WEBVTT - Tech News: Microsoft vs. Hackers 0:00:04.440 --> 0:00:12.280 Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey thereon 0:00:12.400 --> 0:00:16.239 Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm 0:00:16.239 --> 0:00:19.720 an executive producer with iHeartRadio and how the tech are you. 0:00:20.440 --> 0:00:23.880 It's time for the tech news for Thursday August third, 0:00:24.200 --> 0:00:29.280 twenty twenty three. Over in the UK, the Competition and 0:00:29.400 --> 0:00:35.000 Markets Authority or CMA has re entered negotiations with Microsoft 0:00:35.080 --> 0:00:40.600 regarding the long awaited acquisition of Activision Blizzard. Now, you 0:00:40.680 --> 0:00:44.520 might recall that there were a lot of regulators around 0:00:44.600 --> 0:00:49.160 the world who initially resisted this deal, but over time 0:00:49.280 --> 0:00:53.440 most of them came around to giving the acquisition the 0:00:53.479 --> 0:00:57.160 green light after the companies had made multiple assurances that 0:00:57.160 --> 0:01:00.800 they weren't going to freeze out competitors like Sony from 0:01:01.280 --> 0:01:05.360 having access to stuff like Call of Duty, specifically that franchise. 0:01:05.920 --> 0:01:09.160 Here in the United States, a judge denied the Federal 0:01:09.200 --> 0:01:13.320 Trade Commission's attempt to secure an injunction against this deal, 0:01:14.120 --> 0:01:18.320 and then the FTC subsequently withdrew its case, but it 0:01:18.440 --> 0:01:21.520 could still file that case again in the future, so 0:01:22.200 --> 0:01:26.640 that's not necessarily over here in the US. But right now, 0:01:27.120 --> 0:01:31.440 the one remaining hurdle for these two companies is in 0:01:31.520 --> 0:01:35.520 the UK. Microsoft has committed to a ten year licensing 0:01:35.640 --> 0:01:38.720 arrangement with Sony regarding the Call of Duty franchise and 0:01:38.760 --> 0:01:43.080 an effort to remove concerns about this arrangement. The CMA 0:01:43.120 --> 0:01:47.039 is seeking comment from companies and individuals, leaving open the 0:01:47.080 --> 0:01:50.320 option to respond to the CMA until the end of 0:01:50.400 --> 0:01:54.840 the day tomorrow. It's unknown if the CMA will reverse 0:01:54.880 --> 0:01:57.600 its decision, but if it does, that would be the 0:01:57.720 --> 0:02:02.280 first time the CMA has done so since Brexit. According 0:02:02.280 --> 0:02:06.440 to the Financial Times, the CMA has until August twenty 0:02:06.520 --> 0:02:09.480 ninth to rule on this matter, so by the end 0:02:09.520 --> 0:02:12.200 of this month we should know if this acquisition can 0:02:12.280 --> 0:02:16.560 move forward or not, at least until the FTC makes 0:02:16.720 --> 0:02:21.560 its next move. Dan gooden Over at Ours Technica has 0:02:21.600 --> 0:02:25.720 a great piece about how Microsoft is reeling after security 0:02:25.760 --> 0:02:30.000 experts have blasted the company's security practices or lack thereof 0:02:30.240 --> 0:02:33.639 for its cloud based products like Azure. In case you're 0:02:33.680 --> 0:02:38.119 not familiar with Azure or Asure if you prefer, it's 0:02:38.160 --> 0:02:42.640 Microsoft's cloud platform and it lets customers use Microsoft's cloud 0:02:42.680 --> 0:02:45.840 services to develop apps and that kind of thing. So 0:02:46.080 --> 0:02:49.280 it's similar in many ways to Amazon Web Services or 0:02:49.400 --> 0:02:54.480 Google Cloud or countless other cloud platforms anyway, Gooden quotes 0:02:54.600 --> 0:02:59.480 Amit Juran, the CEO of internet security firm Tenable, who 0:02:59.520 --> 0:03:05.280 called my Microsoft quote unquote grossly irresponsible, which doesn't seem 0:03:05.320 --> 0:03:09.359 to be mincing many words. You know, the complaints aren't unfounded. 