1 00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:03,360 Speaker 1: They wanted my asshole smell. 2 00:00:03,800 --> 00:00:08,160 Speaker 2: Everybody's smell is different, and the East Germans Stastasia. As 3 00:00:08,160 --> 00:00:10,880 Speaker 2: you know, they had a program where they would try 4 00:00:10,920 --> 00:00:13,600 Speaker 2: to get you sit on a certain chair with a cushion, 5 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:17,320 Speaker 2: and in this cushion it had special chemicals that collected 6 00:00:17,400 --> 00:00:20,400 Speaker 2: your smell. 7 00:00:20,520 --> 00:00:23,560 Speaker 3: I'm John Seipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. I served in 8 00:00:23,560 --> 00:00:27,160 Speaker 3: the CIA's Clandestine Service for twenty eight years, living undercover 9 00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:28,680 Speaker 3: all around the world. 10 00:00:28,400 --> 00:00:30,800 Speaker 2: And in my thirty three years with the CIA, I 11 00:00:30,840 --> 00:00:33,680 Speaker 2: served in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. 12 00:00:33,840 --> 00:00:36,120 Speaker 3: Although we don't usually look at it this way, we 13 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:38,879 Speaker 3: created conspiracies in our operations. 14 00:00:39,040 --> 00:00:41,479 Speaker 1: We got people to believe things that weren't true. 15 00:00:41,600 --> 00:00:44,519 Speaker 3: Now we're investigating the conspiracy theories we see in the 16 00:00:44,560 --> 00:00:45,760 Speaker 3: news almost every day. 17 00:00:46,000 --> 00:00:48,279 Speaker 2: Will break them down for you to determine whether they 18 00:00:48,280 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 2: could be real or whether we're being manipulated. 19 00:00:50,920 --> 00:00:54,040 Speaker 3: Welcome to Mission implausible. 20 00:00:56,640 --> 00:00:57,160 Speaker 1: So Adam. 21 00:00:57,240 --> 00:01:00,720 Speaker 2: In our former world, when we dealt with other hostile 22 00:01:00,760 --> 00:01:04,640 Speaker 2: foreign intelligence services, the rule sort of is that they 23 00:01:04,680 --> 00:01:08,119 Speaker 2: can't kill us, but they can't leave us alone either. 24 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:11,640 Speaker 2: But there's a gray area in between where just how 25 00:01:11,680 --> 00:01:12,960 Speaker 2: much can they fuck with us? 26 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:13,200 Speaker 1: Right? 27 00:01:13,319 --> 00:01:16,720 Speaker 2: Can they hurt us, damage us, discombobulate us. I don't 28 00:01:16,720 --> 00:01:18,479 Speaker 2: know if you had the same thing as a journalist 29 00:01:18,520 --> 00:01:21,760 Speaker 2: being manipulated, but I think it's the same sort of deal, right. 30 00:01:22,040 --> 00:01:24,399 Speaker 4: Yeah, it's kind of like our relationship. You can't kill me, 31 00:01:24,480 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 4: but you just. 32 00:01:27,000 --> 00:01:29,000 Speaker 3: Well that's the problem. Everything's done on zoom now you 33 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:29,880 Speaker 3: can't kill anybody. 34 00:01:30,959 --> 00:01:31,160 Speaker 1: Yeah. 35 00:01:31,200 --> 00:01:33,040 Speaker 4: I mean, obviously there are journalists who are killed. 36 00:01:33,040 --> 00:01:33,640 Speaker 1: I don't want to. 37 00:01:33,560 --> 00:01:36,920 Speaker 4: Belittle that, but I would say probably similar to you. 38 00:01:38,120 --> 00:01:40,680 Speaker 4: Every interaction, we deal with a lot of flax, a 39 00:01:40,720 --> 00:01:43,200 Speaker 4: lot of pr people, a lot of communications people, a 40 00:01:43,200 --> 00:01:45,720 Speaker 4: lot of people who their job is to get a 41 00:01:45,760 --> 00:01:49,680 Speaker 4: message out. And that doesn't mean it's an evil conspiracy theory, 42 00:01:49,720 --> 00:01:51,920 Speaker 4: but it's you know, I want you to see this movie, 43 00:01:52,080 --> 00:01:54,760 Speaker 4: or you know, we're really promoting this new initiative at 44 00:01:54,800 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 4: the Department of State or whatever, and so there's you 45 00:01:58,960 --> 00:02:02,400 Speaker 4: do develop real, really relationships with people who are paid 46 00:02:02,440 --> 00:02:06,520 Speaker 4: to manipulate you. Sometimes it does get to the hostile place. 47 00:02:06,840 --> 00:02:09,679 Speaker 4: You know, I've had screaming fights, I've had people try 48 00:02:09,680 --> 00:02:11,120 Speaker 4: and get me fired. 49 00:02:11,200 --> 00:02:12,840 Speaker 1: Break your cameras. Yeah. 50 00:02:12,919 --> 00:02:16,359 Speaker 4: Yeah, And obviously for many journalists in the world, it 51 00:02:16,720 --> 00:02:19,000 Speaker 4: does cost them their lives or their safety. You know, 52 00:02:19,440 --> 00:02:21,040 Speaker 4: I don't want to, but it is. I mean, I 53 00:02:21,080 --> 00:02:24,600 Speaker 4: guess your job, my job, being a cop, like we're 54 00:02:24,680 --> 00:02:27,800 Speaker 4: lied to right professionally, that is our job. And we 55 00:02:27,880 --> 00:02:32,280 Speaker 4: need those liars. We need to get information from them, 56 00:02:32,520 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 4: and we need to somehow assess what they're talking about 57 00:02:35,639 --> 00:02:38,799 Speaker 4: and what is the truth underneath it, knowing we'll never 58 00:02:38,840 --> 00:02:39,480 Speaker 4: know for sure. 59 00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:41,799 Speaker 3: In our old world, there was something you know, I 60 00:02:41,840 --> 00:02:44,120 Speaker 3: don't know better term honor among thieves or what have you, 61 00:02:44,800 --> 00:02:48,040 Speaker 3: is that intelligence services wouldn't hurt each other. You know. 62 00:02:48,080 --> 00:02:49,680 Speaker 3: The worst they could do is could kick you out 63 00:02:49,680 --> 00:02:53,120 Speaker 3: of the country or something if you're called involved in espionage. 64 00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:54,640 Speaker 3: All right, So I think today we're going to talk 65 00:02:54,680 --> 00:02:56,400 Speaker 3: some about this thing that's been in the news. They 66 00:02:56,480 --> 00:02:58,800 Speaker 3: often call the Havana syndrome, and it's now sort of 67 00:02:58,840 --> 00:03:00,959 Speaker 3: known by a number of different names, and for those 68 00:03:01,000 --> 00:03:05,200 Speaker 3: people who haven't followed it. In twenty sixteen in Havana, Cuba, 69 00:03:05,240 --> 00:03:08,680 Speaker 3: there were a number of US diplomats who complained about 70 00:03:08,880 --> 00:03:14,079 Speaker 3: brain injuries, headaches, nausea, migraines, and believed that something was 71 00:03:14,120 --> 00:03:15,800 Speaker 3: happening to this. Maybe it was some sort of directed 72 00:03:15,919 --> 00:03:18,480 Speaker 3: energy weapon. It was microwaves. It was something that they 73 00:03:18,520 --> 00:03:23,040 Speaker 3: believe from the outside was being directed against US embassy diplomats, 74 00:03:23,120 --> 00:03:26,280 Speaker 3: And largely there were people in the CIA station, that's 75 00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:28,919 Speaker 3: our office in Havana, and there were a few Canadians 76 00:03:28,919 --> 00:03:31,079 Speaker 3: as well who reported this, and it became sort of 77 00:03:31,160 --> 00:03:33,480 Speaker 3: a big deal that Trump administration kicked out a number 78 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:36,240 Speaker 3: of Cubans. Marco Rubio and others were claiming that the 79 00:03:36,240 --> 00:03:39,240 Speaker 3: Cubans had attacked Americans. But then shortly thereafter there was 80 00:03:39,280 --> 00:03:42,040 Speaker 3: a number of these similar incidents around the world. And 81 00:03:42,080 --> 00:03:44,520 Speaker 3: what makes it interesting and maybe makes it a conspiracy 82 00:03:44,560 --> 00:03:47,880 Speaker 3: theory is just recently the intelligence community came out with 83 00:03:47,920 --> 00:03:51,680 Speaker 3: a report that said all the evidence points against involvement 84 00:03:51,800 --> 00:03:54,720 Speaker 3: of any US adversary involved in causing these incidents. In 85 00:03:54,720 --> 00:03:57,880 Speaker 3: other words, the assumption was that somebody and a lot 86 00:03:57,880 --> 00:04:00,160 Speaker 3: of people were pointing to the Russians. In fact, I'm 87 00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:01,960 Speaker 3: one of the ones who believes in this conspiracy theory 88 00:04:01,960 --> 00:04:03,760 Speaker 3: that the Russians may be involved in this. Most of 89 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 3: the folks the intellis community it came out and said, 90 00:04:05,640 --> 00:04:07,760 Speaker 3: we don't see that there's any evidence at all of 91 00:04:08,080 --> 00:04:11,960 Speaker 3: a hostile power doing this. You know, I served in Moscow, 92 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:14,760 Speaker 3: and I've followed this type of issue for years and years, 93 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:17,040 Speaker 3: and I still tend to think that there's something there. 