WEBVTT - Tech News: Facebook Locks Out Users 0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:07.800 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 0:00:12.119 --> 0:00:14.560 Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 0:00:14.680 --> 0:00:17.640 Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 0:00:17.680 --> 0:00:20.440 and held the Tech Area. It is time for the 0:00:20.440 --> 0:00:23.840 tech news for March twenty two, thousand and twenty two. 0:00:23.960 --> 0:00:27.880 It's Tuesday, and you know, most of the time I 0:00:28.040 --> 0:00:34.240 talk about how people practice bad security behaviors and etiquette online. 0:00:34.680 --> 0:00:37.840 That that's kind of a common thing to talk about 0:00:37.880 --> 0:00:40.760 in tech in general. Is just that people tend to 0:00:40.800 --> 0:00:43.880 be the weakest link in any security system, and way 0:00:43.960 --> 0:00:48.760 too many people are very bad at protecting themselves digitally. 0:00:49.520 --> 0:00:52.080 In fact, that's how fishing attacks are a thing, right 0:00:52.159 --> 0:00:57.040 That attack depends upon the targets not being cautious enough 0:00:57.120 --> 0:01:00.400 to avoid getting scammed, and some fishing it acts can 0:01:00.440 --> 0:01:03.440 be really sophisticated. But here's the thing, they don't have 0:01:03.560 --> 0:01:07.200 to be, right Like, even an unsophisticated phishing attack is 0:01:07.240 --> 0:01:10.320 going to find a few hits. The more sophisticated is 0:01:10.760 --> 0:01:12.680 the more likely it's going to get hits. But then 0:01:12.720 --> 0:01:16.479 the more time you're spending developing your attack. However, there 0:01:16.520 --> 0:01:19.479 are also people who actually use a bit more restraint 0:01:19.840 --> 0:01:24.520 they are a little more cautious, and then sometimes it 0:01:24.560 --> 0:01:27.680 turns out that they weren't getting scammed at all, and 0:01:27.720 --> 0:01:30.560 instead they find themselves locked out of their Facebook accounts. 0:01:31.200 --> 0:01:35.120 All right, So at the heart of the story is 0:01:35.160 --> 0:01:40.479 that Facebook has the Facebook Protect initiative, and and this 0:01:40.520 --> 0:01:44.600 project that's spearheaded by Facebook was really aiming to convince 0:01:44.880 --> 0:01:49.120 Facebook users whom the company had identified as being particularly 0:01:49.200 --> 0:01:54.240 vulnerable to attack, to enable extra security measures stuff like 0:01:54.600 --> 0:01:58.560 two factor authentication, to protect their accounts from being compromised. 0:01:58.960 --> 0:02:02.160 So we're talking about people who are you know, high 0:02:02.240 --> 0:02:08.320 profile individuals like activists or journalists or politicians. You know, 0:02:08.520 --> 0:02:13.720 people that could easily be targeted by bad actors. You know, 0:02:13.840 --> 0:02:17.520 the the folks who have ill intentions to use those 0:02:17.560 --> 0:02:21.839 accounts to spread misinformation or to otherwise cause harm. So 0:02:22.520 --> 0:02:25.840 Facebook said, you know, these are high value targets. We 0:02:25.880 --> 0:02:28.359 want to let them know. We want them to switch 0:02:28.400 --> 0:02:32.639 over to these enhanced security measures to protect them and 0:02:32.919 --> 0:02:36.840 everybody else from them getting compromised. So they send out 0:02:36.840 --> 0:02:40.079 an email saying that these users need to turn on 0:02:40.120 --> 0:02:43.079 the Facebook Protect feature or else they would get locked 0:02:43.080 --> 0:02:46.480 out of their accounts. Now, the email included a link 0:02:47.040 --> 0:02:51.200 to turn that feature on an active link inside an email. However, 0:02:51.240 --> 0:02:53.680 the email also came from an address that was called 0:02:53.840 --> 0:02:59.320 security at Facebook mail dot com. Now, I don't know 0:02:59.360 --> 0:03:02.000 about you, but if I had received this email, and 0:03:02.040 --> 0:03:05.200 I didn't, but if I had, I definitely would have 0:03:05.240 --> 0:03:08.720 second thoughts on clicking on any kind of link contained 0:03:08.720 --> 0:03:13.680 in a message coming from that address, because it sounds 0:03:13.880 --> 0:03:17.600 us right like. It does not sound like that. You 0:03:17.639 --> 0:03:20.120 would