WEBVTT - Sailors on a Dark Sea: Illusion of Explanatory Depth

0:00:03.080 --> 0:00:05.920
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how Stuff

0:00:05.920 --> 0:00:15.360
<v Speaker 1>Works dot com. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind.

0:00:15.480 --> 0:00:18.040
<v Speaker 1>My name is Robert lamp and I'm Joe McCormick. And

0:00:18.079 --> 0:00:22.239
<v Speaker 1>today we're gonna be looking at understanding a little bit

0:00:22.320 --> 0:00:26.800
<v Speaker 1>of the gaps in our knowledge and our metacognition. And

0:00:26.960 --> 0:00:28.960
<v Speaker 1>it's going to be the first part of a two

0:00:29.000 --> 0:00:33.520
<v Speaker 1>part episode on the illusion of explanatory depth. So if

0:00:33.520 --> 0:00:36.000
<v Speaker 1>you like this one, you should also definitely come back

0:00:36.000 --> 0:00:38.400
<v Speaker 1>for the next episode we released next time, which will

0:00:38.440 --> 0:00:40.120
<v Speaker 1>be a follow up to what we're going to talk

0:00:40.159 --> 0:00:44.199
<v Speaker 1>about today, illusion of explanatory depth. So to put that

0:00:44.240 --> 0:00:48.640
<v Speaker 1>in simpler terms, we're talking about a situation where you

0:00:48.680 --> 0:00:52.279
<v Speaker 1>think you know how something works, you think you have

0:00:52.479 --> 0:00:56.360
<v Speaker 1>a working knowledge of the thing, but in reality you don't. Yeah,

0:00:56.400 --> 0:00:59.720
<v Speaker 1>and we've talked about the gaps between the feeling of

0:00:59.760 --> 0:01:02.840
<v Speaker 1>no wing and the actual knowing before this came up

0:01:02.840 --> 0:01:04.480
<v Speaker 1>in the episode we did about the tip of the

0:01:04.520 --> 0:01:07.600
<v Speaker 1>tongue state. You remember that the sense that you know

0:01:07.880 --> 0:01:12.080
<v Speaker 1>something is not necessarily coterminous with actually being able to

0:01:12.160 --> 0:01:15.399
<v Speaker 1>produce that piece of knowledge from memory. There's a gap

0:01:15.440 --> 0:01:18.240
<v Speaker 1>in your mind. So you think you know the name

0:01:18.560 --> 0:01:21.680
<v Speaker 1>of the actor who played Thaiwan Lanister on Game of Thrones.

0:01:21.760 --> 0:01:23.920
<v Speaker 1>Do you Robert Oh, no, I can't. He has that

0:01:23.959 --> 0:01:26.839
<v Speaker 1>weird name that I can never know, Thaiwan. Yeah, wait,

0:01:26.880 --> 0:01:28.680
<v Speaker 1>which one is Taiwan? No, I'm thinking of Jamie. I

0:01:28.720 --> 0:01:31.080
<v Speaker 1>can never remember Jamie's name. What about Thaiwan? Come on,

0:01:31.120 --> 0:01:34.400
<v Speaker 1>he's an alien? Three? Okay, Well you got it. You

0:01:34.440 --> 0:01:36.400
<v Speaker 1>didn't You didn't have that gap. Then some people might

0:01:36.480 --> 0:01:38.479
<v Speaker 1>there was a gap in there somewhere. I did feel

0:01:38.520 --> 0:01:41.440
<v Speaker 1>a gap. If if you're familiar with Game of Thrones

0:01:41.480 --> 0:01:43.880
<v Speaker 1>out there you were, like some of you were probably thinking, oh,

0:01:44.000 --> 0:01:46.319
<v Speaker 1>I know that name, what is it? What is it?

0:01:46.319 --> 0:01:50.440
<v Speaker 1>It was Charles Dance. Okay. The other possible um gap

0:01:50.480 --> 0:01:52.600
<v Speaker 1>there is you hear Taiwan? And then you were is

0:01:52.640 --> 0:01:56.040
<v Speaker 1>a Tyrian? Is it Thaiwan? More names? Well? I picked

0:01:57.160 --> 0:02:00.120
<v Speaker 1>Character actors often fall into this category. The character know

0:02:00.160 --> 0:02:02.640
<v Speaker 1>the actors you've seen in tons of movies throughout the years.

0:02:02.680 --> 0:02:05.480
<v Speaker 1>They become that tip of the tongue name where you

0:02:05.520 --> 0:02:07.760
<v Speaker 1>know the face. You know some movies they've been in.

0:02:07.840 --> 0:02:09.880
<v Speaker 1>You know you know the name, but you don't know

0:02:09.960 --> 0:02:12.280
<v Speaker 1>the name. At the moment. It's this that guy, Oh,

0:02:12.320 --> 0:02:14.640
<v Speaker 1>what's that guy's name? Yeah, And so there's this gap,

0:02:14.720 --> 0:02:17.680
<v Speaker 1>there's this feeling of knowing, and there's the gap between

0:02:17.720 --> 0:02:21.200
<v Speaker 1>the feeling of knowing and the actual knowing itself. But

0:02:21.320 --> 0:02:23.920
<v Speaker 1>the interesting thing is that this gap can be applied

0:02:24.200 --> 0:02:26.960
<v Speaker 1>to other realms of knowledge. It's not just in trying

0:02:26.960 --> 0:02:29.840
<v Speaker 1>to come up with the name for a thing, for example,

0:02:29.919 --> 0:02:33.000
<v Speaker 1>in a quint essentially how stuff works move I think

0:02:33.080 --> 0:02:35.640
<v Speaker 1>we should look at the domain of knowledge that covers

0:02:36.040 --> 0:02:42.200
<v Speaker 1>understanding how things happen, or really in really understanding how

0:02:42.280 --> 0:02:46.600
<v Speaker 1>things work in causal relationships, because of course we live

0:02:46.600 --> 0:02:50.320
<v Speaker 1>in a world of systems. The system is always trying

0:02:50.360 --> 0:02:54.040
<v Speaker 1>to get you down. But but there are causal systems

0:02:54.040 --> 0:02:57.920
<v Speaker 1>all around us, machines, the coffee maker in the office,

0:02:57.960 --> 0:03:01.800
<v Speaker 1>the computer you're working on, and ammals, animals or systems

0:03:01.800 --> 0:03:05.520
<v Speaker 1>of causal relationships. There are natural cycles, like you know,

0:03:05.600 --> 0:03:09.440
<v Speaker 1>the nitrogen cycle or the water cycle. Those are causal systems.

0:03:09.480 --> 0:03:15.520
<v Speaker 1>And then other natural phenomenon uh, tides, rainbows, I don't know,

0:03:16.120 --> 0:03:19.760
<v Speaker 1>pooping a all natural phenomenon. Well, these are all things

0:03:19.840 --> 0:03:21.560
<v Speaker 1>that I mean too. We have to mention, of course,

0:03:21.560 --> 0:03:24.680
<v Speaker 1>the famous quote other C. Clark, right, that any sufficiently

0:03:24.680 --> 0:03:27.880
<v Speaker 1>advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. But you could pretty

0:03:27.960 --> 0:03:31.200
<v Speaker 1>much say that about like any system, Uh that if

0:03:31.240 --> 0:03:33.799
<v Speaker 1>if you if it's if it's it's it's if it's

0:03:33.800 --> 0:03:37.920
<v Speaker 1>advanced enough and complex enough, and and most systems are U.

0:03:39.520 --> 0:03:41.760
<v Speaker 1>It can it can seem magical in the fact that

0:03:41.800 --> 0:03:45.400
<v Speaker 1>the sun rises in the morning. Um, there's a magic

0:03:45.440 --> 0:03:47.680
<v Speaker 1>to that. We we've we've we've observed it his magic

0:03:47.720 --> 0:03:50.080
<v Speaker 1>and felt it is magic since the time. Out of

0:03:50.080 --> 0:03:53.120
<v Speaker 1>mind we sometimes are even though we have the the

0:03:53.160 --> 0:03:57.280
<v Speaker 1>actual scientific explanation for what's happening, you still also have

0:03:57.520 --> 0:04:02.680
<v Speaker 1>this magical version of the event, uh pared right beside

0:04:02.720 --> 0:04:04.920
<v Speaker 1>it on on the shelf in your mind. Oh totally.

0:04:05.000 --> 0:04:08.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we have strong intuitions to give to give

0:04:08.280 --> 0:04:12.880
<v Speaker 1>magical or kind of fuzzy causal relationships. And and it's

0:04:12.880 --> 0:04:16.520
<v Speaker 1>funny because one way of interpreting the idea of magic

0:04:16.640 --> 0:04:21.160
<v Speaker 1>or the supernatural is it's just causal anddeterminacy, right, Like,

0:04:21.240 --> 0:04:23.560
<v Speaker 1>what do you mean when you say something happened by

0:04:23.600 --> 0:04:27.040
<v Speaker 1>magic or something happened with the supernatural cause, it just

0:04:27.160 --> 0:04:30.599
<v Speaker 1>means that the cause. Essentially you're saying, well, the cause

0:04:30.680 --> 0:04:34.440
<v Speaker 1>isn't clear. It's just kind of like getting vague about

0:04:34.520 --> 0:04:36.800
<v Speaker 1>what it means to be a cause I like this.

0:04:36.880 --> 0:04:40.800
<v Speaker 1>You know, my my son who's almost five. He we

0:04:41.080 --> 0:04:45.119
<v Speaker 1>try to explain how things work to him, as one should,

0:04:45.800 --> 0:04:48.120
<v Speaker 1>but he also has this concept of magic. It's very

0:04:48.160 --> 0:04:50.440
<v Speaker 1>loose concept. So the other day he had a new

0:04:50.800 --> 0:04:53.200
<v Speaker 1>helium balloon and it was one of those uh those

0:04:53.240 --> 0:04:57.240
<v Speaker 1>fancy shiny ones that that you get. What's the material?

0:04:58.120 --> 0:05:00.479
<v Speaker 1>My large, my large? So it was a mile balloons,

0:05:00.480 --> 0:05:02.599
<v Speaker 1>so it last, it was lasting longer. He's used to

0:05:02.600 --> 0:05:04.920
<v Speaker 1>getting these cheap balloons and they the helium goes down

0:05:04.920 --> 0:05:07.120
<v Speaker 1>and they're on the floor, but this one was floating

0:05:07.120 --> 0:05:09.320
<v Speaker 1>the next day and he said, hey, that my balloon

0:05:09.360 --> 0:05:13.160
<v Speaker 1>is still floating. Is this is it magic helium? Um?

0:05:13.200 --> 0:05:15.920
<v Speaker 1>Which I think was maybe like his definition of magic

0:05:15.960 --> 0:05:17.600
<v Speaker 1>is more in line with what you just said. There's

0:05:17.640 --> 0:05:20.400
<v Speaker 1>a there's a mystery there. Uh like he knows that

0:05:20.480 --> 0:05:24.440
<v Speaker 1>this helium is not behaving like like like normal helium.

0:05:24.480 --> 0:05:27.160
<v Speaker 1>That's that he's encountered and he has no other explanation

0:05:27.240 --> 0:05:29.719
<v Speaker 1>for it. Yeah. But yeah, so you don't have to

0:05:29.760 --> 0:05:32.600
<v Speaker 1>at that point explain how the magic does what it does.

0:05:32.680 --> 0:05:34.919
<v Speaker 1>If you did, it would sort of stop being magic.

0:05:36.120 --> 0:05:39.200
<v Speaker 1>But Yeah. So so there are these systems all around us.

0:05:39.240 --> 0:05:41.919
<v Speaker 1>We we sort of naturally feel like they're magic, but

0:05:41.960 --> 0:05:45.640
<v Speaker 1>we can come to understand the causal processes that that

0:05:46.000 --> 0:05:48.800
<v Speaker 1>that sustained them and that make them work. But as

0:05:48.800 --> 0:05:51.800
<v Speaker 1>we've said, understanding and the feeling of understanding are actually

0:05:51.839 --> 0:05:55.479
<v Speaker 1>separate things. And whenever you've got two different binary variables

0:05:55.480 --> 0:05:57.279
<v Speaker 1>like this, I think it's interesting to try to make

0:05:57.320 --> 0:05:59.520
<v Speaker 1>that the grid table, you know, where you've got one

0:05:59.600 --> 0:06:02.800
<v Speaker 1>binary area on a column and one binary on a row.

0:06:02.960 --> 0:06:06.080
<v Speaker 1>So you can think of things that we understand and

0:06:06.120 --> 0:06:08.200
<v Speaker 1>that we don't understand, and then you can think of

0:06:08.279 --> 0:06:10.960
<v Speaker 1>things that you feel like you understand or that you

0:06:11.040 --> 0:06:13.400
<v Speaker 1>don't feel like you understand. So there are things that

0:06:13.440 --> 0:06:16.040
<v Speaker 1>we understand and we feel like that we understand them

0:06:16.040 --> 0:06:19.000
<v Speaker 1>like a hammer. Yes, you think you get it, you

0:06:19.120 --> 0:06:22.360
<v Speaker 1>really do get it. Yeah, there's there's some very simple

0:06:22.360 --> 0:06:25.600
<v Speaker 1>physics involved here. There's a there's a there's a definite

0:06:25.920 --> 0:06:30.440
<v Speaker 1>causal um process going on. Yeah. Then there's maybe how

0:06:30.520 --> 0:06:34.920
<v Speaker 1>microprocessor engineering works. That's one where you probably don't understand

0:06:34.920 --> 0:06:37.720
<v Speaker 1>it and you probably feel like you don't understand it. Right.

0:06:37.800 --> 0:06:39.839
<v Speaker 1>This is one of those where you have a problem

0:06:39.839 --> 0:06:41.960
<v Speaker 1>with your computer and you just you tell your tech

0:06:42.800 --> 0:06:45.880
<v Speaker 1>tech guy or gal, you say, it's all magic to me.

0:06:46.440 --> 0:06:48.200
<v Speaker 1>I don't know how this works. Can you help me

0:06:48.279 --> 0:06:50.600
<v Speaker 1>fix this problem? Right? So, those are the ones where

0:06:50.640 --> 0:06:53.360
<v Speaker 1>are understanding and our feelings are basically in agreement. But

0:06:53.400 --> 0:06:55.720
<v Speaker 1>what about the other two boxes? What about things that

0:06:55.760 --> 0:07:00.279
<v Speaker 1>you understand but you don't feel like you understand can

0:07:00.279 --> 0:07:03.560
<v Speaker 1>actually happen sometimes, and I think it's often the starting

0:07:03.600 --> 0:07:06.839
<v Speaker 1>place of a Socratic dialogue or if you ever you know,

0:07:06.880 --> 0:07:10.440
<v Speaker 1>the Socratic teaching method is where instead of telling students

0:07:10.440 --> 0:07:13.320
<v Speaker 1>what to believe, you ask them questions and sort of

0:07:13.400 --> 0:07:17.160
<v Speaker 1>lead them to understand that they already knew the answer,

0:07:17.400 --> 0:07:20.360
<v Speaker 1>but they just didn't know how to articulate it. And

0:07:20.400 --> 0:07:23.560
<v Speaker 1>so in that case, the child already understands, they just

0:07:23.600 --> 0:07:26.440
<v Speaker 1>didn't know how to put the answer with the question

0:07:26.520 --> 0:07:30.040
<v Speaker 1>in context. But then there's the other box, the things

0:07:30.080 --> 0:07:34.160
<v Speaker 1>you feel like you understand but you don't actually understand.

0:07:34.680 --> 0:07:36.600
<v Speaker 1>And the research we're going to talk about today is

0:07:36.680 --> 0:07:40.600
<v Speaker 1>addressing how there is tons of stuff in this box.

0:07:41.040 --> 0:07:45.000
<v Speaker 1>This box box is filled to the brim. Uh toilets

0:07:45.000 --> 0:07:47.400
<v Speaker 1>are probably in this box for you? What do you?

0:07:47.440 --> 0:07:49.160
<v Speaker 1>What do you think? Unless you're a plumber, or you've

0:07:49.200 --> 0:07:51.600
<v Speaker 1>really done some work on your toilet. I bet toilets

0:07:51.680 --> 0:07:55.760
<v Speaker 1>or in this box. Yeah, I mean they're they're fairly complicated,

0:07:55.880 --> 0:07:58.560
<v Speaker 1>a little little mechanisms, despite the fact that they maybe

0:07:58.560 --> 0:08:02.360
<v Speaker 1>haven't buying large advanced as much as they should, because

0:08:02.360 --> 0:08:04.400
<v Speaker 1>it's kind of one of those technologies that we tend

0:08:04.400 --> 0:08:06.000
<v Speaker 1>to think, all right, it's good enough, and we don't

0:08:06.000 --> 0:08:08.119
<v Speaker 1>want to we don't want to put too much extra

0:08:08.200 --> 0:08:12.200
<v Speaker 1>thought into into its design and function. Yeah, here's another one.

0:08:12.240 --> 0:08:14.960
<v Speaker 1>How How what about mirrors? Mirrors is a great one,

0:08:15.520 --> 0:08:17.360
<v Speaker 1>and I love this example. I think I've brought it

0:08:17.440 --> 0:08:20.080
<v Speaker 1>up before, but yeah, I think it's a perfect example

0:08:20.080 --> 0:08:22.840
<v Speaker 1>of an everyday object that we take mostly for granted,

0:08:23.240 --> 0:08:26.880
<v Speaker 1>but it is ultimately this insane, freaky mystery in our lives.

0:08:27.680 --> 0:08:29.240
<v Speaker 1>I mean, really, it's amazing that we don't just run

0:08:29.240 --> 0:08:34.200
<v Speaker 1>around constantly smashing them like maniacs. I think you, like me,

0:08:34.679 --> 0:08:38.520
<v Speaker 1>love a good creepy mirror story, like a haunted mirror.

0:08:39.280 --> 0:08:42.280
<v Speaker 1>What's the Stephen King won the Representage? The Representage fabrical

0:08:42.360 --> 0:08:45.599
<v Speaker 1>short stories one of his best, in my opinion. Uh,

0:08:45.000 --> 0:08:48.200
<v Speaker 1>and there are tons of them, Lovecraft wrote one Clark

0:08:48.240 --> 0:08:51.760
<v Speaker 1>Ashton Smith wrote one, you could probably fill an entire

0:08:51.800 --> 0:08:53.920
<v Speaker 1>book with just creepy mirror stories, and then I would

0:08:53.960 --> 0:08:56.079
<v Speaker 1>buy said book. But wait a minute. Of course, we

0:08:56.160 --> 0:08:59.720
<v Speaker 1>understand how a mirror works. That's easy. It's just uh, well,

0:08:59.800 --> 0:09:04.440
<v Speaker 1>like the light goes in and then it comes back. Right. Well, yeah,

0:09:04.679 --> 0:09:07.560
<v Speaker 1>we think we we have we have it under wraps, right,

0:09:08.160 --> 0:09:09.959
<v Speaker 1>because we encounter them all the time and we have

0:09:10.080 --> 0:09:15.040
<v Speaker 1>this sort of ubiquitous environmental knowledge of them. But when

0:09:15.040 --> 0:09:17.480
<v Speaker 1>we're put to the test the office seems to be

0:09:17.679 --> 0:09:21.120
<v Speaker 1>uh the case. We we don't really understand how they work.

