1 00:00:02,520 --> 00:00:11,879 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. This is Masters in 2 00:00:11,960 --> 00:00:15,480 Speaker 1: Business with Barry Ritholts on Bloomberg Radio. 3 00:00:16,400 --> 00:00:21,000 Speaker 2: This week on the podcast Another Banger, Bill Bernstein, neurologist, 4 00:00:21,079 --> 00:00:24,520 Speaker 2: investor author, What a perfect time to talk to the 5 00:00:24,600 --> 00:00:28,040 Speaker 2: author of the Birth of Plenty, and of course a 6 00:00:28,080 --> 00:00:32,199 Speaker 2: splendid exchange about how trade has made us all so 7 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:36,199 Speaker 2: much wealthier. Really, a person who dives deep into the 8 00:00:36,240 --> 00:00:41,160 Speaker 2: subject matter, understands it better than anybody else and could 9 00:00:41,159 --> 00:00:45,120 Speaker 2: put it into great historical context. I thought this conversation 10 00:00:45,280 --> 00:00:48,239 Speaker 2: was fascinating, and I think you will also with no 11 00:00:48,360 --> 00:00:54,240 Speaker 2: further ado, my discussion with Bill Bernstein of Efficient Frontier Advisors. 12 00:00:55,360 --> 00:00:57,840 Speaker 2: So you have such a fascinating career, I want to 13 00:00:57,840 --> 00:01:01,080 Speaker 2: get into some of the details before we start talking 14 00:01:01,320 --> 00:01:07,520 Speaker 2: about markets and investing. You practice neurology for twenty years. 15 00:01:07,520 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 2: That's kind of unusual to say I've had enough of that. 16 00:01:11,120 --> 00:01:15,199 Speaker 2: Let me start managing assets. Tell us about that transition. 17 00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:17,319 Speaker 3: Well, first of all, it kept me off the streets, 18 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:20,959 Speaker 3: and secondly, I'm easily bored, so I do move from 19 00:01:21,000 --> 00:01:24,480 Speaker 3: thing to thing. And it occurred to me all about 20 00:01:24,520 --> 00:01:27,080 Speaker 3: forty years ago that I live in a country that 21 00:01:27,200 --> 00:01:30,600 Speaker 3: doesn't have a functioning social safety net, and so I 22 00:01:30,640 --> 00:01:34,240 Speaker 3: was going to have to invest and save on my 23 00:01:34,400 --> 00:01:37,960 Speaker 3: own account to accomplish that. And I approached it the 24 00:01:38,000 --> 00:01:41,560 Speaker 3: way I thought anyone with scientific training would do, which 25 00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:44,319 Speaker 3: is I consulted the peer review literature. I read the 26 00:01:44,360 --> 00:01:48,960 Speaker 3: basic texts, I collected data, I built models, and by 27 00:01:49,000 --> 00:01:51,520 Speaker 3: the time I had done all that, I realized I 28 00:01:51,640 --> 00:01:56,000 Speaker 3: had something that was useful to other small investors, and 29 00:01:56,040 --> 00:01:59,880 Speaker 3: so I began to write things up. And I just 30 00:02:00,400 --> 00:02:03,520 Speaker 3: that when you're writing about investing, one of the key 31 00:02:04,160 --> 00:02:06,840 Speaker 3: subjects that you have to nail down is the history 32 00:02:06,840 --> 00:02:08,720 Speaker 3: of finance. If you don't know the history, you're dead 33 00:02:08,760 --> 00:02:11,560 Speaker 3: in the water. You know. Can you spell long term 34 00:02:11,600 --> 00:02:12,920 Speaker 3: capital management? 35 00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:13,680 Speaker 1: Uh? 36 00:02:14,000 --> 00:02:16,280 Speaker 2: Just LTCM? Yeah, exactly, need to spell it. 37 00:02:17,200 --> 00:02:18,800 Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, if you know, you can, you know, 38 00:02:19,000 --> 00:02:21,920 Speaker 3: solve differential equations as easily as most people brush teeth. 39 00:02:21,960 --> 00:02:24,040 Speaker 3: But if you don't know the history, you're going to 40 00:02:24,080 --> 00:02:26,320 Speaker 3: have your head handed to you, which is what happened 41 00:02:26,360 --> 00:02:29,120 Speaker 3: to them. So I discovered that I enjoyed writing history, 42 00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:32,480 Speaker 3: and so that's how I segued into into writing history. 43 00:02:33,080 --> 00:02:38,400 Speaker 2: And footnote Roger Lowenstein's When Genius Failed is so instructive, 44 00:02:38,800 --> 00:02:42,359 Speaker 2: not just because of the things you're referring to, failing 45 00:02:42,400 --> 00:02:45,720 Speaker 2: to learn from history, the danger of leverage and you know, 46 00:02:45,880 --> 00:02:50,079 Speaker 2: tiny inefficiencies, but it was also a cautionary tale that 47 00:02:50,240 --> 00:02:52,920 Speaker 2: was ignored a few years later led right to the 48 00:02:52,919 --> 00:02:55,080 Speaker 2: Great Financial Crisis, the same mistakes. 49 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:59,200 Speaker 3: Yeah, there's a historian by the name of Robert Kaplan 50 00:02:59,600 --> 00:03:05,160 Speaker 3: who said that all of history is half geography and 51 00:03:05,240 --> 00:03:08,880 Speaker 3: half Shakespeare. And when I heard that, it resonated. I 52 00:03:08,919 --> 00:03:11,720 Speaker 3: realized that investing is the same way. It's half mathematics 53 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:14,240 Speaker 3: and half Shakespeare, and you have to manage. You have 54 00:03:14,280 --> 00:03:16,840 Speaker 3: to master both of them. If you can't master both, 55 00:03:17,040 --> 00:03:18,600 Speaker 3: you're dead in the water. 56 00:03:19,000 --> 00:03:23,040 Speaker 2: Literally. My next question, you describe you describe it as 57 00:03:23,080 --> 00:03:26,400 Speaker 2: half mathematics, half Shakespeare. Some people would call that art 58 00:03:26,440 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 2: and science. But tell us why you need both compounding 59 00:03:31,200 --> 00:03:35,400 Speaker 2: and exponential mathematics and the Bard to be successful as 60 00:03:35,440 --> 00:03:36,000 Speaker 2: an investor. 61 00:03:36,280 --> 00:03:39,000 Speaker 3: Well, it gets to what I call the prom queen 62 00:03:39,080 --> 00:03:40,880 Speaker 3: theory of life, which is the different. 63 00:03:41,000 --> 00:03:43,960 Speaker 2: Wait, the prom queen theory of life. 64 00:03:44,000 --> 00:03:47,640 Speaker 3: Indeed, if you're the prom queen, then the most important 65 00:03:47,680 --> 00:03:50,160 Speaker 3: thing in the world is how you dress and how 66 00:03:51,000 --> 00:03:53,520 Speaker 3: you look, and that's how you judge other people. Brains, 67 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:56,720 Speaker 3: athletic ability, political ability don't matter. 68 00:03:57,040 --> 00:03:57,360 Speaker 1: Well. 69 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:00,720 Speaker 3: Financiers are exactly the same way. If the peak of 70 00:04:00,760 --> 00:04:03,680 Speaker 3: your skill set is your quantitative ability, that is how 71 00:04:03,760 --> 00:04:07,200 Speaker 3: you judge other people. And if other people can't understand 72 00:04:07,920 --> 00:04:12,120 Speaker 3: your models, then they're stupid, all right, getting you have 73 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:15,200 Speaker 3: to you know, the conceit of finance is that basically 74 00:04:15,880 --> 00:04:17,359 Speaker 3: the math is all there is to it, and that 75 00:04:17,400 --> 00:04:20,599 Speaker 3: you don't have a limbic system. They deny the existence 76 00:04:20,640 --> 00:04:24,479 Speaker 3: of their emotions and their psychology, and that's what gets 77 00:04:24,520 --> 00:04:27,159 Speaker 3: them into trouble. They don't understand the history and now 78 00:04:27,200 --> 00:04:30,320 Speaker 3: how that feeds into mass fear and mass greed and 79 00:04:30,320 --> 00:04:33,080 Speaker 3: mass illusions, which is why I wrote that particular book. 80 00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:36,560 Speaker 2: Kind of reminds me of the Richard Feinemann quote imagine 81 00:04:36,600 --> 00:04:39,920 Speaker 2: how much harder physics would be if electrons had feelings? 82 00:04:40,120 --> 00:04:40,600 Speaker 3: Exactly? 83 00:04:40,800 --> 00:04:46,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, so interesting. So since we mentioned Shakespeare, I have 84 00:04:46,200 --> 00:04:50,520 Speaker 2: to ask the obvious question, what writers and investors have 85 00:04:50,880 --> 00:04:54,000 Speaker 2: influenced how you invest and how you write? 86 00:04:54,520 --> 00:04:57,320 Speaker 3: Oh, dear well, Jim Grant of course would be at 87 00:04:57,360 --> 00:05:01,520 Speaker 3: the top of anyone's list, and then the person who's 88 00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:03,640 Speaker 3: right at the top of that list was the was 89 00:05:03,680 --> 00:05:06,360 Speaker 3: a Scottish guy who lived almost two hundred years ago. 90 00:05:06,440 --> 00:05:10,080 Speaker 3: Charles Mackay who wrote Extraordinary Popular Delusions and The Madness 91 00:05:10,080 --> 00:05:13,880 Speaker 3: of Crowds are actually memoirs of Extraordinary popular Delusions and 92 00:05:13,960 --> 00:05:16,640 Speaker 3: the Madness of crowds, and he described all of the 93 00:05:16,640 --> 00:05:19,159 Speaker 3: things that we've been seeing, you know, over the past 94 00:05:19,200 --> 00:05:22,560 Speaker 3: couple of decades, more than two hundred years ago. 95 00:05:23,760 --> 00:05:27,640 Speaker 2: So those are two well known names. Jim Grant is 96 00:05:27,680 --> 00:05:32,640 Speaker 2: really best known as a macro analyst and a fixed 97 00:05:32,680 --> 00:05:36,400 Speaker 2: income investor. How has Grant influenced how you look at 98 00:05:36,400 --> 00:05:37,839 Speaker 2: the world of investing? 99 00:05:38,160 --> 00:05:42,960 Speaker 3: Well, he's also a historian. You know, he's written several 100 00:05:43,040 --> 00:05:47,920 Speaker 3: historically deep books, particularly about Bernard Baruk, but he certainly 101 00:05:48,560 --> 00:05:53,440 Speaker 3: you know, describes the historical episodes of manias and panics. 102 00:05:53,480 --> 00:05:55,640 Speaker 3: I guess the other one would be John Kenneth Galbraith, 103 00:05:56,080 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 3: whose history of nineteen twenty nine crash was non non prole. 104 00:06:01,320 --> 00:06:04,120 Speaker 3: I mean, it was just absolutely superb. You know, it's 105 00:06:04,160 --> 00:06:05,760 Speaker 3: one of those books that you just can't help but 106 00:06:05,880 --> 00:06:09,000 Speaker 3: you know, snickering out loud, you know, with every paragraph. 107 00:06:09,040 --> 00:06:13,680 Speaker 2: And he has probably coined more quotes and phrases that 108 00:06:13,760 --> 00:06:18,200 Speaker 2: other people unknowingly steal and don't credit him because they're 109 00:06:18,480 --> 00:06:20,799 Speaker 2: just the essence of truth and wisdom. 110 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:24,960 Speaker 3: Yeah, especially you know, whenever anybody talks about innovation in finance, 111 00:06:25,000 --> 00:06:28,800 Speaker 3: he describes it as reinventing the wheel, only in slightly 112 00:06:28,800 --> 00:06:29,839 Speaker 3: more unstable form. 113 00:06:31,560 --> 00:06:35,000 Speaker 2: That's pretty that's pretty amusing. We briefly talked about if 114 00:06:35,000 --> 00:06:38,200 Speaker 2: it's in the headlines, if it's above the fold in 115 00:06:38,279 --> 00:06:41,799 Speaker 2: the paper, it's already in price. So you're a proponent 116 00:06:41,839 --> 00:06:46,920 Speaker 2: of modern portfolio theory and the efficient market hypothesis. How efficient? 117 00:06:47,240 --> 00:06:53,000 Speaker 2: How much do market prices truly reflect future discounted cash flow? 118 00:06:53,240 --> 00:06:56,520 Speaker 3: Well? Samuelson once wrote, I think in a private letter 119 00:06:56,600 --> 00:07:01,120 Speaker 3: that the markets were micro efficient but macro inefficient. And 120 00:07:01,160 --> 00:07:04,680 Speaker 3: what he meant by that by micro efficiency was that, 121 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:07,000 Speaker 3: as the both of us know, it is brutally hard 122 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,080 Speaker 3: and getting harder by the day to pick stocks in 123 00:07:10,160 --> 00:07:14,800 Speaker 3: time the market. If you don't know that, you're in 124 00:07:14,800 --> 00:07:19,680 Speaker 3: big trouble. But the markets are also can be macro inefficient. 125 00:07:20,160 --> 00:07:25,680 Speaker 3: So the overall markets can overshoot in one direction or 126 00:07:25,680 --> 00:07:28,559 Speaker 3: the other. It's very hard to almost impossible, to figure 127 00:07:28,560 --> 00:07:31,800 Speaker 3: out exactly when that's going to happen. You can look 128 00:07:31,800 --> 00:07:34,120 Speaker 3: at a market as abulian and frothy, and you can 129 00:07:34,160 --> 00:07:36,960 Speaker 3: say I know what's going to happen, I just can't 130 00:07:37,000 --> 00:07:40,760 Speaker 3: tell you when. So that to me is the best 131 00:07:41,160 --> 00:07:44,600 Speaker 3: explanation or the best description of macro and micro efficiency 132 00:07:45,080 --> 00:07:47,640 Speaker 3: there is. But you know, I mean, my message to 133 00:07:47,640 --> 00:07:50,960 Speaker 3: anybody who's is twenty years old or twenty five years 134 00:07:50,960 --> 00:07:53,480 Speaker 3: old and just coming out of their education and think 135 00:07:53,600 --> 00:07:56,360 Speaker 3: they're going to be the next Warren Buffett, the bad 136 00:07:56,440 --> 00:07:58,520 Speaker 3: news is you're trading against Warren Buffett. 