Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News.
Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lass podcast.
Speaker 3: I'm Jill Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 2: Tracy, we can't go too long without talking about the
Speaker 2: role of the dollar in the United States, the pillar
Speaker 2: of the global financial system, whether there is some threat
Speaker 2: to it or not. We are recording this July seventeenth.
Speaker 2: It has been a fresh week of headlines about say,
Speaker 2: independence of the Federal Reserve and all of the things
Speaker 2: that we talk about all of the time, so we
Speaker 2: sort of need to return to this central question.
Speaker 3: Yeah, the interesting thing about the Fed chair drama is
Speaker 3: when the initial headlines came out about Trump possibly firing Powell,
Speaker 3: the big reaction wasn't the dollar, right, There wasn't a market,
Speaker 3: it wasn't even bonds, It was the currency totally.
Speaker 2: And I think this is one of those things where
Speaker 2: I don't know, we don't know what's going to happen,
Speaker 2: whether Trump will actually try to find cause to fire Powell.
Speaker 2: Who knows what will even happen by the time people
Speaker 2: are listening to this episode. But you know, I think
Speaker 2: people get the sense that with the Fed here, with
Speaker 2: many other things, there is this sort of like erosion
Speaker 2: of an existing set of norms or expectations, et cetera.
Speaker 2: And so you know, I think arguably some damage, for
Speaker 2: better or worse, has already been done to the existing
Speaker 2: institutional arrangement. Everyone around the world is paying attention now
Speaker 2: to mention the sort of arbitrariness or volatility of tariff policy,
Speaker 2: ongoing wars, and so forth. Much is in change. We
Speaker 2: live in interesting times.
Speaker 3: Here's what I think go on. So it's a cliche
Speaker 3: in financial market commentary to talk about a major turning point, yes,
Speaker 3: because we've seen people talk about the dollar for decades. Yeah, exactly.
Speaker 3: But that said, I think what's different about now is
Speaker 3: the number of like long term secular trends that appear
Speaker 3: to be reversed on the move.
Speaker 4: Yeah.
Speaker 3: So you know, there's globalization going from deglobalization. There's population
Speaker 3: growth going to shrinking populations. There's higher inflation instead of
Speaker 3: years and years of deflation. And the interesting thing about
Speaker 3: that is, of course, how are people going to react
Speaker 3: to that? How are markets going to react to that,
Speaker 3: especially when they've grown very, very used to the previous
Speaker 3: situation through you know, back testing and all of that stuff.
Speaker 2: Totally. And I'll just say one thing which makes this
Speaker 2: very interesting timing wise from the perspective of investors, because
Speaker 2: there are a lot of trends that seem to be,
Speaker 2: if not going in reverse, at least a new direction,
Speaker 2: et cetera. One trend that hasn't really gone in reverse, however,
Speaker 2: is you're still getting paid a lot to own US
Speaker 2: tech and you know US markets, they're up solidly on
Speaker 2: the year, they are underperforming, which that is new Global
Speaker 2: equities have outperformed US equities in large part this year.
Speaker 2: But this basic idea that for all the money to
Speaker 2: be made is as an investor is still in like
Speaker 2: a handful of US companies like that in a way
Speaker 2: surprisingly is still kind of intact. And the question is
Speaker 2: will that be like the last sort of the shoe
Speaker 2: to drop, We're the end of US exceptionalism. From just
Speaker 2: the perspective of a globally oriented portfolio manager, I think that's.
Speaker 3: A good thing to watch. I'm gonna pull a page
Speaker 3: out of Bob Bracket's Commodities Energy Transition book and say
Speaker 3: that these types of transitions often take longer than people expect,
Speaker 3: and you shouldn't expect everything to happen all at once.
Speaker 3: It's going to happen in stages, so there's a lot
Speaker 3: to look out for, a lot to discuss.
Speaker 2: Well, I'm really excited to say we have the perfect guest,
Speaker 2: someone we haven't spoken to in several years, but always
Speaker 2: one of the most intro guys around. We're gonna be
Speaker 2: speaking with Inego Fraser Jenkins. He has a market strategist
Speaker 2: at Alliance Bernstein. He has recently published a new quote
Speaker 2: book that's public online about the sort of like the
Speaker 2: big trends of the year, including a big focus on
Speaker 2: the sort of like question about the stability of the
Speaker 2: dollar or a post dollar universe and what that could
Speaker 2: look like. So, Inego, thank you so much for coming
Speaker 2: back on odline.
Speaker 4: Thank you very much. Be good to be back on
Speaker 4: the show.
Speaker 2: Tell me about your books. What are your books and
Speaker 2: what is the theme of this year's book.
Speaker 5: Yeah, so the book is a way of drawing together
Speaker 5: in one place some of the views we have on
Speaker 5: some of the biggest questions that investors face. So is
Speaker 5: actually some of the issues that you've mentioned already in
Speaker 5: terms of globalization turning into deglobalization, of population growth turning
Speaker 5: into a slowdown in working age population, and issues around
Speaker 5: interest rates and inflation being different than the norms of
Speaker 5: the last thirty or so years, and all these issues
Speaker 5: sitting background, we think there's a strong case you made
Speaker 5: that some of the norms of the last thirty or
Speaker 5: forty years really are unwinding and either run their course
Speaker 5: or going into reverse. And then one of the particular
Speaker 5: issues that has really dominated the client conversations that we've
Speaker 5: had in the last three to six months has been
Speaker 5: this question you've been talking about in terms of US exceptionalism,
Speaker 5: Has it ended? Does the dollar change in terms of
Speaker 5: its role as a reserve currency. Is the prognosis the
Speaker 5: dollar the same as prognosis for US equities or are
Speaker 5: these just different things? And these kind of questions we
Speaker 5: really want to get to grips with and offer some
Speaker 5: views what investors can do about them.
Speaker 3: What kind of timeframe are you looking at here, because
Speaker 3: I think we often don't talk enough about time frames,
Speaker 3: and reading some of the book, some of it I found,
Speaker 3: you know, a little bit worrying, a little bit depressing,
Speaker 3: because you're talking about all these long term challenges that
Speaker 3: the entire world basically faces. And so I'm thinking like,
Speaker 3: what is the time frame here? Is on a long
Speaker 3: and timeframe we're all going to be dead anyway, or
Speaker 3: is it in the next twenty or thirty years.