expect it to come from Facebook dot com, not 0:03:20.280 --> 0:03:24.959 Facebook mail dot com. So that immediately would raise red 0:03:24.960 --> 0:03:27.080 flags in my mind. I would think, oh, this is 0:03:27.560 --> 0:03:32.120 not legit, this is a phishing attack. So there were 0:03:32.160 --> 0:03:35.000 some other folks who felt the same way. Plus that 0:03:35.120 --> 0:03:39.000 email address probably ended up having messages get sent to 0:03:39.120 --> 0:03:43.560 junk folders in a lot of cases. So either people 0:03:43.680 --> 0:03:46.560 a lot of people didn't see the message, or they 0:03:46.720 --> 0:03:52.360 rightly suspected or not rightly, they understandably success suspected that 0:03:52.760 --> 0:03:55.280 the message was in fact a phishing attack. They did 0:03:55.280 --> 0:03:59.520 not activate these protect features, and then last week they 0:03:59.560 --> 0:04:03.960 found them selves locked out of their Facebook accounts, apparently 0:04:04.080 --> 0:04:06.760 for at least a subsection of those who got locked out. 0:04:07.600 --> 0:04:11.080 The steps they then received to take in order to 0:04:11.160 --> 0:04:15.960 regain access and to enable Facebook Protect didn't work, So 0:04:16.160 --> 0:04:18.680 that didn't happen to everybody who got locked out. You know, 0:04:18.720 --> 0:04:21.600 people were able to appeal to Facebook and then start 0:04:21.680 --> 0:04:24.640 going through the process to recover their accounts and to 0:04:25.120 --> 0:04:29.200 enable Facebook Protect. At least for a few that didn't work. 0:04:29.240 --> 0:04:31.440 So the company has issued a statement saying it's going 0:04:31.520 --> 0:04:35.839 to work with those particular users to address the problem. 0:04:35.880 --> 0:04:38.560 And just to be clear, I actually think Facebook was 0:04:38.600 --> 0:04:41.320 taking a good approach here. I think that this was merited. 0:04:41.400 --> 0:04:45.960 I think it's important to enable to factor authentication. In fact, 0:04:46.040 --> 0:04:50.360 I think everybody should be enabling to factor authentication for 0:04:50.480 --> 0:04:55.240 platforms like Facebook. But definitely if you're someone who could 0:04:55.560 --> 0:04:59.120 you know, more likely be targeted by hackers and other 0:04:59.160 --> 0:05:02.640 bad actors, you absolutely should enable that. So I think 0:05:02.680 --> 0:05:05.880 that Facebook was coming from a good place in this case. 0:05:05.920 --> 0:05:08.120 I just feel the method of carrying out the initiative 0:05:08.200 --> 0:05:14.880 was maybe not thought through enough. Meanwhile, Apple continues to 0:05:15.000 --> 0:05:18.960 be hit with fines from regulators in the Netherlands. If 0:05:19.000 --> 0:05:23.599 you've been listening to my tech News episodes recently, you 0:05:23.640 --> 0:05:27.400 are probably aware that Dutch regulators were demanding that Apple 0:05:27.480 --> 0:05:32.160 allow third party payment methods within apps on iOS devices, 0:05:32.480 --> 0:05:37.719 specifically within dating apps, although you could extrapolate that to 0:05:37.800 --> 0:05:40.240 be I mean other apps as well, but they were 0:05:40.279 --> 0:05:43.479 specifically talking about dating apps and that for dating apps 0:05:43.480 --> 0:05:47.240 that have in app purchases there should be alternatives to 0:05:47.279 --> 0:05:50.400 Apple's own payment system. Now, Apple has of course been 0:05:50.440 --> 0:05:54.080 resisting these kind of of moves all over the world. 0:05:54.600 --> 0:05:58.080 Right in the United States, there have been court cases 0:05:58.120 --> 0:06:01.880 that have targeted Apple for very similar reasons, with the 0:06:01.960 --> 0:06:05.719 company then appealing decisions. I mean, you know, courts have 0:06:05.760 --> 0:06:08.760 decided against Apple, and Apple has appealed those decisions and 0:06:09.240 --> 0:06:13.159 continues to argue that its own approach, which requires that 0:06:13.279 --> 0:06:16.640 all in app purchases go through Apple's own payment system, 0:06:16.760 --> 0:06:22.280 is actually there to protect users and isn't somehow anti competitive. Uh. 0:06:22.360 --> 0:06:26.360 The Dutch regulators disagreed, saying no, it absolutely is anti competitive, 0:06:26.800 --> 0:06:32.039 and in fact, Apple, when