1 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:12,360 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 2 00:00:12,400 --> 00:00:16,240 Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 3 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:19,759 Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio. And how the tech 4 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:23,360 Speaker 1: are you So? Back in two thousand and seven, a 5 00:00:23,560 --> 00:00:27,280 Speaker 1: rent by mail video business made a move that would 6 00:00:27,320 --> 00:00:33,440 Speaker 1: be a true disruption. We talk about disruptive companies, this 7 00:00:33,680 --> 00:00:36,720 Speaker 1: was definitely one of them. It had already shaken things 8 00:00:36,800 --> 00:00:39,239 Speaker 1: up by taking aim at a huge company that had 9 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:43,159 Speaker 1: dominated the home video rental market for decades through offering 10 00:00:43,200 --> 00:00:47,520 Speaker 1: customers the chance to access a huge media library from 11 00:00:47,520 --> 00:00:50,440 Speaker 1: the comfort of their own homes, albeit they had to 12 00:00:50,479 --> 00:00:52,920 Speaker 1: wait for titles to make their way through the postal 13 00:00:52,960 --> 00:00:57,120 Speaker 1: system before they could enjoy them. But now this upstart 14 00:00:57,160 --> 00:00:59,120 Speaker 1: company in two thousand and seven had set up a 15 00:00:59,160 --> 00:01:01,639 Speaker 1: service where, if if you can believe it, you can 16 00:01:01,680 --> 00:01:06,000 Speaker 1: actually connect to a media player through the Internet and 17 00:01:06,040 --> 00:01:10,039 Speaker 1: watch movies and television shows by streaming them to your device. 18 00:01:11,000 --> 00:01:14,520 Speaker 1: The upstart company was, of course Netflix. It had battled 19 00:01:14,560 --> 00:01:18,920 Speaker 1: with Blockbuster, which actually had the opportunity to buy Netflix 20 00:01:18,959 --> 00:01:21,920 Speaker 1: at one point, but walked away from that deal, and 21 00:01:22,000 --> 00:01:25,640 Speaker 1: Netflix quickly became a big concern for the major studios, 22 00:01:25,959 --> 00:01:31,840 Speaker 1: which understandably and arguably correctly worried that unless someone took action, 23 00:01:32,200 --> 00:01:37,560 Speaker 1: Netflix would become a powerful monopoly for prestige media streaming services. 24 00:01:37,600 --> 00:01:39,960 Speaker 1: I'm not talking about the user generated stuff which you 25 00:01:39,959 --> 00:01:45,479 Speaker 1: would find on platforms like YouTube, but rather studio produced stuff. Now, 26 00:01:45,520 --> 00:01:48,320 Speaker 1: at that point, Netflix would have a lot more leverage 27 00:01:48,320 --> 00:01:50,840 Speaker 1: when negotiating with studios if it was the one and 28 00:01:50,880 --> 00:01:55,000 Speaker 1: only place where customers could go to watch stuff online, 29 00:01:55,280 --> 00:01:59,280 Speaker 1: and studios hate when leverage is given to anyone else 30 00:01:59,280 --> 00:02:03,360 Speaker 1: see also the Guild of America strike. Lots of other 31 00:02:03,520 --> 00:02:07,920 Speaker 1: streaming services would uppear over the next decade and a half. 32 00:02:08,040 --> 00:02:11,480 Speaker 1: Some of them were the product of collaboration Hulu initially 33 00:02:11,800 --> 00:02:14,920 Speaker 1: was I'll talk a little bit about Hulu later on 34 00:02:14,960 --> 00:02:19,320 Speaker 1: in the episode. Some streaming services launched as an extension 35 00:02:19,520 --> 00:02:23,119 Speaker 1: of a television or cable channel, so eventually you would 36 00:02:23,120 --> 00:02:27,160 Speaker 1: get things like Peacock or HBO Max or Disney Plus 37 00:02:27,320 --> 00:02:31,840 Speaker 1: or Paramount Plus, which draws heavily from CBS, and lots more, 38 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:35,840 Speaker 1: including ones that aren't extension of media companies, like things 39 00:02:35,880 --> 00:02:40,240 Speaker 1: like Amazon Prime Video and Apple TV Plus. There are 40 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:44,000 Speaker 1: so many streaming services now that if you subscribed to 41 00:02:44,200 --> 00:02:47,160 Speaker 1: all of them, you would be probably paying more per 42 00:02:47,240 --> 00:02:48,720 Speaker 1: month than you would if you went with one of 43 00:02:48,720 --> 00:02:54,040 Speaker 1: those gargantuan cable TV packages. The landscape is crowded and 44 00:02:54,280 --> 00:02:58,240 Speaker 1: it's complicated. I mean, sure, if all you consume are 45 00:02:58,320 --> 00:03:01,640 Speaker 1: Disney films, and let's be honest, the way we're going, 46 00:03:01,680 --> 00:03:03,920 Speaker 1: pretty soon every movie is going to be a Disney 47 00:03:03,919 --> 00:03:06,800 Speaker 1: movie because the mouse House just gobbles up everything. Well, 48 00:03:07,240 --> 00:03:10,000 Speaker 1: if that's all you do, then Disney Plus might be 49 00:03:10,080 --> 00:03:12,640 Speaker 1: all you need. But most of us are likely to 50 00:03:12,680 --> 00:03:16,280 Speaker 1: find ourselves subscribing to, or at least wanting to subscribe 51 00:03:16,320 --> 00:03:19,919 Speaker 1: to a few different services to get access to all 52 00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:23,360 Speaker 1: the stuff we like, and even then we're probably giving 53 00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:26,079 Speaker 1: up on a couple of things. For example, I think 54 00:03:26,160 --> 00:03:30,600 Speaker 1: at this point, I have Netflix, I have Amazon Prime, 55 00:03:30,960 --> 00:03:34,440 Speaker 1: I have Apple TV Plus, I have Disney Plus, I 56 00:03:34,480 --> 00:03:39,360 Speaker 1: have HBO Max that might be at oh, I've got Peacock. 57 00:03:40,600 --> 00:03:42,920 Speaker 1: So like, that's ridiculous, right, I Mean there are ties 58 00:03:42,920 --> 00:03:44,720 Speaker 1: where I sit there and think, do I really need 59 00:03:44,760 --> 00:03:47,600 Speaker 1: all these answers? No, I don't need them all, but 60 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:51,240 Speaker 1: there are programs that I can only watch through one 61 00:03:51,400 --> 00:03:54,840 Speaker 1: of those services, and there's not really any other alternative. 62 00:03:54,920 --> 00:03:57,280 Speaker 1: So there I go. Now, the last couple of years 63 00:03:57,280 --> 00:04:00,240 Speaker 1: have shown us that on the business side, if we 64 00:04:00,280 --> 00:04:02,320 Speaker 1: go to the other side, yeah, things kind of stink 65 00:04:02,320 --> 00:04:05,640 Speaker 1: if you're a consumer because they're all these different competing services. 66 00:04:06,000 --> 00:04:08,520 Speaker 1: But on the other side, things aren't that rosy either. 67 00:04:09,000 --> 00:04:12,560 Speaker 1: While the consumer struggles with which services they're gonna subscribe 68 00:04:12,560 --> 00:04:16,719 Speaker 1: to or pass up, the media companies behind the services 69 00:04:16,760 --> 00:04:19,640 Speaker 1: are trying to carve out a profitable path while also 70 00:04:19,760 --> 00:04:24,040 Speaker 1: competing with one another. Now, maybe that involves producing new 71 00:04:24,120 --> 00:04:27,360 Speaker 1: films and shows that are exclusively for the streaming service. 72 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:31,440 Speaker 1: Maybe it involves securing licensing for old favorites before a 73 00:04:31,560 --> 00:04:33,600 Speaker 1: rival can do it, though a lot of that stuff 74 00:04:33,680 --> 00:04:37,800 Speaker 1: ends up getting sewn up in existing libraries. Maybe it 75 00:04:37,920 --> 00:04:40,960 Speaker 1: means taking some stuff off the service so that you 76 00:04:40,960 --> 00:04:44,279 Speaker 1: know you're not paying people who made it over and 77 00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:48,919 Speaker 1: over the residuals. Cough. David Zaslov does this a lot cough. 78 00:04:49,640 --> 00:04:55,760 Speaker 1: The point is the streaming service business is really, really tough. 79 00:04:55,839 --> 00:04:58,559 Speaker 1: I mean, it's great when you're on a meteoric rise. 80 00:04:58,640 --> 00:05:01,920 Speaker 1: You know, you launch, people find you, they talk you up. 81 00:05:02,279 --> 00:05:07,480 Speaker 1: Your subscription rates soar you're just doing gangbusters. It's growth 82 00:05:07,520 --> 00:05:11,160 Speaker 1: all the way, baby, but eventually you start to hit 83 00:05:11,200 --> 00:05:14,359 Speaker 1: a plateau and fewer people are signing up this quarter 84 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:17,760 Speaker 1: compared to last quarter, or worse, you might hit a 85 00:05:17,760 --> 00:05:20,640 Speaker 1: point where you actually see subscriber numbers go down, and 86 00:05:20,680 --> 00:05:25,680 Speaker 1: that's super bad. Now, maybe you supplement your revenue by 87 00:05:25,760 --> 00:05:29,839 Speaker 1: showing ads against content. Maybe it's not just subscriptions. Maybe 88 00:05:29,880 --> 00:05:35,159 Speaker 1: advertisers offer some stuff for you as well. Maybe you 89 00:05:35,200 --> 00:05:38,040 Speaker 1: give customers options. Maybe they can subscribe it a higher 90 00:05:38,080 --> 00:05:41,520 Speaker 1: tier and they can get an ad free experience. That's 91 00:05:41,560 --> 00:05:44,080 Speaker 1: pretty common these days. And then if they subscribe it 92 00:05:44,360 --> 00:05:47,360 Speaker 1: a lower tier, they're spending less per month, but they're 93 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:50,640 Speaker 1: also having to sit through ads to watch the content 94 00:05:50,720 --> 00:05:54,360 Speaker 1: they want. You still have to balance costs with revenue, 95 00:05:54,400 --> 00:05:57,240 Speaker 1: and if you have to keep producing high quality content 96 00:05:57,680 --> 00:06:01,479 Speaker 1: to both attract and