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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noah.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Dylan, the Tennessee pal Fagan. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are here. That makes this the stuff they don't want

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Speaker 3: you to know. Friends, neighbors, Fellow conspiracy realist Matt Noel Dylan,

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Speaker 3: I was thinking we keep this beginning part short because

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Speaker 3: as we record right now, it's Friday, March twenty first,

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Speaker 3: and drone strikes are continuing across the globe US, Russia, China, Ron,

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Speaker 3: pretty much anybody who can build a combat drone is

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Speaker 3: doing so. And they're doing so because, on the one hand,

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Speaker 3: there are tremendous advantages. Right, you're not sending a manned

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Speaker 3: F thirty five into enemy territory risking the life of

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Speaker 3: a pilot, you know, or you're not sending a special

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Speaker 3: operation in risking the lives of the people conducting that operation.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, you know, it's it's definitely a positive

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Speaker 4: thing when you consider the horrors of like past, you know,

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Speaker 4: trench warfare and all of that stuff. But it has

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Speaker 4: its own kind of bag of badgers in terms of

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Speaker 4: potential negatives as well.

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Speaker 2: Obviously, well, yeah, and individual human beings are being targeted

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Speaker 2: in places across the world for a myriad of reasons.

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Speaker 2: And the way technology has evolved in the access both

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Speaker 2: individuals and governments have to every person's lives, you know,

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Speaker 2: the digital lives that we all lead. Deciding who gets

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Speaker 2: targeted what gets targeted has become increasingly complex and yet

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Speaker 2: in some ways insanely simple.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, that's the thing. So on the one hand, as

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Speaker 3: we said, the idea of these sorts of targeted strikes,

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Speaker 3: they can ostensibly, in theory, save lives, but they can

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Speaker 3: also produce operational costs, just to put the petty part

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Speaker 3: out there. But on the other hand, they can lead

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Speaker 3: to disastrous mistakes, the deaths of innocent people. Someone was

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Speaker 3: literally just in the wrong place at the wrong time,

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Speaker 3: or made friends with the wrong person on social media.

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Speaker 3: This leads to the erosion of democracy. No fooling, no hyperbole. Tonight,

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Speaker 3: we're exploring an ongoing conspiracy. Who gets to decide who dies.

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Speaker 3: You know, here in the United States. Let's be honest,

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Speaker 3: it's not as though the public at large gets to

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Speaker 3: vote on the fate of every suspected terrorists. But our

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Speaker 3: country does have a system for determining this. It is murky,

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Speaker 3: it is powerful, it is fascinating, it is bureaucratic, and

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Speaker 3: it is terrifying. Friends and neighbors. We want to introduce

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Speaker 3: you to the disposition matrix.

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Speaker 2: So weird. Yeah, and it's not just the US. Remember

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Speaker 2: the old five Eyes group that once was that is

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Speaker 2: now eroded. I don't even know. I think there's just

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Speaker 2: one big old eye that sounds about it.

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Speaker 3: Well, it's it's uh, well, we'll see how how these

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Speaker 3: comments age because uh yeah, five eyes may be going blind,

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Speaker 3: but that might be a story for another evening. The

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Speaker 3: disposition matrix, Uh it sounds like a silly name, but

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Speaker 3: it's it's a very real thing. And to understand why

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Speaker 3: it's and why we consider it a conspiracy, we're going

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Speaker 3: to have to start at the beginning of the United States.

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Speaker 3: After word from our sponsors, here are the facts, all right.

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Speaker 3: The US is like other democracies in theory, it's defined

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Speaker 3: by rule of law. In theory, it's defined by the

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Speaker 3: rule of the public. You vote for representatives. We've said

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Speaker 3: it before. You vote for representatives who, in theory will

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Speaker 3: represent your wishes and desires. And I don't know, it's

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Speaker 3: something we take for granted so often. It's so weird

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Speaker 3: to remember what a huge change democracy was back in

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Speaker 3: the day, right back in the founding of the US.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, the concept of it on paper is fantastic.

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Speaker 4: The idea that you put your faith in an individual

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Speaker 4: who has the best interest of the people at heart,

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Speaker 4: and hopefully through them your will is enacted.

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Speaker 2: It's a nice thing to say yes and tell everybody yes.

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Speaker 3: And it's a difficult thing to do right in a

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Speaker 3: way that is fair to everyone. When when the US

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Speaker 3: was founded itself by conspiracy in seventeen seventy six, a

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Speaker 3: lot of other nations at the time were what we

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Speaker 3: would call absolute monarchies. What does that mean? That means

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Speaker 3: that if the ruler wakes up on the wrong side

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Speaker 3: of the bed, or they catch a case of the

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Speaker 3: Jimmy's a phrase I made up, they could instantly radically

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Speaker 3: change the laws of the land, and thank you. I mean,

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Speaker 3: it's nuts when you think about it. A monarch could

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Speaker 3: order the death of hundreds or thousands of people with

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Speaker 3: no checks on their power. If you're targeted in an

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Speaker 3: absolute monarchy, you have zero legal recourse habeas corpus, the

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Speaker 3: right to appeal, the right to even just go to court.

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Speaker 3: None of that's a thing. The king, the queen, anybody

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Speaker 3: in charge. They could just say, hey, go kill that guy.

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Speaker 4: Oh. Historically, the only real recourse that the common people

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Speaker 4: who are affected by this have is is revolution, is

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Speaker 4: further violence, you know, is overthrow. There was really no

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Speaker 4: other mechanism in place, and that, in theory, is what

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Speaker 4: democracy provides.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, there is a court. There's just one guy and

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Speaker 2: he's a Well, maybe I think absolute monarchy is a

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Speaker 2: great disc that's something we should use that somehow, And

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Speaker 2: that dude is absolute monarchy. It just sounds like it.

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Speaker 4: Malarchy.

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Speaker 3: It's the opposite of hot cheese, which is a phrase

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Speaker 3: we're bringing back on ridiculous history or something's cool. It's

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Speaker 3: hot cheese. Yah, melty malleable yellow so yellow melty. So Yeah.

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Speaker 3: It's a great point. For most of human history, this

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Speaker 3: absolute monarchical thing applied to any kind of rule. You

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Speaker 3: could imagine international situations obviously would get complicated, think of

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Speaker 3: the multiple rulers who bucked against the Athlete Church in Europe.

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Speaker 3: But domestic decisions were the whims of a single person,

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Speaker 3: and the only avenue for serious political change was not

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Speaker 3: just we said revolution earlier, but it could also be war,

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Speaker 3: or it could be incalculable tragedies like the Black Death,

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Speaker 3: you know, like the plague correction from the Rods right,

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Speaker 3: Because the point is by hook or by crook, what

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Speaker 3: had to happen was a great mass of people usually

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Speaker 3: had to die for some sort of lasting change to occur.

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Speaker 3: And if we're again being honest, a revolution or a

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Speaker 3: war didn't usually change all that much. It's just like

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Speaker 3: new management took over. There was a new parent company,

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Speaker 3: and they kept the same system as before. They just

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Speaker 3: put themselves at the top.

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Speaker 4: A soft set.

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Speaker 2: Unless we forget the year old assassination, which was you know,

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Speaker 2: a good standby very valid too. You could think out, well, yeah,

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Speaker 2: you could take out one or two really important people

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Speaker 2: and not have the same effect, but you know that

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Speaker 2: thing where where those people are no longer in charge,

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Speaker 2: and then you just insert a few other people that

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Speaker 2: are more to your liking, and then new management.

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Speaker 4: Then it becomes about like the ideology of the winning

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Speaker 4: you know, revolutionaries, like and if that's even that much

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Speaker 4: better or like, is it even is it self serving

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Speaker 4: in a different direction?

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Speaker 2: You know?

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Speaker 4: And this stuff takes a really long time to kind

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Speaker 4: of shake out.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, please check out our series on the concept of

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Speaker 3: assassination historically a spoiler, It exists and will exist because

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Speaker 3: it works. And if you're looking at the history here,

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Speaker 3: you'll see that the US and France and other emergent

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Speaker 3: democracies sought to change this system. You know, even the

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Speaker 3: most powerful person, they reason, needed to have some sort

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Speaker 3: of rubric, some kind of logic or system behind ordering murder.

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Speaker 3: The president, they argued, would be the servant of the people,

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Speaker 3: never their king. And that applies to prime ministers as well.

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Speaker 3: If we fast forward to let's say, Dylan, give us

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Speaker 3: a fast forward tunk you perfect stop it there, all right,

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Speaker 3: So we're right after World War Two, the US already

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Speaker 3: has a pretty bad jacket of when it comes to

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Speaker 3: democracy and theory versus democracy and action. There are all

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Speaker 3: kinds of disasters, massacres, genocides, assassinations. To your earlier point, Matt,

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Speaker 3: they run against the letter of the law, the spirit

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Speaker 3: of democracy. There's this new world on the horizon, just

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Speaker 3: like other management shifts in nation states, the US says

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Speaker 3: we're going to make a better world pox Americana, right,

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Speaker 3: global peace with the US at the top. And they

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Speaker 3: were able to do this because much of Europe and Asia,

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Speaker 3: you know, it was in shambles after this horrific series

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Speaker 3: of events ca World War Two. The planet looked around,

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Speaker 3: the human planet looked around, and they said, okay, never again.

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Speaker 3: But war never really disappears.

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Speaker 4: It's challenges.

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Speaker 3: Hey, it's like government, it evolves.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean you know, I was looking up, well,

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Speaker 4: we were while you were opening the show bend. Just

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Speaker 4: are wars less deadly? Now? Like numbers wise? Like does that?

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Speaker 4: Does the data shake out? And like the soft answer

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Speaker 4: is yes, But there are other factors, like other forms

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Speaker 4: of collateral damage and maybe didn't exist because of the precision,

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Speaker 4: because of the range and the way that these kinds

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Speaker 4: of modern warfare tactics are deployed.

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Speaker 2: Yeah for sure, Okay, are we gonna can we do

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Speaker 2: the fast forward machine again?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, let's do it. Let's go to uh September eleventh.

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Speaker 2: Hey heard of it, all right?

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Speaker 4: I was there, not there there, but I remember seeing

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Speaker 4: it on TV in high school.

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Speaker 3: Yep.

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Speaker 2: Just let's throw in a couple tiny little pieces of

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Speaker 2: context here, because as a part of that whole Pas

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Speaker 2: Americana thing, the United States going up against the Soviet Union,

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Speaker 2: we engaged in a little thing in Afghanistan and a

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Speaker 2: couple other places, you know, in the Middle East and

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Speaker 2: in Africa with Soviet Union forces the United States forces,

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Speaker 2: but as mostly trained individuals within countries, right, And we

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Speaker 2: had these proxy wars that occurred, which created a whole

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Speaker 2: bunch of militarized groups that were splintered further and further,

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Speaker 2: and a few of those came together and a couple

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Speaker 2: theoretically attacked the United States on September eleventh, two thousand

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Speaker 2: and one, and that created this brand new thing that

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Speaker 2: our democracy and a coalition of the willing decided was

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Speaker 2: going to be a war on a concept, and that

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Speaker 2: concept would be terror.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. I'm really glad you point that out, because that's

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Speaker 3: what we're getting to when we say war evolves like

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Speaker 3: government evolves, right, And it's just like that Philip Larkin

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Speaker 3: poem which has a terrible title, This be the Verse,

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Speaker 3: but it's an amazing poem. Everyone should read it a

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Speaker 3: war on a concept rather than a contained war on

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Speaker 3: a specific nation or a group of nations. The new enemies,

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Speaker 3: many of whom are radicalized by their experiences surviving proxy wars.

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Speaker 3: They don't exist in established military structure. We're talking shifting,

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Speaker 3: decentralized coalitions of what you could loosely call extremist groups,

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Speaker 3: and they're launching these waves of unpredictable asymmetrical attacks around

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Speaker 3: the world. Hit an embassy one day, right, or maybe

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Speaker 3: hit a single person, you know, via improvised explosive device,

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Speaker 3: or thenaby tried to take down an airport. By the way,

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Speaker 3: as we're recording, Heathrow is in some deep thank you

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Speaker 3: for bp me, Dylan, Did you guys hear about this now?