0:09:21.160 --> 0:09:23.400
<v Speaker 1>And and I think this is why we have all

0:09:23.400 --> 0:09:27.000
<v Speaker 1>these fictional tales about weird creepy mirrors, because we need

0:09:27.040 --> 0:09:31.240
<v Speaker 1>that that cultural release valve, that psychic release valve for

0:09:31.280 --> 0:09:34.880
<v Speaker 1>our uneasiness about them. But in terms of just proving

0:09:34.880 --> 0:09:38.120
<v Speaker 1>this out, there was a two thousand five psychological study

0:09:38.120 --> 0:09:40.400
<v Speaker 1>from the University of Liverpool and they looked into this

0:09:40.440 --> 0:09:43.760
<v Speaker 1>and they asked participants in the study to consider a

0:09:44.080 --> 0:09:47.079
<v Speaker 1>draped mirror, so it's, you know, like a haunted mirror

0:09:47.080 --> 0:09:49.000
<v Speaker 1>that's been covered up to keep monsters from coming out

0:09:49.000 --> 0:09:51.480
<v Speaker 1>of it, and they had to predict at which points

0:09:51.559 --> 0:09:53.880
<v Speaker 1>in the room. They would be able to see themselves

0:09:54.480 --> 0:09:57.400
<v Speaker 1>if the mirror in the mirror, if the mirror was uncovered. Okay,

0:09:57.440 --> 0:10:00.120
<v Speaker 1>so if you really had a solid understanding of what

0:10:00.160 --> 0:10:02.640
<v Speaker 1>a mirror, how a mirror works, you should be able

0:10:02.640 --> 0:10:05.520
<v Speaker 1>to predict how you can use it. And they weren't

0:10:05.520 --> 0:10:08.160
<v Speaker 1>able to to do that. They weren't. They weren't able

0:10:08.160 --> 0:10:10.000
<v Speaker 1>to Another thing they couldn't do is they weren't able

0:10:10.040 --> 0:10:12.760
<v Speaker 1>to grasp the fact that your reflection in the mirror

0:10:12.840 --> 0:10:16.559
<v Speaker 1>is always half your size, because the mirror is always

0:10:16.600 --> 0:10:20.000
<v Speaker 1>halfway between the viewer and the viewers reflection. So they'd

0:10:20.000 --> 0:10:22.240
<v Speaker 1>be asked to say, well, they'd be asked how big

0:10:22.320 --> 0:10:25.000
<v Speaker 1>is your your head in that reflection, and they would

0:10:25.120 --> 0:10:27.120
<v Speaker 1>assume that it was the same size as their own head.

0:10:27.920 --> 0:10:30.120
<v Speaker 1>So I would have assumed, yeah, I mean I wouldn't.

0:10:30.120 --> 0:10:32.360
<v Speaker 1>I really had to read the that sentence a couple

0:10:32.400 --> 0:10:35.520
<v Speaker 1>of times. Towie, oh, yeah, there is the mirror is

0:10:35.559 --> 0:10:40.480
<v Speaker 1>halfway between me and the spectral doppelganger with that that

0:10:40.559 --> 0:10:45.120
<v Speaker 1>has his his hair parted on the opposite side. Um

0:10:45.240 --> 0:10:47.680
<v Speaker 1>the But the study basically revealed that we we tend

0:10:47.720 --> 0:10:51.680
<v Speaker 1>to assume the size of the reflection. We tend to

0:10:51.800 --> 0:10:54.800
<v Speaker 1>assume that we know exactly how the angles work for

0:10:54.840 --> 0:10:59.440
<v Speaker 1>the reflection. Uh, we're terrible determining what will be seen

0:10:59.480 --> 0:11:02.000
<v Speaker 1>in a mirror based on the observer's vantage point. And

0:11:02.440 --> 0:11:04.719
<v Speaker 1>a major example of this is the Venus effect that

0:11:04.760 --> 0:11:07.840
<v Speaker 1>we see in so many paintings. Venus. Okay, so you

0:11:07.840 --> 0:11:10.880
<v Speaker 1>have Venus in the painting. Venus is looking at her

0:11:10.880 --> 0:11:14.040
<v Speaker 1>face in a mirror, and we're looking at the painting

0:11:14.240 --> 0:11:17.640
<v Speaker 1>and we see Venus's face. But if she's looking at

0:11:17.640 --> 0:11:20.360
<v Speaker 1>her face in the mirror, how does that work. It's

0:11:20.400 --> 0:11:22.200
<v Speaker 1>It's like, next time you're watching a TV show or

0:11:22.200 --> 0:11:25.240
<v Speaker 1>a movie and there's a scene with a mirror over analysis,

0:11:25.679 --> 0:11:28.600
<v Speaker 1>really think about where's the camera, where's the camera? What

0:11:28.640 --> 0:11:31.839
<v Speaker 1>are they looking at it? It really begins to open

0:11:31.920 --> 0:11:34.320
<v Speaker 1>up your eyes to the fact that it said, Wow,

0:11:34.360 --> 0:11:38.240
<v Speaker 1>I I was completely hoodwinked by this, and maybe I

0:11:38.280 --> 0:11:42.080
<v Speaker 1>don't have the firmest idea of the optical scenario going

0:11:42.120 --> 0:11:45.560
<v Speaker 1>on here. Uh. Slightly related, Also, anytime you're watching a

0:11:45.600 --> 0:11:48.040
<v Speaker 1>movie where there's a mirror on the lid of a

0:11:48.120 --> 0:11:51.480
<v Speaker 1>medicine cabinet and the person opens the medicine cabinet and

0:11:51.520 --> 0:11:54.640
<v Speaker 1>then shuts it be prepared to see another face in

0:11:54.679 --> 0:11:57.120
<v Speaker 1>the mirror behind the person when they shut the lid.

0:11:57.520 --> 0:12:00.319
<v Speaker 1>It happens every time. You know. One more, just very

0:12:00.400 --> 0:12:03.520
<v Speaker 1>quick optical example is just site itself. I think we've

0:12:03.520 --> 0:12:06.520
<v Speaker 1>touched on this that the idea that site is something

0:12:06.559 --> 0:12:10.440
<v Speaker 1>that leaves our eyes. Oh yeah, it's like laser vision. Uh.

0:12:10.480 --> 0:12:12.480
<v Speaker 1>This is one of those things like I talked about earlier,

0:12:12.480 --> 0:12:15.320
<v Speaker 1>where we have this magical unrealistic idea of how it works.

0:12:15.920 --> 0:12:18.920
<v Speaker 1>And even if you have the the realistic idea of

0:12:18.960 --> 0:12:21.360
<v Speaker 1>how it works, the idea of that light is entering

0:12:21.360 --> 0:12:24.760
<v Speaker 1>your eyes, you still you still end up thinking about

0:12:24.800 --> 0:12:28.400
<v Speaker 1>the world in terms of the the fictional scenario. I

0:12:28.400 --> 0:12:30.360
<v Speaker 1>think that's sort of a different gap because I think

0:12:30.400 --> 0:12:33.719
<v Speaker 1>most people do know really they know that the light

0:12:33.840 --> 0:12:36.160
<v Speaker 1>is entering the eyes, that nothing, nothing's going out. But

0:12:36.200 --> 0:12:39.280
<v Speaker 1>you're talking there about the difference between what what we

0:12:39.360 --> 0:12:44.080
<v Speaker 1>know and what we feel, and I think that where

0:12:44.080 --> 0:12:47.800
<v Speaker 1>those two converge, there's room for a lot of confusion.

0:12:48.120 --> 0:12:50.960
<v Speaker 1>I think that's absolutely right. Well, I think so today

0:12:51.000 --> 0:12:53.680
<v Speaker 1>we're going to look at the one big original study

0:12:54.240 --> 0:12:57.640
<v Speaker 1>in the illusion of explanatory depth, and then in the

0:12:57.679 --> 0:13:00.600
<v Speaker 1>next episode we're gonna look at some some takeaways and

0:13:00.640 --> 0:13:03.480
<v Speaker 1>some applications from it. But so I guess we should

0:13:03.520 --> 0:13:06.199
<v Speaker 1>get into the study itself, right, Yeah, do you want

0:13:06.200 --> 0:13:07.920
<v Speaker 1>to take a quick break before we get into it.

0:13:08.559 --> 0:13:10.400
<v Speaker 1>I want to take a quick break, Joe, and then

0:13:10.400 --> 0:13:17.880
<v Speaker 1>when we come back, let's get into this study. All right,

0:13:17.920 --> 0:13:21.800
<v Speaker 1>we're back, all right. So this landmark study is called

0:13:21.920 --> 0:13:26.920
<v Speaker 1>The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science, an Illusion of Explanatory Depth,

0:13:27.200 --> 0:13:31.120
<v Speaker 1>published in Cognitive Science in two thousand two by Frank

0:13:31.200 --> 0:13:36.520
<v Speaker 1>Kyle and Leonard Rosenblit. And so they start by discussing

0:13:36.559 --> 0:13:39.920
<v Speaker 1>the idea of folk theories. Have you ever heard this

0:13:40.000 --> 0:13:44.040
<v Speaker 1>concept before, Robert folk theories or folk science. Yeah, this

0:13:44.120 --> 0:13:47.520
<v Speaker 1>is just kind of the It was like folk medicine, right,

0:13:47.559 --> 0:13:50.760
<v Speaker 1>It's not necessarily there's not necessarily any science to it.

0:13:50.760 --> 0:13:54.800
<v Speaker 1>It's just kind of the the the general understanding of

0:13:54.800 --> 0:13:57.280
<v Speaker 1>how something works or how it's supposed to work. Yeah,

0:13:57.280 --> 0:13:59.600
<v Speaker 1>it's what we come up with when our methods are

0:13:59.600 --> 0:14:02.480
<v Speaker 1>not Garris. Essentially, it's what we all do sort of

0:14:02.480 --> 0:14:06.040
<v Speaker 1>intuitively all the time. And so they say, you know,

0:14:06.080 --> 0:14:09.280
<v Speaker 1>sort of a theory can be defined as a system

0:14:09.320 --> 0:14:13.480
<v Speaker 1>of ideas that are designed to explain something observed. The

0:14:13.480 --> 0:14:16.800
<v Speaker 1>theory gives an explanation, and theories are a totally common

0:14:16.800 --> 0:14:19.600
<v Speaker 1>feature of science and of everyday life. You know, we

0:14:19.600 --> 0:14:21.480
<v Speaker 1>we use theories all the time. They might not be

0:14:21.600 --> 0:14:25.360
<v Speaker 1>good or correct theories, but we're constantly having theories about

0:14:25.480 --> 0:14:28.560
<v Speaker 1>the explanation of the workings of objects and systems. A

0:14:28.680 --> 0:14:32.120
<v Speaker 1>great example of this is that blue blood in your veins.

0:14:33.120 --> 0:14:35.680
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, do you have an explanation for that? Well,

0:14:35.720 --> 0:14:39.120
<v Speaker 1>there's the Well, it's because it's deprived of oxygen, right,

0:14:39.360 --> 0:14:41.680
<v Speaker 1>and that why it turns blue. That's not correct, is it. No,

0:14:41.800 --> 0:14:43.480
<v Speaker 1>it's not correct, but it's It's one of those that

0:14:43.600 --> 0:14:46.880
<v Speaker 1>is often thrown out there sometimes but very intelligent people.

0:14:46.880 --> 0:14:49.000
<v Speaker 1>It's I you know, I don't mean to to mention

0:14:49.000 --> 0:14:52.040
<v Speaker 1>any of these is an example of intellectual failing, but

0:14:52.080 --> 0:14:56.320
<v Speaker 1>they just they pick up esteem. They're passed around, and

0:14:56.760 --> 0:14:59.040
<v Speaker 1>it's easy to go through life thinking that they're true. No,

0:14:59.240 --> 0:15:01.160
<v Speaker 1>and that that can to another thing. We should say.

0:15:01.200 --> 0:15:03.760
<v Speaker 1>This episode is going to be all about our cognitive

0:15:03.800 --> 0:15:07.640
<v Speaker 1>limitations and failures and overconfidence in what we know. But

0:15:07.800 --> 0:15:10.680
<v Speaker 1>this isn't to say that people are stupid or you know,

0:15:10.880 --> 0:15:13.280
<v Speaker 1>we're not accusing the people featured in the studies or

0:15:13.320 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 1>people in general of being dumb. It's just good to

0:15:16.760 --> 0:15:20.440
<v Speaker 1>reckon with what the mistakes human brains usually make. Our

0:15:20.880 --> 0:15:25.840
<v Speaker 1>human brains make mistakes continually, and uh, I mean, the

0:15:25.840 --> 0:15:28.360
<v Speaker 1>best you can do is be aware of the limitations.

0:15:28.400 --> 0:15:30.880
<v Speaker 1>But one of the things about these folk theories is

0:15:30.920 --> 0:15:34.400
<v Speaker 1>that they often feel like they explain more than they

0:15:34.440 --> 0:15:36.960
<v Speaker 1>actually do. And take the blue blood in the vein

0:15:37.320 --> 0:15:40.880
<v Speaker 1>that that seems intuitive. What if somebody you believe that, Okay,

0:15:40.960 --> 0:15:43.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm looking at my veins in their blue and it's

0:15:43.080 --> 0:15:45.720
<v Speaker 1>because the blood turns blue. What if somebody asked you

0:15:46.240 --> 0:15:51.840
<v Speaker 1>to write down an explanation of how that happens. Then

0:15:51.880 --> 0:15:54.000
<v Speaker 1>you'd start being like, well, wait, so I'm trying to

0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:56.480
<v Speaker 1>write the steps down, so the blood is deprived of

0:15:56.520 --> 0:16:00.840
<v Speaker 1>oxygen and turns blue, how does that happen? Don't You'd

0:16:00.840 --> 0:16:04.640
<v Speaker 1>start encountering gaps in your knowledge. And the authors of

0:16:04.680 --> 0:16:07.480
<v Speaker 1>the study right about this, they say, quote, we frequently

0:16:07.520 --> 0:16:10.760
<v Speaker 1>discovered that the theory that seems crystal clear and complete

0:16:10.760 --> 0:16:15.080
<v Speaker 1>in our head suddenly develops gaping holes and inconsistencies when

0:16:15.080 --> 0:16:18.120
<v Speaker 1>we try to set it down on paper. Uh, intuitively,

0:16:18.200 --> 0:16:20.600
<v Speaker 1>I think that's they're exactly correct about that. I've had

0:16:20.600 --> 0:16:23.600
<v Speaker 1>this experience plenty of times, or not even on paper.

0:16:23.640 --> 0:16:25.920
<v Speaker 1>I bet Robert, I bet you've had this experience too.

0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:29.680
<v Speaker 1>I know I have. Here in the podcast studio. In

0:16:29.720 --> 0:16:32.800
<v Speaker 1>the middle of a podcast, maybe a tangent comes up

0:16:32.800 --> 0:16:35.480
<v Speaker 1>where you briefly want to explain how something works that's

0:16:35.520 --> 0:16:38.120
<v Speaker 1>not central to your research, and you think you do,

0:16:38.280 --> 0:16:40.920
<v Speaker 1>so you just start talking, and you get a sentence

0:16:41.000 --> 0:16:43.440
<v Speaker 1>or two in and you wait. You're like, oh, wait

0:16:43.480 --> 0:16:47.080
<v Speaker 1>a minute. I thought I understood that when I started talking,

0:16:47.120 --> 0:16:49.800
<v Speaker 1>But now that I'm saying the words, I don't actually

0:16:49.840 --> 0:16:52.800
<v Speaker 1>know how this works. And you have to stop and

0:16:52.840 --> 0:16:55.520
<v Speaker 1>figure out, Okay, what am I gonna do now? Yeah? Yeah,

0:16:55.760 --> 0:16:57.800
<v Speaker 1>you have to make that decision. Do I do I

0:16:57.840 --> 0:17:00.520
<v Speaker 1>own up to the fact that I that I really

0:17:00.560 --> 0:17:02.560
<v Speaker 1>don't know what I'm talking about. I'm gonna make everybody

0:17:02.560 --> 0:17:05.480
<v Speaker 1>wait while I read about this for fifteen minutes. Or

0:17:05.560 --> 0:17:08.560
<v Speaker 1>do I just plow ahead and somehow easyl my way

0:17:08.560 --> 0:17:11.480
<v Speaker 1>out of it. Um. I think where I encountered this

0:17:11.520 --> 0:17:15.040
<v Speaker 1>a lot is is in the preparation for a podcast episode.

0:17:15.560 --> 0:17:18.200
<v Speaker 1>My wife will ask me what we're recording on this week,

0:17:18.560 --> 0:17:20.679
<v Speaker 1>and I'll say, oh, recording on such and side, and

0:17:20.720 --> 0:17:22.760
<v Speaker 1>she's like, oh, really, what's what's that about? Give me

0:17:22.800 --> 0:17:25.320
<v Speaker 1>the elevator pitch and and then I'll start to explain it,

0:17:25.359 --> 0:17:27.760
<v Speaker 1>and then I'll realize, oh, you know, it's you know,

0:17:27.840 --> 0:17:32.119
<v Speaker 1>A plus VEH equals C, except I can't adequately describe

0:17:32.359 --> 0:17:35.280
<v Speaker 1>step B in the scenario. It made sense in your

0:17:35.320 --> 0:17:38.440
<v Speaker 1>head until you started trying to use words, and then

0:17:38.600 --> 0:17:41.359
<v Speaker 1>that's where the that's where it became problematic. And what

0:17:41.440 --> 0:17:44.040
<v Speaker 1>it reveals is that, in fact, it didn't actually make

0:17:44.119 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 1>sense in my head. It just felt like it did.

0:17:46.680 --> 0:17:48.720
<v Speaker 1>And it's useful to it for us because then you know, oh, well,

0:17:48.760 --> 0:17:51.600
<v Speaker 1>that's that's what I don't understand. That's what I need.

0:17:51.640 --> 0:17:54.239
<v Speaker 1>That needs to make sense to me truly, because if

0:17:54.240 --> 0:17:55.800
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't truly make sense to me, it's not going

0:17:55.880 --> 0:17:58.520
<v Speaker 1>to make sense to the listener. Right. Okay, So folk

0:17:58.640 --> 0:18:02.080
<v Speaker 1>theories in contrast us too scientific theories, where you've got

0:18:02.119 --> 0:18:05.199
<v Speaker 1>scientists trying to constantly hunt down the gaping holes and

0:18:05.240 --> 0:18:10.160
<v Speaker 1>inconsistencies in their theories and fix them. With folk theories, uh,

0:18:10.359 --> 0:18:13.240
<v Speaker 1>the explanatory systems are sort of produced in the minds

0:18:13.280 --> 0:18:17.199
<v Speaker 1>of lay people by non rigorous processes. And uh so,

0:18:17.240 --> 0:18:19.919
<v Speaker 1>if you're not a telecommunications engineer, you probably have some

0:18:20.000 --> 0:18:23.120
<v Speaker 1>kind of folk theory about how your cell phone works. Right,

0:18:23.160 --> 0:18:26.639
<v Speaker 1>You've got some basic skeletal idea of well, there's a

0:18:26.720 --> 0:18:29.639
<v Speaker 1>signal in the phone. Maybe you know, it's electromagnetic radiation

0:18:29.760 --> 0:18:33.560
<v Speaker 1>that goes from the phone from the antenna part maybe

0:18:33.720 --> 0:18:36.040
<v Speaker 1>or the antenna is hidden inside now, But it goes

0:18:36.080 --> 0:18:38.600
<v Speaker 1>from part of the phone to a tower. Does it

0:18:38.640 --> 0:18:40.520
<v Speaker 1>go to a satellite, I don't know. If it goes

0:18:40.560 --> 0:18:42.760
<v Speaker 1>to the cloud, that's a big one. And I and

0:18:42.800 --> 0:18:46.840
<v Speaker 1>I've been guilty of this too, not really stopping to realize,

0:18:46.840 --> 0:18:48.960
<v Speaker 1>oh wait, the cloud, Like I know that there's not

0:18:49.080 --> 0:18:54.439
<v Speaker 1>an invisible wonder Woman's airplane type computing system floating in

0:18:54.480 --> 0:18:59.000
<v Speaker 1>the sky. And yet somehow I fall back on that idea,

0:18:59.560 --> 0:19:02.600
<v Speaker 1>just perhaps just out of like I out of a

0:19:02.680 --> 0:19:07.880
<v Speaker 1>lack of desire to understand um the details and our

0:19:07.880 --> 0:19:12.040
<v Speaker 1>telecommunication system. But but yeah, I find myself at least

0:19:12.040 --> 0:19:14.960
<v Speaker 1>putting it up, putting the non realists, the unrealistic version

0:19:15.000 --> 0:19:19.840
<v Speaker 1>up on the shelf with a more realistic expectation of technology. Yeah,

0:19:19.880 --> 0:19:22.879
<v Speaker 1>and yet nevertheless, you sort of think you understand how

0:19:22.920 --> 0:19:25.160
<v Speaker 1>a cell phone works right at a basic level, at

0:19:25.160 --> 0:19:27.359
<v Speaker 1>a basic level, and and then you start, oh no.

