 --> 0:31:23.480
<v Speaker 1>a long time, but there were just no public examples.

0:31:23.640 --> 0:31:26.720
<v Speaker 1>They are all existed in the world of classification or

0:31:26.800 --> 0:31:30.000
<v Speaker 1>intelligence briefings. So to have this out in the open

0:31:30.480 --> 0:31:32.920
<v Speaker 1>is just a massive change and will really shape the

0:31:33.000 --> 0:31:40.000
<v Speaker 1>discussion about is it a good change? Is to get

0:31:40.040 --> 0:31:42.160
<v Speaker 1>to the point, is the Pentagon having a good morning?

0:31:43.480 --> 0:31:46.000
<v Speaker 1>I think they are. I think the problem is going

0:31:46.040 --> 0:31:47.640
<v Speaker 1>to be for everyone is how you deal with the

0:31:47.720 --> 0:31:51.720
<v Speaker 1>fallout because as the as the article rightfully raises, the

0:31:52.160 --> 0:31:53.920
<v Speaker 1>question is going to be, what's going to happen to

0:31:53.960 --> 0:31:57.640
<v Speaker 1>the U S tech industry because the supply chains are

0:31:57.880 --> 0:32:02.360
<v Speaker 1>so dependent on China uh um and um. There's you know,

0:32:02.720 --> 0:32:05.520
<v Speaker 1>the solution seems to be to remove the supply chain

0:32:06.440 --> 0:32:08.880
<v Speaker 1>from China, but that that's going to be incredibly expensive

0:32:08.920 --> 0:32:11.000
<v Speaker 1>and it's not clear it's going to be technically possible.

0:32:11.640 --> 0:32:16.680
<v Speaker 1>Adam Siegel is the United States perceived as an exceptionally

0:32:16.840 --> 0:32:23.000
<v Speaker 1>aggressive adversary when it comes to cyberspace. I think a

0:32:23.040 --> 0:32:26.080
<v Speaker 1>number of countries certainly see that. And you know, after

0:32:26.160 --> 0:32:31.280
<v Speaker 1>this note in Revelations, the revelations of the Contractor Edwards

0:32:31.400 --> 0:32:34.160
<v Speaker 1>note in you know, certain types of behaviors of the

0:32:34.280 --> 0:32:37.240
<v Speaker 1>US were shown to the rest of the world. China

0:32:37.320 --> 0:32:40.400
<v Speaker 1>in particular took notice of that um and began to

0:32:40.440 --> 0:32:43.480
<v Speaker 1>think about both um, what what it could do to

0:32:43.520 --> 0:32:46.400
<v Speaker 1>become more secure from the US and then also you know,

0:32:46.760 --> 0:32:49.040
<v Speaker 1>put ideas in its head about what type of operations

0:32:49.080 --> 0:32:52.040
<v Speaker 1>it would like to conduct as well. Do you believe

0:32:52.320 --> 0:32:55.040
<v Speaker 1>that countries that we believe to be friendly to the

0:32:55.160 --> 0:33:01.360
<v Speaker 1>United States conduct cyber defense or cyber attack efforts against

0:33:01.440 --> 0:33:06.719
<v Speaker 1>the United States, both private and public? Uh? They do? Uh?

0:33:06.800 --> 0:33:08.440
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if you look at the rip board from

0:33:08.480 --> 0:33:11.080
<v Speaker 1>the Office of Kunter Intelligence, they name a number of

0:33:11.680 --> 0:33:16.080
<v Speaker 1>close to US allies and friends, including South Korea, France,

0:33:16.120 --> 0:33:20.840
<v Speaker 1>and Israel is conducting cyber espionage against the United States. Uh.

0:33:20.920 --> 0:33:23.400
<v Speaker 1>Many United States does the stand point honestly, it also

0:33:24.360 --> 0:33:27.920
<v Speaker 1>spies on its spread now, so so this is important.

0:33:27.920 --> 0:33:32.640
<v Speaker 1>Do we are we putting microchips on motherboards on servers

0:33:32.760 --> 0:33:38.000
<v Speaker 1>of other countries? Have? Yeah? I mean the study revelations

0:33:38.040 --> 0:33:40.400
<v Speaker 1>and as the report at the Bloomberg Reporting notes that

0:33:40.480 --> 0:33:44.560
<v Speaker 1>the US prefers to interdict the product along the way

0:33:45.360 --> 0:33:48.960
<v Speaker 1>UM and and insert something then so getting a specific

0:33:49.880 --> 0:33:54.080
<v Speaker 1>server motherboard, not in the Chinese case of UM putting

0:33:54.120 --> 0:33:56.720
<v Speaker 1>it in you know, many devices and hoping that it

0:33:56.920 --> 0:34:00.680
<v Speaker 1>ends up into a specific supply chain. Speak of you

0:34:00.800 --> 0:34:05.520
<v Speaker 1>can about the US Department of Defense Defense Security Service.

0:34:05.640 --> 0:34:09.880
<v Speaker 1>What is the d s S do? Uh? It's to

0:34:10.040 --> 0:34:15.399
<v Speaker 1>help defend and respond to attacks on military networks. UM

0:34:15.880 --> 0:34:19.320
<v Speaker 1>and so it is working with Fibric Command and the

0:34:19.440 --> 0:34:23.200
<v Speaker 1>National Security Agency UM and reaching out to the private sector,

0:34:23.719 --> 0:34:27.440
<v Speaker 1>in particular the defense industry base to help them improve

0:34:27.520 --> 0:34:31.000
<v Speaker 1>their security NETMA. Adam, thank you so much. Just thrilled

0:34:31.040 --> 0:34:33.640
<v Speaker 1>to finish out our coverage today and surveillance uh and

0:34:33.760 --> 0:34:36.320
<v Speaker 1>speak of you, Adam Single Folks is with the Council

0:34:36.400 --> 0:34:39.279
<v Speaker 1>on Foreign Relations and he has just simply build up

0:34:39.320 --> 0:34:42.200
<v Speaker 1>a franchise as a director of Digital and cybers based

0:34:42.960 --> 0:34:47.640
<v Speaker 1>Policy at CFR. And again, Pim, the book, uh, you

0:34:47.680 --> 0:34:49.880
<v Speaker 1>know when it came out was more than a splash

0:34:49.960 --> 0:34:59.240
<v Speaker 1>the hacked world order. Thanks for listening to the Bloomberg

0:34:59.280 --> 0:35:05.239
<v Speaker 1>Surveillance Pie podcast. Subscribe and listen to interviews on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud,

0:35:05.640 --> 0:35:09.799
<v Speaker 1>or whichever podcast platform you prefer. I'm on Twitter at

0:35:09.920 --> 0:35:14.120
<v Speaker 1>Tom Keene before the podcast. You can always catch us worldwide.

0:35:14.600 --> 0:35:15.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm Bloomberg Radio