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Speaker 1: Also media, Welcome to it could happen here a show

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Speaker 1: that is sometimes about surveillance, digital privacy, in all the

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Speaker 1: ways that little black rectangle you keep in your pocket

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Speaker 1: could be used against you. I'm Garrison Davis. Today I

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Speaker 1: am joined by Cooper Quinton, a security researcher and senior

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Speaker 1: public interest technologist at the EFF or the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

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Speaker 2: Cooper, Hello, Hey, Garrison, happy to be here again.

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Speaker 1: Yes, always happy to have you on. And you will

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Speaker 1: be especially useful today because we're going to be talking

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Speaker 1: about geo fencing because last week the Supreme Court ruled

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Speaker 1: that geo fencing qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment. Now,

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Speaker 1: before we get into what that means and why it's important.

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Speaker 2: All very normal terms, I emplicitly I understand.

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Speaker 1: Before we do that, let's start to define some of

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Speaker 1: our terms here, starting off with what is geo fencing?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, So the geofence warrants, which are what this case

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Speaker 3: is about, are warrants to a tech company, usually Google,

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Speaker 3: that say, give us all of the identity account ideas

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Speaker 3: that had phones in this set of geographic coordinates at

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Speaker 3: this time period. So they send that to Google. Google

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Speaker 3: sends back a list of all of the accounts they know.

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Speaker 3: I'm usually anonymized at first, but that were in that

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Speaker 3: you know, geographic square from you know, I'm A to

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Speaker 3: time B. This is actually not something that Google does anymore.

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Speaker 3: They've recently taken steps to no longer technically be able

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Speaker 3: to respond to these warrants, which is a rare w

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Speaker 3: for Google. But that is a geofence warrant. That's what's

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Speaker 3: at the heart of.

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Speaker 1: That, Yeah, I mean, And the goal is essentially to

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Speaker 1: identify what phones and by tension, which people were res

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Speaker 1: around the time a crime was committed, to narrow down

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Speaker 1: a suspect from a very large pool of just random

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Speaker 1: people in an area.

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Speaker 2: Yes, exactly, exactly.

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Speaker 3: So there's a couple of ways you can think about this, Right,

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Speaker 3: if there was a protest and you want us to

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Speaker 3: know their identities of all the protesters, you could get

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Speaker 3: a geofence warrant for the area of.

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Speaker 2: That protest, for the time of the protest.

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Speaker 3: Or if there was a bank robbery, which happens here, right,

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Speaker 3: you get a geofence warrant for two locations you think

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Speaker 3: the bank robber might have been in, and then you

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Speaker 3: are able to narrow it down from the you know

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Speaker 3: which identities show up in both places, right, and those

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Speaker 3: that's your list of primary suspects.

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Speaker 1: So the reason why we're talking about this today is

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Speaker 1: because on Monday, June twenty ninth, in a six' three,

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Speaker 1: ruling The Supreme court found that police getting access to

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Speaker 1: location data through a geo fence does constitute a quote

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Speaker 1: unquote search under The Fourth. Amendment and this this finding

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Speaker 1: could have really big impacts on digital privacy. Rights the

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Speaker 1: fact that geofencing is a Fourth amen search means that

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Speaker 1: the practice of geofencing is subject To Fourth amen restrictions and. Protections,

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Speaker 1: now there's also been some, PEOPLE i, think maybe exaggerating

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Speaker 1: certain aspects of this, ruling because the court did not

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Speaker 1: rule that geofence warrants are themselves, unreasonable just like in,

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Speaker 1: general that that question is still is still going to

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Speaker 1: be determined by The Fourth. Circuit but what the court

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Speaker 1: did find here also should not be minimized or it

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Speaker 1: also is pretty. Significant to quote from the majority, quote

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Speaker 1: an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records

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Speaker 1: about his cell phone's, location and police intrude on that

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Speaker 1: constitutionally protected interest when they demand the, information even though

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Speaker 1: for only a limited time and from a third party

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Speaker 1: tech company. Unquote, well we'll get into some of what

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Speaker 1: that's referencing in terms of like third party tech companies.

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Speaker 1: Later as you, mentioned this case does revolve around a bank,

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Speaker 1: robbery AND i want to get into some of the

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Speaker 1: context of this because it also will help understand sort

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Speaker 1: of the ongoing case regarding the specific geofense warrant that was. Used,

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Speaker 1: so in twenty, nineteen someone made off with almost two

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Speaker 1: hundred thousand dollars from a credit union and the suspect

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Speaker 1: was seen on their phone prior to the, robbery so

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Speaker 1: police Asked google to hand over the location data for

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Speaker 1: all cell phones or the devices in a one hundred

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Speaker 1: and fifty meters radius around the bank within.

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Speaker 3: An hour of that.

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Speaker 1: Robbery nineteen anonymous users were first. Identified police then narrow

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Speaker 1: that down to nine users who they got more information

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Speaker 1: from From. Google they tracked the location for a longer

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Speaker 1: period of time before police then requested personally identifying information

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Speaker 1: on three, users which they then used to arrest the.

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Speaker 1: Suspect so the suspect eventually pleaded, guilty but it was

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Speaker 1: like a conditional plate because they were still challenging the

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Speaker 1: evidence that was obtained through the geofense, warrant citing A

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Speaker 1: Fourth amendment vile arguing that the warrant authorizing the location

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Speaker 1: data search was. Invalid and this claim made its way

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Speaker 1: through the district, court to the appeals, court to The Supreme.

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Speaker 1: Court and we'll get into that in a. Bit you

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Speaker 1: already laid out some of the details of the specific

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Speaker 1: like geofence warrant that was. Used it has this three step.

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Speaker 1: Process first this big, pool then a smaller, pool and

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Speaker 1: then personal identifying information on the smallest. Pool one thing

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Speaker 1: that is really interesting to me is that the process

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Speaker 1: for setting up this warrant was set up with the

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Speaker 1: help Of. Google they like worked together to make this

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Speaker 1: process back when this was still like an emerging investigative

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Speaker 1: avenue like, five, six seven years.

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Speaker 2: Ago, yeah that's.

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Speaker 1: Right and, also as you've, Mentioned google's location history feature

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Speaker 1: operates differently now the information that is being collected is

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Speaker 1: stored on the user.

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Speaker 2: Phone, yeah they.

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Speaker 1: Don't have the same type of access that they had

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Speaker 1: back in twenty nineteen in which this case.

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Speaker 2: Emerges that's. Right they are no longer able to respond

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Speaker 2: to t offense, warrants which is.

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Speaker 3: Great this does not mean they can't respond to other

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Speaker 3: types of, warrants and this doesn't mean that other companies

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Speaker 3: won't respond to offense.

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Speaker 1: Warrants, YEAH i. Guess do you want to discuss a

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Speaker 1: few of the different ways in which location data is? Collected, yeah.

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Speaker 3: Certainly so there's there's a couple of. Ways, LET'S i

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Speaker 3: guess sandbox this entirely just to cell phone location because

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Speaker 3: you don't want to go off on attention about license plate.

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Speaker 2: Readers or other notion tracking.

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Speaker 3: Mechanisms but one of the big ways that that people

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Speaker 3: have been that's kind of been on people's minds lately

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Speaker 3: is advertising location.

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Speaker 2: Data so this is like the.

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Speaker 3: Product, weblock which is owned by this, Company, PenLink WHICH

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Speaker 3: i recently bought a contract, with and several other forcement

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Speaker 3: law enforcement agency to buy contract.

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Speaker 2: With The Citizen law just put out a pretty great

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Speaker 2: report about.

