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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeart Radio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noel.

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Speaker 3: They called me Ben.

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Speaker 4: We're joined as always with our super producer Paul, Mission

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Speaker 4: Control decand most importantly, you are you. You are here.

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Speaker 4: That makes this the stuff they don't want you to know. Uh,

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Speaker 4: let's open this way.

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Speaker 5: Uh.

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Speaker 4: How do you guys feel about the emergency alert system

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Speaker 4: in the United States? I personally dig it. I think

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Speaker 4: it's a cool thing.

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Speaker 3: This is only a test, you guys, This is only

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Speaker 3: a test. It's cool, man.

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Speaker 6: It's sort of like, uh uh, it's like an international

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Speaker 6: or a national firearm. Like I guess if we grow

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Speaker 6: up experiencing probably more fire drills in school than actual

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Speaker 6: you know, emergencies, and then we've probably all experienced more

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Speaker 6: tests of the emergency broadcasting system than actual necessary uses

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Speaker 6: of it.

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Speaker 3: But it's good to have it there in the back pocket,

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Speaker 3: you know.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, And it's better that their test, you know, it's

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Speaker 4: unsent that most of what we hear there are tests.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, not too many invasions of the country. Yet a

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Speaker 2: couple of tornadoes, a couple of you know, one hundred tornadoes,

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Speaker 2: which are it's important to have this kind of thing available. Well,

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Speaker 2: we'll get into the reasons, but man, the history of

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Speaker 2: this thing, the reason why I got put in place

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Speaker 2: is ish.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, and it's this system is similar to the Amber

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Speaker 4: Alert for missing persons, which should be you know, common

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Speaker 4: knowledge to most folks in the US. It's meant to

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Speaker 4: educate and protect the public, to arm them with information.

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Speaker 4: It's one of those thinking about this. It's one of

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Speaker 4: those rare things that pretty much everyone in government and

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Speaker 4: private industry agree on. Let's try to keep people from

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Speaker 4: dying in disasters. No one wants another hurricane Katrina, for example,

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Speaker 4: or you shouldn't.

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Speaker 6: Oh no, Well, it requires such a commitment, such a

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Speaker 6: buy in from everybody, right, Like I mean, I know

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Speaker 6: it's the law, but you know, when you get that

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Speaker 6: Amber alert, you get it on your phone, you get

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Speaker 6: it on the rate, you get it everywhere, and it

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Speaker 6: has to buy its very nature, has to have one

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Speaker 6: hundred percent adherence.

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Speaker 3: Mm hmm. Yeah.

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Speaker 4: And for most Americans, the emergency alert system or street

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Speaker 4: name EAS is an infrequent cameo in your life. Imagine

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Speaker 4: you're listening to the radio in your car, maybe you

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Speaker 4: have local TV on in the background, you're checking your phone.

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Speaker 4: You receive a text from the system, and now that

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Speaker 4: you have this information, you are more likely to survive

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Speaker 4: dangerous events so long as the system is working, so

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Speaker 4: long as the information is real, so long the whole

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Speaker 4: thing hasn't been hacked. Here are the facts. All right,

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Speaker 4: we're kind of describing it, and it's a familiar thing again,

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Speaker 4: But for people who are not listening from the United States,

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Speaker 4: who may have their own equivalent warning system, how would

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Speaker 4: we describe the EAS.

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Speaker 2: Well, it's a way for the United States government to

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Speaker 2: interrupt broadcasting basically with an emergency message of any sort.

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Speaker 3: Right.

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Speaker 2: It's mostly for radio and television, at least back in

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Speaker 2: the day. That's how it was developed. Right, So, if

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Speaker 2: anyone was listening to something or watching something, the system

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Speaker 2: was a tool basically for the president himself or herself

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Speaker 2: to jump on and say, hey, everybody, we got to

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Speaker 2: watch out for this thing.

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Speaker 6: And it's it's triggered, you know, I mean, it's we'll

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Speaker 6: get more into it. But we actually, as the employee

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Speaker 6: of a large broadcast company. We are all required to

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Speaker 6: take training courses periodically around the emergency alert system, how

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Speaker 6: to use it, how it's used, its history, and most importantly,

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Speaker 6: how to not accidentally trigger it, because that can.

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Speaker 3: Be done right.

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Speaker 4: As a result, we've been directed not to play this

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Speaker 4: the actual tone, which should be familiar to everybody. We

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Speaker 4: can describe it for you. It should only be used

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Speaker 4: for testing, educational, or actual emergency purposes. The best way

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Speaker 4: to describe it going to the primary sources is, as

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Speaker 4: Matt pointed out, it's back in the day, it was

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Speaker 4: primarily for radio and TV broadcasters. Now it'll be for

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Speaker 4: satellite operators, wireless cable systems. Also you know, mobile phones

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Speaker 4: or smartphones. And the whole goal is to, at the

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Speaker 4: most extreme version, provide the President of the United States

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Speaker 4: the capability to address the entirety of the American people

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Speaker 4: within ten minutes during a national emergency, which is a

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Speaker 4: heck of a heck of a time window and very

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Speaker 4: impressive to do this, I mean, with so many moving parts.

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Speaker 6: Whereas an amberiller it might be more regionalized or even localized,

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Speaker 6: the eas is nationalized.

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Speaker 3: And potentially potentially one hundred percent.

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Speaker 6: And it's so interesting because, you know, Matt, you pointed

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Speaker 6: out that it is something that has a background in

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Speaker 6: just you know, old school broadcast methods like TV and radio.

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Speaker 6: Therefore too when you hear that test, I swear I

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Speaker 6: almost guarantee the voice of that guy you hear was

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Speaker 6: probably recorded back in the fifties and they're still using

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Speaker 6: the same one just because it's just always I mean,

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Speaker 6: he sees like this is a touch of the emergency.

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Speaker 3: I swear that's gotta be vintage day.

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Speaker 6: That has to be well, you save money, oh yeah,

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Speaker 6: but it's also just in place. It's probably it's just

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Speaker 6: like whatever systems that are in place, server rooms, whatever

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Speaker 6: might be. It's got to be more low tech than that.

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Speaker 6: And this is just what's in there.

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Speaker 3: Well.

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Speaker 2: But with the new system, you can upload any MP

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Speaker 2: three that's right through the system, right which which plays

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Speaker 2: into you know, the later discussions in this episode about

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Speaker 2: what happens if somebody takes over. I just want to

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Speaker 2: point out we're talking about it as a national system,

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Speaker 2: but can also be localized. The only way I've ever

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Speaker 2: personally experienced it is through a weather alert when the

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Speaker 2: when naa National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration issues an alert that's

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Speaker 2: very localized to like a town or a region of

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Speaker 2: a state, and within the United States, that says, hey,

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Speaker 2: there has been a tornado warning in your area, or

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Speaker 2: there's you know, there's a tornado watch happening right now.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, Because there's a triumvirate of agencies taking taking helm

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Speaker 4: of this in some way. It is true. Interesting fact

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Speaker 4: if you want to be real fun at a party.

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Speaker 4: The EAS is theoretically deployable on a nationwide level. However,

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Speaker 4: the President has so far fingers crossed, knock on wood,

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Speaker 4: not done that. So you're much more likely to hear

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Speaker 4: this on a regional or local level through state or

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Speaker 4: territorial or tribal authorities. And this is a good thing.

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Speaker 4: That's why the voices might sound a little bit different

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Speaker 4: when they get to the details of the thing versus

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Speaker 4: the announced you know, the ubiquitous tone of the test.

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Speaker 4: The triumvira here is FEMA, the disaster guys, and then

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Speaker 4: they team up with the FCC, the communications gang, and

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Speaker 4: then as previously mentioned a moment ago, Noah, the National

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Speaker 4: Oceanic Atmospheric Administration. Without getting too into the weeds, FEMA

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Speaker 4: maintains the system. NOAH, through their National Weather Service branch,

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Speaker 4: is responsible for most of the alerts that get sent

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Speaker 4: out way or another, and the FCC's role is to

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Speaker 4: set the standards for the networks participating to kind of

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Speaker 4: determine the flow of traffic right in the order of operations.

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Speaker 4: Everybody works together to make sure this thing comes into

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Speaker 4: play when we need it. And that is why we

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Speaker 4: hear the test. You know. It's just like how the

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Speaker 4: military has to do drills all the time so that

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Speaker 4: when they're in an actual combat situation they know what

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Speaker 4: to do and it is familiar. That's the whole points.

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Speaker 4: That's why you hear this at the weirdest times. It's

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Speaker 4: a little cameo in your life.

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Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, and I remember growing up when the TV

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Speaker 2: was on way more frequently actually on cable or something.

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Speaker 2: It would be a specific cable provider that would run

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Speaker 2: a test or you.

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Speaker 4: Know, or like a CBS affiliate, NBC affiliate.

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Speaker 2: Even way back then. It would be on that level

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Speaker 2: of the actual broadcaster that was doing it rather than

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Speaker 2: the company that sends the entire of the cable signal

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Speaker 2: to you.

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Speaker 4: And I want to go back to the point about

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Speaker 4: the training, because this is something a couple of us

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Speaker 4: we're talking about off air before we rolled. My favorite

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Speaker 4: part about that kind of annual training is imagining how

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Speaker 4: bad things would have to get, like how far civilization

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Speaker 4: and chains of command would have to collapse for some

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Speaker 4: g man to hit me up and say, hey, podcast guy,

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Speaker 4: you've got to warn everyone about the tornado in Oklahoma,

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Speaker 4: the super Tornento. It would have to be a shark

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Speaker 4: tornado at that point, Like how many It's kind of

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Speaker 4: like when you think of how many people in government

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Speaker 4: would have to be out of play for, you know,

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Speaker 4: the mayor of a specific state to become commander in chief.

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Speaker 6: It is interesting, though, how this sort of loses its

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Speaker 6: teeth a little bit with the advent of more on

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Speaker 6: demand services, you know, like podcasting. It'd be damn it

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Speaker 6: would be impossible to implement that in a podcast because

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Speaker 6: people are getting the thing. It's on their system, you know,

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Speaker 6: disconnected from the Internet potentially, and they're listening to it,

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Speaker 6: consuming it whenever they want. And such is the case

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Speaker 6: too with like any kind of YouTube. And I don't know,

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Speaker 6: like I'm interested to know is there a future proofing

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Speaker 6: of this or is there some kind of modern version

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Speaker 6: that could break into Internet streams.

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Speaker 3: I don't know the logistics so that would work.

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Speaker 4: Honestly, the best solution, which is imperfect, the best solution

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Speaker 4: deployed and we'll get to this in just a couple

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Speaker 4: of minutes, is the advent of cell phone networks. I'm

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Speaker 4: holding up a phone. It's the advent of those issuing

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Speaker 4: the warnings via text because of course, not everybody has

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Speaker 4: the radio on all the time. In a world where

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Speaker 4: a ton of people aren't watching you know, old rabbit

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Speaker 4: e or broadcast TV, we have to wonder how effective

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Speaker 4: this could be. We need people to know about natural disasters, fires, floods,

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Speaker 4: high winds, hazardous materials, ghastly, you know what I mean.

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Speaker 4: Your local DuPont factory explodes and the cloud is moving

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Speaker 4: north northeast. The people there might not be listening to

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Speaker 4: the radio, so it's the fastest way to get to

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Speaker 4: them is statistically through the use of phones, since most

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Speaker 4: people have those.