0:19:28.080 --> 0:19:30.160
<v Speaker 1>But so the authors of the study, they're they're talking

0:19:30.200 --> 0:19:33.520
<v Speaker 1>about the problems with the way people hold them. So

0:19:33.720 --> 0:19:37.920
<v Speaker 1>they say, quote first, they are novice scientists. People people

0:19:37.960 --> 0:19:41.359
<v Speaker 1>in general are novice scientists. Their knowledge of most phenomena

0:19:41.600 --> 0:19:44.600
<v Speaker 1>is not very deep. We have shallow understandings. But then

0:19:44.640 --> 0:19:49.320
<v Speaker 1>they also say, quote second, their novice epistemologists, meaning people

0:19:49.320 --> 0:19:54.399
<v Speaker 1>who study how knowledge is generated, how we know things, uh, continuing,

0:19:54.600 --> 0:19:58.080
<v Speaker 1>their sense of the properties of knowledge itself, including how

0:19:58.119 --> 0:20:01.600
<v Speaker 1>it is stored, is poor and potentially misleading. So we

0:20:01.680 --> 0:20:04.520
<v Speaker 1>have both an incomplete understanding of how many things work,

0:20:04.720 --> 0:20:07.359
<v Speaker 1>but we also fail to recognize that we have an

0:20:07.359 --> 0:20:11.240
<v Speaker 1>incomplete understanding, uh, exhibited by the fact that when we

0:20:11.280 --> 0:20:13.320
<v Speaker 1>get put on the spot where we're sort of caught

0:20:13.320 --> 0:20:16.080
<v Speaker 1>off guard, we're like, oh, wait, I thought I understood that,

0:20:16.119 --> 0:20:19.600
<v Speaker 1>but now I'm realizing maybe I didn't. UM. So their

0:20:19.640 --> 0:20:23.800
<v Speaker 1>central thesis in this paper is quote we argue here

0:20:23.840 --> 0:20:28.080
<v Speaker 1>that people's limited knowledge and they're misleading. Intuitive epistemology combined

0:20:28.119 --> 0:20:32.080
<v Speaker 1>to create an illusion of explanatory depth or io e ed.

0:20:32.960 --> 0:20:37.880
<v Speaker 1>Most people feel they understand the world in far greater detail, coherence,

0:20:37.960 --> 0:20:42.520
<v Speaker 1>and depth than they actually do. Um Also, they say

0:20:42.520 --> 0:20:45.960
<v Speaker 1>that we're more overconfident about our understanding of some types

0:20:46.000 --> 0:20:50.000
<v Speaker 1>of knowledge than others. Specifically, are our knowledge dealing with

0:20:50.160 --> 0:20:53.639
<v Speaker 1>explanations for how things work that that is that is

0:20:53.680 --> 0:20:56.800
<v Speaker 1>to be singled out. So to test these ideas, the

0:20:56.880 --> 0:21:00.720
<v Speaker 1>authors performed a big series of studies. They're actually twelve

0:21:00.800 --> 0:21:04.760
<v Speaker 1>different studies inside this this massive paper, UH, to measure

0:21:04.760 --> 0:21:09.600
<v Speaker 1>people's level of confidence in their understanding compared with what

0:21:09.680 --> 0:21:12.920
<v Speaker 1>their actual level of understanding is as measured by their

0:21:12.920 --> 0:21:18.120
<v Speaker 1>confidence after they've had some calibration, and then then UH,

0:21:18.160 --> 0:21:22.240
<v Speaker 1>comparing that within various different domains of knowledge, meaning just

0:21:22.359 --> 0:21:26.320
<v Speaker 1>different types of knowing things do you know facts about geography,

0:21:26.440 --> 0:21:29.120
<v Speaker 1>or do you know the narratives of movie plots, or

0:21:29.359 --> 0:21:34.000
<v Speaker 1>do you know how a toilet works. So there have

0:21:34.040 --> 0:21:36.399
<v Speaker 1>been a lot of previous studies about overconfidence, and one

0:21:36.440 --> 0:21:39.760
<v Speaker 1>of the things that's important to establish is that a

0:21:39.800 --> 0:21:43.720
<v Speaker 1>lot of previous research has sort of focused on general knowledge,

0:21:43.920 --> 0:21:48.040
<v Speaker 1>that people might be overconfident about knowledge in general. And

0:21:48.080 --> 0:21:51.440
<v Speaker 1>the authors are not into this idea. That they don't

0:21:51.480 --> 0:21:54.439
<v Speaker 1>like the idea of general knowledge. Instead, they like the

0:21:54.480 --> 0:21:58.320
<v Speaker 1>idea of breaking out knowledge into these different categories, because,

0:21:58.359 --> 0:22:01.040
<v Speaker 1>as they will end up showing in their research, the

0:22:01.160 --> 0:22:05.399
<v Speaker 1>brain estimates its own knowledge in different categories in with

0:22:05.480 --> 0:22:08.639
<v Speaker 1>different levels of accuracy. Yeah. I think we all, most

0:22:08.760 --> 0:22:11.760
<v Speaker 1>healthy individuals realize that they know a lot about some

0:22:11.800 --> 0:22:16.960
<v Speaker 1>things maybe, but certainly little or nothing about other topics. Correct, right,

0:22:17.320 --> 0:22:21.080
<v Speaker 1>and especially uh, not just topics, but different types of

0:22:21.119 --> 0:22:24.240
<v Speaker 1>things to know. Like, you might be way more if

0:22:24.280 --> 0:22:29.639
<v Speaker 1>I ask you, um, Robert, what is the capital of England?

0:22:30.240 --> 0:22:32.760
<v Speaker 1>Before you answer, tell me how confident are you that

0:22:32.800 --> 0:22:34.560
<v Speaker 1>you know the right answer? On a scale of one

0:22:34.600 --> 0:22:38.199
<v Speaker 1>to ten, I would say a ten, Okay, what's the

0:22:38.240 --> 0:22:42.159
<v Speaker 1>capital London? Okay, you're right there, you go. Okay, but

0:22:42.320 --> 0:22:45.080
<v Speaker 1>tell me how confident are you that you can explain

0:22:45.119 --> 0:22:49.840
<v Speaker 1>how a lightsaber works? Well? Uh, not not very because

0:22:49.880 --> 0:22:53.840
<v Speaker 1>that's a it's essentially a magical device. Yeah, I forgot

0:22:54.040 --> 0:22:57.240
<v Speaker 1>and uh and and I also don't I actually I

0:22:57.320 --> 0:23:00.240
<v Speaker 1>think I rewrote the intro page for how lightsabers were

0:23:00.400 --> 0:23:02.840
<v Speaker 1>on how stuff works dot com. Yeah, so I have

0:23:02.960 --> 0:23:06.560
<v Speaker 1>actually worked with the an article, an article that explains

0:23:06.640 --> 0:23:10.000
<v Speaker 1>how it supposedly works, but I don't recall it at all.

0:23:10.680 --> 0:23:12.880
<v Speaker 1>Do you think working on that article would have made

0:23:12.880 --> 0:23:16.080
<v Speaker 1>you more or less confident in your own understanding. I

0:23:16.080 --> 0:23:18.600
<v Speaker 1>think if I had actually worked on the meat of it.

0:23:18.960 --> 0:23:20.840
<v Speaker 1>But that's an article. I think I just brewsed up

0:23:20.880 --> 0:23:23.879
<v Speaker 1>the landing page. I just sexed it up a little.

0:23:23.960 --> 0:23:26.080
<v Speaker 1>Did Tracy Wilson write that one? No, I think it

0:23:26.119 --> 0:23:30.439
<v Speaker 1>was an older piece. Well, anyway, let's go onto the study.

0:23:30.720 --> 0:23:34.359
<v Speaker 1>So study number one out of this. First thing they

0:23:34.359 --> 0:23:37.680
<v Speaker 1>wanted to do was document the illusion of explanatory depth.

0:23:37.760 --> 0:23:39.960
<v Speaker 1>If this thing exists, let's see if we can get

0:23:39.960 --> 0:23:42.120
<v Speaker 1>some evidence that it is there. So they got sixteen

0:23:42.119 --> 0:23:45.920
<v Speaker 1>graduate students from various departments at Yale and these are

0:23:45.920 --> 0:23:49.480
<v Speaker 1>the participants that this was done by professors at Yale University,

0:23:49.560 --> 0:23:52.359
<v Speaker 1>so there's a lot of Yale's in this. And the

0:23:52.880 --> 0:23:55.040
<v Speaker 1>test dealt with their ability to explain how a bunch

0:23:55.080 --> 0:23:58.320
<v Speaker 1>of devices work. So participants were given instructions on how

0:23:58.400 --> 0:24:02.240
<v Speaker 1>to rate their level of explanatory knowledge of a device

0:24:02.280 --> 0:24:05.080
<v Speaker 1>on a scale of one to seven with the help

0:24:05.080 --> 0:24:08.520
<v Speaker 1>of a couple of examples GPS system and a crossbow.

0:24:08.920 --> 0:24:12.159
<v Speaker 1>So with the example of a crossbow, basically a seven

0:24:12.200 --> 0:24:14.480
<v Speaker 1>means you know all the parts and you know how

0:24:14.520 --> 0:24:16.960
<v Speaker 1>all of them work together to make the device work.

0:24:17.040 --> 0:24:20.080
<v Speaker 1>You know all the causal relationships. You could you could

0:24:20.080 --> 0:24:22.760
<v Speaker 1>almost build the thing yourself if you had all the parts.

0:24:23.359 --> 0:24:27.120
<v Speaker 1>Um A one means you you basically don't know anything

0:24:27.160 --> 0:24:29.240
<v Speaker 1>more than what it looks like and what it does.

0:24:29.359 --> 0:24:31.480
<v Speaker 1>You don't know what the parts are, how the parts

0:24:31.480 --> 0:24:34.919
<v Speaker 1>work together. It's almost magic to you. Okay. Then the

0:24:34.960 --> 0:24:38.119
<v Speaker 1>participants were given a list of forty eight objects and

0:24:38.160 --> 0:24:41.240
<v Speaker 1>asked to rate their level of understanding of how the

0:24:41.280 --> 0:24:44.160
<v Speaker 1>object works. So you just go down this list, uh

0:24:44.240 --> 0:24:48.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, uh l C D screen, car, battery, a zipper,

0:24:48.280 --> 0:24:53.560
<v Speaker 1>a spiedometer, piano, key, can opener, hydroelectric turbine, flush toilet,

0:24:53.880 --> 0:24:57.919
<v Speaker 1>cylinder lock, helicopter, quartz watch, sewing machine, And you're supposed

0:24:57.920 --> 0:25:00.000
<v Speaker 1>to give the number on the scale of one to seven.

0:25:00.040 --> 0:25:02.240
<v Speaker 1>Then how well do you understand what all the parts are,

0:25:02.400 --> 0:25:05.200
<v Speaker 1>how they work together? How well do how well do

0:25:05.240 --> 0:25:07.480
<v Speaker 1>you understand how it works? And just to use a

0:25:07.480 --> 0:25:10.320
<v Speaker 1>little terminology because it will recur throughout throughout all the

0:25:10.320 --> 0:25:13.200
<v Speaker 1>different studies here. This first rating is known as T one.

0:25:13.359 --> 0:25:15.880
<v Speaker 1>This thing they give on the first questions their own

0:25:15.880 --> 0:25:19.040
<v Speaker 1>self rating of their explanatory knowledge of each item. Is

0:25:19.119 --> 0:25:21.680
<v Speaker 1>T one. And then in the next phase, the students

0:25:22.119 --> 0:25:25.600
<v Speaker 1>are asked to write a detailed explanation for half of

0:25:25.640 --> 0:25:28.399
<v Speaker 1>the of some of these items in the test category,

0:25:29.000 --> 0:25:32.040
<v Speaker 1>to explain in detail how a sewing machine works. So

0:25:32.240 --> 0:25:35.359
<v Speaker 1>you rated maybe a four on how well you know

0:25:35.400 --> 0:25:37.520
<v Speaker 1>how a sewing machine works? Now we need you to

0:25:37.600 --> 0:25:40.879
<v Speaker 1>explain it step by step in in words, And then

0:25:40.920 --> 0:25:43.359
<v Speaker 1>they wrote that detailed explanation. Then they were asked to

0:25:43.520 --> 0:25:47.160
<v Speaker 1>rate their initial understanding again. So now that you've written

0:25:47.160 --> 0:25:51.520
<v Speaker 1>that explanation, how well did you understand it to begin with? Uh?

0:25:51.560 --> 0:25:54.200
<v Speaker 1>Then they were given and that that rating is T

0:25:54.200 --> 0:25:58.920
<v Speaker 1>two uh. Then they're given a diagnostic question. For example,

0:25:59.400 --> 0:26:01.280
<v Speaker 1>if one of the items they had to explain was

0:26:01.320 --> 0:26:04.639
<v Speaker 1>a cylinder lock, the diagnostic question might be do you

0:26:04.640 --> 0:26:08.000
<v Speaker 1>know how to pick a cylinder lock? And this question

0:26:08.080 --> 0:26:10.720
<v Speaker 1>is designed to force the person to think even more

0:26:10.800 --> 0:26:13.080
<v Speaker 1>about what the parts are and how they work together.

0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:15.960
<v Speaker 1>And then after the diagnostic question, they're asked to rate

0:26:16.000 --> 0:26:19.320
<v Speaker 1>their initial understanding yet again how well did you understand

0:26:19.359 --> 0:26:22.800
<v Speaker 1>it to begin with? And then finally the participants got

0:26:22.800 --> 0:26:26.600
<v Speaker 1>to read a brief explanation written by an expert of

0:26:26.720 --> 0:26:30.280
<v Speaker 1>how these items worked that they explained. And these expert

0:26:30.320 --> 0:26:33.320
<v Speaker 1>explanations came from a cd ROM titled The Way Things

0:26:33.320 --> 0:26:35.719
<v Speaker 1>Worked two point oh. I was hoping they'd use some

0:26:35.800 --> 0:26:40.040
<v Speaker 1>vintage how stuff Works articles. No, no, alas it was

0:26:40.080 --> 0:26:43.200
<v Speaker 1>two thousand two. How staff Works existed then, but we

0:26:43.200 --> 0:26:47.000
<v Speaker 1>were not here anyway. After reading these expert explanations, they

0:26:47.040 --> 0:26:50.879
<v Speaker 1>had to rate again how well they had initially understood

0:26:50.880 --> 0:26:53.680
<v Speaker 1>the device, and then how well they understood it now

0:26:53.800 --> 0:26:57.960
<v Speaker 1>after having read the explanation. So what are the results?

0:26:58.000 --> 0:27:00.399
<v Speaker 1>What does this graph look like? You start with your

0:27:00.440 --> 0:27:03.480
<v Speaker 1>initial guests, and then you get adjusted by having had

0:27:03.520 --> 0:27:07.760
<v Speaker 1>to make an explanation, answer a diagnostic question, and then

0:27:07.800 --> 0:27:10.600
<v Speaker 1>read an expert's explanation. Well, the graph forms a kind

0:27:10.600 --> 0:27:14.600
<v Speaker 1>of U shape or an inverted bell shape, where initially

0:27:14.640 --> 0:27:18.000
<v Speaker 1>the students rate their level of understanding really high or

0:27:18.359 --> 0:27:21.560
<v Speaker 1>relatively high. Not necessarily really high, but it's like, yeah,

0:27:21.920 --> 0:27:24.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, I give it a four. I I understand

0:27:24.400 --> 0:27:28.480
<v Speaker 1>pretty well how a cylinder lock works. Then then they

0:27:28.480 --> 0:27:31.879
<v Speaker 1>have to give the explanation and the ratings drop off significantly.

0:27:32.480 --> 0:27:34.840
<v Speaker 1>Now note that this is not somebody coming in from

0:27:34.840 --> 0:27:37.840
<v Speaker 1>the outside and telling them their explanation is wrong. This

0:27:37.920 --> 0:27:41.560
<v Speaker 1>is their own self evaluation after having had to do

0:27:41.640 --> 0:27:45.360
<v Speaker 1>nothing but just put their own ideas into words. Then

0:27:45.359 --> 0:27:48.359
<v Speaker 1>it continued to drop again after the diagnostic question, and

0:27:48.359 --> 0:27:52.440
<v Speaker 1>then finally shot back up again after reading the experts explanation. No,

0:27:52.640 --> 0:27:55.520
<v Speaker 1>no surprise. If you read somebody telling you how it works,

0:27:55.560 --> 0:27:57.639
<v Speaker 1>now you understand how it works. So it's a perfect

0:27:57.680 --> 0:28:00.320
<v Speaker 1>story arc. It's kind of like a most to kung

0:28:00.359 --> 0:28:03.520
<v Speaker 1>fu movies, right where you have the the the young

0:28:03.640 --> 0:28:06.679
<v Speaker 1>student who is overconfident and then his uh, his, he

0:28:06.720 --> 0:28:10.080
<v Speaker 1>gets his his rear end handed to him by the villain,

0:28:10.520 --> 0:28:12.879
<v Speaker 1>and then he has to learn, he has to accept

0:28:12.920 --> 0:28:15.000
<v Speaker 1>what he doesn't know, and then he has to to

0:28:15.080 --> 0:28:17.760
<v Speaker 1>learn the craft from a from a master, and then

0:28:17.840 --> 0:28:20.840
<v Speaker 1>in the end he can defeat the villain. It's a

0:28:20.880 --> 0:28:26.240
<v Speaker 1>kind of a cry kid situation. Yeah. I think that's

0:28:26.240 --> 0:28:30.920
<v Speaker 1>interesting how how our our narratives play on this this

0:28:31.440 --> 0:28:34.480
<v Speaker 1>fact about us. It almost suggests that somehow we might

0:28:34.600 --> 0:28:38.800
<v Speaker 1>intuitively be somewhat aware of the illusion of explanatory depth.

0:28:39.520 --> 0:28:42.520
<v Speaker 1>But so anyway, looking at this graph, so you know

0:28:42.640 --> 0:28:45.080
<v Speaker 1>that there were drops from T one to T two,

0:28:45.440 --> 0:28:48.000
<v Speaker 1>and then again slightly from T two to T three,

0:28:48.640 --> 0:28:51.280
<v Speaker 1>and then pretty much no drop from T three to

0:28:51.400 --> 0:28:54.560
<v Speaker 1>T four, and then a large increase from T four

0:28:54.640 --> 0:28:57.040
<v Speaker 1>to T five. So one of the things is the

0:28:57.040 --> 0:29:01.000
<v Speaker 1>pattern rules out the idea that confidence is dropping merely

0:29:01.040 --> 0:29:04.320
<v Speaker 1>because of the elapsing of time in the experiment. Right,

0:29:04.360 --> 0:29:07.200
<v Speaker 1>It's not just people are steadily going lower. You know

0:29:07.360 --> 0:29:10.560
<v Speaker 1>that there they eventually stopped lowering their own score, and

0:29:10.560 --> 0:29:13.520
<v Speaker 1>then it comes back up after they read the expert's explanation.