proposing changes, has has failed 0:06:32.040 --> 0:06:37.920 to satisfy the regulators. So far, Apple has been found 0:06:37.960 --> 0:06:41.640 guilty of failing to meet those standards for nine weeks 0:06:41.640 --> 0:06:45.000 in a row and has accrued forty five million euro 0:06:45.160 --> 0:06:48.640 worth of fines. Now, the regular leaders are actually only 0:06:48.720 --> 0:06:52.920 authorized to find a total of fifty million euro. That's 0:06:52.960 --> 0:06:56.719 that's the cap, so Apple has one more week to 0:06:56.720 --> 0:07:00.440 go before it maxes out the fine, assuming that company 0:07:00.480 --> 0:07:04.680 continues to fail to meet regulators demands. Um As an 0:07:04.680 --> 0:07:08.080 example of something that Apple did that did not satisfy 0:07:08.120 --> 0:07:12.840 the regulators, the company allowed for alternative payment systems on 0:07:13.120 --> 0:07:16.560 in app purchases for dating apps in the Netherlands. However, 0:07:17.320 --> 0:07:21.080 the company also demanded a twenty seven commission on all 0:07:21.200 --> 0:07:24.640 in app sales. So yes, you could, if you were 0:07:24.680 --> 0:07:28.240 an app developer, go with a third party payment system, 0:07:28.280 --> 0:07:33.440 but you would have to surrender of your your of 0:07:33.480 --> 0:07:36.760 each sale to Apple, and that would mean that using 0:07:36.760 --> 0:07:40.560 a third party payment processing system would end up being 0:07:40.560 --> 0:07:44.120 more expensive than just using Apple's own method, which is 0:07:44.160 --> 0:07:47.200 a move that the Dutch regulators identified as being anti competitive. 0:07:47.240 --> 0:07:50.320 As I'll get out and I happen to agree. If 0:07:50.800 --> 0:07:55.040 your policy that is supposed to allow for fair competition 0:07:55.720 --> 0:08:00.080 makes anyone who engages in that that approach how have 0:08:00.120 --> 0:08:03.080 to pay more than your method, then you're not really 0:08:03.120 --> 0:08:08.040 making it competitive, right, You're still using your your power, 0:08:08.200 --> 0:08:14.320 your leverage. Two, you know, push people into your own aisle, 0:08:14.640 --> 0:08:17.480 your own pathway. And even if they don't, if they 0:08:17.480 --> 0:08:20.800 do go with a third party you still get instead 0:08:20.800 --> 0:08:25.960 of of every and app transaction. It's pretty ridiculous. Well, 0:08:26.080 --> 0:08:29.480 if Apple's proposals failed to satisfy the regulators, in the 0:08:29.480 --> 0:08:31.559 future of the company will be hit with the max 0:08:31.640 --> 0:08:34.280 fifty million euro fine and the stage will be set 0:08:34.320 --> 0:08:38.079 for a lawsuit that will pit Apple against the regulatory 0:08:38.080 --> 0:08:41.120 body in the Netherlands. And considering that's kind of what 0:08:41.160 --> 0:08:43.600 Apple is doing in other parts of the world, it 0:08:43.679 --> 0:08:46.720 might well be that that was Apple's plan all along. 0:08:47.280 --> 0:08:50.520 I don't know. I don't work at Apple, but you know, 0:08:50.600 --> 0:08:53.240 from the outside, that's kind of what it looks like 0:08:53.800 --> 0:08:57.160 switching over to Google. The company reached a settlement agreement 0:08:57.160 --> 0:08:59.920 with six former employees who claimed that they were the 0:09:00.000 --> 0:09:03.960 targets of retaliation after they attempted to lead employee organization 0:09:04.000 --> 0:09:08.080 efforts at Google. Specifically, three of the employees had organized 0:09:08.120 --> 0:09:11.080 against Google's projects with the U S Customs and Border 0:09:11.120 --> 0:09:18.160 Protection Agency, you know, like circulating UH surveys and documents 0:09:18.200 --> 0:09:22.240 to other employees to kind of gauge resistance to Google's 0:09:22.280 --> 0:09:25.960 agreement to work with US Customs and Border Protection. And 0:09:26.320 --> 0:09:29.760 they say that they were subsequently fired in retaliation for 0:09:29.920 --> 0:09:34.120 leading those efforts. Details of the settlement remain private, so 0:09:34.160 --> 0:09:37.800 we don't know how much money is changing hands here. Google, 0:09:37.920 --> 0:09:40.280 like many companies we've talked about in recent months, has 0:09:40.320 --> 0:09:43.959 been accused numerous times of trying