0:03:09.400 --> 0:03:13.640 Earlier this year, Chinese backed hacker groups penetrated Microsoft's systems 0:03:14.320 --> 0:03:18.480 and stole boatloads of emails from Microsoft customers who were 0:03:18.560 --> 0:03:22.760 using Azure. And there are open questions as to how 0:03:22.800 --> 0:03:26.160 that actually happened, because it would have meant the hackers 0:03:26.200 --> 0:03:29.960 somehow gained access to what should have been a heavily 0:03:30.000 --> 0:03:35.480 protected encryption key. Juran took to a LinkedIn post and 0:03:36.080 --> 0:03:39.680 sent a very lengthy description of how Microsoft is continuing 0:03:39.720 --> 0:03:44.120 to fail its customers. In his opinion, while the company 0:03:44.160 --> 0:03:48.120 initially claims to have fixed the security issue, Uran says 0:03:48.320 --> 0:03:50.880 that his team was able to gain access to quote, 0:03:51.200 --> 0:03:56.280 authentication secrets to a bank end quote. Yeah. All that 0:03:57.240 --> 0:04:01.160 definitely doesn't sound like things were fixed inside cybersecurity terms. 0:04:02.000 --> 0:04:05.840 This is very bad for Microsoft and also for its customers. Heck, 0:04:05.880 --> 0:04:08.800 it's also bad for cloud computing in general, because the 0:04:08.800 --> 0:04:13.520 promise of cloud computing is that a company can benefit 0:04:13.640 --> 0:04:17.640 from some other company's investment in computing and storage capabilities. Right, 0:04:18.600 --> 0:04:21.200 There's no need for you to build out your own 0:04:21.360 --> 0:04:26.240 server farm and databases, or to heavily invest in compute 0:04:26.240 --> 0:04:31.159 power if instead, you can offload those responsibilities onto a 0:04:31.279 --> 0:04:36.320 cloud based product that you purchase or subscribe to. But 0:04:36.400 --> 0:04:39.800 that only works if customers are confident that the system 0:04:39.839 --> 0:04:43.159 is secure and that the provider will respond quickly and 0:04:43.200 --> 0:04:47.359 sufficiently to any vulnerabilities in the system. Failing to do 0:04:47.440 --> 0:04:51.920 that essentially boils down to a breach of trust. Microsoft 0:04:51.960 --> 0:04:55.159 reps have said that the threat of sophisticated attas makes 0:04:55.279 --> 0:04:59.839 cybersecurity more challenging than ever, which is undoubtedly true, but 0:05:00.080 --> 0:05:03.880 Microsoft's critics say this doesn't excuse the company's response to 0:05:03.920 --> 0:05:07.880 this particular breach and how that's been handled so far. 0:05:09.600 --> 0:05:13.280 In other Microsoft hacking news, the company warns that a 0:05:13.360 --> 0:05:17.120 Russian backed hacking group is trying to steal login credentials 0:05:17.600 --> 0:05:24.080 at various specific organizations by sending fraudulent Microsoft team's messages 0:05:24.320 --> 0:05:27.520 while posing as it support, which is of course an 0:05:27.600 --> 0:05:31.400 age old trick, right. We call it social engineering. It's 0:05:31.440 --> 0:05:33.880 where you convince someone to hand over the keys to 0:05:33.960 --> 0:05:36.600 a system, and it's one of the most effective tools 0:05:36.640 --> 0:05:40.359 in hackers arsenals because it's usually way easier to trick 0:05:40.400 --> 0:05:44.279 someone into being an unwitting accomplice to giving you access 0:05:44.320 --> 0:05:46.800 to a system than it is to brute force your 0:05:46.839 --> 0:05:51.520 way into a system. Anyway, Microsoft says the attacks are 0:05:51.600 --> 0:05:55.000 quote unquote highly targeted, with the hacker sending messages to 0:05:55.000 --> 0:06:00.479 people working at less than forty unique global organizations fewer 0:06:00.520 --> 0:06:05.400 than forty This isn't a wide phishing net. In other words, 0:06:05.400 --> 0:06:08.400 this isn't like just trying to see what you can catch. 