1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,119 --> 00:00:14,560 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,680 --> 00:00:17,640 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 4 00:00:17,680 --> 00:00:20,440 Speaker 1: and held the Tech Area. It is time for the 5 00:00:20,440 --> 00:00:23,840 Speaker 1: tech news for March twenty two, thousand and twenty two. 6 00:00:23,960 --> 00:00:27,880 Speaker 1: It's Tuesday, and you know, most of the time I 7 00:00:28,040 --> 00:00:34,240 Speaker 1: talk about how people practice bad security behaviors and etiquette online. 8 00:00:34,680 --> 00:00:37,840 Speaker 1: That that's kind of a common thing to talk about 9 00:00:37,880 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: in tech in general. Is just that people tend to 10 00:00:40,800 --> 00:00:43,880 Speaker 1: be the weakest link in any security system, and way 11 00:00:43,960 --> 00:00:48,760 Speaker 1: too many people are very bad at protecting themselves digitally. 12 00:00:49,520 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 1: In fact, that's how fishing attacks are a thing, right 13 00:00:52,159 --> 00:00:57,040 Speaker 1: That attack depends upon the targets not being cautious enough 14 00:00:57,120 --> 00:01:00,400 Speaker 1: to avoid getting scammed, and some fishing it acts can 15 00:01:00,440 --> 00:01:03,440 Speaker 1: be really sophisticated. But here's the thing, they don't have 16 00:01:03,560 --> 00:01:07,200 Speaker 1: to be, right Like, even an unsophisticated phishing attack is 17 00:01:07,240 --> 00:01:10,320 Speaker 1: going to find a few hits. The more sophisticated is 18 00:01:10,760 --> 00:01:12,680 Speaker 1: the more likely it's going to get hits. But then 19 00:01:12,720 --> 00:01:16,479 Speaker 1: the more time you're spending developing your attack. However, there 20 00:01:16,520 --> 00:01:19,479 Speaker 1: are also people who actually use a bit more restraint 21 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:24,520 Speaker 1: they are a little more cautious, and then sometimes it 22 00:01:24,560 --> 00:01:27,680 Speaker 1: turns out that they weren't getting scammed at all, and 23 00:01:27,720 --> 00:01:30,560 Speaker 1: instead they find themselves locked out of their Facebook accounts. 24 00:01:31,200 --> 00:01:35,120 Speaker 1: All right, So at the heart of the story is 25 00:01:35,160 --> 00:01:40,479 Speaker 1: that Facebook has the Facebook Protect initiative, and and this 26 00:01:40,520 --> 00:01:44,600 Speaker 1: project that's spearheaded by Facebook was really aiming to convince 27 00:01:44,880 --> 00:01:49,120 Speaker 1: Facebook users whom the company had identified as being particularly 28 00:01:49,200 --> 00:01:54,240 Speaker 1: vulnerable to attack, to enable extra security measures stuff like 29 00:01:54,600 --> 00:01:58,560 Speaker 1: two factor authentication, to protect their accounts from being compromised. 30 00:01:58,960 --> 00:02:02,160 Speaker 1: So we're talking about people who are you know, high 31 00:02:02,240 --> 00:02:08,320 Speaker 1: profile individuals like activists or journalists or politicians. You know, 32 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:13,720 Speaker 1: people that could easily be targeted by bad actors. You know, 33 00:02:13,840 --> 00:02:17,520 Speaker 1: the the folks who have ill intentions to use those 34 00:02:17,560 --> 00:02:21,839 Speaker 1: accounts to spread misinformation or to otherwise cause harm. So 35 00:02:22,520 --> 00:02:25,840 Speaker 1: Facebook said, you know, these are high value targets. We 36 00:02:25,880 --> 00:02:28,359 Speaker 1: want to let them know. We want them to switch 37 00:02:28,400 --> 00:02:32,639 Speaker 1: over to these enhanced security measures to protect them and 38 00:02:32,919 --> 00:02:36,840 Speaker 1: everybody else from them getting compromised. So they send out 39 00:02:36,840 --> 00:02:40,079 Speaker 1: an email saying that these users need to turn on 40 00:02:40,120 --> 00:02:43,079 Speaker 1: the Facebook Protect feature or else they would get locked 41 00:02:43,080 --> 00:02:46,480 Speaker 1: out of their accounts. Now, the email included a link 42 00:02:47,040 --> 00:02:51,200 Speaker 1: to turn that feature on an active link inside an email. However, 43 00:02:51,240 --> 00:02:53,680 Speaker 1: the email also came from an address that was called 44 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:59,320 Speaker 1: security at Facebook mail dot com. Now, I don't know 45 00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:02,000 Speaker 1: about you, but if I had received this email, and 46 00:03:02,040 --> 00:03:05,200 Speaker 1: I didn't, but if I had, I definitely would have 47 00:03:05,240 --> 00:03:08,720 Speaker 1: second thoughts on clicking on any kind of link contained 48 00:03:08,720 --> 00:03:13,680 Speaker 1: in a message coming from that address, because it sounds 49 00:03:13,880 --> 00:03:17,600 Speaker 1: us right like. It does not sound like that. You 50 00:03:17,639 --> 00:03:20,120 Speaker 1: would expect it to come from Facebook dot com, not 51 00:03:20,280 --> 00:03:24,959 Speaker 1: Facebook mail dot com. So that immediately would raise red 52 00:03:24,960 --> 00:03:27,080 Speaker 1: flags in my mind. I would think, oh, this is 53 00:03:27,560 --> 00:03:32,120 Speaker 1: not legit, this is a phishing attack. So there were 54 00:03:32,160 --> 00:03:35,000 Speaker 1: some other folks who felt the same way. Plus that 55 00:03:35,120 --> 00:03:39,000 Speaker 1: email address probably ended up having messages get sent to 56 00:03:39,120 --> 00:03:43,560 Speaker 1: junk folders in a lot of cases. So either people 57 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:46,560 Speaker 1: a lot of people didn't see the message, or they 58 00:03:46,720 --> 00:03:52,360 Speaker 1: rightly suspected or not rightly, they understandably success suspected that 59 00:03:52,760 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: the message was in fact a phishing attack. They did 60 00:03:55,280 --> 00:03:59,520 Speaker 1: not activate these protect features, and then last week they 61 00:03:59,560 --> 00:04:03,960 Speaker 1: found them selves locked out of their Facebook accounts, apparently 62 00:04:04,080 --> 00:04:06,760 Speaker 1: for at least a subsection of those who got locked out. 63 00:04:07,600 --> 00:04:11,080 Speaker 1: The steps they then received to take in order to 64 00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:15,960 Speaker 1: regain access and to enable Facebook Protect didn't work, So 65 00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:18,680 Speaker 1: that didn't happen to everybody who got locked out. You know, 66 00:04:18,720 --> 00:04:21,600 Speaker 1: people were able to appeal to Facebook and then start 67 00:04:21,680 --> 00:04:24,640 Speaker 1: going through the process to recover their accounts and to 68 00:04:25,120 --> 00:04:29,200 Speaker 1: enable Facebook Protect. At least for a few that didn't work. 69 00:04:29,240 --> 00:04:31,440 Speaker 1: So the company has issued a statement saying it's going 70 00:04:31,520 --> 00:04:35,839 Speaker 1: to work with those particular users to address the problem. 