94 00:04:17,520 --> 00:04:18,720 Speaker 3: So what's your take on. 95 00:04:18,680 --> 00:04:20,400 Speaker 1: This, Jack, Well, there's just two things, John. 96 00:04:20,440 --> 00:04:25,120 Speaker 2: One is the obvious absence of evidence is not evidence 97 00:04:25,160 --> 00:04:28,440 Speaker 2: of absence. The fact that we haven't found it yet 98 00:04:28,720 --> 00:04:32,160 Speaker 2: definitively doesn't mean it's not so. And then the other 99 00:04:32,200 --> 00:04:34,840 Speaker 2: thing that strikes me is the term conspiracy theory. When 100 00:04:34,880 --> 00:04:37,960 Speaker 2: we throw that out, generally we mean that it's something 101 00:04:38,120 --> 00:04:42,120 Speaker 2: far fetched and not likely. This is a theory about 102 00:04:42,160 --> 00:04:46,880 Speaker 2: a conspiracy and the fact that the Russians or you know, 103 00:04:47,000 --> 00:04:50,799 Speaker 2: name your bad guy would sit down and conspire about 104 00:04:51,160 --> 00:04:56,040 Speaker 2: ways of attacking US intelligence officers operating inside places like 105 00:04:56,360 --> 00:04:59,360 Speaker 2: Moscow or Havana. That's not far fetched at all. That 106 00:04:59,560 --> 00:05:00,440 Speaker 2: is re reality. 107 00:05:01,520 --> 00:05:03,880 Speaker 3: Let me give a little background and to those people 108 00:05:03,920 --> 00:05:06,719 Speaker 3: who believe that there's still something there. And to be 109 00:05:06,920 --> 00:05:09,080 Speaker 3: clear here, we're friends with Mark Paul Marpolis, the guy 110 00:05:09,120 --> 00:05:13,400 Speaker 3: who was one of these people who yes, exactly one 111 00:05:13,480 --> 00:05:14,240 Speaker 3: very public. 112 00:05:14,000 --> 00:05:15,320 Speaker 1: Baths and some others. Yeah. 113 00:05:15,440 --> 00:05:18,080 Speaker 3: So some of the things is there's clear patterns that 114 00:05:18,160 --> 00:05:20,800 Speaker 3: suggest something's going on here, and there's a long history 115 00:05:21,040 --> 00:05:24,960 Speaker 3: one of the patterns is that around the world, for largely, 116 00:05:25,000 --> 00:05:27,000 Speaker 3: the people who seem to have been hit by this 117 00:05:27,120 --> 00:05:29,320 Speaker 3: and have ended up at Walter Reed and other places 118 00:05:29,800 --> 00:05:31,800 Speaker 3: were people who worked in the CI and often people 119 00:05:31,839 --> 00:05:34,279 Speaker 3: who worked on Russia issues. They are in places where 120 00:05:34,279 --> 00:05:36,800 Speaker 3: they tend to have more of a free run, in 121 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:41,080 Speaker 3: Belgrade and Hanoi and Cuba and Guangzhou, China and a 122 00:05:41,160 --> 00:05:44,120 Speaker 3: number of other places. And then the history is serious. 123 00:05:44,160 --> 00:05:47,000 Speaker 3: I served in Moscow and there's decades of the Russians 124 00:05:47,080 --> 00:05:51,080 Speaker 3: blasting radioactive microwaves against our embassy. A number of US 125 00:05:51,120 --> 00:05:54,280 Speaker 3: presidents complained to Russian Soviet leaders saying you have to 126 00:05:54,279 --> 00:05:57,000 Speaker 3: stop this or has increased cancer seem to be coming 127 00:05:57,000 --> 00:05:58,599 Speaker 3: out from a number of our people. There are a 128 00:05:58,640 --> 00:06:01,800 Speaker 3: number of US ambassadors eye of cancer. Eventually, even the 129 00:06:01,800 --> 00:06:04,080 Speaker 3: State Department put it on sort of a health warning 130 00:06:04,120 --> 00:06:06,040 Speaker 3: anybody who serves in Moscow. And there's a number of 131 00:06:06,080 --> 00:06:08,400 Speaker 3: other pieces around that that we'll talk about as we 132 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:08,960 Speaker 3: go forward. 133 00:06:09,080 --> 00:06:12,239 Speaker 2: The State Department needs to look into, I believe, needs 134 00:06:12,240 --> 00:06:15,520 Speaker 2: to look at cancer rates inside of people who served 135 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:18,280 Speaker 2: at the embassy in Moscow over the last twenty years. 136 00:06:18,440 --> 00:06:22,080 Speaker 2: I strongly suspect that instances of cancer and anomalies is 137 00:06:22,120 --> 00:06:24,360 Speaker 2: going to be higher in a place like that based 138 00:06:24,400 --> 00:06:26,359 Speaker 2: on things that we do know about, let alone the 139 00:06:26,360 --> 00:06:30,400 Speaker 2: ones we don't. Putting carcinogenic spy dust on officers that's 140 00:06:30,480 --> 00:06:34,400 Speaker 2: clearly known, Bombarding people with microwaves, maybe not as a 141 00:06:34,440 --> 00:06:36,800 Speaker 2: weapon or maybe as a weapon, and a host of 142 00:06:36,839 --> 00:06:38,719 Speaker 2: other things that we've encountered in our career. 143 00:06:38,920 --> 00:06:41,880 Speaker 3: Well, that's a piece of this that's important. And those 144 00:06:42,000 --> 00:06:45,120 Speaker 3: who were hit in this, supposedly by the Savannah syndrome 145 00:06:45,279 --> 00:06:48,440 Speaker 3: great frustration with the State Department who runs our embassies 146 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:52,120 Speaker 3: overseas and CIA leadership that did not take these health 147 00:06:52,200 --> 00:06:55,160 Speaker 3: risks seriously at first. And that fits another pattern if 148 00:06:55,160 --> 00:06:57,440 Speaker 3: you look at the people over the nineteen fifty six 149 00:06:57,480 --> 00:07:00,000 Speaker 3: sees and on from Moscow who are complaining about health 150 00:07:00,080 --> 00:07:03,440 Speaker 3: problems from serving in Moscow, the State Department and subsequent 151 00:07:03,440 --> 00:07:07,520 Speaker 3: administrations seem to just ignore or dismiss their concerns. And 152 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:11,320 Speaker 3: eventually people in Congress press the administration, the new Bide 153 00:07:11,320 --> 00:07:13,840 Speaker 3: administration to help these people, and there was a law 154 00:07:13,920 --> 00:07:16,200 Speaker 3: essentially passed that gave them the support they need to 155 00:07:16,200 --> 00:07:18,720 Speaker 3: go to Walter read in other places, And to add 156 00:07:18,760 --> 00:07:20,960 Speaker 3: one other piece of this, there's a contradiction here. If 157 00:07:21,000 --> 00:07:23,040 Speaker 3: the intelligent community came out and said there's no evidence 158 00:07:23,080 --> 00:07:25,680 Speaker 3: that this was an attack by a foreign power and 159 00:07:25,720 --> 00:07:28,760 Speaker 3: said most of this seems to be just natural occurrences 160 00:07:28,840 --> 00:07:32,200 Speaker 3: or pre existing conditions, there's a contradiction in the sense 161 00:07:32,240 --> 00:07:35,240 Speaker 3: that Walter read. The place that has studied all of 162 00:07:35,280 --> 00:07:38,560 Speaker 3: these victims have said just the opposite. The doctors have 163 00:07:38,600 --> 00:07:41,320 Speaker 3: said none of these people had pre existing conditions that 164 00:07:41,360 --> 00:07:43,640 Speaker 3: fit with this brain injury, and all of them that 165 00:07:43,640 --> 00:07:45,920 Speaker 3: they could find a specific marker in the brain that 166 00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:48,120 Speaker 3: suggests there was a similarity between them all. 167 00:07:48,240 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, And I think to pay the State Department, it's 168 00:07:50,640 --> 00:07:53,320 Speaker 2: due the agency. I think a lot of the doctors 169 00:07:53,720 --> 00:07:56,680 Speaker 2: are not epidemiologists. 