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Speaker 2: Do you guys remember October of last year? I know,

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Speaker 2: was it October? It was last year? There was a

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Speaker 2: nationwide test with this stuff, specifically to test out the

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Speaker 2: new cell phone alerts with the EAS and it was

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Speaker 2: a big deal.

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Speaker 3: You made the news. I mean it was a like

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Speaker 3: an event, right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it was like everybody needs to be aware that

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Speaker 2: this is a test, because.

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Speaker 3: There were months in advance.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, they were afraid that there would be, you know,

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Speaker 2: at least small pockets of us that would freak the

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Speaker 2: heck out, even though it says on it it's a test.

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Speaker 2: Just that sound alone, and just that I think we've

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Speaker 2: been primed since childhood, at least I know I have

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Speaker 2: been that that sound. It means there is real stuff

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Speaker 2: going down right now.

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Speaker 6: I'm actually really anxious to talk to my kid about

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Speaker 6: this because I would hazard a guess that they are

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Speaker 6: not aware of this system or that sound at all.

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Speaker 3: That I really do bet that's the case.

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Speaker 4: Well, if they have a phone, they're going to learn

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Speaker 4: about it pretty quickly.

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Speaker 3: Man's surely sure, and that you know.

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Speaker 6: But it's also just it hits you a little different

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Speaker 6: than what you're talking about, Matt, that almost nostalgic quality

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Speaker 6: that we attached to it, you know, left of this

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Speaker 6: is serious business, guys.

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Speaker 4: What the whole idea though, is uh is noble right

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Speaker 4: if ambitionious? The idea that we could give the public

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Speaker 4: time to get to higher ground in a tsunami event,

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Speaker 4: or find shelter from something really fast and unpredictable like

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Speaker 4: a tornado. This system, for all its imperfections, has saved lives,

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Speaker 4: and it's a critical piece of infrastructure. It's weird to

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Speaker 4: think that this did not This was not always a

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Speaker 4: thing in the United States. It came after the advent

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Speaker 4: of radio technology and other mass communication platforms. Noah's Weather

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Speaker 4: Bureau didn't give the public a heads up about severe

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Speaker 4: weather warnings until nineteen fifty, and it was kind of

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Speaker 4: catch twenty two Joseph Heller esque because before then, the

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Speaker 4: government boffin thinking was, if we issue these emergency alerts,

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Speaker 4: we could lead to we could accidentally create widespread panic,

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Speaker 4: not the band, we could make false reports. We could accidentally,

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Speaker 4: with the best of intentions, create a disaster when there

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Speaker 4: wasn't really one. So they were very conscious, just as

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Speaker 4: so this up. They're very conscious that the power to

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Speaker 4: address so many people at once could be incredibly dangerous.

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Speaker 3: It is the're on hands where it to fall into them.

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Speaker 2: You know, Well, let's talk about that date, that year,

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Speaker 2: nineteen fifty. Why do we think the United States decided

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Speaker 2: it needed this system in nineteen fifty. Gotta say, not

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Speaker 2: this specific date, but what happened just before nineteen fifty,

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Speaker 2: just a couple of years before. Oh, I don't know,

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Speaker 2: the atomic bomb?

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Speaker 6: Yeah, right, So, like say, this is when you get

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Speaker 6: a lot of duck and cover like videos and things

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Speaker 6: like that.

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Speaker 3: This is of that.

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Speaker 2: Era because there's a real fear that well, hey, if

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Speaker 2: we can do this to a country where all you know,

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Speaker 2: in Japan, where in these two cities, like we gave

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Speaker 2: them fair warning with pamphlets or whatever, but we still,

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Speaker 2: you know, somewhat glassified quite a large swath of two cities.

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Speaker 2: What if that happens to us somewhere? How how are

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Speaker 2: we gonna let people know? Right?

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Speaker 3: Did you just say glassified?

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Speaker 2: I'm not. I'm sorry, I'm that's to.

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Speaker 3: No, I never heard that. I've never heard that. I

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Speaker 3: think it's a I've never heard it before. I think

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Speaker 3: it's very appropriate.

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Speaker 4: I just that's ye atomized, sure, lay waste, yes, left

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Speaker 4: no stone standing on another stone, terrified. I mean, yeah,

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Speaker 4: that's I think that is the terrifying genesis of the

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Speaker 4: change in thinking in governance there at least in the US.

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Speaker 4: And the better minds won the day we could say,

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Speaker 4: because by nineteen fifty one, after Noah went public with

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Speaker 4: publishing these available severe weather warnings, radio stations on the

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Speaker 4: AM band would carry broadcasts during disasters or other emergencies. So,

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Speaker 4: to MAT's point, completely correct. In my opinion, it's a

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Speaker 4: it's a Cold War thing, and unlike a lot of

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Speaker 4: other Cold War legacies, this was a good thing.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, very good thing. Thank goodness for the EAS.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, which was started as the EBS Emergency Broadcast System.

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Speaker 2: That's how I remember you're hearing in nineteen sixty three,

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Speaker 2: Emergency Broadcast System.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, because they used it until nineteen ninety seven. The

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Speaker 4: Emergency Alert System came in in nineteen ninety seven. Why

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Speaker 4: did it switch? Well, if we're looking for historical precedent,

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Speaker 4: why not the nineteen ninety six Olympics. I'm kidding, that's

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Speaker 4: not true, but it sounds kind of plausible.

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Speaker 2: Wow. Yeah, yeah, if you don't.

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Speaker 4: Think about it, it sounds plausible.

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Speaker 2: Sure, sure, But it was mostly because that's around the

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Speaker 2: same time that I got my first cell phone, right,

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Speaker 2: so they must have been changing things up to noting

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Speaker 2: that they were now cellular networks coming out.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, to broaden the scope a bit. I think

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Speaker 4: that's quite astute. And then twenty twelve the all the

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Speaker 4: weird conspiracies about the Mayan calendar were incorrect, and Mayan

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Speaker 4: people have been saying that forever, but because the world

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Speaker 4: didn't end in twenty twelve, we see the rollout of

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Speaker 4: the text the emergence the wireless emergency alerts or weas, and.

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Speaker 2: They were sending texts all the way back in twenty twelve.

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Speaker 3: Yes, ah, I don't know.

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Speaker 2: How, I'm like missed out. I don't I have no

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Speaker 2: recollection of that occurring.

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Speaker 6: I think it was widely adopted, like in terms of

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Speaker 6: like a you know, regularly used thing. But I do

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Speaker 6: remember early texts that would come from say your cell

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Speaker 6: phone provider telling you things about your bill or whatever,

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Speaker 6: and it was almost like what is this novelty thing?

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Speaker 3: Because it was hard to input data into those.

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Speaker 6: You had to use the alpha numeric kind of like

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Speaker 6: one two three kind of like system, and it was

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Speaker 6: just a little bit tricky with early little Nokia brickfallons.

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Speaker 6: That's I do remember it as far back as then

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Speaker 6: as it being a capability.

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Speaker 2: But we're talking about twenty twelve, right, like that's when

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Speaker 2: this wireless thing came in where so they would actually

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Speaker 2: send emergency information via text message to you.

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Speaker 4: Yeah. In addition, started with yeah cell phones in New

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Speaker 4: Mexico in response to flooding twelve and it's.

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Speaker 3: You know, we as IBB's ease.

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Speaker 4: This is a lot of these are a lot of acronyms,

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Speaker 4: but again they're important to understanding tonight's episode because it

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Speaker 4: is an invisible infrastructure empire. But it's even though it's

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Speaker 4: invisible and intangible, it's just as crucial as roads, bridges, electricity,

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Speaker 4: drinking water, all the hits and sadly, just like so

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Speaker 4: many other kinds of infrastructure, as we'll find this evening,

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Speaker 4: the emergency alert system may be imperiled because what would

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Speaker 4: happen if someone hacked it.

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Speaker 6: We'll talk about just that after a quick word from

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Speaker 6: our sponsor.

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Speaker 4: Here's where it gets crazy. It could be an absolute

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Speaker 4: utter catastrophe if someone was able to compromise a system

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Speaker 4: this powerful. On the national level, shore that's possibly existential,

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Speaker 4: but even on the regional or local level, this could

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Speaker 4: really put a monkey wrench in things.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, imagine if everybody and let's just say a

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Speaker 2: super small town, a couple thousand people, Imagine if everybody

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Speaker 2: in that small town gets alerted that there's what do

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Speaker 2: we say, guys, not a weather emergency, something more out

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Speaker 2: there UFO, a UFOs landed in the middle of the town, right,

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Speaker 2: And well, if that panic starts to set in, even

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Speaker 2: with a couple thousand people, we know what that can do,

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Speaker 2: like to the psychology of a group of people, right,

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Speaker 2: and the dangerous situation they would all be in.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, if you hacked any level of this, you would

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Speaker 4: remove a foundational piece of the safety net for the

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Speaker 4: American public, and you would remove their ability to shelter

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Speaker 4: from or escape from a fast event like a tornado.

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Speaker 4: People would die if you prevented this. So in the

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Speaker 4: other scenario, the one I think you're referencing there, meta,

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Speaker 4: you could leverage some aspect of the eas to issue

356
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Speaker 4: fake or misleading warnings. You could create a disaster as

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Speaker 4: a distraction. It's like a weaponized version of that old

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Speaker 4: canard or fake story about Orson Wells and the War

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Speaker 4: of the World's broadcast. We all heard that story, right,

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Speaker 4: and hopefully we all know it's not true. Well, yeah,

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Speaker 4: I mean, there's a quick background.

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Speaker 6: It was like a radio play that was produced by

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Speaker 6: Orson Wells's Radio Theater Company, and it was just so

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Speaker 6: damn good and at least for the time, and it

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Speaker 6: was not I guess, I mean it.

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Speaker 3: Was caveat it. If I'm not mistaken, Ben.

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Speaker 6: They certainly did, but people tuned in halfway a lot

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Speaker 6: of times it didn't hear the opening sort of qualifier

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Speaker 6: that this was just a you know play, And a

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Speaker 6: lot of people really did think that we were being

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Speaker 6: this is like a real news broadcast and we were

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Speaker 6: being you know, invaded by alien forces.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, some percentage of people believe that, but if we

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Speaker 4: were Snoop, we would say it was mostly false. But

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Speaker 4: the thing is it teaches us a real, an actual

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Speaker 4: and plausible tactic. I guess we'll add one more scenario here.