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Speaker 4: And hereby Heathrow, what's going on there?

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Speaker 2: Uh?

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Speaker 3: He throw lost power, his massive fire and thousands of

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Speaker 3: people are are stranded at at the airport or tribe

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Speaker 3: or planes are turning around and right now people are

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Speaker 3: still trying to figure out what happened. The elephant in

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Speaker 3: the room there always is going to be is it

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Speaker 3: an accident? Was it on purpose? Sure?

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Speaker 4: Well, that's something else the factor And like I mean

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Speaker 4: in terms of this evolution of war. We also have

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Speaker 4: to think about like the evolution of cyber warfare and

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Speaker 4: you know, hacking of infrastructure and causing terror you know,

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Speaker 4: quote unquote in that way.

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Speaker 3: The weaponization of information. Gosh, great point.

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Speaker 2: So hey, let's jump back to war, guys. So the

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Speaker 2: United States government and that Coalition of the Willing realized,

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Speaker 2: especially after a bunch of countries deployed a bunch of

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Speaker 2: troops on the ground into Afghanistan, into Iraq and too

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Speaker 2: other places across the Middle East, right after September eleventh run,

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Speaker 2: right around early two thousand and three, they realized, oh,

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Speaker 2: this battle, it kind of reminds us of something that

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Speaker 2: time that we tried to expend Soviet resources by having

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Speaker 2: them fight giant proxy wars in this same exact place

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Speaker 2: in Afghanistan, in particular.

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Speaker 3: The Banber of Empires exactly.

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Speaker 2: Just realizing that, oh, we cannot fight this war the

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Speaker 2: way we've fought previous wars, even the last time we

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Speaker 2: were in Iraq. We can't fight the war like this.

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Speaker 2: They needed a way to target these far flowng individuals

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Speaker 2: in groups, right, and hey, they said, we've got this

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Speaker 2: new technology.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, this is the way I think we can. We

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Speaker 3: can approach this on the ground through personal experience. So

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Speaker 3: a growing number of powerful policy makers are saying, look,

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Speaker 3: we're dealing with a new threat, right, and we are

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Speaker 3: functioning under military and democratic norms or policies or laws

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Speaker 3: rules of the road that are unequipped to deal with

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Speaker 3: this new flavor of danger. So if we stick with

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Speaker 3: the rules of the road comparison for a moment, let's

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Speaker 3: set the scene. If we get some traffic, sounds perfect,

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Speaker 3: all right, You're an average person. You're stuck in traffic.

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Speaker 3: It stinks. You want to get out of this mess

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Speaker 3: of these shrieking orangs, these bumper to bumpered tail lights.

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Speaker 3: But you're just another driver on the road. You have

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Speaker 3: to obey the law. In this comparison, the United States,

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Speaker 3: more so than many other countries, is the most powerful

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Speaker 3: car out there. Uncle Sam owns the road. Uncle Sam

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Speaker 3: makes the laws of traffic. So if you run in

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Speaker 3: to any kind of complication or a thing you don't like,

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Speaker 3: you can just change the rules. Right, And that is

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Speaker 3: what brings us to tonight's exploration. It's a struggle for democracy.

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Speaker 3: It's a profound philosophical operational dilemma. It's really kind of

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Speaker 3: a question about the soul of a country. If you

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Speaker 3: champion yourself as a protector of human rights, why are

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Speaker 3: you creating secret list of people to be captured, kidnapped

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Speaker 3: or killed. This is a true story. They were originally

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Speaker 3: called killed list. But this all these things we're describing now,

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Speaker 3: for this context, they have led our nation to something

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Speaker 3: called the disposition matrix.

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Speaker 4: That's right, that's right.

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Speaker 2: And it all goes back in my mind to the

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Speaker 2: Cold War. Back in the day. It was how do

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Speaker 2: you find out if somebody in their heart of hearts

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Speaker 2: believes in the other side?

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Speaker 3: Right?

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Speaker 2: How do you know? It goes back to Spycraft's stuff

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Speaker 2: and this paranoia about anyone could be a member of

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Speaker 2: the enemy team.

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Speaker 3: Right.

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Speaker 2: So, but in this case it's specifically, you know, they

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Speaker 2: use that what do they use that word when they're

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Speaker 2: talking about the war on terror? What they were saying

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Speaker 2: without saying it was the war on Islamic terror. That

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Speaker 2: is what they meant in those in those rooms, right,

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Speaker 2: and that became a thing that was not okay to say.

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Speaker 2: And but that is ultimately when they're in there in

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Speaker 2: the White House situation room on Terror Tuesday, they are

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Speaker 2: that's Yeah, that's what they call it.

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Speaker 4: It's like Taco Tuesday.

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Speaker 2: Holy crap, we're going to get into it. But like,

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Speaker 2: that's what this thing was and and probably is. They

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Speaker 2: were trying to figure out who could possibly be on

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Speaker 2: the other team, and in this case, it was anybody

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Speaker 2: that may be a part of one of these tiny

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Speaker 2: splinter groups that are hidden away and unknown, and and

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Speaker 2: how do you figure out if somebody is or is not?

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Speaker 2: And that's why this thing, the disposition matrix, was born.

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Speaker 3: And we'll see other precedents that will need to lean on,

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Speaker 3: such as co Intel Probe, which also conducts what critics

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Speaker 3: would call thoroughly un American attempts to leverage a divination

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Speaker 3: for the greater good. We'll pause for a word from

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Speaker 3: our sponsors, and then we'll introduce you to the disposition matrix.

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Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy, all right, The term sounds

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Speaker 3: of twos, right. Disposition matrix? What is that? That's I

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Speaker 3: propose that's a thing where if someone is hostile to you,

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Speaker 3: or you know, rude to you could just say I

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Speaker 3: don't like your disposition matrix here, dog, But.

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Speaker 4: It's in a disposition matrix. Dodge you.

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Speaker 3: This, Yeah, in this sense. It is a concrete and

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Speaker 3: dangerous thing. It is way beyond a kill list or

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Speaker 3: list of names. It's a database. It's used to track, capture, kidnap,

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Speaker 3: or murder suspected enemies of the United States. And we

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Speaker 3: are purposely choosing our language here. Other euphemisms would be

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Speaker 3: rendition instead of kidnapping or you know, enhanced interrogation. Sure, yeah, disposing.

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Speaker 2: Of well yeah, it had everything. So it was a

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Speaker 2: person's full biography, right where they went to school, where

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Speaker 2: they currently live, the people they associate with. It had

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Speaker 2: stuff in there about what particular threat they could pose

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Speaker 2: to the United States or its allies again, like locations

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Speaker 2: where they've been or might be, like with probabilities of

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Speaker 2: where they might be, as well as a range of

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Speaker 2: how to get rid of rid of them as you're saying,

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Speaker 2: there have been like rendition or you know, kidnapping them

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Speaker 2: and taking them to a black site maybe somewhere in

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Speaker 2: East Africa, or how to take them out like the

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Speaker 2: thing of those old lists we talked about with how

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Speaker 2: to take out Castro think many versions of that for

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Speaker 2: individual humans.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, again, it's way more than a list of names.

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Speaker 3: We're going to dive into that level of sophistication, as

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Speaker 3: well as the inherent problems. In a moment I think

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Speaker 3: before we continue, it is crucial to note the public

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Speaker 3: owes a great debt of thanks to a journalist named

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Speaker 3: Greg Miller. Back in twenty twelve, Greg Miller brought the

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Speaker 3: existence of the disposition matrix to the public eye. His

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Speaker 3: investigative series is the first in depth look at this.

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Speaker 3: Prior to this journalist work, the mere existence of the

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Speaker 3: matrix was officially considered a secret. And it's such a pickle,

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Speaker 3: you know, because democracy prides itself on due process. So

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Speaker 3: how did this bastion of human rights and rule of

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Speaker 3: law find itself not just put it out hitless, but

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Speaker 3: indeed going a step further and institutionalizing eurocratizing I don't

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Speaker 3: know if that's a word codifying the practice. The story really,

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Speaker 3: in this regard starts with a guy named John O. Brennant,

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Speaker 3: not O apostrophe Brennant, but like his middle name, starts

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Speaker 3: with him.

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Speaker 4: He was born in New Jersey in nineteen fifty five

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Speaker 4: and could be considered a pretty classic American success story.

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Speaker 4: He started to work for the CIA in nineteen eighty

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Speaker 4: and after that he answered an employment add or a

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Speaker 4: one hat in the New York Times.

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Speaker 3: That's how he got the job. I love that love

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Speaker 3: he's reading the classified and he goes, oh, okay, yes, yea.

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Speaker 4: So I guess that has very different recruitment tactics back

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Speaker 4: in those days. But whatever it takes. He made a

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Speaker 4: lot of particularly controversial decisions in his tenure, as well

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Speaker 4: as some pretty powerful enemies in the United States and abroad.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and he's he's like the success story that Drake

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Speaker 3: wants to be. He started at the bottom of the CIA,

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Speaker 3: and as you said, he rose through the ranks because

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Speaker 3: of his fairly strident stands or some would say unfairly

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Speaker 3: strident stands on bending the rules in the face of

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Speaker 3: a greater good or in the face of enormous threats.

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Speaker 3: He's the guy who defended torture, extraordinary rendition, enhanced interrogation.

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Speaker 3: This came to the four when he would be in

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Speaker 3: confirmation hearings and he would say things like, look, I

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Speaker 3: personally don't approve of waterboarding, but I didn't stop anybody

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Speaker 3: from doing it because we had a mission. And there

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Speaker 3: were consequences to this. He was prevented from becoming director

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Speaker 3: of the CIA or National Intelligence back in two thousand

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Speaker 3: and eight. I want to say because of this, but

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Speaker 3: internally he had a lot of power. He had the experience,

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Speaker 3: he had the expertise. He was considered a top authority.

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Speaker 3: Colleagues admired him. He was also administration agnostic, which I

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Speaker 3: think is a very important point here. So when you

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Speaker 3: hear us reference you know, one of the Bush administrations,

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Speaker 3: where you hear US reference the Barack Obama administration, we

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Speaker 3: have to realize that Brennan was there regardless of which

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Speaker 3: political party took the you know, took the King of

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Speaker 3: the Hill seat.

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Speaker 2: So yeah, well, and remember that that's six years up

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Speaker 2: until two thousand and eight. That's six years of sending

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Speaker 2: people to Guantanamo. Sometimes taxi drivers that accidentally got caught

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Speaker 2: up in the situation. Sometimes that is, you know, the

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Speaker 2: suspected leader of organizations that gets Antiguantanamo or to some

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Speaker 2: other black site, and it's torture. This guy oversaw with

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Speaker 2: all the rest of the military and intelligence apparatus of

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Speaker 2: the United States and a bunch of other countries torturing people.

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Speaker 3: Mm. Yeah, and he was Look, there's no two ways

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Speaker 3: about it. These programs illegal and ethically fraud as they are.

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Speaker 3: They did, they did get actual bad guys, but they

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Speaker 3: also got innocent people who just happened to have similar names.

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Speaker 3: That's a that's a huge piece to remember to that

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Speaker 3: taxi driver example. As as Britain is the White House

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Speaker 3: counter Terrorism Advisor under the administration of President Barack Obama.

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Speaker 3: He leads the charge to institutionalize, to codify this stuff,

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Speaker 3: and his former colleagues and officials came forward, first anonymously

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Speaker 3: and then later with their names on it, and they said,

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Speaker 3: this guy is the principle, like the driving force of

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Speaker 3: these kill lists. One guy. Daniel Benjamin later told The

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Speaker 3: New York Times that Bretan had quote more power and

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Speaker 3: influence than anyone in a comparable position in the last

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Speaker 3: twenty years. So this guy is This guy is a

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Speaker 3: guy you can't really vote for directly, but he is

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Speaker 3: making the moves, yep.