0:06:08.440 --> 0:06:11.760 This is more like spear phishing, where you have specifically 0:06:11.839 --> 0:06:15.240 identified the targets you're interested in. Now, the name of 0:06:15.279 --> 0:06:18.800 this hacking group is APT twenty nine, but it's better 0:06:18.880 --> 0:06:23.080 known as Midnight Blizzard, and US authorities say this group 0:06:23.120 --> 0:06:26.760 has links to Russia's intelligence service. So if you use 0:06:26.880 --> 0:06:29.280 Microsoft teams, then you happen to work for one of 0:06:29.360 --> 0:06:32.880 these unnamed organizations. I don't know which ones specifically we're 0:06:32.920 --> 0:06:35.599 being targeted, but presumably a lot of them are like 0:06:35.640 --> 0:06:38.520 government agencies and things of that nature, and high profile 0:06:38.600 --> 0:06:42.039 tech companies that sort of stuff. I would recommend against 0:06:42.120 --> 0:06:46.480 responding to weird requests from it, especially if they're asking 0:06:46.520 --> 0:06:49.240 you to share multi factor authentication information. That should be 0:06:49.320 --> 0:06:53.800 a dead giveaway every single time if someone's asking you 0:06:53.920 --> 0:06:57.120 to share some multi factor authentication stuff, like they're like, hey, 0:06:57.120 --> 0:06:58.960 I need to log into your account, can you give 0:06:59.000 --> 0:07:04.520 me the the the six digit you know number so 0:07:04.600 --> 0:07:09.120 I can access and authenticate? Obviously your answer should be 0:07:09.120 --> 0:07:12.960 no every single time, no, no, no, no no. But 0:07:13.240 --> 0:07:16.280 you know again, it's a trick that works. So Microsoft 0:07:16.280 --> 0:07:19.920 has raised the flag on that one. Speaking of Russia, 0:07:20.360 --> 0:07:25.040 a court in Moscow has fined Apple four hundred thousand rubles, 0:07:25.360 --> 0:07:30.040 which is, let me do the quick calculation here, around 0:07:30.120 --> 0:07:33.640 two hundred and seventy dollars. And the reason is Russia 0:07:33.680 --> 0:07:37.320 says that Apple failed to delete what the court was 0:07:37.360 --> 0:07:42.840 calling inaccurate content, specifically about the ongoing quote unquote special 0:07:42.880 --> 0:07:48.120 military operation in Ukraine. Apple, which by the way, stopped 0:07:48.160 --> 0:07:50.800 all products sales in Russia more than a year ago 0:07:50.880 --> 0:07:56.120 after Russia first invaded Ukraine, has not commented on this fine. 0:07:56.280 --> 0:07:58.560 I mean, two hundred and seventy dollars, that's not even 0:07:58.680 --> 0:08:02.280 enough money to even read as a thing to Apple, 0:08:02.600 --> 0:08:07.200 that's nothing, And really it's another example of how Russian 0:08:07.240 --> 0:08:10.520 institutions are trying to define the narrative on Russia's war 0:08:10.680 --> 0:08:14.480 on Ukraine and anyone who doesn't toe the line in 0:08:14.520 --> 0:08:18.720 that they're trying to punish. Although four hundred thousand rubles, 0:08:18.760 --> 0:08:23.360 I mean, I just like it, Why would you even bother? Anyway, 0:08:23.480 --> 0:08:26.320 Apple joins Wikimedia as one of the companies that the 0:08:26.360 --> 0:08:30.200 Russians have declared are in violation for disseminating incorrect information. 0:08:30.920 --> 0:08:36.040 TorrentFreak dot com reports that Putin's government in Russia is 0:08:36.080 --> 0:08:39.360 trying to lock down internet within the country even more 0:08:39.400 --> 0:08:42.160 than it already has. A New law that will go 0:08:42.200 --> 0:08:45.400 into effect later this year will make it illegal for 0:08:45.559 --> 0:08:49.160 any Russian Internet platform to allow someone to sign up 0:08:49.160 --> 0:08:52.760 for their services if that person is using a foreign 0:08:52.880 --> 0:08:56.760 email system. For example, if someone has a Gmail email account, 0:08:56.960 --> 0:08:59.280 they cannot use that email account to sign up for 0:08:59.320 --> 0:09:02.800 one of these Russian internet platforms. It would be against 0:09:02.840 --> 0:09:06.760 the law. Further, these platforms will not be allowed to 0:09:06.800 --> 0:09:11.120 offer