to discourage employees from 0:09:44.080 --> 0:09:47.480 organizing in various ways. But as we have seen recently, 0:09:48.360 --> 0:09:52.040 there's a general movement, particularly here in the United States, 0:09:52.080 --> 0:09:58.320 that is building around unionization and organization and employee empowerment. Uh, 0:09:58.480 --> 0:10:01.600 it's possible that Google will end up just encouraging more 0:10:01.640 --> 0:10:06.600 employee organization efforts in the future. Um Typically that seems 0:10:06.640 --> 0:10:09.080 to be what happens is that the harder they clamped down, 0:10:09.679 --> 0:10:13.200 the more people want to resist. And on another Google story, 0:10:13.640 --> 0:10:16.320 the U S Department of Justice alleges that Google makes 0:10:16.360 --> 0:10:19.079 it a practice to train employees on using legal counsel 0:10:19.160 --> 0:10:23.920 as a shield against sharing business communications. So essentially, what 0:10:23.920 --> 0:10:26.160 the d o J is saying here is that when 0:10:26.240 --> 0:10:31.320 Google wants to make sure that certain internal communications remain 0:10:31.600 --> 0:10:37.000 confidential and within company control, they tag that with a 0:10:37.200 --> 0:10:42.760 request for legal advice. So even documents that would not 0:10:43.080 --> 0:10:45.679 need any kind of legal advice at all, at least 0:10:45.720 --> 0:10:48.560 according to the allegations, would get this tag on them, 0:10:48.840 --> 0:10:52.960 and by getting that tag and sending the communications onto 0:10:53.040 --> 0:10:56.880 legal counsel makes the communication a legal matter and the 0:10:56.920 --> 0:11:01.600 subject of attorney client privilege, and as such, uh, they 0:11:01.600 --> 0:11:05.800 could be withheld from discovery. I mean, it's attorney client privilege. 0:11:05.840 --> 0:11:09.520 It's not something that gets shared beyond those two parties. 0:11:10.559 --> 0:11:12.400 So the d o J is saying this isn't a 0:11:12.480 --> 0:11:16.600 legitimate use of legal consultation, that in many cases legal 0:11:16.640 --> 0:11:21.400 counsel never responded to any request for advice because there 0:11:21.480 --> 0:11:25.240 was never a an actual earnest request, that it was 0:11:25.360 --> 0:11:31.199 really just a way to kind of sidestep any investigative abilities. 0:11:31.600 --> 0:11:33.319 So the d o J says that Google has been 0:11:33.320 --> 0:11:35.960 relying on this method since at least two thousand fifteen, 0:11:36.440 --> 0:11:39.160 and the d o J is seeking to sanction Google 0:11:39.240 --> 0:11:42.160 and compel the company to share quote all withheld or 0:11:42.160 --> 0:11:46.160 redacted emails where no attorney responded to the purported request 0:11:46.200 --> 0:11:49.200 for legal advice end quote. Now, Google, for its part, 0:11:49.679 --> 0:11:53.720 denies the allegation that it improperly relied on legal counsel. 0:11:54.280 --> 0:11:57.480 So we'll have to see where this goes next. We've 0:11:57.480 --> 0:11:59.880 got several more stories to go before we get there. 0:12:00.040 --> 0:12:11.280 Let's take a quick break. Washington, d C aka the 0:12:11.480 --> 0:12:16.280 District of Columbia is suing the food delivery service grub Hub, 0:12:16.600 --> 0:12:20.640 claiming that the company engages in deceptive trade practices in 0:12:20.800 --> 0:12:25.960 violation of the District of Columbia's Consumer Protection Procedures Act. Now, 0:12:25.960 --> 0:12:28.400 the d C Attorney General has said that grub Hub 0:12:28.559 --> 0:12:32.880 was adding in a ton of hidden fees and also listening, 0:12:33.080 --> 0:12:36.880 you know, numerous restaurants that didn't actually have a contract 0:12:36.880 --> 0:12:40.600 agreement with Grubhub. So, in other words, grubhub was advertising 0:12:41.360 --> 0:12:43.840 that it had access to restaurants that it had not 0:12:44.120 --> 0:12:46.680 made any kind of contract with. That could lead to 0:12:46.720 --> 0:12:50.760 incidents where business rejects an online order because it never 0:12:51.360 --> 0:12:56.640 created that relationship, which obviously has an adverse effect on 0:12:57.480 --> 0:13:02.360 the customer. I have used a food delivery service a 0:13:02.400 --> 0:13:07.480 few times during the pandemic, a few being a drastic understatement, 0:13:07.960 --> 0:13:11.920 and I've encountered similar things, and I don't I don't 0:13:11.960 --> 0:13:16.959 know if it's an honest mistake or if it's similar 0:13:17.000 --> 0:13:19.440 to what is going on in the District of Columbia. 