WEBVTT - Why the True Price of a Bond Can Still Be Hard To Know

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Allaway and I'm Joe. WI isn't all so, Joe?

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<v Speaker 1>I think equity markets have been um getting all the

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<v Speaker 1>attention lately. Yeah, for good reason. Um, you know, the

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<v Speaker 1>index level is extremely high, individual stocks all kinds of

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<v Speaker 1>wild stories. But I am aware that there's also some

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<v Speaker 1>interesting stuff in credit markets. I it's not getting as

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<v Speaker 1>much attention, but I've kind of I'm aware that there's

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<v Speaker 1>some stuff going on. Yeah, we're gonna try to fix

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<v Speaker 1>the imbalance of of attention. In this episode. We're going

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<v Speaker 1>to get very very um technical and a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>wonky and take a look at not just credit as

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<v Speaker 1>you mentioned, corporate bonds, but um, we'll also look at

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<v Speaker 1>things like US treasuries. Um, what's going on there? So

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<v Speaker 1>I should just say, as we're recording this episode, I

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<v Speaker 1>was just looking at the yield on the thirty year

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<v Speaker 1>and that's getting up to almost two per cent, which

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<v Speaker 1>is a nice round number that people like to focus on.

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<v Speaker 1>But the question, of course, is when we talk about

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<v Speaker 1>bond yields, when we talk about bond prices, what exactly

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<v Speaker 1>are we talking about. None of these trade on an exchange,

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<v Speaker 1>So where does that pricing information come from? Yeah, this

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<v Speaker 1>is always a fascinating question. We've discussed it in various

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<v Speaker 1>forms a few times with Chris White as as well

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<v Speaker 1>as others. Which is just this idea that Okay, everyone

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<v Speaker 1>can look up on their monitor and see a quote

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<v Speaker 1>for the say, um, you know, price of Microsoft shares,

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<v Speaker 1>and we know where that comes from, and there's sort

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<v Speaker 1>of like some sort of central repository for that. But

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<v Speaker 1>in the world of fixed income, whether it's a sort

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<v Speaker 1>of credit or rates, pricing is at a minimum much

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<v Speaker 1>more distributed across all different kinds of platforms, all different

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<v Speaker 1>kinds of players. In the idea that they're just sort

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<v Speaker 1>of like one agreed upon price is um, it's not

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<v Speaker 1>as much of a thing at all. Yeah, that's exactly right.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's the kind of thing that people don't tend

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about unless something bad is happening in the market,

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<v Speaker 1>at which point suddenly everyone starts talking about bond pricing

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<v Speaker 1>and what exactly, um, the process is there. And we

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<v Speaker 1>saw a little bit of that in during the big

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<v Speaker 1>market sell off. Of course, we had a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>turmoil in credit. We also had a lot of turmoil

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<v Speaker 1>in the U. S. Treasury market, and that's when people

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<v Speaker 1>started talking about discrepancies in bond prices, which is it's

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<v Speaker 1>never a good sign, is it. Uh No, it's like basically,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, with all these things, it's like, once you

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<v Speaker 1>have to start learning, by the time you're learning about

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<v Speaker 1>how something actually works, usually that means trouble him. Yeah, exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>So okay, yes, So today, um, we're going to be

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<v Speaker 1>diving into the topic of bond pricing and we're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>be talking to the authors of a paper that came

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<v Speaker 1>out in January, a really really interesting paper by morning Star.

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<v Speaker 1>It's called Bond Pricing Agreeing to Disagree and uh basically

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<v Speaker 1>the authors on that crunched a bunch of numbers to

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<v Speaker 1>really look at how different funds are pricing bonds and

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<v Speaker 1>the discrepancies that are going on. So really interesting. Um So,

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<v Speaker 1>without further ado, then let's bring on Eric Jacobson. He's

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<v Speaker 1>a fixed income strategist at morning Star, and we'll bring

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<v Speaker 1>on his co author as well, match Up Kawara. Thank

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<v Speaker 1>you both for coming on, glad to be with you,

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<v Speaker 1>thanks for having us. So, I guess first things first,

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<v Speaker 1>but you know, Joe and I were joking a bit

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<v Speaker 1>about how people don't tend to look at the technicals

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<v Speaker 1>of bond pricing unless things are going wrong. What prompted

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<v Speaker 1>you to do the paper? Well, there are a few

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<v Speaker 1>things I think, you know, I hate to use the

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<v Speaker 1>cliche that that crises are an opportunity, but when you're

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<v Speaker 1>in the when you when you look at bond bonds

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<v Speaker 1>and bond funds, the most exciting stuff always happens when

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<v Speaker 1>something goes wrong. And that's really what happened as usual

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<v Speaker 1>in in March, and we started thinking about what we

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<v Speaker 1>might see in the data at that period of time.

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<v Speaker 1>And there's a relatively new filing that is required by

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<v Speaker 1>the SEC called MPort, which is really an electronic version

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<v Speaker 1>of a portfolio filing, essentially almost the same as an

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<v Speaker 1>annual report UM, but for you know, reasons that most

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<v Speaker 1>people wouldn't really care about. Having it digitized makes a

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<v Speaker 1>huge difference in being able to deal with the data.

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<v Speaker 1>And so it gave us an opportunity, because obviously we

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<v Speaker 1>collect that stuff across the industry. UM, it gave us

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<v Speaker 1>an opportunity to pull some of the data that was

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<v Speaker 1>that we knew would be very clean or as clean

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<v Speaker 1>as we could imagine it to be given how it's

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<v Speaker 1>submitted to the SEC and look at how different firms

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<v Speaker 1>price their bonds at the end of a particular day,

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<v Speaker 1>which you know, it's been possible to do that in

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<v Speaker 1>the past, but as I just sort of alluded about

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<v Speaker 1>the filing issue, it would have been it was a

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<v Speaker 1>lot more difficult and a lot more difficult to do

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<v Speaker 1>knowing for sure that the that the data was going

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<v Speaker 1>to be filed consistently. So, uh, you know, unfortunately a

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<v Speaker 1>very bad time in the market for a lot of people,

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<v Speaker 1>third quarter at the end of the first quarter, but

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<v Speaker 1>not a terrible time to do research. So what was

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<v Speaker 1>your most striking finding in terms of the different prices

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<v Speaker 1>that can emerge on the same security, the same bond,

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<v Speaker 1>and the different approaches that a different holder took in

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<v Speaker 1>their prices. Sure, so, you know, the first thing I

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<v Speaker 1>would say is that we did not expect to see

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<v Speaker 1>prices sort of on top of each other perfectly aligned.

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<v Speaker 1>For some of the is I think that that you

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<v Speaker 1>guys alluded to, But you know, some of it is

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<v Speaker 1>just sort of structural in the sense of when when

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<v Speaker 1>bond portfolios are marked, they're marked at the end of

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<v Speaker 1>the day, and it's handled in slightly different ways depending

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<v Speaker 1>on the firm that's doing it and some of the

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<v Speaker 1>decisions that they make about pricing. So one of them

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<v Speaker 1>is simply what time of day, and you can price

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<v Speaker 1>bond portfolios that either three o'clock or flour o'clock. It

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<v Speaker 1>seems that there's a lot more consistently, and there used

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<v Speaker 1>to be a lot more firms are doing at three

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<v Speaker 1>o'clock hour, but there is some diversity in that they

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<v Speaker 1>also have the option of choosing to price either at

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<v Speaker 1>the bid or the ask or the mid and so

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<v Speaker 1>that's just another layer of difference there. And most firms

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<v Speaker 1>are also, well pretty much all the firms that we

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<v Speaker 1>know of a all use third party pricing services. And

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<v Speaker 1>so then you add to add to the fact that

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<v Speaker 1>there are a multitude, not not a huge number, but

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<v Speaker 1>there are different services. So once you get through all

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<v Speaker 1>three of those lenses, it's certainly posible for prices to

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<v Speaker 1>be somewhat different. And you know, I think that the

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<v Speaker 1>key issue here, I think you guys were talking before

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<v Speaker 1>about the end of day price for a stock. Part

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<v Speaker 1>of the reason for this that we have this issue

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<v Speaker 1>is that um even if you are able to observe

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<v Speaker 1>a price, you know, at two o'clock in the afternoon

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<v Speaker 1>for a particular bond, and it's recorded by FINNRA, that's

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<v Speaker 1>the regulator, and it's disseminated through trace, which is a

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<v Speaker 1>reporting system. If that's not the price, if if that

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<v Speaker 1>trade doesn't happen anywhere near the close of the market,

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<v Speaker 1>then the somebody has to look at what that bond

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<v Speaker 1>and say, well, this is what the price should have

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<v Speaker 1>been at the end of the day, because the market

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<v Speaker 1>shifted between the last trade and now, and we really

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<v Speaker 1>need to change the price to reflect that. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>part of you know, where you get all this difference.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, as we mentioned in the paper, there are

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<v Speaker 1>lots of bonds that don't trade at all in a

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<v Speaker 1>single day either, so that complicates things as well. Finally,

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<v Speaker 1>I would say there's always a possibility that that the

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<v Speaker 1>asset amount you can challenge the price that comes from

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<v Speaker 1>from pricing service. So that's that as another layer of complexity.