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Speaker 2: And guys, to be honest, making this type of list

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Speaker 2: of like your top enemies is something any military is

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Speaker 2: going to do in a time of war, Right, who

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Speaker 2: are the people we can take out that will have

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Speaker 2: the most effect. That makes sense. It's weird to think

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Speaker 2: of it in a matrix of all the other moves

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Speaker 2: that the government is taking at the time, right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, a sea change proper, you know, a change

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Speaker 3: in the way warfare is conducted. This CIA becomes essentially

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Speaker 3: a paramilitary force, or they're doing a lot of things

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Speaker 3: a paramilitary force would do instead of an intelligence agency.

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Speaker 3: The drone fleet massively expands. More and more groups are

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Speaker 3: getting into the mixtape of the disposition matrix, you know,

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Speaker 3: and they're also helping carry out its desires. It soon

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Speaker 3: evolves or expands to take over all the other kill

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Speaker 3: list that various drone programs run by various other US

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Speaker 3: agencies and departments have. But yeah, by the way, I

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Speaker 3: guess we should mention that the Pentagon Jaysack, et cetera.

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Speaker 3: They had their killest too, and the matrix is bringing

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Speaker 3: them all together. The word you would hear often on

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Speaker 3: the Terrorist Tuesdays would be something like streamlining.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, geez, just on that same tip Ben about how

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Speaker 2: everything's changing so much. We mentioned a couple episodes back

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Speaker 2: about the technology of drones and even using like a

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Speaker 2: mothership drone and multiple smaller drones that could have explosives

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Speaker 2: attached to them. That goes back to the original invasion

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Speaker 2: of a rock like during George Bush's father's rain, and

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Speaker 2: that technology has been involving and evolving. It's been used.

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Speaker 2: The predator drones were in use when we invaded a

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Speaker 2: Rock for the second time, and then that technology has

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Speaker 2: been evolving. And then we get up to twenty twelve

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Speaker 2: here when we start to learn about this stuff. Drone

435
00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:41,560
Speaker 2: technology is so far advanced and the abilities that each

436
00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:49,800
Speaker 2: single one has to theoretically theoretically target an individual, right,

437
00:27:51,160 --> 00:27:54,879
Speaker 2: and we'll learn like how that's the kind of sales

438
00:27:54,920 --> 00:27:58,680
Speaker 2: pitch thing that you would get right from the manufacturer.

439
00:27:58,520 --> 00:28:01,160
Speaker 3: Right right. We also so you know, we know that

440
00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:06,720
Speaker 3: there was a strong, a strong desire for that kind

441
00:28:06,760 --> 00:28:10,600
Speaker 3: of technological aptitude. Just historically. I'm trying to remember, we

442
00:28:10,640 --> 00:28:13,360
Speaker 3: did an episode of Ridiculous History on this. I'm trying

443
00:28:13,400 --> 00:28:19,160
Speaker 3: to remember the experimental plane that could deploy other planes.

444
00:28:22,240 --> 00:28:25,240
Speaker 3: We're saying it is, there's always been a precedent for this.

445
00:28:25,400 --> 00:28:28,960
Speaker 3: The technology started to catch up with the desire and

446
00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:36,000
Speaker 3: the imagination. Brennan is not himself designing UAV on mandarial vehicles,

447
00:28:36,280 --> 00:28:40,640
Speaker 3: but he is reaching a position of prominence because of

448
00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:43,720
Speaker 3: the climate at the time. The US is beset with

449
00:28:43,840 --> 00:28:47,600
Speaker 3: global threats they're coming from multiple regions. There was this

450
00:28:47,800 --> 00:28:51,720
Speaker 3: very real, and I hate to say it not invalid

451
00:28:52,160 --> 00:28:55,480
Speaker 3: since that plane, by the old rules, would not just

452
00:28:55,520 --> 00:28:58,640
Speaker 3: put the US on its back foot, it could mean

453
00:28:58,720 --> 00:29:01,760
Speaker 3: that thousands of innocent people would die. So we had

454
00:29:01,800 --> 00:29:05,640
Speaker 3: to take serious emergency action. If we didn't, people were

455
00:29:05,640 --> 00:29:08,800
Speaker 3: saying in the halls of power, then September eleventh could

456
00:29:08,800 --> 00:29:12,040
Speaker 3: be more than a single tremendous catastrophe. It could be

457
00:29:12,080 --> 00:29:13,760
Speaker 3: a harbinger, a precedent.

458
00:29:14,320 --> 00:29:17,960
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's definitely what was driving everyone and everything. I think

459
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:20,440
Speaker 2: at this point, the thought that that could happen again.

460
00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:24,080
Speaker 2: And while a catastrophe to the level of September eleven

461
00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:27,840
Speaker 2: hasn't occurred in the United States yet, across the years

462
00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:32,040
Speaker 2: that we're covering here, terror attacks or what we're labeled

463
00:29:32,040 --> 00:29:35,440
Speaker 2: as terror attacks were occurring across the globe, and often

464
00:29:35,480 --> 00:29:38,560
Speaker 2: in countries that were allies of the United States. So

465
00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:42,800
Speaker 2: you can see why that pressure was there, and because

466
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:46,200
Speaker 2: the United States has set itself up as that peacekeeper, essentially,

467
00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:51,320
Speaker 2: the one that goes in when stuff goes wrong, the

468
00:29:51,400 --> 00:29:54,720
Speaker 2: human beings at the top, like Brennan here again, I

469
00:29:54,960 --> 00:29:57,720
Speaker 2: keep trying to go back to internal pressure that somebody

470
00:29:57,760 --> 00:30:01,840
Speaker 2: feels right. Sure, there's the there's the pressure overall that

471
00:30:01,960 --> 00:30:06,160
Speaker 2: maybe an organization or like a governmental organization or an

472
00:30:06,200 --> 00:30:08,840
Speaker 2: arm of the military feels But then that individual when

473
00:30:08,840 --> 00:30:10,360
Speaker 2: they go to sleep at night feels it.

474
00:30:11,480 --> 00:30:14,880
Speaker 3: Yeah, and it's real. It's a ticking time bomb kind

475
00:30:14,960 --> 00:30:22,720
Speaker 3: of situation because you can think of various moments in

476
00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:26,840
Speaker 3: history and various things immortalized in film and fiction where

477
00:30:26,880 --> 00:30:29,760
Speaker 3: someone says, yeah, I have to be sure I'm a

478
00:30:29,800 --> 00:30:31,720
Speaker 3: bad guy, but I have to be the guy who

479
00:30:31,760 --> 00:30:34,160
Speaker 3: keeps the other bad guys from the door tip of

480
00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:38,400
Speaker 3: the cap to true detective you know, Brennan, his supporters,

481
00:30:38,840 --> 00:30:42,640
Speaker 3: the various US presidents, everyone else. It's not as though

482
00:30:42,680 --> 00:30:47,160
Speaker 3: they were waking up gleefully planning to kill folks for laughs.

483
00:30:47,760 --> 00:30:52,160
Speaker 3: They were, perhaps at first reluctantly bending and then later

484
00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:56,840
Speaker 3: breaking established norms in service of this greater good. You know,

485
00:30:56,960 --> 00:31:00,920
Speaker 3: call me a villain if my if you, but if

486
00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:05,920
Speaker 3: my actions are saving the lives of innocent people, then yeah,

487
00:31:06,120 --> 00:31:09,320
Speaker 3: I'll let it stand as it is. I mean, at first,

488
00:31:09,360 --> 00:31:14,680
Speaker 3: the kill list themselves, right, everybody's panicking Post nine to eleven,

489
00:31:14,760 --> 00:31:17,600
Speaker 3: Pre nine to eleven co Intel pro stuff, the kill

490
00:31:17,680 --> 00:31:22,440
Speaker 3: list themselves, or these observation surveillance lists. They're seen as

491
00:31:22,520 --> 00:31:26,120
Speaker 3: a one and done thing, an emergency stop gap, but

492
00:31:26,240 --> 00:31:30,800
Speaker 3: the mission creep always creeps, right, So it becomes a

493
00:31:30,920 --> 00:31:34,200
Speaker 3: new normal in the future age of war. We can

494
00:31:34,320 --> 00:31:39,120
Speaker 3: leverage information to be more precise, to be more correct,

495
00:31:39,360 --> 00:31:42,080
Speaker 3: and if we lose a little bit of accountability on

496
00:31:42,120 --> 00:31:47,400
Speaker 3: the way, you know, kudos to future historian grad students

497
00:31:47,480 --> 00:31:51,600
Speaker 3: because we just got them their masters or their PhD studies.

498
00:31:52,200 --> 00:31:55,760
Speaker 2: Yeah, I shout out to the Rabbel Rouser index that

499
00:31:55,840 --> 00:32:00,239
Speaker 2: we discovered I don't even know years back now now

500
00:32:01,360 --> 00:32:03,840
Speaker 2: where we realized that there was a huge list that

501
00:32:03,880 --> 00:32:07,160
Speaker 2: the FBI was keeping of people internally in the United States,

502
00:32:07,680 --> 00:32:10,880
Speaker 2: not just like this, but people that they were watching. Right,

503
00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:14,120
Speaker 2: So you then watched did that person take a trip

504
00:32:14,200 --> 00:32:18,200
Speaker 2: to I don't know, Egypt sometime recently? Uh? Oh, now

505
00:32:18,240 --> 00:32:20,520
Speaker 2: they get upgraded within that list.

506
00:32:21,040 --> 00:32:23,640
Speaker 3: Why does this guy keep going to Yemen? He doesn't

507
00:32:23,680 --> 00:32:25,720
Speaker 3: have family there? Or does he?

508
00:32:26,200 --> 00:32:28,440
Speaker 2: Oh wait to say he has dual citizenship?

509
00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:33,480
Speaker 3: Oh snap, which is what they called it, the oh

510
00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:38,560
Speaker 3: Snap file. The kidding, we hope, but this is maybe

511
00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:42,640
Speaker 3: here we take a second to look at what the

512
00:32:42,680 --> 00:32:45,920
Speaker 3: disposition matrix is how it works.

513
00:32:46,440 --> 00:32:49,280
Speaker 4: Sounds good. We're going to enter the matrix right after

514
00:32:49,320 --> 00:32:57,479
Speaker 4: a quick word from our sponsor. So remember we referred

515
00:32:57,520 --> 00:32:59,960
Speaker 4: to this thing as being a database, but this isn't

516
00:33:00,120 --> 00:33:02,760
Speaker 4: just like an elaborate Excel spreadsheet. It is so much

517
00:33:02,840 --> 00:33:07,840
Speaker 4: more than a list alone. It compiles as you said earlier, Matt,

518
00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:11,560
Speaker 4: I believe biographies of targets. It's a full dossier on

519
00:33:11,840 --> 00:33:16,640
Speaker 4: their movements, their known associates, locations, group affiliations, and it

520
00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:21,360
Speaker 4: goes even further than that with I guess recommended strategies

521
00:33:21,440 --> 00:33:26,080
Speaker 4: for all of these various ways of handling or disposing

522
00:33:26,120 --> 00:33:30,200
Speaker 4: of these individuals, including capturing, kidnapping, and even murdering them.

523
00:33:30,960 --> 00:33:34,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, like, if this guy's in this is a quote.

524
00:33:34,280 --> 00:33:38,160
Speaker 3: If this guy is in Saudi Arabia, let's pull our

525
00:33:38,200 --> 00:33:43,360
Speaker 3: Saudi connections right. Or if they're on public transit in

526
00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:46,160
Speaker 3: the right place, let's follow them there. If they happen

527
00:33:46,200 --> 00:33:50,840
Speaker 3: to be in North Africa, here's who will work with

528
00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:54,440
Speaker 3: to find them. Per Greg Miller, we just can't say

529
00:33:55,920 --> 00:33:59,720
Speaker 3: enough enough good stuff about your work there, mister Miller.