keep custom you might find that 97 00:06:01,520 --> 00:06:04,440 Speaker 1: your profit margins are so thin they only have one side, 98 00:06:05,120 --> 00:06:07,880 Speaker 1: or maybe even that you're losing money, And if you're 99 00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:11,920 Speaker 1: seriously unlucky, you might find that you're on borrowed time, 100 00:06:12,160 --> 00:06:15,960 Speaker 1: that you're losing money, and there's no pathway out of that. 101 00:06:16,800 --> 00:06:19,000 Speaker 1: The hope is that you scale up to a point 102 00:06:19,400 --> 00:06:23,160 Speaker 1: where you ultimately are making more money than you're spending, 103 00:06:23,720 --> 00:06:27,919 Speaker 1: but depending on how the landscape is, that might not 104 00:06:28,000 --> 00:06:30,800 Speaker 1: even be a possibility. So we're going to take a 105 00:06:30,800 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 1: look at some failed streaming services, ones that made an 106 00:06:34,640 --> 00:06:37,960 Speaker 1: effort to hang with the cool kids, but ultimately flopped 107 00:06:38,080 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 1: or faded away, as the case may be, and in 108 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:46,120 Speaker 1: one case, stopped a month after it had started. Now, 109 00:06:46,120 --> 00:06:48,839 Speaker 1: I think I'm gonna start with a fairly recent example, 110 00:06:49,240 --> 00:06:52,719 Speaker 1: one that I talked about a lot as the service launched, faltered, 111 00:06:52,760 --> 00:06:57,160 Speaker 1: and then flopped. And that's Quibi. Do you remember Quibi? 112 00:06:57,760 --> 00:07:03,520 Speaker 1: In case you don't, here's the deal. So Jeffrey Katzenberg, 113 00:07:03,760 --> 00:07:08,680 Speaker 1: who famously founded DreamWorks Animation after he left Walt Disney Studios. 114 00:07:09,120 --> 00:07:11,520 Speaker 1: That story is a crazy one, by the way, full 115 00:07:11,680 --> 00:07:17,120 Speaker 1: of like corporate drama, a lot of like like executives 116 00:07:17,640 --> 00:07:22,560 Speaker 1: being really bitter about each other. Unfortunately, it it's the 117 00:07:22,640 --> 00:07:24,880 Speaker 1: kind of stuff that really blogs in a different kind 118 00:07:24,880 --> 00:07:26,640 Speaker 1: of podcast. So as much as I would love to 119 00:07:26,680 --> 00:07:29,160 Speaker 1: gush about it, I'm just gonna leave it here. Anyway, 120 00:07:29,760 --> 00:07:32,960 Speaker 1: he decided he wanted to create a short form, highly 121 00:07:33,040 --> 00:07:38,040 Speaker 1: produced video delivery platform aimed at the smartphone market. So 122 00:07:38,200 --> 00:07:42,680 Speaker 1: you know, like TikTok is a user generated platform right. 123 00:07:43,240 --> 00:07:47,520 Speaker 1: But what Katzenberg wanted to do was make a studio 124 00:07:47,840 --> 00:07:52,040 Speaker 1: produced version of short form video platforms. So instead of 125 00:07:52,040 --> 00:07:56,360 Speaker 1: it being you know, some kid hitting on a really 126 00:07:56,400 --> 00:08:02,000 Speaker 1: cool dance or something and then getting virally famous, it 127 00:08:02,040 --> 00:08:05,160 Speaker 1: would be studios making content and then using this platform 128 00:08:05,240 --> 00:08:09,720 Speaker 1: to distribute that content. And you could sort of see 129 00:08:09,760 --> 00:08:13,440 Speaker 1: the logic behind the decision because people are on their 130 00:08:13,480 --> 00:08:16,560 Speaker 1: phones a lot. They are using their phones more and 131 00:08:16,640 --> 00:08:20,840 Speaker 1: more to access entertainment, and short form content works well 132 00:08:20,880 --> 00:08:24,080 Speaker 1: in situations where you might not have the time or 133 00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:27,560 Speaker 1: desire to sit down to an hour or more of video, 134 00:08:27,960 --> 00:08:32,160 Speaker 1: So why not create a platform specifically for that kind 135 00:08:32,320 --> 00:08:36,960 Speaker 1: of audience. Katzenberg founded QUIBI, which kind of stands for 136 00:08:37,040 --> 00:08:40,840 Speaker 1: quick Bites. He founded it in the summer of twenty eighteen. 137 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:44,880 Speaker 1: Originally it had the name new TV, but it would 138 00:08:44,920 --> 00:08:47,520 Speaker 1: change to quibbi a little bit later. In twenty eighteen, 139 00:08:47,880 --> 00:08:50,880 Speaker 1: he hired Meg Whitman, who was the former CEO of 140 00:08:50,920 --> 00:08:54,400 Speaker 1: Hewlett Packard, and she became the CEO of Quibi, and 141 00:08:54,480 --> 00:08:57,840 Speaker 1: Katzenberg and Whitman very quickly were making the rounds to 142 00:08:58,440 --> 00:09:03,120 Speaker 1: various studios effort to drive up investments for Quibi, and 143 00:09:03,160 --> 00:09:06,559 Speaker 1: they did. They raised like a billion dollars in the process. 144 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:09,960 Speaker 1: So the plan was to get production ramped up in 145 00:09:09,960 --> 00:09:14,079 Speaker 1: twenty nineteen in preparation for a launch of the actual 146 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:18,400 Speaker 1: platform in the spring of twenty twenty. The hope was 147 00:09:18,440 --> 00:09:21,520 Speaker 1: to create all sorts of different kinds of content across 148 00:09:21,559 --> 00:09:26,520 Speaker 1: all genres reality, television, comedy, action, everything, and that they 149 00:09:26,520 --> 00:09:30,000 Speaker 1: would take the form of stuff like short form television episodes, 150 00:09:30,040 --> 00:09:33,360 Speaker 1: so things that lasted like ten minutes, to films that 151 00:09:33,400 --> 00:09:37,440 Speaker 1: could be divided into ten minute long chapters, again all 152 00:09:37,440 --> 00:09:40,880 Speaker 1: designed to be watched on your mobile device. In fact, 153 00:09:41,120 --> 00:09:44,240 Speaker 1: they even had this weird morphing technology where you could 154 00:09:44,440 --> 00:09:48,480 Speaker 1: watch content either in portrait or landscape mode, and your 155 00:09:48,520 --> 00:09:53,120 Speaker 1: experience of watching that program would depend upon what mode 156 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:57,240 Speaker 1: you were using, because you would get different views. Like 157 00:09:57,280 --> 00:10:01,200 Speaker 1: it was shot with this in mind. It was kind 158 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:04,959 Speaker 1: of it was really ambitious, but also kind of odd 159 00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:07,480 Speaker 1: to make that choice. It almost meant like you had 160 00:10:07,480 --> 00:10:10,240 Speaker 1: to make two versions of your movie in order to 161 00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:12,240 Speaker 1: do it so that way, like if you're watching it 162 00:10:12,280 --> 00:10:15,560 Speaker 1: in portrait mode, you're not missing some pivotal piece of 163 00:10:15,600 --> 00:10:19,000 Speaker 1: information way off to the side in the frame because 164 00:10:19,000 --> 00:10:21,000 Speaker 1: it wouldn't show up due to the fact that your 165 00:10:21,040 --> 00:10:27,199 Speaker 1: screen is vertical rather than horizontal. Anyway, they really pushed this, 166 00:10:27,520 --> 00:10:30,360 Speaker 1: and producing stuff takes a lot of money, right You 167 00:10:30,440 --> 00:10:34,280 Speaker 1: mentioned that earlier, like it is expensive to make studio 168 00:10:34,360 --> 00:10:37,720 Speaker 1: level content, highly produced content, even if you're cutting corners, 169 00:10:37,760 --> 00:10:41,840 Speaker 1: it's still expensive. And meanwhile, the launch date was getting closer. 170 00:10:42,160 --> 00:10:45,600 Speaker 1: Now it is impossible for us to say if Quibi 171 00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:50,040 Speaker 1: would have survived if things had been a little different. Personally, 172 00:10:50,280 --> 00:10:52,880 Speaker 1: I think Quibi was doomed to fail no matter what, 173 00:10:53,679 --> 00:10:57,000 Speaker 1: but the decline may have taken a lot longer if 174 00:10:57,120 --> 00:11:00,599 Speaker 1: things had been very different in twenty twenty, because it 175 00:11:00,640 --> 00:11:03,240 Speaker 1: seems to me like the mobile focused approach really limited 176 00:11:03,280 --> 00:11:06,080 Speaker 1: Quibi's usefulness. But maybe it would have held on, and 177 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:08,160 Speaker 1: maybe it would have even been a success. I'll never 178 00:11:08,200 --> 00:11:11,800 Speaker 1: be able to tell. But you know, something major happened 179 00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:15,240 Speaker 1: in twenty twenty. We had the COVID nineteen pandemic hit, 180 00:11:15,760 --> 00:11:18,840 Speaker 1: and nearly everyone was stuck at home for a long time, 181 00:11:18,920 --> 00:11:23,000 Speaker 1: so the use case for Quibi was reduced significantly. I mean, 182 00:11:23,080 --> 00:11:25,640 Speaker 1: here was a product that was intended to go to 183 00:11:25,840 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 1: folks who were looking for some sort of entertainment while 184 00:11:29,240 --> 00:11:31,920 Speaker 1: they were like on a bus or on a subway 185 00:11:32,360 --> 00:11:34,800 Speaker 1: or standing in line, you know, doing all the things 186 00:11:34,800 --> 00:11:37,960 Speaker 1: that they could not do because they were stuck at home. 187 00:11:38,320 --> 00:11:41,200 Speaker 1: And at home they had access to tons of other 188 00:11:41,360 --> 00:11:46,920 Speaker 1: entertainment services that were designed to work with their lifestyles, 189 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:49,920 Speaker 1: So trying to fit Quibi in when they were no 190 00:11:50,000 --> 00:11:55,840 Speaker 1: longer in those use cases it just didn't really catch. Now. 191 00:11:55,920 --> 00:11:58,719 Speaker 1: At launch, Quibi did see quite a few downloads. I 192 00:11:58,720 --> 00:12:01,360 Speaker 1: think it hit like number three on the most popular 193 00:12:01,400 --> 00:12:04,120 Speaker 1: apps for the week that it debuted, but then the 194 00:12:04,160 --> 00:12:08,640 Speaker 1: following week that those download numbers dropped drastically. Signing up 195 00:12:08,679 --> 00:12:11,360 Speaker 1: would give you access to Quibe for three months for free, 196 00:12:11,480 --> 00:12:13,679 Speaker 1: and after that you were supposed to pay for a subscription. 