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<v Speaker 1>You know that they they may think that they know

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<v Speaker 1>the real value of that bond better than the pricing agency,

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<v Speaker 1>which which is quite conceivably true. If one manager challenges

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<v Speaker 1>the bond and another firm doesn't, then you know, prices

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<v Speaker 1>might look different for that reason as well. Can you

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<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit more about the third party pricing services,

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<v Speaker 1>because I think this is sort of whenever people hear

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<v Speaker 1>about this UM for the first time, I think it's

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<v Speaker 1>difficult for a lot of people to get their heads

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<v Speaker 1>around that there are actually companies out there whose job

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<v Speaker 1>is to kind of triangulate the price of a corporate bond. Sure,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's interesting because you know, people will sometimes ask,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, why wouldn't you just price the bond yourself

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<v Speaker 1>if you're a manager, and as much it just eluded

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<v Speaker 1>maybe in some cases a bond that's not widely held,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe the manager it knows even more about it. The

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<v Speaker 1>pricing service. You know that the truth is is that

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<v Speaker 1>we've evolved into this system because the goal is to

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<v Speaker 1>have a third party or an arms length party, if

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<v Speaker 1>you will, UM making those pricing determinations, to sort of

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<v Speaker 1>remove the manager a step away from that decision. Since

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<v Speaker 1>the decision that the manager, the decision that's made on

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<v Speaker 1>that price can affect the performance of an account that

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<v Speaker 1>a manager is running, and so forth. And it's the

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<v Speaker 1>kind of thing that has evolved over the years. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>I haven't been involved in bond pricing directly, so it's uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, I don't have the full history of the

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<v Speaker 1>industry at my fingertips, but I can tell you that

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<v Speaker 1>pricing has historically a lot of that information has come

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<v Speaker 1>from broker dealers themselves, so uh, and even today, the

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<v Speaker 1>pricing services do talk to the broke dealers, and there

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<v Speaker 1>are pricing services that are associated on some cases with

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<v Speaker 1>broker dealers as well, so it's kind of a mix there.

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<v Speaker 1>But you know, the idea is that, um, when you

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<v Speaker 1>have a portfolio of you know, a hundred and fifty

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<v Speaker 1>different bonds or maybe a thousand when you're talking about

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<v Speaker 1>mortgages are a very large mutual fund, you need to

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<v Speaker 1>be able to gather market information very very quickly in

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<v Speaker 1>order to that kind of pricing. So it makes sense

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<v Speaker 1>to have a third party do it. And one of

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<v Speaker 1>the advantages of having an agency that's that's sort of

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<v Speaker 1>independent is that they can be in touch with multiple dealers,

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<v Speaker 1>they can take in all the data feeds, and they

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<v Speaker 1>also have systems in place so that, um, if there

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<v Speaker 1>isn't any really fresh information, but they have a signpost

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<v Speaker 1>of some kind to work off of for example, you

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<v Speaker 1>know that the bond has this level of maturity, you

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<v Speaker 1>know that it has this credit rating, it's in this sector,

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<v Speaker 1>and etcetera. You can sort of triangulate a prices. I

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<v Speaker 1>think someone said, um, they use a lot of different

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<v Speaker 1>tools for that. Some of them are now they're starting

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<v Speaker 1>to use AI for some of that stuff. But the

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<v Speaker 1>idea of fundamentally is to try and get that to

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<v Speaker 1>be as dispassionate as as decision as possible. UM. And

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<v Speaker 1>you know, one of the things that we talked about

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<v Speaker 1>in the paper is one of the reasons that you

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<v Speaker 1>have some differentiation aside from the other factors, is that

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<v Speaker 1>there are a good handful of pricing services, and some

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<v Speaker 1>firms may use a single service for everything, but most

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<v Speaker 1>of the larger mutual fund managers that most people are

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<v Speaker 1>invested with, UH pick and choose among the services depending

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<v Speaker 1>on the asset class that they're that they're using. And

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<v Speaker 1>then UH and so, for example, you know, if they

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<v Speaker 1>are looking at one particular kind of mortgage bond for

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<v Speaker 1>a private mortgage security, the kind that blew up during

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<v Speaker 1>a crisis, they may use a single pricing service just

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<v Speaker 1>for that and use somebody else for for all the

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<v Speaker 1>other sectors, So you know, this comes up every once

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<v Speaker 1>in a while. Obviously, Q one of last year was

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<v Speaker 1>one time, I forget, what is it, tracy, when were

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<v Speaker 1>we talking about like energy bonds in the junk bond

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<v Speaker 1>E t F like years ago. I feel like that

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<v Speaker 1>was late, I want to say, although, yeah, I think

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<v Speaker 1>it happened. No, I think, but I want so yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it was late. And I know there's like

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<v Speaker 1>a bunch there's like an oil crash or a bunch

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<v Speaker 1>of junk bond E t F got dislocated. Hasn't really

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<v Speaker 1>been a problem yet, this question of ambiguous bond pricing

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<v Speaker 1>of instruments that don't trade, because I know there's all

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<v Speaker 1>these questions that emerge about the sort of liquidity mismatch

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<v Speaker 1>where the bonds don't really move, but the E t

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<v Speaker 1>F that or the funds that own the bonds have

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<v Speaker 1>to provide daily prices or even intramarket daily liquidity. How

0:13:04.320 --> 0:13:06.720
<v Speaker 1>big of an issue is this because so far it

0:13:06.760 --> 0:13:10.160
<v Speaker 1>seems like mostly the infrastructure has work. Yeah, I think.

0:13:10.280 --> 0:13:14.440
<v Speaker 1>You know, one of the benefits of the mutual fund

0:13:14.480 --> 0:13:17.240
<v Speaker 1>structure in particular is that you know a lot of

0:13:17.280 --> 0:13:22.319
<v Speaker 1>these differences get kind of washed out on a large portfolio.

0:13:22.920 --> 0:13:25.360
<v Speaker 1>So even in a mutual fund that you know that

0:13:25.400 --> 0:13:28.440
<v Speaker 1>has truly billions and billions of dollars, even if there

0:13:28.440 --> 0:13:30.679
<v Speaker 1>are a good handful of bonds where the pricing seems

0:13:30.720 --> 0:13:32.600
<v Speaker 1>to be all over the map, you know, when you

0:13:32.960 --> 0:13:35.240
<v Speaker 1>when you add all that up and average it out,

0:13:35.760 --> 0:13:37.680
<v Speaker 1>they turn out to be kind of rounding errors in

0:13:37.679 --> 0:13:40.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot of cases. UM we still have some research

0:13:40.320 --> 0:13:42.800
<v Speaker 1>to do on that, because we haven't gone through the

0:13:42.920 --> 0:13:45.040
<v Speaker 1>entire universe and done it at the fund by fund level,

0:13:45.360 --> 0:13:48.600
<v Speaker 1>but that seems to be the case for the most part.

0:13:48.920 --> 0:13:50.839
<v Speaker 1>You know. The big problem, as you alluded though, is

0:13:50.880 --> 0:13:53.960
<v Speaker 1>when you wind up in a big crisis situation, and

0:13:54.679 --> 0:13:58.360
<v Speaker 1>the more concentrated a portfolio, and the worst the crisis

0:13:58.360 --> 0:14:01.320
<v Speaker 1>and the longer at last, the bigger problem that can be.

0:14:01.559 --> 0:14:04.400
<v Speaker 1>And of course you know this isn't exclusive to bonds.