Speaker 5: I think the interesting thing is there are a bunch
Speaker 5: of different forces acting at the same time of markets. Now,
Speaker 5: all these are strategic forces, but the one's talking about
Speaker 5: in the book that is, and so they can be
Speaker 5: thought about as acting over a say, five to ten
Speaker 5: year timeframe. And of course anything that involves a conversation
Speaker 5: on demographics occasion build just kind of close their ears
Speaker 5: because they think, well, it's so slow moving, that's surely
Speaker 5: that's not going to matter. But actually, if it's happening
Speaker 5: in conjunction with other things, then there is an argument
Speaker 5: that that strategic arison perhaps isn't quite so far off
Speaker 5: as people thought. And when that view on deglobalization, of example,
Speaker 5: is tied with concerns around debt levels, it's concerned around
Speaker 5: the shift from globalization deglobalization. These are things that have
Speaker 5: suddenly zoomed up the list of concerns and investors have
Speaker 5: and so I'd argue that although one might have thought
Speaker 5: that these issues that were sort of further off in
Speaker 5: some sort of notional strategic future. Then in fact, what
Speaker 5: we've seen in the last six months or so is
Speaker 5: those longer term issues become things that dominate the near term.
Speaker 5: So that's a longer term future has become issue a
Speaker 5: few people to face.
Speaker 2: Now, just on the demographics point, you mentioned that a
Speaker 2: lot of you hear that word it's okay, the slow
Speaker 2: moving trend. It is actually those staggering the numbers when
Speaker 2: you look at so you know, obviously people talk about
Speaker 2: the population trajectories in China, aging in the waste, but
Speaker 2: even like I saw these charts of Latin American population growth,
Speaker 2: like fertility is collapsing everywhere. I mean, it's really extraordinary,
Speaker 2: and it's it's not happening slowly.
Speaker 5: Yes to the changes there, a'bsolutely having very rapidly in
Speaker 5: terms of the context of past changes have seen, and
Speaker 5: I think that people just need to be aware of
Speaker 5: just the scale of the support the demographics as given
Speaker 5: to growth rates of Alaska thirty or forty years. I've
Speaker 5: seen this extraordinary period when there's been globalization that's brought
Speaker 5: extra workers into the sort of same environment in terms
Speaker 5: of the economic arena that they work in, and you've
Speaker 5: had a large kind of cohort of people who've all
Speaker 5: been in the workforce, and you've had an increase in
Speaker 5: the female come participation ratio at the same time, and
Speaker 5: so you have a series of things that have meant
Speaker 5: that there have been many more workers available. And I'd
Speaker 5: argue that even before you're going to get into the
Speaker 5: issue around deglobalization, that demographic shift alone undoes a very
Speaker 5: large part of this increase in the global worklupool. But
Speaker 5: that we've seen through the process of globalization since the eighties.
Speaker 5: Now people can you get very negative about this, but
Speaker 5: you know, it isn't an outlook that implies a bearish
Speaker 5: where a prognosis for the future, but it certainly changes
Speaker 5: the base case where you think kind of growth lies. So,
Speaker 5: for example, if you look at the sort of prognosis
Speaker 5: from here onwards, we have an outlook of an extra
Speaker 5: of ten to fifteen years, where on the UN population
Speaker 5: data at least that the US working age population is
Speaker 5: still going to grow, but it's going to grow much
Speaker 5: more slowly than people have been used in the last
Speaker 5: of thirty years or grown about zero point two percent perannum.
Speaker 5: But in Europe the working age population is going to
Speaker 5: shrink at about half percent pranum. In China, it's really
Speaker 5: going to shrink quickly at about one percent paranom between
Speaker 5: now and twenty fifty. So yes, I mean other forces
Speaker 5: are happening in parallel with this kind of clearly, but
Speaker 5: you know, as a base level effect, that does change
Speaker 5: one's view on what growth rates look like. No, beginally
Speaker 5: in that context. That yes, from an absolute perspective, that's
Speaker 5: setting US growth slows down. But back to the other
Speaker 5: thread that you started this podcast with in terms of
Speaker 5: the US exceptionism point, although growth is slowing in the US,
Speaker 5: the base assumption that we have and the most forecasters
Speaker 5: have is working age population does still grow ever so slightly,
Speaker 5: and that is a better prognosis than say in Europe,
Speaker 5: in Japan, in China where it's shrinking out right.
Speaker 3: Can I ask about government duck because this is the
Speaker 3: other thing that you know, people have been talking about
Speaker 3: for a very very long time. High deficits actually in
Speaker 3: the developed world, I think, the highest level of debt
Speaker 3: since like World War two something like that. How do
Speaker 3: you reconcile I guess the warnings over debt driven instability
Speaker 3: or impact on economic growth with the fact that investors
Speaker 3: keep for the most part buying government bonds. I know,
Speaker 3: after April second, we did see a spike in like
Speaker 3: ten year treasury rates, but it came down a bit
Speaker 3: after that. It's actually pretty close to where it was
Speaker 3: in early April now. But it does seem like there
Speaker 3: is a broadly continued appetite for debt. So when would
Speaker 3: that actually become a concern for investors?
Speaker 5: Like keep being asked this question by investors in I
Speaker 5: bet been a common question and really for the last
Speaker 5: a year or so. So, yeah, you're right in saying
Speaker 5: that the level of net debt to GDP is the
Speaker 5: same as it was in World War Two. I guess
Speaker 5: the first thing to say about that is not just
Speaker 5: a US problem, that's actually a G seven wide problem.
Speaker 5: So G seven debt in terms of net debt to
Speaker 5: GDPs back to where it was at the end of
Speaker 5: World War Two. Now, of course, it's been getting there
Speaker 5: for some time. It's been rising really kind of thirty years,
Speaker 5: and that hasn't mattered in an environment of falling interest rates.
Speaker 5: But if there has been a definitive turn in the
Speaker 5: interest rate cycle, then that obviously starts to become a problem.
Speaker 5: People like to fret about these debt levels, and certainly
Speaker 5: other things equal, it implies that sovereign issuers, including the US,
Speaker 5: are more risky than they were before. And so you
Speaker 5: could say, well, maybe there should be a pricing a
Speaker 5: sovereign risk and a should be a steeper yield curve.