71 00:04:35,880 --> 00:04:38,560 Speaker 1: And just to be clear, I actually think Facebook was 72 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:41,320 Speaker 1: taking a good approach here. I think that this was merited. 73 00:04:41,400 --> 00:04:45,960 Speaker 1: I think it's important to enable to factor authentication. In fact, 74 00:04:46,040 --> 00:04:50,360 Speaker 1: I think everybody should be enabling to factor authentication for 75 00:04:50,480 --> 00:04:55,240 Speaker 1: platforms like Facebook. But definitely if you're someone who could 76 00:04:55,560 --> 00:04:59,120 Speaker 1: you know, more likely be targeted by hackers and other 77 00:04:59,160 --> 00:05:02,640 Speaker 1: bad actors, you absolutely should enable that. So I think 78 00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:05,880 Speaker 1: that Facebook was coming from a good place in this case. 79 00:05:05,920 --> 00:05:08,120 Speaker 1: I just feel the method of carrying out the initiative 80 00:05:08,200 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 1: was maybe not thought through enough. Meanwhile, Apple continues to 81 00:05:15,000 --> 00:05:18,960 Speaker 1: be hit with fines from regulators in the Netherlands. If 82 00:05:19,000 --> 00:05:23,599 Speaker 1: you've been listening to my tech News episodes recently, you 83 00:05:23,640 --> 00:05:27,400 Speaker 1: are probably aware that Dutch regulators were demanding that Apple 84 00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:32,160 Speaker 1: allow third party payment methods within apps on iOS devices, 85 00:05:32,480 --> 00:05:37,719 Speaker 1: specifically within dating apps, although you could extrapolate that to 86 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:40,240 Speaker 1: be I mean other apps as well, but they were 87 00:05:40,279 --> 00:05:43,479 Speaker 1: specifically talking about dating apps and that for dating apps 88 00:05:43,480 --> 00:05:47,240 Speaker 1: that have in app purchases there should be alternatives to 89 00:05:47,279 --> 00:05:50,400 Speaker 1: Apple's own payment system. Now, Apple has of course been 90 00:05:50,440 --> 00:05:54,080 Speaker 1: resisting these kind of of moves all over the world. 91 00:05:54,600 --> 00:05:58,080 Speaker 1: Right in the United States, there have been court cases 92 00:05:58,120 --> 00:06:01,880 Speaker 1: that have targeted Apple for very similar reasons, with the 93 00:06:01,960 --> 00:06:05,719 Speaker 1: company then appealing decisions. I mean, you know, courts have 94 00:06:05,760 --> 00:06:08,760 Speaker 1: decided against Apple, and Apple has appealed those decisions and 95 00:06:09,240 --> 00:06:13,159 Speaker 1: continues to argue that its own approach, which requires that 96 00:06:13,279 --> 00:06:16,640 Speaker 1: all in app purchases go through Apple's own payment system, 97 00:06:16,760 --> 00:06:22,280 Speaker 1: is actually there to protect users and isn't somehow anti competitive. Uh. 98 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:26,360 Speaker 1: The Dutch regulators disagreed, saying no, it absolutely is anti competitive, 99 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:32,039 Speaker 1: and in fact, Apple, when proposing changes, has has failed 100 00:06:32,040 --> 00:06:37,920 Speaker 1: to satisfy the regulators. So far, Apple has been found 101 00:06:37,960 --> 00:06:41,640 Speaker 1: guilty of failing to meet those standards for nine weeks 102 00:06:41,640 --> 00:06:45,000 Speaker 1: in a row and has accrued forty five million euro 103 00:06:45,160 --> 00:06:48,640 Speaker 1: worth of fines. Now, the regular leaders are actually only 104 00:06:48,720 --> 00:06:52,920 Speaker 1: authorized to find a total of fifty million euro. That's 105 00:06:52,960 --> 00:06:56,719 Speaker 1: that's the cap, so Apple has one more week to 106 00:06:56,720 --> 00:07:00,440 Speaker 1: go before it maxes out the fine, assuming that company 107 00:07:00,480 --> 00:07:04,680 Speaker 1: continues to fail to meet regulators demands. Um As an 108 00:07:04,680 --> 00:07:08,080 Speaker 1: example of something that Apple did that did not satisfy 109 00:07:08,120 --> 00:07:12,840 Speaker 1: the regulators, the company allowed for alternative payment systems on 110 00:07:13,120 --> 00:07:16,560 Speaker 1: in app purchases for dating apps in the Netherlands. However, 111 00:07:17,320 --> 00:07:21,080 Speaker 1: the company also demanded a twenty seven commission on all 112 00:07:21,200 --> 00:07:24,640 Speaker 1: in app sales. So yes, you could, if you were 113 00:07:24,680 --> 00:07:28,240 Speaker 1: an app developer, go with a third party payment system, 114 00:07:28,280 --> 00:07:33,440 Speaker 1: but you would have to surrender of your your of 115 00:07:33,480 --> 00:07:36,760 Speaker 1: each sale to Apple, and that would mean that using 116 00:07:36,760 --> 00:07:40,560 Speaker 1: a third party payment processing system would end up being 117 00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:44,120 Speaker 1: more expensive than just using Apple's own method, which is 118 00:07:44,160 --> 00:07:47,200 Speaker 1: a move that the Dutch regulators identified as being anti competitive. 119 00:07:47,240 --> 00:07:50,320 Speaker 1: As I'll get out and I happen to agree. If 120 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:55,040 Speaker 1: your policy that is supposed to allow for fair competition 121 00:07:55,720 --> 00:08:00,080 Speaker 1: makes anyone who engages in that that approach how have 122 00:08:00,120 --> 00:08:03,080 Speaker 1: to pay more than your method, then you're not really 123 00:08:03,120 --> 00:08:08,040 Speaker 1: making it competitive, right, You're still using your your power, 124 00:08:08,200 --> 00:08:14,320 Speaker 1: your leverage. Two, you know, push people into your own aisle, 125 00:08:14,640 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 1: your own pathway. And even if they don't, if they 126 00:08:17,480 --> 00:08:20,800 Speaker 1: do go with a third party you still get instead 127 00:08:20,800 --> 00:08:25,960 Speaker 1: of of every and app transaction. It's pretty ridiculous. Well, 128 00:08:26,080 --> 00:08:29,480 Speaker 1: if Apple's proposals failed to satisfy the regulators, in the 129 00:08:29,480 --> 00:08:31,559 Speaker 1: future of the company will be hit with the max 130 00:08:31,640 --> 00:08:34,280 Speaker 1: fifty million euro fine and the stage will be set 131 00:08:34,320 --> 00:08:38,079 Speaker 1: for a lawsuit that will pit Apple against the regulatory 132 00:08:38,080 --> 00:08:41,120 Speaker 1: body in the Netherlands. And considering that's kind of what 133 00:08:41,160 --> 00:08:43,600 Speaker 1: Apple is doing in other parts of the world, it 134 00:08:43,679 --> 00:08:46,720 Speaker 1: might well be that that was Apple's plan all along. 