services to customers until those customers go through a 0:09:11.280 --> 0:09:17.680 verification process to prove their identities first. Now, obviously that 0:09:17.880 --> 0:09:22.120 means that anything the customers then access or post or 0:09:22.160 --> 0:09:27.079 whatever is linked directly to them there's no anonymity here. 0:09:27.880 --> 0:09:32.040 They have a trail that leads right back to them, 0:09:32.080 --> 0:09:35.440 assuming that it is the person who created the account 0:09:35.440 --> 0:09:39.000 who's actually using the account. So that's a real big 0:09:39.000 --> 0:09:43.120 concern too. Right, it's like a form of government tracking. 0:09:43.720 --> 0:09:46.080 As I have talked about in previous episodes of this show. 0:09:46.720 --> 0:09:49.480 Russia is also cracked down on virtual private networks or 0:09:49.559 --> 0:09:54.400 VPN services within Russia. Like all outside VPN services have 0:09:54.520 --> 0:09:58.480 had real problems working within Russia because Russia wanted to 0:09:58.480 --> 0:10:03.560 crack down on that internally, some of the VPN services 0:10:03.559 --> 0:10:07.520 that were originating out of Russia chose to just shut 0:10:07.600 --> 0:10:11.480 down operations in the country because the only way they 0:10:11.480 --> 0:10:14.080 are allowed to operate within the country is to also 0:10:14.160 --> 0:10:17.960 agree to certain criteria with Russia's government. Those are the 0:10:18.000 --> 0:10:21.040 only VPN services that are allowed to operate within Russia, 0:10:21.600 --> 0:10:25.640 So that brings into question if the Russian government can 0:10:25.720 --> 0:10:30.240 demand that a VPN service within Russia must share its 0:10:30.320 --> 0:10:33.840 logs that show what customers were doing on the VPN, 0:10:33.920 --> 0:10:36.520 which kind of defeats at least one of the purposes 0:10:36.559 --> 0:10:39.960 of using a VPN in the first place. Right, Like, 0:10:40.080 --> 0:10:42.600 a lot of the reason to use a VPN is 0:10:42.640 --> 0:10:45.040 to kind of make sure that snoops don't see what 0:10:45.200 --> 0:10:47.480 you're doing. Like it may be that you know you 0:10:47.559 --> 0:10:51.240 need to handle some sensitive information, or maybe you're a whistleblower, 0:10:51.320 --> 0:10:54.440 or maybe you're a journalist or whatever, and so you 0:10:54.480 --> 0:10:56.880 don't want to be tracked down. That's obviously a big 0:10:56.960 --> 0:11:00.760 danger to you and your work. But if the government 0:11:00.800 --> 0:11:02.839 can come to the VPN and demand, hey, you've got 0:11:02.840 --> 0:11:04.680 to hand over all your logs and show us who 0:11:04.800 --> 0:11:08.280 was accessing what, then the VPN doesn't really serve its 0:11:08.320 --> 0:11:12.880 purpose anyway. Russian law also makes it illegal to talk 0:11:12.960 --> 0:11:17.120 about using VPNs and other methods like tor in an 0:11:17.160 --> 0:11:22.400 effort to circumvent Russian controls. So not only are they 0:11:22.440 --> 0:11:25.760 limiting things, you can't even talk about the possibility of 0:11:25.880 --> 0:11:29.920 using tools to get around these controls because that in 0:11:29.960 --> 0:11:35.079 itself is illegal. So yeah, really cracking down over there. Okay, 0:11:35.360 --> 0:11:37.600 I've got a bunch of other news items we're going 0:11:37.640 --> 0:11:40.720 to cover today. Let's take a quick break to thank 0:11:40.760 --> 0:11:53.720 our sponsors. We're back, and now for some the left 0:11:53.760 --> 0:11:57.320 hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing news. 0:11:57.880 --> 0:12:02.160 The Washington Post reports that the FBA has actually discovered 0:12:02.240 --> 0:12:06.359 who was at least partly responsible for directing a contractor 0:12:06.600 --> 0:12:10.680 to purchase a spy tool from the Israeli company in SOO. 0:12:10.920 --> 0:12:14.280 Now you might remember NSO is the company that was 0:12:14.320 --> 0:12:18.200 behind Pegasus. That was a tool that could turn a 0:12:18.320 --> 0:12:22.880 targeted iOS device like an iPhone into an espionage gadget. 