170 00:07:55,480 --> 00:07:58,920 Speaker 3: And that's tough because the medical professionals in the bureaucracies 171 00:07:59,160 --> 00:08:02,920 Speaker 3: they come and go, and so this studying of longer 172 00:08:03,000 --> 00:08:06,200 Speaker 3: term issues is almost something just institutionally doesn't happen in 173 00:08:06,240 --> 00:08:07,720 Speaker 3: these bureaucracies, right. 174 00:08:07,920 --> 00:08:12,040 Speaker 2: I wonder if this was done and the outcomes were 175 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:15,560 Speaker 2: not good, would people still want to take your families 176 00:08:15,640 --> 00:08:19,040 Speaker 2: to places like Moscow if you knew that statistically you 177 00:08:19,080 --> 00:08:21,080 Speaker 2: have a higher instance of cancer. We do take our 178 00:08:21,120 --> 00:08:25,200 Speaker 2: families to places that are just unhealthy on a basis. 179 00:08:25,360 --> 00:08:29,640 Speaker 2: For example, I lived in Delhi and as judged by 180 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:34,320 Speaker 2: particulate matter, shit in the air quite literally because they 181 00:08:34,679 --> 00:08:37,680 Speaker 2: burned cowdung during the wintertime. It is the highest rate 182 00:08:37,720 --> 00:08:40,720 Speaker 2: of pollution in the world. I remember when we first 183 00:08:40,760 --> 00:08:43,839 Speaker 2: went to Zimbabwe, the guy who I took the house 184 00:08:43,880 --> 00:08:46,720 Speaker 2: over from was telling me about the back garden and 185 00:08:46,760 --> 00:08:49,400 Speaker 2: I've got three small girls, ten and seven and six, 186 00:08:49,960 --> 00:08:52,560 Speaker 2: and he says, yeah, watch out for the cobras. 187 00:08:52,720 --> 00:08:53,840 Speaker 1: I'm like, huh. 188 00:08:54,240 --> 00:08:56,920 Speaker 3: I was in Moscow, if you remember when the tanks 189 00:08:56,920 --> 00:08:59,240 Speaker 3: surrounded the Russian Parliament and started shooting at it in 190 00:08:59,240 --> 00:09:01,160 Speaker 3: the nineteen ninety three, when there was a coup attempt, 191 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:03,280 Speaker 3: and I was there and there was people shooting out 192 00:09:03,280 --> 00:09:04,520 Speaker 3: of buildings and these other kind of stuff, and I 193 00:09:04,559 --> 00:09:06,680 Speaker 3: remember my mother and my family being all nervous, and 194 00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:08,400 Speaker 3: not long after that they actually came to visit me 195 00:09:08,440 --> 00:09:09,760 Speaker 3: and stay in my apartment. And I remember at the 196 00:09:09,840 --> 00:09:11,079 Speaker 3: end of the you know, my mother was there. I 197 00:09:11,120 --> 00:09:12,800 Speaker 3: can't even remember a week or something, and she goes, 198 00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:15,679 Speaker 3: you know, I was focusing what you see on TV 199 00:09:15,800 --> 00:09:17,840 Speaker 3: and thinking about all these bigger issues. But now that 200 00:09:17,880 --> 00:09:20,760 Speaker 3: I've been here, I realized, I'm much more scared of 201 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:23,400 Speaker 3: you dying in this awful traffic the way people drive me. 202 00:09:24,720 --> 00:09:27,679 Speaker 3: I said, absolutely, it's crazy and dangerous. 203 00:09:27,760 --> 00:09:29,800 Speaker 1: So not trying to what up you, but what upping you. 204 00:09:32,080 --> 00:09:36,000 Speaker 2: In Manila, our house was just the other side of 205 00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:38,880 Speaker 2: this highway. We had this like fifteen foot concrete fence 206 00:09:39,520 --> 00:09:43,800 Speaker 2: and there was an explosion next door. The neighbor had 207 00:09:43,840 --> 00:09:46,400 Speaker 2: the wall blown in, and it turned out there was 208 00:09:46,440 --> 00:09:50,640 Speaker 2: a bus someone that Abusayaf had put an artillery shell 209 00:09:50,960 --> 00:09:53,400 Speaker 2: and rigged it up with the timer and put it 210 00:09:53,440 --> 00:09:56,400 Speaker 2: on a bus. It had exploded. It had killed seven 211 00:09:56,480 --> 00:09:58,839 Speaker 2: or eight people when the bus blew up and the 212 00:09:58,960 --> 00:10:02,040 Speaker 2: artillery shell blew through our next door neighbor's wall. And 213 00:10:02,120 --> 00:10:04,280 Speaker 2: for a while there there was a question like, oh 214 00:10:04,320 --> 00:10:08,360 Speaker 2: my gosh, was this possibly an attack focused on me? 215 00:10:08,559 --> 00:10:10,000 Speaker 1: And the Philippine police. 216 00:10:09,760 --> 00:10:11,960 Speaker 2: Later came in and said, oh no, no, no, it 217 00:10:12,040 --> 00:10:15,199 Speaker 2: wasn't focused on you. It was just a regular bombing, right, 218 00:10:15,240 --> 00:10:18,160 Speaker 2: It wasn't a bombing focused on you. And the only 219 00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:21,280 Speaker 2: reason that the fence was blown in was because they 220 00:10:21,320 --> 00:10:24,199 Speaker 2: put the artillery shell in facing in the back of 221 00:10:24,240 --> 00:10:26,440 Speaker 2: the bus, facing towards the front of the bus. So 222 00:10:26,520 --> 00:10:29,839 Speaker 2: it would kill everybody. But somehow somebody had pushed the 223 00:10:29,840 --> 00:10:33,200 Speaker 2: shell so that it went sideways and shot actually outwards 224 00:10:33,200 --> 00:10:34,400 Speaker 2: and hit our neighbor's fence. 225 00:10:35,880 --> 00:10:37,920 Speaker 3: We got to take a break now, and we'll be 226 00:10:38,000 --> 00:10:47,319 Speaker 3: back in just a minute, and rebec right after it happened. 227 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:49,480 Speaker 3: In twenty sixteen, I wrote an article about this to 228 00:10:49,520 --> 00:10:51,520 Speaker 3: try to put some of it in context, to show 229 00:10:51,559 --> 00:10:54,640 Speaker 3: about how these kind of things that happened in the past. 230 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:57,680 Speaker 3: It's rare that we've seen in places where diplomats and 231 00:10:57,679 --> 00:11:00,680 Speaker 3: CI officers live attacks that are meant just to harm 232 00:11:00,800 --> 00:11:05,160 Speaker 3: diplomats and CIA officers. Rather, we've seen unhealthy and dangerous 233 00:11:05,200 --> 00:11:08,160 Speaker 3: efforts to use technology that does hurt us, but it's 234 00:11:08,200 --> 00:11:11,560 Speaker 3: often for surveillance purposes or some other intelligence purpose. So 235 00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:14,720 Speaker 3: when we talked about microwaves bashing against the US embassy 236 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:17,360 Speaker 3: for years, that was most likely an effort that they 237 00:11:17,360 --> 00:11:19,400 Speaker 3: would use to turn on and turn off and trigger 238 00:11:19,520 --> 00:11:22,120 Speaker 3: listening devices. Back in the fifties, they would even put 239 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:25,040 Speaker 3: radioactive little spikes in people's tires that would leave marks 240 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 3: on the road so their surveillance cars could hold back 241 00:11:27,440 --> 00:11:30,400 Speaker 3: and still follow where American diplomats would go. Years ago, 242 00:11:30,640 --> 00:11:32,719 Speaker 3: we sort of found out that the Russians are using 243 00:11:32,760 --> 00:11:36,079 Speaker 3: this thing they called Metca, which was we called spy dust, 244 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:40,000 Speaker 3: which was an invisible electromagnetic powder that had a customized 245 00:11:40,080 --> 00:11:42,800 Speaker 3: chemical identifier. And the idea was they would smear it 246 00:11:42,840 --> 00:11:46,000 Speaker 3: onto door handles or furniture of cars of people like 247 00:11:46,080 --> 00:11:50,480 Speaker 3: me Americans that they suspected might be handling spies CIA officers, 248 00:11:50,679 --> 00:11:52,480 Speaker 3: And what it was it was a tagging agent and 249 00:11:52,559 --> 00:11:55,319 Speaker 3: it was used by the Russian security elements to covertly 250 00:11:55,400 --> 00:11:57,719 Speaker 3: monitor their own community. Then what they would do is 251 00:11:57,760 --> 00:11:59,800 Speaker 3: on the weekend they would go through the embassy and 