197 00:12:14,040 --> 00:12:17,240 Speaker 1: So about three quarters of Quibi's users just opted to 198 00:12:17,360 --> 00:12:20,280 Speaker 1: bounce off the service rather than convert to a paid 199 00:12:20,360 --> 00:12:23,840 Speaker 1: subscription once their free trial was up. So the company 200 00:12:23,840 --> 00:12:26,520 Speaker 1: attempted to bail water out of the sinking boat, but 201 00:12:26,720 --> 00:12:29,600 Speaker 1: six months after going live, the writing was on the wall. 202 00:12:29,640 --> 00:12:32,720 Speaker 1: So in mid October twenty twenty, the Wall Street Journal 203 00:12:32,760 --> 00:12:35,040 Speaker 1: reported that Quibi was on the way out, and by 204 00:12:35,120 --> 00:12:38,960 Speaker 1: December of twenty twenty, the lights had gone off in Quibi. 205 00:12:39,400 --> 00:12:43,600 Speaker 1: Roku ended up purchasing Quibi's library, and thankfully creators retained 206 00:12:43,600 --> 00:12:46,199 Speaker 1: the rights to their intellectual property, which gave them the 207 00:12:46,280 --> 00:12:49,240 Speaker 1: chance to find some other platform to host their work. 208 00:12:49,520 --> 00:12:51,840 Speaker 1: We're going to talk about a different company later here, 209 00:12:52,120 --> 00:12:55,479 Speaker 1: where it's like the opposite of that to an extreme. 210 00:12:56,120 --> 00:12:58,800 Speaker 1: But yeah, Quibi came and went so fast it didn't 211 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:03,440 Speaker 1: even say goodbye. Now there's a lot more we're going 212 00:13:03,480 --> 00:13:07,240 Speaker 1: to talk about today with various failed streaming services. But 213 00:13:07,320 --> 00:13:09,559 Speaker 1: before we get into all of that, so that we 214 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:24,520 Speaker 1: don't fail, let's take a quick break to thank our sponsors. So, yeah, Quibi. 215 00:13:25,440 --> 00:13:28,439 Speaker 1: There were some major players in entertainment behind the scenes, 216 00:13:28,640 --> 00:13:33,120 Speaker 1: both directly working for Quibi and also investing into the company. 217 00:13:33,440 --> 00:13:36,800 Speaker 1: But our next example was an actual extension of a 218 00:13:36,840 --> 00:13:41,920 Speaker 1: truly massive media conglomerate. So NBC Universal, which itself is 219 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:45,960 Speaker 1: a branch of Comcast, decided to dip its corporate tow 220 00:13:46,160 --> 00:13:50,280 Speaker 1: in the subscription based video on demand service back in 221 00:13:50,480 --> 00:13:55,600 Speaker 1: twenty fifteen. So a media executive named Evan Shapiro led 222 00:13:55,679 --> 00:13:58,440 Speaker 1: the charge, and the goal was to create a video 223 00:13:58,520 --> 00:14:03,160 Speaker 1: service centered around owned comedy. So the question was could 224 00:14:03,280 --> 00:14:07,360 Speaker 1: Yuck Yucks bring in the buck bucks? The service would 225 00:14:07,360 --> 00:14:10,600 Speaker 1: be called SISO, and it launched to a small beta 226 00:14:10,640 --> 00:14:13,440 Speaker 1: test in December twenty fifteen, but the actual service went 227 00:14:13,679 --> 00:14:18,480 Speaker 1: live in early twenty sixteen. Shapiro spared no expense when 228 00:14:18,480 --> 00:14:21,480 Speaker 1: it came to curating content for the service. He wanted 229 00:14:21,840 --> 00:14:25,840 Speaker 1: all things comedy, including older material like episodes of Monty 230 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: Python's Flying Circus or the Great Sketch show The Kids 231 00:14:29,440 --> 00:14:32,400 Speaker 1: in the Hall. That Saturday Night Live library was part 232 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:35,000 Speaker 1: of it. Remember this was an extension of NBC Universal. 233 00:14:35,360 --> 00:14:40,720 Speaker 1: He also initially had eyes on making SISO the exclusive 234 00:14:40,760 --> 00:14:43,920 Speaker 1: platform to stream episodes of the Office and Parks and 235 00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:49,520 Speaker 1: rec Those plans would ultimately fall through, not Shapiro's fault, really, 236 00:14:50,080 --> 00:14:52,920 Speaker 1: but it was a part of his plan where he thought, 237 00:14:53,000 --> 00:14:55,280 Speaker 1: if we can do this, then that's going to attract 238 00:14:55,600 --> 00:14:59,880 Speaker 1: a huge base of users. He made licensing deals left, right, 239 00:14:59,840 --> 00:15:02,400 Speaker 1: now center. He brought in a ton of popular comedy 240 00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:05,440 Speaker 1: under one roof, and he also empowered his staff to 241 00:15:05,920 --> 00:15:09,840 Speaker 1: produce original content for the platform as well. NBC Universal 242 00:15:10,680 --> 00:15:14,840 Speaker 1: was kind of using CISO as a sort of experimental platform, 243 00:15:14,880 --> 00:15:18,400 Speaker 1: the idea of being that if a comedy centric video 244 00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:22,520 Speaker 1: on demand service and over the top streaming service, if 245 00:15:22,560 --> 00:15:26,840 Speaker 1: that could work well, then INBC. Universal might launch other 246 00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:31,240 Speaker 1: genre or interest specific streaming platforms in the future, like 247 00:15:31,680 --> 00:15:36,080 Speaker 1: maybe one based around horror. Universal famously has a really 248 00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:40,040 Speaker 1: deep horror library that they keep trying to exploit in 249 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:43,840 Speaker 1: the modern era and often failed to do so. Or 250 00:15:43,880 --> 00:15:46,840 Speaker 1: maybe like a streaming service that's really focused on things 251 00:15:46,920 --> 00:15:51,240 Speaker 1: like reality television programming, which arguably can be scarier and 252 00:15:51,280 --> 00:15:55,560 Speaker 1: more disturbing than horror is. The Sisow subscription was just 253 00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:58,880 Speaker 1: three dollars ninety nine cents per month when it launched. 254 00:16:00,040 --> 00:16:03,120 Speaker 1: Victual Catalog was heavy on stuff that comedy fans were 255 00:16:03,200 --> 00:16:07,800 Speaker 1: likely to gravitate toward, including a sizable library of British 256 00:16:07,800 --> 00:16:10,920 Speaker 1: comedy that could actually be a little tricky to access 257 00:16:10,960 --> 00:16:13,840 Speaker 1: here in the United States outside of some notable exceptions 258 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:18,040 Speaker 1: like everyone's heard of Monty Python's Flying Circus, But there 259 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:21,200 Speaker 1: are a lot of other British comedies that the average 260 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,680 Speaker 1: American may not be familiar with. Some of them are 261 00:16:25,600 --> 00:16:28,600 Speaker 1: really famous, I mean, like some you might have encountered 262 00:16:28,640 --> 00:16:32,280 Speaker 1: on other channels like Adult Swim showed The Mighty Boosh 263 00:16:32,360 --> 00:16:36,840 Speaker 1: for a while, which is a bizarre, absurd comedy series, 264 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:39,240 Speaker 1: And then there were some sketch comedies, like one of 265 00:16:39,240 --> 00:16:43,840 Speaker 1: my favorites was that Mitchell and Weblook, which Netflix carried 266 00:16:43,960 --> 00:16:48,600 Speaker 1: briefly and then it became unaccessible to an American public. 267 00:16:48,960 --> 00:16:51,960 Speaker 1: I finally ended up breaking down and buying the British 268 00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:55,040 Speaker 1: DVDs and a region free DVD player so I could 269 00:16:55,080 --> 00:16:58,480 Speaker 1: find I could watch them again. But anyway, the goal 270 00:16:58,600 --> 00:17:01,960 Speaker 1: of CISO was to create original content. That was the 271 00:17:02,000 --> 00:17:05,680 Speaker 1: long term goal, to make its own content that would 272 00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:09,000 Speaker 1: build its own following, much like Netflix had done with 273 00:17:09,080 --> 00:17:12,000 Speaker 1: things like Orange as the New Black and A House 274 00:17:12,040 --> 00:17:15,520 Speaker 1: of Cards and Stranger Things, And now every streaming services 275 00:17:15,600 --> 00:17:18,440 Speaker 1: is following that same kind of philosophy. So you use 276 00:17:18,520 --> 00:17:23,480 Speaker 1: the library to first attract your ground base of subscribers, 277 00:17:23,840 --> 00:17:27,080 Speaker 1: and then you create original content to attract new ones 278 00:17:27,119 --> 00:17:30,480 Speaker 1: and to keep everybody there. Now, one early mistake that 279 00:17:30,520 --> 00:17:34,760 Speaker 1: the executives made over at SISO, though according to Shapiro, 280 00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:37,800 Speaker 1: was actually folks higher up at NBC Universal that made 281 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:41,080 Speaker 1: this mistake, was to flinch at a deal that would 282 00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:44,320 Speaker 1: have made CISO the exclusive streaming home for the Office. 