137 00:07:58,560 --> 00:08:03,160 Speaker 2: That's right, that's right. I have been told that markets 138 00:08:03,160 --> 00:08:06,200 Speaker 2: can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent. 139 00:08:06,640 --> 00:08:09,960 Speaker 3: Yeah, that's an apocryphal quote from right from Canes yet. 140 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:12,640 Speaker 2: Right, but not really. I don't believe he ever said that. No, 141 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:14,120 Speaker 2: he certainly never wrote it. 142 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:16,080 Speaker 3: No, he never said it or wrote it. 143 00:08:16,480 --> 00:08:22,200 Speaker 2: So, speaking of apocryphal times, you have said investors should 144 00:08:22,240 --> 00:08:26,320 Speaker 2: build their portfolios for the worst two percent of market 145 00:08:26,320 --> 00:08:30,800 Speaker 2: conditions rather than normal times. Tell us why you believe that, 146 00:08:31,040 --> 00:08:33,120 Speaker 2: and how do we go about accomplishing that? 147 00:08:33,280 --> 00:08:37,120 Speaker 3: Well, that's that directly falls out of Charlie Munger's dictum, 148 00:08:37,559 --> 00:08:41,200 Speaker 3: which is that, yes, compounding is magic, but the first 149 00:08:41,600 --> 00:08:46,400 Speaker 3: rule of compounding is never to interrupt it unnecessarily, and 150 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:51,240 Speaker 3: you're most liable to interrupt, compounding to panic and sell 151 00:08:51,520 --> 00:08:54,280 Speaker 3: during the worst two percent of times. So you design 152 00:08:54,320 --> 00:08:56,640 Speaker 3: your portfolio for the worst two percent of times, which 153 00:08:56,640 --> 00:08:59,520 Speaker 3: means that it should be more conservative then you think 154 00:08:59,520 --> 00:09:03,120 Speaker 3: it should be the other ninety eight percent of the time. 155 00:09:03,559 --> 00:09:07,679 Speaker 3: And it's a suboptimal allocation to have less stocks. A 156 00:09:07,760 --> 00:09:10,520 Speaker 3: suboptimal But what I like to say, is it a 157 00:09:10,559 --> 00:09:14,120 Speaker 3: suboptimal allocation you can execute is better than an optimal 158 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:17,320 Speaker 3: one you can't execute. 159 00:09:15,880 --> 00:09:19,480 Speaker 2: No doubt about that. You mentioned someone twenty twenty five. 160 00:09:19,720 --> 00:09:22,439 Speaker 2: There are a number of people who have said, and 161 00:09:22,760 --> 00:09:25,720 Speaker 2: I've been swayed in this direction. Hey, when you're twenty 162 00:09:25,720 --> 00:09:28,200 Speaker 2: twenty five years old and you don't need this money 163 00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:32,360 Speaker 2: for thirty forty fifty years, do you really need bonds 164 00:09:32,360 --> 00:09:35,439 Speaker 2: to offset the volatility of equities. Shouldn't you be one 165 00:09:35,520 --> 00:09:37,600 Speaker 2: hundred percent equities at that age? 166 00:09:38,120 --> 00:09:42,920 Speaker 3: Theoretically yes, Practically no, because there are a few sentient 167 00:09:43,000 --> 00:09:46,480 Speaker 3: beings in this quadrant of the galaxy that can tolerate 168 00:09:46,480 --> 00:09:47,760 Speaker 3: one hundred percent stocks. 169 00:09:48,120 --> 00:09:51,880 Speaker 2: Huh really really interesting. So you mentioned half math, half Shakespeare. 170 00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:55,160 Speaker 2: Let's talk about the math side. So when you started 171 00:09:55,240 --> 00:10:00,360 Speaker 2: looking at investing and bringing a scientific rigor to the process. 172 00:10:00,679 --> 00:10:04,840 Speaker 2: You created your own set of asset class databases. This 173 00:10:04,920 --> 00:10:10,640 Speaker 2: is before CRISP and other widely available databases. Tell us 174 00:10:10,640 --> 00:10:11,760 Speaker 2: how you want about doing this? 175 00:10:11,960 --> 00:10:13,520 Speaker 3: Oh no, no, I stole it from them. 176 00:10:13,559 --> 00:10:14,080 Speaker 2: Oh you did? 177 00:10:14,200 --> 00:10:16,840 Speaker 3: Yeah? I mean I went out and spent full disclosure. 178 00:10:16,920 --> 00:10:19,280 Speaker 3: Yeah yeah, no, I mean, I mean what did I do? 179 00:10:19,360 --> 00:10:21,880 Speaker 3: I went out. I did what anybody would do in 180 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:25,080 Speaker 3: that situation, which I spent ninety five dollars which seemed 181 00:10:25,080 --> 00:10:27,959 Speaker 3: like a king's ransom at the time, for the Ibbitson yearbook. 182 00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:32,319 Speaker 3: And I transcribed all you know, nine hundred and eighty 183 00:10:32,320 --> 00:10:35,360 Speaker 3: five data points into a spreadsheet which I had just 184 00:10:35,440 --> 00:10:38,440 Speaker 3: learned how to use, you know, sometime around nineteen ninety. 185 00:10:39,120 --> 00:10:41,199 Speaker 3: And then that was the start of my models. And 186 00:10:41,200 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 3: the other people provided me with data. Ken Fisher, bless 187 00:10:44,559 --> 00:10:47,320 Speaker 3: his soul, supplied me with a fair amount of data, 188 00:10:47,640 --> 00:10:51,120 Speaker 3: and I, you know, impersonated a professional investor at certain 189 00:10:51,200 --> 00:10:53,080 Speaker 3: large banks and was able to get data sits from 190 00:10:53,120 --> 00:10:54,680 Speaker 3: them as as well. 191 00:10:55,720 --> 00:10:58,920 Speaker 2: By the way, I find Ken Fisher to be one 192 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:05,280 Speaker 2: of the more fascinating people in finance, because not only 193 00:11:05,720 --> 00:11:09,240 Speaker 2: did he bring a writer's perspective. I think he was 194 00:11:09,280 --> 00:11:13,920 Speaker 2: the longest running Forbes columnist at like forty three years, 195 00:11:13,920 --> 00:11:17,680 Speaker 2: some crazy number, writing a monthly column for them. But 196 00:11:18,240 --> 00:11:23,079 Speaker 2: he was both an investor and a very accomplished business 197 00:11:23,120 --> 00:11:27,440 Speaker 2: person in terms of like he was early in direct mail, 198 00:11:27,559 --> 00:11:29,920 Speaker 2: he was early in the Internet, he was early in 199 00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:33,720 Speaker 2: just as running a business, just throwing stuff against the wall, 200 00:11:33,760 --> 00:11:37,960 Speaker 2: seeing what stuck, and just ab testing, iterating on a 201 00:11:38,000 --> 00:11:42,400 Speaker 2: continual basis, long before Google started doing that online. He 202 00:11:42,480 --> 00:11:46,480 Speaker 2: was one of the early people who developed here's what 203 00:11:46,720 --> 00:11:50,960 Speaker 2: financial asset management marketing should look like. 204 00:11:51,360 --> 00:11:53,720 Speaker 3: Yeah, and he did all those things, and he's also 205 00:11:53,880 --> 00:11:58,000 Speaker 3: a superb writer and observer. I think you interviewed him 206 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:01,400 Speaker 3: a couple of times, Yeah, once or twice, maybe once 207 00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:05,720 Speaker 3: memorably and well there was that sure, And you know, 208 00:12:05,920 --> 00:12:07,719 Speaker 3: he said something on one of your interviews that that 209 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:10,120 Speaker 3: stuck with me, you know, for the past twenty years, 210 00:12:10,920 --> 00:12:13,760 Speaker 3: which is that he pays close attention to the headlines 211 00:12:14,480 --> 00:12:16,960 Speaker 3: because he knows that if something is above the fold, 212 00:12:16,960 --> 00:12:20,200 Speaker 3: it's already been impounded into prices and can be safely ignored. 213 00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:22,320 Speaker 2: That's exactly right. I thought you were going in a 214 00:12:22,320 --> 00:12:26,920 Speaker 2: different direction the first time quick digression. The first time 215 00:12:26,960 --> 00:12:30,199 Speaker 2: I interviewed him right in the studio. He was kind 216 00:12:30,280 --> 00:12:32,960 Speaker 2: enough to do an interview with me in the first 217 00:12:33,040 --> 00:12:37,240 Speaker 2: year of the podcast, which was, you know, admittedly pretty terrible. 218 00:12:37,280 --> 00:12:40,840 Speaker 2: I was very rough around the edges, and it was 219 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:44,199 Speaker 2: very formal and rigorous and tell us about small cap 220 00:12:44,240 --> 00:12:47,840 Speaker 2: and tell us about emerging market value. And it was 221 00:12:47,920 --> 00:12:51,959 Speaker 2: really on the you know, just kind of straight down 222 00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:56,200 Speaker 2: the line and really boring. And afterwards we're having a 223 00:12:56,240 --> 00:12:59,760 Speaker 2: conversation as the new firm going pretty good, we're a 224 00:12:59,760 --> 00:13:02,559 Speaker 2: few hundred million dollars, blah blah blah. You know, we 225 00:13:02,960 --> 00:13:06,400 Speaker 2: come in second very often on some of these big households. 226 00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:09,640 Speaker 2: And he said to me, wait till you're five years 227 00:13:09,679 --> 00:13:13,480 Speaker 2: old and a billion dollars in assets under management, and 228 00:13:13,520 --> 00:13:15,440 Speaker 2: the world will open up to you, because no one 229 00:13:15,440 --> 00:13:17,959 Speaker 2: with real money wants to give, you know, a small 230 00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:21,559 Speaker 2: firm with no history a big chunk of cash. And 231 00:13:21,600 --> 00:13:24,559 Speaker 2: we just started talking about how the business ran and 232 00:13:24,600 --> 00:13:28,560 Speaker 2: how he delegated authority and how he built stuff. And 233 00:13:28,640 --> 00:13:31,440 Speaker 2: I'm sitting there listening to them, listening to him, and 234 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:36,360 Speaker 2: saying to myself, idiot, this is the conversation, not the 235 00:13:36,400 --> 00:13:39,080 Speaker 2: small cap nonsense. You just spent an hour chatting about 236 00:13:39,520 --> 00:13:43,280 Speaker 2: And when he finished schooling me, I said, can you 237 00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:46,600 Speaker 2: come back one day and we'll discuss that because this 238 00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:49,520 Speaker 2: is fascinating and he goes, sure, anytime. So a year 239 00:13:49,640 --> 00:13:52,400 Speaker 2: later we came back and had the conversation we should 240 00:13:52,400 --> 00:13:56,720 Speaker 2: have had. He has always impressed with me with how 241 00:13:57,440 --> 00:14:02,760 Speaker 2: insightful and unique his perspective is. I mean, we're all 242 00:14:02,800 --> 00:14:05,760 Speaker 2: a little neurodivergent. He has his issues, I have mine, 243 00:14:06,200 --> 00:14:09,200 Speaker 2: but I just find him to be an absolutely fascinating guy. 244 00:14:09,360 --> 00:14:10,840 Speaker 3: I mean, if we can get into just a little 245 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:13,720 Speaker 3: bit of neurophysiology here, there's something called the well. 246 00:14:13,640 --> 00:14:16,840 Speaker 2: You happen to be a neurologist, so let's have at it. 247 00:14:16,880 --> 00:14:20,920 Speaker 3: There's something called the default mode network, which is a 248 00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:25,120 Speaker 3: part of your brain that becomes electrically active when you're 249 00:14:25,160 --> 00:14:28,480 Speaker 3: at rest and which turns itself off when you're doing 250 00:14:28,560 --> 00:14:32,440 Speaker 3: any focused task. And it turns out you can locate 251 00:14:32,480 --> 00:14:35,920 Speaker 3: it anatomically on imaging studies, and people who have well 252 00:14:35,960 --> 00:14:39,960 Speaker 3: developed anatomically well developed default mode networks tend to be 253 00:14:40,120 --> 00:14:44,640 Speaker 3: very good at reading other people and have good emotional intelligence. 254 00:14:44,680 --> 00:14:46,680 Speaker 3: The opposite of that is in people who are on 255 00:14:46,720 --> 00:14:49,560 Speaker 3: the spectrum who have small default mode networks and are 256 00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:51,320 Speaker 3: not good at reading other. 257 00:14:51,200 --> 00:14:54,800 Speaker 2: People, and so he kind of blunt by the way, 258 00:14:54,800 --> 00:14:58,680 Speaker 2: the firm is done fine. They've recovered from his stumble. 259 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:01,600 Speaker 2: I don't know if it was even pre pandemic. And 260 00:15:01,640 --> 00:15:04,480 Speaker 2: I thought he kind of got slagged by a lot 261 00:15:04,480 --> 00:15:07,600 Speaker 2: of people unfairly. The guy has been a public figure 262 00:15:07,640 --> 00:15:09,960 Speaker 2: for forty five years. He's been at least writing in 263 00:15:10,040 --> 00:15:15,360 Speaker 2: public for all that time. You know, sometimes stuff happens, 264 00:15:15,400 --> 00:15:20,040 Speaker 2: and in a sort of social media gotcha environment. 265 00:15:20,520 --> 00:15:25,400 Speaker 3: To say nothing of being a spectacularly effective environmentalist. 266 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:29,960 Speaker 2: So on our last interview with him, we talked about 267 00:15:30,160 --> 00:15:34,600 Speaker 2: all the trees and woods that he has purchased and 268 00:15:34,680 --> 00:15:39,840 Speaker 2: put into permanent conservation. He's done giant studies on sequoias 269 00:15:39,840 --> 00:15:43,200 Speaker 2: and redwoods. I think he's one of the leading experts 270 00:15:43,240 --> 00:15:46,440 Speaker 2: in a specific type of tree known in the Pacific Northwest. 