135 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:50,520 Speaker 1: I don't know. I don't work at Apple, but you know, 136 00:08:50,600 --> 00:08:53,240 Speaker 1: from the outside, that's kind of what it looks like 137 00:08:53,800 --> 00:08:57,160 Speaker 1: switching over to Google. The company reached a settlement agreement 138 00:08:57,160 --> 00:08:59,920 Speaker 1: with six former employees who claimed that they were the 139 00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:03,960 Speaker 1: targets of retaliation after they attempted to lead employee organization 140 00:09:04,000 --> 00:09:08,080 Speaker 1: efforts at Google. Specifically, three of the employees had organized 141 00:09:08,120 --> 00:09:11,080 Speaker 1: against Google's projects with the U S Customs and Border 142 00:09:11,120 --> 00:09:18,160 Speaker 1: Protection Agency, you know, like circulating UH surveys and documents 143 00:09:18,200 --> 00:09:22,240 Speaker 1: to other employees to kind of gauge resistance to Google's 144 00:09:22,280 --> 00:09:25,960 Speaker 1: agreement to work with US Customs and Border Protection. And 145 00:09:26,320 --> 00:09:29,760 Speaker 1: they say that they were subsequently fired in retaliation for 146 00:09:29,920 --> 00:09:34,120 Speaker 1: leading those efforts. Details of the settlement remain private, so 147 00:09:34,160 --> 00:09:37,800 Speaker 1: we don't know how much money is changing hands here. Google, 148 00:09:37,920 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 1: like many companies we've talked about in recent months, has 149 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:43,959 Speaker 1: been accused numerous times of trying to discourage employees from 150 00:09:44,080 --> 00:09:47,480 Speaker 1: organizing in various ways. But as we have seen recently, 151 00:09:48,360 --> 00:09:52,040 Speaker 1: there's a general movement, particularly here in the United States, 152 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:58,320 Speaker 1: that is building around unionization and organization and employee empowerment. Uh, 153 00:09:58,480 --> 00:10:01,600 Speaker 1: it's possible that Google will end up just encouraging more 154 00:10:01,640 --> 00:10:06,600 Speaker 1: employee organization efforts in the future. Um Typically that seems 155 00:10:06,640 --> 00:10:09,080 Speaker 1: to be what happens is that the harder they clamped down, 156 00:10:09,679 --> 00:10:13,200 Speaker 1: the more people want to resist. And on another Google story, 157 00:10:13,640 --> 00:10:16,320 Speaker 1: the U S Department of Justice alleges that Google makes 158 00:10:16,360 --> 00:10:19,079 Speaker 1: it a practice to train employees on using legal counsel 159 00:10:19,160 --> 00:10:23,920 Speaker 1: as a shield against sharing business communications. So essentially, what 160 00:10:23,920 --> 00:10:26,160 Speaker 1: the d o J is saying here is that when 161 00:10:26,240 --> 00:10:31,320 Speaker 1: Google wants to make sure that certain internal communications remain 162 00:10:31,600 --> 00:10:37,000 Speaker 1: confidential and within company control, they tag that with a 163 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:42,760 Speaker 1: request for legal advice. So even documents that would not 164 00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:45,679 Speaker 1: need any kind of legal advice at all, at least 165 00:10:45,720 --> 00:10:48,560 Speaker 1: according to the allegations, would get this tag on them, 166 00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:52,960 Speaker 1: and by getting that tag and sending the communications onto 167 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:56,880 Speaker 1: legal counsel makes the communication a legal matter and the 168 00:10:56,920 --> 00:11:01,600 Speaker 1: subject of attorney client privilege, and as such, uh, they 169 00:11:01,600 --> 00:11:05,800 Speaker 1: could be withheld from discovery. I mean, it's attorney client privilege. 170 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:09,520 Speaker 1: It's not something that gets shared beyond those two parties. 171 00:11:10,559 --> 00:11:12,400 Speaker 1: So the d o J is saying this isn't a 172 00:11:12,480 --> 00:11:16,600 Speaker 1: legitimate use of legal consultation, that in many cases legal 173 00:11:16,640 --> 00:11:21,400 Speaker 1: counsel never responded to any request for advice because there 174 00:11:21,480 --> 00:11:25,240 Speaker 1: was never a an actual earnest request, that it was 175 00:11:25,360 --> 00:11:31,199 Speaker 1: really just a way to kind of sidestep any investigative abilities. 176 00:11:31,600 --> 00:11:33,319 Speaker 1: So the d o J says that Google has been 177 00:11:33,320 --> 00:11:35,960 Speaker 1: relying on this method since at least two thousand fifteen, 178 00:11:36,440 --> 00:11:39,160 Speaker 1: and the d o J is seeking to sanction Google 179 00:11:39,240 --> 00:11:42,160 Speaker 1: and compel the company to share quote all withheld or 180 00:11:42,160 --> 00:11:46,160 Speaker 1: redacted emails where no attorney responded to the purported request 181 00:11:46,200 --> 00:11:49,200 Speaker 1: for legal advice end quote. Now, Google, for its part, 182 00:11:49,679 --> 00:11:53,720 Speaker 1: denies the allegation that it improperly relied on legal counsel. 183 00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:57,480 Speaker 1: So we'll have to see where this goes next. We've 184 00:11:57,480 --> 00:11:59,880 Speaker 1: got several more stories to go before we get there. 185 00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:11,280 Speaker 1: Let's take a quick break. Washington, d C aka the 186 00:12:11,480 --> 00:12:16,280 Speaker 1: District of Columbia is suing the food delivery service grub Hub, 187 00:12:16,600 --> 00:12:20,640 Speaker 1: claiming that the company engages in deceptive trade practices in 188 00:12:20,800 --> 00:12:25,960 Speaker 1: violation of the District of Columbia's Consumer Protection Procedures Act. Now, 189 00:12:25,960 --> 00:12:28,400 Speaker 1: the d C Attorney General has said that grub Hub 190 00:12:28,559 --> 00:12:32,880 Speaker 1: was adding in a ton of hidden fees and also listening, 191 00:12:33,080 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 1: you know, numerous restaurants that didn't actually have a contract 192 00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:40,600 Speaker 1: agreement with Grubhub. So, in other words, grubhub was advertising 193 00:12:41,360 --> 00:12:43,840 Speaker 1: that it had access to restaurants that it had not 194 00:12:44,120 --> 00:12:46,680 Speaker 1: made any kind of contract with. That could lead to 195 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:50,760 Speaker 1: incidents where business rejects an online order because it never 196 00:12:51,360 --> 00:12:56,640 Speaker 1: created that relationship, which obviously has an adverse effect on 197 00:12:57,480 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 1: the customer. I have used a food delivery service a 198 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:07,480 Speaker 1: few times during the pandemic, a few being a drastic understatement, 199 00:13:07,960 --> 00:13:11,920 Speaker 1: and I've encountered similar things, and I don't I don't 200 00:13:11,960 --> 00:13:16,959 Speaker 1: know if it's an honest mistake or if it's similar 201 00:13:17,000 --> 00:13:19,440 Speaker 1: to what is going on in the District of Columbia. 