283 00:17:44,760 --> 00:17:48,879 Speaker 1: As I mentioned earlier, so Netflix was really interested in 284 00:17:49,200 --> 00:17:53,200 Speaker 1: having access to the office. They really really really wanted it, 285 00:17:53,840 --> 00:17:57,240 Speaker 1: and the plan was originally that CISO was going to 286 00:17:57,280 --> 00:18:01,400 Speaker 1: get the exclusive deal, but Netflix made INBC Universal executives 287 00:18:01,440 --> 00:18:05,280 Speaker 1: an offer they couldn't refuse, and they agreed to let 288 00:18:05,440 --> 00:18:09,120 Speaker 1: Netflix get access to those programs, which meant CISO would 289 00:18:09,160 --> 00:18:12,439 Speaker 1: not have that exclusivity. And even if CISO were to 290 00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:15,200 Speaker 1: show episodes of the Office, the fact that you could 291 00:18:15,200 --> 00:18:17,200 Speaker 1: already get it on Netflix and a lot of people 292 00:18:17,280 --> 00:18:20,520 Speaker 1: were already Netflix subscribers meant you weren't going to lure 293 00:18:20,640 --> 00:18:24,639 Speaker 1: Netflix users to SISO just based on the Office, So 294 00:18:24,880 --> 00:18:28,480 Speaker 1: one of the things that possibly could have brought over 295 00:18:28,640 --> 00:18:32,960 Speaker 1: a larger base of subscribers fell through. On the flip side, 296 00:18:33,000 --> 00:18:36,600 Speaker 1: it also meant that CISO had some budget freed up 297 00:18:36,680 --> 00:18:41,520 Speaker 1: for making original content. Now Apparently, Shapiro initially was told 298 00:18:41,520 --> 00:18:44,640 Speaker 1: that NBC Universal was going to have this enormous marketing 299 00:18:44,680 --> 00:18:49,080 Speaker 1: campaign to promote CISO, like a ten million dollar effort 300 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:53,479 Speaker 1: to highlight the service across the company's various networks, But 301 00:18:53,520 --> 00:18:58,800 Speaker 1: that really didn't manifest and CISO received relatively little marketing support, 302 00:18:59,040 --> 00:19:03,320 Speaker 1: which not surprise, meant that subscription numbers were lackluster. I mean, 303 00:19:03,359 --> 00:19:06,520 Speaker 1: it's hard to get excited about subscribing to a service 304 00:19:06,600 --> 00:19:09,439 Speaker 1: if you've never heard of it, or if the promotion 305 00:19:09,560 --> 00:19:13,320 Speaker 1: you see doesn't really talk it up enough. Making matters 306 00:19:13,359 --> 00:19:16,600 Speaker 1: worse is that Ciso had its own video player that 307 00:19:16,720 --> 00:19:20,639 Speaker 1: occasionally had technical issues and wasn't compatible with some of 308 00:19:20,680 --> 00:19:24,560 Speaker 1: the hardware consumers used to access streaming content. So again, 309 00:19:24,640 --> 00:19:28,200 Speaker 1: let's contrast this with Netflix. Netflix had made a decision 310 00:19:28,280 --> 00:19:31,119 Speaker 1: a long time ago to pretty much make sure it 311 00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:34,919 Speaker 1: was anywhere where there's a screen. Netflix worked to create 312 00:19:34,960 --> 00:19:40,040 Speaker 1: apps that were compatible with video game consoles, with streaming boxes, 313 00:19:40,040 --> 00:19:44,400 Speaker 1: connected to televisions, to smart TVs. In fact, like if 314 00:19:44,440 --> 00:19:47,399 Speaker 1: you have a fridge that has a video screen incorporated 315 00:19:47,400 --> 00:19:49,800 Speaker 1: in it, there's a chance that there's a Netflix app 316 00:19:49,920 --> 00:19:54,960 Speaker 1: native for that particular device. But Comcast's approach wasn't as 317 00:19:54,960 --> 00:19:57,679 Speaker 1: broad a and this is kind of a pun a 318 00:19:57,800 --> 00:20:01,879 Speaker 1: spectrum as what Netflix was. Take now, CISO did end 319 00:20:01,960 --> 00:20:05,280 Speaker 1: up joining Amazon's streaming Partners program in mid twenty sixteen. 320 00:20:05,359 --> 00:20:08,280 Speaker 1: That helped a little. By the end of twenty sixteen, 321 00:20:08,359 --> 00:20:11,280 Speaker 1: it was finally compatible with Apple TV. But you know, 322 00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:13,920 Speaker 1: this was like a full year in operation when these 323 00:20:13,960 --> 00:20:17,960 Speaker 1: things started to click into place. While CISO failed to 324 00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:20,760 Speaker 1: take off to the moon, it did grow in its 325 00:20:20,760 --> 00:20:24,359 Speaker 1: second year, so in twenty seventeen it began an upward 326 00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:28,359 Speaker 1: trajectory for subscriber growth. The famous podcast My Brother, My 327 00:20:28,400 --> 00:20:31,080 Speaker 1: Brother and Me launched a television show on the network 328 00:20:31,119 --> 00:20:35,280 Speaker 1: in twenty seventeen. They often joke about how the SISO 329 00:20:35,440 --> 00:20:40,000 Speaker 1: platform subsequently died on their podcast a lot, but while 330 00:20:40,040 --> 00:20:42,440 Speaker 1: they make jokes about it, their show was not likely 331 00:20:42,480 --> 00:20:45,960 Speaker 1: to have been a contributing factor to ciso's demise. The 332 00:20:46,040 --> 00:20:49,080 Speaker 1: service was spending a lot more money than it was 333 00:20:49,160 --> 00:20:52,800 Speaker 1: bringing in, and arguably this was necessary in order to 334 00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:56,000 Speaker 1: scale to a level that could compete with bigger, more 335 00:20:56,119 --> 00:21:00,480 Speaker 1: established services like Netflix. But a prestige show on CISO 336 00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:05,199 Speaker 1: called There's Johnny About Johnny Carson may have been the 337 00:21:05,240 --> 00:21:09,560 Speaker 1: straw that broke NBC Universal's back. It was an expensive 338 00:21:09,720 --> 00:21:12,800 Speaker 1: show to produce and with the numbers headed in the 339 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:15,879 Speaker 1: wrong direction, At least for the higher ups at NBC Universal, 340 00:21:16,440 --> 00:21:19,600 Speaker 1: it meant Evan Shapiro got his walk in papers in 341 00:21:19,680 --> 00:21:23,800 Speaker 1: May twenty seventeen. CISO kept on going for a little bit, 342 00:21:23,840 --> 00:21:26,280 Speaker 1: but it didn't last long. A couple of months after 343 00:21:26,280 --> 00:21:29,200 Speaker 1: Shapiro had left, SISO announced it would be shutting down 344 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:31,200 Speaker 1: by the end of the year, and it didn't even 345 00:21:31,200 --> 00:21:33,640 Speaker 1: make it that far. It actually went dark in mid 346 00:21:33,680 --> 00:21:39,439 Speaker 1: November twenty seventeen. Ciso's failure is complicated. It probably relates 347 00:21:39,440 --> 00:21:42,119 Speaker 1: to a lot of different factors. One is that it 348 00:21:42,160 --> 00:21:44,920 Speaker 1: didn't get the marketing push it needed from its parent company, 349 00:21:45,040 --> 00:21:48,159 Speaker 1: a lesson NBC Universal appears to have learned, because you 350 00:21:48,280 --> 00:21:51,240 Speaker 1: can't turn around without running into a promo for Peacock 351 00:21:51,320 --> 00:21:54,480 Speaker 1: these days, so they've definitely changed their tune on that. 352 00:21:55,080 --> 00:21:59,120 Speaker 1: But for another, SISO failed to explore AD supported options, 353 00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:01,800 Speaker 1: which potentially could have brought in revenue to help offset 354 00:22:01,840 --> 00:22:06,600 Speaker 1: the costs. Third, some of the moves to produce original 355 00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:09,360 Speaker 1: content might have been a bit too ambitious so early on, 356 00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:12,600 Speaker 1: Like it's really good to have the goal to create 357 00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:16,320 Speaker 1: prestige content, but it's possible that the service needed the 358 00:22:16,359 --> 00:22:19,719 Speaker 1: ground to be a touch more firm before trying to 359 00:22:19,800 --> 00:22:22,760 Speaker 1: create something like There's Johnny. This is no shade on 360 00:22:22,840 --> 00:22:25,480 Speaker 1: There's Johnny. I'm not saying that that was a bad 361 00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:29,439 Speaker 1: series by far, just that it was. It was a 362 00:22:29,440 --> 00:22:33,320 Speaker 1: big risk considering how much it costs, and maybe the 363 00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:36,320 Speaker 1: wise move would have been to hold off just a 364 00:22:36,320 --> 00:22:40,920 Speaker 1: bit longer to try and establish a standing before going 365 00:22:40,960 --> 00:22:44,000 Speaker 1: into it. It's hard to say, like these things. In hindsight, 366 00:22:44,119 --> 00:22:45,960 Speaker 1: it's really easy to say one way or the other. 367 00:22:46,000 --> 00:22:48,040 Speaker 1: But at the time, I'm sure these decisions were not 368 00:22:48,119 --> 00:22:51,199 Speaker 1: easy ones. Some of the content that was on CISO 369 00:22:51,560 --> 00:22:54,880 Speaker 1: would end up going to other platforms, including another one 370 00:22:55,119 --> 00:23:00,639 Speaker 1: then no longer exists, VRV or verve. The history of 371 00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:03,280 Speaker 1: VRV or I'm just gonna call it VERV why not. 372 00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:06,000 Speaker 1: The history of VERV is also pretty short. So for 373 00:23:06,080 --> 00:23:10,080 Speaker 1: one thing, it launched in late twenty sixteen, so CISO 374 00:23:10,200 --> 00:23:12,320 Speaker 1: was wrapping up its first year in twenty sixteen. That's 375 00:23:12,320 --> 00:23:15,639 Speaker 1: when VERV launched, and it was sort of a sister 376 00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:20,520 Speaker 1: service to the anime focused streaming platform called crunchy Roll. 377 00:23:21,119 --> 00:23:25,720 Speaker 1: Crunchy Role still exists. VERV was kind of a similar 378 00:23:25,840 --> 00:23:29,960 Speaker 1: streaming service, but crunchy Role focused on anime. Vervewould end 379 00:23:30,040 --> 00:23:33,200 Speaker 1: up getting lots of different content from all sorts of companies. 