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Speaker 4: If you cut it off, you would you would be

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Speaker 4: able to remove public knowledge of man made disasters as well,

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Speaker 4: such as large scale attacks, terrorist incursions. Luckily, the US

380
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Speaker 4: has super creepy eyes and ears all over the place,

381
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Speaker 4: on the ground, the sea, the heavens, so there are

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Speaker 4: redundant systems that will let the government know when a

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Speaker 4: missile launches and so forth. But if you hack the eas,

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Speaker 4: then the government might know about these things. But the

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Speaker 4: public might not so very very dangerous water. Well, it's

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Speaker 4: like you got too flip size kind of. You got

387
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Speaker 4: the boy who cried wolf scenario, which is dangerous in

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Speaker 4: and of itself, and then you have the like cutting

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Speaker 4: it off entirely scenario, which is dangerous in a different way.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think that's really scary to me, the thought

391
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Speaker 2: of it could just not function when I personally or

392
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Speaker 2: my family needs it to function. And have you guys

393
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Speaker 2: ever been in a scenario where you've been at your

394
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Speaker 2: house or you've been somewhere and you were unaware that

395
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Speaker 2: there was going to be a severe storm and you

396
00:22:19,680 --> 00:22:22,679
Speaker 2: for some reason were just oblivious to like what the

397
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Speaker 2: sky was doing and what the clouds were doing, and

398
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Speaker 2: the darkness or whatever it was, and then all of

399
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Speaker 2: a sudden, you find yourself in the middle of a

400
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Speaker 2: very severe weather event like that has happened to Melickers. Yeah,

401
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Speaker 2: And I I don't know. I don't know if it's

402
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Speaker 2: just if it's too out there, but the fear I

403
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Speaker 2: know that I experienced in those moments, especially because I

404
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Speaker 2: had a very young child at the time, just like

405
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Speaker 2: what do I do? Oh God, what do I do?

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Speaker 2: And when the panic sets in it's very difficult to

407
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Speaker 2: act in that cool headed manner that you may actually

408
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Speaker 2: need to have when there's an emergency situation.

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Speaker 3: Little heads up goes a long way.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, And if I was paying attention and I'd gotten

411
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Speaker 2: an alert or something, then I feel like I would

412
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Speaker 2: have at least handled myself better than I did. I

413
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Speaker 2: don't know. I think removing it is really scarier than

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Speaker 2: I thought it would be.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, also this reminds me everybody check out

416
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Speaker 4: the go Bag episode. We know it's not for everybody,

417
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Speaker 4: but just like people train with the eas improv is cool,

418
00:23:30,080 --> 00:23:34,520
Speaker 4: but preparation and prepared responses. Preparation and practice responses, I

419
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Speaker 4: should say, are your best bet in things like this.

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Speaker 4: What are you going to do when the grocery stores

421
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Speaker 4: close their doors right and the water doesn't come out

422
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Speaker 4: of the faucets. It's okay to look nuts nine times

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Speaker 4: if the tenth time it's the correct move totally.

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Speaker 6: And you know, while we certainly have issues where weather

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Speaker 6: conditions can be very very serious here in the United States,

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Speaker 6: you know, things like you know, hurricanes and tornadoes and

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Speaker 6: all of that stuff. In Japan and in countries like that,

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Speaker 6: I mean tsunamis are a serious issue, and so I

429
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Speaker 6: was just looking up a little bit about the Japanese

430
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Speaker 6: version of this technology, and they have kind of figured

431
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Speaker 6: it in to where you will get an alert on

432
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Speaker 6: your computer as well, like it's all tied in, whereas

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Speaker 6: we're a little behind the curve here unless we've missed

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Speaker 6: something and there's been an update.

435
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Speaker 3: But I don't think that's the case.

436
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Speaker 6: The jay alert system is much more robust than this

437
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Speaker 6: what we have here.

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Speaker 3: In the States.

439
00:24:31,320 --> 00:24:34,119
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I've seen it. I've experienced it, and you

440
00:24:34,160 --> 00:24:37,960
Speaker 4: can go You can make an argument that there's more

441
00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:41,479
Speaker 4: of a unified approach to it because the US system

442
00:24:41,680 --> 00:24:44,879
Speaker 4: has so many moving parts. Very true, you know so.

443
00:24:45,080 --> 00:24:47,879
Speaker 4: And also the legislation here does take a while to

444
00:24:47,920 --> 00:24:50,639
Speaker 4: catch up. This is this is where we get to

445
00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:54,480
Speaker 4: a crazier part. This all might sounds a little alarmist

446
00:24:54,560 --> 00:24:56,520
Speaker 4: right now. If you're hearing this in a safe place

447
00:24:56,560 --> 00:24:58,400
Speaker 4: and you look outside and you say, well, it's kind

448
00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:00,919
Speaker 4: of hot, but it looks like a nice day for

449
00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:03,360
Speaker 4: the day walkers out there, we have to step back

450
00:25:03,359 --> 00:25:08,720
Speaker 4: and ask ourselves, could any of these events actually occur? Yes,

451
00:25:09,320 --> 00:25:12,320
Speaker 4: And the people who are concerned about this are not

452
00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:17,080
Speaker 4: just fringe wing nuts, you know on the chans somewhere.

453
00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:20,320
Speaker 4: They're experts worried about this, and they have precedent. Do

454
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:23,119
Speaker 4: we want to talk? Oh gosh, all right. In February

455
00:25:23,160 --> 00:25:26,080
Speaker 4: twenty thirteen, let's just do it this way. TV stations

456
00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:30,160
Speaker 4: in multiple states Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, and then later

457
00:25:30,200 --> 00:25:35,080
Speaker 4: a couple others encountered a pretty hilarious prank with profoundly

458
00:25:35,160 --> 00:25:38,639
Speaker 4: disturbing implications. Is it okay if we play the clip?

459
00:25:38,960 --> 00:25:42,320
Speaker 4: Mosty okay with you guys. We'll play just the first part. Okay, folks,

460
00:25:42,400 --> 00:25:46,040
Speaker 4: here it is. We're only going to play part of

461
00:25:46,080 --> 00:25:49,840
Speaker 4: this so that this does not get mistaken for an

462
00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:51,200
Speaker 4: actual emergency alert.

463
00:25:51,320 --> 00:25:51,960
Speaker 3: But here we go.

464
00:25:52,080 --> 00:25:57,480
Speaker 4: This is KRTV out of Montana, a local CBS affiliate.

465
00:25:57,920 --> 00:26:00,880
Speaker 4: In twenty thirteen. February twenty thirteen.

466
00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:05,360
Speaker 5: Civil authorities in your area have reported that the bodies

467
00:26:05,400 --> 00:26:07,920
Speaker 5: of the dead are rising from their graves and attacking

468
00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:11,159
Speaker 5: their living. Follow the messages on screen that will be

469
00:26:11,240 --> 00:26:15,160
Speaker 5: updated as information becomes available. Do not attempt to approach

470
00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:18,600
Speaker 5: or apprehend these bodies, as they are considered extremely dangerous.

471
00:26:18,680 --> 00:26:19,240
Speaker 3: I repeat.

472
00:26:19,760 --> 00:26:23,160
Speaker 5: Civil authorities in your area have reported that the bodies

473
00:26:23,200 --> 00:26:25,600
Speaker 5: of the dead are rising from their graves and attacking

474
00:26:25,640 --> 00:26:28,679
Speaker 5: the living. Follow the messages on screen that will be

475
00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:32,720
Speaker 5: updated as information becomes available. Do not attempt to approach

476
00:26:32,840 --> 00:26:36,439
Speaker 5: or apprehend these bodies, as they are considered extremely dangerous.

477
00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:40,080
Speaker 5: This station will now sees transmission, so please use your

478
00:26:40,160 --> 00:26:43,800
Speaker 5: battery power radio tune into nine twenty am for formation.

479
00:26:48,160 --> 00:26:51,560
Speaker 4: So what how would you feel if you heard that

480
00:26:51,960 --> 00:26:55,440
Speaker 4: over a pancake commercial? By the way, in Montana.

481
00:26:56,880 --> 00:27:00,720
Speaker 6: If it's interrupting pancakes, I mean, we're in serious trouble

482
00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:01,960
Speaker 6: here as far as I'm concerned.

483
00:27:02,040 --> 00:27:04,880
Speaker 2: Well, it was was it? Was it the news or

484
00:27:04,920 --> 00:27:07,200
Speaker 2: was it a full on infomercial that was happening?

485
00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:11,639
Speaker 4: This was this was a series of advertisements, okay, in

486
00:27:11,680 --> 00:27:14,040
Speaker 4: the midst of something called the Steve Wilco Show.

487
00:27:14,440 --> 00:27:17,160
Speaker 2: Okay, got You, Got You? So it's an advertising block

488
00:27:17,240 --> 00:27:21,000
Speaker 2: inside one of their television shows. Yeah, no, I mean

489
00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:24,280
Speaker 2: that's pretty horrifying. I think the language that was used

490
00:27:24,320 --> 00:27:28,320
Speaker 2: by the person speaking there made it feel very genuine, right,

491
00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:34,360
Speaker 2: except for, you know, the bodies of the dead are

492
00:27:34,480 --> 00:27:37,000
Speaker 2: rising from their graves, which you're just like, nah, that

493
00:27:37,320 --> 00:27:41,280
Speaker 2: what But the well, the response basically the person is

494
00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:44,120
Speaker 2: telling you to do right, keep your radio, tune into

495
00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:48,800
Speaker 2: the station for alerts, don't go near the bodies. It

496
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:49,800
Speaker 2: sounded genuine.

497
00:27:50,160 --> 00:27:57,600
Speaker 4: Ugh, there's one like one forensic misstep or structural misstep

498
00:27:57,880 --> 00:28:02,000
Speaker 4: the speaker makes. They use the first person tense, they

499
00:28:02,040 --> 00:28:04,440
Speaker 4: say I at some point, which you're not supposed to.

500
00:28:04,560 --> 00:28:07,000
Speaker 4: Oh really, But that's that's the thing a lot of

501
00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:09,880
Speaker 4: people will miss. I didn't clock it until listening through

502
00:28:09,920 --> 00:28:10,640
Speaker 4: a few times.

503
00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:11,800
Speaker 3: But yeah, you're right.

504
00:28:11,880 --> 00:28:16,520
Speaker 4: Like the fact that it has the actual emergency tone, right,

505
00:28:16,880 --> 00:28:21,159
Speaker 4: the fact that there are specific, clear instructions, calls to action,

506
00:28:21,640 --> 00:28:26,920
Speaker 4: next steps. This does feel even for skeptical people, right,

507
00:28:27,080 --> 00:28:30,480
Speaker 4: A lot of folks would understandably have one of those

508
00:28:31,440 --> 00:28:33,760
Speaker 4: oh crap, really moments.

509
00:28:34,720 --> 00:28:37,399
Speaker 2: Do we know if that person got arrested and like

510
00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:41,680
Speaker 2: find hundreds of thousands of not millions of dollars? Because

511
00:28:41,680 --> 00:28:44,240
Speaker 2: they I feel like I could identify that person's voice.

512
00:28:44,440 --> 00:28:48,000
Speaker 2: It was very I mean, is yeah, you would recognize

513
00:28:48,000 --> 00:28:49,640
Speaker 2: that person if they stood in fornt of even talked.

514
00:28:49,640 --> 00:28:55,080
Speaker 4: I think yeah, as far as we know, they have

515
00:28:55,280 --> 00:29:00,240
Speaker 4: not been apprehended, and they hit multiple places over multiple days.

516
00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:03,640
Speaker 4: We also know I was surprised to find that at

517
00:29:03,760 --> 00:29:06,560
Speaker 4: least at the time, the fine for this kind of

518
00:29:06,560 --> 00:29:09,440
Speaker 4: thing that we call a broadcast signal intrusion was up

519
00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:11,840
Speaker 4: to a year in jail and one thousand dollars.

520
00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:13,600
Speaker 2: One thousand dollars.

521
00:29:13,960 --> 00:29:16,280
Speaker 4: That's it, I know, right, that's.