202 00:13:19,480 --> 00:13:23,080 Speaker 1: According to the Attorney General. Grub Hub also, according to 203 00:13:23,120 --> 00:13:27,040 Speaker 1: the accusations, pumped up the prices for restaurant items, So 204 00:13:27,080 --> 00:13:29,560 Speaker 1: in other words, you would be spending more to buy 205 00:13:29,559 --> 00:13:32,120 Speaker 1: that burrito through grub Hub than you would if you 206 00:13:32,200 --> 00:13:35,000 Speaker 1: just went to the restaurant just for the base price, um. 207 00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:37,319 Speaker 1: And that's before you factor in all the other fees 208 00:13:37,360 --> 00:13:39,920 Speaker 1: that grubhub throws in, like the delivery fees and service 209 00:13:39,960 --> 00:13:43,480 Speaker 1: fees and whatnot. So the base burrito cost alone would 210 00:13:43,480 --> 00:13:45,320 Speaker 1: be higher than you would find in the restaurant. And 211 00:13:45,360 --> 00:13:48,640 Speaker 1: I'm pretty sure that's true across nearly all third party 212 00:13:48,679 --> 00:13:51,880 Speaker 1: delivery services. I've definitely, at least, you know, in my 213 00:13:51,920 --> 00:13:54,800 Speaker 1: own experience, I've observed this is the case where I 214 00:13:54,880 --> 00:13:57,200 Speaker 1: know the price of a thing at a restaurant and 215 00:13:57,200 --> 00:13:59,960 Speaker 1: I look at it on delivery services, and it's typically 216 00:14:00,000 --> 00:14:04,000 Speaker 1: at least a couple of bucks more expensive there. And 217 00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:05,920 Speaker 1: there are a lot of other parts to this lawsuit, 218 00:14:05,960 --> 00:14:09,400 Speaker 1: to including an accusation that grub hub has created websites that, 219 00:14:09,520 --> 00:14:13,000 Speaker 1: at least on the surface, appear to belong to specific restaurants, 220 00:14:13,000 --> 00:14:17,040 Speaker 1: but in fact they redirect customers to grub Hub's own services, 221 00:14:17,080 --> 00:14:20,480 Speaker 1: and that further, these sites can leave people with the 222 00:14:20,520 --> 00:14:24,360 Speaker 1: implication that there's no other way to get a delivery 223 00:14:24,480 --> 00:14:27,360 Speaker 1: ordered from that specific restaurant, when that might not be 224 00:14:27,440 --> 00:14:30,160 Speaker 1: the case. There may be cases where restaurants have their 225 00:14:30,200 --> 00:14:34,360 Speaker 1: own delivery services or they rely upon some independent group 226 00:14:34,800 --> 00:14:38,200 Speaker 1: and that you can order directly from them, but according 227 00:14:38,240 --> 00:14:43,360 Speaker 1: to the lawsuit, Grubhub's approach is to try and and 228 00:14:43,560 --> 00:14:47,160 Speaker 1: uh overshadow those so that people go through Grubhub instead. 229 00:14:47,480 --> 00:14:51,360 Speaker 1: We've seen similar complaints raised against Google's order online option 230 00:14:51,440 --> 00:14:54,440 Speaker 1: in search results, and there's no question that the delivery 231 00:14:54,480 --> 00:14:58,880 Speaker 1: industry has adopted some let's call them questionable business practices, 232 00:14:59,200 --> 00:15:01,240 Speaker 1: but it remains to be seen if they go far 233 00:15:01,320 --> 00:15:05,920 Speaker 1: enough to be considered illegal. The identity authentication company oct 234 00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:09,440 Speaker 1: To announced that it might have experienced a data breach, 235 00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:12,720 Speaker 1: which is a big old yaalza. So Octa is a 236 00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:18,640 Speaker 1: business that provides authentication services to other businesses, big ones 237 00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:23,840 Speaker 1: like T Mobile UH. Companies outsource authentication to Octa and 238 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:27,360 Speaker 1: then rely on Octa to verify that, say, an employee 239 00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:29,600 Speaker 1: is who they claim to be before they are allowed 240 00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:32,320 Speaker 1: to access whatever they're trying to access. So a lot 241 00:15:32,360 --> 00:15:35,040 Speaker 1: of companies might use like their own VPN or virtual 242 00:15:35,080 --> 00:15:39,000 Speaker 1: private network for internal systems, and a company like Octa 243 00:15:39,320 --> 00:15:41,240 Speaker 1: can act as sort of like a bouncer. You know, 244 00:15:41,280 --> 00:15:43,000 Speaker 1: it's making sure that the people who are trying to 245 00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:46,880 Speaker 1: access those internal systems actually have the credentials saying they 246 00:15:46,880 --> 00:15:49,760 Speaker 1: can do it, or rather you know, authenticating that those 247 00:15:49,800 --> 00:15:54,440 Speaker 1: credentials are in fact legit. So, according to OCTA's CEO, 248 00:15:54,720 --> 00:15:58,680 Speaker 1: the company had identified an intrusion attempt back in January, 249 00:15:58,800 --> 00:16:02,080 Speaker 1: but contained the situation. He said that it did not 250 00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:06,040 Speaker 1: result in a massive breach. But meanwhile, a hacker group 251 00:16:06,160 --> 00:16:10,000 Speaker 1: called laps US where the last s there's it's l 252 00:16:10,080 --> 00:16:13,920 Speaker 1: A P S U S dollar sign because of course 253 00:16:13,920 --> 00:16:16,680 Speaker 1: it is. That group has claimed to be responsible for 254 00:16:16,720 --> 00:16:19,760 Speaker 1: the attack and did so in an effort to access 255 00:16:19,800 --> 00:16:22,840 Speaker 1: the systems of an Octa client, So, in other words, 256 00:16:23,120 --> 00:16:27,120 Speaker 1: not to necessarily compromise Octa itself, but in order to 257 