380 00:23:33,200 --> 00:23:37,119 Speaker 1: They included companies like Geek and Sundry, which was really 381 00:23:37,320 --> 00:23:42,760 Speaker 1: a YouTube studios channel. Rooster Teeth was another company that 382 00:23:42,800 --> 00:23:46,760 Speaker 1: provided content to VERV, and other partners included College Humor, 383 00:23:46,800 --> 00:23:50,160 Speaker 1: which would subsequently develop its own subscription streaming service called 384 00:23:50,240 --> 00:23:55,320 Speaker 1: Dropout TV Mashinima dot Com, which we will talk about 385 00:23:55,359 --> 00:23:57,480 Speaker 1: more in a second. So there's a spoiler. We know 386 00:23:57,560 --> 00:23:59,879 Speaker 1: Mainama is not gonna last forever. They were also a 387 00:24:00,040 --> 00:24:03,720 Speaker 1: partner with VERV. Shutter provided content to Verver for a while. 388 00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:08,239 Speaker 1: Shutter is a horror based company Riff Tracks, which is 389 00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:10,399 Speaker 1: made up of people who used to be part of 390 00:24:10,480 --> 00:24:13,960 Speaker 1: Mystery Science Theater three thousand. They partnered with Verve for 391 00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:17,040 Speaker 1: a while, and like crunchy Roll, verv wasn't over the 392 00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:21,480 Speaker 1: top streaming service. It contained multiple channels of content ranging 393 00:24:21,520 --> 00:24:26,720 Speaker 1: from animation to geeky lifestyle programming to horror, so you 394 00:24:26,760 --> 00:24:30,119 Speaker 1: could log into the little service you know, you subscribe 395 00:24:30,160 --> 00:24:33,760 Speaker 1: to Verve and you could access all this different stuff. 396 00:24:34,359 --> 00:24:38,280 Speaker 1: So partners joined and dropped out of Verve over the years. 397 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:41,040 Speaker 1: So it's actually really hard to talk about what was 398 00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:44,600 Speaker 1: on Verve because it all depended upon what year it was. So, 399 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:47,040 Speaker 1: like I said, at one point you had Shutter as 400 00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:50,040 Speaker 1: part of Verve, and then Shutter would leave Verve in 401 00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:57,000 Speaker 1: twenty nineteen. That same year, Nerdiced left Verve, Curiosity Stream, Geek, 402 00:24:57,040 --> 00:25:00,280 Speaker 1: and Sundry they all left Verve in twenty nineteen but 403 00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:04,080 Speaker 1: others would join the service, so there was this fluctuating 404 00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:07,439 Speaker 1: list of content that was available throughout its short history. 405 00:25:07,520 --> 00:25:10,440 Speaker 1: Makes it a little difficult to talk about verv because 406 00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,200 Speaker 1: it's not like there was a central identity you could 407 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:17,080 Speaker 1: easily point at, because it was serving as a distribution 408 00:25:17,160 --> 00:25:20,760 Speaker 1: platform for lots of different partners, and those partners kept changing. 409 00:25:21,280 --> 00:25:24,760 Speaker 1: By early twenty twenty two, all those partners were pretty 410 00:25:24,800 --> 00:25:27,680 Speaker 1: much gone. They had left after the terms of their 411 00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:31,720 Speaker 1: licensing contracts expired, and in March twenty twenty two word 412 00:25:31,760 --> 00:25:34,840 Speaker 1: got out that verv was going to cease to exist 413 00:25:34,840 --> 00:25:37,720 Speaker 1: to be its own thing, it would merge with crunchy Roll. 414 00:25:38,480 --> 00:25:40,800 Speaker 1: The Verve app went dark just a couple of weeks 415 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:44,200 Speaker 1: before I recorded this episode on May eighth, twenty twenty three. 416 00:25:44,640 --> 00:25:50,199 Speaker 1: So even the backup plan needed a backup plan, and 417 00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:52,119 Speaker 1: this really shows how challenging it could be to run 418 00:25:52,200 --> 00:25:56,040 Speaker 1: a streaming service successfully. Now, a lot of partners I 419 00:25:56,119 --> 00:25:59,160 Speaker 1: mentioned they still have their own platforms. Many of them 420 00:25:59,200 --> 00:26:02,160 Speaker 1: are part of much larger companies. So even though verv 421 00:26:02,760 --> 00:26:05,920 Speaker 1: doesn't exist anymore, some of a lot of the partners 422 00:26:06,160 --> 00:26:08,480 Speaker 1: that worked with Verve, they do still exist in one 423 00:26:08,560 --> 00:26:12,400 Speaker 1: form or another. So, for example, rooster Teeth, which initially 424 00:26:12,480 --> 00:26:15,919 Speaker 1: launched as a sort of independent content company, is today 425 00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:20,440 Speaker 1: part of Warner Brothers Discovery Shutter the horror themed over 426 00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:23,840 Speaker 1: the top streaming services owned by ABC Networks, and it 427 00:26:23,880 --> 00:26:26,840 Speaker 1: can also be accessed not just through its own app, 428 00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:35,280 Speaker 1: but also through Amazon Video. So there are different places 429 00:26:35,320 --> 00:26:37,480 Speaker 1: you can find this content. You just can't go to 430 00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:40,920 Speaker 1: one central location and find it all there anymore, which 431 00:26:41,000 --> 00:26:43,959 Speaker 1: is part of the problem. Right. It's a big challenge 432 00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:47,760 Speaker 1: we consumers face is that we might hear about something 433 00:26:47,760 --> 00:26:50,639 Speaker 1: we're interested in. Just figuring out where the heck you 434 00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:54,480 Speaker 1: can get hold of that content can be a huge headache. 435 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:57,479 Speaker 1: Figuring out, Hey, do I actually subscribe to the service 436 00:26:57,520 --> 00:26:59,359 Speaker 1: that runs this thing, or am I going to have 437 00:26:59,359 --> 00:27:02,479 Speaker 1: to subscribe to something else. All Right, we're gonna take 438 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:04,679 Speaker 1: another quick break. When we come back, I've got some 439 00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:18,240 Speaker 1: more failed streaming platforms to talk about. We're back, And 440 00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:21,560 Speaker 1: as I said, I had mentioned Machinima earlier. By that, 441 00:27:21,640 --> 00:27:25,399 Speaker 1: I mean mashinima dot com. It has also ceased to 442 00:27:25,520 --> 00:27:29,320 Speaker 1: be It operated for about twenty years before it went away, 443 00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:33,520 Speaker 1: and it's a fascinating story all by itself. And I'm 444 00:27:33,560 --> 00:27:35,600 Speaker 1: gonna give a very brief one. I could do a 445 00:27:35,680 --> 00:27:39,760 Speaker 1: full episode about machinima dot com because holy cow, there's 446 00:27:39,800 --> 00:27:42,199 Speaker 1: a lot to talk about, both from a tech side 447 00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:46,560 Speaker 1: and from a business side, and really a talent side 448 00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:49,920 Speaker 1: as well. Uh. It launched a ton of different shows, 449 00:27:49,960 --> 00:27:52,240 Speaker 1: including one that I still followed today, though you could 450 00:27:52,320 --> 00:27:55,119 Speaker 1: argue that the show I followed today is very different 451 00:27:55,160 --> 00:27:58,600 Speaker 1: from the show as it originated back in the Maschionama days. 452 00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:04,160 Speaker 1: But but Mainama is a portmanteau of machine and cinema, 453 00:28:04,560 --> 00:28:09,000 Speaker 1: or sometimes machine and anime. It typically refers to a 454 00:28:09,000 --> 00:28:13,760 Speaker 1: type of entertainment where you use computer generated characters, often 455 00:28:13,960 --> 00:28:17,760 Speaker 1: video game characters, and you use them like digital puppets, 456 00:28:18,080 --> 00:28:20,800 Speaker 1: and you tell a story, and that includes stories that 457 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:24,480 Speaker 1: have nothing to do with the platform you're using, the 458 00:28:24,560 --> 00:28:27,600 Speaker 1: video game you're using. So in the old days, folks 459 00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:29,760 Speaker 1: did this just for the fun of it. They used 460 00:28:29,880 --> 00:28:33,960 Speaker 1: in game tools to cobble together and record short sketches 461 00:28:34,119 --> 00:28:38,120 Speaker 1: or stories. So typically your camera was provided by someone 462 00:28:38,160 --> 00:28:40,600 Speaker 1: who is