Speaker 5: The problem is that so far those fears have been
Speaker 5: utterly swamped by the demands that investors have for liquid assets,
Speaker 5: and say for liquid assets. So you have seen attempts
Speaker 5: to price sovereign risk, yes, arguably in April in the US,
Speaker 5: a couple of years ago in the UK around the
Speaker 5: LDI crisis, prior to the last French election. If you
Speaker 5: get these episodes where the market tries to price sovereign risk,
Speaker 5: but it's very hard to know at what point that
Speaker 5: becomes a problem, because this is a can that obviously
Speaker 5: can be kicked down the road a long way. There
Speaker 5: was a fascinating paper published by Nil Ferguson earlier this
Speaker 5: year where he made the argument that basically is not
Speaker 5: net debt to GDP that really matters. It's the relative
Speaker 5: size of the debt service costs compared to defense budget,
Speaker 5: and the reason that seems like a relevant thing to
Speaker 5: talk about is last year was the first year where
Speaker 5: the US service costs on debt exceeded the US defense budget.
Speaker 5: And then he goes back and looked at previous examples
Speaker 5: of great powers that have seen this kind of crossover
Speaker 5: take place and bad things happen.
Speaker 4: And whether that is the example of.
Speaker 5: The UK, or the Ottoman Empire or the Habsburgs, a
Speaker 5: whole series of historical episodes have led to great powers
Speaker 5: no longer being able to project hard power if the
Speaker 5: debt service cost is much larger than the defense budget. Now,
Speaker 5: the interesting example that I guess is vaguely relevant from
Speaker 5: that is most relevant is the UK. In nineteen twenty,
Speaker 5: the debt service cost became much greater than defense budget.
Speaker 5: That had a big impact on the ability to project
Speaker 5: hard power. Now what's interesting is UK managed to reverse
Speaker 5: course and actually end up with a defense budget again
Speaker 5: larger than interest service costs and debt. But it did
Speaker 5: so through inflation depreciation and through the loss of reserve
Speaker 5: currency status, which I guess is the kind of key
Speaker 5: thing that makes irrelevant today. So I guess conclude in
Speaker 5: terms of how one thinks about this, you know, I
Speaker 5: think the sovereign risk is something that perhaps should be
Speaker 5: priced given the massive uncertainty about you know, how that
Speaker 5: risk is perceived in the market versus demand for liquidity.
Speaker 5: I think one's just left with a kind of directional
Speaker 5: answer saying, well, yes, at some point the yield cuve
Speaker 5: should steepen, but it's very, very hard to make a
Speaker 5: tactical kind of call around that. I think perhaps a
Speaker 5: more pertinent way for investors to actually think about their
Speaker 5: in practical terms is it it means that the dollar
Speaker 5: is less of a safe haven asset but than it
Speaker 5: was before. And that's the key point of Really it's
Speaker 5: not so much in terms of up with a particular
Speaker 5: return forecast on a dollar being different from where it was,
Speaker 5: say six months ago. I think has become almost consensus
Speaker 5: across the street that people are now more naked than
Speaker 5: dollar than they were, say six months ago. But I
Speaker 5: guess what's interesting is the riskiness of it and the
Speaker 5: idea that risk the dollar are now more correlated with
Speaker 5: risks to other risk assets. So that implies a different
Speaker 5: approach the way people should form portfolios.
Speaker 2: Okay, let's get into this because I think this is
Speaker 2: the really important point, which is that people talk about
Speaker 2: some sort of you know, risks to the dollar, risks
Speaker 2: to the dollar's status, And so I want to talk
Speaker 2: about more like setting aside timing. Maybe it's fast, maybe
Speaker 2: it's slow, maybe it's a medium term. What are the
Speaker 2: data points that you would look at to say something
Speaker 2: is happening. Is it dollar levels against other currencies? Is
Speaker 2: it dollar share of transactions, is a dollar share of
Speaker 2: sovereign savings? Or is it And it seems like where
Speaker 2: you're going with this, is it the relationship whether it's
Speaker 2: inverse or po two risky assets. What are these sort
Speaker 2: of like fingerprints of what it would look like when
Speaker 2: it's like, oh, something has meaningfully changed about the way
Speaker 2: people view the dollar in their portfolios.
Speaker 5: So first we'll got of pick up in terms of
Speaker 5: relationship with dollar and other assets. And so you've seen
Speaker 5: just the lasting a few months episodes when the a
Speaker 5: dollar has declined at the same time as that bond
Speaker 5: deals have gone up. Is a more risky environment and
Speaker 5: a dollar hasn't behaved in a safe haven asset in
Speaker 5: that kind of environment. You've also seen a more deeply
Speaker 5: negative correlation between dollar and gold obviously priced in dollars.
Speaker 5: That implies that the dollar's seen it as less of
Speaker 5: a safe haven asset, and you've seen an increased correlation
Speaker 5: between assets such as gold, silver, platinum, and bitcoin, all
Speaker 5: things which are plausibly possible, non fear, zero duration assets
Speaker 5: that you know that through a certain lens, share certain characteristics. Anyway,
Speaker 5: so you've seen this market behavior where more dollar risk
Speaker 5: has been priced. At least there have been episodes of that.
Speaker 5: What I think would really change this though, and make
Speaker 5: it more of an immediate concern for people, is if
Speaker 5: there are large flows out of US bonds from institution investors.
Speaker 5: Now there's been a lot of talk about this, There's
Speaker 5: been a lot of coverage of it. I've been asked
Speaker 5: about it in many many meetings, but so far, as
Speaker 5: far as we can tell, that is much more talk
Speaker 5: than actual flow. I mean, there have been episodes, for example,
Speaker 5: where the Japanese pension system or elements of European pensions
Speaker 5: have been selling dollar bonds, but the numbers are very
Speaker 5: small in the scheme of things. So so far, what
Speaker 5: you're still seeing is a demand for safer, liquid assets.
Speaker 5: It's still a dominant we have forces, but that's the
Speaker 5: thing that we really look for for a change. I mean,
Speaker 5: I think one thing the background is one has to
Speaker 5: bear in mind there are some very different kinds of
Speaker 5: risks here that are all being conflated, and the point
Speaker 5: of the same direction where they come from, I guess
Speaker 5: a different basis. So one is the concern around fiscal
Speaker 5: and ability, as we discussed, so that, yes, it's certainly
Speaker 5: a concern, but you never know what the timing that's
Speaker 5: going to be. Separate from that is a more geopolitical imperative,
Speaker 5: which is the need for countries which are arrivals to
Speaker 5: the US to try and dedollarize in some way. Now
Speaker 5: the problem is there is no viable alternatives. That means
Speaker 5: that the flow into other alternatives is going to be slow.