252 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:03,200 Speaker 3: they had a means of looking for this chemical identifier 253 00:12:03,280 --> 00:12:06,040 Speaker 3: through people's offices. So they would go into Evan's office 254 00:12:06,040 --> 00:12:08,680 Speaker 3: and they would see my chemical tag in Evan's office, 255 00:12:08,800 --> 00:12:11,240 Speaker 3: and if Ivan had not reported that he'd been meeting me, 256 00:12:11,480 --> 00:12:14,480 Speaker 3: he would come under Connor intelligence scrutiny as possibly a 257 00:12:14,520 --> 00:12:16,920 Speaker 3: spy working with And we found out eventually this was 258 00:12:16,920 --> 00:12:19,920 Speaker 3: carcinogenic and it was so unhealthy to those of us 259 00:12:19,920 --> 00:12:21,320 Speaker 3: who got it. And so I when I was in 260 00:12:21,320 --> 00:12:24,640 Speaker 3: my first tour overseas in Helsinki, Finland, I was developing 261 00:12:24,640 --> 00:12:28,480 Speaker 3: a relationship with a Russian KGB officer who eventually became 262 00:12:28,760 --> 00:12:31,720 Speaker 3: one of Putin's closest advisors and then become a Minister 263 00:12:31,760 --> 00:12:34,880 Speaker 3: of Defense in Russia. KGB officer, and he put this 264 00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:37,240 Speaker 3: chemical tag on me. And the reason we knew about 265 00:12:37,240 --> 00:12:39,120 Speaker 3: it is we knew that they did this, and so 266 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:41,400 Speaker 3: we had a means of wiping and testing after a 267 00:12:41,480 --> 00:12:43,840 Speaker 3: Russian had been at our house and then sending that 268 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:46,160 Speaker 3: to our science experts to test that to see if 269 00:12:46,200 --> 00:12:47,960 Speaker 3: you had been spy dusted. And I had been and 270 00:12:47,960 --> 00:12:50,360 Speaker 3: I was like, oh great, So I got this carcinogenic 271 00:12:50,360 --> 00:12:52,200 Speaker 3: stuff all over my house. And that was sort of 272 00:12:52,200 --> 00:12:55,120 Speaker 3: the notion that when we saw this Havana syndrome, is 273 00:12:55,360 --> 00:12:57,400 Speaker 3: this is odd and people are getting hurt. But is 274 00:12:57,440 --> 00:12:59,959 Speaker 3: this to hurt people or is it for some other purpose. 275 00:13:00,240 --> 00:13:03,679 Speaker 2: This reminds you of the story where the East Germans 276 00:13:03,840 --> 00:13:06,280 Speaker 2: did get and I'm trying to think this is on 277 00:13:06,280 --> 00:13:10,480 Speaker 2: the radio where I can even say this. 278 00:13:09,000 --> 00:13:11,560 Speaker 3: This is not a radio Jerry, You're a little bit all. 279 00:13:11,960 --> 00:13:16,640 Speaker 2: They wanted my asshole smell. Everybody's smell is different, and 280 00:13:16,840 --> 00:13:19,440 Speaker 2: the East Germans Tastasia. As you know, they had a 281 00:13:19,480 --> 00:13:23,720 Speaker 2: program where when you crossed over into East Germany. They 282 00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:26,280 Speaker 2: would try to get you sit on a certain chair 283 00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:29,040 Speaker 2: with a cushion, and in this cushion it had had 284 00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:34,320 Speaker 2: special chemicals that collected your smell. And after you left, 285 00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:37,320 Speaker 2: they would go out and they would take this chemically 286 00:13:37,400 --> 00:13:40,440 Speaker 2: treated chemical cushion and they would take a piece of 287 00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:43,160 Speaker 2: it and they would put it in a jar, and 288 00:13:43,200 --> 00:13:47,160 Speaker 2: then later, with specially trained dogs, they would go into 289 00:13:47,320 --> 00:13:50,560 Speaker 2: rooms or to see whether or not you had been 290 00:13:50,640 --> 00:13:54,560 Speaker 2: there or not. John, I did want to ask in 291 00:13:54,720 --> 00:13:59,200 Speaker 2: reading about Havana syndrome. One of the theories that I 292 00:13:59,280 --> 00:14:03,480 Speaker 2: read was that perhaps that it wasn't meant so much 293 00:14:03,600 --> 00:14:07,160 Speaker 2: as a weapon because it was mostly like in hotel rooms, 294 00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:11,160 Speaker 2: but was a way to like disrupt sleep patterns. Because 295 00:14:11,280 --> 00:14:13,840 Speaker 2: what people don't always know is so much of what 296 00:14:13,880 --> 00:14:18,120 Speaker 2: we do in the n espionage world is you've got 297 00:14:18,120 --> 00:14:21,600 Speaker 2: to be quick and awake and with it and able 298 00:14:21,680 --> 00:14:25,640 Speaker 2: to make hard decisions and remember things. And if they 299 00:14:25,680 --> 00:14:28,600 Speaker 2: can disrupt your sleep patterns, and if they can make 300 00:14:28,640 --> 00:14:31,480 Speaker 2: you not be on top of your game, if they 301 00:14:31,520 --> 00:14:35,280 Speaker 2: can make you stupid, you're going to make mistakes. You know, 302 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:39,000 Speaker 2: you are an expert in SDRs, and maybe explain to 303 00:14:39,000 --> 00:14:41,640 Speaker 2: what people is if you can't remember license plates well 304 00:14:41,760 --> 00:14:43,800 Speaker 2: or people, you're going to make a mistake and you're 305 00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:46,880 Speaker 2: going to get caught. That was one theory put forward 306 00:14:46,880 --> 00:14:48,560 Speaker 2: that I thought was interesting and I'd like to get 307 00:14:48,600 --> 00:14:49,560 Speaker 2: your take on that. 308 00:14:49,560 --> 00:14:50,120 Speaker 1: That's a good point. 309 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:53,360 Speaker 3: So in our parlance and SDR is a surveillance detection run. 310 00:14:53,440 --> 00:14:56,640 Speaker 3: So when we meet a source, a spy who's working 311 00:14:56,640 --> 00:14:58,680 Speaker 3: for the United States, the goal is to keep that 312 00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:01,520 Speaker 3: person safe, right, so that person providing potentially life saving 313 00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:03,960 Speaker 3: information to the United States government in committing trees and 314 00:15:04,000 --> 00:15:06,200 Speaker 3: against his or her own country. So if you're in 315 00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:08,040 Speaker 3: Moscow and you're meeting a source, you have to know 316 00:15:08,200 --> 00:15:11,160 Speaker 3: one hundred percent certainty that the bad guys did not 317 00:15:11,240 --> 00:15:12,920 Speaker 3: see this. We have to be right one hundred percent 318 00:15:12,960 --> 00:15:15,200 Speaker 3: of the time. If they're right one time and they 319 00:15:15,200 --> 00:15:17,640 Speaker 3: bring the dogs, like Jerry said, behind us to see 320 00:15:17,640 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 3: where're going and they can figure out who was there, 321 00:15:19,920 --> 00:15:22,200 Speaker 3: that Russian who were meeting, that person is going to 322 00:15:22,240 --> 00:15:25,240 Speaker 3: be arrested at the very best or executed at the worst, 323 00:15:25,280 --> 00:15:28,240 Speaker 3: and perhaps even their family. So we go through, depending 324 00:15:28,280 --> 00:15:31,400 Speaker 3: on the country you're in, a very sophisticated means of 325 00:15:31,440 --> 00:15:33,640 Speaker 3: proving that you don't have surveillance, so you might go out, 326 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,160 Speaker 3: you might drive around places that you can manipulate to 327 00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:39,360 Speaker 3: see if someone is following You're not from overhead traffic 328 00:15:39,440 --> 00:15:42,480 Speaker 3: copters or planes of people walking or cars that are 329 00:15:42,480 --> 00:15:44,520 Speaker 3: following all those type of things. And so one of 330 00:15:44,560 --> 00:15:47,120 Speaker 3: the things I think that might speak against this being 331 00:15:47,360 --> 00:15:50,880 Speaker 3: done is to try to think about the practical operational 332 00:15:51,280 --> 00:15:55,160 Speaker 3: difficulties in pulling this off. You'd have to have exquisite intelligence. 