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Speaker 3: Them but the way that they get their data is

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Speaker 3: through a combination of advertising APIs from. Applications, basically so

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Speaker 3: when an application on their phone wants to show AN,

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Speaker 3: ad first it sends a request to what's called a

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Speaker 3: real time bidding, database and it sends a request with

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Speaker 3: a unique idea for your phone called a mobile AD

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Speaker 3: id or, made and some information about you which can

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Speaker 3: include your, location and then, companies any random, Company you

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Speaker 3: OR i could set up a company to sit up

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Speaker 3: these real time bidding centers and just kind of gather

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Speaker 3: all those data and never make any bids or that,

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Speaker 3: data never spend any, money just gather all that data

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Speaker 3: of pairing people's mobile advertising ideas whilst their location. Information

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Speaker 3: and this is exactly what weblock. Does so what they

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Speaker 3: do is they sell this information to. Police police can

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Speaker 3: then you, know buy access to this. Information and this

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Speaker 3: is another thing that gets confus used with geofencing a,

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Speaker 3: lot but it's it's a different type of.

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Speaker 2: Geofencing they can.

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Speaker 3: Sort of draw a circle around a specific area and

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Speaker 3: weblock will show them all of the information they have

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Speaker 3: about phones that have been in that area recently or

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Speaker 3: during a specific time. Period and that's not a geofence.

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Speaker 3: Warrant that is a geofence search of a, database which

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Speaker 3: which is essentially the same Thing google is doing on

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Speaker 3: the back, end but there's no warrant involved in this.

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Speaker 2: Case but that's a very that's a very common method of.

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Speaker 3: Tracking the other, way the other way that they get

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Speaker 3: data is just through codes that they embed in certain

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Speaker 3: ad libraries that will get them that data sort of

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Speaker 3: the same, way but without going through the real time bidding.

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Speaker 2: Process but it's still data being given to.

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Speaker 3: Them basically by ad libraries that they pay a bit

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Speaker 3: of money for to the ad company or.

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Speaker 1: Whatever in a little, bit we'll discuss some of the

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Speaker 1: implications of The Supreme court's, findings specifically all like the

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Speaker 1: third party. Doctrine but do you think that there's a

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Speaker 1: possibility that the ruling in this case might be able

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Speaker 1: to be used to put up challenges towards something like

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Speaker 1: advertising location.

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Speaker 2: Collection. Yeah, Again i'm not a.

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Speaker 3: Lawyer legal strategy is quite outside my general domain of,

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Speaker 3: expertise but it certainly seems to me like there should

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Speaker 3: be an opening. Here the big loophole that law enforcement

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Speaker 3: has been exploiting, wellefully we call it the data broker, loophole, Right,

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Speaker 3: yeah has been a problem for a. While there was

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Speaker 3: a bill called The Fourth Amendment Is not For Sale.

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Speaker 3: Act it passed The house and then died in The. Senate,

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Speaker 3: unfortunately it was proposed By Senator Ron wyden in twenty twenty.

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Speaker 2: One that wasn't attempt to close this.

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Speaker 4: Loophole but given the wording of the of the opinion,

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Speaker 4: here you, know specifically around people's location data being very

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Speaker 4: very much private.

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Speaker 3: Data you, KNOW i think that there's a reasonable argument

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Speaker 3: to bring a case to The Supreme court about the

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Speaker 3: sales specifically of cellular location.

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Speaker 2: Data, yeah because they did rule.

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Speaker 3: That the third party doctrine which we can get, into

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Speaker 3: does not apply to cellular location. Data so THAT'S i,

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Speaker 3: MEAN i think that's a pretty big point in favor

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Speaker 3: of shutting down the loophole forward location data before it

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Speaker 3: would not shut down the loophole for other.

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Speaker 1: Data but, yeah it is frustrating how we have to

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Speaker 1: kind of take this one step at a, time and

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Speaker 1: that's that is a sort of frustration that actually The

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Speaker 1: Supreme court.

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Speaker 2: Voiced, yeah reformism is rough, man.

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Speaker 1: This like case by case app by app approach does

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Speaker 1: not actually make very much. Sense before we get into,

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Speaker 1: that let's go back to the bank robbers in initial

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Speaker 1: challenge based on The Fourth. Amendment so a district court

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Speaker 1: did agree that the search violent of The Fourth, amendment

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Speaker 1: but it did not actually block the data from being

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Speaker 1: permitted as evidence because the court found that the police

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Speaker 1: officer's reliance on the data was not quote unquote objectively,

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Speaker 1: unreasonable allowing the quote good faith exemption to the exclusionary rule.

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Speaker 1: Unquote this is basically because the technology was still new

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Speaker 1: and because there was few leads in this. Case the

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Speaker 1: district court found that the officer's use of this was

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Speaker 1: not necessarily. Unreasonable so they have this good faith, exemption

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Speaker 1: which which could become a problem later or might, not we'll. See.

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Speaker 1: Now this was appealed to The Fourth, circuit who went

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Speaker 1: back and forth a, bit initially ruling to one that

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Speaker 1: the ge offense did not even qualify as a, search

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Speaker 1: so war wasn't needed in the first. Place one judge

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Speaker 1: dissented from, this arguing that the warrant issued was quote

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Speaker 1: so lacking in particularity and probable cause that it was invalid.

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Speaker 1: Unquote now this too could become important later. On the

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Speaker 1: Full Fourth circuit panel reheard the case, again but were

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Speaker 1: divided seven to, seven half ruling the warrant violated The Fourth,

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Speaker 1: amendment but most justices still found that the exclusionary rules

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Speaker 1: good faith exception applied in this, case and that then

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Speaker 1: leads us back to The Supreme, court and the ruling

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Speaker 1: Last monday only actually covers The Fourth amendment aspect of the.

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Speaker 1: Case they're not ruling on the good faith, exemption and

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Speaker 1: The Fourth amendment question itself is split into two. Issues

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Speaker 1: did the police conduct a search under The Fourth amendment

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Speaker 1: by acquiring location data From? Google and, second did the

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Speaker 1: multi step geofense warrant issued in this? Case did that

225
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Speaker 1: warrant make this search? Unreasonable, now the court only answered

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Speaker 1: this first question did it actually qualify as a, search

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Speaker 1: and hand it off the second part of the question

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Speaker 1: to The Fourth Circuit court Of, appeals who will then

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Speaker 1: also rule on the good faith exemption aspect of this.

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Speaker 1: Case to quote the majority, quote we leave it to

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Speaker 1: The court Of appeals the further question, whether given the warrant,

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Speaker 1: issued the search here was, reasonable meaning that each of

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Speaker 1: its steps was properly described with particularity and found to

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Speaker 1: be supported by probable cause. Unquote Jess caking then writes

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Speaker 1: out instructions for The Fourth, circuit most of which relate

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Speaker 1: just to The Fourth amendment, itself saying that The Fourth

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Speaker 1: amendment protects against quote, unquote the unreasonable search and seizures of, persons, houses,

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Speaker 1: papers and, effects and requires that warrants may only be

239
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Speaker 1: issued upon probable cause and must particularly describe quote the

240
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Speaker 1: place to be searched and the persons or things to

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Speaker 1: be seized. Unquote and this particularly requirement's going to be

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Speaker 1: a big part of this of this case going, forward

243
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Speaker 1: because to issue a, warrant a judgements determine if there's

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Speaker 1: a quote unquote fair probability that the evidence of a

245
00:13:59,679 --> 00:14:02,360
Speaker 1: crime would be, found and that the search is of

246
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Speaker 1: an appropriate. Scope this is quoting from the majority again

247
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Speaker 1: quote that it's carefully tailored to its justifications and will

248
00:14:09,920 --> 00:14:13,720
Speaker 1: not take on the character of the wide ranging exploratory

249
00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:17,360
Speaker 1: searches that the framers intended to prohibit. Unquote and this

250
00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:20,080
Speaker 1: is the specific key issue with these geofense, warrants the

251
00:14:20,160 --> 00:14:23,640
Speaker 1: fact that they cast this large dragonet over just everyone

252
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Speaker 1: in a certain area at a certain.