0:14:04.480 --> 0:14:06.760
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't happen, you don't notice it nearly as often

0:14:06.920 --> 0:14:09.320
<v Speaker 1>with equities, but that you alluded to earlier, you know,

0:14:09.360 --> 0:14:12.480
<v Speaker 1>if you have private placements in a mutual fund or

0:14:12.600 --> 0:14:15.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, very very large slugs of a of a

0:14:15.840 --> 0:14:20.720
<v Speaker 1>private company that's spread around UM, and and that happens

0:14:20.800 --> 0:14:24.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, often with with young uh startup companies, where

0:14:24.720 --> 0:14:27.920
<v Speaker 1>small cap funds get involved, why to put big tech names?

0:14:28.560 --> 0:14:31.160
<v Speaker 1>There can be disagreements about things like that too. Usually

0:14:31.240 --> 0:14:34.280
<v Speaker 1>it's not that big a deal to small investors when

0:14:34.280 --> 0:14:38.680
<v Speaker 1>you have diversified funds um But as I said, crisis

0:14:38.720 --> 0:14:41.720
<v Speaker 1>last lasts long enough, or you have a concentrated enough portfolio,

0:14:42.400 --> 0:14:45.280
<v Speaker 1>that's when it really starts to make a difference. So

0:14:45.360 --> 0:14:47.800
<v Speaker 1>can we talk about that a little bit more in

0:14:47.880 --> 0:14:52.920
<v Speaker 1>your paper? What exactly what was the difference in bond

0:14:53.000 --> 0:14:58.240
<v Speaker 1>pricing differences in normal times versus something like the first

0:14:58.320 --> 0:15:02.160
<v Speaker 1>quarter of twenty twenty, because I think your study looked

0:15:02.160 --> 0:15:06.360
<v Speaker 1>at late which was a relatively calm period in markets,

0:15:06.880 --> 0:15:10.560
<v Speaker 1>and then the end of March. So what was the

0:15:10.600 --> 0:15:14.760
<v Speaker 1>difference between those two periods? Sure, so, as you alluded,

0:15:14.800 --> 0:15:19.080
<v Speaker 1>we we started in September, and just to clarify, you know,

0:15:19.120 --> 0:15:23.800
<v Speaker 1>we used quarter end data and so this was essentially

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:27.080
<v Speaker 1>data on the last day of the quarter, at the

0:15:27.160 --> 0:15:31.320
<v Speaker 1>end of the day and looked across funds and across

0:15:32.080 --> 0:15:35.520
<v Speaker 1>bonds that were appearing in more than one fund. Well,

0:15:35.520 --> 0:15:37.400
<v Speaker 1>this is kind of a nuanced in and of itself.

0:15:37.400 --> 0:15:39.000
<v Speaker 1>But when I say more than one. What I really

0:15:39.000 --> 0:15:43.040
<v Speaker 1>mean is more than one firms funds because each firm,

0:15:43.120 --> 0:15:45.480
<v Speaker 1>no matter how many funds they have, if they own

0:15:45.520 --> 0:15:49.040
<v Speaker 1>the same bond across multiple funds, the structure is to

0:15:49.240 --> 0:15:51.680
<v Speaker 1>price them all at the same price. So when we

0:15:51.720 --> 0:15:53.920
<v Speaker 1>talk about this, we talked about how many firms priced

0:15:53.960 --> 0:15:56.520
<v Speaker 1>the bond, and that appear in the portfolios we looked

0:15:56.560 --> 0:16:01.560
<v Speaker 1>at um. But when you go back to September, for example,

0:16:01.600 --> 0:16:06.600
<v Speaker 1>as you asked, if you take corporate high quality, corporate bronze,

0:16:06.640 --> 0:16:10.120
<v Speaker 1>but corporate brons in generalist, essentially, the differences in price

0:16:10.880 --> 0:16:14.200
<v Speaker 1>were fairly narrow. We use a term that we call

0:16:14.280 --> 0:16:17.920
<v Speaker 1>the price spread percentage, where we took the lowest price

0:16:18.000 --> 0:16:20.960
<v Speaker 1>and the highest price that we found, and then we

0:16:21.120 --> 0:16:25.360
<v Speaker 1>took that the difference between those two and we divided

0:16:25.400 --> 0:16:29.480
<v Speaker 1>it by the mean average, and that gave us this

0:16:29.640 --> 0:16:32.000
<v Speaker 1>price spread percentage. And so if you look at triple

0:16:32.040 --> 0:16:34.240
<v Speaker 1>A and double A bonds at the end of September

0:16:35.760 --> 0:16:38.360
<v Speaker 1>UM that number was very small. It was only about

0:16:38.400 --> 0:16:41.800
<v Speaker 1>thirty basis points for double and triple A and it

0:16:42.120 --> 0:16:45.640
<v Speaker 1>got you know, a triple B was point three seven,

0:16:45.720 --> 0:16:49.000
<v Speaker 1>so pretty small. Those numbers are still meaningful in the

0:16:49.160 --> 0:16:52.840
<v Speaker 1>in the framework of um. You know a market where

0:16:53.400 --> 0:16:55.920
<v Speaker 1>returns for a whole year, you know, the yield on

0:16:55.920 --> 0:16:58.800
<v Speaker 1>on bonds, as you just mentioned earlier, the thirty year

0:16:59.240 --> 0:17:02.400
<v Speaker 1>not quite even two. That's a meaningful number, but it's

0:17:02.480 --> 0:17:06.160
<v Speaker 1>it's within the realm of expectations given all the things

0:17:06.200 --> 0:17:09.960
<v Speaker 1>that we said earlier about prices, and then they do

0:17:10.119 --> 0:17:14.280
<v Speaker 1>tend to get a little bit wider. The the thinner

0:17:14.320 --> 0:17:18.560
<v Speaker 1>the market, lower the quality, the smaller the range of

0:17:19.359 --> 0:17:20.959
<v Speaker 1>values and the bonds part of me what I mean

0:17:21.000 --> 0:17:23.399
<v Speaker 1>to say is, you know, the high yield market is

0:17:23.400 --> 0:17:27.479
<v Speaker 1>many times smaller, for example, than the investment grade corporate market,

0:17:27.760 --> 0:17:30.080
<v Speaker 1>and so you expect more dispersion there, and that's what

0:17:30.160 --> 0:17:34.800
<v Speaker 1>you saw at that point. And then, of course, by contrast,

0:17:34.880 --> 0:17:38.439
<v Speaker 1>when we looked at the end of the first quarter,

0:17:38.880 --> 0:17:44.560
<v Speaker 1>of those numbers were in some cases multiples. So I

0:17:44.640 --> 0:17:48.200
<v Speaker 1>mentioned earlier thirty basis points for the price fred percentage

0:17:48.240 --> 0:17:52.639
<v Speaker 1>for triple A double A corporates at the end of

0:17:52.760 --> 0:17:58.680
<v Speaker 1>March was one, and then the number for triple B

0:17:58.680 --> 0:18:02.679
<v Speaker 1>bonds was two points seven two percent, so literally multiples

0:18:02.840 --> 0:18:06.480
<v Speaker 1>of what we saw at that point. Just another snapshot

0:18:06.480 --> 0:18:12.679
<v Speaker 1>in time. Your thoughts on this sort of significance of

0:18:12.720 --> 0:18:18.080
<v Speaker 1>these figures are what they imply. As Eric said, especially

0:18:18.080 --> 0:18:22.240
<v Speaker 1>in the in the in the crisis mode, these differences

0:18:22.280 --> 0:18:26.840
<v Speaker 1>were way bigger than we expected. One thing that I

0:18:26.920 --> 0:18:30.240
<v Speaker 1>would maybe want to mention is that, you know, I

0:18:30.280 --> 0:18:33.359
<v Speaker 1>remember this old paper that Fisher Black of the famous

0:18:33.560 --> 0:18:37.879
<v Speaker 1>um you know Black and shows formula. You wrote this

0:18:38.000 --> 0:18:41.119
<v Speaker 1>paper at some point, I forget what exact name of

0:18:41.200 --> 0:18:45.160
<v Speaker 1>seven is called noise, And this is kind of what

0:18:45.200 --> 0:18:48.639
<v Speaker 1>we're dealing with here a little bit. You know, the

0:18:48.680 --> 0:18:51.879
<v Speaker 1>bond prices are noisy. You know, they are not perfect.