recording their point of view as the story 463 00:28:40,640 --> 00:28:43,840 Speaker 1: played out, or maybe they were using in game tools 464 00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:48,520 Speaker 1: to position a virtual camera somewhere in an environment. Rooster teeth, 465 00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:51,400 Speaker 1: which I mentioned earlier in this episode had a monumentally 466 00:28:51,440 --> 00:28:55,080 Speaker 1: successful show in this genre called Red Versus Blue. They 467 00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:59,960 Speaker 1: use the Xbox game Halo as the foundation for that show. Anyway, 468 00:29:00,560 --> 00:29:06,880 Speaker 1: a machinima creator named Hugh Hancock registered mainema dot com 469 00:29:06,920 --> 00:29:09,720 Speaker 1: in two thousand. The site would serve as a place 470 00:29:09,760 --> 00:29:13,680 Speaker 1: for creators to store and make available their videos. So 471 00:29:13,800 --> 00:29:18,040 Speaker 1: remember two thousand, this was before YouTube. If you created 472 00:29:18,480 --> 00:29:23,160 Speaker 1: digital video, you had to host that somewhere online. Typically 473 00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:25,560 Speaker 1: you would host it on a server and then people 474 00:29:25,560 --> 00:29:28,680 Speaker 1: would have to navigate to a web page and download 475 00:29:28,720 --> 00:29:31,200 Speaker 1: the video in order to watch it because streaming was 476 00:29:31,240 --> 00:29:35,240 Speaker 1: not really a thing yet. So the website let creators 477 00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:38,400 Speaker 1: tap into a growing audience for the medium. So there 478 00:29:38,440 --> 00:29:42,800 Speaker 1: became like this kind of clearinghouse for machinima based entertainment, 479 00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:45,440 Speaker 1: so people knew where to go to get it, and 480 00:29:45,480 --> 00:29:48,240 Speaker 1: then creators had a place to put it so that 481 00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:51,080 Speaker 1: they didn't have to try and do everything themselves, you know, 482 00:29:51,160 --> 00:29:53,840 Speaker 1: host the material, market it, get people aware of it, 483 00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:59,280 Speaker 1: that kind of thing. But hosting media files is expensive, right, 484 00:29:59,440 --> 00:30:02,560 Speaker 1: especially are downloading them. That's a lot of bills you 485 00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:06,720 Speaker 1: have to pay. So Mashinima was making revenue through an 486 00:30:06,760 --> 00:30:09,560 Speaker 1: online store, so they would sell various types of merchandise 487 00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:13,320 Speaker 1: to fans, and they also sold ad space on the 488 00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:17,280 Speaker 1: site itself. And Hancock was pretty much responsible for running 489 00:30:17,320 --> 00:30:21,320 Speaker 1: the whole darn thing for about six years, and in 490 00:30:21,320 --> 00:30:25,520 Speaker 1: two thousand and six he decided that he needed a rest. 491 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:28,440 Speaker 1: That he had been running it and did about as 492 00:30:28,520 --> 00:30:31,360 Speaker 1: much as he could as a single person, so he 493 00:30:31,520 --> 00:30:34,720 Speaker 1: sold it to the former operators of a company called 494 00:30:34,760 --> 00:30:40,239 Speaker 1: Creative Planet. Now not long after that you had the 495 00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:43,720 Speaker 1: impact of YouTube, and in two thousand and seven Mashinima 496 00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:47,600 Speaker 1: established a YouTube channel and began to upload videos to 497 00:30:47,680 --> 00:30:51,720 Speaker 1: YouTube itself. The company became rather dependent on YouTube actually, 498 00:30:52,040 --> 00:30:55,680 Speaker 1: both as a place to store videos and to monetize them. 499 00:30:56,280 --> 00:31:00,400 Speaker 1: Mishinima grew rapidly. It hit one billion monthly video views 500 00:31:00,440 --> 00:31:05,560 Speaker 1: on YouTube in November twenty eleven. That is an incredible statistic. 501 00:31:06,120 --> 00:31:10,720 Speaker 1: Mashinima was one of the largest most successful channels on YouTube. 502 00:31:10,760 --> 00:31:12,400 Speaker 1: I think the only one that was ahead of it 503 00:31:12,560 --> 00:31:17,640 Speaker 1: was Vivo, the music video channel. It had incredible engagement. 504 00:31:17,640 --> 00:31:20,240 Speaker 1: People would go to mahinema and stay there for more 505 00:31:20,280 --> 00:31:23,320 Speaker 1: than an hour, But the company was also spending money 506 00:31:23,560 --> 00:31:26,440 Speaker 1: very quickly, and in twenty twelve that caught up with 507 00:31:26,520 --> 00:31:29,200 Speaker 1: them and they had to make some cutbacks because they 508 00:31:29,200 --> 00:31:32,080 Speaker 1: were running out of cash. So they laid off more 509 00:31:32,120 --> 00:31:34,920 Speaker 1: than twenty employees, which doesn't sound like a lot of people, 510 00:31:35,200 --> 00:31:38,360 Speaker 1: but Mashinima was a lean operation that was like ten 511 00:31:38,440 --> 00:31:42,360 Speaker 1: percent of all staff at the time. Then there was 512 00:31:42,400 --> 00:31:44,840 Speaker 1: this expose, and this is where I was really talking 513 00:31:44,880 --> 00:31:48,720 Speaker 1: about how Mashinima was different from Quibi. You know, like 514 00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:52,760 Speaker 1: Quibi creators, they retained intellectual property rights for their stuff. 515 00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:55,840 Speaker 1: That wasn't how it was a Machinema. So this expose 516 00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:59,800 Speaker 1: showed how predatory Mashinima could be. The Dallas Observer published 517 00:31:59,800 --> 00:32:02,680 Speaker 1: in our article that said when Creators were signed on 518 00:32:02,960 --> 00:32:07,760 Speaker 1: with Mashinema, they were agreeing to a lifelong contract that 519 00:32:07,960 --> 00:32:12,120 Speaker 1: everything they made from that point forward would essentially belong 520 00:32:12,200 --> 00:32:15,680 Speaker 1: to Mashinema forever. Even if they left the company, Mashinima 521 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:17,880 Speaker 1: would retain rights to that and to all the stuff 522 00:32:17,920 --> 00:32:21,560 Speaker 1: they made afterward. That, y'all, is a bad deal. I 523 00:32:21,600 --> 00:32:25,480 Speaker 1: mean pulling back the curtain. iHeart owns the rights to 524 00:32:25,520 --> 00:32:28,840 Speaker 1: text stuff, so if I were ever to part ways 525 00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:31,360 Speaker 1: with iHeart, I would not be able to take tech 526 00:32:31,400 --> 00:32:33,880 Speaker 1: stuff with me. It does not belong to me, it 527 00:32:33,920 --> 00:32:38,240 Speaker 1: belongs to iHeart. However, I could still create my own 528 00:32:38,320 --> 00:32:42,000 Speaker 1: shows later on and those would belong to me, because 529 00:32:42,320 --> 00:32:46,160 Speaker 1: that's reasonable, right. But Masinima's agreements sounded like something out 530 00:32:46,200 --> 00:32:48,920 Speaker 1: of a fairy tale, like you belong to me forever. 531 00:32:49,080 --> 00:32:53,400 Speaker 1: Like Ursula was in charge of the contracts department at Mashinema, 532 00:32:53,680 --> 00:32:57,280 Speaker 1: the company was growing but also operating at a loss. 533 00:32:57,360 --> 00:33:01,040 Speaker 1: In twenty fourteen, Warner Brothers invested around fourteen million dollars 534 00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:04,640 Speaker 1: in the company. Mashama got a new CEO in the 535 00:33:04,640 --> 00:33:08,760 Speaker 1: form of Chad Gutstein. He reorganized the company, He landed 536 00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:11,640 Speaker 1: some licensing deals with Warner Brothers, and he managed some 537 00:33:11,720 --> 00:33:14,720 Speaker 1: other deals that have ultimately tempted Warner Brothers even more. 538 00:33:14,760 --> 00:33:19,479 Speaker 1: And in twenty sixteen, Mashinama accepted a buyout offer for 539 00:33:19,680 --> 00:33:26,640 Speaker 1: one hundred million smackaroos. So Gutstein joins in twenty fourteen. 540 00:33:26,680 --> 00:33:29,600 Speaker 1: In twenty sixteen, he says, my job here is done 541 00:33:29,920 --> 00:33:33,400 Speaker 1: and he leaves because he was essentially leading the company 542 00:33:33,440 --> 00:33:37,240 Speaker 1: toward this acquisition, and Russell Aerins, who was a Warner 543 00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:41,040 Speaker 1: Brothers executive, became the new head of Mashinema. By the way, 544 00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:44,200 Speaker 1: this is also around the same time when AT and 545 00:33:44,280 --> 00:33:49,320 Speaker 1: T acquired Warner Brothers and formed Warner Media. It is 546 00:33:49,360 --> 00:33:53,520 Speaker 1: weird to think that it hasn't been that long since 547 00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:58,200 Speaker 1: AT and T bought Warner Brothers, much less than divested 548 00:33:58,240 --> 00:34:02,600 Speaker 1: itself of Warner Brothers, where Warner Brothers then merged with Discovery. 549 00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:05,680 Speaker 1: It's crazy how much has changed in just in less 550 00:34:05,680 --> 00:34:09,320 Speaker 1: than a decade. It's it's bonkers, all right. So anyway, 551 00:34:10,000 --> 00:34:15,320 Speaker 1: WarnerMedia reorganized and put Mashinema under a division called Otter Media. 