0:29:15.000 --> 0:29:17.520
<v Speaker 1>So so that basically you have to confront what you

0:29:17.600 --> 0:29:21.440
<v Speaker 1>don't know in order to learn, yes, exactly. And the

0:29:21.520 --> 0:29:24.560
<v Speaker 1>interesting thing is that if they're they they sort of

0:29:24.680 --> 0:29:27.640
<v Speaker 1>rate themselves lower, but then they don't keep dropping, You're

0:29:27.640 --> 0:29:30.800
<v Speaker 1>not in free fall. Maybe that suggests that they're adjusting

0:29:30.960 --> 0:29:34.720
<v Speaker 1>more toward real accuracy in their judgment of how much

0:29:34.760 --> 0:29:37.840
<v Speaker 1>they knew. There's also an interesting note that they have

0:29:37.920 --> 0:29:40.280
<v Speaker 1>though this is not quantified data, but this is just

0:29:40.360 --> 0:29:43.640
<v Speaker 1>sort of a subjective report from the debriefing afterwards. You know,

0:29:43.680 --> 0:29:46.160
<v Speaker 1>they talked to the people who were in the experiments,

0:29:46.440 --> 0:29:50.920
<v Speaker 1>and many participants subjectively said they were surprised and felt

0:29:51.000 --> 0:29:54.160
<v Speaker 1>humbled by how much less they knew than they had

0:29:54.160 --> 0:29:58.560
<v Speaker 1>originally assumed. But also, and this is really interesting, even

0:29:58.640 --> 0:30:02.560
<v Speaker 1>with this new humility. Some of the participants showed that

0:30:02.600 --> 0:30:05.920
<v Speaker 1>they were still susceptible to the illusion of explanatory depth,

0:30:06.000 --> 0:30:08.760
<v Speaker 1>because here's what they said. If only I had gotten

0:30:08.760 --> 0:30:11.720
<v Speaker 1>the cylinder lock instead of the flush toilet or whatever,

0:30:12.240 --> 0:30:15.240
<v Speaker 1>then I would have done better overall. So if only

0:30:15.280 --> 0:30:18.520
<v Speaker 1>I'd gotten these other devices instead of the ones I had,

0:30:18.880 --> 0:30:23.160
<v Speaker 1>And the experimenters say, this judgment seems unlikely to be true,

0:30:23.200 --> 0:30:26.080
<v Speaker 1>given that the average level of performance on the two

0:30:26.400 --> 0:30:31.600
<v Speaker 1>different device sets used in the test was pretty much identical. Okay,

0:30:31.680 --> 0:30:33.959
<v Speaker 1>so it to use the kung fu advantage. It's like

0:30:34.000 --> 0:30:38.200
<v Speaker 1>the the young foolish hero enters into combat with the

0:30:38.280 --> 0:30:42.200
<v Speaker 1>villain and is defeated in a sword fight. Uh, and

0:30:42.240 --> 0:30:45.080
<v Speaker 1>then afterwards he's like like, oh my goodness, Yeah, I

0:30:45.400 --> 0:30:47.200
<v Speaker 1>really didn't know how to fight with a so hard.

0:30:47.200 --> 0:30:50.040
<v Speaker 1>After all. If only he had fought me in judo

0:30:50.680 --> 0:30:53.160
<v Speaker 1>right then, then I truly I would have taken him

0:30:53.160 --> 0:30:55.800
<v Speaker 1>out like that. But what if this guy everybody else

0:30:55.840 --> 0:30:58.680
<v Speaker 1>said that about judo, and this guy has defeated everybody

0:30:58.680 --> 0:31:01.600
<v Speaker 1>in Judo also, Yeah, I mean, if if he's wrong

0:31:01.640 --> 0:31:04.520
<v Speaker 1>about this thing, then it could he is it true

0:31:04.560 --> 0:31:06.840
<v Speaker 1>that he's right about everything else? I would doubt it.

0:31:07.000 --> 0:31:11.120
<v Speaker 1>Well it is if he's very special. Maybe he's very special.

0:31:11.360 --> 0:31:14.000
<v Speaker 1>But but yeah, it shows this um you can still

0:31:14.040 --> 0:31:16.600
<v Speaker 1>you still have the blinders on, like you've been humbled

0:31:16.760 --> 0:31:19.880
<v Speaker 1>on this one category, but you're still susceptible to the

0:31:19.960 --> 0:31:24.360
<v Speaker 1>to the illusion of understanding in all other aspects of life. Yeah,

0:31:24.400 --> 0:31:26.680
<v Speaker 1>if only I'd had the toilet, then I would have

0:31:26.680 --> 0:31:31.160
<v Speaker 1>been golden. Okay, anyway, so established here. But this is

0:31:31.200 --> 0:31:34.680
<v Speaker 1>a pretty small sample sixteen grad students, also Yale grad students.

0:31:34.680 --> 0:31:37.840
<v Speaker 1>That's pretty rarefied group to draw from. So we need

0:31:37.880 --> 0:31:40.000
<v Speaker 1>to do some more experiments of the same type to

0:31:40.040 --> 0:31:43.520
<v Speaker 1>try to replicate the results. So they did another one.

0:31:43.600 --> 0:31:46.960
<v Speaker 1>Study number two, they repeat the same experiment, same conditions,

0:31:47.000 --> 0:31:49.600
<v Speaker 1>with a larger, younger sample, a group of thirty three

0:31:49.680 --> 0:31:53.560
<v Speaker 1>Yale undergrads. Undergrads from the same school were picked because,

0:31:53.560 --> 0:31:57.240
<v Speaker 1>in the words of the author's quote, conceivably graduate study

0:31:57.320 --> 0:32:00.400
<v Speaker 1>leads to an intellectual arrogance, and the allude should of

0:32:00.400 --> 0:32:04.160
<v Speaker 1>explanatory competence might be less in undergraduates who are still

0:32:04.200 --> 0:32:09.080
<v Speaker 1>awed by what they do not know. There were there

0:32:09.080 --> 0:32:10.800
<v Speaker 1>were some parts of the study where the writing was

0:32:10.840 --> 0:32:14.680
<v Speaker 1>a little cheeky. I appreciated it. But the thing is

0:32:14.920 --> 0:32:19.560
<v Speaker 1>it replicated basically got very similar results, producing the same

0:32:19.640 --> 0:32:23.200
<v Speaker 1>pattern with respect to the responses over time. Uh. They

0:32:23.240 --> 0:32:26.960
<v Speaker 1>initially rated their own understanding higher than after they had

0:32:27.000 --> 0:32:30.520
<v Speaker 1>to explain it, not got knocked down, uh, and then

0:32:30.680 --> 0:32:33.719
<v Speaker 1>down by the diagnostic question, and then up again at

0:32:33.720 --> 0:32:35.560
<v Speaker 1>the end after they got to read what the expert

0:32:35.600 --> 0:32:38.200
<v Speaker 1>had to say. But one thing that's interesting about the

0:32:38.240 --> 0:32:40.960
<v Speaker 1>undergrads is that the effect was actually just a little

0:32:40.960 --> 0:32:44.840
<v Speaker 1>bit not significantly, not statistically significantly, but a little bit

0:32:44.920 --> 0:32:48.760
<v Speaker 1>stronger with undergrads than with graduate students. So the uh,

0:32:49.480 --> 0:32:52.800
<v Speaker 1>the the graduate student arrogance theory, we can say is

0:32:52.840 --> 0:32:57.120
<v Speaker 1>probably disproved by this. The the undergrads actually did a

0:32:57.200 --> 0:33:00.720
<v Speaker 1>little worse in over over confidence about their understand I

0:33:00.960 --> 0:33:05.880
<v Speaker 1>can certainly remember being a weirdly overconfident undergraduate, for sure,

0:33:07.000 --> 0:33:09.480
<v Speaker 1>I think we all can. Man, wasn't that a great

0:33:09.480 --> 0:33:12.880
<v Speaker 1>time when you knew everything about everything? You know? I

0:33:12.920 --> 0:33:15.400
<v Speaker 1>do remember the kind of the trajectory of sort of

0:33:16.240 --> 0:33:19.680
<v Speaker 1>in particular, I remember going into some religious studies classes

0:33:20.120 --> 0:33:25.840
<v Speaker 1>with certain ideas about the values of certain religions over others,

0:33:25.920 --> 0:33:29.400
<v Speaker 1>and how religion kind of worked, and and uh, and

0:33:29.440 --> 0:33:31.600
<v Speaker 1>it was just completely foolhardy. And then I was opened

0:33:31.680 --> 0:33:34.920
<v Speaker 1>up to do some some generally basic ideas and religious

0:33:34.920 --> 0:33:38.560
<v Speaker 1>studies and you know the importance of world views and

0:33:38.600 --> 0:33:41.680
<v Speaker 1>how the similarity between systems, the history of these different

0:33:41.680 --> 0:33:44.880
<v Speaker 1>religious systems and uh and and I do remember there

0:33:44.880 --> 0:33:48.080
<v Speaker 1>being like this, this resistance to it at first, giving

0:33:48.120 --> 0:33:51.800
<v Speaker 1>in realizing I didn't know anything, and then a real

0:33:51.840 --> 0:33:53.960
<v Speaker 1>excitement they built up from there and really there's you know,

0:33:54.000 --> 0:33:57.680
<v Speaker 1>continued my entire life. And that's something I always trying

0:33:57.720 --> 0:34:00.720
<v Speaker 1>to keep in mind on our show because sometimes we

0:34:00.760 --> 0:34:05.840
<v Speaker 1>do encounter listeners who have uh an adverse reaction to

0:34:06.560 --> 0:34:10.400
<v Speaker 1>studies that we talk about or different different takes on topics,

0:34:10.560 --> 0:34:13.640
<v Speaker 1>and I always remind myself that, well that to put

0:34:13.640 --> 0:34:16.200
<v Speaker 1>it in terms of our study here, that not quite

0:34:16.239 --> 0:34:19.480
<v Speaker 1>free fall, but that descent that occurs doesn't feel good.

0:34:19.520 --> 0:34:22.560
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't feel it can it can feel It's a

0:34:22.600 --> 0:34:26.120
<v Speaker 1>fearful situation at times and humbling. It's humbling, and it's

0:34:26.160 --> 0:34:30.080
<v Speaker 1>in the process of being humbled. Is is not necessarily enjoyable.

0:34:30.360 --> 0:34:32.640
<v Speaker 1>It's like being beaten by the villain and a karate

0:34:32.719 --> 0:34:35.400
<v Speaker 1>movie and the first the first act, but the true

0:34:35.440 --> 0:34:38.200
<v Speaker 1>wise person seeks to be constantly humbled by what they

0:34:38.239 --> 0:34:42.000
<v Speaker 1>don't know. I agree, I am humbled weekend, week out

0:34:42.000 --> 0:34:44.160
<v Speaker 1>by the things I don't know. Oh so, how wise

0:34:44.200 --> 0:34:47.200
<v Speaker 1>are you then, Robert, Well, that that's the thing. I

0:34:48.040 --> 0:34:50.640
<v Speaker 1>admit that I am not the you know, the wisest

0:34:51.120 --> 0:34:53.960
<v Speaker 1>guy in the room, but I am. I'm willing to

0:34:54.000 --> 0:34:55.480
<v Speaker 1>admit that there's a lot there, a lot of things

0:34:55.520 --> 0:34:59.239
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, and I'm continually hungry to to fill

0:34:59.239 --> 0:35:03.120
<v Speaker 1>in those gaps, as we should all be, sir um. Okay,

0:35:03.160 --> 0:35:06.080
<v Speaker 1>So back to the study. So we've looked at one

0:35:06.120 --> 0:35:09.200
<v Speaker 1>sample and then a larger sample of undergrads. Maybe we

0:35:09.239 --> 0:35:12.680
<v Speaker 1>need to look at a different university. Maybe Yale students

0:35:12.680 --> 0:35:16.120
<v Speaker 1>are just generally more arrogant about their own understanding. So

0:35:16.160 --> 0:35:18.400
<v Speaker 1>they figured they should try this at a different university.

0:35:18.719 --> 0:35:22.239
<v Speaker 1>Sixteen students from a regional, less selective state university were

0:35:22.280 --> 0:35:25.000
<v Speaker 1>given the exact same experiment UH and they judged the

0:35:25.040 --> 0:35:28.000
<v Speaker 1>selectivity by comparing the students s A T scores. The

0:35:28.000 --> 0:35:30.680
<v Speaker 1>students at the Southern University had an average of five

0:35:31.040 --> 0:35:33.640
<v Speaker 1>and forty points less on their combined math and verbal

0:35:34.280 --> 0:35:37.279
<v Speaker 1>and the result was The pattern of the pattern of

0:35:37.320 --> 0:35:40.120
<v Speaker 1>results was very similar to the first two studies, a

0:35:40.160 --> 0:35:43.960
<v Speaker 1>steep drop off in confidence after being asked to explain

0:35:44.120 --> 0:35:47.279
<v Speaker 1>what you thought you knew, and then rising confidence and

0:35:47.320 --> 0:35:50.680
<v Speaker 1>new understanding after reading the expert explanation. In fact, though

0:35:50.680 --> 0:35:53.640
<v Speaker 1>the overall pattern was similar between the Yale students and

0:35:53.640 --> 0:35:56.160
<v Speaker 1>the students from this other university, the students at the

0:35:56.280 --> 0:36:00.480
<v Speaker 1>less selective university actually showed a slightly stronger illustion of

0:36:00.480 --> 0:36:03.840
<v Speaker 1>explanatory depth effect uh, mostly due to the fact that

0:36:03.880 --> 0:36:07.480
<v Speaker 1>their initial ratings of knowledge were about a point higher

0:36:07.960 --> 0:36:11.000
<v Speaker 1>than those of the Yale students, and so the results

0:36:11.160 --> 0:36:13.960
<v Speaker 1>results of the first two studies were basically replicated. But

0:36:14.000 --> 0:36:16.879
<v Speaker 1>basically you could you could rule out various different interpretations

0:36:16.880 --> 0:36:19.600
<v Speaker 1>of what this means. Yeah, I mean again, because we're

0:36:19.640 --> 0:36:21.480
<v Speaker 1>all susceptible to this. I think we should trying not

0:36:21.480 --> 0:36:25.319
<v Speaker 1>to put judgment, you know, moral judgments on people's I know,

0:36:25.400 --> 0:36:28.080
<v Speaker 1>I said arrogant a minute ago, because I think the

0:36:28.120 --> 0:36:29.960
<v Speaker 1>authors were being a little bit cheeky when they were

0:36:29.960 --> 0:36:34.759
<v Speaker 1>talking about grad Yale graduate arrogant um. But yeah, it's

0:36:34.800 --> 0:36:38.120
<v Speaker 1>not that you're a bad person if you overestimate how

0:36:38.200 --> 0:36:42.879
<v Speaker 1>well you understand the workings of a toilet we've all

0:36:42.920 --> 0:36:45.600
<v Speaker 1>been there. Yeah, especially if you have attempt to fix one.

0:36:45.760 --> 0:36:48.480
<v Speaker 1>That's generally where the humbling comes. Where if something breaks

0:36:48.480 --> 0:36:50.800
<v Speaker 1>in the house and I think, oh, well, maybe I

0:36:50.880 --> 0:36:53.280
<v Speaker 1>can fix that. Of course I've got an Ikea toolkit,

0:36:54.440 --> 0:36:56.560
<v Speaker 1>let me add it. And then it's you know, hours

0:36:56.640 --> 0:36:58.799
<v Speaker 1>later you realize I'm in over my head. I need

0:36:58.800 --> 0:37:01.239
<v Speaker 1>to actually call an expert. But you don't want to

0:37:01.280 --> 0:37:06.840
<v Speaker 1>admit defeat, right, Okay, So next study studying number four, Well,

0:37:07.000 --> 0:37:10.680
<v Speaker 1>maybe a strange selection of devices is driving the effect. Right,

0:37:10.680 --> 0:37:14.480
<v Speaker 1>they're asking people about certain things cylinder lock, helicopter, toilet,

0:37:14.520 --> 0:37:18.399
<v Speaker 1>all that stuff. What if it's just particularly strong for

0:37:18.600 --> 0:37:22.320
<v Speaker 1>cylinder locks and toilets and helicopters. What if this effect

0:37:22.320 --> 0:37:24.680
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't show up is strongly for other devices. So they

0:37:24.719 --> 0:37:28.080
<v Speaker 1>did the same experiment again, got thirty two undergrads, what

0:37:28.200 --> 0:37:32.160
<v Speaker 1>with many more options for devices. Uh, to explain in

0:37:32.200 --> 0:37:34.839
<v Speaker 1>the experiment and to keep the experiment time under one hour,

0:37:35.760 --> 0:37:38.399
<v Speaker 1>the last couple of ratings T four and T five

0:37:38.440 --> 0:37:41.040
<v Speaker 1>were taken off, so participants only did the first three

0:37:41.120 --> 0:37:44.960
<v Speaker 1>ratings and the results where the different devices didn't change anything,

0:37:45.040 --> 0:37:47.759
<v Speaker 1>the results were the same, So it seems to be

0:37:47.920 --> 0:37:50.799
<v Speaker 1>robust across all different types of machines that you would

0:37:50.800 --> 0:37:54.759
<v Speaker 1>need to explain the workings of. People generally overestimate their

0:37:54.840 --> 0:37:58.960
<v Speaker 1>understanding of them, and then the explanation makes them realize

0:37:59.000 --> 0:38:02.719
<v Speaker 1>that they overestimate aided. So next study, well, what if

0:38:02.760 --> 0:38:05.200
<v Speaker 1>the subjects are just being cautious? This is something I

0:38:05.239 --> 0:38:07.399
<v Speaker 1>thought about when I was sort of running through this

0:38:07.600 --> 0:38:10.080
<v Speaker 1>uh with with Rachel on the way to work today.

0:38:10.080 --> 0:38:12.320
<v Speaker 1>I was like, how well would you think you understand

0:38:12.680 --> 0:38:15.640
<v Speaker 1>how you know A can open our works or something?

0:38:16.120 --> 0:38:19.879
<v Speaker 1>And we discovered that we would tend to just rate

0:38:19.880 --> 0:38:23.640
<v Speaker 1>ourselves very low, maybe because we've been primed with the

0:38:23.680 --> 0:38:26.600
<v Speaker 1>fact that there isn't an illusion of explanatory depth. So

0:38:26.640 --> 0:38:29.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm just gonna I'm gonna start with a two to

0:38:29.480 --> 0:38:32.200
<v Speaker 1>be safe. Yeah, because if you're asking me, hey, do

0:38:32.239 --> 0:38:34.320
<v Speaker 1>you know how do you know how it can opener works?

0:38:34.800 --> 0:38:36.960
<v Speaker 1>I would think you're trying to trick me, right, And

0:38:37.000 --> 0:38:39.960
<v Speaker 1>so maybe maybe the experiment is doing the same thing

0:38:40.480 --> 0:38:43.640
<v Speaker 1>in that once the experience. As the experiment goes on,

0:38:43.760 --> 0:38:46.920
<v Speaker 1>people are just becoming more cautious. They're being put on

0:38:47.120 --> 0:38:51.560
<v Speaker 1>guard and regardless of the actual accuracy of their original

0:38:51.600 --> 0:38:54.360
<v Speaker 1>explanatory depths. Does that make sense, Like they're not adjusting

0:38:54.760 --> 0:38:58.439
<v Speaker 1>toward how well they actually understand things, they're maybe they're

0:38:58.440 --> 0:39:02.640
<v Speaker 1>just adjusting towards call and just lower in general and

0:39:02.760 --> 0:39:06.120
<v Speaker 1>so um. Some students were recruited to subjectively, so they

0:39:06.160 --> 0:39:10.000
<v Speaker 1>basically they did the same study again, the same test,

0:39:10.360 --> 0:39:13.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, hadding people make the assessments. But then they

0:39:13.120 --> 0:39:17.480
<v Speaker 1>also got some people to subjectively rate the explanations written

0:39:17.640 --> 0:39:21.040
<v Speaker 1>by the original people in the study. And some really

0:39:21.040 --> 0:39:24.200
<v Speaker 1>complicated statistical analysis was required on this one, but the

0:39:24.200 --> 0:39:27.480
<v Speaker 1>basic result was that, according to the independent raiders who

0:39:27.520 --> 0:39:32.000
<v Speaker 1>read people's explanations and rated them on the scale, the

0:39:32.040 --> 0:39:35.839
<v Speaker 1>participants initially overestimated their level of understanding, and then their

0:39:35.880 --> 0:39:40.319
<v Speaker 1>confidence ratings became more accurate when they dropped after being

0:39:40.360 --> 0:39:42.600
<v Speaker 1>asked to give the explanation on the and on the

0:39:42.640 --> 0:39:45.560
<v Speaker 1>calibration question. So this seems to rule out the idea

0:39:45.600 --> 0:39:48.960
<v Speaker 1>that people are just becoming more timid or more modest

0:39:49.040 --> 0:39:51.960
<v Speaker 1>or cautious as the ratings go on through the test.