253
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Speaker 3: Time that's, Right you're you're basically, searching you, know potentially

254
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Speaker 3: fundra is potentially thousands of, people right if you imagine

255
00:14:35,480 --> 00:14:40,120
Speaker 3: a geofense warrant in Downtown manhattan or, something right, like

256
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Speaker 3: you're treating everyone.

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Speaker 2: As a suspect right off the.

258
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Speaker 3: Bat and THAT'S i, mean that's the problem with any

259
00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:49,320
Speaker 3: any sort of mass, surveillance any sort of dragon that.

260
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Speaker 3: Surveillance but that's exactly what this. Is and SO i

261
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Speaker 3: mean this is this is a good ruling by The Supreme. Court,

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Speaker 3: Right it's not, perfect but it's surprisingly good given This supreme.

263
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Speaker 1: Courtance, now a lot of this ruling is based on

264
00:15:04,680 --> 00:15:07,520
Speaker 1: a previous, ruling where it's built on a previous ruling

265
00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:12,200
Speaker 1: from twenty, eighteen this case Called carpenter. V United, states

266
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Speaker 1: which was also a very important ruling that have affected

267
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Speaker 1: the way police can gain access to cell phone location

268
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Speaker 1: history through cell site.

269
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Speaker 3: Towers, yeah So carpenter ruled that police required them weren't

270
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Speaker 3: to get cell site location, information specifically historic cell site

271
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Speaker 3: location INFORMATION csli is the acronym for.

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Speaker 2: THAT csli is.

273
00:15:40,120 --> 00:15:45,080
Speaker 3: Basically the police go to a phone company and, say tell,

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Speaker 3: us who was connected to these towers at this?

275
00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:50,840
Speaker 2: Time, right tell us what towers this phone connected?

276
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Speaker 3: To and the core rule that that was essentially equivalent

277
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Speaker 3: to putting an ankle?

278
00:15:58,000 --> 00:15:59,200
Speaker 2: Monitor was there specific?

279
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Speaker 3: Language, yeah won everybody in THE us right that that

280
00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:06,360
Speaker 3: was that fine ring location. Data and so they ruled

281
00:16:06,360 --> 00:16:08,960
Speaker 3: that you needed a warrant to get that location, data

282
00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:12,560
Speaker 3: which was a really excellent. Ruling this case was brought

283
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Speaker 3: to the court on the basis of That carpenter versus

284
00:16:17,360 --> 00:16:20,720
Speaker 3: The United states, ruling and this you, know reaffirmed and.

285
00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:24,960
Speaker 3: Expanded the big difference was that the information That bloonpardman

286
00:16:25,040 --> 00:16:28,440
Speaker 3: had gotten from the phone companies in this case covered

287
00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:33,120
Speaker 3: a larger amount of, people but The chatterery case covered

288
00:16:33,160 --> 00:16:35,440
Speaker 3: a much smaller area and a much smaller amount of.

289
00:16:35,440 --> 00:16:38,520
Speaker 3: People but The court decided that this ruling still applied

290
00:16:38,600 --> 00:16:40,880
Speaker 3: even in the smaller, case which is. Great it's you,

291
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Speaker 3: know really it's it's narrowing it, down, right which is

292
00:16:43,760 --> 00:16:44,840
Speaker 3: how The Supreme court.

293
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Speaker 2: Works.

294
00:16:45,160 --> 00:16:47,400
Speaker 3: Right you get a broad ruling that then sort of

295
00:16:47,560 --> 00:16:50,480
Speaker 3: exceptions to that, rule and, like you, know the limits

296
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Speaker 3: of that that ended up being, tested which brings us

297
00:16:53,120 --> 00:16:54,760
Speaker 3: back to what we were saying. Before, Right, so like

298
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Speaker 3: the next THING i think the next thing to test

299
00:16:56,800 --> 00:16:59,080
Speaker 3: is does this that's the spring. POINT i think this

300
00:16:59,240 --> 00:17:04,320
Speaker 3: ruling apply to purchased. Data, yeah it seems like maybe

301
00:17:04,320 --> 00:17:06,760
Speaker 3: they hinted that a little, bit but it's you, know

302
00:17:06,840 --> 00:17:09,560
Speaker 3: it won't be clear until somebody actually brings that case

303
00:17:09,600 --> 00:17:10,040
Speaker 3: to The Supreme.

304
00:17:10,080 --> 00:17:15,000
Speaker 1: Court one of the most promising sentences in the ruling is,

305
00:17:15,320 --> 00:17:19,000
Speaker 1: quote a new technology should not transform what individuals had

306
00:17:19,040 --> 00:17:22,960
Speaker 1: reasonably thought they could withhold from the. Government, yeah AND

307
00:17:23,080 --> 00:17:25,840
Speaker 1: i mean that sort of reasoning, then and there's there's

308
00:17:25,880 --> 00:17:28,200
Speaker 1: actually a lot of it throughout the majority's of. Ruling

309
00:17:28,240 --> 00:17:30,200
Speaker 1: but like there's there's a lot of sentences like that

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00:17:30,200 --> 00:17:33,280
Speaker 1: that could that could be really really useful going. Forward,

311
00:17:33,560 --> 00:17:36,520
Speaker 1: Yeah and like you, know a carpenter was itself based

312
00:17:36,560 --> 00:17:39,639
Speaker 1: on another surveillance case called The United states Versus, jones

313
00:17:39,960 --> 00:17:43,119
Speaker 1: which covered another method of tracking physical location on, movements

314
00:17:43,160 --> 00:17:45,760
Speaker 1: and this was through a using A gps to monitor a, vehicle,

315
00:17:45,960 --> 00:17:49,000
Speaker 1: right and that that was a five four, ruling so very. Close,

316
00:17:49,200 --> 00:17:52,440
Speaker 1: Yeah but in that, case the court found THAT gps

317
00:17:52,440 --> 00:17:55,080
Speaker 1: tracking does qualify as The Fourth amendment search because quote,

318
00:17:55,119 --> 00:17:58,320
Speaker 1: unquote individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

319
00:17:58,359 --> 00:18:03,280
Speaker 1: whole of their physical, movement Right and essentially because of

320
00:18:03,280 --> 00:18:07,000
Speaker 1: how difficult it was to at the, time like secretly

321
00:18:07,119 --> 00:18:10,639
Speaker 1: monitor and track the movements of a, vehicle including on

322
00:18:10,720 --> 00:18:14,520
Speaker 1: and off public, roads so including on private, roads, yep

323
00:18:14,800 --> 00:18:17,159
Speaker 1: it was then reasonable to expect a certain level of

324
00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:20,520
Speaker 1: privacy because of how difficult this. Was but upon the

325
00:18:20,520 --> 00:18:23,480
Speaker 1: proliferation OF gps, trackers the ease in which this type

326
00:18:23,480 --> 00:18:26,679
Speaker 1: of government surveillance could be, achieved you, know changed, dramatically

327
00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:29,800
Speaker 1: and that's the context in Which Justice keigan is writing

328
00:18:29,800 --> 00:18:33,040
Speaker 1: this sentence that a new technology do not transform what

329
00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:35,600
Speaker 1: individuals had reasonally thought they could withhold from the.

330
00:18:35,640 --> 00:18:38,719
Speaker 3: Government, yeah that's, Right AND i MEAN i think that's

331
00:18:38,720 --> 00:18:40,639
Speaker 3: a that's a really important sense for a lot of.

332
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Speaker 2: Things.