271 00:15:46,840 --> 00:15:51,680 Speaker 2: He's really like a wildly fascinating guy, and I hope 272 00:15:51,720 --> 00:15:56,000 Speaker 2: people don't judge him for that. I mean, I don't 273 00:15:56,040 --> 00:15:59,720 Speaker 2: know what to call it. That politically incorrect snafu. I 274 00:16:00,240 --> 00:16:02,440 Speaker 2: think he meant it in any other way, and it, 275 00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:04,640 Speaker 2: you know, they kind of had to reel him in 276 00:16:04,680 --> 00:16:07,760 Speaker 2: a bit. But the farm is doing fine. His farm 277 00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:10,440 Speaker 2: is doing fine. And there was like about a five 278 00:16:10,480 --> 00:16:14,120 Speaker 2: billion dollar outflow. But when you're one hundred and five 279 00:16:14,160 --> 00:16:16,840 Speaker 2: or one hundred and ten billion dollars, all right, you 280 00:16:16,920 --> 00:16:18,840 Speaker 2: got to dance with who brought you there? He built 281 00:16:18,880 --> 00:16:21,320 Speaker 2: it up to that. But I find him to be 282 00:16:21,320 --> 00:16:22,360 Speaker 2: really an interesting guy. 283 00:16:22,840 --> 00:16:25,280 Speaker 3: Yeah, and he has the address here on Lexington, so 284 00:16:25,320 --> 00:16:26,680 Speaker 3: he knows where to send the chocolates. 285 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:30,840 Speaker 2: I think I'm going to begin with a quote that 286 00:16:31,000 --> 00:16:34,080 Speaker 2: I stole from Bill to start a chapter of my 287 00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:37,800 Speaker 2: new book. To the extent you succeed in finance, you 288 00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:42,400 Speaker 2: succeed by suppressing the limbic system, your system one, the 289 00:16:42,560 --> 00:16:47,240 Speaker 2: very fast moving emotional system. If you cannot suppress that, 290 00:16:47,960 --> 00:16:52,080 Speaker 2: you are going to die poor. I love that quote. 291 00:16:52,680 --> 00:16:55,080 Speaker 2: Is it an exaggeration or is it accurate? 292 00:16:55,440 --> 00:16:57,800 Speaker 3: No, it's it's extremely accurate. Let me tell you a 293 00:16:57,840 --> 00:17:03,120 Speaker 3: personal story. I have a good friend who is a 294 00:17:03,160 --> 00:17:07,160 Speaker 3: wealthy person, and that has enabled this person to have 295 00:17:07,280 --> 00:17:13,840 Speaker 3: a career in public service, and she's done very very well. 296 00:17:13,840 --> 00:17:16,400 Speaker 3: And one day, after I'd known her for many, many years, 297 00:17:16,400 --> 00:17:19,520 Speaker 3: she told me that her sister was poor. All right? 298 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:22,360 Speaker 3: Or did not have a lot of money. And I said, 299 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:25,080 Speaker 3: I don't understand this. Was she disinherited? Did she make 300 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:27,920 Speaker 3: the family angry? And she looked at me straight in 301 00:17:28,000 --> 00:17:30,200 Speaker 3: the eye and she said no, she was afraid of stocks. 302 00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:34,600 Speaker 3: Really yeah, And so that's the difference. If you can 303 00:17:34,640 --> 00:17:37,879 Speaker 3: suppress that fear, you will do very well, and if 304 00:17:37,920 --> 00:17:41,920 Speaker 3: you can't suppress the fear, then you probably will die poor. 305 00:17:42,640 --> 00:17:46,280 Speaker 2: So it's so fascinating you said that you must have 306 00:17:46,320 --> 00:17:50,639 Speaker 2: a similar situation. I live in liberal New York. You 307 00:17:51,160 --> 00:17:55,159 Speaker 2: live in liberal Oregon, right, But we have clients that 308 00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:57,920 Speaker 2: are on the left and the right. And so anytime 309 00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:02,520 Speaker 2: you put out a commentary on current affairs, not only 310 00:18:02,640 --> 00:18:05,040 Speaker 2: because you don't want to offend half your clients, but 311 00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:08,399 Speaker 2: because it's a good analytical strategy to try and go 312 00:18:08,480 --> 00:18:12,760 Speaker 2: down the middle. Be objective and fact based. But whatever 313 00:18:12,800 --> 00:18:15,440 Speaker 2: your personal bias is, keep it, keep it out of it. 314 00:18:16,040 --> 00:18:18,760 Speaker 2: And I wrote something up about what are the best 315 00:18:18,760 --> 00:18:21,000 Speaker 2: and worst case scenarios about the tariffs, And we'll talk 316 00:18:21,040 --> 00:18:25,479 Speaker 2: a ton later about tariffs. But the fascinating thing is 317 00:18:25,560 --> 00:18:27,639 Speaker 2: when you look at history, and you look at a 318 00:18:27,760 --> 00:18:31,120 Speaker 2: chart of everything that's happened, go back one hundred years, 319 00:18:31,119 --> 00:18:34,280 Speaker 2: go back to nineteen twenty six. There's always a reason 320 00:18:34,320 --> 00:18:37,600 Speaker 2: to sell stocks year in, year out. There's always some 321 00:18:38,320 --> 00:18:43,280 Speaker 2: spectacularly crazy news that says this is gonna be terrible. 322 00:18:43,280 --> 00:18:46,760 Speaker 2: I want to sell. And if you're selling in response 323 00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:50,479 Speaker 2: to headlines, you know, and you're gonna wait for the 324 00:18:50,800 --> 00:18:53,359 Speaker 2: dust to clear by that it's too late. You've missed 325 00:18:53,520 --> 00:18:56,720 Speaker 2: most of the recovery. How do we deal with that 326 00:18:57,400 --> 00:19:02,439 Speaker 2: never ending threat that persists? This time is different since 327 00:19:02,840 --> 00:19:06,439 Speaker 2: and carent affairs the headlines today? Does it feel like 328 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:09,600 Speaker 2: the tariffs are different? Or is this no different than 329 00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:13,560 Speaker 2: the Great Financial Crisis, the pandemic, the dot com implosion, 330 00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:17,240 Speaker 2: go down the list to say nothing of the Kennedy 331 00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:21,159 Speaker 2: assassination nine to eleven, Like there are endless reasons to 332 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:24,040 Speaker 2: be panicked about what's going on in the world. 333 00:19:24,320 --> 00:19:27,800 Speaker 3: Yes, this time certainly was different. Never before in American 334 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:32,320 Speaker 3: history has a colossally incompetent American president tried to creator 335 00:19:32,400 --> 00:19:34,959 Speaker 3: the economy. And that's it's very different. 336 00:19:35,160 --> 00:19:37,360 Speaker 2: Do you think that was his purpose? Is he like, hey, 337 00:19:37,359 --> 00:19:39,360 Speaker 2: we cause the recession rates come down and that's good 338 00:19:39,400 --> 00:19:40,080 Speaker 2: for real estate? 339 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:44,680 Speaker 3: Or I think we've talked about this one. The Rosetta 340 00:19:44,720 --> 00:19:48,600 Speaker 3: Stone of Donald Trump is a call in show he 341 00:19:48,680 --> 00:19:52,199 Speaker 3: did with Howard Stern along with his daughter and his 342 00:19:52,320 --> 00:19:56,800 Speaker 3: son Junior, And Howard looked at him and said, quick, 343 00:19:56,920 --> 00:20:00,760 Speaker 3: multiply six times seventeen. All right. None of the three 344 00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:04,679 Speaker 3: of them could do itred two. Well, that's the whole point. 345 00:20:05,320 --> 00:20:08,919 Speaker 3: And you know, Don Junior laughed, he thought it was funny. 346 00:20:09,480 --> 00:20:11,120 Speaker 3: Ivankas said, oh no, you don't have to be able 347 00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:11,800 Speaker 3: to do math. 348 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:15,120 Speaker 2: To do real estate or investing for that math. 349 00:20:15,400 --> 00:20:18,320 Speaker 3: But the most interesting response was Donald's. He said, no, 350 00:20:18,359 --> 00:20:20,879 Speaker 3: it's one hundred and twelve, and he argued with Howard 351 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:22,960 Speaker 3: Stern about whether it was one hundred and two or 352 00:20:22,960 --> 00:20:24,320 Speaker 3: one hundred and twelve. 353 00:20:24,320 --> 00:20:27,240 Speaker 2: Six times ten is sixty six times seven is forty two, 354 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:30,320 Speaker 2: sixteen forty two. I mean that's how I do math 355 00:20:30,320 --> 00:20:31,639 Speaker 2: in my head. I don't know how you do it. 356 00:20:31,760 --> 00:20:33,840 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, there's yeah, that's one way to do it. 357 00:20:33,960 --> 00:20:37,480 Speaker 3: Or you might know that three times seventeen is fifty one, okay, 358 00:20:37,520 --> 00:20:40,439 Speaker 3: and you could double it, double it exactly. And so 359 00:20:40,600 --> 00:20:43,520 Speaker 3: this is a math problem that you know, a reasonably 360 00:20:43,520 --> 00:20:47,080 Speaker 3: bright middle school student can handle. None of the three 361 00:20:47,119 --> 00:20:49,320 Speaker 3: Trumps could do it, okay, and so this is the 362 00:20:49,320 --> 00:20:53,400 Speaker 3: guy who's now directing our economy. So that's different. All right, Well, 363 00:20:53,520 --> 00:20:56,320 Speaker 3: how different was that from nine to eleven? All right, 364 00:20:56,400 --> 00:20:57,719 Speaker 3: nine to eleven was sure different. 365 00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:01,480 Speaker 2: I mean, arguably, Jeorge H. W. Bush is in the 366 00:21:01,520 --> 00:21:05,320 Speaker 2: sharpest tool in the in the box. Barack Obama had 367 00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:09,520 Speaker 2: no national experience whatsoever, had no idea how really the 368 00:21:09,600 --> 00:21:13,960 Speaker 2: national apparatus worked. You could do this on both sides 369 00:21:14,000 --> 00:21:16,840 Speaker 2: to some degree. You're saying this time really. 370 00:21:16,840 --> 00:21:19,159 Speaker 3: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, this is this is this, this 371 00:21:19,240 --> 00:21:21,640 Speaker 3: is completely there were there were adults in the room 372 00:21:22,040 --> 00:21:24,159 Speaker 3: during the Bush presidency, and there were adults in the 373 00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:27,400 Speaker 3: room during the first Trump presidency. They're all gone now. 374 00:21:28,119 --> 00:21:30,560 Speaker 2: And yet the market continued to go higher during the 375 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:34,120 Speaker 2: first Trump presidency regardless of who was president. 376 00:21:33,880 --> 00:21:37,480 Speaker 3: Because they took him literally but not seriously. 377 00:21:37,760 --> 00:21:41,159 Speaker 2: Other way around, Yeah, seriously but not literally. Yeah, this 378 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:43,639 Speaker 2: time I think we should be taking him literally but 379 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:44,360 Speaker 2: not seriously. 380 00:21:44,480 --> 00:21:47,120 Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, that's right, got it reversed exactly. 381 00:21:47,240 --> 00:21:51,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, the great So we talked earlier about the efficient 382 00:21:51,119 --> 00:21:56,320 Speaker 2: market hypothesis. So to be fair to the president, he's 383 00:21:56,359 --> 00:21:59,879 Speaker 2: been talking about Tariff's whole adult life. He says, Tariff 384 00:21:59,920 --> 00:22:02,119 Speaker 2: is the most beautiful word in the dictionary. He says, 385 00:22:02,480 --> 00:22:07,479 Speaker 2: I'm tariff man. Why were the markets so surprised by 386 00:22:07,600 --> 00:22:12,080 Speaker 2: Liberation Day when here's a guy who has told you, 387 00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:16,760 Speaker 2: I'm going to implement big, beautiful tariffs in my second term. 388 00:22:17,160 --> 00:22:20,800 Speaker 2: Why did the market have to adjust revenue and earnings 389 00:22:20,840 --> 00:22:26,520 Speaker 2: expectations down substantially after April second if the market's so efficient. 390 00:22:26,359 --> 00:22:28,800 Speaker 3: Well, I think that the reason why is because he 391 00:22:29,280 --> 00:22:31,360 Speaker 3: didn't do ninety percent of the other things he said 392 00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:32,840 Speaker 3: he was going to do. He was going to repeal 393 00:22:32,840 --> 00:22:37,280 Speaker 3: Obamacare and give us a big, beautiful healthcare system. He 394 00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:42,840 Speaker 3: was going to redo our infrastructure. He was going to 395 00:22:43,600 --> 00:22:45,760 Speaker 3: establish peace in the Ukraine on day one. 396 00:22:46,119 --> 00:22:48,960 Speaker 2: And I think that his breaking and the price of eggs, yeah. 397 00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:51,520 Speaker 3: Exactly, And I think that his I think that his 398 00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:54,879 Speaker 3: promise on tariff's just got put in the bin with 399 00:22:54,920 --> 00:22:57,480 Speaker 3: the rest of the stuff. He obviously wasn't going to 400 00:22:57,480 --> 00:22:58,159 Speaker 3: do it and didn't do. 401 00:22:59,320 --> 00:23:02,360 Speaker 2: But I think people did take him seriously. They did expect, 402 00:23:03,280 --> 00:23:08,680 Speaker 2: you know, the sort of muscular US foreign policy and 403 00:23:09,320 --> 00:23:13,120 Speaker 2: take tough you know, a tough stance with the Middle East, 404 00:23:13,160 --> 00:23:17,000 Speaker 2: a tough stance with the Russia Ukraine War, and he's 405 00:23:17,040 --> 00:23:21,879 Speaker 2: going to bring prices down. That's why I believe most 406 00:23:22,080 --> 00:23:26,480 Speaker 2: of his non hardcore supporters voted him. I think a 407 00:23:26,520 --> 00:23:30,040 Speaker 2: lot of people were kind of surprised by what he's done. 408 00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:34,440 Speaker 2: Are you suggesting that we should not be long term 409 00:23:34,480 --> 00:23:37,960 Speaker 2: investors and step aside or do we just have to 410 00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:39,160 Speaker 2: ride this out? 411 00:23:39,400 --> 00:23:39,480 Speaker 1: No? 412 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:42,280 Speaker 3: I think that it's this time is different in the 413 00:23:42,320 --> 00:23:45,159 Speaker 3: same way that all the other times were were different. 