0:39:52.280 --> 0:39:55.000
<v Speaker 1>According to some independent judges who come in and said,

0:39:55.080 --> 0:39:58.040
<v Speaker 1>oh wow, this explanation of a can opener is a

0:39:58.120 --> 0:40:04.440
<v Speaker 1>two um. According to these people, the participants are actually

0:40:04.640 --> 0:40:08.080
<v Speaker 1>becoming more accurate as the test goes on, that they're

0:40:08.080 --> 0:40:11.879
<v Speaker 1>getting closer to how good their understanding was for real.

0:40:12.840 --> 0:40:15.239
<v Speaker 1>Here's another thing related to the priming I was just

0:40:15.320 --> 0:40:19.320
<v Speaker 1>talking about studying number six. Can you destroy the effect

0:40:19.560 --> 0:40:22.360
<v Speaker 1>just by warning people that they're going to have to

0:40:22.400 --> 0:40:25.040
<v Speaker 1>give an explanation for how some of the items work.

0:40:25.800 --> 0:40:27.880
<v Speaker 1>So think about it this way, Robert. You know, I

0:40:27.920 --> 0:40:30.440
<v Speaker 1>ask you, um, on a scale of one to seven,

0:40:30.520 --> 0:40:33.400
<v Speaker 1>how well do you understand how a toilet works? And

0:40:33.520 --> 0:40:38.640
<v Speaker 1>be prepared to explain your answer. Yeah. Another example of

0:40:38.680 --> 0:40:41.080
<v Speaker 1>this would be when someone asks you, hey, have you

0:40:41.080 --> 0:40:44.080
<v Speaker 1>ever seen such and such movie? Your answer might be

0:40:44.120 --> 0:40:46.759
<v Speaker 1>different if you know that the follow up is tell

0:40:46.800 --> 0:40:49.920
<v Speaker 1>me the breakdown of the plot. Yeah, because because that

0:40:50.000 --> 0:40:51.960
<v Speaker 1>I've had that happened before and says, hey, you know

0:40:52.000 --> 0:40:54.359
<v Speaker 1>such and such movie? And sometimes you interpret that as

0:40:54.680 --> 0:40:57.279
<v Speaker 1>do I know of that movie? Did I see the

0:40:57.280 --> 0:41:00.400
<v Speaker 1>trailer for it once? Uh? Did I watch it twenty

0:41:00.440 --> 0:41:04.800
<v Speaker 1>years ago? Yes? Yes? Maybe, But then if you actually

0:41:04.840 --> 0:41:08.920
<v Speaker 1>have to prove that you know this film, that's sometimes

0:41:08.920 --> 0:41:11.759
<v Speaker 1>a different can of worms, right, Yeah, So it could

0:41:11.760 --> 0:41:14.759
<v Speaker 1>put you on guard. And so the question is if

0:41:14.760 --> 0:41:18.080
<v Speaker 1>the illusion of explanatory depth effect is real. What we

0:41:18.080 --> 0:41:21.759
<v Speaker 1>would expect is that maybe maybe warning people this way

0:41:22.400 --> 0:41:24.880
<v Speaker 1>might reduce the effect, elimit a little bit, but it

0:41:24.880 --> 0:41:29.680
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't eliminate it. It shouldn't make it completely go away. Right. Um?

0:41:29.880 --> 0:41:33.319
<v Speaker 1>So with thirty one undergrads again, uh, they did the

0:41:33.320 --> 0:41:36.960
<v Speaker 1>exact same test, except they added a paragraph warning the

0:41:37.000 --> 0:41:38.759
<v Speaker 1>subjects that they were going to have to give a

0:41:38.800 --> 0:41:43.560
<v Speaker 1>written explanation and answer a diagnostic question. So what happened here? Well,

0:41:43.600 --> 0:41:47.000
<v Speaker 1>the results on this one were pretty odd. The same

0:41:47.120 --> 0:41:50.640
<v Speaker 1>pattern presented itself in that the first ratings they gave

0:41:50.640 --> 0:41:53.560
<v Speaker 1>were higher, and then they dropped after being asked to

0:41:53.560 --> 0:41:56.600
<v Speaker 1>write an explanation, and then again after the diagnostic question,

0:41:56.920 --> 0:42:00.360
<v Speaker 1>but the magnitude of the effect was reduced, so the

0:42:00.440 --> 0:42:04.760
<v Speaker 1>drop off was much less. Um, there's still a difference

0:42:04.760 --> 0:42:07.400
<v Speaker 1>between the initial and the later ratings. But the odd

0:42:07.400 --> 0:42:10.640
<v Speaker 1>part is it wasn't because the subjects who were warned

0:42:10.800 --> 0:42:14.759
<v Speaker 1>initially rated their understanding any lower. That's what you would expect, right,

0:42:14.760 --> 0:42:17.880
<v Speaker 1>you'd expect that if you've been warned, your first rating

0:42:17.880 --> 0:42:20.359
<v Speaker 1>would be more cautious, Right Yeah, I mean, if someone

0:42:20.440 --> 0:42:22.839
<v Speaker 1>warns you, whatever you say, someone's going to call you

0:42:23.000 --> 0:42:26.520
<v Speaker 1>on it. So don't. Don't b S is because you

0:42:26.520 --> 0:42:28.680
<v Speaker 1>you will be you'll be corrected, you'll have to have

0:42:28.760 --> 0:42:32.280
<v Speaker 1>to prove your answer. Yeah, but that's not what happened here. Instead,

0:42:32.320 --> 0:42:35.799
<v Speaker 1>they were no less confident in their initial understanding. It

0:42:35.880 --> 0:42:41.080
<v Speaker 1>was because their later self ratings were higher. And that's

0:42:41.120 --> 0:42:44.560
<v Speaker 1>kind of weird, right, So this seems to reveal that

0:42:44.680 --> 0:42:46.600
<v Speaker 1>it's it's not just a it's not it's certainly not

0:42:46.719 --> 0:42:50.480
<v Speaker 1>a conscious matter of I really thinking, Oh, I really

0:42:50.520 --> 0:42:52.800
<v Speaker 1>don't understand how toilets work, but I don't want anybody

0:42:52.840 --> 0:42:55.640
<v Speaker 1>to know, so I'll just tell them I understand. Could

0:42:55.680 --> 0:42:57.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean it? Could? I mean? Maybe that's what's going

0:42:57.560 --> 0:43:00.840
<v Speaker 1>on the author's right quote. One path stability is that

0:43:00.920 --> 0:43:05.240
<v Speaker 1>the new instruction changed the way participants used the rating scales.

0:43:05.840 --> 0:43:09.560
<v Speaker 1>For example, hearing the explicit instructions may have caused participants

0:43:09.560 --> 0:43:13.480
<v Speaker 1>to try to be more consistent with their subsequent ratings

0:43:13.520 --> 0:43:17.680
<v Speaker 1>because they had less justification for being surprised at their

0:43:17.719 --> 0:43:22.200
<v Speaker 1>poor performance. Basically like being it's like you were warned.

0:43:22.280 --> 0:43:25.719
<v Speaker 1>What excuse did you have for overcome for being overconfident

0:43:25.800 --> 0:43:28.600
<v Speaker 1>in how much you knew UM and the fact that

0:43:28.640 --> 0:43:30.400
<v Speaker 1>you were warned? Maybe I don't know, it makes you

0:43:30.440 --> 0:43:33.840
<v Speaker 1>more embarrassed that you were overconfident, and thus you're less

0:43:33.840 --> 0:43:38.160
<v Speaker 1>likely to admit how overconfident you were initially. I don't

0:43:38.160 --> 0:43:41.440
<v Speaker 1>know that that's a that's an odd result here, so

0:43:41.520 --> 0:43:44.640
<v Speaker 1>that's worth keeping in mind. But at this point the

0:43:44.640 --> 0:43:50.120
<v Speaker 1>study considers the initial effect basically satisfactorily satisfactorily replicated for

0:43:50.200 --> 0:43:53.160
<v Speaker 1>how we understand the mechanical workings of devices, and then

0:43:53.160 --> 0:43:56.040
<v Speaker 1>it's gonna move on to other things, other types of

0:43:56.080 --> 0:44:00.000
<v Speaker 1>knowledge and what the researchers called different domains of knowledge.

0:44:00.200 --> 0:44:02.879
<v Speaker 1>Does the same illusion of knowledge hold true for things

0:44:03.400 --> 0:44:07.920
<v Speaker 1>other than next like explanations of causally complex phenomenon like

0:44:08.120 --> 0:44:10.880
<v Speaker 1>how a machine works, how a device works. Does it

0:44:10.960 --> 0:44:15.120
<v Speaker 1>exist for facts? Does it exist for narratives for procedures?

0:44:15.400 --> 0:44:18.520
<v Speaker 1>Can it be lumped in with general over confidence effects?

0:44:18.760 --> 0:44:22.439
<v Speaker 1>Or is the illusion of explanatory depth its own thing?

0:44:23.120 --> 0:44:24.880
<v Speaker 1>So maybe we should take a quick break and then

0:44:24.880 --> 0:44:27.320
<v Speaker 1>when we come back we will get into the rest

0:44:27.360 --> 0:44:35.600
<v Speaker 1>of this study. All right, we're back, So study number seven.

0:44:35.880 --> 0:44:37.640
<v Speaker 1>One of the things is what if people are just

0:44:37.719 --> 0:44:41.200
<v Speaker 1>generally overconfident about what they know, regardless of the type

0:44:41.200 --> 0:44:43.400
<v Speaker 1>of knowledge. What if it's not just explaining things. What

0:44:43.480 --> 0:44:47.120
<v Speaker 1>if everybody's overconfident about all their knowledge. Yeah, I could

0:44:47.120 --> 0:44:49.479
<v Speaker 1>see it being sort of like the scenario in which

0:44:49.520 --> 0:44:53.000
<v Speaker 1>the brain just sort of convinces you that you have

0:44:53.040 --> 0:44:55.320
<v Speaker 1>an answer to a question just so you don't have

0:44:55.360 --> 0:44:58.279
<v Speaker 1>to worry about Because the brain is ultimately an economic system,

0:44:58.320 --> 0:45:01.080
<v Speaker 1>it can't it doesn't need a waste reas sources. So

0:45:01.160 --> 0:45:04.600
<v Speaker 1>it's it's I've read, for instance, the individuals who have

0:45:04.680 --> 0:45:07.439
<v Speaker 1>been quizzed on where they were and what they were

0:45:07.440 --> 0:45:11.720
<v Speaker 1>doing during the September eleventh attacks. People have very specific answers,

0:45:11.719 --> 0:45:14.120
<v Speaker 1>so saying I was wearing a blue shirt, was eating

0:45:14.640 --> 0:45:19.960
<v Speaker 1>hunting nut cheerios, but that in many cases what seems

0:45:19.960 --> 0:45:23.600
<v Speaker 1>to be happening is you're in this state of fight,

0:45:23.760 --> 0:45:27.839
<v Speaker 1>fight or flight. Really uh, there's you're not sure how

0:45:27.840 --> 0:45:31.680
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna survive on some level, and your brain just

0:45:31.680 --> 0:45:33.799
<v Speaker 1>goes ahead and makes up an answer for you. Because

0:45:33.800 --> 0:45:35.200
<v Speaker 1>if to say they don't worry about it was a

0:45:35.200 --> 0:45:37.560
<v Speaker 1>blue shirt, why don't you worry about your shirt that

0:45:37.719 --> 0:45:41.000
<v Speaker 1>there's this awful catastrophic event taking place. Don't worry about

0:45:41.000 --> 0:45:43.120
<v Speaker 1>the cereal bam, I'll just check something off. Don't don't

0:45:43.160 --> 0:45:45.640
<v Speaker 1>even don't even fret. Yeah, I've I've heard about this too,

0:45:45.880 --> 0:45:51.239
<v Speaker 1>like memory confabulation in these like momentary memories, you know,

0:45:51.280 --> 0:45:55.279
<v Speaker 1>the flash bold memories from some big event in your past. Yeah.

0:45:55.320 --> 0:45:57.440
<v Speaker 1>So it's like, if I go into the bathroom and

0:45:57.880 --> 0:45:59.480
<v Speaker 1>on some level one thing, do I know how a

0:45:59.560 --> 0:46:01.600
<v Speaker 1>toilet works? My brain is kind of saying, yeah, you

0:46:01.600 --> 0:46:03.920
<v Speaker 1>know how toilet works, use the restroom, and then you

0:46:03.960 --> 0:46:06.560
<v Speaker 1>flush it obviously. Yeah, don't worry. You've got other things

0:46:06.600 --> 0:46:09.000
<v Speaker 1>to do. Stop worrying about the toilet. Okay, So let's

0:46:09.040 --> 0:46:12.759
<v Speaker 1>test some basic geography here. So specifically, what they did

0:46:12.920 --> 0:46:16.200
<v Speaker 1>was naming the capitals of countries around the world. Experiment

0:46:16.280 --> 0:46:18.520
<v Speaker 1>Ers that came up with a list of forty eight countries,

0:46:18.719 --> 0:46:21.600
<v Speaker 1>and they split it roughly in thirds between countries where

0:46:21.640 --> 0:46:24.480
<v Speaker 1>it's easy to know the capital, or where at least

0:46:24.520 --> 0:46:27.920
<v Speaker 1>where you would expect American students to easily guess the capital.

0:46:28.200 --> 0:46:31.279
<v Speaker 1>How about England. We hit that one already, you know,

0:46:31.440 --> 0:46:35.399
<v Speaker 1>man genius here. Uh, then the ones where they were

0:46:35.440 --> 0:46:38.680
<v Speaker 1>moderate likely moderately likely to know the capital, and then

0:46:38.680 --> 0:46:40.759
<v Speaker 1>the ones where they were very unlikely to know. So

0:46:40.880 --> 0:46:44.640
<v Speaker 1>split into thirds. Uh, Robert, what's the capital of Brazil. Oh,

0:46:44.719 --> 0:46:49.200
<v Speaker 1>this one, it's like Brazilia, but my Portuguese is not good.

0:46:49.440 --> 0:46:51.759
<v Speaker 1>You are correct. I was hoping i'd trick you into

0:46:51.760 --> 0:46:55.439
<v Speaker 1>saying Rio de jann Arrow. Well, this is You would

0:46:55.440 --> 0:46:58.239
<v Speaker 1>have caught me with various states for sure, because yeah,

0:46:58.280 --> 0:47:00.720
<v Speaker 1>you think of the what's the most thing this city

0:47:00.800 --> 0:47:03.640
<v Speaker 1>from that country or US state, and then you assume

0:47:03.719 --> 0:47:07.439
<v Speaker 1>that's the capital. If I recall correctly, the Brazilia Rio

0:47:07.600 --> 0:47:11.200
<v Speaker 1>de Janeiro confusion is actually a major plot point in

0:47:11.280 --> 0:47:14.239
<v Speaker 1>one of the I Know what you did last summer sequels,

0:47:14.719 --> 0:47:19.640
<v Speaker 1>which I am here publicly admitting that I've seen. But

0:47:19.680 --> 0:47:24.640
<v Speaker 1>then also, here's a hard one. What's the capital of Tajikstan. Yeah,

0:47:24.680 --> 0:47:27.400
<v Speaker 1>that one. That one is one that I I probably

0:47:27.440 --> 0:47:29.279
<v Speaker 1>should have a leg up on that one because I

0:47:29.280 --> 0:47:32.359
<v Speaker 1>took because I remember taking a course in college about

0:47:32.640 --> 0:47:37.279
<v Speaker 1>former Soviet states in that region. Yeah, I'm drawn up

0:47:37.320 --> 0:47:39.600
<v Speaker 1>complete blank on that one. I think it used to

0:47:39.680 --> 0:47:43.719
<v Speaker 1>be called Stalinabad, but now it's a ducham Bay Okay.

0:47:44.080 --> 0:47:47.799
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, anyway, so participants fifty two college undergraduates, um

0:47:48.080 --> 0:47:50.560
<v Speaker 1>and they were first shown a list of all the countries.

0:47:50.600 --> 0:47:52.200
<v Speaker 1>So here all the countries you're gonna have to know

0:47:52.239 --> 0:47:55.000
<v Speaker 1>the capitals of go down and rate them on the

0:47:55.040 --> 0:47:58.080
<v Speaker 1>seventh same seven point scale. Rate your confidence in how

0:47:58.120 --> 0:48:00.280
<v Speaker 1>well do you know the capital of all these countries? Reason?

0:48:00.760 --> 0:48:03.319
<v Speaker 1>And then they're asked to actually list the names of

0:48:03.360 --> 0:48:05.719
<v Speaker 1>capitals for half the countries and then asked to re

0:48:05.920 --> 0:48:08.920
<v Speaker 1>rate their knowledge. So essentially it's the same thing, except

0:48:09.000 --> 0:48:11.640
<v Speaker 1>instead of giving an explanation of how something works, you're

0:48:11.680 --> 0:48:14.640
<v Speaker 1>just listing the capital. Then they're told the real names

0:48:14.680 --> 0:48:16.880
<v Speaker 1>of the capitals and asked to re rate their knowledge.

0:48:16.920 --> 0:48:19.600
<v Speaker 1>So what are the results here, Well compared to a

0:48:19.680 --> 0:48:23.080
<v Speaker 1>combined group from studies one through four, and the authors

0:48:23.120 --> 0:48:26.479
<v Speaker 1>justify combining them into one group in their discussion. Uh,

0:48:26.560 --> 0:48:28.799
<v Speaker 1>the students who were tested on the facts showed a

0:48:28.920 --> 0:48:32.640
<v Speaker 1>different pattern in the same direction, but with less magnitude.

0:48:32.719 --> 0:48:36.959
<v Speaker 1>So confidence dropped off significantly between the first and second rating,

0:48:37.040 --> 0:48:40.359
<v Speaker 1>So after people had to answer the questions, they were

0:48:40.440 --> 0:48:44.160
<v Speaker 1>less confident, But UH, it stayed almost the same for

0:48:44.200 --> 0:48:46.360
<v Speaker 1>the final rating. And though the drop off from T

0:48:46.480 --> 0:48:50.720
<v Speaker 1>one to T two is statistically significant, UH, it's significantly

0:48:50.840 --> 0:48:54.680
<v Speaker 1>smaller than the drop off in explanation. So essentially, with facts,

0:48:55.440 --> 0:48:58.040
<v Speaker 1>we're seeing a pattern that's going in the same direction,

0:48:58.080 --> 0:49:01.120
<v Speaker 1>but it's just much smaller. The line graph shows a

0:49:01.160 --> 0:49:03.960
<v Speaker 1>slight decrease, but it's closer to being flat than the

0:49:04.000 --> 0:49:07.600
<v Speaker 1>graph line for the device explanations. So we've got some

0:49:07.840 --> 0:49:10.920
<v Speaker 1>overconfidence with capitals, and I think we've all got to

0:49:10.960 --> 0:49:13.799
<v Speaker 1>be that way given our schooling. Right, How how many

0:49:13.800 --> 0:49:16.120
<v Speaker 1>capitals did you have to learn in school? Why why

0:49:16.120 --> 0:49:19.360
<v Speaker 1>do they do capitals? You know? I remember I remember

0:49:19.400 --> 0:49:22.000
<v Speaker 1>exercises where we had to of course remember the states

0:49:22.000 --> 0:49:24.560
<v Speaker 1>and their capitals, but I also remember just a lot

0:49:24.600 --> 0:49:30.279
<v Speaker 1>of geography quizzes that had no substance to them, like

0:49:30.320 --> 0:49:33.960
<v Speaker 1>you'd have to you'd have to memorize all the nations

0:49:33.960 --> 0:49:37.080
<v Speaker 1>of Africa, and yes, some of the some of the

0:49:37.160 --> 0:49:39.719
<v Speaker 1>nations you were learning about, you know, every everyone's learning

0:49:39.760 --> 0:49:43.000
<v Speaker 1>about Egypt, everyone's learning something about South Africa. But then

0:49:43.000 --> 0:49:46.839
<v Speaker 1>there are all these other African states. You're not even

0:49:46.960 --> 0:49:49.919
<v Speaker 1>asked to know anything about them, just except for their name,

0:49:50.000 --> 0:49:53.600
<v Speaker 1>and so they're useless facts because there's no substance behind it. Yeah,

0:49:53.600 --> 0:49:55.680
<v Speaker 1>I feel like it would be much more useful if

0:49:55.800 --> 0:49:58.520
<v Speaker 1>if you're doing that instead of learning capitals, to learn

0:49:58.680 --> 0:50:03.360
<v Speaker 1>like primary language is main ethnic groups and main exports,

0:50:04.880 --> 0:50:06.600
<v Speaker 1>but I guess there's only so much time in a day.