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:31,400 Speaker 1: get at one of the clients that Octa services. According 258 00:16:31,440 --> 00:16:35,640 Speaker 1: to laps us, uh, the hackers are aren't part of 259 00:16:35,680 --> 00:16:39,040 Speaker 1: some cyber war group. They're not like a state sponsored 260 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:42,080 Speaker 1: hacker group. They're just in it for the money, so, 261 00:16:42,160 --> 00:16:48,120 Speaker 1: you know, honest crooks. In Israel, the Israeli National Cyber 262 00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:52,640 Speaker 1: Directorate issued a report that says sixties six thousand closed 263 00:16:52,760 --> 00:16:56,800 Speaker 1: circuit television systems in the country aren't very secure and 264 00:16:56,920 --> 00:17:01,040 Speaker 1: could be hacked relatively easily. In fact, hacked is being 265 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:04,879 Speaker 1: too generous based upon what's going on here. Hacked is 266 00:17:06,119 --> 00:17:09,280 Speaker 1: is suggesting a level of effort that you really don't 267 00:17:09,280 --> 00:17:12,679 Speaker 1: even need to consider. Uh. And you know, there there 268 00:17:12,680 --> 00:17:18,560 Speaker 1: are a lot of drawbacks to living in a surveillance state, um, 269 00:17:18,680 --> 00:17:22,120 Speaker 1: which you could argue, you know, Israel could kind of 270 00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:24,240 Speaker 1: qualify for that. There are a lot of places in Europe, 271 00:17:24,240 --> 00:17:28,520 Speaker 1: they have a lot of CCTV systems. So one complaint 272 00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:30,520 Speaker 1: you might have of living in a surveillance state is 273 00:17:30,560 --> 00:17:33,840 Speaker 1: that big brother is watching you. But another is that 274 00:17:34,800 --> 00:17:37,000 Speaker 1: you aren't sure who is watching you, but you're pretty 275 00:17:37,040 --> 00:17:40,520 Speaker 1: darn sure you're being watched. And that's the case here right. 276 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:44,080 Speaker 1: So according to the directorate, the problem stems from a 277 00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:48,320 Speaker 1: dead simple solution. Uh. The systems all come with like 278 00:17:48,520 --> 00:17:52,119 Speaker 1: default login and passwords so that you can you know, 279 00:17:52,160 --> 00:17:56,200 Speaker 1: administrate the system. And apparently tons of people who install 280 00:17:56,240 --> 00:17:58,840 Speaker 1: these systems never bothered to go in and change the 281 00:17:58,920 --> 00:18:03,879 Speaker 1: default loggin it. So maybe you've heard security experts advocate 282 00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:06,360 Speaker 1: that you know, you change your standard logging and password 283 00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:09,200 Speaker 1: for your home network, for your you know, your router, 284 00:18:09,359 --> 00:18:12,119 Speaker 1: for example, and that's a very good idea because there 285 00:18:12,119 --> 00:18:14,880 Speaker 1: are a lot of equipment manufacturers, not as many now 286 00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:17,760 Speaker 1: as there used to be, but still happens. But there 287 00:18:17,800 --> 00:18:21,000 Speaker 1: are manufacturers that rely on a relatively small number of 288 00:18:21,000 --> 00:18:25,439 Speaker 1: default passwords. So if a hacker knows this, and a 289 00:18:25,440 --> 00:18:30,200 Speaker 1: hacker has a dictionary list of all the known default passwords, 290 00:18:30,640 --> 00:18:33,639 Speaker 1: they can attempt to gain administrative level access to your 291 00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:36,080 Speaker 1: network pretty quickly, like if you haven't changed it, then 292 00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:38,800 Speaker 1: it's just you know, a brute force attack can be 293 00:18:38,800 --> 00:18:42,040 Speaker 1: pretty darn fast if if it's a fairly small list 294 00:18:42,119 --> 00:18:45,760 Speaker 1: of possible passwords. So that same issue is in play 295 00:18:45,840 --> 00:18:49,160 Speaker 1: with these CCTV systems in Israel, and those are meant 296 00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:53,880 Speaker 1: to provide physical security, so clearly they're failing in their purpose. 297 00:18:54,080 --> 00:18:57,879 Speaker 1: If the people who are using them haven't changed those passwords, 298 00:18:58,119 --> 00:19:02,960 Speaker 1: you cannot be certain that system is secure. If someone 299 00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:05,800 Speaker 1: can access it just by using a default password right there, 300 00:19:05,840 --> 00:19:08,480 Speaker 1: that that's no security at all. It could lead to 301 00:19:08,520 --> 00:19:11,920 Speaker 1: an Ocean's eleven kind of high situation where thieves compromise 302 00:19:11,960 --> 00:19:15,240 Speaker 1: the security system by typing in a default password and 303 00:19:15,240 --> 00:19:19,000 Speaker 1: then disabling or otherwise interfering with the system while they 304 00:19:19,080 --> 00:19:21,960 Speaker 1: rob a place blind and in the movies that could 305 00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:24,119 Speaker 1: be really fun and exciting, but in the real world 306 00:19:24,440 --> 00:19:27,960 Speaker 1: it is totally not plus. I mean, folks could compromise 307 00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:32,280 Speaker 1: systems for a much more violent and tragic reasons, and 308 00:19:32,320 --> 00:19:35,879 Speaker 1: that would be truly terrible. So the reason why the 309 00:19:35,880 --> 00:19:40,040 Speaker 1: director even made this pronouncement of the fact that there 310 00:19:40,040 --> 00:19:44,360 Speaker 1: are tens of thousands of potentially vulnerable systems in Israel, 311 00:19:45,240 --> 00:19:49,760 Speaker 1: it's because they had actually been receiving reports from CCTV 312 00:19:49,920 --> 00:19:54,720 Speaker 1: owners that they had been hacked. So clearly a big problem, 313 00:19:54,880 --> 00:19:58,200 Speaker 1: and obviously the solution to that problem is not that difficult. 