0:18:52.720 --> 0:18:56.679
<v Speaker 1>We don't know for sure what a given bond is

0:18:58.080 --> 0:19:01.879
<v Speaker 1>it's worth, and that's what we see being here. So

0:19:02.000 --> 0:19:07.720
<v Speaker 1>on the plot positive side, um, you know. Fisher Black

0:19:07.760 --> 0:19:11.480
<v Speaker 1>asked the question, you know, when would you say that

0:19:11.560 --> 0:19:15.560
<v Speaker 1>the market is efficient? And as the answer was, if

0:19:15.680 --> 0:19:17.879
<v Speaker 1>if there is some kind of a true value which

0:19:17.920 --> 0:19:21.399
<v Speaker 1>we don't know about, but let's assume that it is there.

0:19:22.600 --> 0:19:25.360
<v Speaker 1>Fisher Black said that the market will be efficient if

0:19:26.000 --> 0:19:29.360
<v Speaker 1>if the the market is efficient if it will assign

0:19:29.440 --> 0:19:34.200
<v Speaker 1>a price within the factor of two of the real

0:19:35.200 --> 0:19:41.280
<v Speaker 1>unobservable true value. So if if something is something let's

0:19:41.280 --> 0:19:46.280
<v Speaker 1>say is is is there's an instrument who's true values

0:19:46.359 --> 0:19:49.520
<v Speaker 1>let's say a hundred then Fisher Black would say that

0:19:49.560 --> 0:19:52.919
<v Speaker 1>the market is efficient if if if it assigns at

0:19:53.040 --> 0:19:57.320
<v Speaker 1>the value of somewhere between fifty and two hundred um.

0:19:57.560 --> 0:20:00.760
<v Speaker 1>That was his definition. So what we see here, you

0:20:00.800 --> 0:20:04.639
<v Speaker 1>know this is these are these are fractions of of

0:20:04.840 --> 0:20:08.919
<v Speaker 1>what official Black thoughts might still constitute an efficient market.

0:20:09.000 --> 0:20:14.600
<v Speaker 1>So in that sense, we are not seeing anything critical here.

0:20:15.240 --> 0:20:18.360
<v Speaker 1>On the other hand, as I mentioned, if you see

0:20:18.359 --> 0:20:24.360
<v Speaker 1>attempt percentage point price differential between between bonds, that that

0:20:24.400 --> 0:20:27.080
<v Speaker 1>can well be like two years worth a yield for

0:20:27.200 --> 0:20:31.199
<v Speaker 1>some events, for high yield issue, right, so that is

0:20:31.280 --> 0:20:38.640
<v Speaker 1>a potential, uh, you know, point of concern. Um, I'm

0:20:38.640 --> 0:20:44.280
<v Speaker 1>not sure what solution to this problem might be. Nothing

0:20:44.560 --> 0:20:47.119
<v Speaker 1>obvious count comes to mind. If we don't want to

0:20:47.240 --> 0:20:52.280
<v Speaker 1>end up with just one pricing service, we don't probably

0:20:52.280 --> 0:20:56.640
<v Speaker 1>want the government to dictate what that price is. So

0:20:57.560 --> 0:21:00.280
<v Speaker 1>I think we are stuck with the system that that

0:21:00.520 --> 0:21:05.280
<v Speaker 1>we have here. Let's just hope it continues to function

0:21:05.600 --> 0:21:10.520
<v Speaker 1>reasonably well. One thing that Eric probably didn't highlight, so

0:21:10.720 --> 0:21:13.520
<v Speaker 1>our sample that we are dealing with, we are only

0:21:13.560 --> 0:21:18.200
<v Speaker 1>dealing with bonds that had at least two different firms

0:21:18.280 --> 0:21:22.439
<v Speaker 1>pricing it. Now, it turns out that this is in

0:21:22.480 --> 0:21:26.679
<v Speaker 1>many cases the minority of all the bonds. Most of

0:21:26.680 --> 0:21:29.639
<v Speaker 1>the bonds that we are dealing with in these sectors

0:21:29.960 --> 0:21:33.199
<v Speaker 1>and especially in the municipal market, they are owned only

0:21:33.240 --> 0:21:37.560
<v Speaker 1>by one firm. So we don't really know. We can't

0:21:37.880 --> 0:21:40.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, you have only one price that you can't

0:21:40.119 --> 0:21:43.520
<v Speaker 1>talk about how spread out that price is, right, but

0:21:43.680 --> 0:21:46.560
<v Speaker 1>that that seems to be that seems to be more

0:21:46.560 --> 0:21:49.840
<v Speaker 1>of a norm than one would expect. So we're kind

0:21:49.840 --> 0:21:52.600
<v Speaker 1>of dealing with these two issues. One is only one

0:21:53.640 --> 0:21:58.200
<v Speaker 1>one player owns a given bonds and secondly, what Eric mentions,

0:21:58.320 --> 0:22:02.760
<v Speaker 1>these bonds oftentimes go through long periods of not being

0:22:02.760 --> 0:22:07.280
<v Speaker 1>traded at all, So so how do you a sign

0:22:08.720 --> 0:22:12.159
<v Speaker 1>a price to what? Instruments like that? Though I don't remember,

0:22:12.280 --> 0:22:15.159
<v Speaker 1>we were talking to somebody from a who came from

0:22:15.200 --> 0:22:18.959
<v Speaker 1>a big firm, and he was telling us that this

0:22:19.040 --> 0:22:25.040
<v Speaker 1>was in the context of of some emerging market paper.

0:22:25.920 --> 0:22:27.440
<v Speaker 1>You know, they had to put a price on it.

0:22:27.440 --> 0:22:30.200
<v Speaker 1>Says this bond hasn't traded for seven years. Now, who

0:22:30.240 --> 0:22:33.280
<v Speaker 1>really knows what it's worth, So we're going to just

0:22:33.320 --> 0:22:35.600
<v Speaker 1>say that it's worth seventy dollars and it's going to

0:22:35.720 --> 0:22:40.000
<v Speaker 1>be done with it. Wow. So I know we're talking

0:22:40.000 --> 0:22:42.840
<v Speaker 1>about how especially when when you look at something like

0:22:42.920 --> 0:22:45.800
<v Speaker 1>new knees or something like corporate bonds where they really

0:22:45.800 --> 0:22:50.000
<v Speaker 1>aren't trading that regularly, there's a tendency to say, well,

0:22:50.200 --> 0:22:53.440
<v Speaker 1>this isn't the fact that there are pricing discrepancies, isn't

0:22:53.480 --> 0:22:56.800
<v Speaker 1>that worrying? And they tend to get sort of normalized

0:22:56.920 --> 0:22:59.400
<v Speaker 1>in the long term and everything kind of works out.

0:22:59.520 --> 0:23:03.560
<v Speaker 1>But one thing that was really surprising in your paper

0:23:03.920 --> 0:23:09.280
<v Speaker 1>was that you also found price discrepancies in treasuries during

0:23:09.320 --> 0:23:12.840
<v Speaker 1>the worst of the market sell off in And this

0:23:12.920 --> 0:23:16.120
<v Speaker 1>is supposed to be, you know, a huge and liquid

0:23:16.359 --> 0:23:21.640
<v Speaker 1>and standardized market, and yet in March of last year,

0:23:21.800 --> 0:23:26.040
<v Speaker 1>people seem to have difficulty agreeing what US government debt

0:23:26.160 --> 0:23:29.399
<v Speaker 1>was actually worth. Um, can you walk us through your findings?

0:23:29.440 --> 0:23:32.159
<v Speaker 1>And then also, I guess your thoughts around this, like,

0:23:32.200 --> 0:23:36.560
<v Speaker 1>how could that possibly have happened? Sure, so what you

0:23:36.600 --> 0:23:38.919
<v Speaker 1>said is right on. You know, we we when you

0:23:38.960 --> 0:23:41.440
<v Speaker 1>look at the data for the end of the third

0:23:41.520 --> 0:23:46.240
<v Speaker 1>quarter of UM, the differences were very very small. Um.

0:23:46.440 --> 0:23:48.240
<v Speaker 1>You know, anyone looking at our charts, we'll see that

0:23:48.280 --> 0:23:50.960
<v Speaker 1>there are cases where there are these outliers that show

0:23:51.040 --> 0:23:54.639
<v Speaker 1>up in the data, and you know, we've audited a

0:23:54.720 --> 0:23:58.760
<v Speaker 1>number them and found that it's the data. We the

0:23:58.800 --> 0:24:00.919
<v Speaker 1>representation that we came up with its accurate. But there

0:24:00.960 --> 0:24:03.639
<v Speaker 1>were certainly a handful of cases where we think that

0:24:03.720 --> 0:24:07.919
<v Speaker 1>firms were actually reporting the information incorrectly, but you know,

0:24:08.119 --> 0:24:10.040
<v Speaker 1>we didn't we didn't strip that out if we knew

0:24:10.080 --> 0:24:12.360
<v Speaker 1>that the data that we were using the right data.