333 00:15:55,200 --> 00:15:57,560 Speaker 3: You have to know exactly where these people are. You'd 334 00:15:57,560 --> 00:16:00,520 Speaker 3: have to understand travel patterns, where they live, what where 335 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:02,920 Speaker 3: their windows face. If this is a weapon that is 336 00:16:02,960 --> 00:16:04,640 Speaker 3: like a directed energy weapon, you'd have to have a 337 00:16:04,720 --> 00:16:07,080 Speaker 3: means to get this into the country set up, have 338 00:16:07,200 --> 00:16:09,080 Speaker 3: a means to do this so that you do not 339 00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:14,880 Speaker 3: get caught. We're really fortunate here because our next guest 340 00:16:14,960 --> 00:16:18,480 Speaker 3: is John Lee Anderson. He's a biographer and author and 341 00:16:18,560 --> 00:16:21,680 Speaker 3: investigative reporter, a staff writer for The New Yorker who's 342 00:16:21,720 --> 00:16:25,480 Speaker 3: lived in war zones all around the world, in Afghanistan, Iraq, 343 00:16:25,680 --> 00:16:27,720 Speaker 3: spent lots of time in Cuba. He's written a number 344 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:30,840 Speaker 3: of books and worked with our colleague Adam Davidson. So 345 00:16:31,080 --> 00:16:33,360 Speaker 3: we're lucky to have him here, John Lee Anderson, Hey 346 00:16:33,400 --> 00:16:36,280 Speaker 3: John John. I've read your reporting, and I've impressed with 347 00:16:36,480 --> 00:16:37,840 Speaker 3: reporting on a lot of places in the world. But 348 00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:39,640 Speaker 3: can you tell me a little bit about yourself and 349 00:16:39,680 --> 00:16:41,280 Speaker 3: how you ended up reporting on this story. 350 00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:44,840 Speaker 5: So I began reporting on the Havana syndrome when actually 351 00:16:44,840 --> 00:16:47,560 Speaker 5: Adam Ntuz, who is a recent hire at The New Yorker, 352 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:51,000 Speaker 5: came to me and asked me for help. The editor 353 00:16:51,280 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 5: had assigned him to do the story, but he didn't 354 00:16:54,320 --> 00:16:57,920 Speaker 5: know Cuba. So we began working together and did a 355 00:16:57,960 --> 00:17:01,800 Speaker 5: story on Havana syndrome together or Adam kept his ear 356 00:17:01,840 --> 00:17:04,439 Speaker 5: to the ground and did a few follow ups, and 357 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:07,120 Speaker 5: then we did a podcast series that took place over 358 00:17:07,160 --> 00:17:09,879 Speaker 5: a year, which was great fun, and we traveled together 359 00:17:10,000 --> 00:17:14,120 Speaker 5: to various places. Ultimately I think digging as deep as 360 00:17:14,119 --> 00:17:18,520 Speaker 5: anybody did into this phenomenon. Prior to Adam coming to 361 00:17:18,600 --> 00:17:22,040 Speaker 5: me on this, I had begun to do some investigation 362 00:17:22,160 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 5: of my own with the Americans I knew who were 363 00:17:24,600 --> 00:17:27,440 Speaker 5: dealing with the Cubans at the time, and was coming 364 00:17:27,480 --> 00:17:32,359 Speaker 5: away with some interesting information that was inconclusive but suggested 365 00:17:32,400 --> 00:17:35,040 Speaker 5: that there were patterns to it that led back to 366 00:17:35,320 --> 00:17:38,879 Speaker 5: the intelligence agencies in both countries, so it was a 367 00:17:38,920 --> 00:17:41,600 Speaker 5: really good fit for me to work with Adam on this. 368 00:17:42,160 --> 00:17:44,000 Speaker 3: So Johnny, it's really great to have you on with 369 00:17:44,080 --> 00:17:47,560 Speaker 3: us today. Your reporting on this has been spectacular. Obviously, 370 00:17:47,560 --> 00:17:50,159 Speaker 3: you did a podcast with Animentus, and you've done several 371 00:17:50,280 --> 00:17:52,639 Speaker 3: articles for The New Yorker and other things. I just 372 00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:54,720 Speaker 3: wanted to start with sort of a big question, based 373 00:17:54,760 --> 00:17:58,040 Speaker 3: on all of your research into what was once called 374 00:17:58,040 --> 00:18:00,680 Speaker 3: the Havana syndrome and how the US government has responded 375 00:18:00,720 --> 00:18:02,520 Speaker 3: to it and to the people who believe they were 376 00:18:02,600 --> 00:18:05,520 Speaker 3: hit and doctors and things. What are some big takeaways 377 00:18:05,560 --> 00:18:08,560 Speaker 3: that you have, any surprises or anything that you could 378 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:10,640 Speaker 3: guess sort of going forward on this issue. 379 00:18:10,880 --> 00:18:13,439 Speaker 5: In a way, I don't know that I've ever felt 380 00:18:13,480 --> 00:18:17,439 Speaker 5: particularly surprised, because I mean, I've known Cuba over the years, 381 00:18:17,800 --> 00:18:21,040 Speaker 5: going back to the very early nineties when I lived there, 382 00:18:21,240 --> 00:18:24,040 Speaker 5: and then have returned over the years, sort of watching 383 00:18:24,119 --> 00:18:28,280 Speaker 5: the political alchemy of the place evolve, and when the 384 00:18:28,560 --> 00:18:32,280 Speaker 5: roll Castro Barack Obama opening happened, I was there a lot, 385 00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:34,720 Speaker 5: and you need to be there to feel the street 386 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:36,959 Speaker 5: and know what the subtext is. Again La bola as 387 00:18:37,000 --> 00:18:39,080 Speaker 5: they call it, the rumor mill, which is always more 388 00:18:39,080 --> 00:18:41,840 Speaker 5: than the rumor mil. It's where the actual intelligence flows 389 00:18:41,840 --> 00:18:45,200 Speaker 5: on the island, because there is no official story other 390 00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:48,679 Speaker 5: than the kind of orthodoxy of the Communist Party. Fast 391 00:18:48,720 --> 00:18:52,439 Speaker 5: forward to later in twenty sixteen, when we now know 392 00:18:52,600 --> 00:18:57,080 Speaker 5: that the first alleged attacks occurred. These attacks took place 393 00:18:57,160 --> 00:19:01,280 Speaker 5: within a couple of weeks of Fidel dying, major historic event. 394 00:19:01,359 --> 00:19:02,960 Speaker 5: For all the fact that he'd been off the main 395 00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:05,960 Speaker 5: stage for a decade, this was huge in an island 396 00:19:05,960 --> 00:19:09,560 Speaker 5: where he had dominated everything for half a century. And 397 00:19:10,119 --> 00:19:13,879 Speaker 5: when I pieced this together, I thought, well, it makes sense. 398 00:19:14,119 --> 00:19:17,080 Speaker 5: I mean, I knew that in Washington, people who were 399 00:19:17,160 --> 00:19:20,680 Speaker 5: part of the opening that had taken place, that there 400 00:19:20,720 --> 00:19:24,120 Speaker 5: was a freeze after Obama's visit, but nobody wanted to 401 00:19:24,200 --> 00:19:28,040 Speaker 5: talk about it publicly, because of course they were being deterministic. 402 00:19:28,040 --> 00:19:31,080 Speaker 5: They wanted the policy to go forward. Those who'd helped 403 00:19:31,480 --> 00:19:34,000 Speaker 5: open the door, Shure didn't want to close it or 404 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:37,119 Speaker 5: leak that there were difficulties. But I knew privately that 405 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:40,480 Speaker 5: there were and there was a new era of hostilities. 