0:12:22.920 --> 0:12:25.559 You could activate the microphone on the phone and listen 0:12:25.600 --> 0:12:27.800 in on conversations that were happening within the room. You 0:12:27.800 --> 0:12:30.680 could activate the camera, you could look through the phone's 0:12:30.920 --> 0:12:36.840 information like it really was an incredibly dangerous espionage tool 0:12:36.960 --> 0:12:41.680 that NSO sold to lots of different customers. Anyway, back 0:12:41.720 --> 0:12:45.920 in April, the New York Times found that a contractor 0:12:46.559 --> 0:12:51.000 had bought and used a tool from NSO and had 0:12:51.040 --> 0:12:56.079 done so on behalf of a US government agency, though 0:12:56.400 --> 0:13:00.199 it wasn't known which agency, it was, just that this 0:13:00.480 --> 0:13:05.520 this contractor had purchased this from NSO. However, the Biden 0:13:05.559 --> 0:13:10.520 administration had put NSO on a blacklist saying no US 0:13:10.840 --> 0:13:15.080 government office or company or anything like that should purchase 0:13:15.280 --> 0:13:18.439 products from NSO. So the White House directed the FBI 0:13:18.520 --> 0:13:24.000 to track down who the heck authorized a contractor to 0:13:24.120 --> 0:13:26.520 purchase this tool from the NSO, and the FBI says 0:13:26.559 --> 0:13:33.720 it was the FBI sad trombone. But the FBI says 0:13:33.840 --> 0:13:37.240 they toats didn't know that the invasive surveillance they were 0:13:37.240 --> 0:13:40.640 relying upon was thanks to a tool from the NSO group, 0:13:41.120 --> 0:13:46.240 so it's not really their fault. The Contractorriva Networks secured 0:13:46.280 --> 0:13:49.840 the use of a tool from NSO called Landmark. This 0:13:49.960 --> 0:13:54.520 tool allows for geo tracking targets without their knowledge and 0:13:54.679 --> 0:13:58.880 was specifically used for people in Mexico, people like connected 0:13:58.880 --> 0:14:05.240 to drug cartels, such spooky stuff. And also, the FBI 0:14:05.360 --> 0:14:08.280 says once they found out the Reva Networks had been 0:14:08.360 --> 0:14:11.360 naughty and the purchased this tool from NSO, the FBI 0:14:11.520 --> 0:14:16.000 totally terminated that contract with Reva Networks. Now I might 0:14:16.240 --> 0:14:20.080 just be a humble technology podcaster, but I find the 0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:27.240 FBI's excuses to be not fully satisfactory. Firstly, the FBI 0:14:27.360 --> 0:14:30.560 had already used Reva Networks in the past to purchase 0:14:30.600 --> 0:14:36.000 tools from NSO, including Pegasus, and this was before NSO 0:14:36.160 --> 0:14:39.880 was on the blacklist, so arguably it was kind of 0:14:39.920 --> 0:14:44.240 in the clear. But anyway, this was not an unprecedented event. 0:14:44.440 --> 0:14:46.640 FBI had worked with Reva Networks in the past, and 0:14:46.800 --> 0:14:50.480 Reva Networks had been using NSO products as part of 0:14:50.560 --> 0:14:53.960 the contract work they were doing with FBI. Secondly, I 0:14:53.960 --> 0:14:58.040 would argue whether the tool came from NSO or from 0:14:58.120 --> 0:15:02.000 Reva Networks itself or from some other developer, there are 0:15:02.080 --> 0:15:05.640 issues that are really more about what this tool does 0:15:06.360 --> 0:15:09.640 that concern me, rather than where it came from. The 0:15:09.760 --> 0:15:14.000 lack of oversight and accountability for the FBI and for 0:15:14.120 --> 0:15:19.040 its various contract partners raises some really troubling questions about 0:15:19.080 --> 0:15:23.160 the FBI's authority. I mean, part of the reason ANSO 0:15:23.240 --> 0:15:26.560 Group is on the blacklist is not because of these 0:15:26.800 --> 0:15:30.400 incredibly invasive tools it makes. I mean, you would think 0:15:30.440 --> 0:15:32.400 that's the case, but that's not really why it's on 0:15:32.440 --> 0:15:34.640 the blacklist. The reason why it's on the blacklist is 0:15:34.680 --> 0:15:38.200 that company counts among its most loyal customers some of 0:15:38.240 --> 0:15:42.000 the most dangerous dictators and authoritarians in the world, who 0:15:42.040 --> 0:15:46.520 subsequently use those tools to target people like journalists and activists. 