0:50:06.920 --> 0:50:09.040
<v Speaker 1>Then again, I guess I won't complain when I I

0:50:09.080 --> 0:50:11.080
<v Speaker 1>don't know. It's good being able to produce a capital.

0:50:11.160 --> 0:50:14.399
<v Speaker 1>You still you still get that third grade rush. Oh yeah,

0:50:14.440 --> 0:50:20.000
<v Speaker 1>I did it, Brazilia. Okay, So next next test study

0:50:20.080 --> 0:50:23.120
<v Speaker 1>number eight. Uh, let's look let's look at a different

0:50:23.160 --> 0:50:25.840
<v Speaker 1>domain of knowledge. So we've looked at we've looked at

0:50:25.920 --> 0:50:29.400
<v Speaker 1>explanations for causal phenomenon with devices, and we've looked at facts.

0:50:29.560 --> 0:50:32.920
<v Speaker 1>What about procedures? So this, uh, this type of knowledge

0:50:32.960 --> 0:50:35.719
<v Speaker 1>in a way is very similar to explaining how devices work.

0:50:36.200 --> 0:50:40.440
<v Speaker 1>It involves explaining how you do something. How do you

0:50:40.520 --> 0:50:43.480
<v Speaker 1>tie a tie? How do you bake chocolate chip cookies

0:50:43.520 --> 0:50:46.200
<v Speaker 1>from scratch? How do you drive from New York to

0:50:46.280 --> 0:50:49.839
<v Speaker 1>New Haven? This makes me think of all the wonderful

0:50:49.960 --> 0:50:54.040
<v Speaker 1>wiki how um explanations out there, often with pictures that

0:50:54.200 --> 0:50:57.799
<v Speaker 1>explain and yet don't explain the thing you looked that.

0:50:57.920 --> 0:51:00.480
<v Speaker 1>Those things are my favorite looking up obscure e how

0:51:00.640 --> 0:51:02.600
<v Speaker 1>articles used to be one of my favorite games on

0:51:02.600 --> 0:51:04.960
<v Speaker 1>the Internet, the best one I ever came across. I

0:51:04.960 --> 0:51:07.759
<v Speaker 1>swear this is true. It was an eHow article because

0:51:08.000 --> 0:51:10.320
<v Speaker 1>I think it doesn't exist anymore. But it was called

0:51:10.480 --> 0:51:15.880
<v Speaker 1>how to pray for Money? Oh really, yeah, for money?

0:51:16.200 --> 0:51:18.600
<v Speaker 1>So it's so it would be like it had instruction

0:51:18.760 --> 0:51:22.920
<v Speaker 1>meal pray asked for money? Well, I think it was.

0:51:22.960 --> 0:51:25.560
<v Speaker 1>Actually it was actually kind of complex because it was

0:51:25.600 --> 0:51:28.719
<v Speaker 1>like recognized that money might not be the most important thing.

0:51:29.320 --> 0:51:32.640
<v Speaker 1>Um that was like step number five. I guess, okay, well,

0:51:32.640 --> 0:51:33.879
<v Speaker 1>these are the kind of things that I guess occur

0:51:34.000 --> 0:51:38.359
<v Speaker 1>when when writing assignments are going out, Um, you know

0:51:38.440 --> 0:51:43.280
<v Speaker 1>lickety split based purely on you know, search engine terms,

0:51:43.360 --> 0:51:46.800
<v Speaker 1>right right, Okay, So this part, so they're going to

0:51:46.880 --> 0:51:48.839
<v Speaker 1>run the same test they've done before, all the same

0:51:48.920 --> 0:51:52.359
<v Speaker 1>rating steps, everything's the same, except instead of explanations, it's

0:51:52.360 --> 0:51:54.239
<v Speaker 1>going to be how do you do this? Here's a

0:51:54.280 --> 0:51:57.480
<v Speaker 1>procedure right down the steps and and what order they

0:51:57.480 --> 0:52:01.919
<v Speaker 1>come in and how they work together. Results are very interesting. Uh,

0:52:01.960 --> 0:52:05.680
<v Speaker 1>this pattern was completely unlike anything we've seen before. So

0:52:05.840 --> 0:52:08.640
<v Speaker 1>instead of the ratings dropping off between T one and

0:52:08.680 --> 0:52:11.279
<v Speaker 1>T two, your first guests and then your adjustment after

0:52:11.320 --> 0:52:13.719
<v Speaker 1>you have to write something, write the answer out, the

0:52:13.840 --> 0:52:18.080
<v Speaker 1>ratings actually showed a slight but statistically non significant increase

0:52:18.239 --> 0:52:21.000
<v Speaker 1>from one to two and so after you have to

0:52:21.040 --> 0:52:23.720
<v Speaker 1>give an account of how to bake chocolate chip cookies,

0:52:24.040 --> 0:52:27.480
<v Speaker 1>you're actually more confident in your knowledge than you were

0:52:27.600 --> 0:52:31.919
<v Speaker 1>before you wrote down the steps. Um, and I thought

0:52:31.960 --> 0:52:34.200
<v Speaker 1>that was interesting, but it also sort of matches. I

0:52:34.200 --> 0:52:36.600
<v Speaker 1>can see how that would be true. Like you think

0:52:36.640 --> 0:52:39.560
<v Speaker 1>you probably know how to do something, then you write

0:52:39.600 --> 0:52:42.440
<v Speaker 1>down the steps to do it, and looking at them

0:52:42.480 --> 0:52:44.439
<v Speaker 1>there you're like, oh, yeah, I was right, I knew,

0:52:44.480 --> 0:52:47.200
<v Speaker 1>And so you're a little more confident. Yeah, especially if

0:52:47.200 --> 0:52:50.279
<v Speaker 1>it's something you've chocolate chip cookies as an example, Like

0:52:50.360 --> 0:52:52.920
<v Speaker 1>so often you're going off a recipe, or at least

0:52:53.200 --> 0:52:56.719
<v Speaker 1>I I'm not being a real baker. So I'm gonna

0:52:56.760 --> 0:52:59.440
<v Speaker 1>look up the recipe and then I'm gonna follow the

0:52:59.440 --> 0:53:03.200
<v Speaker 1>recipe with no intent of memorizing it. And then afterwards

0:53:03.200 --> 0:53:05.239
<v Speaker 1>I may be able to recall those steps and list

0:53:05.280 --> 0:53:09.279
<v Speaker 1>them out and say, all right, that looks accurate. But

0:53:09.320 --> 0:53:12.640
<v Speaker 1>then if I actually take that list and compared to

0:53:12.680 --> 0:53:14.960
<v Speaker 1>the recipe, I'm bound to have left out some like

0:53:15.120 --> 0:53:19.440
<v Speaker 1>key steps well like baking them, like something I don't know,

0:53:20.120 --> 0:53:24.040
<v Speaker 1>like licking the raw egg laden spoon. All on that

0:53:24.120 --> 0:53:26.840
<v Speaker 1>part I got down. Oh yeah, So so the authors

0:53:26.880 --> 0:53:30.120
<v Speaker 1>also report again this is some non quantified information, but

0:53:30.239 --> 0:53:34.840
<v Speaker 1>just some post test debriefing. They report that the students

0:53:34.920 --> 0:53:38.120
<v Speaker 1>didn't show any of the now characteristic surprise and all

0:53:38.160 --> 0:53:41.080
<v Speaker 1>the other stuff, you know. After the test they'd be like, Wow,

0:53:41.120 --> 0:53:43.799
<v Speaker 1>I can't believe how much I didn't know. Instead, they

0:53:43.800 --> 0:53:46.640
<v Speaker 1>seemed perfectly aware of how much or how little they

0:53:46.719 --> 0:53:49.680
<v Speaker 1>knew about how to do things. On the other hand,

0:53:49.800 --> 0:53:51.759
<v Speaker 1>I guess, yeah, I would say, this isn't really all

0:53:51.800 --> 0:53:55.319
<v Speaker 1>that surprising. Our mental process of remembering how to do

0:53:55.400 --> 0:53:58.799
<v Speaker 1>something is very different from our mental process of remembering

0:53:59.080 --> 0:54:02.399
<v Speaker 1>how something x sternal to the self works because when

0:54:02.400 --> 0:54:05.360
<v Speaker 1>you're remembering how to do something, it's usually a first

0:54:05.400 --> 0:54:10.719
<v Speaker 1>person memory. You picture yourself being the thing doing the thing. Yeah,

0:54:10.800 --> 0:54:14.799
<v Speaker 1>often it's like an unlanguaged experience. I've had this this

0:54:14.960 --> 0:54:19.080
<v Speaker 1>experience with Legos recently because because I'm building Legos with

0:54:19.120 --> 0:54:21.960
<v Speaker 1>my son. Haven't built built anything out of Legos since

0:54:22.000 --> 0:54:25.200
<v Speaker 1>I was a kid, and I'm realizing that I'm I'm

0:54:25.200 --> 0:54:27.840
<v Speaker 1>sure there are industry terms for all the different blocks

0:54:27.840 --> 0:54:30.960
<v Speaker 1>and the sizes of blocks, but I do not know

0:54:31.000 --> 0:54:35.160
<v Speaker 1>what those terms are, so I'm and the the of course,

0:54:35.160 --> 0:54:39.120
<v Speaker 1>the instructions are wordless, so I don't have any length

0:54:39.239 --> 0:54:42.000
<v Speaker 1>or I have very little language to describe the steps

0:54:42.000 --> 0:54:44.560
<v Speaker 1>that are taking place, but I can, you know, I

0:54:44.600 --> 0:54:46.960
<v Speaker 1>can picture myself doing it. Yeah, And there there are

0:54:46.960 --> 0:54:49.600
<v Speaker 1>also plenty of things where there is like something you

0:54:49.640 --> 0:54:51.560
<v Speaker 1>know how to do through muscle memory that would be

0:54:51.560 --> 0:54:54.319
<v Speaker 1>difficult to put into words, like could you explain the

0:54:54.400 --> 0:54:57.080
<v Speaker 1>steps of how to ride a bicycle? Right? Or a

0:54:57.080 --> 0:55:00.680
<v Speaker 1>big one is is tying a long neck? Hi? Yeah,

0:55:00.840 --> 0:55:02.840
<v Speaker 1>but like I can I can tie one on myself,

0:55:02.880 --> 0:55:05.399
<v Speaker 1>I cannot tie one on another person all the time

0:55:05.400 --> 0:55:07.200
<v Speaker 1>with people where if they're going to tie a tie

0:55:07.239 --> 0:55:10.200
<v Speaker 1>for someone, they have to wear it themselves. Uh. Well,

0:55:10.239 --> 0:55:13.160
<v Speaker 1>at least that is interesting and I think that's true

0:55:13.160 --> 0:55:15.600
<v Speaker 1>in my experience. But it does not seem so much

0:55:15.640 --> 0:55:17.799
<v Speaker 1>born out in these results. It seems like people are

0:55:18.280 --> 0:55:21.239
<v Speaker 1>or maybe actually it's not that people were perfect at

0:55:21.280 --> 0:55:24.000
<v Speaker 1>being able to explain how to do procedures. They were

0:55:24.040 --> 0:55:27.000
<v Speaker 1>just very accurate in predicting how well they would be

0:55:27.040 --> 0:55:30.840
<v Speaker 1>able to explain them, because you are you. It's based

0:55:30.880 --> 0:55:33.680
<v Speaker 1>on an actual memory of doing the thing or trying

0:55:33.719 --> 0:55:37.279
<v Speaker 1>to do the thing. Yeah. Um so yeah, So next

0:55:37.280 --> 0:55:39.200
<v Speaker 1>next study, what about a different type of knowledge. We've

0:55:39.239 --> 0:55:42.440
<v Speaker 1>looked at facts, We've looked at procedures. How about narratives.

0:55:43.320 --> 0:55:46.359
<v Speaker 1>One of my favorite things to recall is what happened

0:55:46.480 --> 0:55:49.080
<v Speaker 1>in that part of Big Trouble and Little China after

0:55:49.800 --> 0:55:54.759
<v Speaker 1>the monster for first Pokes's head. I don't anyway, So yeah,

0:55:54.840 --> 0:55:57.400
<v Speaker 1>recalling a narrative if if the plot of a narrative

0:55:57.520 --> 0:56:00.759
<v Speaker 1>is basically realist in terms of genre, you're not talking

0:56:00.760 --> 0:56:04.680
<v Speaker 1>about el topo or something. There is a causal logic

0:56:04.800 --> 0:56:07.239
<v Speaker 1>to the events that take place in it, right, in

0:56:07.239 --> 0:56:09.440
<v Speaker 1>the sense that a narrative, like the plot of a

0:56:09.480 --> 0:56:13.359
<v Speaker 1>book or a movie, is a kind of machine. It's

0:56:13.360 --> 0:56:17.080
<v Speaker 1>a structure built out of causal relationships that can be labeled, explained,

0:56:17.080 --> 0:56:20.760
<v Speaker 1>and summarized. So so let's let's look at the machine

0:56:20.840 --> 0:56:24.399
<v Speaker 1>of movie plots. Thirty nine students were given a list

0:56:24.400 --> 0:56:28.040
<v Speaker 1>of twenty popular movies UH, selected to be things college

0:56:28.040 --> 0:56:30.800
<v Speaker 1>students were likely to have seen. I think Forest Gump

0:56:30.880 --> 0:56:33.640
<v Speaker 1>was one of them. UH. And they're asked which of

0:56:33.680 --> 0:56:36.160
<v Speaker 1>the movies they had seen, and then asked to rate

0:56:36.239 --> 0:56:39.520
<v Speaker 1>their understanding of the plots of five of the movies

0:56:39.560 --> 0:56:42.920
<v Speaker 1>they'd seen, and then, after their t one first ratings,

0:56:43.239 --> 0:56:46.000
<v Speaker 1>they had to describe each of those five plots and

0:56:46.000 --> 0:56:49.040
<v Speaker 1>then rewrite their original understanding, So the same procedure we've

0:56:49.080 --> 0:56:53.839
<v Speaker 1>seen the whole time, except instead of explaining devices or procedures,

0:56:53.920 --> 0:56:58.000
<v Speaker 1>it's plots of movies. And then finally they read reviews

0:56:58.040 --> 0:57:01.440
<v Speaker 1>from a professional movie website, not review summaries of plots

0:57:01.480 --> 0:57:04.880
<v Speaker 1>from a professional movie review website, and then compared those

0:57:04.920 --> 0:57:07.520
<v Speaker 1>to what they had and rated again, and the results

0:57:07.520 --> 0:57:09.600
<v Speaker 1>were that the pattern was closer to the one for

0:57:09.719 --> 0:57:12.480
<v Speaker 1>procedures than the one for devices. I thought this was

0:57:12.560 --> 0:57:15.400
<v Speaker 1>interesting because in a narrative, you were recalling a narrative

0:57:15.440 --> 0:57:18.320
<v Speaker 1>that's not something you had to do with your body.

0:57:18.400 --> 0:57:21.400
<v Speaker 1>It's so that it's taking that element out, but it's

0:57:21.440 --> 0:57:25.040
<v Speaker 1>closer to the pattern for procedures. There's no significant drop

0:57:25.040 --> 0:57:27.400
<v Speaker 1>off from T one to T two. People were pretty

0:57:27.440 --> 0:57:31.240
<v Speaker 1>accurate at predicting how well they knew narratives. That's interesting

0:57:31.280 --> 0:57:34.560
<v Speaker 1>because just thinking back on movies I've seen, like you mentioned,

0:57:34.600 --> 0:57:37.040
<v Speaker 1>Big Trouble a Little China, and I instantly started trying

0:57:37.040 --> 0:57:39.840
<v Speaker 1>to in my mind sort of piece out of timeline

0:57:39.840 --> 0:57:41.800
<v Speaker 1>of that movie. And it's a movie I've seen a lot,

0:57:42.520 --> 0:57:44.240
<v Speaker 1>and and and I have a lot of Love for

0:57:44.520 --> 0:57:48.040
<v Speaker 1>But there I think there's some definite holes in my

0:57:48.120 --> 0:57:51.080
<v Speaker 1>attempt to restructure. You know, at what point they go

0:57:51.240 --> 0:57:54.880
<v Speaker 1>to the to the import export business there, and then

0:57:54.920 --> 0:57:56.560
<v Speaker 1>they come out, and then they go back in And

0:57:56.600 --> 0:57:59.920
<v Speaker 1>when did this encounter fall in line? You know, they

0:58:00.120 --> 0:58:02.760
<v Speaker 1>ran a different study to test different devices just to

0:58:02.760 --> 0:58:05.120
<v Speaker 1>make sure the device list they had wasn't peculiar. I

0:58:05.160 --> 0:58:07.840
<v Speaker 1>wonder if they should have run another test with different movies,

0:58:07.880 --> 0:58:11.720
<v Speaker 1>Like what if the movies they had were unusually perspicuous

0:58:11.760 --> 0:58:14.800
<v Speaker 1>and clear in terms of plot relationship? Yeah, like say

0:58:14.800 --> 0:58:18.720
<v Speaker 1>a romantic comedy, say like the movie Amala. Despite the

0:58:18.760 --> 0:58:20.840
<v Speaker 1>fact that I've seen Big Trouble A Little China far

0:58:20.880 --> 0:58:23.800
<v Speaker 1>more than I've seen Amlay, I'm far more confident in

0:58:23.840 --> 0:58:28.040
<v Speaker 1>my ability to to just rattle off the plot points

0:58:28.360 --> 0:58:31.960
<v Speaker 1>and the basic movement of the narrative for Amlay because

0:58:32.000 --> 0:58:34.520
<v Speaker 1>it one thing follows from another, Right, it follows a

0:58:34.600 --> 0:58:38.520
<v Speaker 1>basic Uh, there's a basic blueprint for that sort of film.