530
00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:06,360
Speaker 3: Per him, the names of terrorism targets are also correlated

531
00:34:06,480 --> 00:34:10,920
Speaker 3: toward resources that could be used to track them down.

532
00:34:11,160 --> 00:34:14,200
Speaker 3: And then you know, in the defense of the matrix

533
00:34:14,320 --> 00:34:20,440
Speaker 3: or its architects, at least, you will run into justification. Right,

534
00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:24,080
Speaker 3: why is this a bad guy? Here is a sealed indictment,

535
00:34:24,520 --> 00:34:28,000
Speaker 3: or here is some human we gathered on this person.

536
00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:34,000
Speaker 3: We are, at least internally, we are rationalizing why this

537
00:34:34,080 --> 00:34:38,600
Speaker 3: person should be kidnapped or murdered. At this point, they're

538
00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:40,160
Speaker 3: already heavily surveilled.

539
00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:44,920
Speaker 2: Exactly. The wielders of the matrix know that this person

540
00:34:45,000 --> 00:34:49,320
Speaker 2: is directly associated with this known group that is considered

541
00:34:49,360 --> 00:34:53,680
Speaker 2: a terrorist organization, right, and we know that this person

542
00:34:53,840 --> 00:34:57,360
Speaker 2: has made moves X through Y, and we're worried about

543
00:34:57,640 --> 00:34:58,120
Speaker 2: move Z.

544
00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:00,239
Speaker 4: So we need to take this person now.

545
00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:06,720
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, we see this idea that the database maps.

546
00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:11,600
Speaker 3: Here's why it's called disposition matrix. It maps the disposition

547
00:35:12,280 --> 00:35:16,640
Speaker 3: of suspects possibly beyond the reach of the American drone program,

548
00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:21,000
Speaker 3: especially in the earlier days. If we go to the Atlantic,

549
00:35:21,120 --> 00:35:24,760
Speaker 3: we'll see an excellent article by these journalists, Daniel Biman

550
00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:29,719
Speaker 3: and Benjamin Wittess w I T TES that gives you

551
00:35:29,840 --> 00:35:34,000
Speaker 3: a flow chart. Now, the headline of this article might

552
00:35:34,239 --> 00:35:36,919
Speaker 3: strike people that some people the wrong way. It might

553
00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:40,719
Speaker 3: ruffle some feathers. The headline is how Obama decides your

554
00:35:40,760 --> 00:35:44,279
Speaker 3: fate if he thinks you're a terrorist. And if we

555
00:35:44,400 --> 00:35:50,000
Speaker 3: scroll through then we can see the flow chart of

556
00:35:51,160 --> 00:35:53,799
Speaker 3: sort of the decision tree, and it starts with a

557
00:35:53,840 --> 00:35:57,839
Speaker 3: target being identified or you could even say pitched to

558
00:35:57,920 --> 00:35:58,520
Speaker 3: the matrix.

559
00:35:59,280 --> 00:36:03,080
Speaker 4: So first a target is identified in the criteria for

560
00:36:03,239 --> 00:36:07,560
Speaker 4: identifying that target kind of by design is quite broad

561
00:36:08,200 --> 00:36:13,320
Speaker 4: and pretty vague and based on inputs collaboration through multiple

562
00:36:13,320 --> 00:36:17,239
Speaker 4: intelligence agencies who you know, are able to pull from

563
00:36:17,640 --> 00:36:23,400
Speaker 4: telecommunication data, social media activity, all of the human intelligence

564
00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:25,640
Speaker 4: kind of aspects that we've talked about on the show

565
00:36:26,080 --> 00:36:29,799
Speaker 4: Ad nauseum, so pretty much anything you could possibly get

566
00:36:29,840 --> 00:36:32,439
Speaker 4: your hands on, or your eyes on, or your ears on.

567
00:36:32,800 --> 00:36:34,520
Speaker 4: They are leveraging that stuff.

568
00:36:34,920 --> 00:36:40,080
Speaker 3: And so we've already violated a lot of what are

569
00:36:40,120 --> 00:36:44,720
Speaker 3: called privacy protections in the first step. Now the data

570
00:36:44,880 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 3: gets analyzed, you know, some coalition internally of different agencies

571
00:36:51,600 --> 00:36:54,400
Speaker 3: and experts. They do that thing that people who like

572
00:36:54,520 --> 00:36:58,120
Speaker 3: wine do. They sort of they smell the data, you know,

573
00:36:58,320 --> 00:37:04,759
Speaker 3: the switch it around around the glass. They get the bouquet. Right.

574
00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:11,680
Speaker 3: If something exists and then they say they determined. Then

575
00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:15,760
Speaker 3: in step two, is this person, this individual a threat

576
00:37:15,920 --> 00:37:21,200
Speaker 3: to US national security? And again the definition of threat

577
00:37:21,440 --> 00:37:25,200
Speaker 3: is super vague here. The definition of threat is kind

578
00:37:25,239 --> 00:37:28,680
Speaker 3: of like the old meme of walking into a target

579
00:37:28,760 --> 00:37:32,600
Speaker 3: without a shopping list and just going off vibes. This

580
00:37:32,760 --> 00:37:35,560
Speaker 3: is a vibe check, they but they do. You know,

581
00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:39,000
Speaker 3: I don't want to dismiss it or diminish the level

582
00:37:39,040 --> 00:37:44,040
Speaker 3: of work because they're looking into associations deeply. So, yeah,

583
00:37:44,120 --> 00:37:48,160
Speaker 3: this person may not be identified as a terrorist. They

584
00:37:48,200 --> 00:37:50,759
Speaker 3: may have never even had a late fee at the library.

585
00:37:51,160 --> 00:37:54,719
Speaker 3: But what if they're in frequent contact with someone who

586
00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:59,680
Speaker 3: knows someone who knows someone who is suspected of terrorist activity?

587
00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:02,919
Speaker 3: What if they have any unexplained finances?

588
00:38:02,960 --> 00:38:05,000
Speaker 4: Yeah, however to find I mean, if there are even

589
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:07,600
Speaker 4: seven degrees from Kevin Bacon, they're going to be of

590
00:38:07,680 --> 00:38:09,080
Speaker 4: interest in this situation.

591
00:38:09,600 --> 00:38:11,359
Speaker 3: The travel is a tricky thing too.

592
00:38:11,880 --> 00:38:15,359
Speaker 2: Yes, well, and to remember all that hubbub about metadata

593
00:38:15,680 --> 00:38:17,240
Speaker 2: guys back in the day.

594
00:38:17,160 --> 00:38:19,279
Speaker 4: This is why this leads to this. We don't know

595
00:38:19,320 --> 00:38:22,239
Speaker 4: who they are, but we basically know who's talking to

596
00:38:22,280 --> 00:38:25,720
Speaker 4: who are that these nodes are communicating on a regular basis.

597
00:38:25,760 --> 00:38:27,759
Speaker 2: More or less, right, Yeah, all you really need for

598
00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:31,239
Speaker 2: those leads are those tiny little dots of data. Then

599
00:38:31,280 --> 00:38:35,600
Speaker 2: you can start correlating that with all this other stuff

600
00:38:35,920 --> 00:38:36,920
Speaker 2: that's getting caught up.

601
00:38:37,440 --> 00:38:41,120
Speaker 3: And again, because the definitions right and the rubric is

602
00:38:41,160 --> 00:38:45,840
Speaker 3: so broad here, it is possible, I'm not going to

603
00:38:45,880 --> 00:38:50,120
Speaker 3: say plausible necessarily, but it is quite possible for someone

604
00:38:50,280 --> 00:38:53,919
Speaker 3: to just have hit the wrong nodes of information. Right,

605
00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:57,680
Speaker 3: You're in the wrong Facebook group or something, you travel

606
00:38:57,760 --> 00:39:01,880
Speaker 3: to you know, insert country here too often. And once

607
00:39:01,960 --> 00:39:06,400
Speaker 3: that all this goes through, you know that Bouquet snifting,

608
00:39:06,520 --> 00:39:10,720
Speaker 3: smaller experience of surveillance, and once someone is considered viable,

609
00:39:11,120 --> 00:39:14,280
Speaker 3: they enter the next phase, which has the most nineteen

610
00:39:14,360 --> 00:39:19,640
Speaker 3: eighties action movie blockbuster ridiculous name to kill Chain.

611
00:39:19,880 --> 00:39:23,439
Speaker 4: Yes, man, that's fine. Could you be in that? Maybe

612
00:39:23,520 --> 00:39:25,839
Speaker 4: Jean Claude van Dam No, it's not quite up his alley.

613
00:39:25,920 --> 00:39:27,160
Speaker 4: It needs to be a little more of like a

614
00:39:27,320 --> 00:39:30,000
Speaker 4: Jason Statham type figure. I think the kill Chain.

615
00:39:30,640 --> 00:39:33,239
Speaker 3: He was in Blood Sport. I'd watch Fandamn and kill Chain.

616
00:39:33,480 --> 00:39:35,480
Speaker 4: Remember that one time we went to like an iHeart

617
00:39:35,560 --> 00:39:37,279
Speaker 4: event and we got through the red carpet and John

618
00:39:37,320 --> 00:39:39,480
Speaker 4: Claude van Dam was ahead of us online. I'll never

619
00:39:39,520 --> 00:39:40,919
Speaker 4: forget that as long as I live.

620
00:39:41,280 --> 00:39:45,480
Speaker 3: I bumped into him and he turned around, and I thought,

621
00:39:45,600 --> 00:39:48,800
Speaker 3: oh man, the guy from Time Cop is going to

622
00:39:48,840 --> 00:39:49,880
Speaker 3: beat the snot out of me.

623
00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:52,279
Speaker 4: And when you said he turned around, I'm picturing him

624
00:39:52,360 --> 00:39:54,440
Speaker 4: doing a roundhouse kick. To write to your.

625
00:39:54,280 --> 00:39:57,840
Speaker 3: Face, he's a very he's he's ready.

626
00:39:57,960 --> 00:39:58,760
Speaker 4: Yeah, he was ready.

627
00:39:58,800 --> 00:40:00,840
Speaker 3: He's very kind to very small.

628
00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:01,600
Speaker 4: He can get you.

629
00:40:01,680 --> 00:40:07,400
Speaker 3: Ye. This kill chain is not automatically out. Instead, it

630
00:40:07,480 --> 00:40:13,719
Speaker 3: is identification to determination of what happens next, heavy surveillance,

631
00:40:13,800 --> 00:40:17,600
Speaker 3: real eye of sourron stuff. If the person does appear

632
00:40:17,640 --> 00:40:20,080
Speaker 3: to be a threat, you get the next part of

633
00:40:20,120 --> 00:40:24,400
Speaker 3: the decision tree, a series of options for actions Drone

634
00:40:24,440 --> 00:40:30,600
Speaker 3: strikes for example, or this isn't this is less common now,

635
00:40:30,840 --> 00:40:34,600
Speaker 3: but special operations for on the ground attacks. Think of

636
00:40:34,640 --> 00:40:39,279
Speaker 3: Osama bin Laden extraordinary rendition. The real name for that

637
00:40:39,400 --> 00:40:42,360
Speaker 3: is kidnapping and take him to a black site and

638
00:40:42,400 --> 00:40:44,319
Speaker 3: figure out if he's actually a taxi driver.

639
00:40:45,040 --> 00:40:51,200
Speaker 2: Yep, yep, guys, I'm going to bring up here so

640
00:40:51,800 --> 00:40:56,319
Speaker 2: we know this reporting comes out twenty twelve right then

641
00:40:56,480 --> 00:41:00,399
Speaker 2: very soon after that, other countries around the world, after

642
00:41:00,400 --> 00:41:04,000
Speaker 2: they get wind of it thanks to Greg Miller, other

643
00:41:04,080 --> 00:41:06,440
Speaker 2: journalists start looking into the same kind of stuff in

644
00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:10,200
Speaker 2: their countries. And we learned from reporting by Ian Cobain

645
00:41:10,280 --> 00:41:14,200
Speaker 2: and The Guardian in July of twenty thirteen that it's

646
00:41:14,239 --> 00:41:17,879
Speaker 2: not just the United States looking at targets. It's not

647
00:41:17,960 --> 00:41:21,080
Speaker 2: just all of the mechanisms you know, and organizations within

648
00:41:21,120 --> 00:41:24,600
Speaker 2: the US. It is am I five, am I six.