414 00:23:45,320 --> 00:23:49,920 Speaker 3: I mean, you know October nineteenth, you know nineteen eighty seven, Boy, 415 00:23:49,960 --> 00:23:52,159 Speaker 3: that was sure different. We've never seen that before and 416 00:23:52,160 --> 00:23:54,480 Speaker 3: we've never seen it since. And the smart thing to 417 00:23:54,560 --> 00:23:57,960 Speaker 3: do on October twentieth of nineteen eighty seven was to 418 00:23:57,960 --> 00:23:58,560 Speaker 3: buy stocks. 419 00:23:58,760 --> 00:23:59,000 Speaker 1: Right. 420 00:23:59,400 --> 00:24:02,160 Speaker 2: So when you say so, not that you had time 421 00:24:02,800 --> 00:24:05,000 Speaker 2: like I was hoping, we would be down. I don't 422 00:24:05,000 --> 00:24:07,680 Speaker 2: get excited about down eight to ten percent, but down 423 00:24:07,760 --> 00:24:10,960 Speaker 2: twenty percent, you've got my attention. I want to start 424 00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:14,000 Speaker 2: legging into more equities. We never quite got there on 425 00:24:14,040 --> 00:24:17,040 Speaker 2: the SMP, right, I think, well we down eighteen percent, 426 00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:17,800 Speaker 2: seventeen percent. 427 00:24:18,160 --> 00:24:20,440 Speaker 3: Yeah, And it's the same thing with you know late 428 00:24:20,560 --> 00:24:23,120 Speaker 3: March of twenty twenty, Boy, that was fast. 429 00:24:22,960 --> 00:24:26,240 Speaker 2: Thirty four percent seventeen days. So if you were looking 430 00:24:26,280 --> 00:24:29,560 Speaker 2: for down twenty You got it. You just only had 431 00:24:29,560 --> 00:24:30,600 Speaker 2: a day or two to react. 432 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:33,280 Speaker 3: Yeah, I don't, you know. I try to stay away 433 00:24:33,280 --> 00:24:36,480 Speaker 3: from correction ten percent bear market twenty percent. To me, 434 00:24:36,520 --> 00:24:37,280 Speaker 3: that's numerology. 435 00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:39,840 Speaker 2: There's no difference one hundred you and I know, you know, 436 00:24:39,960 --> 00:24:43,040 Speaker 2: I find the base ten like what you have ten 437 00:24:43,080 --> 00:24:45,800 Speaker 2: fingers and ten toes. So twenty percent is a bear market. 438 00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:48,520 Speaker 2: There's just no data that supports that. 439 00:24:48,680 --> 00:24:51,080 Speaker 3: No, there's no difference between the market being down nineteen 440 00:24:51,119 --> 00:24:55,080 Speaker 3: percent and down being down twenty one percent. It behaves 441 00:24:55,119 --> 00:24:56,320 Speaker 3: the same way in both cases. 442 00:24:56,440 --> 00:24:59,919 Speaker 2: Arguably. If so, maybe I should make our rebalance BA 443 00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:03,680 Speaker 2: instead of being down twenty percent, maybe it's down sixteen percent. 444 00:25:04,080 --> 00:25:06,600 Speaker 2: So you get executed and then add a second one 445 00:25:06,680 --> 00:25:07,840 Speaker 2: down twenty four percent. 446 00:25:07,920 --> 00:25:12,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, until you get to you know, March of nine, 447 00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:15,439 Speaker 3: and there you've rebalanced. You've thrown all your cash in 448 00:25:15,520 --> 00:25:16,600 Speaker 3: three different times. 449 00:25:17,160 --> 00:25:19,560 Speaker 2: And but you know, if you've thrown away your cash, 450 00:25:19,760 --> 00:25:23,080 Speaker 2: it kind of works out. The really the really strange 451 00:25:23,119 --> 00:25:27,440 Speaker 2: thing about bear markets, and I'm my frame of reference 452 00:25:27,520 --> 00:25:31,000 Speaker 2: is not just twenty to twenty thirteen, but the Dow 453 00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:35,200 Speaker 2: kisses one thousand in nineteen sixty six and it doesn't 454 00:25:35,200 --> 00:25:38,080 Speaker 2: get over and on a permanent basis till nineteen eighty two. 455 00:25:38,880 --> 00:25:43,119 Speaker 2: And if you just continued to dollar cost average for 456 00:25:43,200 --> 00:25:47,880 Speaker 2: those sixteen years, or from twenty to twenty thirteen, when 457 00:25:47,960 --> 00:25:52,240 Speaker 2: the market finally got over all its previous highs, that's 458 00:25:52,280 --> 00:25:54,399 Speaker 2: when you start to make a ton of money because 459 00:25:54,760 --> 00:26:00,400 Speaker 2: that next cyclical I'm sorry, that next secular move. Those 460 00:26:00,400 --> 00:26:03,480 Speaker 2: bad buys you've made over the past ten years, suddenly 461 00:26:03,520 --> 00:26:04,320 Speaker 2: they start flower. 462 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:08,840 Speaker 3: Yeah, there's this academic parlor game we're both aware of, 463 00:26:09,240 --> 00:26:12,439 Speaker 3: which is the argument is do stocks get riskier with 464 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:16,840 Speaker 3: a longer time horizon? And the correct academic answer is yes, 465 00:26:17,119 --> 00:26:19,680 Speaker 3: they do. But the assumption there is that you're a 466 00:26:19,720 --> 00:26:22,480 Speaker 3: buy and hold investor, all right, But there are other 467 00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:25,280 Speaker 3: kinds of investors besides buy and hold investors. If you 468 00:26:25,440 --> 00:26:30,800 Speaker 3: are a periodic savory, you're a young person who's putting 469 00:26:30,800 --> 00:26:33,520 Speaker 3: money away, then stocks are really not all that risky 470 00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:37,440 Speaker 3: for the reason you just gave. On the other hand, 471 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:39,960 Speaker 3: if you're a retiree and you have no more human 472 00:26:40,119 --> 00:26:45,240 Speaker 3: capital left than stocks are three mile Island dangerous? You are? 473 00:26:45,600 --> 00:26:48,240 Speaker 2: You know, you have to explain what that means to a. 474 00:26:48,280 --> 00:26:51,320 Speaker 3: Young Yeah, there was a nuclear There was a nuclear 475 00:26:51,359 --> 00:26:53,639 Speaker 3: accident which was sort of the junior early version of 476 00:26:53,680 --> 00:26:57,720 Speaker 3: Chernobyl at three Mile Island outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. There was 477 00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:00,880 Speaker 3: a movie that was that was parody of all Yeah, yeah, 478 00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:05,800 Speaker 3: the China syndrome. That's right, uh and and and so 479 00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:08,840 Speaker 3: the point being that if you're an older person, stocks 480 00:27:08,920 --> 00:27:11,840 Speaker 3: are are risky. And you could say, if you're you know, 481 00:27:11,920 --> 00:27:14,160 Speaker 3: like me, you don't have a lot of human capital left, well, 482 00:27:14,440 --> 00:27:18,080 Speaker 3: five out of six times, uh, stocks have higher returns 483 00:27:18,080 --> 00:27:20,400 Speaker 3: in bonds. So even in retirement, I should have plenty 484 00:27:20,760 --> 00:27:23,240 Speaker 3: of stocks. And that's like saying that when you play 485 00:27:23,320 --> 00:27:25,320 Speaker 3: Russian roulette five out of six times you win. 486 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:30,000 Speaker 2: I guess five out of six times. But that said 487 00:27:30,200 --> 00:27:33,200 Speaker 2: that that six time is a doozy, isn't it exactly? 488 00:27:33,200 --> 00:27:36,000 Speaker 3: It's it's it's all about asymmetric consequences. It's if you're 489 00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:39,240 Speaker 3: if you're invested too heavily in bonds and you should 490 00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:41,040 Speaker 3: have been invested in stocks, well you don't get to 491 00:27:41,040 --> 00:27:43,359 Speaker 3: fly first class, you don't get to buy the beamer. 492 00:27:43,880 --> 00:27:44,120 Speaker 1: Uh. 493 00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:46,879 Speaker 3: But on the other hand, if you invest too heavily 494 00:27:46,920 --> 00:27:50,480 Speaker 3: in stocks and you're wrong, then you're bunking with your kids. 495 00:27:50,920 --> 00:27:53,239 Speaker 2: Right, if you're an older investor and you don't have 496 00:27:53,240 --> 00:27:56,040 Speaker 2: that time horizon, right. Yeah, someone someone said to me, 497 00:27:56,080 --> 00:27:59,760 Speaker 2: can you really look through the next four years if 498 00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:02,840 Speaker 2: you're not retiring for ten or twenty years, or if 499 00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:05,720 Speaker 2: your kids five twenty nine, they're not going to school 500 00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:10,400 Speaker 2: for ten fifteen years. That's the easy question. The challenge 501 00:28:10,440 --> 00:28:13,679 Speaker 2: is what happens if you're retiring in twenty five, twenty six, 502 00:28:13,840 --> 00:28:18,160 Speaker 2: twenty seven, right in the next three years. You know, 503 00:28:18,240 --> 00:28:22,480 Speaker 2: that sequence of returns problem is really thorny. I think 504 00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:24,240 Speaker 2: it was Bill Sharp said, it's one of the most 505 00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:27,040 Speaker 2: difficult problems in all of finance. How much do you 506 00:28:27,160 --> 00:28:30,240 Speaker 2: draw down each year? We all use four percent as 507 00:28:30,240 --> 00:28:32,640 Speaker 2: an average, but how much do you draw down each 508 00:28:32,680 --> 00:28:35,560 Speaker 2: year if your first couple of years of retirement is 509 00:28:35,720 --> 00:28:37,919 Speaker 2: down five, down, ten, down, twenty percent? 510 00:28:38,160 --> 00:28:41,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, there's this one or wonderful little bit of quantitative 511 00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:43,280 Speaker 3: work done by Mike Kitsis. And wait, foul about you 512 00:28:43,320 --> 00:28:47,360 Speaker 3: know the reversel glide slope, which is you actually raise 513 00:28:47,400 --> 00:28:51,080 Speaker 3: your equity allocation the further into retirement you get, and 514 00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:53,040 Speaker 3: that just if you think about it logically, it just 515 00:28:53,080 --> 00:28:55,600 Speaker 3: falls right out of that your first your first five 516 00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:58,080 Speaker 3: ten years of retirement, you want to be fairly conservative 517 00:28:58,200 --> 00:29:00,280 Speaker 3: just for that reason. And then when you're eight years 518 00:29:00,320 --> 00:29:02,040 Speaker 3: old and you know you'll be pushing up the daisies 519 00:29:02,840 --> 00:29:05,479 Speaker 3: in five or ten years, then you can be more 520 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:09,480 Speaker 3: aggressive because you don't need that much of a liability 521 00:29:09,520 --> 00:29:11,000 Speaker 3: match in portfolio at that age. 522 00:29:11,360 --> 00:29:14,640 Speaker 2: Huh really really interesting. So you wrote a short book 523 00:29:14,680 --> 00:29:19,200 Speaker 2: called Deep Risk talking about different types of risk. Explain 524 00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:21,560 Speaker 2: what is deep risk? What is shallow risk? 525 00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,400 Speaker 3: Well, shallow risk is the way we normally think about risk. 526 00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:28,320 Speaker 3: There's this theoretical finance dogma that risk is the same 527 00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:34,320 Speaker 3: as variance or standard deviation. And the problem with that 528 00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:38,440 Speaker 3: is that's only true in the short term short term volatility, 529 00:29:38,720 --> 00:29:41,840 Speaker 3: and short term volatility is not of any real importance 530 00:29:41,880 --> 00:29:44,960 Speaker 3: to the long term investor. The real risk of long 531 00:29:45,040 --> 00:29:48,320 Speaker 3: term investing is not having enough assets to pay for 532 00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:53,720 Speaker 3: your living expenses five, ten, fifteen, twenty thirty years from now. 533 00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:55,959 Speaker 3: So what are the things? What are the what are 534 00:29:55,960 --> 00:30:01,720 Speaker 3: the events that can that can impair that? Big ones? Inflation? Inflation? 535 00:30:01,960 --> 00:30:05,760 Speaker 3: Hyper inflation in particularly is extremely common. It is almost 536 00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:09,880 Speaker 3: the rule rather than the exception. Really, sure, you look, 537 00:30:10,040 --> 00:30:12,720 Speaker 3: all you have to do is ask yourself, what unit 538 00:30:12,760 --> 00:30:15,479 Speaker 3: of currency that would buy yourself something in the year 539 00:30:15,560 --> 00:30:17,920 Speaker 3: nineteen hundred can still buy yourself something today? Well, the 540 00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:21,120 Speaker 3: US dollar can still buy yourself something, okay, can buy 541 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:24,840 Speaker 3: you something. A Japanese yen sure can and it can't. 542 00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:27,640 Speaker 3: An English pound can, and a Swiss franc maybe can 543 00:30:27,680 --> 00:30:29,320 Speaker 3: buy you a candy bar if you find the right 544 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:36,880 Speaker 3: store in Geneva or more likely burn and so you 545 00:30:36,920 --> 00:30:39,320 Speaker 3: know those, you know, they're the case of the yen 546 00:30:39,400 --> 00:30:42,320 Speaker 3: and the French franc and the German lera are much 547 00:30:42,320 --> 00:30:45,680 Speaker 3: more common than the US dollar and the Swiss frank 548 00:30:45,760 --> 00:30:46,680 Speaker 3: and the English pound. 