552 00:34:16,080 --> 00:34:19,480 Speaker 1: This was in December twenty eighteen. Another company that was 553 00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:23,680 Speaker 1: under Otter Media Rooster Teeth. Well. Then, just a few 554 00:34:23,719 --> 00:34:27,680 Speaker 1: weeks later, on January nineteenth, twenty nineteen, Otter Media wiped 555 00:34:27,840 --> 00:34:32,520 Speaker 1: all of Mashinima's YouTube videos off the face of the earth, 556 00:34:32,640 --> 00:34:35,839 Speaker 1: like the whole channel was nuked from orbit. It's the 557 00:34:35,920 --> 00:34:39,040 Speaker 1: only way to be sure. Every single video was deleted 558 00:34:39,160 --> 00:34:41,920 Speaker 1: or at least removed from public view. Then, at the 559 00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:44,719 Speaker 1: beginning of February twenty nineteen, word got out that Otter 560 00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:49,680 Speaker 1: Media had laid off every single Mashinema employee. All eighty 561 00:34:49,840 --> 00:34:54,320 Speaker 1: plus of them were fired or moved to a different 562 00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:58,360 Speaker 1: division within Otter Media. So what gets Why was Machinima 563 00:34:58,360 --> 00:35:01,680 Speaker 1: wiped out like that? Well, the was to consolidate digital 564 00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:05,640 Speaker 1: media offerings in Warner Media, so the company owned a 565 00:35:05,640 --> 00:35:09,000 Speaker 1: whole bunch of different digital media production companies and channels 566 00:35:09,400 --> 00:35:14,080 Speaker 1: like a bunch, including Brewster Teeth, a full screen Crunchy Role. 567 00:35:14,320 --> 00:35:18,080 Speaker 1: Warner would later sell Crunchy Role to Sony in twenty twenty, 568 00:35:18,760 --> 00:35:22,160 Speaker 1: and they just wanted to kind of streamline things. They 569 00:35:22,160 --> 00:35:25,680 Speaker 1: felt like there was too much overlap. It probably ended 570 00:35:25,760 --> 00:35:27,960 Speaker 1: up being for the best because, as we all know, 571 00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:31,200 Speaker 1: Discovery would acquire Warner Brothers after AT and T decided 572 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:34,120 Speaker 1: that its earlier decision to buy the company was a booboo, 573 00:35:34,600 --> 00:35:38,360 Speaker 1: and knowing how David zaslovorx I imagined, Mishinima would have 574 00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:40,719 Speaker 1: been an early candidate for the chopping block in an 575 00:35:40,760 --> 00:35:44,399 Speaker 1: effort to reduce costs if it had still been a thing. 576 00:35:45,080 --> 00:35:47,799 Speaker 1: On a similar note, here in Atlanta, we had a 577 00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:52,239 Speaker 1: company called film Struck. Technically this was a division under 578 00:35:52,280 --> 00:35:56,000 Speaker 1: Warner Brothers and Turner Classic Movies. The service launched in 579 00:35:56,040 --> 00:36:00,799 Speaker 1: twenty sixteen with two tiers, so for six ninety nine 580 00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:03,800 Speaker 1: cents a month, you would have access to a basic 581 00:36:03,880 --> 00:36:08,080 Speaker 1: digital library of various movies, mostly film classics. But if 582 00:36:08,120 --> 00:36:10,919 Speaker 1: you coughed up ten dollars ninety nine cents a month, 583 00:36:11,280 --> 00:36:15,480 Speaker 1: you would also have access to the criterion collection libraries. 584 00:36:15,840 --> 00:36:19,840 Speaker 1: There's lots of different, highly regarded movies. So the whole 585 00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:24,720 Speaker 1: concept behind this particular streaming platform was to attract movie 586 00:36:24,760 --> 00:36:27,759 Speaker 1: lovers who wanted to be able to watch classics and 587 00:36:27,840 --> 00:36:31,200 Speaker 1: foreign films and independent films, the stuff that you often 588 00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:35,040 Speaker 1: can't find on most streaming platforms. They said, well, here's 589 00:36:35,080 --> 00:36:37,600 Speaker 1: the solution. We're going to make this platform and you'll 590 00:36:37,600 --> 00:36:42,080 Speaker 1: be able to access those titles here. The service lasted 591 00:36:42,080 --> 00:36:45,320 Speaker 1: two whole years and then shut down in twenty eighteen. 592 00:36:45,760 --> 00:36:48,640 Speaker 1: So why did it shut down? Well, remember how I 593 00:36:48,680 --> 00:36:51,960 Speaker 1: said AT and T merged with WarnerMedia. Well, part of 594 00:36:51,960 --> 00:36:55,439 Speaker 1: that process involved slimming down and streamlining things. And Film 595 00:36:55,480 --> 00:36:59,520 Speaker 1: Struck was struck because it was seen as having a 596 00:36:59,560 --> 00:37:03,960 Speaker 1: limited It was a niche product. So it didn't last 597 00:37:04,040 --> 00:37:07,600 Speaker 1: at all due to corporate maneuvers. I mean, that was 598 00:37:08,440 --> 00:37:12,960 Speaker 1: the reason why it died. So if that hadn't happened, 599 00:37:12,960 --> 00:37:15,239 Speaker 1: if the corporate maneuvers had not been a thing. If 600 00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:18,160 Speaker 1: giant companies weren't trying to figure out what can we 601 00:37:18,239 --> 00:37:21,000 Speaker 1: strike from our record books to make this deal look better, 602 00:37:21,560 --> 00:37:25,920 Speaker 1: then would Film Struck have been a big success. Probably not, 603 00:37:26,160 --> 00:37:29,360 Speaker 1: but it might have done just fine, especially being supported 604 00:37:29,360 --> 00:37:32,680 Speaker 1: by a community of film lovers. But we're never going 605 00:37:32,760 --> 00:37:37,319 Speaker 1: to know. Also, we had another streaming service launched out 606 00:37:37,320 --> 00:37:41,319 Speaker 1: of Atlanta that lasted a whole month and then it 607 00:37:41,360 --> 00:37:43,440 Speaker 1: was a shock when it got shut down. So in 608 00:37:43,440 --> 00:37:46,719 Speaker 1: this case, and it relates back to Warner again, I'm 609 00:37:46,760 --> 00:37:52,560 Speaker 1: talking about CNN Plus, the subscription based streaming service related 610 00:37:52,560 --> 00:37:55,440 Speaker 1: to CNN, but it was going to carry things like documentaries, 611 00:37:55,840 --> 00:37:58,759 Speaker 1: TV specials, that kind of thing, stuff that goes into 612 00:37:58,840 --> 00:38:01,480 Speaker 1: much more depth than would be a lot of original programming. 613 00:38:01,880 --> 00:38:05,840 Speaker 1: The division spit something like three hundred million dollars in 614 00:38:05,920 --> 00:38:09,200 Speaker 1: building up to the launch, because, as I mentioned, this 615 00:38:09,239 --> 00:38:12,640 Speaker 1: sort of production ain't cheap. Throughout twenty twenty one, it 616 00:38:12,760 --> 00:38:16,080 Speaker 1: was gearing up for this event. It actually launched on 617 00:38:16,120 --> 00:38:20,640 Speaker 1: March twenty ninth, twenty twenty two, and it didn't immediately 618 00:38:20,680 --> 00:38:24,160 Speaker 1: crush it. It's not like they suddenly were overwhelmed by subscribers, 619 00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:26,319 Speaker 1: but you know, they had just gotten started but by 620 00:38:26,360 --> 00:38:30,480 Speaker 1: the following month it got shut down. So again this 621 00:38:30,520 --> 00:38:35,760 Speaker 1: would be because of David the Grim Reaper Zaslov, because 622 00:38:35,800 --> 00:38:39,440 Speaker 1: CNN was part of Warner Brothers. Discovery merged with Warner 623 00:38:39,480 --> 00:38:43,480 Speaker 1: Brothers after AT and T bounced off of that partnership, 624 00:38:43,960 --> 00:38:46,560 Speaker 1: and Zaslov needed to take a serious swing at cutting 625 00:38:46,600 --> 00:38:50,640 Speaker 1: costs because both Discovery and Warner Brothers were in some 626 00:38:50,800 --> 00:38:54,680 Speaker 1: fairly tough times. So once upon a time, this show 627 00:38:54,880 --> 00:38:59,080 Speaker 1: tech stuff was actually part of Discovery Communications, and David 628 00:38:59,160 --> 00:39:03,239 Speaker 1: Zaslov was CEO of Discovery and now he's CEO of 629 00:39:03,239 --> 00:39:05,920 Speaker 1: Warner Brothers Discovery. So I got to see how things 630 00:39:05,960 --> 00:39:09,560 Speaker 1: operated to a certain extent. It's not like I was 631 00:39:09,600 --> 00:39:12,920 Speaker 1: in the room where it happens to quote Hamilton, but 632 00:39:13,040 --> 00:39:15,080 Speaker 1: you know, I was in the company, so I could 633 00:39:15,160 --> 00:39:18,000 Speaker 1: kind of see what was going on. And the cable 634 00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:21,799 Speaker 1: business is really tough, similar to streaming. You know, things 635 00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:24,840 Speaker 1: are great when you're pouring on subscribers. It's a money 636 00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:27,680 Speaker 1: train at that point, baby, All those monthly fees are 637 00:39:27,719 --> 00:39:31,040 Speaker 1: pouring in throughout the year. Those big carriage deals with 638 00:39:31,160 --> 00:39:36,920 Speaker 1: cable companies, they're huge and they bring in billions of dollars. However, 639 00:39:37,080 --> 00:39:41,000 Speaker 1: Eventually you hit saturation and it gets a lot harder 640 00:39:41,040 --> 00:39:44,919 Speaker 1: to grow as a company, and growth is what investors want. 641 00:39:45,440 --> 00:39:47,600 Speaker 1: So yeah, you could still be making huge amounts of money, 642 00:39:47,680 --> 00:39:51,279 Speaker 1: but if you're not growing, that's a problem. So Discovery 643 00:39:51,320 --> 00:39:53,360 Speaker 1: was kind of running up against that. Back when I 644 00:39:53,480 --> 00:39:56,960 Speaker 1: was there, the