333
00:18:41,480 --> 00:18:45,240
Speaker 3: Right that's an important sentence for the fight against liceless

334
00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:47,400
Speaker 3: slate meaners and flock.

335
00:18:47,160 --> 00:18:50,040
Speaker 2: And the you, know other companies in that. Industry that's

336
00:18:50,080 --> 00:18:53,240
Speaker 2: an important sentence for cellular location. Information.

337
00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:55,720
Speaker 3: Right like this is a great, ruling, right but it

338
00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:58,520
Speaker 3: leaves open the whole, issue LIKE i was, saying of you,

339
00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:02,040
Speaker 3: know being able to buy surveillance, information, right and like

340
00:19:02,080 --> 00:19:06,040
Speaker 3: that's what enables license fe, readers that's what enables companies

341
00:19:06,400 --> 00:19:09,760
Speaker 3: that survey social, media that's what enables tools like web

342
00:19:09,760 --> 00:19:11,480
Speaker 3: block that sell location.

343
00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:12,760
Speaker 2: Information from ad. Tech.

344
00:19:13,320 --> 00:19:16,440
Speaker 3: Right and it does seem like they are they are

345
00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:20,280
Speaker 3: hinting that maybe they you, know that they are ready

346
00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:22,360
Speaker 3: to rule on. That to, me it's a very it's

347
00:19:22,640 --> 00:19:25,919
Speaker 3: it's a very self apparent, argument right that that just

348
00:19:25,960 --> 00:19:29,639
Speaker 3: because locally bought something doesn't mean they should get around the.

349
00:19:29,800 --> 00:19:32,480
Speaker 3: Warrant the terrible part of this is that you, know

350
00:19:32,520 --> 00:19:36,680
Speaker 3: we will probably have to argue technology in its own

351
00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:42,840
Speaker 3: rights unless you, know we had a Functioning congress.

352
00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:45,000
Speaker 2: And well they were able to pass very.

353
00:19:45,040 --> 00:19:48,320
Speaker 1: Popular let's not get too, Ridiculous let's not uh, Right

354
00:19:48,560 --> 00:19:50,280
Speaker 1: let's keep things grounded in reality.

355
00:19:50,359 --> 00:19:53,840
Speaker 3: Here, yeah, Yeah i'm Gonna i'm gonna hope for more

356
00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:55,159
Speaker 3: realistic goals like totally.

357
00:19:55,200 --> 00:19:58,240
Speaker 1: Anarchy, NO i mean, absolutely it would be great to

358
00:19:58,280 --> 00:20:01,359
Speaker 1: see some of this stuff just be. Enshrine but there's

359
00:20:01,400 --> 00:20:03,159
Speaker 1: a lot to look forward to considering this. Ruling AND

360
00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:05,239
Speaker 1: i think to that, point before we, close let's talk

361
00:20:05,240 --> 00:20:08,479
Speaker 1: about the third party. Doctrine, specifically what is the third party?

362
00:20:08,520 --> 00:20:12,080
Speaker 3: Doctrine, so the third party doctrine is a doctrine in

363
00:20:12,080 --> 00:20:16,919
Speaker 3: THE us law that states that people don't have a

364
00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:22,960
Speaker 3: reasonable expectation of privacy in information that they've given to

365
00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:26,520
Speaker 3: a third, party such as a phone company or a

366
00:20:26,560 --> 00:20:27,720
Speaker 3: bank or a tech.

367
00:20:27,760 --> 00:20:28,160
Speaker 2: Company.

368
00:20:28,520 --> 00:20:33,679
Speaker 3: Yeah, essentially this is how historically law enforcement has gotten

369
00:20:33,800 --> 00:20:38,040
Speaker 3: information from bone companies or from, banks et, cetera with

370
00:20:38,160 --> 00:20:39,520
Speaker 3: our tech companies without a.

371
00:20:39,640 --> 00:20:42,760
Speaker 2: Warrant and the heart of this ruling.

372
00:20:42,560 --> 00:20:47,120
Speaker 3: Is that The justice has said that cellular location data

373
00:20:47,760 --> 00:20:51,400
Speaker 3: being an equivalent total surveillance to that of an inkle. Monitor,

374
00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:56,320
Speaker 3: yeah the third party doctrine does not apply to cellular location.

375
00:20:56,440 --> 00:20:58,800
Speaker 1: Data, yeah, because like the third party doctrine was set

376
00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:01,679
Speaker 1: up specifically in reference to like the types of financial

377
00:21:01,720 --> 00:21:04,160
Speaker 1: information that you will hand over to a bank right

378
00:21:04,200 --> 00:21:07,399
Speaker 1: to do business at the, bank or by dialing a

379
00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:11,520
Speaker 1: phone number the phone company that knows what the phone number. Is, Right,

380
00:21:11,600 --> 00:21:15,560
Speaker 1: like those were the specific instances that established third party,

381
00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:18,920
Speaker 1: doctrine and third party auction was not applied In carpenter V,

382
00:21:19,040 --> 00:21:22,400
Speaker 1: us and So kagan wrote that for the very same

383
00:21:22,440 --> 00:21:25,320
Speaker 1: reasons it should not be applied to location history from tech,

384
00:21:25,320 --> 00:21:29,400
Speaker 1: companies and even more, specifically because the types of information

385
00:21:29,520 --> 00:21:32,880
Speaker 1: that location history From google had access to was even

386
00:21:32,960 --> 00:21:35,680
Speaker 1: more intimate and fine tuned than what you could get

387
00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:36,640
Speaker 1: from just picking a cell.

388
00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:41,040
Speaker 3: Tower that's, right because the location information From google is

389
00:21:41,080 --> 00:21:44,000
Speaker 3: based on not only YOUR, GPS i mean it is

390
00:21:44,000 --> 00:21:47,320
Speaker 3: YOUR gps, location which is fairly, accurate but also the

391
00:21:47,520 --> 00:21:51,760
Speaker 3: like triangulations of your location From Wi fi devices And

392
00:21:51,840 --> 00:21:55,960
Speaker 3: bluetooth devices around. You whereas the location you get FROM,

393
00:21:56,240 --> 00:22:00,639
Speaker 3: csli which was what was at issue In, carpenter is

394
00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:04,720
Speaker 3: going to depend on how dense cell.

395
00:22:04,520 --> 00:22:06,960
Speaker 2: Towers are in the area you're, in because.

396
00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:09,639
Speaker 3: It's just a methodical equation of like what your signal

397
00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:11,720
Speaker 3: strength is to your nearest free cell, towers and you

398
00:22:11,760 --> 00:22:16,040
Speaker 3: can kind of mariangulate somebody to a broader area based on.

399
00:22:16,160 --> 00:22:19,320
Speaker 1: That, well AND i, mean and location history from From

400
00:22:19,359 --> 00:22:23,000
Speaker 1: google at this point was you, know tracking people's movements

401
00:22:23,040 --> 00:22:26,280
Speaker 1: like every two. Minutes, yeah and could operate on a

402
00:22:26,359 --> 00:22:28,879
Speaker 1: longitude and latitudes like they could not only just figure

403
00:22:28,920 --> 00:22:31,199
Speaker 1: out where you were on a, map but if you

404
00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:33,480
Speaker 1: were in a, building what floor you were on that?

405
00:22:33,560 --> 00:22:35,639
Speaker 1: Building like much a much a much more fine tuned

406
00:22:35,640 --> 00:22:36,200
Speaker 1: to look.

407
00:22:36,280 --> 00:22:37,560
Speaker 2: Right altitude as. Well.

408
00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:37,960
Speaker 3: Yeah.