549 00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:49,280 Speaker 2: Those German deutsch Mark, Italian lera. 550 00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:53,560 Speaker 3: Exactly exactly, Yeah, I mean you start with, you know, 551 00:30:54,680 --> 00:30:57,080 Speaker 3: a reich mark in the year nineteen twenty and you 552 00:30:57,120 --> 00:30:59,400 Speaker 3: know by nineteen twenty three, late nineteen twenty three, you 553 00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:02,640 Speaker 3: were down to one trillionth of its personal purchasing power. 554 00:31:02,920 --> 00:31:05,560 Speaker 3: That's hyper inflation. So that's the rule. So that's the 555 00:31:05,600 --> 00:31:08,240 Speaker 3: most common thing that you have to worry about, and 556 00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:11,520 Speaker 3: that is, relatively speaking, the easiest one to defend against. Now, 557 00:31:11,520 --> 00:31:14,160 Speaker 3: there are other three other things that can well. 558 00:31:14,040 --> 00:31:15,840 Speaker 2: Wait before you go to the other three things. How 559 00:31:15,880 --> 00:31:16,920 Speaker 2: do you defend against that. 560 00:31:18,160 --> 00:31:20,160 Speaker 3: Well. First of all, in the US, we have these 561 00:31:20,360 --> 00:31:23,959 Speaker 3: marvelous instruments called tips, and all you have to do 562 00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:26,960 Speaker 3: is worry about, you know, the Department of Labor rejiggering 563 00:31:28,080 --> 00:31:31,280 Speaker 3: the inflation adjustment, which is something to worry about. But 564 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:34,400 Speaker 3: of all the worries you can have, that's a relatively 565 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:35,640 Speaker 3: small one. 566 00:31:35,800 --> 00:31:39,000 Speaker 2: We went through that with Michael Boskin already rejiggered how 567 00:31:39,040 --> 00:31:42,160 Speaker 2: we calculate, right, of course, the living adjustments. Rather than 568 00:31:42,920 --> 00:31:46,880 Speaker 2: debating this like adults politically, they just made some I'm 569 00:31:46,920 --> 00:31:50,320 Speaker 2: not a big fan of substitution or hedonic adjustment. When 570 00:31:50,520 --> 00:31:55,760 Speaker 2: when steak gets too pricey and you substitute chicken, that 571 00:31:55,920 --> 00:31:58,360 Speaker 2: just means I've been priced out of steak. Not that 572 00:31:58,440 --> 00:31:58,840 Speaker 2: this is. 573 00:31:58,760 --> 00:32:01,800 Speaker 3: The equivalent, Yeah, exactly, I mean it is. It is 574 00:32:01,840 --> 00:32:06,320 Speaker 3: a problem. But of all of the asset classes that 575 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:10,240 Speaker 3: protect you with the greatest charity against the decrement in 576 00:32:10,320 --> 00:32:13,800 Speaker 3: your future consumption, loss of your future consumption, tips do 577 00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:15,719 Speaker 3: it better than anything else I can think of. All. 578 00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:18,240 Speaker 2: Right, stock, really interesting stocks. 579 00:32:18,600 --> 00:32:21,920 Speaker 3: Do a relatively good job of it. You know. Elroy 580 00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:24,040 Speaker 3: Dimson likes to point out that stocks are an inflation 581 00:32:24,160 --> 00:32:27,400 Speaker 3: head simply because of their high returns, but they're also 582 00:32:27,400 --> 00:32:31,720 Speaker 3: a claim when real assets. You know, companies own real estate, 583 00:32:31,760 --> 00:32:35,040 Speaker 3: they own equipment, they have human capital, and those retain 584 00:32:35,240 --> 00:32:36,040 Speaker 3: real value. 585 00:32:36,360 --> 00:32:42,480 Speaker 2: Plus stocks are their revenue and profits are in dollars, 586 00:32:42,760 --> 00:32:45,640 Speaker 2: so at least in the US, so if there's inflation, 587 00:32:46,480 --> 00:32:49,280 Speaker 2: the cost of their goods go up and their total dollars, 588 00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:52,680 Speaker 2: maybe their profits get squeezed, but everything seems to rise 589 00:32:53,040 --> 00:32:56,040 Speaker 2: in an inflationary environment on the equity side, right. 590 00:32:55,920 --> 00:32:58,160 Speaker 3: Right, And then there's certain kinds of stocks that are 591 00:32:58,280 --> 00:33:01,600 Speaker 3: especially good at protecting you inst inflation. Value stocks do 592 00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:06,240 Speaker 3: why because they tend to be overly leveraged, and with inflation, 593 00:33:06,520 --> 00:33:10,520 Speaker 3: their debts tend to get inflated away and so that 594 00:33:10,560 --> 00:33:12,960 Speaker 3: flows to their bottom line. So if you look, for example, 595 00:33:12,960 --> 00:33:15,560 Speaker 3: at the period that we just talked about from sixty 596 00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:19,960 Speaker 3: six to eighty two, value stocks actually perform the market 597 00:33:20,040 --> 00:33:24,760 Speaker 3: by an inflation by a very good margin. And then finally, 598 00:33:24,760 --> 00:33:30,080 Speaker 3: there are commodities producers in an inflation environment, the petroleum stocks, 599 00:33:30,160 --> 00:33:34,360 Speaker 3: gold stocks, base metal producers are all going to do 600 00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:39,040 Speaker 3: fairly well, at least relatively well to the market. And 601 00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:41,800 Speaker 3: then finally, you know, on the bond side, for God's sakes, 602 00:33:42,320 --> 00:33:45,400 Speaker 3: keep your maturity short. As we found out in twenty. 603 00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:48,040 Speaker 2: Two, I noticed when you talked about real assets, you 604 00:33:48,080 --> 00:33:51,960 Speaker 2: did not discuss real property. How does real property do 605 00:33:52,080 --> 00:33:54,520 Speaker 2: as an inflation hedge over time? 606 00:33:54,880 --> 00:33:57,000 Speaker 3: It's pretty good. But what I like to say about 607 00:33:57,200 --> 00:33:59,920 Speaker 3: real estate is that it's not an investment. It's a job. 608 00:34:00,440 --> 00:34:00,640 Speaker 2: Yeah. 609 00:34:00,760 --> 00:34:03,200 Speaker 3: If you, if you, if you, if you enjoy dealing 610 00:34:03,200 --> 00:34:07,760 Speaker 3: with drug addle tenants and fixing toilets, then be my guest. 611 00:34:08,640 --> 00:34:12,040 Speaker 2: Okay, I wasn't. I wasn't thinking of rental properties. I 612 00:34:12,200 --> 00:34:16,040 Speaker 2: was thinking of the various roots and offices and paying 613 00:34:16,080 --> 00:34:19,600 Speaker 2: a professional to manage it. So you're not getting the 614 00:34:19,680 --> 00:34:21,760 Speaker 2: two am call that the toilet is overflow. 615 00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:23,719 Speaker 3: Yeah, but then by the time you're investing in public reads, 616 00:34:23,760 --> 00:34:25,400 Speaker 3: you're back in the stock market again. 617 00:34:25,200 --> 00:34:29,719 Speaker 2: Right, So there's no difference. Really really really really interesting. 618 00:34:30,120 --> 00:34:33,120 Speaker 2: I was kind of fascinated by a data point you 619 00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:37,959 Speaker 2: shared talking about old Master paintings. Imagine if you bought 620 00:34:37,960 --> 00:34:42,400 Speaker 2: a Rembrandt for one hundred bucks, and three hundred and 621 00:34:42,440 --> 00:34:45,280 Speaker 2: fifty years later you sold it for ten million dollars 622 00:34:45,840 --> 00:34:48,239 Speaker 2: the return was a little over three percent a year. 623 00:34:48,760 --> 00:34:53,840 Speaker 2: That that's astonishing. All these paintings look like they've appreciated 624 00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:58,960 Speaker 2: so much. Tell us about the math behind these paintings 625 00:34:58,960 --> 00:35:01,000 Speaker 2: that go for ten twenty thirty million dollars. 626 00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:04,600 Speaker 3: Well, it's really it's really not about finance or math. 627 00:35:04,719 --> 00:35:08,799 Speaker 3: What it's about is human neuropsychology. We are particularly bad 628 00:35:08,840 --> 00:35:12,600 Speaker 3: at exponential calculations. And you know, it's the old thing 629 00:35:12,600 --> 00:35:15,400 Speaker 3: that even the the they knew back in the in 630 00:35:15,440 --> 00:35:19,880 Speaker 3: the Far East, that you know, the emperor asks the 631 00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:22,799 Speaker 3: artisan or the farmer what he wants. We'll put one 632 00:35:22,840 --> 00:35:25,200 Speaker 3: grain of rice on the first square in the of 633 00:35:25,239 --> 00:35:27,200 Speaker 3: the chessboard. And by the time you get, of course 634 00:35:27,239 --> 00:35:29,560 Speaker 3: to the to the square, but by the time you 635 00:35:29,600 --> 00:35:31,960 Speaker 3: get to the sixty fourth square, he's the wealthiest person 636 00:35:32,640 --> 00:35:35,520 Speaker 3: on the planet. Human beings are not good at that. 637 00:35:35,600 --> 00:35:38,239 Speaker 3: And that's all that. That's a demonstration of. Now, if 638 00:35:38,239 --> 00:35:42,280 Speaker 3: you want to get into the academic finance of it, 639 00:35:42,280 --> 00:35:47,800 Speaker 3: it's that art has value in investment, has investment value, 640 00:35:47,800 --> 00:35:50,719 Speaker 3: but it also has a complementary value, which is a 641 00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:55,680 Speaker 3: syesthetic return. And Bill Bommel did the research on this, 642 00:35:55,760 --> 00:35:58,719 Speaker 3: the late Bill Bommel. Then Yu did the research on 643 00:35:58,760 --> 00:36:02,040 Speaker 3: this and figured out out that art had a much 644 00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:06,879 Speaker 3: lower return than stocks or bonds simply because of its 645 00:36:07,080 --> 00:36:08,200 Speaker 3: esthetic return. 646 00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:10,839 Speaker 2: Makes a lot of sense. And that's before we get 647 00:36:10,880 --> 00:36:14,839 Speaker 2: to the whole survivorship bias that you only see the 648 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:18,120 Speaker 2: most famous paintings in the world and their price tag. 649 00:36:18,600 --> 00:36:21,800 Speaker 2: The tens of thousands of other paintings that aren't auctioned 650 00:36:21,840 --> 00:36:24,840 Speaker 2: off each year, we don't see their returns. 651 00:36:24,440 --> 00:36:27,359 Speaker 3: So to say nothing of the maintenance and insurance and 652 00:36:27,400 --> 00:36:30,160 Speaker 3: security costs of keeping the art as well. 653 00:36:30,760 --> 00:36:33,600 Speaker 2: No doubt, no doubt about that. It's funny because you 654 00:36:33,600 --> 00:36:37,160 Speaker 2: have this whole group of investing books and then you 655 00:36:37,239 --> 00:36:41,840 Speaker 2: also have this separate group of really fascinating historical books 656 00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:47,000 Speaker 2: about markets and the economy and global trade. Let's start 657 00:36:47,000 --> 00:36:52,680 Speaker 2: with the splendid exchange. It's so perfect for the moment 658 00:36:52,800 --> 00:36:57,399 Speaker 2: we're in. What is the history of trade and how 659 00:36:57,480 --> 00:37:00,960 Speaker 2: has it helped raise everybody standard of living? 660 00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:05,880 Speaker 3: Well, it just gets down to Adam Smith's concept of specialization. 661 00:37:06,120 --> 00:37:12,200 Speaker 3: Nations specialize, and nations have and people have an intrinsic 662 00:37:12,960 --> 00:37:15,600 Speaker 3: tendency too, as he put it, truck and barter. They 663 00:37:15,600 --> 00:37:19,400 Speaker 3: want to trade one thing for another. So you know, 664 00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:22,840 Speaker 3: the one of the great luxury commodities of the seventeenth 665 00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:25,240 Speaker 3: century was the pineapple. If you look at the coats 666 00:37:25,280 --> 00:37:28,680 Speaker 3: of arms of all these European aristocrats, about third or 667 00:37:28,680 --> 00:37:30,680 Speaker 3: a quarter of them have a pineapple on them. Why 668 00:37:30,760 --> 00:37:33,040 Speaker 3: because they came from the New World. They were incredibly 669 00:37:33,120 --> 00:37:38,799 Speaker 3: precious and they were delicious. Everybody in Europe wanted a 670 00:37:38,840 --> 00:37:43,719 Speaker 3: pineapple because they don't grow pineapples in Europe. And so 671 00:37:44,080 --> 00:37:52,200 Speaker 3: different nations have different geographical and intellectual and technological endowments. 672 00:37:52,280 --> 00:37:55,760 Speaker 3: And it's if you improve everybody's standard of living by 673 00:37:55,880 --> 00:37:58,640 Speaker 3: trading among nations the things that other nations aren't good at. 674 00:38:00,160 --> 00:38:03,040 Speaker 2: That seems fair. And we all specialize and we all 675 00:38:03,080 --> 00:38:06,840 Speaker 2: do different things. It makes sense as the US developed 676 00:38:06,880 --> 00:38:10,479 Speaker 2: computer technology and software that we're not going to make 677 00:38:10,680 --> 00:38:15,400 Speaker 2: furniture or fabrics or sneakers or those sorts of things. 678 00:38:16,080 --> 00:38:19,680 Speaker 2: But at what point does globalization go too far? At 679 00:38:19,719 --> 00:38:23,319 Speaker 2: what point have we hollowed out the middle class by 680 00:38:23,400 --> 00:38:28,000 Speaker 2: outsourcing manufacturing to China and other low cost countries. 