0:24:12.440 --> 0:24:15.639
<v Speaker 1>But when you look down at the at the intercuartile

0:24:15.760 --> 0:24:17.960
<v Speaker 1>ranges as we as we picked them out, So in

0:24:17.960 --> 0:24:22.119
<v Speaker 1>other words, sort of the the concentration of bonds for

0:24:22.160 --> 0:24:23.800
<v Speaker 1>the most part in the middle that it was a

0:24:23.960 --> 0:24:28.080
<v Speaker 1>very very narrow band at the end of September. Then

0:24:28.119 --> 0:24:30.520
<v Speaker 1>when you got to the end of the first quarter,

0:24:32.000 --> 0:24:36.040
<v Speaker 1>there were pricing differences that went not quite to a

0:24:36.040 --> 0:24:39.119
<v Speaker 1>full percentage point, but just under that. And as you said,

0:24:39.200 --> 0:24:43.840
<v Speaker 1>that's that's pretty remarkable. Um. You know, the reasons for

0:24:43.920 --> 0:24:46.560
<v Speaker 1>that are kind of all over the map a little

0:24:46.600 --> 0:24:48.639
<v Speaker 1>bit in terms of um, you know, some of this

0:24:48.800 --> 0:24:50.600
<v Speaker 1>was covered pretty widely in the press in terms of

0:24:50.600 --> 0:24:54.119
<v Speaker 1>off the run securities and what have you. UM, But

0:24:55.280 --> 0:24:57.280
<v Speaker 1>the bottom line I think is that it really it

0:24:57.320 --> 0:25:00.480
<v Speaker 1>really made a strong case that it was important that

0:25:00.480 --> 0:25:04.000
<v Speaker 1>that UM that the FED stepped in when they did

0:25:04.040 --> 0:25:06.320
<v Speaker 1>and made the decision that did, because you can only imagine,

0:25:06.880 --> 0:25:10.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, we saw much wider differences for other sectors. UM.

0:25:10.760 --> 0:25:12.439
<v Speaker 1>You can only imagine how much worse it would have

0:25:12.480 --> 0:25:15.679
<v Speaker 1>been and would have potentially gotten if they hadn't gotten.

0:25:15.720 --> 0:25:18.160
<v Speaker 1>And I'm sorry much it where you're gonna add something, No,

0:25:18.160 --> 0:25:20.239
<v Speaker 1>no, no no, no no, because the fact that I was

0:25:20.520 --> 0:25:23.720
<v Speaker 1>just leading up to the same timp but you said

0:25:23.760 --> 0:25:27.720
<v Speaker 1>it already. I mean, the Thud was really worried about

0:25:27.760 --> 0:25:31.080
<v Speaker 1>what was happening, even in the you know, the treasuries

0:25:31.119 --> 0:25:35.159
<v Speaker 1>are supposed to be the gold standard trading much and

0:25:35.160 --> 0:25:37.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't trade bonds ourselves, but you know, we've definitely

0:25:37.560 --> 0:25:41.880
<v Speaker 1>heard observations that there were certain bonds at certain times

0:25:41.880 --> 0:25:46.480
<v Speaker 1>of the day during that period where people were seeing

0:25:47.040 --> 0:25:51.720
<v Speaker 1>UM spreads that were unheard of from anything they had

0:25:51.760 --> 0:25:54.080
<v Speaker 1>seen before. And as much as said that was that

0:25:54.200 --> 0:25:57.639
<v Speaker 1>was you know, again, however you want to frame it,

0:25:57.680 --> 0:25:59.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I think we were all very fortunate that

0:25:59.880 --> 0:26:03.800
<v Speaker 1>the that was was awakened at the switch when that happened,

0:26:04.640 --> 0:26:07.359
<v Speaker 1>because as bad as that is for the treasuring market.

0:26:07.400 --> 0:26:10.520
<v Speaker 1>The implications down the way from that are just huge.

0:26:11.520 --> 0:26:13.920
<v Speaker 1>I think hopefully the average person on the street that

0:26:14.000 --> 0:26:18.200
<v Speaker 1>doesn't read, you know, the financial papers, probably didn't even

0:26:18.280 --> 0:26:20.480
<v Speaker 1>notice it. But if it had gotten to that point,

0:26:20.480 --> 0:26:22.480
<v Speaker 1>we really would have been in a real best trip.

0:26:23.640 --> 0:26:27.720
<v Speaker 1>H Well, one other thing that maybe should have mentioned

0:26:27.760 --> 0:26:30.919
<v Speaker 1>that It just occurred to me recently that you know,

0:26:31.080 --> 0:26:36.280
<v Speaker 1>I've given what we are seeing with these prices, what

0:26:36.400 --> 0:26:41.240
<v Speaker 1>is the row of quantitative approaches and fixed income? That's

0:26:41.320 --> 0:26:44.840
<v Speaker 1>kind of began to worry me a little bit. If

0:26:44.840 --> 0:26:49.919
<v Speaker 1>you don't really know what the prices of something, how

0:26:50.040 --> 0:26:53.920
<v Speaker 1>you're trying to arbitract some differences between these mombs. So

0:26:55.000 --> 0:26:59.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure that people who do this have thought about it,

0:26:59.440 --> 0:27:03.959
<v Speaker 1>but I haven't, and I don't know how they are

0:27:04.000 --> 0:27:06.320
<v Speaker 1>dealing with it. But that does seem to I mean,

0:27:06.320 --> 0:27:08.280
<v Speaker 1>it is an interesting question. I mean, when you talk

0:27:08.400 --> 0:27:13.800
<v Speaker 1>to sort of quants in the traditional equity space, you

0:27:13.840 --> 0:27:16.639
<v Speaker 1>get the impressure. They spend a lot of time on

0:27:17.320 --> 0:27:21.199
<v Speaker 1>data quality, cleaning the data, making sure that they have

0:27:21.280 --> 0:27:23.920
<v Speaker 1>access to really high you know that the data is good.

0:27:24.000 --> 0:27:26.880
<v Speaker 1>So when we when thinking about poorting some of these

0:27:26.920 --> 0:27:29.600
<v Speaker 1>ideas to the bond space, if you can't even agree

0:27:29.760 --> 0:27:34.119
<v Speaker 1>on what historical bond pricing data is, it does seem

0:27:34.160 --> 0:27:36.520
<v Speaker 1>harder to imagine that some of these strategies would be

0:27:36.520 --> 0:27:42.400
<v Speaker 1>as effective. Yeah, and and you don't see I don't

0:27:42.440 --> 0:27:45.720
<v Speaker 1>hear that much about those right in the market. So

0:27:46.520 --> 0:27:49.280
<v Speaker 1>I wonder if that's part of the reason. I don't know.

0:27:50.200 --> 0:27:53.080
<v Speaker 1>I think that's one of the ultimate reasons why. You know,

0:27:53.119 --> 0:27:56.919
<v Speaker 1>the conventional wisdom is that there is more more to

0:27:57.000 --> 0:28:00.719
<v Speaker 1>do in the fixed income space for active management um

0:28:00.840 --> 0:28:03.560
<v Speaker 1>then perhaps on the equity side, because there is so

0:28:03.640 --> 0:28:06.680
<v Speaker 1>much structural inefficiency. And one thing we haven't talked about

0:28:06.760 --> 0:28:10.200
<v Speaker 1>is the fact that you're literally talking about millions of bonds,

0:28:10.880 --> 0:28:14.240
<v Speaker 1>and not only are there several million bonds out there

0:28:14.280 --> 0:28:17.520
<v Speaker 1>at this moment, but a month from now, those bonds

0:28:17.560 --> 0:28:19.440
<v Speaker 1>will be different. And over the course of a year,

0:28:19.760 --> 0:28:22.600
<v Speaker 1>you know that that inventory, if you will turn over

0:28:22.600 --> 0:28:25.880
<v Speaker 1>because bonds are constantly maturing and their new bonds constantly

0:28:25.880 --> 0:28:30.920
<v Speaker 1>coming out. The universe of US domestic stocks is reasonably static,

0:28:30.960 --> 0:28:32.840
<v Speaker 1>and that statics probably not the right word, but the

0:28:32.920 --> 0:28:35.159
<v Speaker 1>number is a manageable number most of the time. You know,