406 00:19:40,520 --> 00:19:46,840 Speaker 5: So I immediately assumed that these attacks, these events that 407 00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:51,159 Speaker 5: had affected initially the officers on the island had to 408 00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:56,280 Speaker 5: do with a homegrown attempt to shut down the station, 409 00:19:56,720 --> 00:20:01,720 Speaker 5: you know, to affect America's intelligence gathering ability on the island. Now, 410 00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:04,320 Speaker 5: I didn't know how they would have done that. It 411 00:20:04,400 --> 00:20:07,760 Speaker 5: was out of character for them to hurt physically, damage, 412 00:20:08,040 --> 00:20:10,679 Speaker 5: cause pain and that kind of thing to spies on 413 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:13,959 Speaker 5: the island. It wasn't their modus operandi, and so I 414 00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:17,600 Speaker 5: assumed it was some kind of untested listening device gone bad. 415 00:20:18,320 --> 00:20:20,720 Speaker 5: The more I talked with people that sort of know 416 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:23,280 Speaker 5: that world, the more I assumed it was something like 417 00:20:23,400 --> 00:20:27,120 Speaker 5: a new technology that they had gotten from somebody, and 418 00:20:27,320 --> 00:20:30,680 Speaker 5: the obvious partner in that regard would be the Russians, 419 00:20:31,200 --> 00:20:33,000 Speaker 5: and that this might have been an easy way to 420 00:20:33,040 --> 00:20:37,000 Speaker 5: go about getting rid of that enhanced American intelligence gathering 421 00:20:37,040 --> 00:20:38,960 Speaker 5: presence on the is it. I also entertained that it 422 00:20:39,080 --> 00:20:41,399 Speaker 5: possibly it was Chinese. I'd heard that there was a 423 00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:44,400 Speaker 5: lot of Chinese electronics on the island in a particular 424 00:20:44,440 --> 00:20:48,320 Speaker 5: building under the purview of Cuban counter intelligence. But going 425 00:20:48,359 --> 00:20:52,240 Speaker 5: back five years, she wasn't as hostile as he is today, 426 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:56,280 Speaker 5: and most people tended to dismiss it when I trotted 427 00:20:56,280 --> 00:20:59,240 Speaker 5: that one out. So it kind of evolved into this 428 00:20:59,359 --> 00:21:03,960 Speaker 5: idea that Russian technology in cahoots with a small group 429 00:21:04,040 --> 00:21:08,359 Speaker 5: of Cuban counter intelligence, with probably a very senior person 430 00:21:08,440 --> 00:21:14,200 Speaker 5: in charge of the operation, aimed at dismantling America's intelligence 431 00:21:14,240 --> 00:21:17,000 Speaker 5: gathering ability. And they did it. And then my reading 432 00:21:17,000 --> 00:21:18,720 Speaker 5: has always been that once they did it, they took 433 00:21:18,760 --> 00:21:22,600 Speaker 5: it on the road. No surprise about the idea that 434 00:21:22,680 --> 00:21:26,560 Speaker 5: Cuban hardliners would have done something like that. Someone told me, 435 00:21:26,600 --> 00:21:30,200 Speaker 5: I think that two million Americans visited the island within 436 00:21:30,440 --> 00:21:32,359 Speaker 5: I think it was eighteen months, or maybe it was 437 00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:35,760 Speaker 5: even a year of the opening of relations. That's a 438 00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:40,600 Speaker 5: lot of Americans to suddenly be swarming around Cuba and 439 00:21:40,680 --> 00:21:44,200 Speaker 5: knowing those guys unwomen the way I do. I would 440 00:21:44,200 --> 00:21:47,480 Speaker 5: say that that probably really freaked them out. And with 441 00:21:47,600 --> 00:21:50,600 Speaker 5: Fidel's death coming right on the heels of a very 442 00:21:50,680 --> 00:21:55,000 Speaker 5: unexpected outcome in the American election, counterintelligence would have been 443 00:21:55,160 --> 00:21:58,320 Speaker 5: in a very paranoid state and wanting to reassert control 444 00:21:58,560 --> 00:22:01,080 Speaker 5: of an island where they had all we known what 445 00:22:01,320 --> 00:22:04,160 Speaker 5: was going on, and now they no longer did. They 446 00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:07,920 Speaker 5: felt like their grip on knowledge of who was there 447 00:22:07,960 --> 00:22:10,680 Speaker 5: and what they were up to, I think was slipping away. 448 00:22:12,680 --> 00:22:21,800 Speaker 2: Let's take a breather and back in a moment, and 449 00:22:21,880 --> 00:22:26,199 Speaker 2: we're back. Juddley, I share your instinct that there is 450 00:22:26,240 --> 00:22:29,399 Speaker 2: a conspiracy and that there's a Russian Cuban link that 451 00:22:29,440 --> 00:22:32,520 Speaker 2: we haven't come across yet. One thing that unsettles me, though, 452 00:22:32,680 --> 00:22:36,360 Speaker 2: is that the gr you especially, they've generally been sloppy 453 00:22:36,600 --> 00:22:38,679 Speaker 2: by and large when get involved in these things. They 454 00:22:38,760 --> 00:22:42,560 Speaker 2: get caught, and there's things like travel patterns, they talk 455 00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:45,240 Speaker 2: out of school, there's you know, we sort of get 456 00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:47,760 Speaker 2: a sense of what's going on in the Kremlin whispers. 457 00:22:48,119 --> 00:22:50,480 Speaker 2: I'm not hearing those kind of things from people who 458 00:22:50,520 --> 00:22:52,920 Speaker 2: follow it. So I'm just surprised that the Russians, if 459 00:22:52,920 --> 00:22:54,920 Speaker 2: this is it, that they've gotten away with. 460 00:22:54,840 --> 00:22:55,600 Speaker 1: It for so long. 461 00:22:55,880 --> 00:23:00,000 Speaker 5: What haven't the Russians gotten away with however, thank you 462 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:00,560 Speaker 5: in the world. 463 00:23:00,800 --> 00:23:01,800 Speaker 2: Well, I mean. 464 00:23:01,680 --> 00:23:03,520 Speaker 1: They do it, they get caught, but they still just 465 00:23:03,560 --> 00:23:04,040 Speaker 1: fucking do it. 466 00:23:04,119 --> 00:23:08,639 Speaker 5: Yeah, I mean, well, you know, I say probably Russian technology, 467 00:23:08,680 --> 00:23:10,960 Speaker 5: because I don't know that the Cubans have it. But 468 00:23:11,000 --> 00:23:12,960 Speaker 5: you know, the Cubans have been pretty resourceful over the 469 00:23:13,080 --> 00:23:17,639 Speaker 5: years in adapting to circumstances in they have a great 470 00:23:17,880 --> 00:23:21,960 Speaker 5: science nucleus, and you know, they're into scientific research. I 471 00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:24,439 Speaker 5: don't know what they've done in weapons research, but you 472 00:23:24,440 --> 00:23:29,600 Speaker 5: know they have fifty years of investment in various sectors. 473 00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:34,280 Speaker 5: The only country prior to this that we know regularly 474 00:23:34,480 --> 00:23:39,080 Speaker 5: use some form of microwave technology to bombard the Americans 475 00:23:39,359 --> 00:23:44,840 Speaker 5: in Moscow without apparent harm, but nonetheless bombard the embassy 476 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:49,040 Speaker 5: in the hopes of either deflecting or towarding the CI 477 00:23:49,240 --> 00:23:52,480 Speaker 5: station's you know, abilities to listen from the embassy. I 478 00:23:52,520 --> 00:23:55,200 Speaker 5: gather it's true that we don't have a smoking gun. 479 00:23:55,280 --> 00:23:58,119 Speaker 5: It's true that we haven't found a couple of characters 480 00:23:58,119 --> 00:24:01,840 Speaker 5: who are going around poisoning people's tea or putting new 481 00:24:02,080 --> 00:24:06,520 Speaker 5: you know, radioactive toxins on door knobs and things. But 482 00:24:07,080 --> 00:24:11,359 Speaker 5: if it's asymmetrical warfare, something Putin has done a lot of, 483 00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:15,000 Speaker 5: maybe this was something they tried there and took it elsewhere. 484 00:24:15,280 --> 00:24:17,480 Speaker 5: It's interesting to note, although the CI of course has 485 00:24:17,480 --> 00:24:20,120 Speaker 5: never been it's always been mum on this as far 486 00:24:20,119 --> 00:24:24,200 Speaker 5: as I understand. The next big station was Vienna, which 487 00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:27,439 Speaker 5: is an important station, and to my knowledge, it was 488 00:24:27,560 --> 00:24:31,680 Speaker 5: virtually atomized in similar at texts, and there's been no 489 00:24:31,760 --> 00:24:35,480 Speaker 5: whistleblower on that, you know, The CIA has of course 490 00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:38,960 Speaker 5: been hermetic about that, you don't show weakness to the enemy, right. 