522
00:29:16,080 --> 00:29:20,080
Speaker 2: So crazy because in our FCC training we learned that

523
00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:24,120
Speaker 2: there was some radio show that played this the official

524
00:29:24,160 --> 00:29:30,160
Speaker 2: eas tone and all of that bringing stuff, and then

525
00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:33,520
Speaker 2: they could find hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was

526
00:29:33,520 --> 00:29:35,040
Speaker 2: a lot of money.

527
00:29:35,600 --> 00:29:37,840
Speaker 6: But is that like you're talking about for an individual

528
00:29:37,920 --> 00:29:43,280
Speaker 6: ben for this was my understanding here at the time.

529
00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:46,640
Speaker 4: God these intrusions, so they probably, I mean, as a

530
00:29:46,680 --> 00:29:51,240
Speaker 4: result of this, obviously a lot of things changed because

531
00:29:51,280 --> 00:29:54,520
Speaker 4: someone had the proof of concept and said, hey, we

532
00:29:54,600 --> 00:29:59,800
Speaker 4: can convince small towns everywhere or regions of states that

533
00:30:00,200 --> 00:30:06,160
Speaker 4: dead are rising from the grave. And yeah, that's part

534
00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:10,720
Speaker 4: of why I think so many media companies clamped down

535
00:30:10,880 --> 00:30:14,520
Speaker 4: on this stuff. The stations evolved all very quickly, to

536
00:30:14,560 --> 00:30:18,360
Speaker 4: their credit, launched into damage control and they said, look, hey,

537
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:24,440
Speaker 4: if anybody's wondering dead people are still dead. That part

538
00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:28,600
Speaker 4: hasn't changed. We're sorry there was an interruption in the programming.

539
00:30:28,640 --> 00:30:31,520
Speaker 4: We're figuring out what's going to happen after this, and

540
00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:35,440
Speaker 4: this also I think calls to mind other infamous signal

541
00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:39,800
Speaker 4: intrusions like the Max Headroom event in nineteen eighty seven

542
00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:44,280
Speaker 4: that we covered in depth previously, or the Captain Midnight

543
00:30:44,440 --> 00:30:46,520
Speaker 4: thing where he took over HBO for a second.

544
00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:47,040
Speaker 5: Mm hmm.

545
00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:51,680
Speaker 2: Let's get as. I just wanted a note here. I

546
00:30:51,720 --> 00:30:55,520
Speaker 2: didn't know the FBI would get involved if you try

547
00:30:55,560 --> 00:30:59,280
Speaker 2: and hijack the emergency broadcast system like that or the EA.

548
00:30:59,440 --> 00:31:02,080
Speaker 6: It makes sense, though, right, because you're like crust, I mean,

549
00:31:02,120 --> 00:31:05,240
Speaker 6: it's it's uh, it's federal. You know, it's a federal system.

550
00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:10,239
Speaker 6: You're doing something that affects things across state lines, you know,

551
00:31:10,360 --> 00:31:13,000
Speaker 6: literally every potentially every state line.

552
00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:14,040
Speaker 3: Uh yeah, I mean I.

553
00:31:14,680 --> 00:31:17,280
Speaker 6: Didn't know that either, wouldn't necessarily immediately thought that, but

554
00:31:17,320 --> 00:31:19,120
Speaker 6: when you say it out loud, it does kind of

555
00:31:19,120 --> 00:31:20,320
Speaker 6: make sense in its own way, right.

556
00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:23,040
Speaker 2: Well. Yeah, but in the case we just talked about,

557
00:31:23,080 --> 00:31:26,920
Speaker 2: that was one tiny little station in Great Falls, Montana,

558
00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:31,240
Speaker 2: right where that broadcast alert went through with that fake one,

559
00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:34,920
Speaker 2: But the FBI just immediately was on the case.

560
00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:38,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, It's like how it's a federal crime to mess

561
00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:39,160
Speaker 4: with the mail.

562
00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:40,760
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, I guess that's true.

563
00:31:42,120 --> 00:31:45,360
Speaker 4: Yeah, and you know they're they're not playing. And also

564
00:31:45,360 --> 00:31:48,600
Speaker 4: a lot of people got caught out because they learned

565
00:31:48,720 --> 00:31:52,400
Speaker 4: that they were not as safe as they thought they were.

566
00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:56,040
Speaker 4: And objectively, for a lot of people, probably a lot

567
00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:59,160
Speaker 4: of our longtime listeners who happened to see this, it's

568
00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:04,240
Speaker 4: kind of hilarious, right, No, because no one got killed spoiler,

569
00:32:04,360 --> 00:32:07,120
Speaker 4: No one got killed by the undead, and as far

570
00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:09,320
Speaker 4: as we know, no one died in some sort of

571
00:32:09,760 --> 00:32:13,600
Speaker 4: ensuing panic. But this was a shot across the bow

572
00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:19,520
Speaker 4: of broadcasting infrastructure, and later analysis seemed to find that

573
00:32:19,600 --> 00:32:22,880
Speaker 4: the most mundane possible reason for this was indeed the cause.

574
00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:27,280
Speaker 4: The head of the Michigan Association of Broadcasters said, here's

575
00:32:27,320 --> 00:32:34,200
Speaker 4: what happened. TV stations bought this equipment for these emergency systems,

576
00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:38,600
Speaker 4: and that equipment, like so many electronics who buy even today,

577
00:32:38,880 --> 00:32:42,600
Speaker 4: came with default passwords. And the folks who were setting

578
00:32:42,640 --> 00:32:46,320
Speaker 4: this up at their local stations just didn't change the

579
00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:50,040
Speaker 4: default passwords. That's what the trade group said. You just

580
00:32:50,120 --> 00:32:53,600
Speaker 4: kept the password admin for admin one, two, three four,

581
00:32:54,200 --> 00:32:56,080
Speaker 4: And you were like, all right, that's fine, I got

582
00:32:56,120 --> 00:32:56,840
Speaker 4: other stuff to do.

583
00:32:57,440 --> 00:33:00,959
Speaker 2: That's so funny. That's the exact problem that all of

584
00:33:01,000 --> 00:33:07,080
Speaker 2: these emergency road signs are having, where every all of

585
00:33:07,120 --> 00:33:09,800
Speaker 2: the you know, Department of Transportation.

586
00:33:09,320 --> 00:33:12,240
Speaker 3: Ones with the texts, yeah, the little you.

587
00:33:12,200 --> 00:33:15,600
Speaker 2: Know with it's not scrolling texts. They like display some

588
00:33:15,680 --> 00:33:18,920
Speaker 2: text then blips out, then displays some more texts and

589
00:33:19,040 --> 00:33:24,200
Speaker 2: that thing. And those systems, almost all of them have

590
00:33:24,360 --> 00:33:26,760
Speaker 2: a little panel in the back that you can access

591
00:33:26,800 --> 00:33:29,840
Speaker 2: that usually isn't locked, and they've got a default password

592
00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:33,160
Speaker 2: and anybody can walk up there at any time and

593
00:33:33,280 --> 00:33:35,719
Speaker 2: just change the thing and say, oh, zombies ahead.

594
00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:41,920
Speaker 4: It's like, how it's so terrifyingly easy to hack traffic

595
00:33:42,000 --> 00:33:46,360
Speaker 4: lights in most of America. It's because it's like it's

596
00:33:46,400 --> 00:33:47,800
Speaker 4: a why would you situation?

597
00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:49,600
Speaker 2: I didn't know that you can just open a panel

598
00:33:49,640 --> 00:33:51,080
Speaker 2: somewhere and just hack them.

599
00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:54,000
Speaker 3: Well, there's a very maybe A mentioned this.

600
00:33:54,120 --> 00:33:57,760
Speaker 6: There's a very specific episode of mcguyver where he yeah,

601
00:33:57,840 --> 00:33:59,960
Speaker 6: it's a panel, like it's like a at least back

602
00:34:00,080 --> 00:34:02,200
Speaker 6: in the eighties or whatever, it was like a box

603
00:34:02,440 --> 00:34:05,440
Speaker 6: that if you break into, there's like circuit boards and

604
00:34:05,480 --> 00:34:08,840
Speaker 6: he kind of you know, switched some jumpers or whatever.

605
00:34:09,080 --> 00:34:11,600
Speaker 6: You know. The mcguiver, but he did it as a

606
00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:14,360
Speaker 6: way of creating a diversion, but it actually could have

607
00:34:14,400 --> 00:34:16,840
Speaker 6: potentially caused a traffic bile up, but could have killed

608
00:34:16,840 --> 00:34:20,080
Speaker 6: in a peoples. That always really sketched me out about mcguiver.

609
00:34:20,800 --> 00:34:24,360
Speaker 4: Oh my gosh, we're going somewhere with this, folks. Because

610
00:34:25,520 --> 00:34:29,640
Speaker 4: right now, in a lot of places, the traffic lights

611
00:34:29,719 --> 00:34:35,680
Speaker 4: are are wirelessly networked, which is a convenience. But with

612
00:34:35,719 --> 00:34:40,880
Speaker 4: that convenience comes the opportunity for Shenanigans. University of Michigan

613
00:34:41,200 --> 00:34:44,880
Speaker 4: researchers back in twenty fourteen found that you could with

614
00:34:45,000 --> 00:34:49,560
Speaker 4: a simple laptop, nothing like no NSA or NRO black

615
00:34:49,600 --> 00:34:53,920
Speaker 4: box stuff, with a regular, publicly available laptop, you could

616
00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:57,200
Speaker 4: hack traffic light networks. And you see this in The

617
00:34:57,239 --> 00:35:01,600
Speaker 4: Italian Job. You see this in other films, right, and

618
00:35:01,640 --> 00:35:03,600
Speaker 4: I guess you see it in video games too, right.

619
00:35:04,560 --> 00:35:05,760
Speaker 3: I think it was in some of those.

620
00:35:06,480 --> 00:35:09,359
Speaker 2: Yeah there, well there, What is that video game where

621
00:35:09,360 --> 00:35:12,799
Speaker 2: it's specifically about hacking the entire city and everybody in it?

622
00:35:13,000 --> 00:35:16,080
Speaker 2: There's Camp Watch Dogs. Yeah, that's the one. That's what

623
00:35:16,120 --> 00:35:16,880
Speaker 2: I'm thinking about.

624
00:35:17,040 --> 00:35:20,000
Speaker 4: Okay, I thought that was a good game. I don't

625
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:20,920
Speaker 4: think I ever finished it.

626
00:35:21,000 --> 00:35:23,920
Speaker 2: I never played it, but I remember seeing lots and

627
00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:25,000
Speaker 2: lots of promo for it.

628
00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:28,400
Speaker 3: That's right, they spent a lot of money on the promo.

629
00:35:29,080 --> 00:35:32,920
Speaker 4: And then the thing is these trade groups. It feels

630
00:35:32,960 --> 00:35:36,040
Speaker 4: like they're acting in good faith, but we could also

631
00:35:36,400 --> 00:35:40,600
Speaker 4: wonder whether they're trying to assign blame to someone else

632
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:44,080
Speaker 4: in this system of many moving parts. Are they saying, oh,

633
00:35:44,160 --> 00:35:47,920
Speaker 4: it's the employees who just put in admin or didn't

634
00:35:47,960 --> 00:35:54,960
Speaker 4: change their default password. Other people disagreed. Security firms. One

635
00:35:54,960 --> 00:35:57,040
Speaker 4: that got quoted a lot at the time, a group

636
00:35:57,080 --> 00:36:02,040
Speaker 4: called io Active. They said, look, it's deeper than the passwords.