0:28:35.160 --> 0:28:37.840
<v Speaker 1>we're talking about several thousand Once you get out into

0:28:37.880 --> 0:28:41.560
<v Speaker 1>the millions. You've got to do a lot to keep

0:28:41.600 --> 0:28:44.080
<v Speaker 1>that data clean and too, and to even something as

0:28:44.080 --> 0:28:46.320
<v Speaker 1>simple as getting a price as as you said, So

0:28:46.800 --> 0:28:49.680
<v Speaker 1>it is a it is a big, big lift for

0:28:49.760 --> 0:28:52.440
<v Speaker 1>a lot of firms and they spend a tremendous amount

0:28:52.440 --> 0:28:54.880
<v Speaker 1>of money and time on it. Yeah, the barriers to

0:28:55.200 --> 0:28:57.680
<v Speaker 1>entry are very high in the extent income. It's not

0:28:57.800 --> 0:29:00.880
<v Speaker 1>like if you want to open, uh, you know, an

0:29:00.920 --> 0:29:03.720
<v Speaker 1>equity account, um, you still have to do all the

0:29:03.920 --> 0:29:08.120
<v Speaker 1>kind of compliance and whatever stuff. But but other than that,

0:29:09.560 --> 0:29:13.680
<v Speaker 1>you can just you know, do your research and a

0:29:13.720 --> 0:29:17.600
<v Speaker 1>constructive portfolio with you can just walk off the street

0:29:17.680 --> 0:29:20.800
<v Speaker 1>and then start a bunch of that that Really there

0:29:20.880 --> 0:29:23.880
<v Speaker 1>is no room, there is no room for small players here.

0:29:24.080 --> 0:29:27.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean the outlays of you know that you have

0:29:28.000 --> 0:29:32.680
<v Speaker 1>to spend on on data and analytics are just just enormous,

0:29:33.600 --> 0:29:36.200
<v Speaker 1>which kind of makes you wonder. It makes you wonder

0:29:37.000 --> 0:29:39.720
<v Speaker 1>what is what the future of this of this whole

0:29:39.800 --> 0:29:56.040
<v Speaker 1>market is going to look like. M Magic. You touched

0:29:56.040 --> 0:29:59.840
<v Speaker 1>on the idea of what the solutions could be too

0:30:00.080 --> 0:30:03.760
<v Speaker 1>these bond pricing issues, And for as long as I've

0:30:03.920 --> 0:30:07.680
<v Speaker 1>covered bonds, especially in the corporate space, there's been talk

0:30:07.760 --> 0:30:12.160
<v Speaker 1>about doing more electronic bond trading, UM, maybe moving it

0:30:12.240 --> 0:30:16.440
<v Speaker 1>to something that resembles an exchange and something that might

0:30:16.520 --> 0:30:21.400
<v Speaker 1>have more transparent pricing. But what are the prospects of

0:30:21.440 --> 0:30:25.080
<v Speaker 1>that actually happening, because again, like I feel like the

0:30:25.120 --> 0:30:27.280
<v Speaker 1>industry has been talking about it for years and years

0:30:27.320 --> 0:30:31.120
<v Speaker 1>and years and it just never really seems to UM.

0:30:31.160 --> 0:30:34.440
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there's been progress, but it certainly isn't anywhere

0:30:34.440 --> 0:30:37.440
<v Speaker 1>near the level of something like stocks. Well. I mean one,

0:30:37.560 --> 0:30:41.160
<v Speaker 1>I'll let Eric pick it up later. But but one

0:30:41.200 --> 0:30:45.360
<v Speaker 1>thing that you know, whatever platform you you can think of,

0:30:46.600 --> 0:30:49.600
<v Speaker 1>will not address as the fact that you know, some

0:30:49.680 --> 0:30:53.880
<v Speaker 1>of these guys just not trade a sign how the

0:30:54.000 --> 0:30:56.760
<v Speaker 1>US sign a price to something that last traded three

0:30:56.800 --> 0:30:59.560
<v Speaker 1>weeks ago. So that that was our finding. I think

0:30:59.560 --> 0:31:04.080
<v Speaker 1>that's about half of mombs, half of corporate bombs well

0:31:04.200 --> 0:31:06.560
<v Speaker 1>and through at least a three week period when they

0:31:06.560 --> 0:31:09.600
<v Speaker 1>were not traded. Yeah, I think the issue is really

0:31:09.640 --> 0:31:13.200
<v Speaker 1>that it's always going to be a part of the market. UM.

0:31:13.280 --> 0:31:16.440
<v Speaker 1>The there are a couple issues there. One is this

0:31:16.600 --> 0:31:19.680
<v Speaker 1>issue a sort of critical mass, so you know, firms

0:31:19.720 --> 0:31:24.400
<v Speaker 1>have definitely talked about and tried to take more of it.

0:31:24.640 --> 0:31:31.040
<v Speaker 1>Electronic and that works better in places where there's going

0:31:31.080 --> 0:31:33.160
<v Speaker 1>to be a lot of trading and a lot of

0:31:33.760 --> 0:31:37.760
<v Speaker 1>supply and demand meeting. It's meeting halfway in the same spaces, right,

0:31:38.080 --> 0:31:42.959
<v Speaker 1>And that's why there are some electronic trading platforms um

0:31:43.120 --> 0:31:46.080
<v Speaker 1>that do some of the work. You know there there are,

0:31:46.120 --> 0:31:48.520
<v Speaker 1>There is a lot of electronic trading in the treasury market.

0:31:48.800 --> 0:31:51.720
<v Speaker 1>There even is quite a bit in the higher, higher

0:31:51.800 --> 0:31:56.400
<v Speaker 1>quality corporate market. But that that is that works best

0:31:57.000 --> 0:32:02.240
<v Speaker 1>when you're dealing with the high volume, high deal size bonds.

0:32:03.120 --> 0:32:07.040
<v Speaker 1>The further down the ladder you go, the more um

0:32:07.040 --> 0:32:10.960
<v Speaker 1>fragmented it gets, the less trading there is. Then it's

0:32:11.080 --> 0:32:13.440
<v Speaker 1>a bigger lift to try and get everybody together. And

0:32:13.800 --> 0:32:16.040
<v Speaker 1>the fact of the matter is is that for for

0:32:16.080 --> 0:32:19.120
<v Speaker 1>anybody who's actively involved in the industry, whether that's the

0:32:19.880 --> 0:32:24.760
<v Speaker 1>investment banks and dealers or even the large active managers,

0:32:24.760 --> 0:32:29.960
<v Speaker 1>to some degree, there's an incentive too have some inefficiency

0:32:30.000 --> 0:32:33.000
<v Speaker 1>in the trading, especially when it comes to the dealers,

0:32:33.040 --> 0:32:36.200
<v Speaker 1>because they do make a lot more money on these

0:32:36.240 --> 0:32:40.720
<v Speaker 1>structural inefficiencies in fixed income than they're able to in equities.

0:32:41.360 --> 0:32:46.360
<v Speaker 1>It's inevitable that when there is inefficiency that you can

0:32:46.520 --> 0:32:49.360
<v Speaker 1>ring out with technology. Somebody will eventually get there and

0:32:49.400 --> 0:32:52.720
<v Speaker 1>be able to do it. It will take more time, um,

0:32:52.760 --> 0:32:55.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, because it requires that sort of critical mass.

0:32:55.480 --> 0:32:57.680
<v Speaker 1>You have to be able to bring enough buyers and

0:32:57.680 --> 0:33:00.800
<v Speaker 1>sellers together. Um. And when you don't have a single

0:33:01.000 --> 0:33:04.520
<v Speaker 1>point of exchange, that that's more difficult. But what we

0:33:04.600 --> 0:33:07.200
<v Speaker 1>said earlier about the nature of the bond market, the

0:33:07.240 --> 0:33:10.880
<v Speaker 1>fact that it is so fragmented and splintered, and there

0:33:10.880 --> 0:33:13.800
<v Speaker 1>are you know, even even a single I mean, look

0:33:13.800 --> 0:33:16.480
<v Speaker 1>at it this way. A single large company, a very

0:33:16.600 --> 0:33:21.080
<v Speaker 1>very large mega cap company will still have one stock right,

0:33:21.200 --> 0:33:24.600
<v Speaker 1>one share, common equity, maybe a couple of maybe they've

0:33:24.600 --> 0:33:26.920
<v Speaker 1>got some prefers, what have you. But fundamentally, when you

0:33:27.000 --> 0:33:30.880
<v Speaker 1>trade you know G E, you're trading G. They made.