649
00:41:24,960 --> 00:41:28,400
Speaker 2: It's folks in Australia and again mostly the Five Eyed countries.

650
00:41:28,680 --> 00:41:31,799
Speaker 2: It's folks all over the planet looking at some of

651
00:41:31,840 --> 00:41:34,680
Speaker 2: the same information, gathering up some of the same information

652
00:41:34,800 --> 00:41:38,480
Speaker 2: through their telecoms, through all of er systems, and then

653
00:41:38,520 --> 00:41:43,640
Speaker 2: making recommendations to the United States as kind of I

654
00:41:43,640 --> 00:41:47,280
Speaker 2: don't know, the weapon that gets aimed at people.

655
00:41:47,960 --> 00:41:51,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, it's real avengers assemble kind of thing. The

656
00:41:51,480 --> 00:41:55,440
Speaker 3: Australian Secret Intelligence Service or ASIS is in there, as

657
00:41:55,480 --> 00:42:01,759
Speaker 3: you mentioned massade. Obviously at first, at least on the

658
00:42:01,880 --> 00:42:06,359
Speaker 3: US side, there's a lot of interest in Pakistan right

659
00:42:06,480 --> 00:42:11,680
Speaker 3: and if Kakistan right in the stands And the first

660
00:42:11,760 --> 00:42:16,040
Speaker 3: question for any enthusiast or fan of these things we

661
00:42:16,120 --> 00:42:20,240
Speaker 3: call civil rights is do they have any civil rights?

662
00:42:20,239 --> 00:42:23,680
Speaker 3: The people being accused? The answer there is no. But

663
00:42:23,920 --> 00:42:27,719
Speaker 3: the second question would be, is there any sort of

664
00:42:27,840 --> 00:42:32,719
Speaker 3: at least internal check and balance, internal review? Is there?

665
00:42:32,880 --> 00:42:36,200
Speaker 3: You know, like the old philosophy of the tenth man.

666
00:42:36,760 --> 00:42:37,840
Speaker 3: You guys know that one.

667
00:42:38,719 --> 00:42:40,359
Speaker 4: It's third man, and what's the tenth man?

668
00:42:41,480 --> 00:42:45,240
Speaker 3: Yeah, we love numbering people, right, So the tenth man

669
00:42:45,360 --> 00:42:49,080
Speaker 3: is this old idea that if there are if there's

670
00:42:49,120 --> 00:42:53,560
Speaker 3: a group of ten people decision makers, right, analysts, what

671
00:42:54,040 --> 00:42:58,359
Speaker 3: have you and nine of them agree on a thing,

672
00:42:58,960 --> 00:43:02,279
Speaker 3: that is the job of the tenth person there to

673
00:43:02,440 --> 00:43:05,920
Speaker 3: play devil's advocate, to say, what if you know and

674
00:43:06,000 --> 00:43:08,879
Speaker 3: you have to have you have to have something like that.

675
00:43:09,239 --> 00:43:13,160
Speaker 3: So it may be at least a comfort of if

676
00:43:13,160 --> 00:43:17,400
Speaker 3: a cold comfort, to realize that targets on the disposition

677
00:43:17,600 --> 00:43:24,080
Speaker 3: matrix are to our understanding, reviewed every three months. And yeah,

678
00:43:24,280 --> 00:43:27,839
Speaker 3: so if you make it without blowing up that first

679
00:43:27,960 --> 00:43:31,640
Speaker 3: ninety days, that's the closest you get to something like

680
00:43:31,680 --> 00:43:33,759
Speaker 3: an appeal. But you are not part of it. You

681
00:43:33,840 --> 00:43:35,280
Speaker 3: may never know you're on the list.

682
00:43:36,200 --> 00:43:38,719
Speaker 2: Geez jeez, Louise.

683
00:43:39,280 --> 00:43:42,520
Speaker 3: We got to mention that when Greg Miller brought this

684
00:43:42,640 --> 00:43:46,160
Speaker 3: to the public eye back in twenty twelve, holy smokes,

685
00:43:46,160 --> 00:43:49,799
Speaker 3: more than a decade ago. Now, the Matrix was already

686
00:43:49,840 --> 00:43:55,040
Speaker 3: a global enterprise. It was facilitating operations on and off

687
00:43:55,040 --> 00:43:59,439
Speaker 3: the books in the stands in Somalia, Yemen, a couple

688
00:43:59,520 --> 00:44:03,080
Speaker 3: of other countries, and the goal was to expand, to

689
00:44:03,239 --> 00:44:08,040
Speaker 3: franchise out to operations across northern and Eastern Africa as

690
00:44:08,080 --> 00:44:10,799
Speaker 3: well as in Iran. Okay, they were gonna they were

691
00:44:10,840 --> 00:44:13,839
Speaker 3: gonna touch to Ran as well and UH with with

692
00:44:13,880 --> 00:44:17,040
Speaker 3: some friends and Massade and our British friends. They were

693
00:44:17,120 --> 00:44:18,799
Speaker 3: they were quite suited to do so.

694
00:44:19,480 --> 00:44:23,120
Speaker 2: Yep, I'm gonna tenth man, the tenth man of that list.

695
00:44:23,920 --> 00:44:27,160
Speaker 2: You noticed that nothing was happening in Saudi Arabia, even

696
00:44:27,200 --> 00:44:30,080
Speaker 2: though the intelligence was showing that the threats were coming

697
00:44:30,080 --> 00:44:32,040
Speaker 2: directly from there and some of the funding.

698
00:44:32,840 --> 00:44:37,480
Speaker 3: Yeah confirmed it. Also also notice there's not a lot

699
00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:42,560
Speaker 3: of coverage of Uncle Sam's so called hegemonic backyard right

700
00:44:42,680 --> 00:44:45,400
Speaker 3: the Caribbean, South and Central America.

701
00:44:45,880 --> 00:44:50,120
Speaker 2: Hm hmm, just interesting, just ye, just pointing.

702
00:44:49,800 --> 00:44:53,959
Speaker 3: That one out. You know, we're just we're walking down

703
00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:59,799
Speaker 3: the street of uh of trade craft houses and we're going, oh,

704
00:44:59,800 --> 00:45:02,320
Speaker 3: that's it's weird. There's no one oh.

705
00:45:01,920 --> 00:45:03,040
Speaker 2: No, one knows on that one.

706
00:45:03,120 --> 00:45:09,920
Speaker 3: Eh. Yeah, so we could assume that this with all

707
00:45:09,960 --> 00:45:12,640
Speaker 3: the information we've heard so far, we could, like a

708
00:45:12,719 --> 00:45:16,040
Speaker 3: lot of people back in twenty twelve, assumed that this

709
00:45:16,239 --> 00:45:19,640
Speaker 3: was just an intelligence gathering op, you know what I mean,

710
00:45:19,760 --> 00:45:23,000
Speaker 3: the stuff that all the countries and all the big

711
00:45:23,040 --> 00:45:28,160
Speaker 3: private businesses do all the time. But it clearly, very quickly,

712
00:45:28,640 --> 00:45:34,400
Speaker 3: like Day two, evolved past that into a covert assassination initiative.

713
00:45:34,440 --> 00:45:38,040
Speaker 3: No trial, no jury, none of that other pesky stuff

714
00:45:38,120 --> 00:45:42,560
Speaker 3: that America appears to hold so sacro sainct. You don't

715
00:45:42,600 --> 00:45:45,120
Speaker 3: know if you're on the list, right, And if you

716
00:45:45,160 --> 00:45:48,839
Speaker 3: are on the list, there's no realistic way for you

717
00:45:48,920 --> 00:45:53,000
Speaker 3: to appeal being on a kill list. You can't go

718
00:45:53,080 --> 00:45:56,759
Speaker 3: in and say, hey, actually I am just you know,

719
00:45:57,400 --> 00:46:03,000
Speaker 3: an uber driver. You're looking like I am just I

720
00:46:03,560 --> 00:46:06,319
Speaker 3: am just a grad student, right, You're looking for the

721
00:46:06,360 --> 00:46:10,239
Speaker 3: other ben bullet, and yes he's super down with you know,

722
00:46:10,440 --> 00:46:14,040
Speaker 3: insert organization here, But that's not me. There's more than

723
00:46:14,040 --> 00:46:15,040
Speaker 3: one person with this.

724
00:46:15,120 --> 00:46:19,600
Speaker 4: Name, which can happen on like something much less severe,

725
00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:22,320
Speaker 4: but like a no fly list. But if I'm not mistaken,

726
00:46:22,440 --> 00:46:25,880
Speaker 4: you can there is some recourse to finding out if

727
00:46:25,880 --> 00:46:28,440
Speaker 4: you're on that kind of list, and getting off of it.

728
00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:33,319
Speaker 3: Correct, Yes, yeah, yeah, okay, that's correct, yeah, depending on

729
00:46:33,360 --> 00:46:35,520
Speaker 3: your country, yes, yes, yes, yes, okay.

730
00:46:35,680 --> 00:46:37,479
Speaker 2: I want to tell you some crazy here that deals

731
00:46:37,520 --> 00:46:39,720
Speaker 2: exactly with this, and it comes from that Guardian article,

732
00:46:40,160 --> 00:46:43,520
Speaker 2: and it was a It's a father who lives in

733
00:46:43,560 --> 00:46:48,360
Speaker 2: London with his sons, okay and three sons, and he

734
00:46:48,560 --> 00:46:52,440
Speaker 2: is a dual citizen of both Britain I guess or

735
00:46:52,520 --> 00:46:56,720
Speaker 2: the United Kingdom and Egypt. And one of his sons

736
00:46:57,800 --> 00:47:02,720
Speaker 2: there there there, they're all Muslim, right, they follow Islam.

737
00:47:03,200 --> 00:47:07,040
Speaker 2: One of his sons becomes associated with one of these

738
00:47:07,080 --> 00:47:12,759
Speaker 2: groups that's a quote known terrorist organization, sure, and one

739
00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:16,400
Speaker 2: of his sons is targeted, put into the disposition matrix

740
00:47:16,640 --> 00:47:20,200
Speaker 2: via the United Kingdom and m I five, only to

741
00:47:20,280 --> 00:47:25,040
Speaker 2: be killed okay. And then the father has no idea

742
00:47:25,080 --> 00:47:27,360
Speaker 2: why or what's going on why one of his sons

743
00:47:27,400 --> 00:47:32,120
Speaker 2: has been killed, and in order to fix things, he

744
00:47:32,200 --> 00:47:35,200
Speaker 2: and his whole family fly to Egypt, renounce their citizenship

745
00:47:35,400 --> 00:47:38,840
Speaker 2: in Egypt, and then come back to the United Kingdom

746
00:47:38,880 --> 00:47:43,520
Speaker 2: to say, hey, guys, we are not terrorists. Basically, because

747
00:47:43,560 --> 00:47:47,040
Speaker 2: one of the things that the British government did around

748
00:47:47,040 --> 00:47:50,480
Speaker 2: this time is they would if somebody had dual citizenship

749
00:47:50,480 --> 00:47:52,799
Speaker 2: and was spending a lot of time in Somalia. Let's

750
00:47:52,800 --> 00:47:57,160
Speaker 2: say they would send a little message and a letter

751
00:47:57,360 --> 00:48:00,719
Speaker 2: to the known address somewhere in the United Kingdom that says, hey,

752
00:48:00,719 --> 00:48:02,200
Speaker 2: you're no longer a British citizen.

753
00:48:02,360 --> 00:48:02,560
Speaker 3: Whoa.