0:13:19.480 --> 0:13:23.080 According to the Attorney General. Grub Hub also, according to 0:13:23.120 --> 0:13:27.040 the accusations, pumped up the prices for restaurant items, So 0:13:27.080 --> 0:13:29.560 in other words, you would be spending more to buy 0:13:29.559 --> 0:13:32.120 that burrito through grub Hub than you would if you 0:13:32.200 --> 0:13:35.000 just went to the restaurant just for the base price, um. 0:13:35.120 --> 0:13:37.319 And that's before you factor in all the other fees 0:13:37.360 --> 0:13:39.920 that grubhub throws in, like the delivery fees and service 0:13:39.960 --> 0:13:43.480 fees and whatnot. So the base burrito cost alone would 0:13:43.480 --> 0:13:45.320 be higher than you would find in the restaurant. And 0:13:45.360 --> 0:13:48.640 I'm pretty sure that's true across nearly all third party 0:13:48.679 --> 0:13:51.880 delivery services. I've definitely, at least, you know, in my 0:13:51.920 --> 0:13:54.800 own experience, I've observed this is the case where I 0:13:54.880 --> 0:13:57.200 know the price of a thing at a restaurant and 0:13:57.200 --> 0:13:59.960 I look at it on delivery services, and it's typically 0:14:00.000 --> 0:14:04.000 at least a couple of bucks more expensive there. And 0:14:04.040 --> 0:14:05.920 there are a lot of other parts to this lawsuit, 0:14:05.960 --> 0:14:09.400 to including an accusation that grub hub has created websites that, 0:14:09.520 --> 0:14:13.000 at least on the surface, appear to belong to specific restaurants, 0:14:13.000 --> 0:14:17.040 but in fact they redirect customers to grub Hub's own services, 0:14:17.080 --> 0:14:20.480 and that further, these sites can leave people with the 0:14:20.520 --> 0:14:24.360 implication that there's no other way to get a delivery 0:14:24.480 --> 0:14:27.360 ordered from that specific restaurant, when that might not be 0:14:27.440 --> 0:14:30.160 the case. There may be cases where restaurants have their 0:14:30.200 --> 0:14:34.360 own delivery services or they rely upon some independent group 0:14:34.800 --> 0:14:38.200 and that you can order directly from them, but according 0:14:38.240 --> 0:14:43.360 to the lawsuit, Grubhub's approach is to try and and 0:14:43.560 --> 0:14:47.160 uh overshadow those so that people go through Grubhub instead. 0:14:47.480 --> 0:14:51.360 We've seen similar complaints raised against Google's order online option 0:14:51.440 --> 0:14:54.440 in search results, and there's no question that the delivery 0:14:54.480 --> 0:14:58.880 industry has adopted some let's call them questionable business practices, 0:14:59.200 --> 0:15:01.240 but it remains to be seen if they go far 0:15:01.320 --> 0:15:05.920 enough to be considered illegal. The identity authentication company oct 0:15:06.000 --> 0:15:09.440 To announced that it might have experienced a data breach, 0:15:09.480 --> 0:15:12.720 which is a big old yaalza. So Octa is a 0:15:12.760 --> 0:15:18.640 business that provides authentication services to other businesses, big ones 0:15:18.720 --> 0:15:23.840 like T Mobile UH. Companies outsource authentication to Octa and 0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:27.360 then rely on Octa to verify that, say, an employee 0:15:27.400 --> 0:15:29.600 is who they claim to be before they are allowed 0:15:29.640 --> 0:15:32.320 to access whatever they're trying to access. So a lot 0:15:32.360 --> 0:15:35.040 of companies might use like their own VPN or virtual 0:15:35.080 --> 0:15:39.000 private network for internal systems, and a company like Octa 0:15:39.320 --> 0:15:41.240 can act as sort of like a bouncer. You know, 0:15:41.280 --> 0:15:43.000 it's making sure that the people who are trying to 0:15:43.040 --> 0:15:46.880 access those internal systems actually have the credentials saying they 0:15:46.880 --> 0:15:49.760 can do it, or rather you know, authenticating that those 0:15:49.800 --> 0:15:54.440 credentials are in fact legit. So, according to OCTA's CEO, 0:15:54.720 --> 0:15:58.680 the company had identified