0:33:30.920 --> 0:33:34.840
<v Speaker 1>The same company may have literally hundreds of bonds, and

0:33:35.320 --> 0:33:38.840
<v Speaker 1>the differences among them may have Sometimes it may be

0:33:38.920 --> 0:33:41.600
<v Speaker 1>as simple as just the maturity. But once you spread

0:33:41.600 --> 0:33:44.360
<v Speaker 1>that out, you've got different coupons, different maturities, and very

0:33:44.440 --> 0:33:47.560
<v Speaker 1>large companies with subsidiaries and so forth, may issue bonds

0:33:47.560 --> 0:33:50.760
<v Speaker 1>at every different level, so the underlying credit qualities slightly

0:33:50.800 --> 0:33:52.959
<v Speaker 1>different because they have legal differences in one of them

0:33:53.000 --> 0:33:57.680
<v Speaker 1>as well. Trying to standardize and commoditize those Um there

0:33:57.720 --> 0:33:59.880
<v Speaker 1>there are certainly party of these parties that benefit from that,

0:34:00.000 --> 0:34:04.000
<v Speaker 1>including the issuers themselves would But as long as you've

0:34:04.040 --> 0:34:07.959
<v Speaker 1>got that much differentiation, you're always going to have a

0:34:08.040 --> 0:34:10.200
<v Speaker 1>huge swath of the market that isn't going to trade

0:34:10.640 --> 0:34:13.239
<v Speaker 1>quite that often. I do think that in some of

0:34:13.239 --> 0:34:14.840
<v Speaker 1>it is a matter of time and some of it

0:34:14.920 --> 0:34:17.080
<v Speaker 1>is a matter of sort of the socialization of the market,

0:34:17.080 --> 0:34:20.400
<v Speaker 1>people sort of getting on the same page. But no

0:34:20.440 --> 0:34:22.719
<v Speaker 1>matter how far down the road you go in terms

0:34:22.760 --> 0:34:27.560
<v Speaker 1>of making it electronic, UM, you're still gonna have inefficiency

0:34:27.760 --> 0:34:30.239
<v Speaker 1>people trying. You know, the bottom line is traders still

0:34:30.239 --> 0:34:34.160
<v Speaker 1>get on the phone and haggle over prices for bonds.

0:34:34.640 --> 0:34:37.799
<v Speaker 1>That's always going to happen to some degree, the less

0:34:37.840 --> 0:34:41.239
<v Speaker 1>standardized and the smaller the bond is. So one other

0:34:41.320 --> 0:34:45.399
<v Speaker 1>thing to add to to this, Uh, what we are

0:34:45.480 --> 0:34:51.040
<v Speaker 1>hearing is that pricing agencies, pricing services now apparently look

0:34:51.080 --> 0:34:56.320
<v Speaker 1>at at e t F prices because whoever is creating

0:34:56.400 --> 0:35:00.160
<v Speaker 1>the E t F units, um, they are implicit like

0:35:01.200 --> 0:35:04.719
<v Speaker 1>putting some price on these on these things, whether they

0:35:04.719 --> 0:35:07.400
<v Speaker 1>have been traded or not. So that might be a

0:35:07.480 --> 0:35:11.480
<v Speaker 1>potentially interesting having you to to get around that problem.

0:35:11.480 --> 0:35:14.960
<v Speaker 1>Although it's it's clearly not perfect, but but it tells

0:35:15.000 --> 0:35:19.000
<v Speaker 1>you something. It's kind of crazy when the like liquid

0:35:19.239 --> 0:35:22.160
<v Speaker 1>wrapper that you put around the stuff that doesn't trade

0:35:22.239 --> 0:35:25.799
<v Speaker 1>very much becomes the reference point for pricing because it

0:35:25.840 --> 0:35:30.040
<v Speaker 1>doesn't trade much. It's weird. Yeah, I think that that's definitely,

0:35:30.440 --> 0:35:33.880
<v Speaker 1>definitely an important, interesting thing that's that the market is

0:35:33.920 --> 0:35:37.600
<v Speaker 1>starting to absorb and learn about. I would point out though,

0:35:37.680 --> 0:35:41.000
<v Speaker 1>that you're still dealing with a subset of the market.

0:35:41.120 --> 0:35:44.279
<v Speaker 1>Usually when you have a corporate bond e t F

0:35:44.400 --> 0:35:47.680
<v Speaker 1>that has a hundred bonds in it, that will certainly

0:35:47.719 --> 0:35:51.319
<v Speaker 1>affect the liquidity of those one bonds and bonds that

0:35:51.360 --> 0:35:54.399
<v Speaker 1>are similar in nature to it UM, but you wind

0:35:54.480 --> 0:35:58.279
<v Speaker 1>up getting concentration liquidity in those in that area as well,

0:35:58.360 --> 0:36:01.319
<v Speaker 1>So that kind of things. Certainly there's no question that

0:36:01.320 --> 0:36:05.680
<v Speaker 1>that should have an effect of creating better efficiency in

0:36:05.760 --> 0:36:08.800
<v Speaker 1>parts of the market where those et f s live UM,

0:36:08.840 --> 0:36:11.879
<v Speaker 1>But to the degree that they have that bonds are

0:36:11.920 --> 0:36:15.480
<v Speaker 1>not concentrated inside those et f s, you're still going

0:36:15.520 --> 0:36:18.160
<v Speaker 1>to be dealing quite a bit with with this issue.

0:36:18.480 --> 0:36:21.080
<v Speaker 1>Look that it's still an analogy, it's not doesn't fit entirely.

0:36:21.120 --> 0:36:23.600
<v Speaker 1>But you know, when we talk about companies being a

0:36:23.640 --> 0:36:25.200
<v Speaker 1>part of our not being a part of the SMP

0:36:25.280 --> 0:36:27.920
<v Speaker 1>five hundred, it makes a difference. If you're not in

0:36:28.000 --> 0:36:31.000
<v Speaker 1>that s your the demand for your stock is not

0:36:31.040 --> 0:36:33.520
<v Speaker 1>going to be the same. So it is kind of

0:36:33.560 --> 0:36:38.160
<v Speaker 1>a somewhat paradoxical situation where you know, fixed income is

0:36:38.160 --> 0:36:42.560
<v Speaker 1>supposed to be this safe and kind of boring asset,

0:36:42.600 --> 0:36:46.279
<v Speaker 1>but we don't really to some extent now what these

0:36:46.320 --> 0:36:51.279
<v Speaker 1>prices are, at least much less clearly than than we

0:36:51.360 --> 0:36:55.520
<v Speaker 1>do four equities. That to me that was a little paradoxical,

0:36:56.360 --> 0:36:59.120
<v Speaker 1>and that sends fixed income is a little closer to

0:36:59.200 --> 0:37:02.240
<v Speaker 1>like private equa to you or something of that nature.

0:37:02.440 --> 0:37:07.759
<v Speaker 1>Not maybe to the same degree, but nature, I think

0:37:08.200 --> 0:37:11.880
<v Speaker 1>it's closer in terms of pricing. I love the idea

0:37:11.960 --> 0:37:15.320
<v Speaker 1>that we think of bonds is really boring, as you said,

0:37:15.440 --> 0:37:19.040
<v Speaker 1>but like below the surface, maybe you know someone an

0:37:19.040 --> 0:37:22.799
<v Speaker 1>asset manager and a pricing service provider are having like

0:37:22.880 --> 0:37:26.360
<v Speaker 1>this raging debate about how much the bond is actually worth,

0:37:27.000 --> 0:37:29.200
<v Speaker 1>But we don't get to see that most of the time.

0:37:29.840 --> 0:37:32.879
<v Speaker 1>You know, Marchick mentioned earlier about the fact that such

0:37:32.920 --> 0:37:37.520
<v Speaker 1>a huge proportion of municipal bonds that we observed were

0:37:37.560 --> 0:37:40.720
<v Speaker 1>only being held in the funds of a single firm each.

0:37:41.280 --> 0:37:44.000
<v Speaker 1>That's that's what's particularly interesting when you said about below

0:37:44.080 --> 0:37:46.920
<v Speaker 1>the surface. You know, that's where that kind of argument

0:37:46.920 --> 0:37:48.960
<v Speaker 1>may really come in when a manager may be the

0:37:49.080 --> 0:37:55.600
<v Speaker 1>only large investor holding that bond, and that that means

0:37:55.640 --> 0:37:59.360
<v Speaker 1>that the pricing service itself isn't necessarily seeing in anybody

0:37:59.360 --> 0:38:02.840
<v Speaker 1>else's port olio either. Um, They're gonna sign a price

0:38:02.840 --> 0:38:07.480
<v Speaker 1>based on some formula, some matrix or or artificial intelligence.