314 00:19:58,240 --> 00:20:01,720 Speaker 1: It just involves law ugging in as an administrator and 315 00:20:01,720 --> 00:20:05,800 Speaker 1: then changing the password information to something that's a strong 316 00:20:06,440 --> 00:20:09,520 Speaker 1: log in, you know as a strong password, something that 317 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:11,959 Speaker 1: is not going to come up in a dictionary attack, 318 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:19,320 Speaker 1: and that's going to discourage more than of all hacker attempts, 319 00:20:19,320 --> 00:20:22,760 Speaker 1: Like there is no such thing as a hack proof 320 00:20:22,800 --> 00:20:26,679 Speaker 1: system that does not exist. But the more difficult you 321 00:20:26,760 --> 00:20:30,800 Speaker 1: make it for someone from outside to access your system, 322 00:20:30,840 --> 00:20:33,360 Speaker 1: the fewer people are actually gonna go through the trouble 323 00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:36,440 Speaker 1: of seeing it through all the way, especially if you're 324 00:20:36,440 --> 00:20:39,919 Speaker 1: in a target rich environment where you might say, oh, well, 325 00:20:39,960 --> 00:20:42,160 Speaker 1: they changed the password, but the place next door didn't, 326 00:20:42,200 --> 00:20:45,080 Speaker 1: so let's just target them instead. I mean, that's that's 327 00:20:45,119 --> 00:20:48,000 Speaker 1: kind of the where Israel is seeing itself right now. 328 00:20:48,640 --> 00:20:53,080 Speaker 1: Tesla opened its first European Giga factory today. Elon Musk 329 00:20:53,200 --> 00:20:55,480 Speaker 1: was on hand in Germany for the event and the 330 00:20:55,520 --> 00:20:59,359 Speaker 1: company delivered thirty model y SUVs two customers in the 331 00:20:59,359 --> 00:21:02,840 Speaker 1: region as part of the celebration. Tesla had a bit 332 00:21:02,880 --> 00:21:06,879 Speaker 1: of an uphill battle getting this giga factory online. Uh. 333 00:21:07,000 --> 00:21:10,560 Speaker 1: It faced numerous questions about the environmental impact of the facility, 334 00:21:10,920 --> 00:21:13,440 Speaker 1: something that some people might find ironic. I mean, it's 335 00:21:13,520 --> 00:21:18,320 Speaker 1: all about developing electric vehicles, which at least you know, 336 00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:23,600 Speaker 1: in in use, should be uh more environmentally friendly than 337 00:21:23,720 --> 00:21:26,920 Speaker 1: internal combustion engines, But you still have to build out 338 00:21:26,920 --> 00:21:29,719 Speaker 1: the facilities to make them, and that itself can have 339 00:21:29,960 --> 00:21:34,959 Speaker 1: a tremendous environmental impact. Musk and his team sort of 340 00:21:35,000 --> 00:21:37,680 Speaker 1: dismissed the environmental concerns, saying that they would be using 341 00:21:37,720 --> 00:21:40,280 Speaker 1: up very little water in the region. Um And The 342 00:21:40,400 --> 00:21:42,680 Speaker 1: Verge has an article about this that has a bit 343 00:21:42,760 --> 00:21:45,080 Speaker 1: that actually made me laugh out loud when I read it, 344 00:21:45,560 --> 00:21:49,159 Speaker 1: namely that in order to build the giga factory in Germany. 345 00:21:49,600 --> 00:21:53,760 Speaker 1: Tesla first had to clear a forest. However, the article 346 00:21:53,840 --> 00:21:57,439 Speaker 1: states Musk and company said that was fine because the 347 00:21:57,480 --> 00:22:03,119 Speaker 1: forest was or wasn't natural, quote unquote wasn't natural. It 348 00:22:03,240 --> 00:22:07,080 Speaker 1: wasn't a natural forest. Now. I don't know if Musk 349 00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:10,040 Speaker 1: said that or if that's just how John Porter, who 350 00:22:10,040 --> 00:22:14,119 Speaker 1: wrote the article put it in their article, but that 351 00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:17,640 Speaker 1: wording made me laugh, that it wasn't a natural forest. Now, 352 00:22:17,640 --> 00:22:20,600 Speaker 1: the meaning behind that was that the this forest was 353 00:22:20,680 --> 00:22:25,160 Speaker 1: planted by humans for the purposes of supplying raw materials 354 00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:28,760 Speaker 1: to a cardboard manufacturing facility. So that's what they mean 355 00:22:28,800 --> 00:22:30,879 Speaker 1: by it's not a natural forest. It wasn't a pre 356 00:22:31,040 --> 00:22:34,920 Speaker 1: existing forest. It was a group of trees that had 357 00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:39,960 Speaker 1: been planted by people expressly for the purposes of industry. Still, 358 00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:44,040 Speaker 1: the idea of Tesla clearing out an unnatural forest seems 359 00:22:44,160 --> 00:22:46,920 Speaker 1: right for a sci fi horror movie to me anyway. 360 00:22:46,960 --> 00:22:49,040 Speaker 1: It will take some time for the Giga factory to 361 00:22:49,320 --> 00:22:52,639 Speaker 1: scale up to full production, and Musk projected that the 362 00:22:52,640 --> 00:22:55,840 Speaker 1: facility will produce at most thirty thousand vehicles for the 363 00:22:55,880 --> 00:22:58,960 Speaker 1: first half of this year. The goal is to get 364 00:22:58,960 --> 00:23:01,520 Speaker 1: it up to producing as many as half a million 365 00:23:01,640 --> 00:23:05,160 Speaker 1: vehicles per year once it is going at full blast. 366 00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:08,000 Speaker 1: We have a couple more stories to cover before we 367 00:23:08,040 --> 00:23:18,480 Speaker 1: get to those, let's take another quick break. In an 368 00:23:18,480 --> 00:23:22,719 Speaker 1: effort to hold companies accountable for their impact on climate change, 369 00:23:22,920 --> 00:23:26,679 Speaker 1: the US Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed new rules 370 00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:30,840 Speaker 1: that would require publicly traded companies, as companies that have 371 00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:34,240 Speaker 1: their stock traded on some stock market, they will have to, 372 00:23:34,560 --> 00:23:37,920 Speaker 1: as part of their filings with the SEC, disclose their 373 00:23:37,960 --> 00:23:43,400 Speaker 1: greenhouse gas emissions each year um that includes indirect greenhouse 374 00:23:43,400 --> 00:23:47,960 Speaker 1: gas emissions. And to me, this makes total sense because 375 00:23:48,040 --> 00:23:50,960 Speaker 1: the US has a goal to cut emissions by more 376 00:23:51,000 --> 00:23:56,040 Speaker 1: than half by but in order for you to know 377 00:23:56,720 --> 00:23:58,879 Speaker 1: whether or not you hit that goal, you first have 378 00:23:58,960 --> 00:24:01,520 Speaker 1: to know how much you're emitted, right, Like, you've got 379 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:05,440 Speaker 1: to know the amount of greenhouse gas emissions in order 380 00:24:05,480 --> 00:24:08,760 Speaker 1: to judge whether or not you actually cut back by 381 00:24:08,880 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 1: half or really because it's more than half. You can't 382 00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:16,320 Speaker 1: say that one way or another if you have no metrics, Right, 383 00:24:16,359 --> 00:24:19,240 