637
00:36:02,239 --> 00:36:05,719
Speaker 4: We found critical vulnerabilities in both the software and the

638
00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:10,160
Speaker 4: hardware of all these stations across the United States. This

639
00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:14,040
Speaker 4: means that just like hacking traffic lights, hackers could remotely

640
00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:20,239
Speaker 4: compromise these devices, broadcast fake messages, potentially stop messages from

641
00:36:20,239 --> 00:36:23,880
Speaker 4: going out if they were real. And then, I don't know,

642
00:36:23,960 --> 00:36:26,239
Speaker 4: it gets weirder because they could also just go in

643
00:36:26,320 --> 00:36:29,240
Speaker 4: and change the password, right, classic.

644
00:36:28,800 --> 00:36:29,759
Speaker 3: Hacker power move.

645
00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:33,440
Speaker 2: Yep. And this is we're still in twenty thirteen and

646
00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:37,600
Speaker 2: immediately following that year, right because of this major thing

647
00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:41,239
Speaker 2: which I improperly said was just from Montana, but it

648
00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:44,000
Speaker 2: was Michigan, Montana and New Mexico. Sorry about that, guys,

649
00:36:45,120 --> 00:36:47,719
Speaker 2: but it was a small station that was broadcasting out

650
00:36:47,880 --> 00:36:53,480
Speaker 2: to a lot of places. So they're finding that in

651
00:36:53,560 --> 00:36:59,360
Speaker 2: twenty thirteen, twenty fourteen. I'm assuming there are these vulnerabilities everywhere.

652
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:02,520
Speaker 2: So is there anything to do to change it? I'm

653
00:37:02,520 --> 00:37:05,440
Speaker 2: assuming we made a lot of changes afterwards.

654
00:37:05,640 --> 00:37:10,360
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, hopefully. It kind of it put the burden

655
00:37:10,520 --> 00:37:15,160
Speaker 4: on the individual stations, right, the individual outlets we want

656
00:37:15,160 --> 00:37:18,120
Speaker 4: to shout out. Mike Davis, the chief research scientist of

657
00:37:18,160 --> 00:37:21,359
Speaker 4: Bioactive at the time, he said something really scary in

658
00:37:21,400 --> 00:37:24,799
Speaker 4: some twenty thirteen interviews. I think it was in well,

659
00:37:24,840 --> 00:37:27,120
Speaker 4: let's start with the one right after this, like in

660
00:37:27,160 --> 00:37:31,240
Speaker 4: February of twenty thirteen. He was talking to people various

661
00:37:31,320 --> 00:37:34,839
Speaker 4: you know, security forms and news outlets that are more

662
00:37:34,880 --> 00:37:38,320
Speaker 4: tech forward, and he said, look, here's the thing. Even

663
00:37:38,360 --> 00:37:41,719
Speaker 4: after these attacks, I can go on Google Search, and

664
00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:45,279
Speaker 4: just using Google, which was way better search system back then,

665
00:37:45,920 --> 00:37:49,920
Speaker 4: I can easily find thirty different systems that can be

666
00:37:50,040 --> 00:37:52,920
Speaker 4: hit the same way. Because if you don't change the

667
00:37:52,960 --> 00:37:58,200
Speaker 4: default password, you can often find that default password online

668
00:37:58,280 --> 00:38:03,719
Speaker 4: in a user manual makes things which trivializes the hacking exercise.

669
00:38:04,120 --> 00:38:07,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, somebody somewhere is going to post it. I remember

670
00:38:07,320 --> 00:38:10,480
Speaker 2: seeing that quote in one of these articles. It was

671
00:38:10,520 --> 00:38:13,720
Speaker 2: just said, if there is a default password for any

672
00:38:13,800 --> 00:38:18,560
Speaker 2: piece of hardware, someone has posted it online.

673
00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:20,160
Speaker 3: Exactly.

674
00:38:21,800 --> 00:38:25,080
Speaker 2: Think about how much troubleshooting everyone does with all their hardware.

675
00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:29,480
Speaker 2: I mean that back then. Nowadays there's a forum somewhere

676
00:38:29,560 --> 00:38:32,520
Speaker 2: where somebody's like, oh, that's an easy fix. Just use

677
00:38:32,560 --> 00:38:34,120
Speaker 2: the default password.

678
00:38:36,560 --> 00:38:41,040
Speaker 4: Go in type admin, do a quick reset. Yeah exactly.

679
00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:48,040
Speaker 4: And this is something that remains scary today because the

680
00:38:48,120 --> 00:38:53,440
Speaker 4: observations of these security experts would prove prescient. Similar tactics

681
00:38:53,480 --> 00:38:58,480
Speaker 4: were shown in later attacks years after this. In February

682
00:38:58,680 --> 00:39:04,520
Speaker 4: twenty seventeen, four years later, a radio station out of Winchester,

683
00:39:04,800 --> 00:39:08,960
Speaker 4: Indiana got their emergency system hacked. Get this with the

684
00:39:09,000 --> 00:39:13,800
Speaker 4: same tactics and the same frickin zombie apocalypse message. Really

685
00:39:13,880 --> 00:39:18,200
Speaker 4: the same one. Someone waited four years and was just

686
00:39:18,239 --> 00:39:23,040
Speaker 4: sort of snoopy duping around. Man, is the password still admin?

687
00:39:23,440 --> 00:39:23,960
Speaker 3: These guys?

688
00:39:24,120 --> 00:39:28,759
Speaker 2: Huh, yep, we got men. Do you guys? Have you

689
00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:31,439
Speaker 2: guys watched any of the videos that you can find

690
00:39:31,480 --> 00:39:33,640
Speaker 2: all of our social media where it's someone pranking like

691
00:39:33,680 --> 00:39:36,640
Speaker 2: a family member with a very similar thing. It's mostly

692
00:39:36,760 --> 00:39:41,680
Speaker 2: UAP and UFO invasion alien invasion stuff. But you can

693
00:39:41,719 --> 00:39:47,320
Speaker 2: find videos where people have made very convincing looking pieces

694
00:39:47,360 --> 00:39:50,800
Speaker 2: of news or something, or they've edited together an actual

695
00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:54,839
Speaker 2: broadcast from news and then put in their own emergency

696
00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:59,120
Speaker 2: about alien invasions. And it's mostly people our age or

697
00:39:59,160 --> 00:40:03,359
Speaker 2: like ten years maybe, like parents and early grandparents who

698
00:40:03,360 --> 00:40:08,560
Speaker 2: are getting getting hacked by their kids in pumps. Yeah,

699
00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:09,840
Speaker 2: and Coast to Coast.

700
00:40:09,640 --> 00:40:10,600
Speaker 3: Doesn't take the call.

701
00:40:10,840 --> 00:40:14,000
Speaker 4: Yeah, they just said it to a cousin, a family

702
00:40:14,040 --> 00:40:16,799
Speaker 4: member epic. You know, that's like an uncle or a

703
00:40:16,880 --> 00:40:19,359
Speaker 4: dad joke, you know what I mean. And if you're

704
00:40:19,480 --> 00:40:22,920
Speaker 4: just pranking one family member, who are we to interfere

705
00:40:22,960 --> 00:40:28,440
Speaker 4: with your personal relationship. But if you're pranking like Montana,

706
00:40:28,719 --> 00:40:30,520
Speaker 4: then you should kind of get in trouble.

707
00:40:30,640 --> 00:40:32,919
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it's a big deal.

708
00:40:33,480 --> 00:40:34,279
Speaker 3: It's a big deal.

709
00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:37,520
Speaker 4: But also, you know, twenty thirteen to twenty seventeen talk

710
00:40:37,560 --> 00:40:41,359
Speaker 4: about committing to the bit it gets. So we've we've

711
00:40:41,360 --> 00:40:43,960
Speaker 4: given the funny part of this, but let's let's get

712
00:40:43,960 --> 00:40:46,000
Speaker 4: to the even more dangerous part. Maybe after a word

713
00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:47,040
Speaker 4: from our sponsors.

714
00:40:47,160 --> 00:40:54,719
Speaker 3: Let's do it all right.

715
00:40:54,760 --> 00:40:58,319
Speaker 4: They're further issues we talked. We had the question about

716
00:40:58,360 --> 00:41:00,600
Speaker 4: the fallout of this right, the after what.

717
00:41:00,560 --> 00:41:01,000
Speaker 3: Do you do?

718
00:41:01,640 --> 00:41:07,000
Speaker 4: So the federal government came out made all these recommendations.

719
00:41:07,320 --> 00:41:12,960
Speaker 4: The FCC did not, interestingly enough, mandate that everybody UH

720
00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:18,920
Speaker 4: changed their passwords, but they strongly urged people to do so,

721
00:41:19,520 --> 00:41:23,240
Speaker 4: which is weird. It's kind of like their signpost saying

722
00:41:23,280 --> 00:41:25,800
Speaker 4: that if you go past this point, it's your fault.

723
00:41:26,920 --> 00:41:29,319
Speaker 2: I mean, we tried to tell you. We tried to

724
00:41:29,360 --> 00:41:32,000
Speaker 2: tell you. That is so weird because I guess you couldn't.

725
00:41:32,160 --> 00:41:34,640
Speaker 2: I mean, how do you enforce that mandate? You send

726
00:41:34,880 --> 00:41:39,920
Speaker 2: an agent to every broadcasting you know, room everywhere that

727
00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:41,839
Speaker 2: has a piece of equipment that can do.

728
00:41:41,880 --> 00:41:46,040
Speaker 4: This, And how do you justify the cost of that right?

729
00:41:46,280 --> 00:41:50,960
Speaker 4: And how do you fight back against trade groups, private

730
00:41:51,120 --> 00:41:54,360
Speaker 4: powerful private actors who say, you know, oh, come on,

731
00:41:54,760 --> 00:41:58,080
Speaker 4: there's a one off. We got it. We sent an email.

732
00:41:58,280 --> 00:41:59,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, just tell them to do it.

733
00:41:59,480 --> 00:41:59,919
Speaker 3: We're good.

734
00:42:02,239 --> 00:42:08,120
Speaker 4: Yeah, that's the issue. The FCC also strongly recommends, even

735
00:42:08,120 --> 00:42:11,719
Speaker 4: though we're being very careful with it, they strongly recommend

736
00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:16,320
Speaker 4: never using those tones outside of genuine emergency alerts, testing

737
00:42:16,400 --> 00:42:20,480
Speaker 4: or educational purposes, and that is a direct result of

738
00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:25,840
Speaker 4: this twenty thirteen series of incidents. They also, let's see,

739
00:42:26,000 --> 00:42:29,799
Speaker 4: they also said, oh, you know, update your software since

740
00:42:29,840 --> 00:42:33,120
Speaker 4: things are increasingly connected online. But it was too late.

741
00:42:33,880 --> 00:42:38,359
Speaker 4: The horses had left the barn. The hacker horses had

742
00:42:38,440 --> 00:42:42,239
Speaker 4: left the broadcast barn, or something to that effect, and

743
00:42:42,600 --> 00:42:45,680
Speaker 4: people did an update for years after the fact, because

744
00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:49,839
Speaker 4: again it felt distant from them. Right, yes, I run

745
00:42:49,880 --> 00:42:53,839
Speaker 4: a radio station, but I'm in Delaware. This stuff only

746
00:42:53,880 --> 00:42:55,000
Speaker 4: happens in Montana.