409
00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:41,440
Speaker 1: Yeah part of What carpenter found was that cell phone

410
00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:45,800
Speaker 1: location information is quote unquote quantitatively different from telephone numbers

411
00:22:45,960 --> 00:22:50,200
Speaker 1: and bank. Records, yes and so because of that, finding

412
00:22:50,480 --> 00:22:53,399
Speaker 1: they applied that, same that same logic to this. Case

413
00:22:53,440 --> 00:22:56,720
Speaker 1: AND i want to read through kind of two paragraphs

414
00:22:56,760 --> 00:23:00,240
Speaker 1: that is similar to the line about about how how

415
00:23:00,560 --> 00:23:03,119
Speaker 1: you know people's expectation of privacy should not be changed

416
00:23:03,280 --> 00:23:06,480
Speaker 1: because of technological. DEVELOPMENTS i think there's two lines here

417
00:23:06,520 --> 00:23:09,199
Speaker 1: that could become really important going forward in terms of

418
00:23:09,440 --> 00:23:13,480
Speaker 1: how we understand like even just the notion of digital. Privacy,

419
00:23:14,359 --> 00:23:18,080
Speaker 1: quote cell phone location information is not truly shared as

420
00:23:18,119 --> 00:23:21,159
Speaker 1: one normally understands the, term because cell phones and the

421
00:23:21,200 --> 00:23:24,120
Speaker 1: services they provide are such a pervasive and insistent part

422
00:23:24,119 --> 00:23:27,639
Speaker 1: of daily, life indispensable to participation in modern, society that

423
00:23:27,680 --> 00:23:29,879
Speaker 1: a person could hardly help but generate a trail of

424
00:23:29,920 --> 00:23:33,679
Speaker 1: location data in no meaningful. Sense the court, thought does

425
00:23:33,760 --> 00:23:37,879
Speaker 1: that mean the person voluntarily exposes to any third party

426
00:23:38,119 --> 00:23:41,960
Speaker 1: a comprehensive dossier of his physical. Movements so that's just

427
00:23:42,000 --> 00:23:44,760
Speaker 1: As kegan kind of combining the analysis for this specific

428
00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:48,160
Speaker 1: case with the analysis For, carpenter and then she goes

429
00:23:48,200 --> 00:23:51,760
Speaker 1: on to, write, quote the government's app by, app feature

430
00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:55,879
Speaker 1: by future method of Granting Fourth amendment protections misapprehends the

431
00:23:56,000 --> 00:23:59,240
Speaker 1: very nature of modern cell phone. Use Pretty much everything

432
00:23:59,240 --> 00:24:02,479
Speaker 1: a person does on a smartphone requires some kind of opt.

433
00:24:02,520 --> 00:24:04,880
Speaker 1: In the point of carrying cell phones is to use

434
00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:07,520
Speaker 1: what's on, them As carpenter, said to use the apps

435
00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:10,600
Speaker 1: and the services they. Provide that is what has become

436
00:24:10,640 --> 00:24:14,200
Speaker 1: a pervasive and, insistent even indispensable part of daily. Life

437
00:24:14,359 --> 00:24:17,639
Speaker 1: and so that is What carpenter insulated from the third party.

438
00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:21,080
Speaker 3: Doctrine, yeah my short term memory is terrible So i've

439
00:24:21,160 --> 00:24:24,080
Speaker 3: forgotten the exact, wording but the part where she's addressing

440
00:24:24,080 --> 00:24:26,560
Speaker 3: how piecemeal it, is, right and how like she's, yeah

441
00:24:26,600 --> 00:24:29,800
Speaker 3: this applies to all, Apps this applies to all uses

442
00:24:29,840 --> 00:24:30,520
Speaker 3: of this location.

443
00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:34,120
Speaker 2: Data never shall this be subject to these third party doctriate.

444
00:24:34,640 --> 00:24:39,840
Speaker 3: RIGHT i think that that is pretty damning for companies

445
00:24:39,880 --> 00:24:41,119
Speaker 3: that are currently selling this.

446
00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:43,960
Speaker 2: Data too long, orse it should be pretty damning.

447
00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:48,640
Speaker 1: Anyway, yeah and like the idea that through simply using these,

448
00:24:48,640 --> 00:24:52,080
Speaker 1: devices which are now necessary from our, life using these

449
00:24:52,200 --> 00:24:55,240
Speaker 1: does not mean that we're voluntarily giving this data over

450
00:24:55,680 --> 00:24:58,240
Speaker 1: to companies and by, extension the. Government they don't just

451
00:24:58,280 --> 00:25:00,439
Speaker 1: have free access to it because we are using the

452
00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:02,800
Speaker 1: things that are necessary for daily. Life if they want

453
00:25:02,840 --> 00:25:04,960
Speaker 1: access to, it they have to go through the proper,

454
00:25:05,040 --> 00:25:07,880
Speaker 1: channels which are laid out in The Fourth. Amendments, yes

455
00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:10,600
Speaker 1: you have to get a warrant at. Least, Yes and

456
00:25:10,680 --> 00:25:13,160
Speaker 1: so to, close talk about kind of what this could

457
00:25:13,160 --> 00:25:15,639
Speaker 1: mean going, forward, right because the question of whether the

458
00:25:15,720 --> 00:25:19,919
Speaker 1: particular geofense warrant used in this bank robbery, case if

459
00:25:20,000 --> 00:25:22,360
Speaker 1: if that was reasonable or, unreasonable now goes to The Fourth,

460
00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:24,920
Speaker 1: circuit who will determine if probable cause was established to

461
00:25:24,920 --> 00:25:27,200
Speaker 1: support the scope of the, search and if the warrant

462
00:25:27,280 --> 00:25:31,000
Speaker 1: satisfied the particularity. Requirements considering the fact that it cast

463
00:25:31,040 --> 00:25:33,960
Speaker 1: a broad dragnet over a whole area rather than being you,

464
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:36,720
Speaker 1: know fine tuned to a specific suspect or even a

465
00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:41,160
Speaker 1: group of, Suspects kagan wrote of the, warrant, quote how

466
00:25:41,240 --> 00:25:45,399
Speaker 1: the officers would make their choices at the second and third,

467
00:25:45,440 --> 00:25:49,520
Speaker 1: steps how they would pick the user's subject to more intense,

468
00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:53,959
Speaker 1: scrutiny the warrant said very little. Unquote this is kind

469
00:25:53,960 --> 00:25:56,399
Speaker 1: of part of like the instructions in which they are

470
00:25:56,440 --> 00:26:01,720
Speaker 1: writing to the Fourth. Circuit now the, suspect the bank robber.

471
00:26:01,800 --> 00:26:05,840
Speaker 1: Suspect compared the geofense warrant to a quote unquote unconstitutional

472
00:26:05,920 --> 00:26:09,560
Speaker 1: general warrant lacking in probable, cause with steps two and

473
00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:12,320
Speaker 1: three of the warrant leaving quote too much authority to

474
00:26:12,359 --> 00:26:16,119
Speaker 1: police officers and too little to the magistrate. Unquote so

475
00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:18,120
Speaker 1: what that's saying is that in this like three step,

476
00:26:18,160 --> 00:26:22,280
Speaker 1: warrant when the police are able to determine who in

477
00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:24,880
Speaker 1: the broad pool of people caught in the drag net

478
00:26:24,960 --> 00:26:28,280
Speaker 1: who to investigate, further that choice was just up to

479
00:26:28,320 --> 00:26:30,840
Speaker 1: police officers that question was not laid out in front

480
00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:33,280
Speaker 1: of a. JUDGE a judge did not authorize that aspect

481
00:26:33,320 --> 00:26:35,520
Speaker 1: of the. Search that was just up to the discretion of.