0:38:07.480 --> 0:38:11.320
<v Speaker 1>And that's a case where the manager may know something

0:38:11.360 --> 0:38:13.480
<v Speaker 1>about the you know, it's if it's a few million

0:38:13.520 --> 0:38:16.279
<v Speaker 1>dollar bond of a small, you know, nursing home in

0:38:16.320 --> 0:38:19.960
<v Speaker 1>West Texas, that's where that argument may come. But it's

0:38:20.120 --> 0:38:21.920
<v Speaker 1>as you said, it's all it's all under the surface,

0:38:21.960 --> 0:38:24.080
<v Speaker 1>and we'll never see anything about that. So there was

0:38:24.120 --> 0:38:30.520
<v Speaker 1>more though bonds all right, Well, Um, Matcha and Eric.

0:38:30.600 --> 0:38:33.719
<v Speaker 1>That was that was really interesting, um, and really good

0:38:33.719 --> 0:38:38.200
<v Speaker 1>fun to dive beneath the surface of an otherwise boring

0:38:38.320 --> 0:38:40.880
<v Speaker 1>fixed income market. So thank you so much for coming on.

0:38:41.080 --> 0:38:43.920
<v Speaker 1>Really appreciate it. Thank you, it's our pleasure. Thanks. That

0:38:44.000 --> 0:39:03.359
<v Speaker 1>was great, So Joe, I actually feel kind of bad

0:39:03.400 --> 0:39:06.560
<v Speaker 1>for calling the fixed income market boring because I don't

0:39:06.560 --> 0:39:08.680
<v Speaker 1>think it is. But I do think that there is

0:39:08.719 --> 0:39:11.200
<v Speaker 1>this big portion of it in terms of the market

0:39:11.239 --> 0:39:15.280
<v Speaker 1>structure that doesn't get as much attention as it should

0:39:15.520 --> 0:39:18.680
<v Speaker 1>in my mind, and the pricing of a lot of

0:39:18.680 --> 0:39:21.040
<v Speaker 1>bonds is one of them. No, I think it's super

0:39:21.040 --> 0:39:23.799
<v Speaker 1>one of those things. Interesting. My big takeaway is that

0:39:23.920 --> 0:39:26.719
<v Speaker 1>I feel like if I were going to start some

0:39:26.800 --> 0:39:29.200
<v Speaker 1>sort of like asset manager, or if I were going

0:39:29.239 --> 0:39:31.879
<v Speaker 1>to get into trading or something like that, I feel

0:39:31.920 --> 0:39:34.600
<v Speaker 1>like I would definitely go into the bond space, just

0:39:34.680 --> 0:39:37.560
<v Speaker 1>because you know, listening to that after all, you know,

0:39:37.600 --> 0:39:39.680
<v Speaker 1>it still feels like it's come up in some of

0:39:39.680 --> 0:39:43.640
<v Speaker 1>our conversations. There are so many I guess inefficiencies or

0:39:43.840 --> 0:39:46.600
<v Speaker 1>sources of friction might be a better way to characterize

0:39:46.600 --> 0:39:50.520
<v Speaker 1>it in the space, whereas with equities there are very few,

0:39:51.280 --> 0:39:53.680
<v Speaker 1>And as such, I suspect that there are you know,

0:39:54.160 --> 0:39:58.359
<v Speaker 1>risk premium out there yet still to be harvested by

0:39:58.400 --> 0:40:01.720
<v Speaker 1>the enterprising bond manager the more they understand this stuff.

0:40:02.480 --> 0:40:04.600
<v Speaker 1>I was worried for a second when when you talked

0:40:04.600 --> 0:40:06.600
<v Speaker 1>about starting something that you were going to start like

0:40:06.680 --> 0:40:11.680
<v Speaker 1>the team the electronic bond trading platform. Um, but no,

0:40:11.920 --> 0:40:16.200
<v Speaker 1>in a different direction. Okay, I take advantage, take advantage

0:40:16.200 --> 0:40:23.640
<v Speaker 1>of all all the fragmented bond trading platforms to find inefficiencies. Yes, Um.

0:40:23.680 --> 0:40:25.880
<v Speaker 1>The other thing, I mean, there's a lot to unpack

0:40:25.960 --> 0:40:30.680
<v Speaker 1>in that discussion. Um. The description of the treasury pricing

0:40:30.760 --> 0:40:34.560
<v Speaker 1>discrepancies is still really remarkable to me, um, and I

0:40:34.560 --> 0:40:37.080
<v Speaker 1>would love to hear more about that. But the other

0:40:37.120 --> 0:40:38.840
<v Speaker 1>thing that stuck out was this idea of e t

0:40:39.160 --> 0:40:42.759
<v Speaker 1>s kind of becoming um the reference price for the

0:40:42.800 --> 0:40:46.759
<v Speaker 1>bonds they're actually wrapped around. UM. And I've heard that

0:40:46.880 --> 0:40:51.800
<v Speaker 1>before from people in the market, and I can understand why,

0:40:52.000 --> 0:40:55.879
<v Speaker 1>but it just seems so circular to me and sort

0:40:55.920 --> 0:40:59.680
<v Speaker 1>of like intuitively odd when when that came up, like

0:40:59.719 --> 0:41:02.600
<v Speaker 1>I literally got in my head that image of the

0:41:02.640 --> 0:41:07.280
<v Speaker 1>snake eating its tail. So say it's exactly like It's like, okay,

0:41:07.280 --> 0:41:10.160
<v Speaker 1>so it doesn't sound right. It sounds problematic, Like I

0:41:10.160 --> 0:41:13.080
<v Speaker 1>don't know how it would become a problem, but it

0:41:13.120 --> 0:41:16.880
<v Speaker 1>doesn't sound great if the instrument designed to hold the

0:41:16.920 --> 0:41:21.880
<v Speaker 1>bonds can't be priced easily because the bonds are a

0:41:21.960 --> 0:41:24.080
<v Speaker 1>liquid and so you end up pricing the bonds based

0:41:24.080 --> 0:41:27.359
<v Speaker 1>on where the et F trade. It does not sound great,

0:41:27.400 --> 0:41:29.400
<v Speaker 1>but maybe it's fine. I don't know. We'll have to

0:41:29.400 --> 0:41:31.160
<v Speaker 1>wait to a crisis and then will say, oh, yes,

0:41:31.239 --> 0:41:34.560
<v Speaker 1>that was a big deal. Well, I mean, to some extent,

0:41:34.600 --> 0:41:37.840
<v Speaker 1>we we kind of had, um the credit crisis in

0:41:38.840 --> 0:41:41.239
<v Speaker 1>and the e t f s performed reasonably well. But

0:41:41.360 --> 0:41:45.000
<v Speaker 1>you could imagine a scenario where um, because the e

0:41:45.080 --> 0:41:47.239
<v Speaker 1>t f s are sort of influencing the underlying and

0:41:47.320 --> 0:41:51.280
<v Speaker 1>vice versa, maybe you get a cascade effect of some sort.

0:41:51.480 --> 0:41:55.839
<v Speaker 1>But anyway, um, your your image of the snake eating

0:41:55.880 --> 0:41:58.720
<v Speaker 1>its own tail is it's gonna stick with me. Okay,

0:41:58.840 --> 0:42:01.279
<v Speaker 1>should we leave it there? Let's leave it there? All right?

0:42:01.520 --> 0:42:04.280
<v Speaker 1>This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

0:42:04.280 --> 0:42:07.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:42:07.160 --> 0:42:10.080
<v Speaker 1>Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi Isn't though. You could

0:42:10.080 --> 0:42:13.480
<v Speaker 1>follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart. Follow our producer

0:42:13.560 --> 0:42:17.520
<v Speaker 1>Laura Carlson. She's at Laura M. Carlson. Follow the Bloomberg

0:42:17.560 --> 0:42:21.480
<v Speaker 1>head of podcast Francesca Levi at Francesca Today, and check

0:42:21.520 --> 0:42:24.440
<v Speaker 1>out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg under the handle

0:42:24.760 --> 0:42:26.600
<v Speaker 1>at podcasts. Thanks for listening,