747
00:42:55,120 --> 00:42:57,000
Speaker 2: Well yeah, and it was a one off thing, right,

748
00:42:57,800 --> 00:43:00,120
Speaker 2: it was a weird, weird one off that happened. And

749
00:43:01,400 --> 00:43:03,880
Speaker 2: that's weird. That's probably not gonna happen to us. Come on,

750
00:43:03,960 --> 00:43:07,920
Speaker 2: that's like lightning striking kind of thing. Wait, that happens

751
00:43:07,960 --> 00:43:10,879
Speaker 2: all the time. Hold on, hell ry.

752
00:43:12,560 --> 00:43:15,320
Speaker 3: Waiter. There's like a like a Broadway.

753
00:43:15,360 --> 00:43:19,560
Speaker 6: So I was like lightning striking again and again and

754
00:43:19,600 --> 00:43:20,560
Speaker 6: again and again.

755
00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:25,359
Speaker 4: God, that's also a great oldie song. And shout out

756
00:43:25,400 --> 00:43:29,560
Speaker 4: to the band Live because maybe, uh, maybe that's about

757
00:43:29,560 --> 00:43:33,799
Speaker 4: the twenty thirteen incident before it happened, because I think

758
00:43:33,800 --> 00:43:36,960
Speaker 4: they made the song beforehand. We found the culprit of

759
00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:41,240
Speaker 4: the twenty thirteen the twenty thirteen hacks, we also found

760
00:43:41,280 --> 00:43:43,640
Speaker 4: some terrible stuff that happened after this at that point

761
00:43:43,640 --> 00:43:48,480
Speaker 4: about people not getting their s together are Palt Mike Davis,

762
00:43:48,520 --> 00:43:51,080
Speaker 4: in a blog post a little bit after, just like

763
00:43:51,160 --> 00:43:56,160
Speaker 4: in July twenty thirteen, said hey, remember how I told you,

764
00:43:56,400 --> 00:43:59,920
Speaker 4: Just searching on Google found thirty different systems that can

765
00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:02,960
Speaker 4: easily be hacked the same way or kinds of systems.

766
00:44:03,320 --> 00:44:06,680
Speaker 4: He said, Well, in April of twenty thirteen, as we

767
00:44:06,760 --> 00:44:10,320
Speaker 4: kept looking, we found two hundred and twenty two vulnerable systems,

768
00:44:10,600 --> 00:44:13,600
Speaker 4: and then by July of that same year, we found

769
00:44:13,640 --> 00:44:17,160
Speaker 4: four hundred and twelve. The numbers seem to be increasing

770
00:44:17,400 --> 00:44:18,440
Speaker 4: rather than decreasing.

771
00:44:18,760 --> 00:44:23,320
Speaker 2: And these are devices that are now online essentially or

772
00:44:23,480 --> 00:44:26,920
Speaker 2: accessible remotely, Because that is a big deal. If you

773
00:44:26,920 --> 00:44:31,560
Speaker 2: could only access this emergency alert system via plugging into

774
00:44:31,680 --> 00:44:35,840
Speaker 2: a machine or something that then goes out right, something

775
00:44:35,880 --> 00:44:39,400
Speaker 2: that is offline completely, that's one thing, because then that

776
00:44:39,480 --> 00:44:41,719
Speaker 2: means you've got an intruder on the you know, on

777
00:44:41,800 --> 00:44:47,239
Speaker 2: the premises that's doing some actual hacking. It's if it's online,

778
00:44:47,719 --> 00:44:49,520
Speaker 2: then you just got to get into the network.

779
00:44:50,400 --> 00:44:53,960
Speaker 4: Yeah, and then also we could argue that there is

780
00:44:54,480 --> 00:44:56,880
Speaker 4: I don't think it's even an argument there's a clear

781
00:44:57,160 --> 00:45:01,480
Speaker 4: and very strong incentive for that remote access because again,

782
00:45:01,680 --> 00:45:04,279
Speaker 4: of that very short ten minute window.

783
00:45:04,600 --> 00:45:06,719
Speaker 2: What are you going to send somebody in to the

784
00:45:06,760 --> 00:45:11,600
Speaker 2: studio within that ten minutes to set up the EAS system.

785
00:45:11,960 --> 00:45:13,640
Speaker 2: That's probably not going to happen unless you've got a

786
00:45:13,680 --> 00:45:17,320
Speaker 2: lighthouse situation where somebody lives above the building.

787
00:45:17,760 --> 00:45:20,520
Speaker 4: Or as always there there's someone always at the switch

788
00:45:20,760 --> 00:45:24,720
Speaker 4: like nuclear operations sort. But that, yeah, that's the issue.

789
00:45:24,719 --> 00:45:27,560
Speaker 4: Even in twenty twenty four, folks, we do not know

790
00:45:27,680 --> 00:45:30,760
Speaker 4: for sure how many of these systems have been patched

791
00:45:30,880 --> 00:45:35,000
Speaker 4: or fixed updated over the last ten years. We also

792
00:45:35,040 --> 00:45:38,760
Speaker 4: don't know how many other new vulnerabilities may have arisen,

793
00:45:39,239 --> 00:45:43,239
Speaker 4: and we know that this is a global thing. Broadcast

794
00:45:43,280 --> 00:45:49,600
Speaker 4: signal intrusion is okay, ethics aside, I'll say it. It's fascinating.

795
00:45:49,800 --> 00:45:52,840
Speaker 4: Who doesn't love a little pirate radio as it were?

796
00:45:53,120 --> 00:45:58,840
Speaker 4: But we see similar instances I thought, I thought we

797
00:45:59,040 --> 00:46:03,400
Speaker 4: particularly enjoy this one from nineteen seventy seven in the

798
00:46:03,480 --> 00:46:05,080
Speaker 4: United Kingdom.

799
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:09,600
Speaker 6: In the UK, someone took over Southern television, which is funny.

800
00:46:09,719 --> 00:46:11,560
Speaker 6: I mean, of course, there's southern parts of the UK,

801
00:46:11,640 --> 00:46:14,279
Speaker 6: but we disassociate here being from the south, and that's

802
00:46:14,320 --> 00:46:18,040
Speaker 6: what southern is. It's a regional ITV broadcaster. And on

803
00:46:18,080 --> 00:46:21,440
Speaker 6: the twenty sixth of November nineteen seventy seven, audio was

804
00:46:21,520 --> 00:46:25,719
Speaker 6: broadcast over the evening News from a quote galactic overlord

805
00:46:26,000 --> 00:46:29,520
Speaker 6: who warned humanity that they had a quote once again,

806
00:46:29,880 --> 00:46:30,440
Speaker 6: but a.

807
00:46:30,360 --> 00:46:32,680
Speaker 3: Short time to live together in.

808
00:46:32,800 --> 00:46:37,440
Speaker 2: Peace, and then they will be turned into pieces by me,

809
00:46:37,760 --> 00:46:39,400
Speaker 2: the galactic overlord.

810
00:46:40,080 --> 00:46:40,600
Speaker 3: Now I don't know.

811
00:46:40,640 --> 00:46:42,760
Speaker 6: This to me seems sort of like a carpai DM

812
00:46:42,840 --> 00:46:44,839
Speaker 6: kind of thing. You know, It's like, hey, listen, we

813
00:46:44,880 --> 00:46:48,160
Speaker 6: don't have that long together on this planets. We might

814
00:46:48,200 --> 00:46:50,479
Speaker 6: as well spend it living in peace. But it also,

815
00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:52,000
Speaker 6: you know, could be taken as a.

816
00:46:52,120 --> 00:46:55,960
Speaker 2: Threat just the fact that this person refer to themselves

817
00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:58,480
Speaker 2: as an overlord. I mean, come on, that's not that's

818
00:46:58,840 --> 00:46:59,200
Speaker 2: that's not.

819
00:46:59,200 --> 00:47:04,080
Speaker 3: There benev overlords. There can be you know, positive overlords.

820
00:47:04,239 --> 00:47:06,320
Speaker 4: So is it like what I'm just trying to figure

821
00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:07,279
Speaker 4: out the org chart?

822
00:47:07,719 --> 00:47:08,320
Speaker 3: Are there.

823
00:47:09,680 --> 00:47:14,279
Speaker 4: Regular like surface lords, then there's a surface overlord, then

824
00:47:14,320 --> 00:47:19,640
Speaker 4: there are like solar system lords, solar system overlords, thin

825
00:47:19,719 --> 00:47:22,160
Speaker 4: galactic lords, thin galactic overlords.

826
00:47:22,360 --> 00:47:25,240
Speaker 2: I don't know, man, I just know there are underlings

827
00:47:25,440 --> 00:47:30,680
Speaker 2: and overlords, you know, in the between, right?

828
00:47:30,719 --> 00:47:31,720
Speaker 4: Are there under lords?

829
00:47:32,560 --> 00:47:35,000
Speaker 2: Oh? Now that's a good question.

830
00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:40,560
Speaker 4: Check out a Weird Holes episode Mysterious Holds. Tell us

831
00:47:40,560 --> 00:47:44,960
Speaker 4: if you yourself are at underlord. We know this as

832
00:47:45,280 --> 00:47:48,120
Speaker 4: and maybe this is the crux. Here we end where

833
00:47:48,160 --> 00:47:50,759
Speaker 4: it began. This has been a military tactic as well.

834
00:47:51,120 --> 00:47:56,000
Speaker 4: Broadcast signal intrusion. The Nation of Israel swamped the signals

835
00:47:56,040 --> 00:47:59,640
Speaker 4: from a Palestinian TV channel back in the day all

836
00:47:59,760 --> 00:48:05,120
Speaker 4: mon Our TV to broadcast anti hamas propaganda. There were

837
00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:10,239
Speaker 4: some Polish nerds, honestly, and I say we say that

838
00:48:10,280 --> 00:48:13,200
Speaker 4: with great affection, they took over a TV broadcast in

839
00:48:13,320 --> 00:48:18,160
Speaker 4: nineteen eighty four and they did it entirely as ideological actors.

840
00:48:18,200 --> 00:48:21,360
Speaker 4: They were telling other people in Poland to boycott the

841
00:48:21,440 --> 00:48:27,120
Speaker 4: national elections because they were corrupt. And that's a genuine danger, right. Honestly,

842
00:48:27,160 --> 00:48:30,480
Speaker 4: the zombie thing's hilarious. The Max Headroom thing is hilarious.

843
00:48:30,880 --> 00:48:33,680
Speaker 4: I guess technically we're supposed to tell you that both

844
00:48:33,680 --> 00:48:37,000
Speaker 4: their criminal acts. So don't do it if you can

845
00:48:37,040 --> 00:48:40,160
Speaker 4: avoid it, with understanding that you know you might be

846
00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:43,759
Speaker 4: in a situation, but otherwise, you know, stick to your

847
00:48:43,800 --> 00:48:47,760
Speaker 4: regularly schedule broadcast. I mean, what happens if an Internet

848
00:48:47,760 --> 00:48:51,200
Speaker 4: savvy terrorist group gets a hold of part of these

849
00:48:51,239 --> 00:48:55,360
Speaker 4: systems or god forbid, the entire shebang almost called it

850
00:48:55,360 --> 00:48:56,000
Speaker 4: a skidadal.