0:58:38.760 --> 0:58:41.880
<v Speaker 1>And I'm not saying Big Trump A Little China doesn't

0:58:41.920 --> 0:58:44.520
<v Speaker 1>follow a very basic blueprint as well. Now, I think

0:58:44.560 --> 0:58:47.280
<v Speaker 1>some kind of random things happened in it, you wouldn't

0:58:47.280 --> 0:58:50.080
<v Speaker 1>necessarily infer from one scene, what's going to happen in

0:58:50.120 --> 0:58:55.440
<v Speaker 1>the Uh? Yeah? Anyway, So next study, let's look at

0:58:55.480 --> 0:58:58.160
<v Speaker 1>one more different type of knowledge. So we've looked at

0:58:58.520 --> 0:59:02.600
<v Speaker 1>explanations for machines, facts about geography, procedures on how to

0:59:02.640 --> 0:59:05.880
<v Speaker 1>do things, and narratives from movie plots. How about explaining

0:59:05.960 --> 0:59:11.360
<v Speaker 1>natural phenomenon. Natural phenomena are complex causal systems. In a way,

0:59:11.400 --> 0:59:14.360
<v Speaker 1>they're very much like devices or like machines, except they're

0:59:14.480 --> 0:59:17.280
<v Speaker 1>you know, they're not made by humans. But in other senses,

0:59:17.560 --> 0:59:20.760
<v Speaker 1>they are like that. They have causal relationships, different components

0:59:20.800 --> 0:59:23.480
<v Speaker 1>that work together, and they in the end they make

0:59:23.600 --> 0:59:28.240
<v Speaker 1>something happen. Uh. So participants were thirty one Yale undergrads

0:59:28.280 --> 0:59:32.800
<v Speaker 1>and study was identical to the ones before, except instead

0:59:32.840 --> 0:59:36.800
<v Speaker 1>of explaining how device works, you explain how tides occur,

0:59:37.160 --> 0:59:41.240
<v Speaker 1>how why comets have tales, how earthquakes occur, how rainbows

0:59:41.280 --> 0:59:44.360
<v Speaker 1>are formed, things like that. So, just like in the

0:59:44.400 --> 0:59:48.240
<v Speaker 1>first four studies, they gave the initial confidence rating, you know, rainbows, Oh,

0:59:48.280 --> 0:59:50.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm six on rainbows. Then they had to explain how

0:59:50.920 --> 0:59:56.120
<v Speaker 1>they're formed, YadA YadA, and the results were it's a jackpot.

0:59:56.200 --> 1:00:00.360
<v Speaker 1>The results distribution from the explanations of natural phenomen we're

1:00:00.520 --> 1:00:05.280
<v Speaker 1>very similar to those four devices. They were closest to devices. So,

1:00:05.280 --> 1:00:08.400
<v Speaker 1>whether it's tides or whether it's toilets, we think we

1:00:08.560 --> 1:00:11.520
<v Speaker 1>understand how things work, but when we try to explain it,

1:00:11.560 --> 1:00:14.560
<v Speaker 1>we realize there are lots of gaps in our understanding.

1:00:15.120 --> 1:00:17.880
<v Speaker 1>So to summarize the results across all these studies we've

1:00:17.920 --> 1:00:21.400
<v Speaker 1>we've seen that people are significantly overconfident in their understanding

1:00:21.400 --> 1:00:25.520
<v Speaker 1>of how devices work and how natural phenomena occur, um

1:00:25.560 --> 1:00:29.480
<v Speaker 1>that asking for an explanation makes this overconfidence apparent and

1:00:29.560 --> 1:00:34.440
<v Speaker 1>reduces it. People are somewhat overconfident, but less so about

1:00:34.440 --> 1:00:37.760
<v Speaker 1>their knowledge of facts like capital cities, and people are

1:00:37.800 --> 1:00:41.280
<v Speaker 1>fairly accurate at judging their own knowledge of procedures, how

1:00:41.280 --> 1:00:44.800
<v Speaker 1>to do stuff, and narratives what happened in a movie? Now,

1:00:44.840 --> 1:00:47.040
<v Speaker 1>the big question is this is the thing we haven't

1:00:47.080 --> 1:00:52.200
<v Speaker 1>gotten to yet. Why? Why? So? What's causing these differences

1:00:52.200 --> 1:00:56.360
<v Speaker 1>in metacognition across different domains of knowledge? Why are we

1:00:56.440 --> 1:01:00.200
<v Speaker 1>more overconfident about some types of knowledge than other is?

1:01:00.200 --> 1:01:03.160
<v Speaker 1>What is it that would make us more confident about

1:01:03.440 --> 1:01:06.560
<v Speaker 1>knowing how a toilet works than about knowing the plot

1:01:06.560 --> 1:01:09.320
<v Speaker 1>of Forest Gump. Well, my my initial answer would be

1:01:09.360 --> 1:01:13.760
<v Speaker 1>that we assume a certain simplicity of its design, Like

1:01:14.280 --> 1:01:18.720
<v Speaker 1>without even really reminiscing too much on Forest Gump, I'm

1:01:18.760 --> 1:01:22.720
<v Speaker 1>given the fact that it was a big blockbuster summer movie,

1:01:23.480 --> 1:01:26.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm assuming it has a pretty simplistic structure. And as

1:01:26.520 --> 1:01:30.320
<v Speaker 1>for the toilet, I mean it has such a it

1:01:30.360 --> 1:01:33.120
<v Speaker 1>has such a a low standing in the household when

1:01:33.160 --> 1:01:36.560
<v Speaker 1>it's functioning that you you just assume it couldn't be

1:01:36.600 --> 1:01:39.600
<v Speaker 1>that complicated. Why would why would it take high technology

1:01:39.880 --> 1:01:45.840
<v Speaker 1>to simply dispose of human waste? Yeah, I guess I

1:01:45.840 --> 1:01:48.160
<v Speaker 1>can see that. I mean, so one of the answers

1:01:48.200 --> 1:01:50.120
<v Speaker 1>that was given in the piloting they did for this,

1:01:50.240 --> 1:01:51.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, when they were trying to think, what, what

1:01:51.680 --> 1:01:54.960
<v Speaker 1>are some good hypotheses that could explain this this difference

1:01:55.200 --> 1:02:00.360
<v Speaker 1>is complexity of the device, and so the hypothese sees

1:02:00.400 --> 1:02:04.160
<v Speaker 1>that they ended up wanting to test where how about confusion?

1:02:05.000 --> 1:02:09.640
<v Speaker 1>They called it confusion of environmental support with internal representation,

1:02:10.000 --> 1:02:13.120
<v Speaker 1>And what that means is confusion of the fact that

1:02:13.200 --> 1:02:15.800
<v Speaker 1>you can see the parts and how they work with

1:02:16.000 --> 1:02:18.560
<v Speaker 1>the idea that you can represent the parts and how

1:02:18.600 --> 1:02:22.120
<v Speaker 1>they work in your mind. Um. And so what this

1:02:22.160 --> 1:02:27.840
<v Speaker 1>predicts is devices like bicycles and can openers and stuff

1:02:27.880 --> 1:02:32.240
<v Speaker 1>that are very clear and perspicuous are the things that

1:02:32.320 --> 1:02:37.080
<v Speaker 1>were most likely to overestimate our knowledge of the workings

1:02:37.120 --> 1:02:39.360
<v Speaker 1>of because when we can just look at them and

1:02:39.400 --> 1:02:42.080
<v Speaker 1>see all the parts, there's no there's no sensation that

1:02:42.160 --> 1:02:46.120
<v Speaker 1>the workings are being hidden from us. But in your mind,

1:02:46.920 --> 1:02:49.200
<v Speaker 1>try to draw a picture of a bicycle right now,

1:02:50.680 --> 1:02:53.800
<v Speaker 1>I think actually, even if you've seen lots of bicycles,

1:02:53.880 --> 1:02:57.280
<v Speaker 1>chances are you just mentally illustrated a bicycle that could

1:02:57.360 --> 1:03:00.680
<v Speaker 1>not work. I don't know, I feel I feel a

1:03:00.720 --> 1:03:04.160
<v Speaker 1>sense of perhaps false confidence here. Well maybe I mean,

1:03:04.200 --> 1:03:07.120
<v Speaker 1>maybe I'm just because I assembled one on Christmas. Well,

1:03:07.160 --> 1:03:09.400
<v Speaker 1>if you've if you've actually assembled a bicycle, then you

1:03:09.440 --> 1:03:11.440
<v Speaker 1>might be in a different category. But I'm willing to

1:03:11.480 --> 1:03:15.160
<v Speaker 1>accept that I'm completely foolhardy on this. The bicycle might

1:03:15.200 --> 1:03:17.600
<v Speaker 1>be if you've actually worked on them with your hands,

1:03:17.680 --> 1:03:20.000
<v Speaker 1>it might be more in the procedures category. But with

1:03:20.040 --> 1:03:24.280
<v Speaker 1>an ikea tool kits so place. Well, I mean a

1:03:24.320 --> 1:03:26.160
<v Speaker 1>lot of people we would try to draw try to

1:03:26.200 --> 1:03:29.200
<v Speaker 1>draw a bicycle, and then they'd have like a you know,

1:03:29.320 --> 1:03:33.520
<v Speaker 1>like a single bar running from the spokes of both wheels,

1:03:33.800 --> 1:03:36.400
<v Speaker 1>and that would make it impossible to steer the bicycle

1:03:36.560 --> 1:03:38.960
<v Speaker 1>and stuff like that, or they'd have, um, you know,

1:03:39.040 --> 1:03:41.520
<v Speaker 1>the chain running to the front wheel and the back

1:03:41.560 --> 1:03:44.840
<v Speaker 1>wheel or something like that. Well, it also makes me

1:03:44.880 --> 1:03:46.880
<v Speaker 1>think that one of the scenarios here is that you

1:03:46.960 --> 1:03:51.040
<v Speaker 1>feel that one should be able to understand a bicycle. Yes,

1:03:51.280 --> 1:03:53.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm reminded that's the ease of representation. Yeah, Like I'm

1:03:53.800 --> 1:03:56.000
<v Speaker 1>reminded of a bid ends in in the Art of

1:03:56.040 --> 1:03:59.120
<v Speaker 1>Motorcycle Maintenance where uh, it's one of the parts where

1:03:59.120 --> 1:04:02.920
<v Speaker 1>he's talking about motorcyle Coleman. It's that he says that

1:04:02.960 --> 1:04:06.280
<v Speaker 1>the motorcycle is a perfect vehicle, a perfect perfect just

1:04:06.320 --> 1:04:09.720
<v Speaker 1>a perfect system to have control of because it is

1:04:09.760 --> 1:04:12.280
<v Speaker 1>a it is a complex system, but it's not so

1:04:12.360 --> 1:04:16.240
<v Speaker 1>complex that a single individual can't master it and care

1:04:16.280 --> 1:04:19.200
<v Speaker 1>for it. And whereas if you get into progressively more

1:04:19.240 --> 1:04:23.600
<v Speaker 1>complicated mechanical systems or just systems in general, then it

1:04:23.680 --> 1:04:26.560
<v Speaker 1>becomes increasingly difficult for one person to be able to

1:04:26.560 --> 1:04:28.360
<v Speaker 1>have a grasp of it. Can you be the master

1:04:28.520 --> 1:04:31.560
<v Speaker 1>of your prius? I don't know. I mean, I'm sure

1:04:31.560 --> 1:04:34.080
<v Speaker 1>there are people that can. I I could not be

1:04:34.120 --> 1:04:36.919
<v Speaker 1>the master of a motorcycle. I'm and I'm willing to

1:04:36.920 --> 1:04:38.960
<v Speaker 1>to admit that I probably can't even be the master

1:04:39.040 --> 1:04:42.520
<v Speaker 1>of my son's bicycle at this point. Well, I bet

1:04:42.600 --> 1:04:44.959
<v Speaker 1>you're more master than me, now that you've actually used

1:04:44.960 --> 1:04:48.200
<v Speaker 1>your hands on it. I I know now. I was primed,

1:04:48.320 --> 1:04:50.480
<v Speaker 1>actually had to think about what's in a bicycle and

1:04:50.520 --> 1:04:53.440
<v Speaker 1>look it up. But I'm quite confident that if I

1:04:53.480 --> 1:04:55.880
<v Speaker 1>had just been asked to draw a bicycle and the

1:04:55.920 --> 1:04:58.640
<v Speaker 1>different parts and what they do, I would not have

1:04:58.720 --> 1:05:01.000
<v Speaker 1>been able to do it correctually if I hadn't thought

1:05:01.000 --> 1:05:04.720
<v Speaker 1>about it ahead of time. Okay, another hypothesis. What about

1:05:04.840 --> 1:05:09.200
<v Speaker 1>confusing higher and lower levels of an analysis. Basically, this

1:05:09.280 --> 1:05:12.600
<v Speaker 1>just means, uh, if you've got an idea of the

1:05:12.640 --> 1:05:16.560
<v Speaker 1>causal relationships at a high level, you know the big

1:05:16.640 --> 1:05:20.000
<v Speaker 1>parts of a machine and basically what the machine does,

1:05:20.480 --> 1:05:23.200
<v Speaker 1>you assume you have an understanding for the things at

1:05:23.240 --> 1:05:25.240
<v Speaker 1>the lower level, even if you don't. So you think

1:05:25.240 --> 1:05:28.520
<v Speaker 1>about car breakes. Car brakes slow the spinning of the

1:05:28.560 --> 1:05:31.800
<v Speaker 1>wheels by applying friction. I understand how car brakes work,

1:05:32.680 --> 1:05:35.600
<v Speaker 1>but there there are tons of things involved in the

1:05:35.640 --> 1:05:38.600
<v Speaker 1>brakes that you've got some kind of hydraulics probably, or

1:05:38.640 --> 1:05:40.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, fluid or some kind of How how is

1:05:40.760 --> 1:05:44.320
<v Speaker 1>the pressure applied from the brake pedal to the brakes?

1:05:44.360 --> 1:05:46.959
<v Speaker 1>What are all the different little gears and connections and parts.

1:05:47.040 --> 1:05:50.080
<v Speaker 1>There's tons of stuff there that you're not even thinking about.

1:05:50.160 --> 1:05:53.520
<v Speaker 1>But at the high level you basically know what it does,

1:05:54.040 --> 1:05:56.720
<v Speaker 1>and so that makes you assume that you know how

1:05:56.760 --> 1:06:00.280
<v Speaker 1>it works. It's a confusion of the what with the how. Yeah,

1:06:00.360 --> 1:06:04.080
<v Speaker 1>Like examples that come to mind, like a chainsaw. You

1:06:04.160 --> 1:06:06.560
<v Speaker 1>know how the cutting occurs, but do you really know

1:06:06.600 --> 1:06:11.160
<v Speaker 1>how the all the intricacies of the saw itself hydraulic

1:06:11.160 --> 1:06:13.320
<v Speaker 1>press like the one of the end of terminator. Oh yeah,

1:06:13.640 --> 1:06:17.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, but it's pretty simple concept. The two pieces

1:06:17.680 --> 1:06:21.040
<v Speaker 1>come together and flatten the terminator. But there's a lot

1:06:21.080 --> 1:06:24.720
<v Speaker 1>more involved there with the hydraulic system and everything else.

1:06:24.760 --> 1:06:27.240
<v Speaker 1>I like, I don't I don't even have a firm

1:06:27.320 --> 1:06:31.640
<v Speaker 1>enough understanding of that of how how the intense pressure

1:06:31.680 --> 1:06:35.880
<v Speaker 1>is applied via hydraulics. Yeah, yeah, um that that that's

1:06:35.880 --> 1:06:38.600
<v Speaker 1>a good one. How about another explanation. What if it's

1:06:39.080 --> 1:06:43.439
<v Speaker 1>the problem that explanations of of how things work, explanations

1:06:44.000 --> 1:06:48.520
<v Speaker 1>unlike facts and stuff like that have indeterminate end states,

1:06:48.720 --> 1:06:50.920
<v Speaker 1>and that if I ask you the capital of a country,

1:06:51.160 --> 1:06:53.240
<v Speaker 1>how confident are you that you know the capital of

1:06:53.280 --> 1:06:56.120
<v Speaker 1>a country? Whether or not you're right about the answer,

1:06:56.160 --> 1:06:58.160
<v Speaker 1>you know what the answer will look like. It will

1:06:58.200 --> 1:07:00.800
<v Speaker 1>be you know a short word, and you you think

1:07:00.800 --> 1:07:04.959
<v Speaker 1>you probably know what that word is, um with an explanation.

1:07:05.480 --> 1:07:08.080
<v Speaker 1>It's just it's very open ended. You know, you don't

1:07:08.120 --> 1:07:11.360
<v Speaker 1>exactly know what the answer should look like, exactly how

1:07:11.400 --> 1:07:14.360
<v Speaker 1>detailed is it supposed to be? UM? What you know?

1:07:14.440 --> 1:07:16.320
<v Speaker 1>What are all the things that would be in it?

1:07:16.320 --> 1:07:19.520
<v Speaker 1>It's it's it's more amorphous in terms of structure, even

1:07:19.560 --> 1:07:24.040
<v Speaker 1>if you haven't colored inside the lines yet. And then

1:07:24.040 --> 1:07:29.560
<v Speaker 1>the final hypothesis is what about rarity of production? We just, Robert,

1:07:29.640 --> 1:07:31.800
<v Speaker 1>here's one where you and I might be different than

1:07:31.840 --> 1:07:33.680
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people. Not to say we're better, We're

1:07:33.720 --> 1:07:38.120
<v Speaker 1>probably worse. But most people don't have to give explanations

1:07:38.160 --> 1:07:41.680
<v Speaker 1>of how things work very often. But we do often

1:07:41.720 --> 1:07:46.120
<v Speaker 1>have to give recountings of facts, narratives and uh and

1:07:46.200 --> 1:07:48.600
<v Speaker 1>about procedures. Right, these are things that are common for

1:07:48.640 --> 1:07:51.120
<v Speaker 1>everybody to explain, but it's not all that common for

1:07:51.120 --> 1:07:54.680
<v Speaker 1>people to explain how things work, and this may make

1:07:54.800 --> 1:07:59.400
<v Speaker 1>us overestimate our performance at it. Yeah, I think that's reasonable.

1:07:59.440 --> 1:08:01.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean we we are in kind of a privileged

1:08:02.120 --> 1:08:05.840
<v Speaker 1>situation where we are constantly having to confront the things

1:08:05.880 --> 1:08:09.120
<v Speaker 1>we don't know and and research them and form form

1:08:09.120 --> 1:08:12.160
<v Speaker 1>and understanding of ourselves and then share that understanding with

1:08:12.360 --> 1:08:15.720
<v Speaker 1>listeners or readers or viewers what have you. Yeah, we

1:08:15.800 --> 1:08:19.800
<v Speaker 1>we we were practiced enough to know how little we know. Hopefully, No,

1:08:20.000 --> 1:08:23.520
<v Speaker 1>we probably don't know how little we know. We foolishly

1:08:23.600 --> 1:08:26.720
<v Speaker 1>think we know how little we know. But yeah, we

1:08:26.800 --> 1:08:32.559
<v Speaker 1>have an illusion of depth of understanding our own ignorance. Uh,

1:08:32.840 --> 1:08:34.959
<v Speaker 1>hopefully we have a lag up on the on the situation.

1:08:35.080 --> 1:08:38.880
<v Speaker 1>That's the main hope. Maybe. Well we try, we try,

1:08:39.320 --> 1:08:43.360
<v Speaker 1>probably fail, but we try, okay, well to examine how

1:08:43.439 --> 1:08:45.840
<v Speaker 1>these figure. And there are a couple more studies there

1:08:45.840 --> 1:08:48.639
<v Speaker 1>two more in this uh, in this research. So one

1:08:48.680 --> 1:08:51.719
<v Speaker 1>of them, study number eleven is what if the difference

1:08:52.000 --> 1:08:54.400
<v Speaker 1>in the different knowledge types is just that some knowledge

1:08:54.400 --> 1:08:58.120
<v Speaker 1>types are more socially desirable than others. I thought about that.

1:08:58.120 --> 1:09:00.800
<v Speaker 1>That's kind of interesting. What if we're more likely to

1:09:00.920 --> 1:09:06.439
<v Speaker 1>overestimate our knowledge in say, uh devices, because it's much

1:09:06.600 --> 1:09:10.559
<v Speaker 1>cooler to know how a toilet works, uh, and thus

1:09:10.640 --> 1:09:13.720
<v Speaker 1>much more socially desirable, And thus we're sort of internally

1:09:13.840 --> 1:09:19.360
<v Speaker 1>bluffing on the most socially important categories that could be possible.