Speaker 5: We've obviously seen this in the increase bidding by central
Speaker 5: banks for gold. I think it's and I think that
Speaker 5: could spread to other kind of assets as well. But
Speaker 5: that's a sort of non market driven, more geopolitical concern that.
Speaker 4: Can carry on.
Speaker 5: And then you have specific investor concerns, you know, when
Speaker 5: there've been suggestions from the US administration that perhaps we
Speaker 5: can apply some kind of taxes or charges on foreign
Speaker 5: holders and US assets, and that has certainly grabbed attention
Speaker 5: but people are backed away from that. So it doesn't
Speaker 5: seem to be in a media concern right now. But
Speaker 5: it's three very different things pointing the same direction, which
Speaker 5: is for there to be somewhat less trust in the
Speaker 5: dollar as a safe hay. The biggest thing in its favor, though,
Speaker 5: is that growth in the US seems likely to be
Speaker 5: stronger than growth in other regions, and the lack of
Speaker 5: another alternative means the outflows are going to be slow.
Speaker 4: I think.
Speaker 5: So this is a drip Freed story that sits in
Speaker 5: the background.
Speaker 4: I think we have for many years to come.
Speaker 3: Can I tell a story please? I swear it's relevant
Speaker 3: to this conversation, But you've probably heard this story before. Actually, Joe,
Speaker 3: one of the best conversations I ever listened to was
Speaker 3: between Howard Marx and Mike Milkin and the Milkan Conference
Speaker 3: in LA and it was basically about how the investment
Speaker 3: landscape had kind of changed over their careers. So in
Speaker 3: the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties, if you put your
Speaker 3: money in blue chip stocks like the nifty to fifty
Speaker 3: or something like that, everything was fine and you made
Speaker 3: consistent profit. But then the market crashed in the early
Speaker 3: nineteen seventies and you had high inflation and that kind
Speaker 3: of changed everything. So higher volatility along with higher inflation
Speaker 3: ended deterioration in real purchasing power, which meant people lost
Speaker 3: like ninety percent of their money at that time, which
Speaker 3: is crazy. And Mike and Howard's argument was that this
Speaker 3: was what caused the explosion of money managers and also
Speaker 3: the birth of the high yield bond market because people realized, well,
Speaker 3: you can't just buy polaroid stock and more and expect
Speaker 3: a consistent return. You have to be more sophisticated about
Speaker 3: it and measure risk against that return. So I guess
Speaker 3: my question is, are we talking about something similar here
Speaker 3: in terms of a see shift in investor behavior. So
Speaker 3: maybe instead of weighing risk against return, you weigh risk
Speaker 3: against real returns or something like that.
Speaker 5: I think that's a strong narrative that will carry on
Speaker 5: for a long time because people have been very used
Speaker 5: to an environment where for decades and decades inflation has
Speaker 5: been benign. It's been readily low volatility of inflation, inflation
Speaker 5: has been going down, and at the same time we've
Speaker 5: seen strong returns both from equities and from fixed income assets,
Speaker 5: and most of the time and equities in fixing can
Speaker 5: manage to have a negative correlation at between them, and
Speaker 5: so the overall return versus risk that you've achieved in
Speaker 5: real terms has been very strong. Now, I'm absolutely not
Speaker 5: suggesting that we face a bearish outlook, but I think
Speaker 5: we do face a harder outlook, an outlook where there
Speaker 5: are multiple structural forces that imply the level of inflation
Speaker 5: will be somewhat higher and some more volatile given the
Speaker 5: constraints on growth. But that we spoke about in terms
Speaker 5: of demographics, etc. We're given where we are in terms
Speaker 5: of the valuations across most asset classes being high. The
Speaker 5: likelihodea is that the real return achieved from the portfolios
Speaker 5: that have done well for many decades is going to
Speaker 5: be much much lower. And so it raises this really
Speaker 5: fundamental question, which is actually what is the objective of
Speaker 5: most investors? You know, is the objective to maximize return
Speaker 5: per unit risk? Or is it to preserve real returns?
Speaker 5: Or another way of thinking about it is what is
Speaker 5: the definition of risk that'sulting relevant here? I mean, is
Speaker 5: risk the expected volatility of my portfolio the next ten years,
Speaker 5: or is risk the risk of a loss of purchasing
Speaker 5: per of the next ten years, and I would suggest
Speaker 5: that for nearly every investor, if they think about it, it
Speaker 5: ultimately it's the latter of those two that's a.
Speaker 4: Much bigger issue.
Speaker 3: Wait, why not both?
Speaker 5: I mean, ideally one would care about both. It depends
Speaker 5: how many degrees of freedom we think you have, because
Speaker 5: you know, unfortunately, if the expected real return across assets
Speaker 5: is going to be generally lower, if the correlation amongst
Speaker 5: them is generally higher, then eking out a certain level
Speaker 5: of real return becomes much much harder. So I think
Speaker 5: actually there ends up being a direct tension between the
Speaker 5: measure risk as expected of all of the portfolio versus
Speaker 5: preserving purchasing power, because if the thing that really matters
Speaker 5: to you in the long run is preserving purchasing power,
Speaker 5: I would argue that actually you probably have to take
Speaker 5: more risk in the sense of expected vole And even
Speaker 5: though I'm aware that's a horrible thing to have to
Speaker 5: explain to people and it might sound very cavalier at
Speaker 5: a point when the shita pee is thirty five times
Speaker 5: and I'm not spelling out particularly be con't bullish a
Speaker 5: long term outlook, but I think you'll have no choice.
Speaker 5: You have to think about taking more risk, because the
Speaker 5: other option is to underperform inflation, and that is more
Speaker 5: painless to people.
Speaker 4: I mean, the good news.
Speaker 5: At least in that is that people can choose how
Speaker 5: they want to take that risk, how they want to
Speaker 5: partition it, what kind of risks do they believe in,
Speaker 5: what risks are consistent with the liquidity that they need
Speaker 5: and the time horizons they have, and the beliefs they have,
Speaker 5: et cetera, et cetera. But in this tension between the
Speaker 5: two different kinds of risk, I think is that need
Speaker 5: to preserve we are purchasing power. That is the real focus,
Speaker 5: and that is a shifting governance ultimately for many vestetypes.