754
00:48:02,960 --> 00:48:07,640
Speaker 2: And since they did that legally, they were getting around

755
00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:11,480
Speaker 2: all these rules that they had of protecting their own citizens, right,

756
00:48:11,600 --> 00:48:13,840
Speaker 2: so you don't have to do that anymore now, Okay,

757
00:48:14,320 --> 00:48:16,400
Speaker 2: they got the go ahead to be a part of

758
00:48:16,400 --> 00:48:17,000
Speaker 2: the kill chain.

759
00:48:18,040 --> 00:48:22,600
Speaker 3: And then also add to that, further distancing the direct

760
00:48:22,680 --> 00:48:25,840
Speaker 3: hand because you know, the same way five Eyes handles

761
00:48:26,280 --> 00:48:30,480
Speaker 3: loopholes about intelligence gathering, they would say, okay, now it's

762
00:48:30,520 --> 00:48:36,880
Speaker 3: not us the British, it's not the our guys executing someone.

763
00:48:37,280 --> 00:48:41,240
Speaker 3: We provided information to something about someone who's no longer

764
00:48:41,280 --> 00:48:41,880
Speaker 3: a citizen.

765
00:48:42,000 --> 00:48:44,040
Speaker 4: Well, and you know, in the argument could be made

766
00:48:44,080 --> 00:48:47,160
Speaker 4: that this again to the previous point we made about

767
00:48:47,200 --> 00:48:50,239
Speaker 4: like the history of warfare and how things are seemingly

768
00:48:51,040 --> 00:48:56,640
Speaker 4: comparatively less brutal and casualties are you down. One could

769
00:48:56,760 --> 00:48:59,560
Speaker 4: argue though, that there's a kind of knock on consequence

770
00:48:59,600 --> 00:49:03,440
Speaker 4: of this kind of you know, off the books kind

771
00:49:03,440 --> 00:49:07,759
Speaker 4: of underhanded killing by the fact that you know, it's

772
00:49:07,800 --> 00:49:12,120
Speaker 4: creating maybe more enemies than it is killing them, or

773
00:49:12,239 --> 00:49:15,080
Speaker 4: more heavy handed actions that then result in you know,

774
00:49:15,320 --> 00:49:20,200
Speaker 4: legacy resentment that can then create additional conflicts.

775
00:49:20,239 --> 00:49:23,080
Speaker 3: I guess you know, sure, yeah, I mean, look, if anything,

776
00:49:23,320 --> 00:49:28,600
Speaker 3: the disposition matrix is a highly organizational force. And we

777
00:49:28,680 --> 00:49:33,799
Speaker 3: could argue again with validity that because there are so

778
00:49:34,120 --> 00:49:38,520
Speaker 3: many agencies and so many countries, all of which have

779
00:49:38,600 --> 00:49:43,480
Speaker 3: their own monopoly of agencies. Because of all these stakeholders participating,

780
00:49:43,600 --> 00:49:48,920
Speaker 3: if they didn't have some kind of codex or single resource,

781
00:49:49,400 --> 00:49:52,959
Speaker 3: their efforts could become chaotic, multiple groups doing the same

782
00:49:53,000 --> 00:49:56,959
Speaker 3: thing at once, working with different information, making mistakes. There's

783
00:49:57,040 --> 00:49:59,880
Speaker 3: a lot of precedent for this, even just in the US,

784
00:50:00,320 --> 00:50:03,399
Speaker 3: agencies in the past have found themselves at odds. They're

785
00:50:03,480 --> 00:50:08,319
Speaker 3: chasing the same proverbial rabbit and getting in each other's way.

786
00:50:08,480 --> 00:50:11,600
Speaker 3: But again, the thing is, these aren't rabbits. These are people,

787
00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:14,920
Speaker 3: some of them may well be innocent. And the damning

788
00:50:14,960 --> 00:50:18,080
Speaker 3: piece of this is we might never know, we being

789
00:50:18,160 --> 00:50:22,200
Speaker 3: the public, when these mistakes get made, Like we know

790
00:50:22,320 --> 00:50:24,960
Speaker 3: a few. We'll do a few examples here, but this

791
00:50:25,520 --> 00:50:29,279
Speaker 3: I think speaks to the controversies that you're alluding to.

792
00:50:29,400 --> 00:50:35,000
Speaker 3: There noel civil rights groups definitely object to the matrix

793
00:50:35,400 --> 00:50:41,719
Speaker 3: stem disturn. The ACLU has entered the chat, and in

794
00:50:41,800 --> 00:50:44,840
Speaker 3: twenty thirteen, you know when all this was hidden in

795
00:50:45,200 --> 00:50:48,279
Speaker 3: Other journalists like you mentioned Matt, we're writing about this

796
00:50:48,360 --> 00:50:52,880
Speaker 3: as well. The ACLU director of the time, Hina Shamsi,

797
00:50:54,000 --> 00:50:56,920
Speaker 3: had a quote. It's a bit long, so I suggest

798
00:50:56,960 --> 00:50:59,759
Speaker 3: we round robin it. But I think this gives us

799
00:50:59,880 --> 00:51:02,960
Speaker 3: very very good sense of where the criticism is coming from.

800
00:51:03,000 --> 00:51:07,200
Speaker 2: At least here's the quote. Anyone who thought us targeted

801
00:51:07,280 --> 00:51:11,360
Speaker 2: killing outside of armed conflict was a narrow emergency based

802
00:51:11,400 --> 00:51:14,839
Speaker 2: exception to the requirement of due process before a death

803
00:51:14,880 --> 00:51:18,160
Speaker 2: sentence is being proven conclusively wrong.

804
00:51:20,320 --> 00:51:20,759
Speaker 3: That you mind.

805
00:51:20,800 --> 00:51:22,080
Speaker 4: If I take the back out of this, I think

806
00:51:22,080 --> 00:51:24,200
Speaker 4: it sort of hits on maybe what I was talking

807
00:51:24,239 --> 00:51:27,480
Speaker 4: about to a degree. The danger of dispensing with due

808
00:51:27,520 --> 00:51:30,080
Speaker 4: process is obvious because without it we cannot be assured

809
00:51:30,080 --> 00:51:33,040
Speaker 4: that the people in the government's death database truly present

810
00:51:33,120 --> 00:51:36,160
Speaker 4: a concrete, eminent threat to the country. What we do

811
00:51:36,280 --> 00:51:38,520
Speaker 4: know is that tragic mistakes have been made. Hundreds of

812
00:51:38,520 --> 00:51:41,480
Speaker 4: civilian bystanders have died, and our government has even killed

813
00:51:41,480 --> 00:51:45,520
Speaker 4: a sixteen year old US citizen without acknowledging, let alone

814
00:51:45,560 --> 00:51:46,720
Speaker 4: explaining his death.

815
00:51:47,760 --> 00:51:52,640
Speaker 3: A bureaucratized paramilitary killing program that targets people far from

816
00:51:52,719 --> 00:51:57,839
Speaker 3: any battlefield is not just unlawful, it will create more

817
00:51:58,040 --> 00:52:02,040
Speaker 3: enemies than it kills. This is a practical appeal, right,

818
00:52:02,120 --> 00:52:05,040
Speaker 3: and this is one of the main the main bones

819
00:52:05,080 --> 00:52:07,600
Speaker 3: I have to pick with this thing personally, is the

820
00:52:07,600 --> 00:52:12,720
Speaker 3: The argument primarily is against a lack of accountability and transparency,

821
00:52:13,000 --> 00:52:16,280
Speaker 3: but it's also a plea to consider these long tail

822
00:52:16,480 --> 00:52:21,799
Speaker 3: consequences that you could create more terrorists, more extremists through

823
00:52:21,840 --> 00:52:25,759
Speaker 3: these attacks. You know, exercise empathy, folks. Let's imagine you

824
00:52:25,800 --> 00:52:29,359
Speaker 3: are a five year old, right, you're a six year

825
00:52:29,400 --> 00:52:35,839
Speaker 3: old your parents were collateral damage another damning euphemism. Your

826
00:52:35,920 --> 00:52:39,759
Speaker 3: parents were collateral damage in a drone strike, and you

827
00:52:39,840 --> 00:52:43,720
Speaker 3: grow up carrying that, right, Can you blame that person

828
00:52:44,320 --> 00:52:50,000
Speaker 3: foreseeing the United States as an enemy? It certainly functioned

829
00:52:50,000 --> 00:52:51,400
Speaker 3: as one in your life.

830
00:52:51,600 --> 00:52:54,320
Speaker 4: I mean, it's the plot of every like revenge film

831
00:52:54,800 --> 00:52:57,560
Speaker 4: ever made, you know, or at least many of them.

832
00:52:57,640 --> 00:53:00,200
Speaker 4: You know, as someone witnesses their parents being murdered, they

833
00:53:00,200 --> 00:53:04,640
Speaker 4: grow up to become Batman, you know, I mean yeah, yeah.

834
00:53:03,920 --> 00:53:06,560
Speaker 2: Or your brother, your sons. Remember that the father I

835
00:53:06,680 --> 00:53:08,759
Speaker 2: mentioned earlier with the three sons, one of them got

836
00:53:08,760 --> 00:53:12,040
Speaker 2: assassinated by the US government. He a quote from him

837
00:53:12,080 --> 00:53:15,520
Speaker 2: in that Guardian article. Is its madness they're driving these

838
00:53:15,560 --> 00:53:16,759
Speaker 2: boys to Afghanistan.

839
00:53:18,000 --> 00:53:21,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, like our earlier episode on whether the FBI manufactures

840
00:53:21,800 --> 00:53:25,040
Speaker 3: terrorist you know, it is precisely aspect to it.

841
00:53:25,440 --> 00:53:28,279
Speaker 2: And it was a known thing in Washington at least

842
00:53:28,320 --> 00:53:31,360
Speaker 2: in twenty twelve, twenty thirteen, it was known that drone

843
00:53:31,360 --> 00:53:35,680
Speaker 2: strikes were fueling more splinter groups and more individuals to

844
00:53:35,800 --> 00:53:37,520
Speaker 2: join up with a group in their town.

845
00:53:38,719 --> 00:53:42,200
Speaker 3: Absolutely, you know, because now you're looking for some kind

846
00:53:42,200 --> 00:53:45,960
Speaker 3: of recompense, right, And if we look at specific examples,

847
00:53:46,640 --> 00:53:49,719
Speaker 3: let's go to the one that the ACLU alludes to

848
00:53:50,000 --> 00:53:53,760
Speaker 3: in their previous statement from twenty thirteen. In twenty eleven,

849
00:53:53,800 --> 00:53:58,200
Speaker 3: the Obama administration ordered a fatal drone strike on a

850
00:53:58,440 --> 00:54:04,439
Speaker 3: suspected American many terrorists named Anwar al Awlaki. This guy

851
00:54:04,600 --> 00:54:08,160
Speaker 3: becomes the first US citizen and he was a US

852
00:54:08,200 --> 00:54:11,680
Speaker 3: citizen to be targeted and killed by a drone strike

853
00:54:12,120 --> 00:54:15,239
Speaker 3: from his own government that occurred on September thirtieth of

854
00:54:15,360 --> 00:54:19,720
Speaker 3: twenty eleven. Just a few days later, it's October fourteenth.

855
00:54:19,920 --> 00:54:22,600
Speaker 3: His son dies in a drone strike. His son is

856
00:54:22,680 --> 00:54:25,680
Speaker 3: not a suspected terrorist. His son is not the official

857
00:54:25,760 --> 00:54:29,200
Speaker 3: target of the strike. He is a sixteen year old boy.

858
00:54:29,880 --> 00:54:33,759
Speaker 3: And the target is a guy named Ibrahim Albana, an

859
00:54:33,760 --> 00:54:38,240
Speaker 3: Egyptian that was suspected of being a senior Al Qaeda operative.

860
00:54:39,239 --> 00:54:41,759
Speaker 4: Yeah, and the White House Press secretary at the time

861
00:54:41,880 --> 00:54:44,080
Speaker 4: had this to say about it. I would suggest that

862
00:54:44,120 --> 00:54:47,200
Speaker 4: you should have a far more responsible father if they

863
00:54:47,239 --> 00:54:50,280
Speaker 4: are truly concerned about the well being of their children.