851
00:48:56,160 --> 00:48:58,200
Speaker 3: That's the next level of this type of stuff.

852
00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:01,919
Speaker 6: We've talked about, you know, numerous times, the idea of

853
00:49:02,200 --> 00:49:06,440
Speaker 6: you know, getting control of banking details or like records

854
00:49:06,480 --> 00:49:09,640
Speaker 6: in terms of like you know, massive corporate collapse, you know,

855
00:49:09,760 --> 00:49:13,120
Speaker 6: fight club type stuff, I guess, but that is where

856
00:49:13,120 --> 00:49:15,360
Speaker 6: we're at in terms of like how the most havoc

857
00:49:15,480 --> 00:49:18,319
Speaker 6: could be wrought without you know, having to set off

858
00:49:18,360 --> 00:49:19,120
Speaker 6: a single bomb.

859
00:49:19,480 --> 00:49:23,200
Speaker 2: I don't know, guys. It feels like with our interconnectivity

860
00:49:23,239 --> 00:49:26,160
Speaker 2: now and with social media, you'd have to you'd have

861
00:49:26,239 --> 00:49:29,200
Speaker 2: to take that system down, and you'd have to take

862
00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:35,080
Speaker 2: down most of the primary Internet service providers like simultaneously.

863
00:49:35,520 --> 00:49:37,960
Speaker 2: And if you did that, then I think everybody is

864
00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:43,200
Speaker 2: in a super vulnerable position. But otherwise they're gonna be

865
00:49:43,320 --> 00:49:47,479
Speaker 2: alerts that go out just via you know, somebody making

866
00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:50,680
Speaker 2: a post, right, But then is that taken seriously?

867
00:49:51,640 --> 00:49:57,120
Speaker 4: That's the thing, because you don't have to necessarily get

868
00:49:57,160 --> 00:50:00,560
Speaker 4: all the way along the action spectrum of shutting stuff down,

869
00:50:00,640 --> 00:50:07,319
Speaker 4: you could also contaminate the message. Both are herculean efforts. Honestly, like,

870
00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:10,800
Speaker 4: it's not I don't think it's a thing that one

871
00:50:11,200 --> 00:50:13,080
Speaker 4: super villain type person could do.

872
00:50:13,280 --> 00:50:13,960
Speaker 3: I think you would.

873
00:50:14,120 --> 00:50:16,520
Speaker 4: You would need to put together a team.

874
00:50:16,719 --> 00:50:18,440
Speaker 2: I think it would have to be a military action

875
00:50:18,560 --> 00:50:19,520
Speaker 2: to really pull it off.

876
00:50:20,200 --> 00:50:21,560
Speaker 3: M M yeah.

877
00:50:21,680 --> 00:50:23,840
Speaker 4: I mean, and if it's a if it's a terrorist

878
00:50:23,920 --> 00:50:26,480
Speaker 4: level action, it was probably it would probably be a

879
00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:31,359
Speaker 4: proxy group of some other state actor, right, because that's

880
00:50:32,320 --> 00:50:34,799
Speaker 4: those are the most powerful terrorist groups right now. And

881
00:50:35,400 --> 00:50:38,200
Speaker 4: what happens then if the the other issue is what

882
00:50:38,239 --> 00:50:42,280
Speaker 4: if the system itself becomes so compromised that the public

883
00:50:42,320 --> 00:50:44,839
Speaker 4: starts to ignore these warnings. You don't get the full

884
00:50:44,880 --> 00:50:48,080
Speaker 4: attention when that tone comes on, it becomes the broadcast

885
00:50:48,440 --> 00:50:52,920
Speaker 4: that pride wolf every This is crucial because every misstep

886
00:50:53,040 --> 00:50:58,200
Speaker 4: or compromise of the emergency alert system diminishes its effectiveness

887
00:50:58,239 --> 00:51:01,279
Speaker 4: going forward in a measurable way. The whole point is

888
00:51:01,320 --> 00:51:06,040
Speaker 4: to get your undivided attention, right. It's classic behavioralism, right,

889
00:51:06,080 --> 00:51:09,759
Speaker 4: It's it's Pavlov's dog and the bell. It's supposed to

890
00:51:09,800 --> 00:51:12,839
Speaker 4: make you clock in right, and it's supposed to give

891
00:51:12,840 --> 00:51:16,759
Speaker 4: you clear information, instructions and in doing so potentially save

892
00:51:16,880 --> 00:51:21,080
Speaker 4: your life. Diminishing that effectiveness is a feasible goal of

893
00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:25,000
Speaker 4: asymmetric warfare. You can you can wage a war in

894
00:51:25,040 --> 00:51:25,719
Speaker 4: a different way.

895
00:51:25,800 --> 00:51:29,480
Speaker 2: Now, it feels weird that we're talking about this now, guys,

896
00:51:29,960 --> 00:51:32,279
Speaker 2: with the election coming up, with all the weirdness going

897
00:51:32,320 --> 00:51:36,239
Speaker 2: on with both candidates, it feels more and more like

898
00:51:36,280 --> 00:51:38,200
Speaker 2: we're going to get one of these alerts, but not

899
00:51:38,320 --> 00:51:40,839
Speaker 2: for one of the reasons that we grew up, you know,

900
00:51:41,000 --> 00:51:43,760
Speaker 2: learning we would get one of these alerts. It feels

901
00:51:43,800 --> 00:51:46,920
Speaker 2: like there could be one for a legitimate.

902
00:51:46,400 --> 00:51:48,959
Speaker 3: Call that's coming from inside the house kind of one.

903
00:51:49,320 --> 00:51:53,160
Speaker 4: Yeah, I picture you like citizens as a faulty county.

904
00:51:53,440 --> 00:51:56,880
Speaker 4: This is not a test. Be advised, totus. Joe Biden

905
00:51:57,040 --> 00:51:59,919
Speaker 4: has consumed for margaritas at the day of and bust

906
00:52:00,520 --> 00:52:05,160
Speaker 4: and his whereabouts are currently unknown. Do not approach seat shelter.

907
00:52:05,520 --> 00:52:10,920
Speaker 2: Geez, why, guys, that's really funny. I have the scenario

908
00:52:10,960 --> 00:52:14,640
Speaker 2: in my head where something happens to the sitting current

909
00:52:14,719 --> 00:52:18,560
Speaker 2: president right before the election or before you know the

910
00:52:18,960 --> 00:52:23,080
Speaker 2: next president is officially in office and sworn in, and

911
00:52:23,239 --> 00:52:27,920
Speaker 2: some weirdness goes down because both October surprise, Yeah, because

912
00:52:28,080 --> 00:52:31,520
Speaker 2: it feels like both sides are so entrenched and willing

913
00:52:31,600 --> 00:52:36,080
Speaker 2: to do anything to maintain or gain power again, and

914
00:52:36,160 --> 00:52:38,239
Speaker 2: it is just I don't know it.

915
00:52:38,480 --> 00:52:42,520
Speaker 6: Well, it is a little liberating for it to be

916
00:52:42,680 --> 00:52:46,600
Speaker 6: so kind of almost like we don't really like either

917
00:52:46,680 --> 00:52:47,600
Speaker 6: side at this point.

918
00:52:47,920 --> 00:52:49,839
Speaker 3: So it's kind of like, I don't think we.

919
00:52:49,800 --> 00:52:52,440
Speaker 6: Are at the rest risk of pissing anybody off, particularly

920
00:52:52,520 --> 00:52:55,319
Speaker 6: for having partisan opinions, because it's really just more about like,

921
00:52:55,360 --> 00:52:57,480
Speaker 6: could we please preserve democracy?

922
00:52:57,719 --> 00:52:59,600
Speaker 3: Could we please? That would be great?

923
00:52:59,600 --> 00:53:02,560
Speaker 6: Could we please avoid civil war and Mad Max type

924
00:53:02,600 --> 00:53:07,120
Speaker 6: scenarios that would be fantastic. Fascism, let's maybe avoid that one.

925
00:53:07,320 --> 00:53:09,480
Speaker 2: See, there's this weird thing and I want to get

926
00:53:09,520 --> 00:53:13,319
Speaker 2: too political, But in a lot of that thinking, I'm

927
00:53:13,400 --> 00:53:16,080
Speaker 2: noticing that a lot of people believe one side is

928
00:53:16,120 --> 00:53:18,080
Speaker 2: the one that's going to maintain democracy.

929
00:53:18,680 --> 00:53:22,440
Speaker 3: Well, in my head, I know, you're right, you're right,

930
00:53:22,440 --> 00:53:22,759
Speaker 3: you're right.

931
00:53:22,800 --> 00:53:26,840
Speaker 2: Basically there's it's when we we just talked about on

932
00:53:27,040 --> 00:53:32,040
Speaker 2: Strange News, the the changes that just occurred with Scotus,

933
00:53:32,040 --> 00:53:35,880
Speaker 2: with the Supreme Court, with the power of the president.

934
00:53:36,120 --> 00:53:38,640
Speaker 2: So it's just feeling more and more like something's getting

935
00:53:38,680 --> 00:53:41,520
Speaker 2: set up and we're not. We can't see the full

936
00:53:41,520 --> 00:53:44,240
Speaker 2: picture right now, and it might not be the people

937
00:53:44,280 --> 00:53:47,000
Speaker 2: that whatever, whatever team you're on, it might not be

938
00:53:47,160 --> 00:53:48,800
Speaker 2: your team.

939
00:53:49,120 --> 00:53:53,960
Speaker 4: Well, the teams that are active, at least some of them,

940
00:53:54,000 --> 00:53:57,279
Speaker 4: and this is proving conspiracy, are not the teams that

941
00:53:57,480 --> 00:54:01,960
Speaker 4: you can vote for. Yeah, the idea of gently pushing

942
00:54:02,040 --> 00:54:06,160
Speaker 4: people through propaganda is very real. It's more affordable now

943
00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:09,319
Speaker 4: than ever. It's super hot in state craft because it's

944
00:54:09,400 --> 00:54:11,279
Speaker 4: cheap and it works, you know what I mean.

945
00:54:12,040 --> 00:54:14,760
Speaker 2: Well, guys, we just did an entire episode on the

946
00:54:14,800 --> 00:54:18,880
Speaker 2: system that the government alerts us if there's a problem.

947
00:54:19,440 --> 00:54:22,840
Speaker 2: We just saw a couple of weeks ago, the system

948
00:54:22,880 --> 00:54:25,840
Speaker 2: that's supposed to be US alerting that there's a problem.

949
00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:29,360
Speaker 2: The nine to one to one system, the emergency services

950
00:54:29,360 --> 00:54:33,520
Speaker 2: system in the United States went down, like in several

951
00:54:33,600 --> 00:54:36,919
Speaker 2: major cities for and we're look, we're only talking about

952
00:54:37,000 --> 00:54:40,920
Speaker 2: hours here, but for several hours, the nine to one

953
00:54:40,960 --> 00:54:44,200
Speaker 2: to one system went down, which is a huge deal.