681 00:38:28,280 --> 00:38:30,759 Speaker 3: That's a really good question, and it was highlighted by 682 00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:34,080 Speaker 3: a series of patients. Again, it was highlighted by a 683 00:38:34,120 --> 00:38:37,840 Speaker 3: series of papers by an economist named David Otter auto 684 00:38:38,000 --> 00:38:42,560 Speaker 3: R And his colleagues, and it showed just how badly 685 00:38:43,120 --> 00:38:49,200 Speaker 3: communities that were affected by Chinese competition were hollowed hollowed out. Now, 686 00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:53,399 Speaker 3: the problem with free trade is that its harms are 687 00:38:53,440 --> 00:38:57,319 Speaker 3: concentrated and obvious, as David Order found out, but its 688 00:38:57,320 --> 00:39:01,279 Speaker 3: benefits are diffuse. So a world in which we have 689 00:39:01,320 --> 00:39:03,880 Speaker 3: to make our own shirts and our own furniture is 690 00:39:03,920 --> 00:39:07,520 Speaker 3: a world in which the other three hundred and fifty 691 00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:11,640 Speaker 3: million Americans who don't make those things are taxed very heavily. 692 00:39:11,680 --> 00:39:13,799 Speaker 3: So instead of paying fifteen dollars for a shirt, you're 693 00:39:13,800 --> 00:39:17,240 Speaker 3: paying thirty five dollars for a shirt. Instead of paying, 694 00:39:17,320 --> 00:39:18,799 Speaker 3: you know, two and a half dollars for a head 695 00:39:18,840 --> 00:39:21,760 Speaker 3: of lettuce, you've got to pay seven dollars for ahead 696 00:39:22,160 --> 00:39:24,520 Speaker 3: of lettuce. And so that's a world in which everyone 697 00:39:24,600 --> 00:39:28,239 Speaker 3: else is impoverished, but in which those costs are much 698 00:39:28,239 --> 00:39:31,160 Speaker 3: harder to see than the out of work auto worker 699 00:39:31,400 --> 00:39:33,760 Speaker 3: or out of work furniture manufacturer. 700 00:39:34,360 --> 00:39:39,200 Speaker 2: So we certainly have problems in the United States. There's 701 00:39:39,239 --> 00:39:42,840 Speaker 2: wealth inequality, there's income inequality. I think the worst of 702 00:39:43,560 --> 00:39:48,839 Speaker 2: the pandemic inflation is behind us, but we have these 703 00:39:48,920 --> 00:39:53,960 Speaker 2: real problems with which a lot of people are blaming 704 00:39:54,719 --> 00:39:59,960 Speaker 2: on trade and globalization. What's wrong with that thesis. 705 00:40:00,960 --> 00:40:05,200 Speaker 3: The analogy I like to use is Churchill's comment about democracy, 706 00:40:05,560 --> 00:40:07,799 Speaker 3: which is it's the worst form of government that's ever 707 00:40:07,840 --> 00:40:09,719 Speaker 3: been tried, except for all the others that have been 708 00:40:09,760 --> 00:40:12,239 Speaker 3: tried from time to time. I think that's close to 709 00:40:12,280 --> 00:40:17,680 Speaker 3: the exact route. And so the alternative to free trade 710 00:40:17,719 --> 00:40:22,240 Speaker 3: is protectionism, and protectionism, as we found out during the thirties, 711 00:40:23,280 --> 00:40:27,880 Speaker 3: is a disaster in multiple dimensions. What happens when you 712 00:40:27,960 --> 00:40:31,120 Speaker 3: raise tariffs is what we're seeing now, is in the 713 00:40:31,160 --> 00:40:36,080 Speaker 3: first place, prices go up. You know, automakers, automakers have 714 00:40:36,160 --> 00:40:40,719 Speaker 3: to pay more for their steel. You know, people who 715 00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:43,719 Speaker 3: are making agricultural products and processing food have to pay 716 00:40:43,719 --> 00:40:50,280 Speaker 3: more for their imported basic inputs, and so domestic prices 717 00:40:50,320 --> 00:40:52,520 Speaker 3: go up. You get inflation, and we're already starting to 718 00:40:52,560 --> 00:40:55,600 Speaker 3: see the expectation of inflation going up. I think the 719 00:40:55,640 --> 00:40:58,880 Speaker 3: media and expectation is now six point seven percent in 720 00:40:59,000 --> 00:41:02,680 Speaker 3: survey data. And once you see the expectation of inflation 721 00:41:02,800 --> 00:41:05,160 Speaker 3: going up, then inflation goes up, because that's how inflation 722 00:41:05,560 --> 00:41:10,320 Speaker 3: is driven. Then you see retaliation, which we're already seeing 723 00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:14,640 Speaker 3: in spectacular fashion, and you see trade wars. But that 724 00:41:15,120 --> 00:41:19,000 Speaker 3: is not even the worst costs cost of protectionism, because 725 00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:23,319 Speaker 3: what happens with that is that it inflames international relations. 726 00:41:23,920 --> 00:41:28,600 Speaker 3: And it was apparent to people in nineteen forty five 727 00:41:29,120 --> 00:41:31,680 Speaker 3: that one of the causes of the Second World War 728 00:41:32,640 --> 00:41:37,439 Speaker 3: was the protectionism of the nineteen thirties, and that gave 729 00:41:37,600 --> 00:41:42,320 Speaker 3: rise to the new world order that we put in place. 730 00:41:42,320 --> 00:41:45,799 Speaker 3: Basically in nineteen forty five, you know, with the what 731 00:41:46,040 --> 00:41:48,800 Speaker 3: came in what became the World Trade Organization, the IMF 732 00:41:49,760 --> 00:41:54,680 Speaker 3: and Breton Woods, and they said, never, never again, this 733 00:41:54,760 --> 00:41:57,360 Speaker 3: is never going to happen again. Why did the Japanese 734 00:41:57,360 --> 00:41:59,800 Speaker 3: attack Pearl Harbor r It was because we embargoed oil, 735 00:42:00,600 --> 00:42:03,440 Speaker 3: all right, and they knew what would happen if we 736 00:42:03,560 --> 00:42:07,120 Speaker 3: cut off their oil supplies. And I fear the same 737 00:42:07,160 --> 00:42:11,200 Speaker 3: thing would happen today. Imagine, for example, an inverted naval 738 00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:14,640 Speaker 3: encounter in the Straits of Taiwan between US and Japanese 739 00:42:15,200 --> 00:42:18,879 Speaker 3: naval vessels. The difference between a peaceful and a non 740 00:42:18,920 --> 00:42:21,920 Speaker 3: peaceful outcome may very well be the state of mind 741 00:42:22,360 --> 00:42:27,560 Speaker 3: of the policymakers on both sides, whose emotions have been 742 00:42:27,560 --> 00:42:29,400 Speaker 3: inflamed by the trade RUCKUS. 743 00:42:29,920 --> 00:42:35,920 Speaker 2: Huh really interesting. So PAX Americana eighty years of growth 744 00:42:35,960 --> 00:42:42,600 Speaker 2: and economic success, much of which accrued to the benefit 745 00:42:42,640 --> 00:42:46,799 Speaker 2: of the US. Are you implying that that is now 746 00:42:46,840 --> 00:42:47,239 Speaker 2: at risk? 747 00:42:47,640 --> 00:42:51,560 Speaker 3: Yes. Absolutely. There is a man, very fairly well known 748 00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:54,600 Speaker 3: economists by the name of Albert Hirshman, who has a 749 00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:58,680 Speaker 3: fascinating biography. He was Jewish, he was raised in Berlin. 750 00:43:00,280 --> 00:43:02,560 Speaker 3: Not only was he Jewish, but he was also a socialist. 751 00:43:03,560 --> 00:43:07,360 Speaker 3: So he fled the Nazi persecution, fought in the French 752 00:43:07,440 --> 00:43:10,320 Speaker 3: army against the Germans, then wound up in Marseille, spiriting 753 00:43:10,360 --> 00:43:16,000 Speaker 3: people like Hannah Arendt out of Marseille into the United 754 00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:21,879 Speaker 3: into the United States. And he saw quite clearly that 755 00:43:22,120 --> 00:43:26,600 Speaker 3: World War II was enlarged part triggered by the trade 756 00:43:26,760 --> 00:43:30,400 Speaker 3: frictions of that period. For example, you know, one of 757 00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:32,479 Speaker 3: the things that inflamed the Germans so much was because 758 00:43:32,520 --> 00:43:34,480 Speaker 3: they couldn't pay their way out of the World War 759 00:43:34,520 --> 00:43:36,520 Speaker 3: One reparations, because they couldn't export. 760 00:43:37,760 --> 00:43:41,680 Speaker 2: And Lord quad Amat's book goes into great detail about that. 761 00:43:41,760 --> 00:43:45,080 Speaker 3: Yeah, and so he wrote about that in nineteen forty five, 762 00:43:45,120 --> 00:43:47,399 Speaker 3: and he says, we have to establish a world order 763 00:43:47,400 --> 00:43:48,680 Speaker 3: in which that doesn't happen again. 764 00:43:49,200 --> 00:43:52,600 Speaker 2: Huh. So here's the best case scenario. And I want 765 00:43:52,600 --> 00:43:55,440 Speaker 2: to talk a little bit about this because splendid Exchange 766 00:43:55,480 --> 00:43:57,759 Speaker 2: and Birth of plenty are sort of two sides of 767 00:43:57,800 --> 00:44:02,319 Speaker 2: the same coin. Best case scenario, this is just a 768 00:44:02,360 --> 00:44:05,840 Speaker 2: negotiating tactic. We're going to cut all these side deals 769 00:44:06,200 --> 00:44:09,320 Speaker 2: and all this brew Haha, Hey, you took him literally, 770 00:44:09,360 --> 00:44:12,400 Speaker 2: we should have taken him seriously. Is there a way 771 00:44:12,480 --> 00:44:17,640 Speaker 2: out that doesn't destroy the post World War two order 772 00:44:17,719 --> 00:44:21,480 Speaker 2: that has accrued so much wealth to the United States? 773 00:44:21,760 --> 00:44:24,840 Speaker 3: It is possible. I don't think at this point it 774 00:44:24,920 --> 00:44:28,200 Speaker 3: is probable. I think that so much damage has been done. 775 00:44:28,680 --> 00:44:32,680 Speaker 3: I don't think that any any foreign power is ever 776 00:44:32,719 --> 00:44:37,760 Speaker 3: going to trust us again. You know, Donald Trump renegotiates 777 00:44:37,840 --> 00:44:42,120 Speaker 3: andn after we get the USMCA. 778 00:44:41,920 --> 00:44:45,560 Speaker 2: His new treaty in Trump one, in Trump one. 779 00:44:45,480 --> 00:44:48,759 Speaker 3: And then he repudiates that. And you know, let's say 780 00:44:48,760 --> 00:44:53,719 Speaker 3: that the Democrat gets elected into in twenty twenty eight. 781 00:44:53,800 --> 00:44:56,080 Speaker 3: Let's assume that you know that he not only he 782 00:44:56,200 --> 00:44:59,000 Speaker 3: or she not only gets the presidency but also gets 783 00:44:59,000 --> 00:45:03,359 Speaker 3: a democratically dominated Congress. The other nations of the world 784 00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:04,640 Speaker 3: are going to look at us and say, yeah, but 785 00:45:04,680 --> 00:45:06,400 Speaker 3: we don't know who's going to be elected in twenty 786 00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:08,640 Speaker 3: thirty two or twenty thirty six. We can't trust these 787 00:45:08,640 --> 00:45:09,279 Speaker 3: people ever. 788 00:45:09,400 --> 00:45:12,640 Speaker 2: Again, that sounds like a worst case scenario. 789 00:45:12,960 --> 00:45:14,680 Speaker 3: I think that's the most I don't think that's the 790 00:45:14,719 --> 00:45:17,200 Speaker 3: worst case scenario. I can think of worst case scenarios 791 00:45:17,280 --> 00:45:19,440 Speaker 3: than that which I've just I described previous to that 792 00:45:19,520 --> 00:45:22,160 Speaker 3: in front of geopolitics, But I think that's the most 793 00:45:22,200 --> 00:45:24,960 Speaker 3: probable scenario. I don't think that anyone is ever going 794 00:45:25,000 --> 00:45:26,400 Speaker 3: to trust the United States again. 795 00:45:27,320 --> 00:45:30,480 Speaker 2: So I'm an optimist because I was fortunate to be 796 00:45:30,680 --> 00:45:33,720 Speaker 2: born when I was where I was, into the family 797 00:45:33,800 --> 00:45:36,680 Speaker 2: I was. I know that shapes how I see the world. 798 00:45:37,239 --> 00:45:42,240 Speaker 2: I'm kind of hopeful that the twenty twenty six Congress 799 00:45:42,320 --> 00:45:46,800 Speaker 2: changes hands, the tariff power is retaken back by Congress, 800 00:45:46,880 --> 00:45:49,880 Speaker 2: which is within their authority to do, and that whoever 801 00:45:50,000 --> 00:45:53,440 Speaker 2: gets elected in twenty eight, regardless of which side of 802 00:45:53,440 --> 00:45:57,759 Speaker 2: the aisle, just does a global goodwill tour and kind 803 00:45:57,840 --> 00:46:00,959 Speaker 2: of rolls back the past four years. Am I being 804 00:46:01,400 --> 00:46:06,319 Speaker 2: pollyannish about this? Am I too sanguine about the potential 805 00:46:06,440 --> 00:46:10,839 Speaker 2: to repair the worst damage that you're suggesting? 806 00:46:11,120 --> 00:46:14,520 Speaker 3: Well, you and I are engaging in a forecasting exercise. 807 00:46:14,560 --> 00:46:18,240 Speaker 3: Which is well beyond computational impass Human beings, as Philip 808 00:46:18,280 --> 00:46:22,000 Speaker 3: Tatlock described, don't forecast very well, even even the best experts. 809 00:46:23,000 --> 00:46:26,120 Speaker 3: My judgment, my forecast would be that your scenario is 810 00:46:26,200 --> 00:46:30,400 Speaker 3: possible but less probable than mine. But I wouldn't be surprised, 811 00:46:30,440 --> 00:46:34,200 Speaker 3: and I would hope that you're right. But if you 812 00:46:34,640 --> 00:46:37,560 Speaker 3: want a worst case scenario, which I think is as 813 00:46:37,640 --> 00:46:43,080 Speaker 3: probable as yours, the current ructions trashing the treasury market, 814 00:46:43,080 --> 00:46:46,800 Speaker 3: I see rates rising, and I see us falling into 815 00:46:47,680 --> 00:46:49,719 Speaker 3: a debt spiral, and away we go. 816 00:46:50,640 --> 00:46:54,640 Speaker 2: So Ben Hunt of Epsilon Theory wrote a piece a 817 00:46:54,680 --> 00:46:58,440 Speaker 2: week or two ago called the car Crash of Pak's 818 00:46:58,480 --> 00:47:03,080 Speaker 2: Americana and lays out that exact case. Nobody wants to 819 00:47:03,080 --> 00:47:05,319 Speaker 2: buy our treasuries, so how do we finance our debt? 820 00:47:05,760 --> 00:47:09,440 Speaker 2: The dollar, our exorbitant privilege, The dollar as the world's 821 00:47:09,480 --> 00:47:14,200 Speaker 2: reserve currency, is replaced with a basket of euro, yen, wan, 822 00:47:14,400 --> 00:47:19,600 Speaker 2: things like that, and people just start to realize how 823 00:47:19,600 --> 00:47:23,680 Speaker 2: good they had it and frittered it away on a 824 00:47:23,800 --> 00:47:27,000 Speaker 2: very ill advised policy that the last time we tried 825 00:47:27,040 --> 00:47:32,400 Speaker 2: it in nineteen thirty, Smooth Hawley didn't work out well. Either. 