482
00:26:35,520 --> 00:26:38,000
Speaker 1: Officers that is part of his argument that this was

483
00:26:38,040 --> 00:26:41,480
Speaker 1: a constitutional. Violation, now of, course that's not the government's.

484
00:26:41,720 --> 00:26:45,639
Speaker 1: Tick the government claims that the information was quote unquote

485
00:26:45,680 --> 00:26:49,639
Speaker 1: particularized information From google's, database based on probable cause to

486
00:26:49,640 --> 00:26:52,359
Speaker 1: believe That google had the information that would help solve a.

487
00:26:52,359 --> 00:26:55,600
Speaker 1: Crime they also argue that the discretion given to officers

488
00:26:55,960 --> 00:26:57,960
Speaker 1: in the execution of steps two and three of the

489
00:26:57,960 --> 00:27:01,560
Speaker 1: warrant fell within the bounds of Reason. Bulliss so going,

490
00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:05,560
Speaker 1: forward when The Fourth circuit rules on the reasonableness or

491
00:27:05,680 --> 00:27:09,359
Speaker 1: unreasonableness of this, warrant they will also consider what the

492
00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:12,640
Speaker 1: District court and The Fourth circuit themselves have previously ruled.

493
00:27:12,640 --> 00:27:15,000
Speaker 1: On they will reconsider the quote unquote good faith.

494
00:27:15,080 --> 00:27:20,040
Speaker 5: Exemption, yeah the good face exception is a doctrine in

495
00:27:20,040 --> 00:27:24,080
Speaker 5: THE us law that allows, generally evidence obtained without a

496
00:27:24,160 --> 00:27:26,639
Speaker 5: warrant is an admissible in.

497
00:27:26,720 --> 00:27:31,600
Speaker 3: Court the good faith exception allows for evidence which was

498
00:27:31,600 --> 00:27:36,320
Speaker 3: obtained with a faulty warrant where the law enforcement agents

499
00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:38,840
Speaker 3: had reasonable cost to believe.

500
00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:40,240
Speaker 2: That it was a valid, warrant.

501
00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:42,960
Speaker 3: And they they thought they were obtaining a lot of

502
00:27:43,000 --> 00:27:46,159
Speaker 3: evidence quote unquote in good faith with a valid warrant

503
00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:51,640
Speaker 3: that that evidence can still be admissible in court even

504
00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:54,080
Speaker 3: if the warrant is found to be. Invalid so that's

505
00:27:54,160 --> 00:27:56,440
Speaker 3: what they're that's what they'll be invaluting in this. Case

506
00:27:56,480 --> 00:27:58,399
Speaker 3: AND i, mean that's what they've already decided on and

507
00:27:58,400 --> 00:28:01,040
Speaker 3: will have to decide on. Again, yeah even if this

508
00:28:01,359 --> 00:28:04,840
Speaker 3: warrant is, invalid or even if this data is, invalid

509
00:28:05,400 --> 00:28:07,920
Speaker 3: because the second and third step didn't have a warrant

510
00:28:07,920 --> 00:28:11,560
Speaker 3: associated with, them and this still be admissible in his

511
00:28:12,160 --> 00:28:14,160
Speaker 3: case under good base.

512
00:28:14,480 --> 00:28:17,320
Speaker 1: Exception and The Supreme court does have like instructions for

513
00:28:17,400 --> 00:28:20,280
Speaker 1: how how they want that force circuits to reevaluate that,

514
00:28:20,359 --> 00:28:23,040
Speaker 1: question knowing that they've already ruled on it. Before but

515
00:28:23,160 --> 00:28:26,240
Speaker 1: they are instructing them based, on you, know the legal

516
00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:29,520
Speaker 1: opinion that is outlined in the majority that they do

517
00:28:29,600 --> 00:28:33,200
Speaker 1: have to reapproach this question with these new insights from

518
00:28:33,240 --> 00:28:46,080
Speaker 1: The Supreme. Court there is no evidence that rulings like

519
00:28:46,120 --> 00:28:49,680
Speaker 1: this have impacted the way police operate, surveillance especially by

520
00:28:49,680 --> 00:28:52,080
Speaker 1: collecting information from like cell, towers you are kind of

521
00:28:52,120 --> 00:28:56,840
Speaker 1: the the expert in cell site, simulators and THERE'S i

522
00:28:56,880 --> 00:28:59,680
Speaker 1: think reason to believe that The carpenter ruling also affected

523
00:28:59,680 --> 00:29:01,680
Speaker 1: the way that cell site simulators were, used just by

524
00:29:01,720 --> 00:29:04,160
Speaker 1: it not being the particular focus of that, ruling if

525
00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:06,160
Speaker 1: you want, to kind of as a very ending, note

526
00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:08,600
Speaker 1: kind of discussed the Ray hunter, project and you know

527
00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:11,240
Speaker 1: how some previous rulings have like impacted the way that

528
00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:14,920
Speaker 1: type of surveillance has kind of fallen out of. Fashion,

529
00:29:15,320 --> 00:29:15,719
Speaker 1: yeah for.

530
00:29:15,760 --> 00:29:21,440
Speaker 3: Sure SO solfi, simulators also known as stingrays or, Mccatchers

531
00:29:21,880 --> 00:29:25,720
Speaker 3: these are face cell powers that police set up to

532
00:29:26,600 --> 00:29:30,200
Speaker 3: locate a specific person's cell phone OR i should say

533
00:29:30,320 --> 00:29:33,040
Speaker 3: a specific cell phone which is often associated with a specific,

534
00:29:33,120 --> 00:29:33,920
Speaker 3: person with.

535
00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:37,400
Speaker 2: A very fine granular level of.

536
00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:40,440
Speaker 3: Detail at the FF i and some of my colleagues

537
00:29:40,480 --> 00:29:44,280
Speaker 3: have created a product called Ray hunter to get an

538
00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:48,360
Speaker 3: idea of how often cell side simulators were.

539
00:29:48,240 --> 00:29:49,560
Speaker 2: Being used in THE.

540
00:29:49,960 --> 00:29:54,600
Speaker 3: Us, specifically what we were concerned about was that law

541
00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:59,440
Speaker 3: enforcement could use a cell side simulator to spy on

542
00:30:00,040 --> 00:30:04,959
Speaker 3: and identify the people present At First amendment protected, Activities

543
00:30:05,000 --> 00:30:07,920
Speaker 3: so find out who is at a, protest find out

544
00:30:07,920 --> 00:30:10,120
Speaker 3: who is going to an abortion clinic find out who

545
00:30:10,200 --> 00:30:14,160
Speaker 3: is showing up at a, mosque, Right so that was

546
00:30:14,200 --> 00:30:16,480
Speaker 3: a big concern we, had was that they were being

547
00:30:16,560 --> 00:30:21,000
Speaker 3: used for that instead of or what police said they

548
00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:25,920
Speaker 3: were using them, for which is man counts, basically or you,

549
00:30:25,960 --> 00:30:29,720
Speaker 3: know identifying that somebody is in a specific location BEFORE

550
00:30:30,040 --> 00:30:33,160
Speaker 3: spat team does a raid on that. House so for

551
00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:38,000
Speaker 3: the last year or, so we've had hundreds of people

552
00:30:38,120 --> 00:30:41,320
Speaker 3: all over the country bringing these devices around with them

553
00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:44,400
Speaker 3: to protests and just you, know as they go about

554
00:30:44,440 --> 00:30:49,240
Speaker 3: their daily lives to find out sort of what the

555
00:30:49,360 --> 00:30:52,080
Speaker 3: lay of the land is and how often these are being.