Speaker 1: You've got to have the metrics in place in order 384 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:23,320 Speaker 1: for any kind of policy that that is meant to 385 00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:27,399 Speaker 1: achieve this goal to make any sense. So the rules 386 00:24:27,400 --> 00:24:30,879 Speaker 1: would also require companies to submit to third party consultants 387 00:24:30,920 --> 00:24:34,399 Speaker 1: to verify their numbers, so they couldn't just slap a 388 00:24:34,520 --> 00:24:38,639 Speaker 1: number on their SEC filing and have that be that. 389 00:24:38,720 --> 00:24:42,080 Speaker 1: It has to be verified by an outside party, one 390 00:24:42,119 --> 00:24:46,720 Speaker 1: that's not affiliated with the company itself. Uh, there are 391 00:24:46,800 --> 00:24:50,880 Speaker 1: some steps between now and when these rules might actually 392 00:24:50,920 --> 00:24:53,679 Speaker 1: become official, and they might not like that's there's no 393 00:24:53,720 --> 00:24:57,360 Speaker 1: guarantee here. So, for one thing, part of the SEC 394 00:24:57,640 --> 00:25:02,080 Speaker 1: process is to publish rules on its website, and at 395 00:25:02,080 --> 00:25:05,880 Speaker 1: that point, the general public has sixty days where they 396 00:25:05,880 --> 00:25:10,119 Speaker 1: can comment on those rules, so that includes people who 397 00:25:10,200 --> 00:25:15,400 Speaker 1: support or people who criticize the rules, and it even 398 00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:18,439 Speaker 1: supporters might have suggestions for ways to make the rules 399 00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:25,000 Speaker 1: more effective or more fair or or whatever. So that 400 00:25:25,080 --> 00:25:28,720 Speaker 1: process is there for sixty days, and after that the 401 00:25:28,880 --> 00:25:32,920 Speaker 1: SEC takes those comments into consideration. They might go back 402 00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:35,679 Speaker 1: to the drawing board and draft a new version of 403 00:25:35,680 --> 00:25:39,160 Speaker 1: the rules in light of the comments received, and then 404 00:25:39,760 --> 00:25:42,399 Speaker 1: it would go on to a final vote. And of 405 00:25:42,440 --> 00:25:45,160 Speaker 1: course we would likely see opposition to the rule from 406 00:25:45,160 --> 00:25:49,080 Speaker 1: the business sector and those who represent it like lobbyists 407 00:25:49,080 --> 00:25:52,520 Speaker 1: and certain politicians. So in other words, like even if 408 00:25:52,560 --> 00:25:55,320 Speaker 1: this does come to pass, it's likely that we'll see 409 00:25:56,160 --> 00:25:59,399 Speaker 1: various parties challenge it in a court of law arguing 410 00:25:59,400 --> 00:26:02,680 Speaker 1: whether or not it is you know, a legal set 411 00:26:02,720 --> 00:26:05,320 Speaker 1: of rules. So again, no guarantee that this will become 412 00:26:05,359 --> 00:26:10,320 Speaker 1: official or stay official. UM. I honestly think it's a 413 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:12,840 Speaker 1: good first step because I feel like we really do 414 00:26:13,119 --> 00:26:18,760 Speaker 1: have to make some serious moves in order to mitigate 415 00:26:18,840 --> 00:26:21,520 Speaker 1: climate change. I mean, it's there's no way to stop 416 00:26:21,560 --> 00:26:24,719 Speaker 1: climate change at this point, and that that ship sailed 417 00:26:24,760 --> 00:26:27,959 Speaker 1: a long time ago, but we can still mitigate it. 418 00:26:28,000 --> 00:26:33,800 Speaker 1: We can still limit the extent of climate change, and 419 00:26:34,440 --> 00:26:38,880 Speaker 1: by extension, we can limit the damage that climate change 420 00:26:38,960 --> 00:26:43,720 Speaker 1: is going to do. I think everybody has a responsibility 421 00:26:43,840 --> 00:26:46,720 Speaker 1: to play a part in that, honestly, And I say 422 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:48,879 Speaker 1: that as someone like I don't have kids. I do 423 00:26:49,000 --> 00:26:51,840 Speaker 1: have a couple of nieces who I adore, But I 424 00:26:51,880 --> 00:26:55,440 Speaker 1: really think that, you know, older generations owe it to 425 00:26:55,600 --> 00:27:00,560 Speaker 1: younger generations to make these kinds of changes in an 426 00:27:00,560 --> 00:27:03,600 Speaker 1: effort so that the planet that the younger generations, you know, 427 00:27:04,400 --> 00:27:08,720 Speaker 1: when they take adulthood and they're taking leadership roles, that 428 00:27:08,800 --> 00:27:12,359 Speaker 1: they have something, they have something, they're there. So I 429 00:27:12,440 --> 00:27:14,840 Speaker 1: know I'm on a soapbox. I'll get off my soapbox, 430 00:27:14,880 --> 00:27:19,440 Speaker 1: But I think this SEC ruling is a good one. 431 00:27:19,480 --> 00:27:22,760 Speaker 1: I think it's important to hold companies accountable. You can't 432 00:27:22,880 --> 00:27:25,760 Speaker 1: just expect that they're going to do the right thing 433 00:27:26,119 --> 00:27:30,399 Speaker 1: just cause. There has to be this kind of of 434 00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:33,679 Speaker 1: system in place in order to make sure people and 435 00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:38,960 Speaker 1: companies are doing their part. Otherwise, um, we're playing a 436 00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:44,560 Speaker 1: very dangerous game. Finally, NASA says that we now know 437 00:27:45,119 --> 00:27:49,800 Speaker 1: of more than five thousand planets beyond our own Solar system. Now, 438 00:27:49,920 --> 00:27:53,840 Speaker 1: obviously there have to be billions of planets out there. 439 00:27:53,880 --> 00:27:57,639 Speaker 1: After all, there are billions and billions, as Carl Sagan 440 00:27:57,680 --> 00:28:01,280 Speaker 1: would say, of stars, like they're billions of them. Uh, 441 00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:03,679 Speaker 1: and at least some of those stars. A good number 442 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:06,360 Speaker 1: of those stars are likely to have one or more 443 00:28:06,440 --> 00:28:09,800 Speaker 1: planets orbiting them, So by extension, there must be billions 444 00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:14,320 Speaker 1: of planets out there. However, knowing the statistical probability and 445 00:28:14,359 --> 00:28:17,840 Speaker 1: then actually having evidence of a planet orbiting a star, 446 00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:20,840 Speaker 1: those are two very different things. So while we should 447 00:28:20,880 --> 00:28:24,600 Speaker 1: expect to identify countless more exo planets in the years 448 00:28:24,600 --> 00:28:27,840 Speaker 1: to