Speaker 2: So, you know, looking at your big themes this year
Speaker 2: and thinking about this idea of a sort of a
Speaker 2: world where the dollar is less important or less dominant,
Speaker 2: or less safe or something like that. One of the
Speaker 2: things that you mentioned is geopolitics, and of course there
Speaker 2: are multiple wars going on. There is the weaponization of
Speaker 2: the dollar. Of course Russia was on the other end
Speaker 2: of after its invasion of Ukraine. But what about politics.
Speaker 2: I mean, we always talk about geopolitics, but I mean
Speaker 2: also interested in like actual politics and what's going on
Speaker 2: in the United States right now. The attacks on federal
Speaker 2: reserve independence. That's not geopolitics, that's politics. But it could
Speaker 2: shake people's faith in the dollar system. Other you know,
Speaker 2: shackles like that that the government has put on itself
Speaker 2: to maintain some sort of stability, or even just sort
Speaker 2: of the volatility and trade policy, or the fact that
Speaker 2: the government, you know, passed another gigantic tax cut. There's
Speaker 2: no political appetite for meaningful change in the debt trajectory.
Speaker 2: How does politics, domestic politics play into global perceptions of
Speaker 2: dollar stability.
Speaker 4: I think there's two avenues here.
Speaker 5: I guess one avenue again is back to this topic
Speaker 5: of physical sustainability. And if there is no appetite across
Speaker 5: parties to really meaningfully change that fiscal contrajectory, then one
Speaker 5: is left with this question of how sustainable is the debt?
Speaker 5: Can this can be kicked down the road by what
Speaker 5: are the ways out? And I and ultimately I think
Speaker 5: that inflation is the most likely route out. I think
Speaker 5: you have to be hugely optimistic about the growth that
Speaker 5: can come from AI in order to have a view.
Speaker 5: There's an alternative way out. And the second I guess
Speaker 5: is this question of trust in the US from the
Speaker 5: point of overseas investors, and there certainly there have been
Speaker 5: points where that's been shaken. So I was doing a
Speaker 5: series of marketing tours around global clients at the point
Speaker 5: where all the discussions taking place about should there be
Speaker 5: some kind of Mara Laga accord and potentially changing the
Speaker 5: status of foreign owners of US debt And Okay, it
Speaker 5: looks like that's been backed away from my suggestion and
Speaker 5: suddenly hasn't come up in meetings for a long time.
Speaker 5: So maybe that's not going to happen, but just the
Speaker 5: fact it was raised, you know, at the same time
Speaker 5: that there is this concern about physical sustainability and there
Speaker 5: are geopolitical forces which are very strong to try and
Speaker 5: find dollar alternatives, that I guess sort of feeds this
Speaker 5: kind of view that perhaps the dollar has less of
Speaker 5: a safe having status than did before. I mean, the
Speaker 5: big caveat is it depends what can I risk we're
Speaker 5: talking about here. I think if we're talking about general
Speaker 5: business cycle risks, then people, you know, I think, generally
Speaker 5: do take the view now compared to say a year ago,
Speaker 5: that the dollar is more risky when things get really bad,
Speaker 5: and when there's a geopolitical shock, often in a quite
Speaker 5: short term and nature thankfully, then you still see people
Speaker 5: flee to the dollar, and the dollar rally in the
Speaker 5: short term over potentially large shocks.
Speaker 3: Since we're talking risk premiums and political or geopolitical instability,
Speaker 3: one thing I wonder is we're basically talking about how
Speaker 3: the world is changing and norms are shifting, and I'm
Speaker 3: kind of wondering, could the norms or could the response
Speaker 3: from investors change in a more unexpected way, in the
Speaker 3: sense that instead of seeing risk premiums go up because
Speaker 3: everyone is nervous about instability or big shocks or whatever,
Speaker 3: maybe everyone just becomes really used to it and you
Speaker 3: don't see higher risk premiums priced in. I mean, that's
Speaker 3: a consistent theme in market, right, Something major happens and
Speaker 3: then something similar happens later and you don't get as
Speaker 3: big a reaction. Is that a possibility here?
Speaker 4: I mean I think it's possibility.
Speaker 5: I mean, I'm not sure that's enough to tell one
Speaker 5: super bullish in the long wor wace that's fair again,
Speaker 5: I you know, it gets just to stress, you know,
Speaker 5: I do think that the US market and ob equities
Speaker 5: are going to produce we have positive real return, but
Speaker 5: valuations today are high. So I would argue that you
Speaker 5: know that, yes, one can outline a narrative that there
Speaker 5: does not need to be a shift back to structure
Speaker 5: lower levels of valuation because of where we are in
Speaker 5: real rates, because where we are in terms of the
Speaker 5: persistence of profitability for some of the most profitable firms.
Speaker 5: I mean, all these things that justify valuations where they are.
Speaker 5: But to justify a shift upward in valuations, which I
Speaker 5: think is what you're kind of getting to, been a question.
Speaker 5: I think that would just be really tough. So, yes,
Speaker 5: I can get to a positive return outlook, but yes,
Speaker 5: that's driven by views on where real earnings go, not
Speaker 5: by multiple expansion. I think that would be a hard
Speaker 5: core to make.
Speaker 3: Joe has a complicated relationship with gold. But when we're
Speaker 3: talking about real purchasing power, what exactly are you advising
Speaker 3: people to buy to or hedge to preserve that purchasing power.
Speaker 5: Yeah, so there's a broad range responses and it's not
Speaker 5: as simple. But I guess in the future thing has
Speaker 5: perhaps with hindsight it was over years when both bonds
Speaker 5: and equities to pduced positive returns and had negative correlation
Speaker 5: between them. I mean, I think there's a real assets
Speaker 5: for me. Number one is global equities. I mean, as
Speaker 5: long as inflation is only moderately higher and not much higher,
Speaker 5: then there is strong evidence of equities behave like a
Speaker 5: real asset and produce real returns. And that's a liquid
Speaker 5: asset class. So that comes number one. Alongside that, there
Speaker 5: are a range you know, of other real assets as well,
Speaker 5: be it real physical assets, or be it areas of
Speaker 5: private assets for example of private debt that has a
Speaker 5: floating rate nature attached to it. It can be in
Speaker 5: real assets in the form of real estate, farmland, et cetera,
Speaker 5: and things like that.
Speaker 4: And then there's gold. So gold has a long one real.
Speaker 5: Return of the last two hundred years of plus zero
Speaker 5: point two percent per anum as far as we can tell.