491 00:24:39,040 --> 00:24:42,000 Speaker 5: I get that, and I'm not surprised either the fact 492 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:45,760 Speaker 5: that the intelligence community across the board decided to shelve 493 00:24:45,800 --> 00:24:50,200 Speaker 5: this and did so differently than all the previous lawsuits 494 00:24:50,280 --> 00:24:55,360 Speaker 5: brought by soldiers or whoever affected by you know, American weaponry, 495 00:24:55,400 --> 00:24:58,600 Speaker 5: and whether it was Agent Orange or Gulf War syndrome. 496 00:24:59,080 --> 00:25:03,240 Speaker 5: The US government always shelves these lawsuits. The people who 497 00:25:03,280 --> 00:25:07,399 Speaker 5: make these lawsuits, whether they're State Department, other government personnel, 498 00:25:07,640 --> 00:25:12,040 Speaker 5: or soldiers former soldiers, always lose their lawsuits. I noted 499 00:25:12,040 --> 00:25:15,320 Speaker 5: that in this case they didn't lose their lawsuit. Those 500 00:25:15,359 --> 00:25:20,280 Speaker 5: who claimed to have had injuries were paid compensation, and 501 00:25:20,320 --> 00:25:24,440 Speaker 5: then the agencies expressed themselves in a very solemnonic way 502 00:25:24,480 --> 00:25:28,320 Speaker 5: of saying, we feel your pain, but this is over. 503 00:25:28,720 --> 00:25:31,240 Speaker 5: It's also interesting to note that, as far as I know, 504 00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:35,440 Speaker 5: all such alleged attacks or complaints of them, seem to 505 00:25:35,520 --> 00:25:38,960 Speaker 5: have stopped since the Ukrainian invasion occurred. Whether that's pure 506 00:25:39,000 --> 00:25:40,320 Speaker 5: coincidence or not, I don't know. 507 00:25:40,880 --> 00:25:44,440 Speaker 3: It seems to me that the early investigations by CIA, FBI, 508 00:25:44,520 --> 00:25:47,440 Speaker 3: and State were really, really poorly done, And it wasn't 509 00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:50,080 Speaker 3: even until at some point that doctors who are looking 510 00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:52,320 Speaker 3: at these people were sort of trumping and going back 511 00:25:52,320 --> 00:25:54,160 Speaker 3: to the agency and saying, oh, there's nothing here, it's 512 00:25:54,160 --> 00:25:57,080 Speaker 3: all fake, And the doctors are coming back saying absolutely not. 513 00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:00,160 Speaker 3: We see markers, we see that concussion like symptoms when 514 00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:02,240 Speaker 3: there wasn't a concussion, and all these type of things, 515 00:26:02,520 --> 00:26:04,480 Speaker 3: which of course then led, as you mentioned, to the 516 00:26:04,520 --> 00:26:06,920 Speaker 3: payouts and that kind of thing. So in your investigating, 517 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:10,160 Speaker 3: what sense did you get from that, because my understanding 518 00:26:10,240 --> 00:26:12,959 Speaker 3: is now the Hill is taking this on, and the 519 00:26:12,960 --> 00:26:15,600 Speaker 3: Defense Department now seems to be doing investigating that seems 520 00:26:15,600 --> 00:26:18,600 Speaker 3: more serious than those of the FBI, the agency, and 521 00:26:18,640 --> 00:26:19,240 Speaker 3: State Department. 522 00:26:19,480 --> 00:26:23,920 Speaker 5: And talking to the medical professionals who investigated this, they 523 00:26:23,960 --> 00:26:27,679 Speaker 5: were incensed, thinking of one in particular at the University 524 00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:30,119 Speaker 5: of Pennsylvania was incensed at the idea that this was 525 00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:35,560 Speaker 5: somehow adolescent schoolgirls getting hysterical together, which is essentially what 526 00:26:35,600 --> 00:26:37,159 Speaker 5: the naysayers are suggesting. 527 00:26:37,600 --> 00:26:40,600 Speaker 2: My personal sense was, in the beginning and at the 528 00:26:40,640 --> 00:26:43,840 Speaker 2: beginning of the Trump administration, especially without a smoking gun, 529 00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:48,240 Speaker 2: no one wanted to take bad news about the Russians 530 00:26:48,880 --> 00:26:54,320 Speaker 2: to that Oval Office that was, in my view, thought 531 00:26:54,359 --> 00:26:57,760 Speaker 2: well of Vladimir Putin and said so he came out 532 00:26:57,840 --> 00:27:00,879 Speaker 2: and said he believed Vladimir Putin over his own intelligence 533 00:27:00,920 --> 00:27:05,960 Speaker 2: agencies and without a smoking gun walking into the Oval 534 00:27:05,960 --> 00:27:09,480 Speaker 2: Office and saying, you know, the Russians slashed the Cubans 535 00:27:10,160 --> 00:27:13,520 Speaker 2: are committing an act of war, arguably against the United States. 536 00:27:13,560 --> 00:27:18,399 Speaker 2: And there was some reluctance to aggressively go after this 537 00:27:18,600 --> 00:27:22,080 Speaker 2: without absolute proof, and of course, the absolute proof unless 538 00:27:22,080 --> 00:27:24,439 Speaker 2: we get a walk in a defector who walks in 539 00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:27,960 Speaker 2: and says, okay, here's what happened. You know, we're stuck 540 00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:32,160 Speaker 2: with conjecture and assessments and gut feels and circumstantial evidence, 541 00:27:32,280 --> 00:27:36,040 Speaker 2: and those can be pretty compelling, but are not decisive always. 542 00:27:36,520 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 5: That was my sense of it too. The ball was 543 00:27:39,320 --> 00:27:44,560 Speaker 5: effectively dropped during the Trump administration. It's notable that the 544 00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:49,720 Speaker 5: first episodes begin during his period of president elect, and 545 00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:53,760 Speaker 5: it becomes public knowledge in the summer of twenty seventeen, 546 00:27:53,840 --> 00:27:57,080 Speaker 5: he's six eight months in office. It coincides with the 547 00:27:57,119 --> 00:28:00,320 Speaker 5: Russian investigation and the various behavior we saw from Trump, 548 00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:05,480 Speaker 5: and the episodes appear to have traveled on from Cuba 549 00:28:06,080 --> 00:28:09,440 Speaker 5: over the next couple of years to various places. Even 550 00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:12,560 Speaker 5: if we dismissed some of them, there's no good explanation 551 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:16,240 Speaker 5: for Vienna Station and a few others around the world. 552 00:28:16,280 --> 00:28:18,040 Speaker 5: I mean, if I was putin and I was doing it, 553 00:28:18,080 --> 00:28:21,040 Speaker 5: I'd go to town because Trump isn't going to do anything 554 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:23,920 Speaker 5: about it. And then it was really the Biden administration 555 00:28:24,040 --> 00:28:27,200 Speaker 5: where it's resuscitated and becomes a public thing. 556 00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:29,720 Speaker 3: I think Bolton taking it seriously when he was his 557 00:28:29,840 --> 00:28:30,840 Speaker 3: short tenure there. 558 00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:34,480 Speaker 5: Yes, Bolton did. And we had a conversation with Bolton 559 00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:37,920 Speaker 5: in which he basically said, well, I didn't really want 560 00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:40,840 Speaker 5: to get the Boss mad by bringing up Russia. He 561 00:28:40,840 --> 00:28:42,600 Speaker 5: didn't go so far as to say that he had 562 00:28:42,640 --> 00:28:46,520 Speaker 5: deep sixth the topic. He continued to investigate, but that 563 00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:47,840 Speaker 5: he didn't bring it to Trump. 