come, it's pretty cool to reflect on the idea 449 00:28:28,160 --> 00:28:31,360 Speaker 1: that we have so far identified more than five thousand 450 00:28:31,560 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 1: exo planets. We have discovered more than five thousand outs 451 00:28:36,320 --> 00:28:39,600 Speaker 1: at our own solar system. That is incredible to me. Now, 452 00:28:39,640 --> 00:28:43,720 Speaker 1: there's no telling how many of those might inhabit the 453 00:28:43,840 --> 00:28:48,240 Speaker 1: Goldilocks zone around their respective stars. Uh. It's so called 454 00:28:48,280 --> 00:28:51,000 Speaker 1: the Goldilocks zone because it's not too far and not 455 00:28:51,120 --> 00:28:54,320 Speaker 1: too close to a star. Uh. It's the zone where 456 00:28:54,360 --> 00:29:00,720 Speaker 1: we would say a planet could inhabit and partly support 457 00:29:00,800 --> 00:29:03,160 Speaker 1: life as we know it here on Earth. Right, the 458 00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:07,200 Speaker 1: temperature wouldn't be too hot or too cold to allow say, 459 00:29:07,240 --> 00:29:10,360 Speaker 1: liquid water to be on the planet. Doesn't mean that 460 00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:13,840 Speaker 1: liquid water is on the planet, just means that, you know, 461 00:29:13,920 --> 00:29:15,560 Speaker 1: if it were closer than we would know, all the 462 00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:17,680 Speaker 1: water would boil off it, or further away, all the 463 00:29:17,680 --> 00:29:21,040 Speaker 1: water would freeze. So it's in that just right zone. 464 00:29:21,520 --> 00:29:24,240 Speaker 1: And then on top of that, even if we did 465 00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:27,240 Speaker 1: magically know how many of those five thousand planets were 466 00:29:27,280 --> 00:29:31,520 Speaker 1: definitively within their Goldilocks zone, we wouldn't necessarily know if 467 00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:35,239 Speaker 1: any of those could or do support life. But it 468 00:29:35,320 --> 00:29:38,160 Speaker 1: is really neat to think about some other cool facts 469 00:29:38,200 --> 00:29:41,239 Speaker 1: about the planets that scientists have discovered. More than a 470 00:29:41,400 --> 00:29:44,760 Speaker 1: third of those five thousand planets are the size of 471 00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:48,600 Speaker 1: Neptune or Uranus. Both of those are about four times 472 00:29:48,720 --> 00:29:51,680 Speaker 1: larger than the Earth, so they're much bigger than Earth. 473 00:29:51,760 --> 00:29:54,080 Speaker 1: Is that kind of makes sense that when you think 474 00:29:54,120 --> 00:29:56,280 Speaker 1: about it, Yeah, of course it's going to be easier 475 00:29:56,320 --> 00:29:59,920 Speaker 1: for us to detect planets that are larger. Right, small 476 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,560 Speaker 1: our planets are gonna be a lot harder to detect. 477 00:30:03,400 --> 00:30:06,200 Speaker 1: Um a little less than a third of the discovered 478 00:30:06,240 --> 00:30:09,360 Speaker 1: planets are between the size of Earth and Neptune and 479 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:12,520 Speaker 1: are considered to be rocky planets. So in other words, 480 00:30:12,560 --> 00:30:15,000 Speaker 1: that's the kind of planet where we might expect to 481 00:30:15,080 --> 00:30:19,360 Speaker 1: find life if the conditions were just right, like if 482 00:30:19,360 --> 00:30:22,240 Speaker 1: it were in that Goldie Lug zone. And again doesn't 483 00:30:22,320 --> 00:30:24,760 Speaker 1: necessarily mean it even if there's water on the planet, 484 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:28,160 Speaker 1: doesn't necessarily mean there's life there. But there's the potential, 485 00:30:28,200 --> 00:30:30,800 Speaker 1: which is super neat. I think it's just a matter 486 00:30:30,840 --> 00:30:35,280 Speaker 1: of time before we eventually detect life on some other planet. 487 00:30:35,360 --> 00:30:37,640 Speaker 1: I don't think it's going to be like super advanced 488 00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:42,400 Speaker 1: life necessarily, but you know, life in some fashion, whether 489 00:30:42,920 --> 00:30:46,120 Speaker 1: it's you know, multicellular or not. I think eventually that's 490 00:30:46,120 --> 00:30:50,000 Speaker 1: just a guarantee that we will find it, assuming that 491 00:30:50,080 --> 00:30:54,800 Speaker 1: we're still around, we will find it. Um, I don't 492 00:30:54,800 --> 00:30:57,600 Speaker 1: think we're gonna be discovering any e t s out 493 00:30:57,640 --> 00:31:03,040 Speaker 1: there like nothing intelligent, least not anytime soon. We've been 494 00:31:03,080 --> 00:31:05,880 Speaker 1: listening for a while, although there are a lot of 495 00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:09,200 Speaker 1: arguments to be made about that that kind of can 496 00:31:09,320 --> 00:31:13,600 Speaker 1: explain why we haven't picked up any evidence of that 497 00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:15,840 Speaker 1: so far. But I'll have to dedicate a full episode 498 00:31:15,840 --> 00:31:18,560 Speaker 1: to that in the future. Maybe I'll get some of 499 00:31:18,560 --> 00:31:20,160 Speaker 1: the guys from Stuff they Don't Want You to Know 500 00:31:20,280 --> 00:31:22,560 Speaker 1: to come onto the show and talk about it from 501 00:31:22,560 --> 00:31:26,120 Speaker 1: a technical perspective. Uh, because I like them a lot 502 00:31:26,160 --> 00:31:27,240 Speaker 1: and it would be a lot of fun to have 503 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:31,040 Speaker 1: them on and talk about aliens and stuff. Anyway, that's 504 00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:34,600 Speaker 1: it for today's episode. If you have suggestions for topics 505 00:31:34,600 --> 00:31:36,960 Speaker 1: I should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff, please 506 00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:38,880 Speaker 1: reach out to me and let me know what those are. 507 00:31:39,320 --> 00:31:41,240 Speaker 1: The best way to do that is over on Twitter. 508 00:31:41,560 --> 00:31:44,560 Speaker 1: The handle for the show is tech Stuff hs W 509 00:31:45,200 --> 00:31:54,440 Speaker 1: and I'll talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff 510 00:31:54,520 --> 00:31:57,680 Speaker 1: is an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from 511 00:31:57,720 --> 00:32:00,760 Speaker 1: my Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app Apple 512 00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:03,560 Speaker 1: Podcasts or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.