954
00:54:44,840 --> 00:54:49,120
Speaker 2: And if we can't have that kind of emergency communication

955
00:54:49,600 --> 00:54:53,080
Speaker 2: as a two way street at any time, I feel

956
00:54:53,080 --> 00:54:57,120
Speaker 2: like I don't know. It genuinely freaks me out.

957
00:54:57,120 --> 00:54:57,440
Speaker 3: Guys.

958
00:54:58,040 --> 00:55:01,640
Speaker 4: This is why, you know, I agree fully with you, guys.

959
00:55:01,760 --> 00:55:05,360
Speaker 4: This is why I think this is such a crucial episode,

960
00:55:05,480 --> 00:55:10,359
Speaker 4: you know what I mean. Not every conspiracy involves the paranormal.

961
00:55:11,400 --> 00:55:16,440
Speaker 4: Sometimes it's simply those who have power seeking more power,

962
00:55:16,600 --> 00:55:21,200
Speaker 4: right or finding a more cost effective way to you know,

963
00:55:21,320 --> 00:55:23,839
Speaker 4: for a lot of these bad faith actors, or these

964
00:55:23,960 --> 00:55:28,040
Speaker 4: rival forces whatever you want to call them, terrorists state powers,

965
00:55:28,680 --> 00:55:33,560
Speaker 4: they see themselves in a David versus Goliath's situation with

966
00:55:33,640 --> 00:55:39,160
Speaker 4: the United States. By that means they prize and prioritize

967
00:55:39,239 --> 00:55:43,120
Speaker 4: asymmetric warfare. It makes no sense to try to catch

968
00:55:43,200 --> 00:55:46,759
Speaker 4: up with the US in building aircraft carriers. It is

969
00:55:46,800 --> 00:55:51,440
Speaker 4: an unwinnable pursuit at this point, unless something really crazy

970
00:55:51,480 --> 00:55:54,040
Speaker 4: goes wrong. You just spend a little bit less money

971
00:55:54,120 --> 00:55:56,600
Speaker 4: figuring out how to kill the carriers. So if you

972
00:55:56,640 --> 00:56:00,279
Speaker 4: can't attack the US physically on land, which geographic is

973
00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:04,879
Speaker 4: quite difficult, then you grow domestic problems, and you can

974
00:56:04,920 --> 00:56:07,640
Speaker 4: do that very affordably in any number of ways.

975
00:56:07,920 --> 00:56:10,640
Speaker 2: Well, and just imagine, oh god, I hate giving these

976
00:56:10,719 --> 00:56:12,680
Speaker 2: kinds of scenarios could but this is what I see

977
00:56:12,719 --> 00:56:16,160
Speaker 2: in my head. The nine to one one outage was

978
00:56:16,200 --> 00:56:18,759
Speaker 2: in Massachusetts is only for two hours, right, And the

979
00:56:18,760 --> 00:56:22,120
Speaker 2: official word from that, from the people who run that

980
00:56:22,160 --> 00:56:25,640
Speaker 2: system said, oh no, it was a firewall that was

981
00:56:25,760 --> 00:56:29,560
Speaker 2: enacted temporarily for two hours that prevented calls from coming

982
00:56:29,600 --> 00:56:32,200
Speaker 2: in to our system, so nobody could call nine one one.

983
00:56:32,960 --> 00:56:37,719
Speaker 2: Imagine in this asymmetrical warfare scenario where you're attacking the

984
00:56:37,760 --> 00:56:40,640
Speaker 2: eas right in some way, disabling it or hacking it,

985
00:56:41,160 --> 00:56:44,360
Speaker 2: you attack a localized nine to one one system, like

986
00:56:44,360 --> 00:56:48,120
Speaker 2: in a city where whenever you wherever you go in

987
00:56:48,920 --> 00:56:53,120
Speaker 2: no one can alert. Like how nobody has the local

988
00:56:53,280 --> 00:56:56,319
Speaker 2: police station in their phone when many some people do,

989
00:56:56,400 --> 00:56:59,520
Speaker 2: but not many people have that. Right, you call nine

990
00:56:59,560 --> 00:57:02,600
Speaker 2: one one and there's an emergency, and if that doesn't

991
00:57:02,680 --> 00:57:06,800
Speaker 2: go through, as there's an action on the ground taking place,

992
00:57:08,840 --> 00:57:10,799
Speaker 2: I don't know. There's another scenario where I just I

993
00:57:10,800 --> 00:57:11,760
Speaker 2: can see it happening.

994
00:57:12,440 --> 00:57:14,719
Speaker 4: I've seen stuff like that. Yeah, Like you could even

995
00:57:14,800 --> 00:57:20,400
Speaker 4: do through through a couple of telephonic tricks. You could

996
00:57:20,440 --> 00:57:25,120
Speaker 4: even subject a nine to one one center to the

997
00:57:25,240 --> 00:57:28,520
Speaker 4: to the telephone equivalent of a d DOS such that

998
00:57:28,760 --> 00:57:33,280
Speaker 4: the real calls don't go through, right, and then the

999
00:57:33,360 --> 00:57:37,080
Speaker 4: Shenanigans ensue. It's a very dangerous thing, but it is

1000
00:57:37,520 --> 00:57:42,280
Speaker 4: unfortunately quite plausible, and that's why we are happy to report.

1001
00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:45,960
Speaker 4: Still most people in the United States do trust the

1002
00:57:46,000 --> 00:57:49,760
Speaker 4: emergency alert system. Nobody, for instance, is looking at an

1003
00:57:49,760 --> 00:57:53,440
Speaker 4: Amber alert on their phone and going fake news. Thankfully,

1004
00:57:54,200 --> 00:57:57,000
Speaker 4: we pay attention when it pops up, at least long

1005
00:57:57,160 --> 00:58:00,280
Speaker 4: enough to hear that iconic voice tell us whether or

1006
00:58:00,280 --> 00:58:04,640
Speaker 4: not this is only a test. Yeah, the unsung hero

1007
00:58:05,520 --> 00:58:08,720
Speaker 4: of unsung hero of interrupt.

1008
00:58:09,800 --> 00:58:10,320
Speaker 2: He's like the.

1009
00:58:10,320 --> 00:58:13,400
Speaker 3: Wilhelm scream of government broadcast cut ins.

1010
00:58:13,640 --> 00:58:17,040
Speaker 4: He's like the He's kind of like the producer voices

1011
00:58:17,200 --> 00:58:21,720
Speaker 4: on public radio. They never identify themselves. They just drop

1012
00:58:21,760 --> 00:58:24,800
Speaker 4: in and tell you what's coming up next after the news.

1013
00:58:25,640 --> 00:58:28,240
Speaker 2: Dude, they should get like al Pacino or somebody to

1014
00:58:28,320 --> 00:58:32,360
Speaker 2: do it. You know, we're across the entirety of the

1015
00:58:32,440 --> 00:58:32,880
Speaker 2: United States.

1016
00:58:32,920 --> 00:58:41,240
Speaker 4: Al this is a test of the emergency broadcast system. Kevin,

1017
00:58:42,880 --> 00:58:46,280
Speaker 4: He's always going to be Devil's advocate. He's talking to

1018
00:58:46,360 --> 00:58:47,200
Speaker 4: Kevin directly.

1019
00:58:47,840 --> 00:58:48,560
Speaker 3: What this does?

1020
00:58:48,680 --> 00:58:52,120
Speaker 4: I think, especially that beautiful scenario, mat this does give

1021
00:58:52,200 --> 00:58:54,840
Speaker 4: us a lot to think about how securit these systems today.

1022
00:58:55,400 --> 00:58:58,240
Speaker 4: In some cases, it appears to be the stuff they

1023
00:58:58,280 --> 00:59:00,200
Speaker 4: don't want you to know, So we want to hear

1024
00:59:00,240 --> 00:59:02,160
Speaker 4: from you, folks. We know that there's some of us

1025
00:59:02,200 --> 00:59:05,360
Speaker 4: out there this evening who have direct experience with this,

1026
00:59:05,760 --> 00:59:10,680
Speaker 4: certainly with the related field of online security right and

1027
00:59:10,720 --> 00:59:13,840
Speaker 4: security research. So tell us your thoughts, tell us the

1028
00:59:13,880 --> 00:59:17,400
Speaker 4: weirdest stuff you've heard on emergency alert systems, and hey,

1029
00:59:17,560 --> 00:59:19,960
Speaker 4: if you happen to be one of those folks who

1030
00:59:20,000 --> 00:59:24,439
Speaker 4: saw the zombie apocalypse alert live live is a weird

1031
00:59:24,640 --> 00:59:27,520
Speaker 4: word way to describe the zombie situation, but if you

1032
00:59:27,560 --> 00:59:29,560
Speaker 4: know what we mean, if you saw it in situ

1033
00:59:29,720 --> 00:59:32,280
Speaker 4: while it's happening, tell us your experience. We try to

1034
00:59:32,280 --> 00:59:33,760
Speaker 4: be easy to find online.

1035
00:59:33,920 --> 00:59:34,440
Speaker 3: We do.

1036
00:59:34,640 --> 00:59:36,760
Speaker 6: You can find it to the handle Conspiracy Stuff on

1037
00:59:36,800 --> 00:59:39,040
Speaker 6: Facebook where we have our Facebook group Here's where it

1038
00:59:39,080 --> 00:59:42,840
Speaker 6: gets crazy. On YouTube where we make videos and have

1039
00:59:42,960 --> 00:59:46,040
Speaker 6: them coming your way on the regular, as well as

1040
00:59:46,120 --> 00:59:50,280
Speaker 6: on XFKA, Twitter, on Instagram and TikTok. We are Conspiracy

1041
00:59:50,320 --> 00:59:51,120
Speaker 6: Stuff Show.

1042
00:59:51,520 --> 00:59:53,320
Speaker 2: You can also call us. We have a phone number.

1043
00:59:53,320 --> 00:59:58,120
Speaker 2: It's one eight three three std WYTK. When you call in,

1044
00:59:58,320 --> 01:00:01,120
Speaker 2: give yourself a cool nickname and you've got three minutes

1045
01:00:01,160 --> 01:00:04,240
Speaker 2: say whatever you'd like, just at some point let us

1046
01:00:04,280 --> 01:00:05,920
Speaker 2: know if we can use your name and message on

1047
01:00:05,960 --> 01:00:07,960
Speaker 2: the air. And if you've got more to say than

1048
01:00:08,080 --> 01:00:10,480
Speaker 2: can fit in that three minute voicemail, why not instead

1049
01:00:10,680 --> 01:00:12,400
Speaker 2: send us a good old fashioned email.

1050
01:00:12,560 --> 01:00:16,080
Speaker 4: We are the entities that read every piece of correspondence

1051
01:00:16,080 --> 01:00:19,640
Speaker 4: we receive. Be well aware sometimes the void writes back.

1052
01:00:19,920 --> 01:00:23,760
Speaker 4: A special note for conspiracy realists not located in the

1053
01:00:23,880 --> 01:00:26,960
Speaker 4: United States, we would love to learn more about the

1054
01:00:27,000 --> 01:00:29,840
Speaker 4: creepy things in your neck of the Global Woods. This

1055
01:00:29,880 --> 01:00:51,840
Speaker 4: is not a test conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1056
01:00:52,040 --> 01:00:54,080
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

1057
01:00:54,200 --> 01:00:58,720
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1058
01:00:58,800 --> 01:01:01,680
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, where where ever you listen to your favorite shows.