1:09:19.400 --> 1:09:22.760
<v Speaker 1>So twenty four Yale undergrads participated in this. They rate

1:09:22.800 --> 1:09:26.120
<v Speaker 1>it on a seven point scale how embarrassed they would

1:09:26.120 --> 1:09:28.400
<v Speaker 1>be if they have to admit if they had to

1:09:28.439 --> 1:09:32.240
<v Speaker 1>admit they were ignorant about certain things. And the things

1:09:32.720 --> 1:09:35.639
<v Speaker 1>on the list were pulled from a combined master list

1:09:35.680 --> 1:09:39.080
<v Speaker 1>of the contents of previous experiments. So you're asked, like

1:09:39.160 --> 1:09:41.680
<v Speaker 1>four each item, please rate how embarrassed do you think

1:09:41.720 --> 1:09:44.320
<v Speaker 1>you would be if someone asked you to explain the

1:09:44.360 --> 1:09:46.640
<v Speaker 1>item and it turned out that you did not have

1:09:46.800 --> 1:09:50.040
<v Speaker 1>a good understanding or knowledge of that item. So apply

1:09:50.160 --> 1:09:54.120
<v Speaker 1>what I just said to a flesh toilet, the plot

1:09:54.120 --> 1:09:57.840
<v Speaker 1>of Forrest Gump, how to tie a bow tie, the

1:09:57.960 --> 1:10:03.360
<v Speaker 1>capital of England, how rainbows are formed, And the results

1:10:03.400 --> 1:10:06.599
<v Speaker 1>are that people were the least embarrassed to be ignorant

1:10:06.600 --> 1:10:10.160
<v Speaker 1>about how devices worked. They were moderately embarrassed to be

1:10:10.200 --> 1:10:13.720
<v Speaker 1>ignorant about facts, procedures, and natural phenomena, And then this

1:10:13.840 --> 1:10:17.080
<v Speaker 1>was crazy. They were the most embarrassed to be ignorant

1:10:17.120 --> 1:10:22.439
<v Speaker 1>about narratives. Interesting because it seems like you would have

1:10:22.479 --> 1:10:25.600
<v Speaker 1>that that you have the most plausible deniability there I

1:10:25.600 --> 1:10:27.400
<v Speaker 1>haven't seen it in a while, or I haven't seen it,

1:10:27.600 --> 1:10:31.040
<v Speaker 1>or I didn't like it all that. I guess for

1:10:31.120 --> 1:10:33.920
<v Speaker 1>college students, having seen certain movies carries a lot of

1:10:33.960 --> 1:10:38.240
<v Speaker 1>social cache and don't know it's it's you know anyway.

1:10:38.560 --> 1:10:41.639
<v Speaker 1>So this response pattern does not show a correlation between

1:10:41.720 --> 1:10:45.360
<v Speaker 1>overconfidence and a knowledge domain and the social desirability of

1:10:45.360 --> 1:10:47.920
<v Speaker 1>the knowledge domain. People are not bluffing themselves on the

1:10:48.000 --> 1:10:51.320
<v Speaker 1>important stuff, or they would be convinced they know way

1:10:51.360 --> 1:10:54.280
<v Speaker 1>more about what happens in movies than they actually do

1:10:55.479 --> 1:10:59.960
<v Speaker 1>last study. In this research, so what exactly is correlated

1:11:00.040 --> 1:11:04.000
<v Speaker 1>with overconfidence? Having established that people are the most overconfident

1:11:04.040 --> 1:11:07.880
<v Speaker 1>about their understandings of devices and natural phenomenon, ruling out

1:11:07.920 --> 1:11:10.320
<v Speaker 1>the idea that this is because those domains of knowledge

1:11:10.320 --> 1:11:14.519
<v Speaker 1>are socially accepted or desirable. Uh, the experimenters, they were

1:11:14.520 --> 1:11:16.840
<v Speaker 1>trying to measure what are the other factors that are

1:11:16.880 --> 1:11:20.880
<v Speaker 1>correlated with overconfidence and understanding? So they returned to our

1:11:20.880 --> 1:11:24.320
<v Speaker 1>old friends, the devices, the cylinder lock, the flush toilet

1:11:24.520 --> 1:11:28.120
<v Speaker 1>the Grand list from studies one through four. Now, this

1:11:28.200 --> 1:11:32.799
<v Speaker 1>tested a lot of different correlates, like familiarity with the item,

1:11:32.920 --> 1:11:36.519
<v Speaker 1>the ratio of visible versus hidden parts, the number of

1:11:36.640 --> 1:11:40.840
<v Speaker 1>mechanical versus electrical parts, the total number of parts, and

1:11:40.960 --> 1:11:44.000
<v Speaker 1>the number of parts for which one knows the names. Uh.

1:11:44.040 --> 1:11:46.760
<v Speaker 1>There was a lot of complicated analysis on this one

1:11:46.800 --> 1:11:49.920
<v Speaker 1>as well, but in the end the researchers ruled that

1:11:50.000 --> 1:11:54.479
<v Speaker 1>the visible or two hidden parts ratio explained the most

1:11:54.600 --> 1:11:58.120
<v Speaker 1>of the variation in over confidence. In other words, a

1:11:58.200 --> 1:12:02.679
<v Speaker 1>device with visible trans parent mechanisms, in their words, seems

1:12:02.720 --> 1:12:05.280
<v Speaker 1>to be the most likely to trick you into thinking

1:12:05.320 --> 1:12:08.120
<v Speaker 1>you understand how it works, when in fact you would

1:12:08.120 --> 1:12:10.880
<v Speaker 1>discover yourself unable to explain it. So like we were

1:12:10.880 --> 1:12:13.439
<v Speaker 1>talking about the can open or the bicycle, things that

1:12:13.520 --> 1:12:16.400
<v Speaker 1>seem very clear and easy to to look at and

1:12:16.479 --> 1:12:19.679
<v Speaker 1>think you understand are the most likely to make people

1:12:19.800 --> 1:12:23.439
<v Speaker 1>over confident in their understanding um. They also believe that

1:12:23.479 --> 1:12:27.200
<v Speaker 1>the results indicate that the quote levels of analysis confusion

1:12:27.360 --> 1:12:31.439
<v Speaker 1>and the label mechanism confusion may contribute to feelings of knowing,

1:12:31.479 --> 1:12:34.479
<v Speaker 1>so that means confusing the higher level with the lower

1:12:34.560 --> 1:12:37.639
<v Speaker 1>level you know knowing confusing what it does with how

1:12:37.680 --> 1:12:40.679
<v Speaker 1>it does it at the granular level, and then also

1:12:41.320 --> 1:12:44.200
<v Speaker 1>knowing the names for parts of a thing might make

1:12:44.240 --> 1:12:47.960
<v Speaker 1>you overconfident in thinking that you know how the thing works.

1:12:48.439 --> 1:12:51.160
<v Speaker 1>A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, it certainly is.

1:12:51.240 --> 1:12:54.120
<v Speaker 1>And I can definitely think of this in like biology.

1:12:54.200 --> 1:12:56.920
<v Speaker 1>Remember in high school when you learn the names of

1:12:56.920 --> 1:12:58.800
<v Speaker 1>all the parts of the cell. Maybe not high school,

1:12:58.800 --> 1:13:00.720
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what, but some s class you have

1:13:00.720 --> 1:13:02.720
<v Speaker 1>in school. If you learn all the parts of the

1:13:02.760 --> 1:13:06.599
<v Speaker 1>cell in human maybe there's an art project involved. And

1:13:06.640 --> 1:13:08.800
<v Speaker 1>then you think you know how the cell works. I

1:13:08.800 --> 1:13:11.960
<v Speaker 1>don't know. You don't know how the cell works? Are

1:13:12.000 --> 1:13:13.800
<v Speaker 1>you a fool? Yeah? I mean the same can be

1:13:13.800 --> 1:13:15.640
<v Speaker 1>said of the human body, right, I mean you you

1:13:15.760 --> 1:13:18.960
<v Speaker 1>you learn all these different anatomical parts, the different organs.

1:13:19.520 --> 1:13:23.360
<v Speaker 1>But to say you know what a liver is is

1:13:23.400 --> 1:13:25.160
<v Speaker 1>the different thing than saying you know how the liver

1:13:25.280 --> 1:13:29.400
<v Speaker 1>works exactly right. So they say in their final discussion, Uh,

1:13:29.600 --> 1:13:32.200
<v Speaker 1>they're they're thinking about, you know, the explanations for what

1:13:32.360 --> 1:13:35.240
<v Speaker 1>causes the illusion of explanatory depth, and and they're sort

1:13:35.280 --> 1:13:38.280
<v Speaker 1>of focusing a lot on this idea of the the

1:13:38.400 --> 1:13:41.120
<v Speaker 1>environmental support being able to look at an object and

1:13:41.160 --> 1:13:44.880
<v Speaker 1>see the parts and confusing that for an understanding. And

1:13:45.000 --> 1:13:47.439
<v Speaker 1>I thought this was a good, good passage, They say, quote,

1:13:47.680 --> 1:13:50.080
<v Speaker 1>it would be easy to assume that you can derive

1:13:50.200 --> 1:13:53.959
<v Speaker 1>the same kind of representational support from the mental movie

1:13:54.240 --> 1:13:57.200
<v Speaker 1>that you could from observing a real phenomenon. So that's

1:13:57.240 --> 1:13:59.040
<v Speaker 1>like when you play a movie of a thing in

1:13:59.080 --> 1:14:02.880
<v Speaker 1>your head. Uh. They that you could confuse that with

1:14:03.439 --> 1:14:06.599
<v Speaker 1>the same level of information that you get from looking

1:14:06.640 --> 1:14:09.600
<v Speaker 1>at the object working the right quote. Of course, the

1:14:09.640 --> 1:14:12.519
<v Speaker 1>mental movie is more like Hollywood than it is like

1:14:12.600 --> 1:14:16.800
<v Speaker 1>real life. It fails to respect reality constraints. When we

1:14:16.880 --> 1:14:20.599
<v Speaker 1>try to lean on the seductively glossy surface, we find

1:14:20.680 --> 1:14:24.080
<v Speaker 1>that the facades of our mental films are hollow cardboard.

1:14:24.560 --> 1:14:28.080
<v Speaker 1>That discovery, the revelation of the shallowness of our mental

1:14:28.200 --> 1:14:34.160
<v Speaker 1>representations for perceptually salient processes, maybe what causes the surprise

1:14:34.240 --> 1:14:38.439
<v Speaker 1>and our participants. And that seems very plausible to me.

1:14:38.520 --> 1:14:41.000
<v Speaker 1>Like you, you try to put together a mental movie

1:14:41.000 --> 1:14:43.479
<v Speaker 1>of how they can opener works, and you're playing the

1:14:43.520 --> 1:14:46.639
<v Speaker 1>cartoon in your mind, and because you can do that,

1:14:47.120 --> 1:14:49.160
<v Speaker 1>you're like, oh, okay, I know how it works. Like

1:14:49.240 --> 1:14:52.080
<v Speaker 1>I just made the parts work in my mind, so

1:14:52.120 --> 1:14:54.080
<v Speaker 1>I know what all the parts are and what they do.

1:14:54.640 --> 1:14:57.679
<v Speaker 1>And it's something. Uh, it's something about this trick where

1:14:57.720 --> 1:15:01.439
<v Speaker 1>our imagination is less vivid than we think it is.

1:15:02.120 --> 1:15:04.000
<v Speaker 1>Like I'm picturing it in my head, I can see

1:15:04.000 --> 1:15:06.280
<v Speaker 1>it in my head, but then you try to explain

1:15:06.320 --> 1:15:08.960
<v Speaker 1>it and you realize there are blind spots in your

1:15:08.960 --> 1:15:12.760
<v Speaker 1>own imagination that you do not realize are there. Yeah,

1:15:12.760 --> 1:15:16.360
<v Speaker 1>our minds kind of tricks, isn't thinking We've filled in

1:15:16.400 --> 1:15:19.759
<v Speaker 1>all those little gaps. Um, Like I was having similar

1:15:19.760 --> 1:15:23.400
<v Speaker 1>situation just with Big Trouble a Little China. I feel

1:15:23.439 --> 1:15:26.559
<v Speaker 1>like my memory of it, when I summon it is

1:15:26.600 --> 1:15:29.879
<v Speaker 1>more of it, just a flash of images and uh

1:15:29.960 --> 1:15:33.719
<v Speaker 1>and and probably leaning heavy on just the film score,

1:15:34.400 --> 1:15:37.680
<v Speaker 1>just all these different ideas, scenes and sounds from the

1:15:37.720 --> 1:15:41.760
<v Speaker 1>film that I have encapsulated as my memory of the film.

1:15:41.800 --> 1:15:43.519
<v Speaker 1>I think that's true for a lot of movies with

1:15:43.560 --> 1:15:46.439
<v Speaker 1>me yea. And yet for some reason, people are generally

1:15:46.479 --> 1:15:48.960
<v Speaker 1>better at predicting how well they'll be able to describe

1:15:48.960 --> 1:15:51.680
<v Speaker 1>a narrative, so that that's one of the outliers for me.

1:15:51.720 --> 1:15:54.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm wondering what that really means. Well, I mean you

1:15:54.960 --> 1:15:58.000
<v Speaker 1>could could certainly take that apart and say, well, it's

1:15:58.120 --> 1:15:59.360
<v Speaker 1>a lot of it has to do with the way

1:15:59.400 --> 1:16:01.920
<v Speaker 1>that we make sense of our lives being narratives when

1:16:01.920 --> 1:16:06.120
<v Speaker 1>they're really not looking for the story shape in everything

1:16:06.240 --> 1:16:09.920
<v Speaker 1>from you know, your personal life to current events. It's

1:16:10.960 --> 1:16:13.960
<v Speaker 1>we're continually bashing our head up against the reality that

1:16:14.040 --> 1:16:17.680
<v Speaker 1>things do not play out with the economy or the

1:16:17.720 --> 1:16:22.599
<v Speaker 1>form of a traditional narrative. Well, unless you have anything else, Robert,

1:16:22.600 --> 1:16:24.519
<v Speaker 1>I think we should wrap up this first part, and

1:16:24.560 --> 1:16:27.080
<v Speaker 1>then when we return next time, we can look at

1:16:27.080 --> 1:16:29.880
<v Speaker 1>some of the applications of the fact that we have

1:16:30.000 --> 1:16:34.120
<v Speaker 1>an illusion of understanding, an illusion of explanatory depth about

1:16:34.120 --> 1:16:36.479
<v Speaker 1>the world around us. How can this knowledge be brought

1:16:36.520 --> 1:16:39.960
<v Speaker 1>to bear in various domains of life. Yeah, we'll consider

1:16:40.000 --> 1:16:43.839
<v Speaker 1>the children, will consider politics. Um, we might even consider

1:16:43.920 --> 1:16:46.439
<v Speaker 1>zombies a little bit. We'll see. Uh So. One of

1:16:46.439 --> 1:16:48.320
<v Speaker 1>the one thing though, I do want to to keep

1:16:48.320 --> 1:16:50.800
<v Speaker 1>in mind about this is that you shouldn't just take

1:16:50.800 --> 1:16:54.120
<v Speaker 1>this as pessimistic, right, uh Like, oh, we we don't

1:16:54.120 --> 1:16:56.400
<v Speaker 1>actually understand things as well as we do. How horrible

1:16:57.280 --> 1:16:59.680
<v Speaker 1>you could be pessimistic. You could say, why do we

1:16:59.760 --> 1:17:02.000
<v Speaker 1>know so much less about? How things work, then we

1:17:02.040 --> 1:17:04.439
<v Speaker 1>feel like we do. Or you could look at this

1:17:04.520 --> 1:17:07.599
<v Speaker 1>in a very optimistic way, and then and instead ask

1:17:07.680 --> 1:17:11.639
<v Speaker 1>the question, how are we so good at surviving in

1:17:11.720 --> 1:17:15.439
<v Speaker 1>and traveling through and manipulating the world when our models

1:17:15.439 --> 1:17:20.960
<v Speaker 1>for understanding causal relationships are so skeletal and bare bones, Like,

1:17:21.160 --> 1:17:25.080
<v Speaker 1>why are we so good at life compared to how

1:17:25.479 --> 1:17:32.480
<v Speaker 1>absolutely uh uh sparse are our mental imagery that animates

1:17:32.520 --> 1:17:36.400
<v Speaker 1>our understanding of the workings of things? Is? Yeah, And

1:17:36.439 --> 1:17:38.840
<v Speaker 1>I think at two other positive spins. Hey, if I

1:17:38.960 --> 1:17:43.200
<v Speaker 1>forget details of the plot and the narrative structure of

1:17:43.240 --> 1:17:45.000
<v Speaker 1>Big Trouble and Little China, that means the next time

1:17:45.040 --> 1:17:47.599
<v Speaker 1>I see it, a lot of stuff's gonna be new again.

1:17:47.760 --> 1:17:50.439
<v Speaker 1>Oh and then, and we talked about our own privileged

1:17:50.800 --> 1:17:55.240
<v Speaker 1>place of continually exploring new topics and and confronting what

1:17:55.320 --> 1:17:57.920
<v Speaker 1>we don't know and learning more about the world around us.

1:17:58.200 --> 1:18:00.559
<v Speaker 1>We should also point out, at risk of sounding like

1:18:00.600 --> 1:18:03.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm pandering uh, that our audience probably is in much

1:18:03.920 --> 1:18:05.920
<v Speaker 1>the same boat. The mere fact that you listen to

1:18:05.920 --> 1:18:08.800
<v Speaker 1>stuff to blow your mind, um, that you engage in

1:18:09.160 --> 1:18:15.320
<v Speaker 1>uh educational infocational uh podcast it just means. It means

1:18:15.360 --> 1:18:18.160
<v Speaker 1>that you to realize. Hey, Like, for instance, we had

1:18:18.160 --> 1:18:21.040
<v Speaker 1>to recently had an episode on butter. Some people might say,

1:18:21.120 --> 1:18:22.880
<v Speaker 1>I know how better works. I'm not gonna listen to that.

1:18:23.200 --> 1:18:25.120
<v Speaker 1>But people who did listen to it, they realized, well,

1:18:25.120 --> 1:18:27.120
<v Speaker 1>I think I know how better works. But if they

1:18:27.120 --> 1:18:29.320
<v Speaker 1>did an episode on it, then I guess there's more

1:18:29.439 --> 1:18:32.080
<v Speaker 1>to the scenario than I than I than I give

1:18:32.080 --> 1:18:34.760
<v Speaker 1>it credit. Oh that, I guess there's more. Moment. I

1:18:34.760 --> 1:18:37.800
<v Speaker 1>feel like it's very central to what we do. Yeah. Uh,

1:18:38.080 --> 1:18:40.680
<v Speaker 1>but don't let it go to your head. Robert, you

1:18:40.760 --> 1:18:43.200
<v Speaker 1>and I and you out there listening. We're no better.

1:18:43.360 --> 1:18:47.640
<v Speaker 1>We're no better. We just we just strive to understand

1:18:47.720 --> 1:18:50.760
<v Speaker 1>the depths of our ignorance, all right, And if you

1:18:50.800 --> 1:18:53.080
<v Speaker 1>want to strive to explore the depths of your ignorance,

1:18:53.280 --> 1:18:55.040
<v Speaker 1>head on over to stuff to Blow your Mind dot com.

1:18:55.040 --> 1:18:58.320
<v Speaker 1>That's where we find all the podcast episodes, videos, blog post,

1:18:58.520 --> 1:19:00.599
<v Speaker 1>you name. It leaks out to social media accounts. We're

1:19:00.600 --> 1:19:03.559
<v Speaker 1>on Facebook, Twitter, Tumbler, et cetera. About the Mothership is

1:19:03.560 --> 1:19:05.519
<v Speaker 1>Stuff to Blow your Mind dot com. And of course,

1:19:05.600 --> 1:19:07.640
<v Speaker 1>as always, if you want to email us directly to

1:19:07.640 --> 1:19:10.599
<v Speaker 1>get in touch about this episode or any other you

1:19:10.640 --> 1:19:13.240
<v Speaker 1>can hit us up at blow the Mind at how

1:19:13.280 --> 1:19:25.320
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com for more on this and thousands

1:19:25.360 --> 1:19:50.560
<v Speaker 1>of other topics. Is it how stuff works dot com.