Speaker 5: So it's very small number, although maybe one should you
Speaker 5: say that if you're buying it because you're frightening some
Speaker 5: really risk off event, then a zero real return may
Speaker 5: not be such a bad thing.
Speaker 3: There's a value in getting a good night's sleep. That's
Speaker 3: something that I've kind of learned like investors are willing
Speaker 3: to pay to have that sort of end of the
Speaker 3: world hedge.
Speaker 5: Yes, although the risk, of course is the lost opportunity
Speaker 5: that becomes because in the last time, thirty years of
Speaker 5: that would be an appalling call.
Speaker 2: I lose sleep because other people are getting richer. So
Speaker 2: you know, there are all kinds of reasons to lose.
Speaker 4: Sleep, although in the last a couple of years obviously
Speaker 4: girls actually.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and then I lose sleep over there too, I
Speaker 2: just don't sleep well.
Speaker 5: I think the key argument favorite gold, and we've been
Speaker 5: pro a gold allocation in the advice for give to
Speaker 5: clients for some years. But the key argument in favor
Speaker 5: of it is that, look, yes, you want a big
Speaker 5: overweight on equity strategically, even if it's not that bullsh
Speaker 5: no outlook, but just because that gives you a positive
Speaker 5: real return. The question is what you add around that
Speaker 5: equity position that helps diversify risk portfolio, because the problem
Speaker 5: is that if inflation does remain higher and perhaps more volatile,
Speaker 5: then bonds are not going to diversify equity risk as
Speaker 5: they have in the past. The key attraction of gold
Speaker 5: is that the correlation of gold and equities remains at
Speaker 5: zero at different inflation levels. So it does seem to
Speaker 5: have an established track record as being a diversifier risk
Speaker 5: of equity risk that is in higher inflation episodes, and
Speaker 5: that's its kind of key roid in portfolios. Then I mean,
Speaker 5: on top of that, my goals will take the view
Speaker 5: that for geopolitical reasons and nonprofit different reasons, central banks
Speaker 5: will carry on buying it, and that might give upward support.
Speaker 4: But I'm not going to attempt to give a number
Speaker 4: of forecasts on that because that's going to be too
Speaker 4: hard to do.
Speaker 2: One of the biggest structural trends you talk about in
Speaker 2: more volatile future world or potentially more inflationary future world,
Speaker 2: is a climate risk. And I have to say that
Speaker 2: over the last several years, I've come to roll my
Speaker 2: eyes a little bit when I see financial institutions talk
Speaker 2: about climate. Sometimes it feels perfunctory. We've seen performative, performative
Speaker 2: sometimes in the last couple of years. And again this
Speaker 2: is not on the research side, this is not on
Speaker 2: the investing side. But in the last couple of years,
Speaker 2: suddenly banks losing their interest in climate period et cetera.
Speaker 2: Like suddenly these client all this talk that executives love
Speaker 2: to talk about on panels in the mid twenty tens,
Speaker 2: suddenly they don't see it anymore. So I thought it
Speaker 2: was actually interesting they'd here in twenty twenty five and
Speaker 2: you're still talking about climate net zero being unrealistic in
Speaker 2: your view. From his social perspective, temperatures expected to continue
Speaker 2: to rise. Talk to us about like why I shouldn't
Speaker 2: be cynical about when I see financial institution to talk
Speaker 2: about climate and why it should actually be you know,
Speaker 2: one one of the key pillars of risk going forward.
Speaker 5: Yeah, So our viue is very kind specific on this,
Speaker 5: which is we want to think about what are the
Speaker 5: big structural forces that act on markets over a five
Speaker 5: to ten ure horizon, and what are the things that
Speaker 5: really affect the fundamental risks that investors face. So, in
Speaker 5: conjunction with these other forces are happening at the same
Speaker 5: time in terms of demographic shifts and AI and worries
Speaker 5: about death and deglobalization, we also have, I think a
Speaker 5: need to think about whether there are risks associated with
Speaker 5: climate and the specific view that we have on that
Speaker 5: is that it seems highly unlikely that the world will
Speaker 5: achieve net zero by twenty fifty for two different kinds
Speaker 5: of reasons. One is that it's social and politically really
Speaker 5: hard to change behaviors fast enough. Secondly, is the power
Speaker 5: demand of AI. So you know, so as far as
Speaker 5: we can tell, by the end of the next year,
Speaker 5: global data center power demand will be the same part
Speaker 5: demand as the total power of Japan. So we've basically
Speaker 5: added a G three economy onto global power demand and
Speaker 5: that will continue to grow. So that implies that we
Speaker 5: don't hit net zero. The climate science seems suggest that
Speaker 5: means that it is likely we see a warming greater
Speaker 5: than two degrees. And then the question is, well, do
Speaker 5: investors need to care about this? Does this matter either
Speaker 5: from the point of view of inflation, inflation risks, supply
Speaker 5: chain risk, or growth rates. So in our book we
Speaker 5: spend a lot of time so pulling academic evidence on
Speaker 5: what the effect is of a change in temperature on GDP. Now,
Speaker 5: the first thing say is you plot the twenty eight
Speaker 5: studies that we looked at in terms of the link
Speaker 5: between a temperature and growth. They're all over the place.
Speaker 5: It's a big bunch of points. So the first thing
Speaker 5: I say about it is there's huge disagreement about what
Speaker 5: the relationship between temperature and growth is. But the trend
Speaker 5: line through it, if you seemed to put a sort
Speaker 5: of average line and through it is downwards. So yes,
Speaker 5: we can argue about how material it is, but there
Speaker 5: is a link that seems to be the consensus of
Speaker 5: crossed the academic works that we looked at that you know,
Speaker 5: at the margin, a bigger increase in temperature is bad
Speaker 5: for growth. Again, the question is, you know, how does
Speaker 5: matter and how do people kind of think about it?
Speaker 5: And what's the scale of this, Because the average of
Speaker 5: all those, you know, implies a change in the equity
Speaker 5: outlook ten years forward that just simply shaves zero point
Speaker 5: two percent parannum of the global equity outlooks. That might
Speaker 5: not sound like a very big deal. You know, it's
Speaker 5: certainly smaller than the impact of demographic change or mean
Speaker 5: reversion on an equity forecast. Having said that, the more
Speaker 5: recent forecasts are worse than the older forecasts and imply
Speaker 5: something that looks like a minus point five and minus
Speaker 5: point six percent paranum impact on equitturns at the ten
Speaker 5: year mark, and that starts to get to be the
Speaker 5: same kind of order of magnitude as demographics have on
Speaker 5: the average return the one should expect. But I'd argue
Speaker 5: that we go beyond that because the real thing that
Speaker 5: struck me it's just the scale of the error bars
Speaker 5: around these forecasts huge. So yes, of course we can
Speaker 5: argue about what globalization and demographics and core profitability and
Speaker 5: labor versus profit share will do to the earnings outlook,
Speaker 5: and we can try our best to have models.