864
00:54:51,400 --> 00:54:53,239
Speaker 4: WHOA this c really.

865
00:54:53,040 --> 00:54:54,759
Speaker 3: Tone deaf allfing continues.

866
00:54:54,920 --> 00:54:58,120
Speaker 4: I don't think becoming an Al Qaeda jihadis terrorist is

867
00:54:58,120 --> 00:55:02,240
Speaker 4: the best way to go about doing your busines, says

868
00:55:02,320 --> 00:55:04,200
Speaker 4: the guy had killed my father.

869
00:55:06,920 --> 00:55:09,759
Speaker 2: It makes me think of the collateral murder video that

870
00:55:09,760 --> 00:55:13,200
Speaker 2: WikiLeaks put out back in twenty ten. I think a

871
00:55:13,280 --> 00:55:18,239
Speaker 2: two thousand and seven airstrike on people that ended up

872
00:55:18,239 --> 00:55:21,880
Speaker 2: being journalists and a group of people that journalists were

873
00:55:21,880 --> 00:55:22,760
Speaker 2: following and.

874
00:55:22,640 --> 00:55:29,200
Speaker 3: With yeah, yeah, And then that's another example. Let's go

875
00:55:29,320 --> 00:55:32,600
Speaker 3: to the example. Some of us may, unfortunately remember the

876
00:55:32,680 --> 00:55:37,719
Speaker 3: drone strike on a wedding procession. On December twelfth, twenty thirteen,

877
00:55:39,719 --> 00:55:44,520
Speaker 3: US drone launched four hellfire missiles on a convoy of

878
00:55:44,680 --> 00:55:48,560
Speaker 3: eleven vehicles, cars and pickup trucks. This was a during

879
00:55:48,719 --> 00:55:53,680
Speaker 3: a counter terrorism hop in Yemen, in rural Yemen. The

880
00:55:53,760 --> 00:55:59,359
Speaker 3: strike killed a dozen people, it wounded at least fifteen others,

881
00:56:00,080 --> 00:56:03,440
Speaker 3: and quite seriously, there's no two ways about it with

882
00:56:03,560 --> 00:56:07,359
Speaker 3: this kind of stuff, whatever the intentions may be, civilians

883
00:56:07,560 --> 00:56:11,680
Speaker 3: are getting murdered in the process of hunting suspected terrorists

884
00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:19,080
Speaker 3: and again suspected So there are some internal documentation things

885
00:56:19,120 --> 00:56:24,040
Speaker 3: assets that are justifying these operations, but there's no day

886
00:56:24,080 --> 00:56:26,719
Speaker 3: in court. You know, there's no right to appeal. You

887
00:56:26,800 --> 00:56:29,960
Speaker 3: might not know you're on the list until the explosion.

888
00:56:30,560 --> 00:56:35,520
Speaker 4: And we know this program is it remains current correct correct,

889
00:56:35,520 --> 00:56:38,239
Speaker 4: because it was my understanding that it came about under

890
00:56:38,280 --> 00:56:41,920
Speaker 4: the Obama administration and then it was continued by the

891
00:56:41,960 --> 00:56:45,000
Speaker 4: Biden administration, but that wasn't necessarily like a done dealer.

892
00:56:45,160 --> 00:56:47,839
Speaker 4: I think maybe he even reinstated it like it did

893
00:56:47,880 --> 00:56:51,120
Speaker 4: go away for a little while. It was my understanding.

894
00:56:51,160 --> 00:56:55,160
Speaker 4: There's this article I found on forever wars dot com.

895
00:56:55,280 --> 00:57:01,360
Speaker 4: Joe Biden's Disposition Matrix, and it just says that the A.

896
00:57:01,360 --> 00:57:05,359
Speaker 4: Biden administration has reinstated a bureaucratic structure created under Barack

897
00:57:05,360 --> 00:57:07,880
Speaker 4: Obama that wields the power of life and death.

898
00:57:08,880 --> 00:57:12,400
Speaker 3: And drud strikes continue under the current administration as well.

899
00:57:12,840 --> 00:57:17,680
Speaker 3: The Disposition matrix or something like it continues apace. You know,

900
00:57:17,840 --> 00:57:22,200
Speaker 3: supporters will say, look, this is imperfect. Everybody admits that,

901
00:57:22,240 --> 00:57:25,440
Speaker 3: but the program is still far more preferable to the

902
00:57:25,440 --> 00:57:28,160
Speaker 3: tactics of the past. And I'm interested to hear you

903
00:57:28,160 --> 00:57:29,080
Speaker 3: guys thoughts on that.

904
00:57:30,200 --> 00:57:35,320
Speaker 2: Well, I mean, what are the other tactics Sending operatives

905
00:57:35,320 --> 00:57:38,760
Speaker 2: in in the night, having a couple of well placed

906
00:57:38,920 --> 00:57:44,160
Speaker 2: CIA spies that you know, take somebody out, But even

907
00:57:44,200 --> 00:57:47,880
Speaker 2: then you're still killing people that you suspect are a

908
00:57:47,920 --> 00:57:50,200
Speaker 2: part of something. It reminds me. I've been playing a

909
00:57:50,240 --> 00:57:52,480
Speaker 2: lot of Call of Duty lately. It reminds me of

910
00:57:52,480 --> 00:57:56,120
Speaker 2: all the storylines that they put in these video games

911
00:57:57,400 --> 00:58:00,240
Speaker 2: where they they you know, have all this into hell

912
00:58:00,360 --> 00:58:02,560
Speaker 2: on some bad guy. So they're going in or they're

913
00:58:02,600 --> 00:58:05,640
Speaker 2: sending in a drone strike just like this, and it's

914
00:58:05,800 --> 00:58:10,560
Speaker 2: just there's something about it. It's also secretive it's also.

915
00:58:11,560 --> 00:58:14,400
Speaker 4: And weirdly corporate and cold, you know what I mean.

916
00:58:14,520 --> 00:58:17,720
Speaker 4: I don't know, there's something mentality, yeah.

917
00:58:17,000 --> 00:58:19,240
Speaker 2: But at the same time, there are human beings that

918
00:58:19,280 --> 00:58:25,200
Speaker 2: are plotting terrible things absolutely, So it's just it's I

919
00:58:25,240 --> 00:58:27,800
Speaker 2: get what we're saying when we're saying it's preferable, right.

920
00:58:28,120 --> 00:58:30,200
Speaker 4: And I guess you have to look at the math though,

921
00:58:30,320 --> 00:58:32,680
Speaker 4: and the math is murky and it's hard to make

922
00:58:32,720 --> 00:58:36,120
Speaker 4: out because we don't know those knock on consequences, like

923
00:58:36,160 --> 00:58:39,960
Speaker 4: we can't we can't always identify that in the data

924
00:58:40,040 --> 00:58:42,080
Speaker 4: right away. That stuff that happens kind of behind the

925
00:58:42,080 --> 00:58:44,560
Speaker 4: scenes and takes a lifetime of growing up with that

926
00:58:44,680 --> 00:58:47,720
Speaker 4: resentment to lead down the path of making a choice

927
00:58:47,720 --> 00:58:52,320
Speaker 4: to you know, continue on perhaps become an even greater enemy,

928
00:58:52,480 --> 00:58:54,160
Speaker 4: you know, than the person that was killed in the

929
00:58:54,200 --> 00:58:55,080
Speaker 4: first place.

930
00:58:54,880 --> 00:58:57,280
Speaker 2: Because in many instances, they're like twenty year olds, right,

931
00:58:57,400 --> 00:59:00,160
Speaker 2: young twenty year olds that are being targeted by this list.

932
00:59:00,520 --> 00:59:03,480
Speaker 3: Right, And this is this is something that I think

933
00:59:03,520 --> 00:59:09,400
Speaker 3: we should all collectively grapple with together because the idea

934
00:59:09,680 --> 00:59:16,400
Speaker 3: that there is a less imperfect system inherently acknowledges that imperfections,

935
00:59:16,520 --> 00:59:20,520
Speaker 3: dangerous ones exist and indeed, they may be endemic to

936
00:59:20,760 --> 00:59:24,360
Speaker 3: the thing, they may be inextricable from that from the

937
00:59:24,440 --> 00:59:27,480
Speaker 3: pursuit of the disposition matrix. So how much credence can

938
00:59:27,520 --> 00:59:31,240
Speaker 3: we put in the idea that this will become better

939
00:59:31,440 --> 00:59:35,120
Speaker 3: over time, the fewer mistakes will be made. We simply cannot.

940
00:59:35,240 --> 00:59:39,040
Speaker 3: When there is no transparency outside of that three month

941
00:59:39,600 --> 00:59:43,560
Speaker 3: review time window, there's not really there's not really anything,

942
00:59:43,840 --> 00:59:49,720
Speaker 3: And outside of saying someone is suspected of terrorism, there's

943
00:59:49,720 --> 00:59:51,880
Speaker 3: not hard proof. Now we know a lot of Again,

944
00:59:51,920 --> 00:59:56,360
Speaker 3: a lot of supporters of this program will say, hey, logically,

945
00:59:56,360 --> 00:59:59,280
Speaker 3: you're putting you're putting us in a very difficult position

946
00:59:59,640 --> 01:00:04,600
Speaker 3: because we can't prove that we prevented another nine to

947
01:00:04,640 --> 01:00:08,440
Speaker 3: eleven because we killed someone before it happened, right, so

948
01:00:08,480 --> 01:00:13,640
Speaker 3: we can't prove what would have happened in the future. Still,

949
01:00:13,760 --> 01:00:16,800
Speaker 3: it's not going away. Drone strikes are the new normal.

950
01:00:17,120 --> 01:00:22,480
Speaker 3: The disposition matrix, the weaponization of data, the weaponization of

951
01:00:22,520 --> 01:00:26,160
Speaker 3: the Kevin Bacon game, is not just going to continue,

952
01:00:26,240 --> 01:00:30,360
Speaker 3: it is going to expand. And to the earlier question,

953
01:00:30,440 --> 01:00:34,120
Speaker 3: there maybe one of the thresholds of efficacy or one

954
01:00:34,160 --> 01:00:36,480
Speaker 3: of the milestones to consider if we have the numbers

955
01:00:36,760 --> 01:00:40,920
Speaker 3: would be, at what point does the number of civilians

956
01:00:41,560 --> 01:00:43,960
Speaker 3: who die as a result of this, At what point

957
01:00:43,960 --> 01:00:47,320
Speaker 3: does that exceed the number of civilians who died in

958
01:00:48,520 --> 01:00:52,840
Speaker 3: nine to eleven, right in actual terrorist attacks? And if so,

959
01:00:53,600 --> 01:00:58,680
Speaker 3: how far can that discrepancy extend before someone says we

960
01:00:58,800 --> 01:01:01,000
Speaker 3: need to reevaluate what's happening.

961
01:01:01,120 --> 01:01:04,400
Speaker 4: That's right, because like, well, maybe total casualties may be down,

962
01:01:04,600 --> 01:01:06,920
Speaker 4: you know, in modern warfare compared to the kinds of

963
01:01:06,960 --> 01:01:11,080
Speaker 4: horrific trench warfare, you know, tactics of the past, and

964
01:01:11,120 --> 01:01:16,120
Speaker 4: beyond the collateral damage of people that were unrelated to

965
01:01:16,440 --> 01:01:19,200
Speaker 4: the actual battle or to any allegiance to one side

966
01:01:19,280 --> 01:01:22,000
Speaker 4: or the other. To me, that's almost like, you know,

967
01:01:22,000 --> 01:01:23,360
Speaker 4: you can it's hard to put a cost on any

968
01:01:23,400 --> 01:01:27,000
Speaker 4: human life, but someone that's an active combatant losing their life,

969
01:01:27,040 --> 01:01:29,080
Speaker 4: they kind of know what they're signing up for. I

970
01:01:29,360 --> 01:01:33,280
Speaker 4: would maybe assign more of a value to someone who

971
01:01:33,320 --> 01:01:36,000
Speaker 4: is completely unrelated to the cause and who it just

972
01:01:36,040 --> 01:01:38,440
Speaker 4: happens to be killed as a result of it. So,

973
01:01:38,520 --> 01:01:40,520
Speaker 4: I mean, I don't know, It's it is kind of

974
01:01:40,560 --> 01:01:42,960
Speaker 4: like a numbers game. But to me, I feel like

975
01:01:43,000 --> 01:01:47,920
Speaker 4: even if fewer mass casualties are taking place in warfare.