0:15:46.800 --> 0:15:49.080 And it would look really, really bad if the US 0:15:49.160 --> 0:15:51.080 government said, you know what, it's okay for us to 0:15:51.080 --> 0:15:53.960 do business with them. So you could argue that optics 0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:57.240 are a really big part of why NSO is on 0:15:57.280 --> 0:16:03.040 that blacklist. However, if we were to be more generous 0:16:03.120 --> 0:16:06.000 and say, maybe the US government said no, this is 0:16:06.240 --> 0:16:09.200 a step too far, This is too invasive, the surveillance 0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:13.560 is too dangerous. There are too few checks and balances 0:16:13.600 --> 0:16:17.520 on authority and overreach. If we were to say that, well, 0:16:17.960 --> 0:16:20.400 I mean a lot of US authorities say right now 0:16:20.440 --> 0:16:26.960 that using geotracking technology doesn't technically violate the Executive Order 0:16:27.240 --> 0:16:31.640 against NSO, so no harm, no foul. If you find 0:16:31.640 --> 0:16:34.200 some other place that makes the same sort of tools, 0:16:34.720 --> 0:16:39.240 oh brave new world. On a different note, researchers at 0:16:39.360 --> 0:16:43.880 Technical University Berlin, along with a researcher named Oleg Droken, 0:16:44.200 --> 0:16:47.320 demonstrated that they could exploit the infotainment system on recent 0:16:47.400 --> 0:16:50.920 Tesla vehicles to gain root access to the vehicles systems. 0:16:51.520 --> 0:16:54.920 This would let someone activate features that normally Tesla reserves 0:16:55.040 --> 0:16:58.840 for paid customers, meaning you could activate stuff that is 0:16:58.880 --> 0:17:02.000 already available in your vehicle and you could do it 0:17:02.040 --> 0:17:05.199 for free rather than have to pay Tesla to unlock it. 0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:07.920 Things like you know, heated seats and full self driving, 0:17:07.960 --> 0:17:10.639 that kind of stuff. They also were able to do 0:17:10.720 --> 0:17:15.040 even more things like remove geolocation restrictions on full self driving. 0:17:15.560 --> 0:17:18.000 They were able to transfer a driver's profile to a 0:17:18.040 --> 0:17:22.280 different Tesla vehicle using this method. However, it's not easy 0:17:22.320 --> 0:17:25.560 to do. It actually requires some electrical engineering, some soldering, 0:17:25.640 --> 0:17:28.959 you know, it's not just software. Hardware is involved too. However, 0:17:29.000 --> 0:17:31.320 if a Tesla owner has the knowledge and skill and 0:17:31.359 --> 0:17:34.120 about one hundred bucks worth of equipment, they could potentially 0:17:34.160 --> 0:17:37.159 do the same thing. They've also said that bad actors 0:17:37.200 --> 0:17:40.040 could possibly use the same method to gain access to 0:17:40.080 --> 0:17:42.679 things like data logs in a Tesla, which could include 0:17:42.720 --> 0:17:47.080 the owner's private information, or otherwise tamper with someone's vehicle. 