Speaker 4: For those, and we have certain error bars around them.
Speaker 5: But the error bars around climate and also AI, I
Speaker 5: would say two things are just very different from everything else.
Speaker 5: That introduced the sense of radical forecast error in what
Speaker 5: we're doing, and really implies that people need to be
Speaker 5: thinking about perhaps diversification in a more radical way, because
Speaker 5: we have path error on ten years horizons that's much
Speaker 5: wider than it's been historically.
Speaker 3: Going back to AI for a second, obviously this is
Speaker 3: really important not just for the energy transition and the
Speaker 3: impact on climate change, but also for the economic outlook,
Speaker 3: the impact on productivity, and also of course for the
Speaker 3: equity market where we've seen the big tech giants just
Speaker 3: continue to dominate. Is there a risk or would it
Speaker 3: be your base case that AI basically just intensifies. I
Speaker 3: guess existing market imbalances where the big just get bigger
Speaker 3: and only a select group of tech firms is kind
Speaker 3: of favored, and that presumably would undermine productivity gains broad
Speaker 3: based productivity gains.
Speaker 5: I think the biggest issue around trying to forecast productivity
Speaker 5: gains is that with any new technology that comes along,
Speaker 5: it turns out to be really really hard to forecast
Speaker 5: what the impact that has on accurate productivity and the
Speaker 5: ability of the economics pression you know, in general and
Speaker 5: everyone across the street to forecast productivity has been really
Speaker 5: poor for a long long time. So I guess we
Speaker 5: should firstly approach productivity forecasts with a degree of humility
Speaker 5: and certainly shouldn't rely on huge productivity gains as a
Speaker 5: justification for earnings growth.
Speaker 4: Say that's the first thing I'd say.
Speaker 5: Secondly is that it has to put in conjunction with
Speaker 5: downward forces on growth from the things we spoke earlier
Speaker 5: in terms of degloverzation and demographics, etc. So yes, it
Speaker 5: seems likely we do get a productivity improvement from AI,
Speaker 5: and the scale of it is hotly debated, But the
Speaker 5: question is is that enough to overcome downward force on
Speaker 5: growth from the levels of growth that we've become used
Speaker 5: to for the last thirty or forty years. And the
Speaker 5: third element is to what extent does a large productivity
Speaker 5: gain from AI require significant displacement of jobs. Now that's
Speaker 5: a very hotly debated topic. We see, we don't know
Speaker 5: the answer to that yet. I mean, on the one hand,
Speaker 5: one per point to two hundred years of technological advance
Speaker 5: and automation, and yet we have almost full employment. There's
Speaker 5: no evidence to date that there's been a structural trend
Speaker 5: increase unemployment through all the automation we've seen since the
Speaker 5: birth of the Industrial Revolution. Equally, at the same time,
Speaker 5: the jobs that seem most at risk from AI driven
Speaker 5: automation are those in non unionized sectors, and that seems
Speaker 5: like a different kind of risk than the one perhaps
Speaker 5: we've seen, you know, through automation ships in the last
Speaker 5: now thirty or forty years. So I think the heart
Speaker 5: of the macro aggregate, you know, going to question around
Speaker 5: AI is firstly, what's the quantum of the productivity increase
Speaker 5: that we can expect, you know, whether that is enough
Speaker 5: to offset these downwindforce and growth elsewhere? And if you
Speaker 5: are very bullish on the outlook for AI driven productivity growth.
Speaker 5: Do you necessarily have to be a bearish in terms
Speaker 5: of the job side look? And that's very much an
Speaker 5: open question at the moment.
Speaker 3: I have just one more question, and it's a personal
Speaker 3: one if you don't mind, but I know you. You
Speaker 3: kind of publicly declared that you're no longer a quant
Speaker 3: which is kind of funny because I kind of imagine
Speaker 3: the equivalent of the office scene where Michael stands up
Speaker 3: and shouts out, I declare bankruptcy. I kind of imagine
Speaker 3: to go at the office of a Lions Bernstein shouting
Speaker 3: I am no longer a quant. But anyway, what does
Speaker 3: all of this mean, the sort of big shift mean
Speaker 3: for systematic investing that basically relies on, you know, back
Speaker 3: testing realms and reams of historic data.
Speaker 5: Yeah, so, I think there is a case made that
Speaker 5: the bigger structural level that we've been in a certain
Speaker 5: economic environment for thirty or forty years, and the forces
Speaker 5: that drove that you have run their course or going intraverse,
Speaker 5: and therefore some of the rules of some that have
Speaker 5: existed for a long time aren't going to work in
Speaker 5: the same way now that does not mean the systematic
Speaker 5: investings suddenly stops working, because obviously there are firstly host
Speaker 5: of processes that operate over shorter time horizons that don't
Speaker 5: need to take into account these huge, slow moving structural forces. Secondly,
Speaker 5: it would be you know, almost absurd, I think, to
Speaker 5: reject any kind of systematic quantitative input given the advances
Speaker 5: in AI that it takes in place, and assuming the
Speaker 5: one thing cary on working in the same way. So
Speaker 5: it's not to kind of reject with that kind of
Speaker 5: process at all, but it is I think hard to
Speaker 5: say that the general approaches that have worked are going
Speaker 5: to carry on in the same way. Specifically when it
Speaker 5: comes down to the really hard questions around helping clients
Speaker 5: think about kind of governance, and back to this question
Speaker 5: we spoke about the beginning, which is actually what is
Speaker 5: the real measure risk that we care about it? You know,
Speaker 5: is that the volatility the portfolio or is it a
Speaker 5: measure of purchasing power? And that's the kind of deep
Speaker 5: governance question that I think it's very hard to attack
Speaker 5: with any kind of systematic process almost necessarily kind of
Speaker 5: sits outside of that. And so as those kind of
Speaker 5: discussions that we're spending a lot more of our time
Speaker 5: on the clients spouse we think for those is where
Speaker 5: some of the biggest shifts are taking place in Ago.