an intrusion attempt back in January, 0:15:58.800 --> 0:16:02.080 but contained the situation. He said that it did not 0:16:02.600 --> 0:16:06.040 result in a massive breach. But meanwhile, a hacker group 0:16:06.160 --> 0:16:10.000 called laps US where the last s there's it's l 0:16:10.080 --> 0:16:13.920 A P S U S dollar sign because of course 0:16:13.920 --> 0:16:16.680 it is. That group has claimed to be responsible for 0:16:16.720 --> 0:16:19.760 the attack and did so in an effort to access 0:16:19.800 --> 0:16:22.840 the systems of an Octa client, So, in other words, 0:16:23.120 --> 0:16:27.120 not to necessarily compromise Octa itself, but in order to 0:16:27.160 --> 0:16:31.400 get at one of the clients that Octa services. According 0:16:31.440 --> 0:16:35.640 to laps us, uh, the hackers are aren't part of 0:16:35.680 --> 0:16:39.040 some cyber war group. They're not like a state sponsored 0:16:39.080 --> 0:16:42.080 hacker group. They're just in it for the money, so, 0:16:42.160 --> 0:16:48.120 you know, honest crooks. In Israel, the Israeli National Cyber 0:16:48.240 --> 0:16:52.640 Directorate issued a report that says sixties six thousand closed 0:16:52.760 --> 0:16:56.800 circuit television systems in the country aren't very secure and 0:16:56.920 --> 0:17:01.040 could be hacked relatively easily. In fact, hacked is being 0:17:01.280 --> 0:17:04.879 too generous based upon what's going on here. Hacked is 0:17:06.119 --> 0:17:09.280 is suggesting a level of effort that you really don't 0:17:09.280 --> 0:17:12.679 even need to consider. Uh. And you know, there there 0:17:12.680 --> 0:17:18.560 are a lot of drawbacks to living in a surveillance state, um, 0:17:18.680 --> 0:17:22.120 which you could argue, you know, Israel could kind of 0:17:22.240 --> 0:17:24.240 qualify for that. There are a lot of places in Europe, 0:17:24.240 --> 0:17:28.520 they have a lot of CCTV systems. So one complaint 0:17:28.520 --> 0:17:30.520 you might have of living in a surveillance state is 0:17:30.560 --> 0:17:33.840 that big brother is watching you. But another is that 0:17:34.800 --> 0:17:37.000 you aren't sure who is watching you, but you're pretty 0:17:37.040 --> 0:17:40.520 darn sure you're being watched. And that's the case here right. 0:17:40.560 --> 0:17:44.080 So according to the directorate, the problem stems from a 0:17:44.160 --> 0:17:48.320 dead simple solution. Uh. The systems all come with like 0:17:48.520 --> 0:17:52.119 default login and passwords so that you can you know, 0:17:52.160 --> 0:17:56.200 administrate the system. And apparently tons of people who install 0:17:56.240 --> 0:17:58.840 these systems never bothered to go in and change the 0:17:58.920 --> 0:18:03.879 default loggin it. So maybe you've heard security experts advocate 0:18:03.960 --> 0:18:06.360 that you know, you change your standard logging and password 0:18:06.400 --> 0:18:09.200 for your home network, for your you know, your router, 0:18:09.359 --> 0:18:12.119 for example, and that's a very good idea because there 0:18:12.119 --> 0:18:14.880 are a lot of equipment manufacturers, not as many now 0:18:14.920 --> 0:18:17.760 as there used to be, but still happens. But there 0:18:17.800 --> 0:18:21.000 are manufacturers that rely on a relatively small number of 0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:25.439 default passwords. So if a hacker knows this, and a 0:18:25.440 --> 0:18:30.200 hacker has a dictionary list of all the known default passwords, 0:18:30.640 --> 0:18:33.639 they can attempt to gain administrative level access to your 0:18:33.640 --> 0:18:36.080 network pretty quickly, like if you haven't changed it, then 0:18:36.119 --> 0:18:38.800 it's just you know, a brute force attack can be 0:18:38.800 --> 0:18:42.040 pretty darn fast if if it's a fairly small list 0:18:42.119 --> 0:18:45.760 of possible passwords. So that same issue is in play 0:18:45.840 --> 0:18:49.160 with these CCTV systems in Israel, and those are meant 0:18:49.200 --> 0:18:53.880 to provide physical security, so clearly they're failing in their purpose. 