826 00:47:32,800 --> 00:47:36,319 Speaker 2: So if that's the case, why would I want to 827 00:47:36,360 --> 00:47:40,440 Speaker 2: own a dollar denominated US assets? Isn't that an argument 828 00:47:40,520 --> 00:47:42,200 Speaker 2: for head for the hills? 829 00:47:42,560 --> 00:47:47,120 Speaker 3: Why? Indeed, and that is certainly an argument for international diversification. 830 00:47:47,719 --> 00:47:50,680 Speaker 3: To invest in countries whose economies are run by adults. 831 00:47:51,560 --> 00:47:54,760 Speaker 2: So once you buy it, the exchange rate no longer matters. 832 00:47:54,760 --> 00:47:59,680 Speaker 2: If you're purchasing Europe, and if you're purchasing Japan or 833 00:47:59,719 --> 00:48:03,320 Speaker 2: in or wherever, and there is inflation in the US 834 00:48:03,360 --> 00:48:06,480 Speaker 2: and there is a decrease in the value of the dollar, 835 00:48:07,080 --> 00:48:09,000 Speaker 2: it doesn't matter after you've made the purchase. 836 00:48:09,440 --> 00:48:12,400 Speaker 3: Yeah, there will be damage on a global scale no 837 00:48:12,440 --> 00:48:14,880 Speaker 3: matter where you invest, but you will mitigate the damage 838 00:48:15,200 --> 00:48:19,120 Speaker 3: by investing abroad. That's the argument for international diversification. It 839 00:48:19,160 --> 00:48:21,440 Speaker 3: hasn't had a lot of fans the past fifteen years, 840 00:48:21,880 --> 00:48:23,960 Speaker 3: but it's coming back into fashion. 841 00:48:24,719 --> 00:48:29,600 Speaker 2: So yeah, No, you've definitely seen this year to date overseas, 842 00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:33,200 Speaker 2: especially Europe and even some of the emerging markets start 843 00:48:33,239 --> 00:48:36,600 Speaker 2: to do much better than they have. What's fascinating about 844 00:48:36,680 --> 00:48:42,200 Speaker 2: splendid exchange is you trace the rise of trade and 845 00:48:42,239 --> 00:48:47,120 Speaker 2: the benefits of an interrelated economy back to the plague, 846 00:48:47,160 --> 00:48:51,359 Speaker 2: the Black Death tell us how the plague led to 847 00:48:52,480 --> 00:48:53,920 Speaker 2: changing up trading patterns. 848 00:48:54,160 --> 00:49:00,359 Speaker 3: Well, it's a fairly well established economic historical subject, which 849 00:49:00,400 --> 00:49:02,920 Speaker 3: is that what the plague did is it overvalued labor. 850 00:49:03,600 --> 00:49:05,960 Speaker 3: A third half of the population of Europe disappeared, and 851 00:49:06,000 --> 00:49:10,680 Speaker 3: so that greatly empowered workers. It drove prosperity, and it 852 00:49:10,719 --> 00:49:14,239 Speaker 3: also probably you know, a century a century and a 853 00:49:14,239 --> 00:49:18,960 Speaker 3: half later, drove the voyages of discovery to the Indies. 854 00:49:18,960 --> 00:49:21,040 Speaker 3: What were people looking for in the Indies. Well, they 855 00:49:21,040 --> 00:49:25,160 Speaker 3: were looking for this really important economic commodity, which was nutmeg, 856 00:49:25,200 --> 00:49:29,319 Speaker 3: mace and clothes, which were great luxuries, and it's what 857 00:49:29,440 --> 00:49:32,160 Speaker 3: made Portugal wealthy early on, and then drove the wealth 858 00:49:32,320 --> 00:49:35,520 Speaker 3: of the Dutch and then finally the English. 859 00:49:36,120 --> 00:49:40,359 Speaker 2: Huh, that's really interesting. So one of the things you 860 00:49:40,400 --> 00:49:44,319 Speaker 2: wrote in Exploded Exchange is trade almost always benefits the 861 00:49:44,440 --> 00:49:47,799 Speaker 2: nations that engage in it, but only averaged over the 862 00:49:47,920 --> 00:49:52,160 Speaker 2: entire national economy. There's always a minority that is hurt 863 00:49:52,200 --> 00:49:56,920 Speaker 2: by evolving trade patterns, and they always call for protection. 864 00:49:57,480 --> 00:50:01,520 Speaker 2: That was very pressing in observation. Is that coming true 865 00:50:01,560 --> 00:50:04,440 Speaker 2: now in what you see for the people who are 866 00:50:04,480 --> 00:50:10,560 Speaker 2: demanding protection from international trade and globalization in the current administration. 867 00:50:10,880 --> 00:50:16,160 Speaker 3: Yeah, when when trade opens up, then someone is hurt. 868 00:50:16,280 --> 00:50:19,480 Speaker 3: If you're making furniture in the United States and people 869 00:50:19,560 --> 00:50:25,040 Speaker 3: in China can make it more cheaply then you can, 870 00:50:25,239 --> 00:50:28,640 Speaker 3: then you're going to be hurt as a furniture maker. 871 00:50:28,680 --> 00:50:30,680 Speaker 3: On the other hand, if you're a consumer of furniture 872 00:50:30,960 --> 00:50:34,520 Speaker 3: and there are you know, thousands and thousand times more 873 00:50:34,640 --> 00:50:37,279 Speaker 3: consumers of furniture than there are makers furniture, then you 874 00:50:37,440 --> 00:50:43,200 Speaker 3: benefit greatly from that. But trade always produces losers and winners. 875 00:50:43,239 --> 00:50:45,440 Speaker 3: Now is part of the fun of writing Splendid Exchange 876 00:50:45,480 --> 00:50:48,640 Speaker 3: was identifying who the losers were three and four hundred 877 00:50:48,719 --> 00:50:51,200 Speaker 3: years ago, and two hundred years ago, and one hundred 878 00:50:51,320 --> 00:50:54,040 Speaker 3: years ago, four hundred years ago, the big losers with 879 00:50:54,160 --> 00:50:56,840 Speaker 3: trade were the people who grew sugar on the island 880 00:50:56,880 --> 00:51:00,520 Speaker 3: of Madeira, which was a sugar producing eye and from 881 00:51:00,520 --> 00:51:04,360 Speaker 3: about the fifteenth century or actually the fourteenth century on, 882 00:51:04,600 --> 00:51:07,320 Speaker 3: and they made a lot of money until people started 883 00:51:07,320 --> 00:51:10,920 Speaker 3: growing sugar in the Caribbean and in Brazil and Madeir 884 00:51:10,960 --> 00:51:14,440 Speaker 3: and sugar producers got clobbered. And did they demand and 885 00:51:15,000 --> 00:51:18,000 Speaker 3: get protection, Yes, they did because they were losers in 886 00:51:18,040 --> 00:51:21,880 Speaker 3: the system. And in the nineteenth century the big losers, 887 00:51:22,000 --> 00:51:24,959 Speaker 3: and they drove a protection as you still see today, 888 00:51:24,960 --> 00:51:28,440 Speaker 3: were European farmers, and was all the fault of Henry Bessemer, 889 00:51:28,760 --> 00:51:33,480 Speaker 3: who learns how to produce or develops a process for 890 00:51:33,520 --> 00:51:37,520 Speaker 3: producing high quality steel which goes into steel rails, which 891 00:51:37,640 --> 00:51:41,440 Speaker 3: enables the grain exporters of the American Midwest and of 892 00:51:41,600 --> 00:51:46,200 Speaker 3: Argentina and of the Ukraine to export vast quantities of 893 00:51:46,440 --> 00:51:52,080 Speaker 3: cheap grain, which bankrupted European farmers who demanded and got protection, 894 00:51:52,200 --> 00:51:54,879 Speaker 3: and they have protection even to this day because of that. 895 00:51:55,480 --> 00:51:58,600 Speaker 2: And then let's talk about the birth of plenty. What 896 00:51:58,880 --> 00:52:02,799 Speaker 2: is the relationship of trade to all the abundance that 897 00:52:02,800 --> 00:52:05,600 Speaker 2: we seem to be enjoying, or at least up until recently. 898 00:52:06,160 --> 00:52:09,800 Speaker 3: Well, yeah, it's the same basic thing. It's the ability 899 00:52:09,880 --> 00:52:14,160 Speaker 3: to purchase things more cheaply than would be available to 900 00:52:14,239 --> 00:52:18,960 Speaker 3: be available to you from domestic producers. It's that simple. 901 00:52:19,000 --> 00:52:21,960 Speaker 3: The birth of plenty was really, really though about the 902 00:52:22,080 --> 00:52:27,200 Speaker 3: four basic preconditions for strong economic growth, which are property 903 00:52:27,280 --> 00:52:32,920 Speaker 3: rights and capital markets and scientific rationalism and modern transport 904 00:52:32,960 --> 00:52:36,480 Speaker 3: and communications systems. And so it's not until you see 905 00:52:36,520 --> 00:52:38,839 Speaker 3: those four things come together that you see the sort 906 00:52:38,880 --> 00:52:42,680 Speaker 3: of modern economic growth that's really only been present for 907 00:52:42,719 --> 00:52:45,840 Speaker 3: the past two hundred years. It really wasn't until relatively 908 00:52:45,880 --> 00:52:48,120 Speaker 3: early in the nineteenth century that this idea that the 909 00:52:48,120 --> 00:52:51,400 Speaker 3: economy grew per capita GDP grew at one or two 910 00:52:51,440 --> 00:52:54,960 Speaker 3: percent per year became a reality. Before eighteen hundred, per 911 00:52:54,960 --> 00:52:56,799 Speaker 3: capita GDP growth was zero. 912 00:52:57,280 --> 00:53:01,240 Speaker 2: Wow, that's amazing. So before we get to our speed round, 913 00:53:01,719 --> 00:53:04,440 Speaker 2: let's talk about your next book. What are you writing now? 914 00:53:04,480 --> 00:53:05,239 Speaker 2: What are you working on? 915 00:53:06,960 --> 00:53:08,840 Speaker 3: I'm still working on it, and whether or not I 916 00:53:08,840 --> 00:53:13,319 Speaker 3: get a publisher for it is open to question. I'm 917 00:53:13,520 --> 00:53:18,640 Speaker 3: interested in two basic subjects. One is the radius of 918 00:53:18,680 --> 00:53:23,000 Speaker 3: trust and societal radius of trust that feeds into the 919 00:53:23,000 --> 00:53:27,879 Speaker 3: strength of institution's rule of law property rights. Why did 920 00:53:27,960 --> 00:53:31,799 Speaker 3: modern prosperity or prosperity of the modern sort arise in 921 00:53:31,840 --> 00:53:36,120 Speaker 3: Northern Europe and England, and in Scandinavia and in Germany 922 00:53:36,120 --> 00:53:39,880 Speaker 3: Weltz because those societies have high radiuses of trust. You 923 00:53:39,960 --> 00:53:42,319 Speaker 3: tend to trust strangers, and the origins of that are 924 00:53:42,719 --> 00:53:47,000 Speaker 3: just extremely, extremely interesting, having to do with prohibitions on 925 00:53:47,120 --> 00:53:50,800 Speaker 3: cousin marriage. It's way too complicated to get into. And 926 00:53:50,840 --> 00:53:53,560 Speaker 3: then the other subject that I'd love to write about 927 00:53:53,640 --> 00:53:56,760 Speaker 3: is something that I call the paradox of religion, which 928 00:53:56,840 --> 00:54:00,239 Speaker 3: is that it is very well established that religiosity is 929 00:54:00,320 --> 00:54:04,560 Speaker 3: beneficial to the individual. People who are religious live longer, 930 00:54:05,760 --> 00:54:09,799 Speaker 3: they are healthier psychologically, they have better social connections, They're 931 00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:12,960 Speaker 3: healthier and happier in every way you'd want to measure. 932 00:54:13,400 --> 00:54:15,480 Speaker 3: On the other hand, when you look at the national level, 933 00:54:15,680 --> 00:54:20,440 Speaker 3: religiosity is inversely correlated with the health of a society. 934 00:54:20,800 --> 00:54:25,080 Speaker 3: So you know, obviously the most religious places on Earth, Somalia, 935 00:54:25,200 --> 00:54:29,120 Speaker 3: the Indian subcontinent, you know, sub Saharan Africa, are also 936 00:54:29,160 --> 00:54:33,040 Speaker 3: the poorest nations on Earth. The richest nations on Earth 937 00:54:33,080 --> 00:54:36,080 Speaker 3: are the ones that are the least religious. What I 938 00:54:36,120 --> 00:54:37,840 Speaker 3: like to talk about is what I call the Somalia 939 00:54:37,880 --> 00:54:42,560 Speaker 3: Sweden scale of religiosity. And there's a concept in economics 940 00:54:43,239 --> 00:54:46,319 Speaker 3: called the paradox of thrift which we're all familiar with, 941 00:54:46,360 --> 00:54:48,640 Speaker 3: which is thrift is good for the individual, it's bad 942 00:54:48,680 --> 00:54:53,839 Speaker 3: for the society. And what you see with religion is 943 00:54:54,000 --> 00:54:57,279 Speaker 3: that it's the same way. Religion is good for the individual, 944 00:54:57,760 --> 00:55:02,400 Speaker 3: but religion is bad for the society overall for obvious reasons. 945 00:55:02,440 --> 00:55:03,520 Speaker 3: You get religious conflict. 946 00:55:04,080 --> 00:55:08,160 Speaker 2: Well, well, let's break that down my savings, my thrift 947 00:55:08,880 --> 00:55:12,759 Speaker 2: is your laws sales, So that's pretty easy to into it. 948 00:55:13,480 --> 00:55:18,680 Speaker 2: Why would my improved psychology and happiness and whatever you, 949 00:55:18,920 --> 00:55:23,160 Speaker 2: as a religious person, end up making the whole country 950 00:55:24,360 --> 00:55:27,440 Speaker 2: more poor less wealthy if everybody's. 951 00:55:26,920 --> 00:55:33,680 Speaker 3: Religious, because because it accentuates religious difference, religious and personal differences. 952 00:55:34,400 --> 00:55:36,640 Speaker 3: If you are deeply religious, you tend to be more 953 00:55:36,880 --> 00:55:41,880 Speaker 3: distrustful of people of different religions. So the societal radius 954 00:55:41,880 --> 00:55:45,520 Speaker 3: of trust is highest in the least religious societies because 955 00:55:45,520 --> 00:55:47,400 Speaker 3: there's less reason for personal conflict. 956 00:55:48,040 --> 00:55:51,960 Speaker 2: And tell us about what is this radius of trust 957 00:55:52,120 --> 00:55:55,200 Speaker 2: you keep referring to give us a little flesh that 958 00:55:55,239 --> 00:55:55,879 Speaker 2: out if you would. 