564 00:28:47,960 --> 00:28:50,160 Speaker 3: But you have an analytic cadre who's been burned over 565 00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:53,560 Speaker 3: the years in Iraq and WMD and things that almost 566 00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:57,320 Speaker 3: needs to have like absolute proof. And you have a 567 00:28:57,360 --> 00:28:59,560 Speaker 3: White House, any white house, frankly, but this White House 568 00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:01,920 Speaker 3: probably too, that says, if you're going to give me 569 00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:06,280 Speaker 3: information that suggests that the Russians are at war with us, 570 00:29:06,320 --> 00:29:08,920 Speaker 3: they're hurting American diplomats and that we have to respond 571 00:29:09,400 --> 00:29:11,560 Speaker 3: you better be damn sure that it's one hundred percent sure, 572 00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:14,280 Speaker 3: And so you probably got internal baticles. I can imagine 573 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:16,680 Speaker 3: the analyst saying, yeah, you're coming at me with a 574 00:29:16,760 --> 00:29:20,000 Speaker 3: lot of patterns, a lot of possible information, but until 575 00:29:20,000 --> 00:29:22,320 Speaker 3: we know for sure, there's no way where we as 576 00:29:22,320 --> 00:29:24,120 Speaker 3: an organization are going to the White House with this. 577 00:29:24,160 --> 00:29:26,560 Speaker 3: And there's probably a lot of frustration inside on from 578 00:29:26,600 --> 00:29:28,640 Speaker 3: our side of the house saying, for christ' sake, we're 579 00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:32,240 Speaker 3: the ones suffering this. We see Russians and grri Peopil 580 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:35,880 Speaker 3: in specific places, the places where it looks like this happened, 581 00:29:35,880 --> 00:29:40,240 Speaker 3: where places like Havana, Vienna, Belgrade, Hanoi, China, places where 582 00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:43,040 Speaker 3: the Russians can operate and sort of hide themselves pretty 583 00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:44,080 Speaker 3: quickly afterwards. 584 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:47,280 Speaker 5: You know, one of the patterns that I found very interesting, 585 00:29:47,680 --> 00:29:51,120 Speaker 5: and I guess it began with Vice President Kamala Harris's 586 00:29:51,280 --> 00:29:54,480 Speaker 5: trip to Hanoi. There began to be a pattern in 587 00:29:54,520 --> 00:29:59,480 Speaker 5: which people right next to a principal figure. Where's that that? 588 00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:00,040 Speaker 3: To me? 589 00:30:00,600 --> 00:30:03,840 Speaker 5: This idea of leaving a signature that to me has 590 00:30:04,320 --> 00:30:06,560 Speaker 5: makes me think of only one leader in the world 591 00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:07,800 Speaker 5: who likes to leave signatures. 592 00:30:08,000 --> 00:30:08,320 Speaker 1: Yeah. 593 00:30:08,440 --> 00:30:10,840 Speaker 5: Again, I can't prove it, but you know, two days 594 00:30:10,840 --> 00:30:13,960 Speaker 5: before she gets to Hanoi, two employees of the US 595 00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:20,200 Speaker 5: Embassy are evacuated with apparent symptoms of havana syndrome. Director 596 00:30:20,280 --> 00:30:23,800 Speaker 5: Burns goes to New Jelly. The person with him is affected. 597 00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:27,920 Speaker 5: Bolton goes to London, two of his briefers are affected, 598 00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:31,520 Speaker 5: and so on. Well, Blinkn goes to Bogatah, and a 599 00:30:31,520 --> 00:30:33,920 Speaker 5: few days before he gets there, I think three days before, 600 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:37,640 Speaker 5: an unnamed number of people at the embassy are withdrawn 601 00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:41,080 Speaker 5: or treated. It's a bit like once they went to town, 602 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:42,920 Speaker 5: once they went on the road with this. It was 603 00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:45,480 Speaker 5: this idea of we're just reminding you were doing this, 604 00:30:45,840 --> 00:30:48,400 Speaker 5: and it's right next to you in each case, and 605 00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:51,520 Speaker 5: that seems to me more than coincidental, because the number 606 00:30:51,560 --> 00:30:56,040 Speaker 5: of senior officials who had people directly within their posse affected. 607 00:30:56,320 --> 00:30:58,320 Speaker 1: Johnley, thank you very much for coming and talking with 608 00:30:58,400 --> 00:31:05,120 Speaker 1: us today. I really enjoyed it. 609 00:31:06,640 --> 00:31:09,320 Speaker 4: Guys, how is John Lee Anderson Adam? 610 00:31:09,320 --> 00:31:11,200 Speaker 3: Have you been hiding behind the scenes? Have you been 611 00:31:11,240 --> 00:31:12,480 Speaker 3: here the whole time listening to this? 612 00:31:12,920 --> 00:31:15,400 Speaker 4: No, I'm just showing up. But you talk to one 613 00:31:15,440 --> 00:31:17,640 Speaker 4: of my favorite, literally one of my very favorite people 614 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:19,080 Speaker 4: in the world, Johnley Anderson. 615 00:31:19,360 --> 00:31:21,840 Speaker 3: I think he's a fascinating guy. I know you worked 616 00:31:21,840 --> 00:31:24,280 Speaker 3: with him some as a journalist, and you know he's 617 00:31:24,320 --> 00:31:26,120 Speaker 3: the kind of guy that you sort of look up to. 618 00:31:26,160 --> 00:31:28,440 Speaker 3: His journalist He's lived around the world, He's dug into 619 00:31:28,440 --> 00:31:31,080 Speaker 3: deep places, He's personally courageous and been a lot of 620 00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:31,960 Speaker 3: dangerous places. 621 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:36,040 Speaker 4: I think John Lee is the single most respected foreign 622 00:31:36,040 --> 00:31:39,959 Speaker 4: correspondent in the US. He's saved my life, and I 623 00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:41,760 Speaker 4: think there's a lot of journalists who can say the 624 00:31:41,800 --> 00:31:44,720 Speaker 4: exact same thing. I mean, he goes to incredibly dangerous places, 625 00:31:44,760 --> 00:31:46,320 Speaker 4: but he does it thoughtfully. 626 00:31:46,440 --> 00:31:49,280 Speaker 3: Also, when you think about Cuba itself, there's very few 627 00:31:49,320 --> 00:31:52,120 Speaker 3: people who have the expertise in Cuba that he has. 628 00:31:52,160 --> 00:31:54,560 Speaker 3: He's lived there for a long time, he's got the contacts, 629 00:31:54,560 --> 00:31:57,520 Speaker 3: and so if we're looking to talk to experts, hard 630 00:31:57,520 --> 00:31:58,400 Speaker 3: to find a better one. 631 00:31:58,600 --> 00:32:03,360 Speaker 2: So Churchill famously that Russia, right, it's a riddle rapped 632 00:32:03,400 --> 00:32:06,040 Speaker 2: in a mystery inside an enigma, and I think we've 633 00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:08,960 Speaker 2: only just started with the mystery and we need to 634 00:32:08,960 --> 00:32:11,120 Speaker 2: get into the enigma part of it later. 635 00:32:11,480 --> 00:32:13,360 Speaker 3: I think that's right. So today I think we've got 636 00:32:13,400 --> 00:32:15,719 Speaker 3: a really good sense of the context, but there clearly 637 00:32:15,760 --> 00:32:17,640 Speaker 3: is a lot more to this story. So in our 638 00:32:17,680 --> 00:32:20,520 Speaker 3: next episode, we are going to continue looking at this 639 00:32:20,600 --> 00:32:23,360 Speaker 3: with someone who is even more closely associated with as 640 00:32:23,400 --> 00:32:26,200 Speaker 3: someone who is actually impacted by what we're now calling 641 00:32:26,240 --> 00:32:28,400 Speaker 3: the Havana syndrome. So stay with us for the next 642 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:30,320 Speaker 3: episode of Mission Implausible. 643 00:32:35,000 --> 00:32:39,120 Speaker 6: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'sha, John Cipher, 644 00:32:39,160 --> 00:32:42,680 Speaker 6: and Jonathan Stern. The associate producers are Rachel Harner and 645 00:32:42,800 --> 00:32:43,720 Speaker 6: David Solinger. 646 00:32:44,080 --> 00:32:44,640 Speaker 1: This has been a 647 00:32:44,640 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 6: Production of honorable, mention and abominable pictures for iHeartMedia.