0:18:54.080 --> 0:18:57.879 If the people who are using them haven't changed those passwords, 0:18:58.119 --> 0:19:02.960 you cannot be certain that system is secure. If someone 0:19:03.000 --> 0:19:05.800 can access it just by using a default password right there, 0:19:05.840 --> 0:19:08.480 that that's no security at all. It could lead to 0:19:08.520 --> 0:19:11.920 an Ocean's eleven kind of high situation where thieves compromise 0:19:11.960 --> 0:19:15.240 the security system by typing in a default password and 0:19:15.240 --> 0:19:19.000 then disabling or otherwise interfering with the system while they 0:19:19.080 --> 0:19:21.960 rob a place blind and in the movies that could 0:19:22.000 --> 0:19:24.119 be really fun and exciting, but in the real world 0:19:24.440 --> 0:19:27.960 it is totally not plus. I mean, folks could compromise 0:19:28.000 --> 0:19:32.280 systems for a much more violent and tragic reasons, and 0:19:32.320 --> 0:19:35.879 that would be truly terrible. So the reason why the 0:19:35.880 --> 0:19:40.040 director even made this pronouncement of the fact that there 0:19:40.040 --> 0:19:44.360 are tens of thousands of potentially vulnerable systems in Israel, 0:19:45.240 --> 0:19:49.760 it's because they had actually been receiving reports from CCTV 0:19:49.920 --> 0:19:54.720 owners that they had been hacked. So clearly a big problem, 0:19:54.880 --> 0:19:58.200 and obviously the solution to that problem is not that difficult. 0:19:58.240 --> 0:20:01.720 It just involves law ugging in as an administrator and 0:20:01.720 --> 0:20:05.800 then changing the password information to something that's a strong 0:20:06.440 --> 0:20:09.520 log in, you know as a strong password, something that 0:20:09.880 --> 0:20:11.959 is not going to come up in a dictionary attack, 0:20:12.560 --> 0:20:19.320 and that's going to discourage more than of all hacker attempts, 0:20:19.320 --> 0:20:22.760 Like there is no such thing as a hack proof 0:20:22.800 --> 0:20:26.679 system that does not exist. But the more difficult you 0:20:26.760 --> 0:20:30.800 make it for someone from outside to access your system, 0:20:30.840 --> 0:20:33.360 the fewer people are actually gonna go through the trouble 0:20:33.440 --> 0:20:36.440 of seeing it through all the way, especially if you're 0:20:36.440 --> 0:20:39.919 in a target rich environment where you might say, oh, well, 0:20:39.960 --> 0:20:42.160 they changed the password, but the place next door didn't, 0:20:42.200 --> 0:20:45.080 so let's just target them instead. I mean, that's that's 0:20:45.119 --> 0:20:48.000 kind of the where Israel is seeing itself right now. 0:20:48.640 --> 0:20:53.080 Tesla opened its first European Giga factory today. Elon Musk 0:20:53.200 --> 0:20:55.480 was on hand in Germany for the event and the 0:20:55.520 --> 0:20:59.359 company delivered thirty model y SUVs two customers in the 0:20:59.359 --> 0:21:02.840 region as part of the celebration. Tesla had a bit 0:21:02.880 --> 0:21:06.879 of an uphill battle getting this giga factory online. Uh. 0:21:07.000 --> 0:21:10.560 It faced numerous questions about the environmental impact of the facility, 0:21:10.920 --> 0:21:13.440 something that some people might find ironic. I mean, it's 0:21:13.520 --> 0:21:18.320 all about developing electric vehicles, which at least you know, 0:21:18.600 --> 0:21:23.600 in in use, should be uh more environmentally friendly than 0:21:23.720 --> 0:21:26.920 internal combustion engines, But you still have to build out 0:21:26.920 --> 0:21:29.719 the facilities to make them, and that itself can have 0:21:29.960 --> 0:21:34.959 a tremendous environmental impact. Musk and his team sort of 0:21:35.000 --> 0:21:37.680 dismissed the environmental concerns, saying that they would be using 0:21:37.720 --> 0:21:40.280 up very little water in the region. Um And The 0:21:40.400 --> 0:21:42.680 Verge has an article about this that has a bit 0:21:42.760 --> 0:21:45.080 that actually made me laugh out loud when I read it, 0:21:45.560 --> 0:21:49.159 namely that in order to build the giga factory in Germany. 