Speaker 2: Fraser Jenkins at Alliance Burnstein, thank you so much for
Speaker 2: coming on. It had been too long. It's always interesting
Speaker 2: to talk to you and read your stuff. Appreciate you
Speaker 2: joining us on the outline.
Speaker 4: Thank you very much for hanging back on my shirt.
Speaker 4: It's for being a huge fun.
Speaker 2: Tracy. I always really like talking to Inego. It's been
Speaker 2: too long, and I think he's probably one of the
Speaker 2: best out there. You know, a lot of people try
Speaker 2: to synthesize big picture ideas, and you know, it must
Speaker 2: be a lot of fun going around the world and
Speaker 2: talking to clients and talk about big idea. I think
Speaker 2: he's one of the best at it, and I think
Speaker 2: he's very cogent and takes that process very seriously.
Speaker 4: He does.
Speaker 3: I do imagine you must get the same questions.
Speaker 5: All right.
Speaker 2: That's so valuable, right, yeah.
Speaker 3: I mean, I guess it allows you to weigh what's
Speaker 3: the biggest concern for people. But I just wonder. I mean,
Speaker 3: I guess you give a sort of set response each
Speaker 3: time you hear it. I don't know, or maybe you
Speaker 3: refine your arguments as you go along. I got to say,
Speaker 3: speaking of arguments, you mentioned that this book is from Inego,
Speaker 3: is publicly available. We should put a link in the
Speaker 3: show notes or something to it so everyone can read
Speaker 3: it alongside this episode.
Speaker 2: The amount of data and interesting charts in there, it's
Speaker 2: certainly well worth anyone approusing. So we will definitely make
Speaker 2: sure that we find a way to point people to that.
Speaker 2: So I'm really interested in this question of and on
Speaker 2: the dollars, specifically about the sensitivity of the dollar to risk, right,
Speaker 2: because for years the view is something bad happens, or
Speaker 2: something new happens, or something people get anxious in the
Speaker 2: flight to dollars. And I still think you see that
Speaker 2: to some extent, but it definitely seems true. I mean,
Speaker 2: you know, you see this recovery and a lot of
Speaker 2: assets since early April, we haven't seen the dollar. And
Speaker 2: I think you have these moments now where you have
Speaker 2: a sort of quote risk event unquote and there is
Speaker 2: no flight to the dollar, it's a flight to gold
Speaker 2: or something else.
Speaker 5: Right.
Speaker 3: And the FED example, yeah, well it's a really good example.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 3: The two things I kind of took away from that
Speaker 3: conversation are even if we're talking about a see shift
Speaker 3: in what's happening in the world, how that translates into markets.
Speaker 3: It doesn't mean it's all going to happen at once, right,
Speaker 3: This can be a very very slow moving thing. And
Speaker 3: I guess I'm going to use the old tanker cliche, right, like,
Speaker 3: if you're in a speak boat, you can turn it
Speaker 3: very quickly. But if you're talking about these huge, huge
Speaker 3: structural changes, it's more of a tanker and it takes
Speaker 3: some time. And then the second thing is, I think,
Speaker 3: what is actually different about this moment, and Inego talked
Speaker 3: about it at the beginning, is just the confluence of
Speaker 3: major changes. Yes, yeah, that seem to be happening. It's
Speaker 3: not just death of the dollar, potentially, it's also death
Speaker 3: of the dollar plus deglobalization plus AI plus AI plus
Speaker 3: population growth and all of that.
Speaker 2: Now, I've been thinking about this and it's a little
Speaker 2: bit tangential to what we've been talking about specifically, But
Speaker 2: there's obviously so many changes. But even if you just
Speaker 2: take one, and one that's been on my mind lately
Speaker 2: is self driving cars. Even if it was nothing else,
Speaker 2: happening technologically in the entire world. I think you could
Speaker 2: make the argument that self driving cars, for example, will
Speaker 2: massively restructure urban landscapes. Right the way that we arrange
Speaker 2: cities and suburbs and excerbs has the potential to change
Speaker 2: massively if people don't.
Speaker 4: Have to drive anymore.
Speaker 2: And this is just one thing, and it actually doesn't
Speaker 2: really get talked about that much, but if you actually
Speaker 2: follow through, the implication is actually big. But there are
Speaker 2: so many things happening right now. That's just one minor
Speaker 2: one that doesn't even get that much attention. But add
Speaker 2: in self driving cars, add in AI and the effect
Speaker 2: that that has on disrupting the white color workforce in
Speaker 2: some way. Add on the rise of a sort of
Speaker 2: domestic political volatility and the attacks on the FED and
Speaker 2: so forth. Add on the fact there are multiple wars
Speaker 2: going on, etc. Add on you know, the fact that
Speaker 2: birth rates are collapsing.
Speaker 3: This is a very long list here, Well, this is
Speaker 3: a lot going on.
Speaker 2: There's a lot going on, and each one of these
Speaker 2: has the potential to be and they're all real.
Speaker 3: I think you need to travel around the world talking
Speaker 3: to clients about how self driving cars are going to
Speaker 3: impact urban planning.
Speaker 2: I'd love to, you know, I think we should do
Speaker 2: We should go around the world and do live odd
Speaker 2: lots events. But we don't have to ask question. We
Speaker 2: just get to hear what everyone else is interested in
Speaker 2: the audio.
Speaker 3: All the clients.
Speaker 4: Yeah, I don't know.
Speaker 2: We let the client, We let the listeners, you know, like,
Speaker 2: we don't what do you guys want to hear about? Listen?
Speaker 2: Let's go on a listening tour.
Speaker 3: We should do that. Yeah, I would love that.
Speaker 2: That would be a nice Let's do a listening tour.
Speaker 3: All right, shall we leave it there?
Speaker 2: Let's leave it there.
Speaker 3: This has been another episode of the Authoughts podcast. I'm
Speaker 3: Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and
Speaker 3: I'm Jolly Wasenthal.
Speaker 2: You can follow me at the Stalwart check out inego
Speaker 2: Fraser Jenkins' book. You can find it at the Alliance
Speaker 2: Bernstein website. You can search that. Follow our producers Kerman
Speaker 2: Rodriguez at Carman Arman, dash O, Bennett at Dashbot and
Speaker 2: kel Brooks at Keil Brooks. More odd Laws content. Go
Speaker 2: to bloomberg dot com slash od Laws with the daily
Speaker 2: newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can chat
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