556
00:30:52,160 --> 00:30:56,560
Speaker 3: Used and the reasoning for this is that we were

557
00:30:56,560 --> 00:30:58,760
Speaker 3: getting the impression that a lot of actorists seem to

558
00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:02,280
Speaker 3: have the impression that cel size emulators were being used

559
00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:06,400
Speaker 3: at every protest and that police were driving around with

560
00:31:06,440 --> 00:31:08,280
Speaker 3: one of these in every, car, Right and there was

561
00:31:08,320 --> 00:31:12,080
Speaker 3: a lot of i think fear and uncertainty and doubt

562
00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:13,840
Speaker 3: and sort of folk.

563
00:31:13,760 --> 00:31:15,440
Speaker 2: Wisdom and misinformation going.

564
00:31:15,480 --> 00:31:17,360
Speaker 3: Around so we wanted to be able to get some

565
00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:20,760
Speaker 3: real facts on the ground to clear it. Up and

566
00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:24,040
Speaker 3: so over the last year what we've seen is we

567
00:31:24,160 --> 00:31:29,920
Speaker 3: have seen evidence of cell site stimulators occasionally what we

568
00:31:30,120 --> 00:31:33,680
Speaker 3: have not seen is a preponderance of.

569
00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:35,600
Speaker 2: Them from what we're, Seeing they're.

570
00:31:35,400 --> 00:31:39,520
Speaker 3: Not being used constantly all the time, everywhere, Right they're

571
00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:44,959
Speaker 3: being used much more rarely than most people. Think and

572
00:31:45,000 --> 00:31:48,480
Speaker 3: we haven't seen really hardly any evidence of them.

573
00:31:48,360 --> 00:31:49,480
Speaker 2: Being used at.

574
00:31:49,600 --> 00:31:54,400
Speaker 3: Protests what we've seen is them being used kind of

575
00:31:55,080 --> 00:31:59,320
Speaker 3: sometimes around major. Cities we've seen them being used outside THE,

576
00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:03,560
Speaker 3: us but inside THE, us we have not seen them

577
00:32:03,600 --> 00:32:09,360
Speaker 3: being used for sort of the mass surveillance reason that we've.

578
00:32:09,360 --> 00:32:14,280
Speaker 3: Feared that has been backed up by looking at the

579
00:32:14,320 --> 00:32:16,400
Speaker 3: warrants for CEL SiZ singulators that we've been able to

580
00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:21,120
Speaker 3: get access, to been backed up by talking to people

581
00:32:21,240 --> 00:32:24,680
Speaker 3: who are close with law enforcement and who you, know

582
00:32:24,720 --> 00:32:27,120
Speaker 3: who understand kind of how law enforcement is actually using.

583
00:32:27,200 --> 00:32:30,760
Speaker 3: These what we're hearing and what we're, seeing the sort

584
00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:34,960
Speaker 3: of evidence of is that self size simulators are being

585
00:32:35,040 --> 00:32:39,720
Speaker 3: used with warrants now because law enforcement by and large

586
00:32:40,280 --> 00:32:47,080
Speaker 3: thinks that The carpenter ruling does apply to self size

587
00:32:47,080 --> 00:32:50,760
Speaker 3: simulators because that is cell site location.

588
00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:53,080
Speaker 1: Information it's the same type of.

589
00:32:53,120 --> 00:32:56,280
Speaker 3: Data it is the same exact type of, data, right

590
00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:58,920
Speaker 3: and so it makes sense that a warrant should have

591
00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:01,600
Speaker 3: applied to that as well before when they figured a

592
00:33:01,600 --> 00:33:04,800
Speaker 3: warrant didn't apply to, this, right BECAUSE i don't, KNOW

593
00:33:04,840 --> 00:33:07,240
Speaker 3: i don't know what the mental gymnastics were, there.

594
00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:10,000
Speaker 2: RIGHT i think it's possible that these were used a lot.

595
00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:13,880
Speaker 3: More but now it seems like most lawnform agencies have

596
00:33:14,080 --> 00:33:16,920
Speaker 3: from the conclusion that the federal government has come as

597
00:33:16,920 --> 00:33:20,120
Speaker 3: a conclusion that this technology does require a warrant and

598
00:33:20,160 --> 00:33:24,320
Speaker 3: that it's more useful for locating a specific person than

599
00:33:24,520 --> 00:33:29,479
Speaker 3: identifying people in a specific. AREA i, think in addition

600
00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:32,920
Speaker 3: to the, warrants it makes technical sense because if you

601
00:33:33,040 --> 00:33:36,360
Speaker 3: want to find the people who are in a specific,

602
00:33:36,440 --> 00:33:43,640
Speaker 3: area cell site stimulator is a, expensive, cumbersome complicated tool

603
00:33:43,760 --> 00:33:49,760
Speaker 3: for doing. That when the alternatives are sending a geofense warrant.

604
00:33:49,520 --> 00:33:52,520
Speaker 1: To, google Asking google just to tell, me, yeah.

605
00:33:52,440 --> 00:33:55,960
Speaker 3: Asking google to tell you for apping the own company

606
00:33:56,520 --> 00:33:59,000
Speaker 3: for a tower dumb getting a warrant for a tower,

607
00:33:59,120 --> 00:34:02,200
Speaker 3: up which is where you ask them to tell you

608
00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:05,600
Speaker 3: everybody that was connected to a specific tower, yeah at

609
00:34:05,600 --> 00:34:08,879
Speaker 3: a specific period of. Time that is something that is

610
00:34:08,960 --> 00:34:11,359
Speaker 3: not addressed by any of these tower dumps are still

611
00:34:11,360 --> 00:34:14,120
Speaker 3: a thing you can get with a, warrant, Right so

612
00:34:14,160 --> 00:34:16,920
Speaker 3: that's that's an, option and then of course all of

613
00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:20,040
Speaker 3: the other methods of non cell phone.

614
00:34:19,920 --> 00:34:22,200
Speaker 2: Based, surveillance, right base recognition is an.

615
00:34:22,200 --> 00:34:25,640
Speaker 3: Option licens create readers are an, option, Right so there

616
00:34:25,680 --> 00:34:28,080
Speaker 3: are so many easier ways to get the identities of

617
00:34:28,120 --> 00:34:31,000
Speaker 3: everybody in a specific. Area it doesn't make sense to

618
00:34:31,080 --> 00:34:34,080
Speaker 3: use those simulators for. That and that's what we're. Seeing

619
00:34:34,160 --> 00:34:37,120
Speaker 3: it seems like what we're being used for a vast

620
00:34:37,200 --> 00:34:41,719
Speaker 3: majority of things is identifying that a specific person is

621
00:34:41,760 --> 00:34:44,520
Speaker 3: in a specific house before a no knock rate is,

622
00:34:44,560 --> 00:34:47,240
Speaker 3: executed and no knock rates are highly.

623
00:34:47,280 --> 00:34:50,040
Speaker 2: PROBLEMATIC i am not a fan of the spot.

624
00:34:50,080 --> 00:34:53,359
Speaker 3: Teams there's a lot of issues, There but if they're

625
00:34:53,440 --> 00:34:56,600
Speaker 3: going to, happen LIKE i, guess, yeah, like let's let's

626
00:34:56,640 --> 00:34:59,839
Speaker 3: make sure we're rating their right house so that they

627
00:34:59,840 --> 00:35:00,600
Speaker 3: can be.

628
00:35:00,600 --> 00:35:02,640
Speaker 2: Sure of which dogs they're killing before.

629
00:35:02,360 --> 00:35:04,560
Speaker 1: They mean, YEAH i, mean swatting has become a, huge

630
00:35:04,600 --> 00:35:09,000
Speaker 1: like harassment tool for people just to deploy against someone

631
00:35:09,040 --> 00:35:11,799
Speaker 1: that they don't like or an influencer that they find,

632
00:35:11,800 --> 00:35:13,680
Speaker 1: annoying and that that that is a real issue as.