959 00:55:56,520 --> 00:55:58,560 Speaker 3: Well, the best example I can think of, sort of 960 00:55:58,560 --> 00:56:03,440 Speaker 3: the most pungent example is what Jared Diamond talks about 961 00:56:03,600 --> 00:56:06,319 Speaker 3: in his field work in New Guinea, which is that 962 00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:11,520 Speaker 3: when two New Guinea highlanders from different valleys meet, the 963 00:56:11,560 --> 00:56:14,759 Speaker 3: first thing they do is they try and figure out 964 00:56:14,760 --> 00:56:17,279 Speaker 3: how they're related. Okay, do you know this person you 965 00:56:17,400 --> 00:56:21,760 Speaker 3: that person, this person your call that Jewish geography judar. Yes, 966 00:56:22,120 --> 00:56:25,080 Speaker 3: and so you figure that out, and the first person 967 00:56:25,200 --> 00:56:27,759 Speaker 3: figures out, oh my god, this person on the other 968 00:56:28,080 --> 00:56:31,920 Speaker 3: side of me doesn't know anything about me, turns around 969 00:56:31,920 --> 00:56:33,920 Speaker 3: and runs like hell because he knows if the other 970 00:56:33,920 --> 00:56:36,600 Speaker 3: person figures that out, he's going to try and kill him. Okay, 971 00:56:36,920 --> 00:56:39,759 Speaker 3: So this is a society where where people are so 972 00:56:39,880 --> 00:56:43,800 Speaker 3: mistrustful of people from different tribes that murder is often 973 00:56:44,120 --> 00:56:48,640 Speaker 3: the result. All right. Now, in Western societies, you get 974 00:56:48,680 --> 00:56:50,920 Speaker 3: at it by what's called the trust question, which is, 975 00:56:51,080 --> 00:56:54,640 Speaker 3: and it's a very very very common question in sociological surveys, 976 00:56:54,680 --> 00:56:57,120 Speaker 3: which is, do you generally believe that other people can 977 00:56:57,200 --> 00:56:59,719 Speaker 3: be trusted or do you endorse the statement that you 978 00:56:59,760 --> 00:57:02,319 Speaker 3: can be too careful about who you trust? And you 979 00:57:02,320 --> 00:57:06,480 Speaker 3: can measure societal radius of trust that way. And a 980 00:57:06,480 --> 00:57:10,560 Speaker 3: society in which people say, yes, most people can be 981 00:57:10,600 --> 00:57:13,120 Speaker 3: trusted and very few people say you can't be too 982 00:57:13,160 --> 00:57:16,880 Speaker 3: trusting of people, those tend to be much wealthier places. Okay. 983 00:57:16,920 --> 00:57:18,680 Speaker 3: Those are the places where you leave your wallet on 984 00:57:18,720 --> 00:57:21,160 Speaker 3: the sidewalk by mistake and it gets returned to you. 985 00:57:21,200 --> 00:57:24,720 Speaker 2: Sure, Japan is notorious for that sort of thing exactly. 986 00:57:24,800 --> 00:57:29,200 Speaker 2: So let me ask you an odd question. Can both 987 00:57:29,240 --> 00:57:31,960 Speaker 2: of those things be true at once? 988 00:57:32,120 --> 00:57:32,520 Speaker 1: Can you? 989 00:57:33,160 --> 00:57:37,560 Speaker 2: Hey, we're social primates. This is how we evolved and adapted, 990 00:57:38,000 --> 00:57:41,360 Speaker 2: and so we want to cooperate, but maybe we need 991 00:57:41,400 --> 00:57:43,960 Speaker 2: to be a little less gullible about people selling us 992 00:57:44,040 --> 00:57:47,760 Speaker 2: crappy financial products. Are those two things compatible? 993 00:57:48,800 --> 00:57:51,560 Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean there certainly are exceptions. No matter how 994 00:57:51,600 --> 00:57:57,480 Speaker 3: trusting you are, you have to be very suspicious of 995 00:57:57,480 --> 00:58:00,640 Speaker 3: the people who calls you from a non identified phone number. 996 00:58:01,800 --> 00:58:04,080 Speaker 2: Really interesting, even if you're. 997 00:58:03,920 --> 00:58:06,440 Speaker 3: A trusting Midwesterner from Peoria, you still have to have 998 00:58:06,480 --> 00:58:07,120 Speaker 3: your guard up. 999 00:58:08,120 --> 00:58:10,439 Speaker 2: So I only have you for a short period of time, 1000 00:58:10,480 --> 00:58:13,600 Speaker 2: and you've done the favorite question so many times, I 1001 00:58:13,640 --> 00:58:16,560 Speaker 2: feel like they're redundant. So rather than go through all 1002 00:58:16,600 --> 00:58:19,680 Speaker 2: of those, I just want to ask you, tell us 1003 00:58:19,680 --> 00:58:23,000 Speaker 2: what you're reading now, what are some of your favorite books? 1004 00:58:23,000 --> 00:58:25,560 Speaker 2: And what's keeping you occupied right here and now? 1005 00:58:26,200 --> 00:58:28,160 Speaker 3: Well, the person I think who I've read more of 1006 00:58:28,200 --> 00:58:30,600 Speaker 3: in the past year than anyone else is a man 1007 00:58:30,640 --> 00:58:35,280 Speaker 3: by the name of Robin Gunbar who is an evolutionary 1008 00:58:37,280 --> 00:58:44,000 Speaker 3: psychologist and an evolutionary biologist at Oxford. And what he 1009 00:58:44,040 --> 00:58:47,800 Speaker 3: did was he figured out that the size of primate 1010 00:58:47,880 --> 00:58:51,000 Speaker 3: social groups was directly related to the size that basically, 1011 00:58:51,040 --> 00:58:54,440 Speaker 3: the size of their brains the size of their neocortexes. 1012 00:58:54,240 --> 00:58:58,880 Speaker 2: Meaning the more the larger your evolutionary brain has developed 1013 00:58:59,320 --> 00:59:02,320 Speaker 2: the biggest circle of friends you could keep clear in 1014 00:59:02,000 --> 00:59:07,439 Speaker 2: your head. We're talking primates up to and including humans. 1015 00:59:07,120 --> 00:59:09,520 Speaker 3: Is that right, Well, yeah, up to and including humans. 1016 00:59:09,560 --> 00:59:09,720 Speaker 2: Now. 1017 00:59:09,840 --> 00:59:13,440 Speaker 3: Dunbar's number for human beings who have the largest neocortex 1018 00:59:13,560 --> 00:59:15,840 Speaker 3: is the largest brain sizes, if you will, it is 1019 00:59:15,840 --> 00:59:19,280 Speaker 3: about one hundred and fifty all right, And so you 1020 00:59:19,320 --> 00:59:21,640 Speaker 3: and I can keep about one hundred and fifty people 1021 00:59:21,800 --> 00:59:24,040 Speaker 3: straight and be able to read them and be able 1022 00:59:24,080 --> 00:59:27,040 Speaker 3: to interact with them and have a good social and 1023 00:59:27,080 --> 00:59:33,360 Speaker 3: trusting social relationship with them. And that's the natural size 1024 00:59:33,360 --> 00:59:35,720 Speaker 3: of a human band. So for example, when you look 1025 00:59:35,720 --> 00:59:40,240 Speaker 3: at church congregations, when a church congregation gets to be 1026 00:59:40,240 --> 00:59:43,080 Speaker 3: beyond one hundred and fifty, say towards two hundred, towards 1027 00:59:43,120 --> 00:59:45,280 Speaker 3: two hundred or two hundred and fifty people, it splits 1028 00:59:45,640 --> 00:59:48,440 Speaker 3: because the group can't cohere, it can't keep itself, it 1029 00:59:48,440 --> 00:59:52,320 Speaker 3: can't keep itself together. What is the basic military unit 1030 00:59:52,360 --> 00:59:54,520 Speaker 3: that you see around the world in all militaries, Well, 1031 00:59:54,520 --> 00:59:56,960 Speaker 3: it's the company. Okay, that's one hundred and twenty, one 1032 00:59:57,040 --> 01:00:03,160 Speaker 3: hundred and forty soldiers. That's dune Bars number. And chimpanzees 1033 01:00:03,200 --> 01:00:05,160 Speaker 3: have a Dunbar's number because they have smaller brains of 1034 01:00:05,160 --> 01:00:08,040 Speaker 3: about fifty that's the size of a chimpanzee tribe or 1035 01:00:08,080 --> 01:00:11,760 Speaker 3: a chimpanzee clan. Lemmurs have very small brains. You can't 1036 01:00:11,840 --> 01:00:16,480 Speaker 3: keep more than two lemurs together. Really, Yeah, And so 1037 01:00:18,120 --> 01:00:20,680 Speaker 3: Dunbar has immersed himself of the world of how we 1038 01:00:20,800 --> 01:00:24,880 Speaker 3: keep our social interactions straight, how we juggle them all, 1039 01:00:25,600 --> 01:00:28,400 Speaker 3: and how we're able to do it. And it turns out, 1040 01:00:28,520 --> 01:00:30,840 Speaker 3: for example, that there are some people who have great 1041 01:00:30,840 --> 01:00:35,640 Speaker 3: emotional intelligence who can who probably have Dunbar's number of 1042 01:00:35,640 --> 01:00:37,520 Speaker 3: two hundred or two hundred and fifty or three hundred. 1043 01:00:37,680 --> 01:00:40,160 Speaker 3: That was probably Bill Clinton. You know, Bill Clinton had 1044 01:00:40,160 --> 01:00:43,200 Speaker 3: this ability to read people. When what was said of 1045 01:00:43,240 --> 01:00:45,400 Speaker 3: Bill Clinton that you know, when you were talking with him, 1046 01:00:46,480 --> 01:00:48,959 Speaker 3: it wasn't just he was taught. He was talking only 1047 01:00:49,000 --> 01:00:51,280 Speaker 3: to you. You were the only person in the room, right, 1048 01:00:51,440 --> 01:00:53,960 Speaker 3: And that's a person with a high Dunbar's number, also 1049 01:00:54,000 --> 01:00:56,360 Speaker 3: with a very high with a very large size to 1050 01:00:56,400 --> 01:01:00,400 Speaker 3: full mode network, which we talked about earlier, which is 1051 01:01:00,440 --> 01:01:02,920 Speaker 3: the part of your bane that maintains your social intelligence. 1052 01:01:03,360 --> 01:01:06,440 Speaker 3: So Dunbar has a series of books out. One is 1053 01:01:06,520 --> 01:01:10,760 Speaker 3: called Friends, which I can't recommend highly enough. And then 1054 01:01:10,760 --> 01:01:14,480 Speaker 3: the other is called The Evolution of Religion, which has 1055 01:01:14,560 --> 01:01:19,560 Speaker 3: to do with with religious groups and how religious groups 1056 01:01:19,600 --> 01:01:21,840 Speaker 3: go here, and how it has to do with his 1057 01:01:22,760 --> 01:01:25,960 Speaker 3: with his number. Both absolutely, both books are just complete 1058 01:01:25,960 --> 01:01:28,360 Speaker 3: and total brain candy feasts. 1059 01:01:28,520 --> 01:01:30,160 Speaker 2: Really all right, I'm going to put those on my 1060 01:01:30,240 --> 01:01:30,960 Speaker 2: list for sure. 1061 01:01:31,320 --> 01:01:33,080 Speaker 3: And and then and then of course the person who 1062 01:01:33,120 --> 01:01:34,480 Speaker 3: I you know that the other two people who I 1063 01:01:34,520 --> 01:01:37,800 Speaker 3: read read repeatedly, over and over again are Joe Henrik, 1064 01:01:38,440 --> 01:01:43,360 Speaker 3: who's the head of theoretical biology at Harvard. He's the 1065 01:01:43,360 --> 01:01:45,320 Speaker 3: guy who wrote the weird book you know, w E 1066 01:01:45,440 --> 01:01:49,720 Speaker 3: I R D. Oh sure, w I W E I 1067 01:01:49,840 --> 01:01:56,440 Speaker 3: R D. Western educated, industrialized, rich and democratic, And it 1068 01:01:56,480 --> 01:01:58,919 Speaker 3: turns out that most human societies are not weird, most 1069 01:01:59,000 --> 01:02:01,880 Speaker 3: human societies, you're true additional societies, and that we in 1070 01:02:01,920 --> 01:02:03,760 Speaker 3: Western societies are the weird ones. 1071 01:02:04,280 --> 01:02:04,440 Speaker 2: Huh. 1072 01:02:05,320 --> 01:02:08,080 Speaker 3: And and he's also the one who's written about how 1073 01:02:08,160 --> 01:02:13,640 Speaker 3: radius of trust evolved, uh, you know, through the prohibitions 1074 01:02:13,640 --> 01:02:16,920 Speaker 3: against cousin marriage. It's the Hendrick hypothesis, which is just 1075 01:02:16,960 --> 01:02:19,360 Speaker 3: a fascinating hypothesis. So those are the kinds of people 1076 01:02:19,400 --> 01:02:20,120 Speaker 3: I enjoy reading. 1077 01:02:20,400 --> 01:02:21,520 Speaker 2: Hut. 1078 01:02:21,800 --> 01:02:25,720 Speaker 3: And then and then fiction Nick Harkaway, Uh, I don't 1079 01:02:25,720 --> 01:02:31,080 Speaker 3: know the name. He's the pseudonym of of Jean Le Carrey. 1080 01:02:32,360 --> 01:02:34,440 Speaker 3: Jehan La Carey, of course is also a pseudonym. 1081 01:02:35,000 --> 01:02:35,120 Speaker 2: Uh. 1082 01:02:35,480 --> 01:02:38,760 Speaker 3: And he's taken up the Smiley series and he it's 1083 01:02:38,800 --> 01:02:40,840 Speaker 3: hard to make you don't want to read it, because 1084 01:02:40,880 --> 01:02:43,240 Speaker 3: who wants to read a book by the son of 1085 01:02:43,320 --> 01:02:45,520 Speaker 3: a great novelist. He's better than his. 1086 01:02:45,600 --> 01:02:48,320 Speaker 2: Father, no kidding? Yeah, wow, that wrote book. 1087 01:02:48,360 --> 01:02:51,200 Speaker 3: Carlo's choice, which is you won't be able to. 1088 01:02:51,200 --> 01:02:53,320 Speaker 2: Put down Carlos joints. 1089 01:02:53,720 --> 01:02:55,360 Speaker 3: Kay. If you know, if you're a Smiley fan, you 1090 01:02:55,440 --> 01:02:57,440 Speaker 3: know who carl is k A r l A all right, 1091 01:02:58,320 --> 01:02:58,880 Speaker 3: Russian spy. 1092 01:02:59,360 --> 01:03:02,040 Speaker 2: Huh sounds like fun. Bill, Thank you for being so 1093 01:03:02,200 --> 01:03:05,880 Speaker 2: generous with your time. We have been speaking to Bill Bernstein, 1094 01:03:06,160 --> 01:03:09,600 Speaker 2: author of so many fascinating books, The Intelligent Investor, Four 1095 01:03:10,040 --> 01:03:11,400 Speaker 2: Pillars of Investor. 1096 01:03:11,600 --> 01:03:12,040 Speaker 1: On and on. 1097 01:03:12,280 --> 01:03:16,040 Speaker 2: His most recent book is on the Delusions of Crowds. 1098 01:03:16,640 --> 01:03:19,160 Speaker 2: If you enjoy this conversation, well, be sure and check 1099 01:03:19,200 --> 01:03:22,080 Speaker 2: out any of the previous five hundred or so we've 1100 01:03:22,160 --> 01:03:24,439 Speaker 2: done over the past ten years. You can find those 1101 01:03:24,560 --> 01:03:29,320 Speaker 2: that Bloomberg, iTunes, Spotify, YouTube. Be sure and check out 1102 01:03:29,480 --> 01:03:33,120 Speaker 2: my new book, How Not to Invest The ideas, numbers, 1103 01:03:33,240 --> 01:03:36,520 Speaker 2: and behaviors that destroy wealth and how to avoid them. 1104 01:03:36,840 --> 01:03:38,440 Speaker 2: I would be remiss if I did not thank the 1105 01:03:38,480 --> 01:03:42,439 Speaker 2: crack team that puts these conversations together each week. John 1106 01:03:42,520 --> 01:03:45,800 Speaker 2: Wasserman is my audio engineer. Anna Luke is my producer. 1107 01:03:46,200 --> 01:03:50,320 Speaker 2: Sean Russo is my head of research. I'm Barry Richolts. 1108 01:03:50,600 --> 01:03:54,240 Speaker 2: You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.