0:21:49.600 --> 0:21:53.760 Tesla first had to clear a forest. However, the article 0:21:53.840 --> 0:21:57.439 states Musk and company said that was fine because the 0:21:57.480 --> 0:22:03.119 forest was or wasn't natural, quote unquote wasn't natural. It 0:22:03.240 --> 0:22:07.080 wasn't a natural forest. Now. I don't know if Musk 0:22:07.280 --> 0:22:10.040 said that or if that's just how John Porter, who 0:22:10.040 --> 0:22:14.119 wrote the article put it in their article, but that 0:22:14.160 --> 0:22:17.640 wording made me laugh, that it wasn't a natural forest. Now, 0:22:17.640 --> 0:22:20.600 the meaning behind that was that the this forest was 0:22:20.680 --> 0:22:25.160 planted by humans for the purposes of supplying raw materials 0:22:25.160 --> 0:22:28.760 to a cardboard manufacturing facility. So that's what they mean 0:22:28.800 --> 0:22:30.879 by it's not a natural forest. It wasn't a pre 0:22:31.040 --> 0:22:34.920 existing forest. It was a group of trees that had 0:22:34.920 --> 0:22:39.960 been planted by people expressly for the purposes of industry. Still, 0:22:40.000 --> 0:22:44.040 the idea of Tesla clearing out an unnatural forest seems 0:22:44.160 --> 0:22:46.920 right for a sci fi horror movie to me anyway. 0:22:46.960 --> 0:22:49.040 It will take some time for the Giga factory to 0:22:49.320 --> 0:22:52.639 scale up to full production, and Musk projected that the 0:22:52.640 --> 0:22:55.840 facility will produce at most thirty thousand vehicles for the 0:22:55.880 --> 0:22:58.960 first half of this year. The goal is to get 0:22:58.960 --> 0:23:01.520 it up to producing as many as half a million 0:23:01.640 --> 0:23:05.160 vehicles per year once it is going at full blast. 0:23:05.640 --> 0:23:08.000 We have a couple more stories to cover before we 0:23:08.040 --> 0:23:18.480 get to those, let's take another quick break. In an 0:23:18.480 --> 0:23:22.719 effort to hold companies accountable for their impact on climate change, 0:23:22.920 --> 0:23:26.679 the US Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed new rules 0:23:27.200 --> 0:23:30.840 that would require publicly traded companies, as companies that have 0:23:30.960 --> 0:23:34.240 their stock traded on some stock market, they will have to, 0:23:34.560 --> 0:23:37.920 as part of their filings with the SEC, disclose their 0:23:37.960 --> 0:23:43.400 greenhouse gas emissions each year um that includes indirect greenhouse 0:23:43.400 --> 0:23:47.960 gas emissions. And to me, this makes total sense because 0:23:48.040 --> 0:23:50.960 the US has a goal to cut emissions by more 0:23:51.000 --> 0:23:56.040 than half by but in order for you to know 0:23:56.720 --> 0:23:58.879 whether or not you hit that goal, you first have 0:23:58.960 --> 0:24:01.520 to know how much you're emitted, right, Like, you've got 0:24:01.520 --> 0:24:05.440 to know the amount of greenhouse gas emissions in order 0:24:05.480 --> 0:24:08.760 to judge whether or not you actually cut back by 0:24:08.880 --> 0:24:13.320 half or really because it's more than half. You can't 0:24:13.760 --> 0:24:16.320 say that one way or another if you have no metrics, Right, 0:24:16.359 --> 0:24:19.240 You've got to have the metrics in place in order 0:24:19.359 --> 0:24:23.320 for any kind of policy that that is meant to 0:24:23.400 --> 0:24:27.399 achieve this goal to make any sense. So the rules 0:24:27.400 --> 0:24:30.879 would also require companies to submit to third party consultants 0:24:30.920 --> 0:24:34.399 to verify their numbers, so they couldn't just slap a 0:24:34.520 --> 0:24:38.639 number on their SEC filing and have that be that. 0:24:38.720 --> 0:24:42.080 It has to be verified by an outside party, one 0:24:42.119 --> 0:24:46.720 that's not affiliated with the company itself. Uh, there are 0:24:46.800 --> 0:24:50.880 some steps between now and when these rules might actually 0:24:50.920 --> 0:24:53.679 become official, and they might not like that's there's no 0:24:53.720 --> 0:24:57.360 guarantee here. So, for one thing, part of the SEC 0:24:57.640 --> 0:25:02.080 process is to publish rules on its website, and at 0:25:02.080 --> 0:25:05.880 that point, the general public has sixty days where they 0:25:05.880 --> 0:25:10.119 can comment on those rules, so that includes people who 0:25:10.200 --> 0:25:15.400 support or people who criticize the rules, and it even 0:25:15.480 --> 0:25:18.439 supporters might have suggestions for ways to make the rules 0:25:18.680 --> 0:25:25.000 more effective or more fair or or whatever. So that 0:25:25.080 --> 0:25:28.720 process is there for sixty days, and after that the 0:25:28.880 --> 0:25:32.920