633
00:35:13,719 --> 00:35:16,480
Speaker 3: Well self thing leaders are not the biggest issue, there,

634
00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:19,280
Speaker 3: Right the, yeah existence of swat teams and how liberally

635
00:35:19,320 --> 00:35:21,240
Speaker 3: they're used is the much bigger.

636
00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:22,200
Speaker 2: ISSUE i think.

637
00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:27,279
Speaker 1: So based on How carpenter seemingly affected the police's reticence

638
00:35:27,360 --> 00:35:30,240
Speaker 1: to use cell site. SIMULATORS i, think like we've, discussed

639
00:35:30,239 --> 00:35:34,040
Speaker 1: there's hope that this new ruling might also be able

640
00:35:34,080 --> 00:35:36,359
Speaker 1: to be applied to some other surveillance methods that that

641
00:35:36,400 --> 00:35:39,239
Speaker 1: will only really become clear over. Time there's there's one

642
00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:43,000
Speaker 1: particular That i'm also interested, in is like keyword, warrants

643
00:35:43,680 --> 00:35:46,279
Speaker 1: where police will just ask a tech company to like

644
00:35:46,760 --> 00:35:50,399
Speaker 1: get information on all users who typed a specific thing

645
00:35:50,520 --> 00:35:53,240
Speaker 1: into a search, bar, right, Right and so there's aspect

646
00:35:53,239 --> 00:35:56,000
Speaker 1: of this recent ruling that could possibly apply to something

647
00:35:56,080 --> 00:35:58,440
Speaker 1: like that as. Well but you, know Despite kagan's annoyance

648
00:35:58,560 --> 00:36:00,879
Speaker 1: at the you, know app by app way in Which

649
00:36:00,880 --> 00:36:04,480
Speaker 1: Fourth amendment protections are, granted organizations like legal rights, organizations

650
00:36:04,520 --> 00:36:07,520
Speaker 1: including like THE ff you, know might still have to

651
00:36:07,640 --> 00:36:10,160
Speaker 1: kind of approach this from an f by app basis

652
00:36:10,200 --> 00:36:13,880
Speaker 1: to get like confirmation that these things are subject to

653
00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:16,040
Speaker 1: The Fourth. Amendment so it's something that we will see

654
00:36:16,080 --> 00:36:16,800
Speaker 1: over time.

655
00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:20,839
Speaker 3: Until in unless we can get comprehensive federal privacy, law

656
00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:23,680
Speaker 3: which again is Not i'm Not i'm not holding out

657
00:36:23,719 --> 00:36:28,239
Speaker 3: hope For congress to pass any privacy bills, anytime anytime.

658
00:36:28,320 --> 00:36:31,239
Speaker 1: Soon not the media, future but we could hope one, day,

659
00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:33,000
Speaker 1: Right and that is a real. Thing same thing with

660
00:36:33,040 --> 00:36:34,960
Speaker 1: the data. Centers this is something THAT i think people

661
00:36:35,000 --> 00:36:37,440
Speaker 1: should try to build a mass movement.

662
00:36:37,440 --> 00:36:37,800
Speaker 4: Around.

663
00:36:38,040 --> 00:36:41,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, absolutely it is happening to some.

664
00:36:41,280 --> 00:36:44,200
Speaker 3: Degree is at the state, level, Right california has a

665
00:36:44,320 --> 00:36:47,680
Speaker 3: pretty good privacy. Law it's not, perfect but it's certainly

666
00:36:47,880 --> 00:36:52,200
Speaker 3: better than the non existent federal. Ones montana became the

667
00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:57,319
Speaker 3: first state to close the loophole allowing law enforcement to

668
00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:03,120
Speaker 3: buy data from. Parties, Right so it's it's there is

669
00:37:03,440 --> 00:37:07,680
Speaker 3: hope that at least at the state, level we can

670
00:37:08,120 --> 00:37:11,200
Speaker 3: try to start closing these, loopholes you, know as a

671
00:37:11,239 --> 00:37:14,880
Speaker 3: band aid until, yeah the federal government maybe steps up

672
00:37:14,920 --> 00:37:16,480
Speaker 3: in four to eight to twenty.

673
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:19,040
Speaker 1: Years you, know we'll take. That you, know it is

674
00:37:19,080 --> 00:37:20,800
Speaker 1: it is very rare to have and it could happen.

675
00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:25,760
Speaker 1: Here episode that ends, with, uh there is some. Hope in, general.

676
00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:27,680
Speaker 2: It's very rare to have a conversation with me that

677
00:37:27,880 --> 00:37:30,680
Speaker 2: ends with anybody all.

678
00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:33,200
Speaker 1: So, True, No i'm, sure but, Yeah i'm sure we

679
00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:35,240
Speaker 1: can Have you want to talk about pegasist to bummas

680
00:37:35,239 --> 00:37:35,920
Speaker 1: allow to get at some.

681
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:38,239
Speaker 2: Point, ABSOLUTELY i have many ways to bumb you.

682
00:37:38,320 --> 00:37:42,600
Speaker 1: Out but where can people find your work online if

683
00:37:42,600 --> 00:37:45,560
Speaker 1: they want to hear more about Ray hunter and and

684
00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:46,879
Speaker 1: all the research you do AT.

685
00:37:47,000 --> 00:37:51,480
Speaker 2: Eff, yeah you can find me at Blue. Sky i'm

686
00:37:51,480 --> 00:37:53,839
Speaker 2: at cooper q dot com on Blue sky or.

687
00:37:54,120 --> 00:37:57,600
Speaker 3: Mastodon if you're that flavor Of linux, nerd you can

688
00:37:57,680 --> 00:38:01,040
Speaker 3: find me at trooper q at mass Dot packers dot.

689
00:38:01,080 --> 00:38:03,279
Speaker 3: Town i'll mast it, on or you can find me

690
00:38:03,360 --> 00:38:06,920
Speaker 3: at E fs dot org of, course WHERE i publish

691
00:38:07,080 --> 00:38:11,959
Speaker 3: all of my writings and that we highly recommend checking

692
00:38:11,960 --> 00:38:15,000
Speaker 3: out our surveillance self defense guides AT ssd dot E

693
00:38:15,120 --> 00:38:19,000
Speaker 3: ff dot. Org we have the pretty much the, longest

694
00:38:19,160 --> 00:38:24,640
Speaker 3: the longest continuously updated technical self defense guides that have ever,

695
00:38:24,719 --> 00:38:25,319
Speaker 3: existed and.

696
00:38:25,280 --> 00:38:28,319
Speaker 2: They're they're really really excellent. RESOURCE i think they're my

697
00:38:28,360 --> 00:38:30,759
Speaker 2: favorite resource that we put. Out so you go check

698
00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:32,919
Speaker 2: those out as. Well thank, You thank.

699
00:38:32,960 --> 00:38:33,920
Speaker 1: You turn off your.

700
00:38:33,920 --> 00:38:40,600
Speaker 6: Phone it could. Happen here is a production of Cool Zone.

701
00:38:40,640 --> 00:38:43,680
Speaker 6: Media for more podcasts from Cool Zone, media visit our

702
00:38:43,719 --> 00:38:46,719
Speaker 6: website Cool zonemedia dot, com or check us out on

703
00:38:46,760 --> 00:38:50,160
Speaker 6: The iHeartRadio, App Apple, podcasts or wherever you listen to.

704
00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:53,000
Speaker 6: Podcasts you can now find sources for it could happen,

705
00:38:53,000 --> 00:38:54,360
Speaker 6: here listed directly in episode.

706
00:38:54,360 --> 00:38:55,680
Speaker 2: Descriptions thanks for.

707
00:38:55,760 --> 00:38:56,160
Speaker 3: Listening