976
01:01:48,120 --> 01:01:50,600
Speaker 4: If more, you know, innocent people are being killed, and

977
01:01:50,680 --> 01:01:53,440
Speaker 4: that's worse than the past. I don't know.

978
01:01:53,880 --> 01:01:57,560
Speaker 2: You know, guys, we've framed this entire thing around the

979
01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:01,800
Speaker 2: war on terror, because that's really how this was fully weaponized,

980
01:02:01,800 --> 01:02:04,200
Speaker 2: and you know, the evolution where it's at right now

981
01:02:04,720 --> 01:02:08,280
Speaker 2: is based on continuing a war on terror enemies of

982
01:02:08,320 --> 01:02:11,880
Speaker 2: the United States and its allies. The thing that really

983
01:02:11,920 --> 01:02:18,080
Speaker 2: scares me is thinking about this weapon and system being

984
01:02:18,120 --> 01:02:24,720
Speaker 2: aimed at people that some new organizations, some new regime

985
01:02:25,880 --> 01:02:31,720
Speaker 2: aimed at civilians and citizens of the United States that

986
01:02:31,760 --> 01:02:35,280
Speaker 2: are seen as enemies of whatever the structure is that

987
01:02:35,320 --> 01:02:39,880
Speaker 2: you are trying to build or protect. It feels like this.

988
01:02:41,520 --> 01:02:43,920
Speaker 2: I don't know what to say other than it's a

989
01:02:43,960 --> 01:02:47,800
Speaker 2: feeling I can feel sometime in the future that's being

990
01:02:47,960 --> 01:02:52,440
Speaker 2: used against United States citizens.

991
01:02:52,840 --> 01:02:56,440
Speaker 3: That's the huge concern right now on the horizon.

992
01:02:56,720 --> 01:02:59,560
Speaker 2: Well, it's certainly concerning me and not.

993
01:02:59,520 --> 01:03:03,080
Speaker 3: Just you citizens, But proponents will say, you know what

994
01:03:03,160 --> 01:03:06,400
Speaker 3: about other countries that are participating in this, Countries that

995
01:03:06,400 --> 01:03:10,520
Speaker 3: are more tightly surveilled, like the UK. If there is

996
01:03:10,560 --> 01:03:15,440
Speaker 3: not a clear rule of law, then it could become

997
01:03:15,680 --> 01:03:19,120
Speaker 3: like a witch hunt. You know, the person accused is

998
01:03:19,160 --> 01:03:26,120
Speaker 3: exonerated after their death, which is very not great. This

999
01:03:26,240 --> 01:03:28,760
Speaker 3: is Yeah, this is a concern that I think is

1000
01:03:29,840 --> 01:03:33,560
Speaker 3: universal amid people who are I wouldn't even call us critics,

1001
01:03:33,640 --> 01:03:37,080
Speaker 3: just people who are watching the trends, the patterns, the

1002
01:03:37,080 --> 01:03:40,120
Speaker 3: current evolution. And you know a lot of our fellow

1003
01:03:40,160 --> 01:03:43,760
Speaker 3: conspiracy realists in the crowd tonight. You know, you're veterans.

1004
01:03:43,920 --> 01:03:46,640
Speaker 3: You're actively serving in the armed forces or in the

1005
01:03:46,640 --> 01:03:51,640
Speaker 3: intelligence agencies in the US or abroad, which means that

1006
01:03:51,800 --> 01:03:55,320
Speaker 3: some of us have witnessed the effects of the disposition

1007
01:03:55,480 --> 01:03:59,320
Speaker 3: matrix firsthand. That's something where I want us to go

1008
01:03:59,360 --> 01:04:01,880
Speaker 3: to a primary We would love to hear from you.

1009
01:04:02,520 --> 01:04:05,400
Speaker 3: Is this a necessary evil? Is this what you would

1010
01:04:05,400 --> 01:04:09,040
Speaker 3: call holdly a net positive for the world. Does it

1011
01:04:09,600 --> 01:04:13,680
Speaker 3: address the dangers it aims to solve? Or have we instead,

1012
01:04:14,120 --> 01:04:19,560
Speaker 3: through desperation with whatever noble intent, created something Unamerican beyond

1013
01:04:19,560 --> 01:04:23,720
Speaker 3: the balance of democracy, an unstoppable force leads to more

1014
01:04:23,760 --> 01:04:26,720
Speaker 3: disaster in the future. These are good questions. Try not

1015
01:04:26,760 --> 01:04:28,640
Speaker 3: to put our thumb on the scale too hard there,

1016
01:04:29,240 --> 01:04:31,320
Speaker 3: but I think we raise valid concerns.

1017
01:04:31,720 --> 01:04:36,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, well, just knowing that way before you ever get

1018
01:04:36,360 --> 01:04:40,280
Speaker 2: taken out, whoever you are, whoever we are, you would

1019
01:04:40,280 --> 01:04:43,680
Speaker 2: be on some list somewhere overlaid with all of your

1020
01:04:43,720 --> 01:04:48,880
Speaker 2: associates and locations and behaviors and likes and dislikes, and

1021
01:04:49,160 --> 01:04:52,440
Speaker 2: knowing that all of that information is already being scooped

1022
01:04:52,520 --> 01:04:56,280
Speaker 2: up on all of us. So it seems as though

1023
01:04:56,320 --> 01:05:00,280
Speaker 2: it probably already exists in one form or another. Of course,

1024
01:05:00,400 --> 01:05:04,560
Speaker 2: where there's a probability that each of us would turn

1025
01:05:04,840 --> 01:05:06,240
Speaker 2: one way or another.

1026
01:05:06,000 --> 01:05:09,440
Speaker 4: There's a non zero likely. Well, and y'all just researching

1027
01:05:09,440 --> 01:05:11,240
Speaker 4: the stuff we do for this show and some of

1028
01:05:11,280 --> 01:05:14,040
Speaker 4: the travels that we do, you know, throughout our lives

1029
01:05:14,080 --> 01:05:16,120
Speaker 4: and careers, I mean, I can see us having a low,

1030
01:05:16,280 --> 01:05:19,960
Speaker 4: perhaps low probability of creeping up onto a list of

1031
01:05:20,000 --> 01:05:20,880
Speaker 4: this type.

1032
01:05:21,000 --> 01:05:23,480
Speaker 2: You know, I mean, or listening to the show absolutely

1033
01:05:23,560 --> 01:05:25,320
Speaker 2: is this part of your behavior.

1034
01:05:25,280 --> 01:05:30,120
Speaker 3: Or even being pulled in in the future expansions to

1035
01:05:30,360 --> 01:05:32,960
Speaker 3: help aid in a bet some of the goals of

1036
01:05:33,000 --> 01:05:36,120
Speaker 3: the matrix of the disposition matrix. Another thing I didn't

1037
01:05:36,120 --> 01:05:38,640
Speaker 3: put it in the episode here, but another thing that

1038
01:05:38,800 --> 01:05:43,640
Speaker 3: naturally has to occur is does the opposition have something

1039
01:05:43,680 --> 01:05:47,240
Speaker 3: like a matrix? Whoever that opposition may be and if so,

1040
01:05:47,680 --> 01:05:50,880
Speaker 3: what are what are they working toward. Anyway, this is

1041
01:05:50,880 --> 01:05:52,600
Speaker 3: the point of the show where we ask what you

1042
01:05:52,680 --> 01:05:57,280
Speaker 3: think and encourage you to enlarge your footprint with us.

1043
01:05:57,600 --> 01:06:01,800
Speaker 3: Participate in the list, where already on probably multiple at

1044
01:06:01,840 --> 01:06:05,360
Speaker 3: this time. Tell us your thoughts folks again, especially you know,

1045
01:06:05,520 --> 01:06:08,360
Speaker 3: not just to the veterans or the active members of

1046
01:06:08,440 --> 01:06:11,720
Speaker 3: armed forces and intelligence, but those who have witnessed the

1047
01:06:11,720 --> 01:06:15,680
Speaker 3: matrix effects firsthand. We really do want to hear from

1048
01:06:15,720 --> 01:06:20,960
Speaker 3: you your opinion on necessary evil or a leviathan that

1049
01:06:21,040 --> 01:06:24,000
Speaker 3: has grown beyond the bounds of democracy. So find us

1050
01:06:24,040 --> 01:06:28,080
Speaker 3: on a telephone, give us an email, or contact us

1051
01:06:28,200 --> 01:06:31,440
Speaker 3: online so you can add another data point to you

1052
01:06:31,480 --> 01:06:33,880
Speaker 3: know your position on the list. Is there a leaderboard?

1053
01:06:34,320 --> 01:06:36,720
Speaker 4: These are all good questions, Ben, and we'd like to

1054
01:06:36,720 --> 01:06:38,560
Speaker 4: hear from you. Reach out to us on your social

1055
01:06:38,560 --> 01:06:41,880
Speaker 4: media platforms of choice. We are Conspiracy Stuff Show on

1056
01:06:42,480 --> 01:06:45,840
Speaker 4: x FKA, Twitter, on YouTube or we have video content

1057
01:06:45,960 --> 01:06:48,520
Speaker 4: galore for you to enjoy. And on Facebook where we

1058
01:06:48,520 --> 01:06:51,160
Speaker 4: have our Facebook group here's where it gets crazy. On

1059
01:06:51,200 --> 01:06:54,360
Speaker 4: Instagram and TikTok, we're Conspiracy Stuff Show.

1060
01:06:54,840 --> 01:06:57,479
Speaker 2: We have a phone number. It is one eight three

1061
01:06:57,560 --> 01:07:02,320
Speaker 2: three st d W y. When you call in, you're

1062
01:07:02,320 --> 01:07:04,720
Speaker 2: gonna have three minutes to leave a voicemail. Please give

1063
01:07:04,760 --> 01:07:07,200
Speaker 2: yourself a cool nickname and let us know within the

1064
01:07:07,240 --> 01:07:09,440
Speaker 2: message if we can use your name and message on

1065
01:07:09,480 --> 01:07:11,800
Speaker 2: the air. If you've got more to say they can

1066
01:07:11,840 --> 01:07:13,880
Speaker 2: fit in a three minute voicemail, why not instead send

1067
01:07:13,960 --> 01:07:15,320
Speaker 2: us a good old fashioned email.

1068
01:07:15,520 --> 01:07:19,080
Speaker 3: We are the entities that read every piece of correspondence

1069
01:07:19,120 --> 01:07:21,440
Speaker 3: we receive, and you don't have to wait until you

1070
01:07:21,800 --> 01:07:24,640
Speaker 3: feel like there's something longer than a voicemail. Whatever, your

1071
01:07:24,760 --> 01:07:28,560
Speaker 3: chosen method of communication is the one we want to

1072
01:07:28,600 --> 01:07:31,760
Speaker 3: hear from you on. So be well aware. Yet I'm

1073
01:07:31,760 --> 01:07:35,560
Speaker 3: afraid sometimes the void rights or calls back. What are

1074
01:07:35,560 --> 01:07:37,800
Speaker 3: we talking about? There's one way to find out. Email

1075
01:07:37,880 --> 01:07:56,520
Speaker 3: us conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1076
01:07:56,720 --> 01:07:58,800
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

1077
01:07:58,880 --> 01:08:03,400
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1078
01:08:03,520 --> 01:08:06,360
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.