company was focusing a lot on establishing 645 00:39:56,960 --> 00:39:59,960 Speaker 1: a presence in countries where it previously didn't have service, 646 00:40:00,760 --> 00:40:05,120 Speaker 1: like Central America or South America, and it was because 647 00:40:05,160 --> 00:40:08,279 Speaker 1: that represented a place where it could actually grow. You 648 00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:11,400 Speaker 1: couldn't really grow in the United States because the Discovery 649 00:40:11,440 --> 00:40:14,280 Speaker 1: channel was already on pretty much all the different cable 650 00:40:14,320 --> 00:40:18,919 Speaker 1: packages it could be on in the US, so you're 651 00:40:18,920 --> 00:40:23,000 Speaker 1: not really growing there. Once you established your presence in 652 00:40:23,040 --> 00:40:26,960 Speaker 1: a part of the world that dried up so that 653 00:40:27,080 --> 00:40:29,919 Speaker 1: you had to go into different it almost becomes like colonization, 654 00:40:30,560 --> 00:40:35,000 Speaker 1: but through cable channels again, kind of similar to streaming, right, Like, 655 00:40:35,040 --> 00:40:39,680 Speaker 1: once you reach a saturation point where the people who 656 00:40:39,719 --> 00:40:43,439 Speaker 1: are likely to subscribe are already subscribed, you don't really 657 00:40:43,480 --> 00:40:47,680 Speaker 1: grow after that. That's a problem. So anyway, Zasov took 658 00:40:47,680 --> 00:40:50,640 Speaker 1: a look at CNN Plus's business plan and its performance 659 00:40:50,640 --> 00:40:53,160 Speaker 1: figures and he said, well, there's no reason to keep 660 00:40:53,160 --> 00:40:57,200 Speaker 1: this around. It's super expensive. It's going to take forever 661 00:40:57,280 --> 00:41:00,640 Speaker 1: for it to reach a point where it might be offitable, 662 00:41:01,040 --> 00:41:04,480 Speaker 1: and in the meantime, we need to cut billions of 663 00:41:04,480 --> 00:41:07,040 Speaker 1: dollars off of our costs. So he shut it down 664 00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:10,040 Speaker 1: after it had been open for a month. Now, there's 665 00:41:10,040 --> 00:41:12,640 Speaker 1: no denying the service was costing Warner Brothers a lot 666 00:41:12,640 --> 00:41:16,240 Speaker 1: of money and that subscribers hadn't exactly gone gaga over it. Plus, 667 00:41:16,280 --> 00:41:18,960 Speaker 1: both Warner Brothers and Discovery also already had their own 668 00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:22,840 Speaker 1: streaming services, which of course raises the possibility that it 669 00:41:22,880 --> 00:41:26,960 Speaker 1: could end up competing against itself in the market. You know, 670 00:41:27,160 --> 00:41:29,640 Speaker 1: maybe one streaming service is a little more expensive than 671 00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:32,279 Speaker 1: the others, but it doesn't have the number of subscribers 672 00:41:32,280 --> 00:41:34,880 Speaker 1: that it should because you've kind of already convinced people 673 00:41:34,920 --> 00:41:37,719 Speaker 1: to go to this other subscription service for less, even 674 00:41:37,719 --> 00:41:40,560 Speaker 1: though it's a different offering. That's a real issue, right, 675 00:41:40,640 --> 00:41:44,160 Speaker 1: So the plug got pulled. Now, there are lots of 676 00:41:44,200 --> 00:41:46,640 Speaker 1: other streaming services that didn't stick around. Like I didn't 677 00:41:46,640 --> 00:41:49,680 Speaker 1: even touch on Vine, which is another user generated one. 678 00:41:49,719 --> 00:41:52,160 Speaker 1: We've talked about that one in the past and how 679 00:41:52,280 --> 00:41:55,960 Speaker 1: Vine was kind of a precursor to mega hit like TikTok. 680 00:41:56,600 --> 00:41:59,400 Speaker 1: But yeah, there are other examples, not just the highly 681 00:41:59,480 --> 00:42:02,760 Speaker 1: produced stuff that I focused on in this episode. Also, 682 00:42:03,239 --> 00:42:09,359 Speaker 1: a lot of these existing streaming services are headed toward consolidation, right, 683 00:42:09,480 --> 00:42:13,440 Speaker 1: Like we know that Discovery and HBO Max are becoming Max, 684 00:42:13,719 --> 00:42:17,240 Speaker 1: so that Max is going to be this combination of material, 685 00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:19,759 Speaker 1: although from why I understand, Discovery is still going to 686 00:42:19,800 --> 00:42:24,560 Speaker 1: continue to operate its own independent streaming service because there's 687 00:42:24,600 --> 00:42:28,120 Speaker 1: a fear that by combining some of those subscribers will 688 00:42:28,160 --> 00:42:31,719 Speaker 1: just jump ship because they don't want the Max stuff, 689 00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:34,960 Speaker 1: they don't want to spend more money on content, so 690 00:42:35,000 --> 00:42:37,040 Speaker 1: they might leave. So I think that both of those 691 00:42:37,040 --> 00:42:39,960 Speaker 1: are going to continue to exist. We found out not 692 00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:44,440 Speaker 1: long ago that Disney is merging Hulu and Disney Plus 693 00:42:44,480 --> 00:42:46,959 Speaker 1: into a single service by the end of this year, 694 00:42:47,480 --> 00:42:50,000 Speaker 1: and that the Disney Plus subscription, at least for the 695 00:42:50,040 --> 00:42:53,320 Speaker 1: ad free experience, will also be going up. So yeah, 696 00:42:53,360 --> 00:42:58,280 Speaker 1: we're still seeing stuff consolidate. We're seeing streaming services merge 697 00:42:58,320 --> 00:43:01,799 Speaker 1: together because I think all of them have come to 698 00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:06,319 Speaker 1: the same conclusion that it's clear there's a demand for 699 00:43:06,400 --> 00:43:09,960 Speaker 1: these services. It's clear people want them, but It's also 700 00:43:10,080 --> 00:43:14,319 Speaker 1: clear that there are real challenges to making it a profitable, 701 00:43:14,600 --> 00:43:20,439 Speaker 1: scalable business while also producing you know, the content that's 702 00:43:20,480 --> 00:43:23,400 Speaker 1: going to keep people there, because that content is so 703 00:43:23,480 --> 00:43:27,840 Speaker 1: expensive and it's not like you know, serving ads against stuff. 704 00:43:27,880 --> 00:43:29,880 Speaker 1: I mean, even though some of these streaming services do 705 00:43:29,960 --> 00:43:33,279 Speaker 1: serve ads or have opportunities for people to subscribe it 706 00:43:33,360 --> 00:43:37,200 Speaker 1: an ad supported tier, but there's no like Box Office 707 00:43:37,920 --> 00:43:42,600 Speaker 1: for these streaming you know, pieces of content, so it's 708 00:43:42,600 --> 00:43:47,560 Speaker 1: it's harder to get it to monetize properly. You know. 709 00:43:47,600 --> 00:43:51,680 Speaker 1: It's the old models don't work on the streaming approach, 710 00:43:52,120 --> 00:43:54,560 Speaker 1: so new models need to be formed, and I think 711 00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:57,600 Speaker 1: we're still seeing that shakeout, which is kind of funny because, 712 00:43:57,640 --> 00:44:00,719 Speaker 1: like I said, Netflix launched their way back in two 713 00:44:00,719 --> 00:44:04,120 Speaker 1: thousand and seven, not long after YouTube had become a thing. 714 00:44:04,640 --> 00:44:08,080 Speaker 1: So the fact that we've been around this long with 715 00:44:08,160 --> 00:44:11,399 Speaker 1: these streaming services and we're still trying to figure out 716 00:44:11,440 --> 00:44:14,479 Speaker 1: a way of making them make money at a level 717 00:44:14,520 --> 00:44:18,640 Speaker 1: where we're gonna get that prestige content, it's really interesting. 718 00:44:19,080 --> 00:44:21,000 Speaker 1: I don't think it's gonna change. I don't think we're 719 00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:23,440 Speaker 1: gonna lose these streaming services. We might lose some of 720 00:44:23,480 --> 00:44:27,160 Speaker 1: them when companies just can't afford to continue the business. 721 00:44:27,719 --> 00:44:30,520 Speaker 1: But I think that's still like the future of entertainment 722 00:44:30,560 --> 00:44:34,360 Speaker 1: for at least the near term. But yeah, a lot 723 00:44:34,400 --> 00:44:36,359 Speaker 1: of stuff's going to have to shake out for it 724 00:44:36,400 --> 00:44:40,680 Speaker 1: to be sustainable and to be profitable. All right, that's 725 00:44:40,719 --> 00:44:42,800 Speaker 1: it for this episode. Like I said, there were a 726 00:44:42,800 --> 00:44:45,160 Speaker 1: ton of other streaming services, some of which were more 727 00:44:45,200 --> 00:44:48,480 Speaker 1: about audio streaming rather than video. But there's a lot 728 00:44:48,480 --> 00:44:50,200 Speaker 1: of others that we could talk about. Maybe I will 729 00:44:50,200 --> 00:44:52,680 Speaker 1: in future episodes, but I really wanted to focus on 730 00:44:52,719 --> 00:44:55,960 Speaker 1: these and kind of explore what went wrong. A lot 731 00:44:55,960 --> 00:44:58,080 Speaker 1: of times it wasn't the fault of the people who 732 00:44:58,080 --> 00:45:01,760 Speaker 1: were running the program. It was literally because folks above 733 00:45:01,840 --> 00:45:05,080 Speaker 1: them had to make some tough decisions while there were 734 00:45:05,080 --> 00:45:08,880 Speaker 1: all these mergers and acquisitions going on. So yeah, tough story, 735 00:45:09,520 --> 00:45:13,320 Speaker 1: but one that I think is worth examining. I hope 736 00:45:13,600 --> 00:45:16,440 Speaker 1: you are all doing well, and I will talk to 737 00:45:16,480 --> 00:45:27,520 Speaker 1: you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. 738 00:45:27,800 --> 00:45:32,839 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 739 00:45:32,960 --> 00:45:38,759 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.