0:17:47.880 --> 0:17:50.560 It would not be easy. Again, it would require physical 0:17:50.640 --> 0:17:53.159 access to the vehicle, but it is possible, and they 0:17:53.200 --> 0:17:56.360 plan to present their findings at black Hat USA, which 0:17:56.359 --> 0:17:58.800 happens next week in Las Vegas. For what it's worth, 0:17:58.880 --> 0:18:01.920 they actually praised sless security measures. They said that they're 0:18:01.960 --> 0:18:05.800 really leaders in the automotive space on that front. This week, 0:18:06.040 --> 0:18:10.480 the US finally officially banned incandescent light bulbs, and you 0:18:10.560 --> 0:18:13.280 might be thinking, I thought we already did that, but no, 0:18:14.280 --> 0:18:16.640 what we did do is announce the plan to ban 0:18:16.800 --> 0:18:20.679 incandescent light bulbs, but hadn't actually put in action. The 0:18:20.720 --> 0:18:22.840 decision actually traces its history all the way back to 0:18:22.880 --> 0:18:26.520 two thousand and seven during George W. Bush's administration, when 0:18:26.560 --> 0:18:28.880 the White House called for a twenty five percent improvement 0:18:28.880 --> 0:18:33.200 in efficiency for light bulbs. In twenty seventeen, Barack Obama 0:18:33.640 --> 0:18:37.760 planned on facing out incandescent bulbs by twenty twenty. Trump 0:18:37.840 --> 0:18:43.080 reversed that decision. Biden reversed the reversal, although technically it 0:18:43.119 --> 0:18:48.560 doesn't target incandescent bulbs specifically. Rather, it says, hey, light 0:18:48.560 --> 0:18:51.360 bulbs need to be able to produce forty five lumens, 0:18:51.440 --> 0:18:54.880 which is a measurement of brightness per wat of electricity, 0:18:55.080 --> 0:18:57.600 and incantestant bulbs just can't do that. They max out 0:18:57.640 --> 0:19:02.080 at around fifteen lumens per watt. They are banned effectively, 0:19:02.200 --> 0:19:04.199 just not by name. Also, there are a lot of 0:19:04.240 --> 0:19:06.160 exceptions to this, like there are a lot of light 0:19:06.160 --> 0:19:09.480 bulbs that are incandescent that get an exception to this rule, 0:19:09.520 --> 0:19:12.520 like black lights, so your wicked band poster can still 0:19:12.880 --> 0:19:15.600 light up in the dark. Yay, okay. I got two 0:19:15.680 --> 0:19:18.520 article recommendations re all before I sign off. The first 0:19:18.560 --> 0:19:21.040 was published yesterday on ours Tetnica. It was written by 0:19:21.160 --> 0:19:25.240 John Broadkin. The article is titled Internet providers that one 0:19:25.320 --> 0:19:29.720 FCC grants try to escape broadband commitments. As the headline indicates, 0:19:29.720 --> 0:19:33.840 The story covers various ISPs that had agreed to participate 0:19:33.840 --> 0:19:36.879 in the US program to provide broadband to rural communities, 0:19:37.320 --> 0:19:39.439 but now they either want more money to do that 0:19:40.000 --> 0:19:42.000 or they just want to get out because I guess 0:19:42.040 --> 0:19:46.440 it's just too darn hard. The second article I recommend 0:19:46.960 --> 0:19:49.159 is from the Washington Post. It was written by Joseph 0:19:49.320 --> 0:19:52.840 men and the headline is hacking group plans system to 0:19:53.000 --> 0:19:56.040 encrypt social media and other apps. So we live in 0:19:56.040 --> 0:19:57.840 a world where lots of places are trying to chip 0:19:57.880 --> 0:20:00.800 away at privacy and encryption. It's not just a auauortarian 0:20:00.920 --> 0:20:04.840 states like Russia. I'm looking at you, UK and also 0:20:04.880 --> 0:20:07.760 parts of the United States. Anyway. This article talks about 0:20:07.800 --> 0:20:10.520 how the hacker group called Cult of the Dead Cow 0:20:10.720 --> 0:20:13.800 is working to create encrypted alternatives to social media, and 0:20:13.840 --> 0:20:16.560 it's well worth a read. But that's it for the 0:20:16.760 --> 0:20:20.399 Tech News for Thursday, August third, twenty twenty three. I 0:20:20.480 --> 0:20:23.119 hope you are all well, and I'll talk to you 0:20:23.160 --> 0:20:34.080 again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For 0:20:34.200 --> 0:20:39.040 more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple podcasts, 0:20:39.160 --> 0:20:44.760 or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.