WEBVTT - Apollo Says Lean In to Private Debt; Pensions Boost

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to The Credit Edge, a weekly markets podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>My name is James Crumbie. I'm a senior editor at Bloomberg.

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<v Speaker 1>This week, we're very pleased to welcome Tristram Leech, co

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<v Speaker 1>head of European Credit at Apollo.

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<v Speaker 2>How are you, Tristram, I'm great, Thank you, Thanks very

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<v Speaker 2>much for having me.

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<v Speaker 1>Thank you very much for joining us today. We're also

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<v Speaker 1>delighted to welcome back Lisa Lee, who covers credit markets

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<v Speaker 1>from London. Great to see Lisa.

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<v Speaker 3>Great to talk to you too, James.

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<v Speaker 1>Also on the show, we're going to be talking to

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<v Speaker 1>Matt Goyner at Bloomberg Intelligence about high rates are actually

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<v Speaker 1>good for some companies, so do stay with us. But first,

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<v Speaker 1>Christram Leach with Apollo, it's great to have you on

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<v Speaker 1>the Credit Edge. You're based in London, you cover global credit,

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<v Speaker 1>and then since you're there in Europe, I just thought

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<v Speaker 1>we'd start there. So I'm going to start with a

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<v Speaker 1>question about European credit. When we look at the years

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<v Speaker 1>so far, it has been pretty dire for the most

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<v Speaker 1>of the world's investment grade bonds. The US is headed

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<v Speaker 1>for its third straight year of losses, which has never

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<v Speaker 1>happened before. When we look at our fifty year history

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<v Speaker 1>on our index, and that's mostly your rates issue. Obviously,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, we don't expect Amazon to default on their debt,

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<v Speaker 1>although some of their bonds are trading in the fifties

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<v Speaker 1>so they look pretty stressed. Junk bonds have done better,

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<v Speaker 1>especially the riskiest ones, unless you're in China, when you

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<v Speaker 1>would have lost a lot of money this year. But

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<v Speaker 1>when we look at Europe, it's really surprising to me

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<v Speaker 1>that it's done so well across the board. If you'd

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<v Speaker 1>invested in corporate bonds there and not in the US,

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<v Speaker 1>you would have made much more money this year than

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<v Speaker 1>anywhere else, even though the economies over there seem to

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<v Speaker 1>be in poor shape generally speaking, and although you do

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<v Speaker 1>seem to be doing a bit better on inflation. And

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<v Speaker 1>I know that index is higher quality, but how has

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<v Speaker 1>it done so much better Tristram than other parts of

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<v Speaker 1>the world.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I guess there's a couple of things going on here.

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<v Speaker 3>Look.

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<v Speaker 2>Firstly, risk assets had that big rally in the early

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<v Speaker 2>part of the year. Some of it's been given back,

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<v Speaker 2>but spreads have been pretty contained in their moves all year,

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<v Speaker 2>and rates have outperformed their US counterparts. Even though we've

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<v Speaker 2>seen obviously weakening in rates globally, you know, the European

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<v Speaker 2>picture is one that's been better, partly because we have

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<v Speaker 2>seen some more softening and inflation data here in Europe.

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<v Speaker 1>So when you look at europe credit generally, does this

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<v Speaker 1>kind of out performance continue.

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<v Speaker 2>Look, I think we think all in returns to credit

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<v Speaker 2>are pretty great. Break evens are very very high, so

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<v Speaker 2>it's relatively hard to visit yourself losing money in the

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<v Speaker 2>medium term in credit. We like many other market participants,

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<v Speaker 2>have been really forthcoming. I think that we think this

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<v Speaker 2>is a great time to be engaged in the credit market,

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<v Speaker 2>and we're hearing that from a lot of our ourps,

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<v Speaker 2>our customers, you know, who are seeking to allocate money

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<v Speaker 2>into credit. That being said, I don't think we think

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<v Speaker 2>spreads are screaming by here. You've seen a little bit

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<v Speaker 2>more weakness in kind of single bees, etc. In Europe

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<v Speaker 2>versus the US, but economic data is slowing pretty fast,

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<v Speaker 2>especially in Europe, so I think there's the scope for

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<v Speaker 2>a little bit of spread weakness, possibly counterbalanced by more

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<v Speaker 2>performance and rates.

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<v Speaker 3>So you overseee a whole swath of different kinds of

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<v Speaker 3>credit when you look at the relative value, where do

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<v Speaker 3>you see the best buy in Europe versus US IG

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<v Speaker 3>junk private clos One of the.

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<v Speaker 2>Things we've been I think pretty forthcoming about is that

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<v Speaker 2>private credit is generally offering a really attractive pickup to

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<v Speaker 2>syndicate it in public markets at the moment. If you

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<v Speaker 2>look at where the European syndicated loan market is currently trading,

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<v Speaker 2>and you look at where similar quality credit is pricing

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<v Speaker 2>in the unitranch, you know, private debt market, that pickup

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<v Speaker 2>is really striking. For very similar quality companies. You're getting

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<v Speaker 2>a material spread pickup, and obviously the all in returns

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<v Speaker 2>is very very attractive. So that's certainly something we'd call

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<v Speaker 2>out as a very attractive relative value. I think the

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<v Speaker 2>relative value piece of cross geographies is a little bit

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<v Speaker 2>more nuanced. You know, there's a little bit more spread

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<v Speaker 2>at a given level of credit quality in Europe versus

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<v Speaker 2>the US. However, the European growth data has been you know,

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<v Speaker 2>really slowing very fast. It's pretty eye catching how rapidly

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<v Speaker 2>we're seeing Europe slow down, and so I think that

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<v Speaker 2>probably does argue that you need a little bit more

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<v Speaker 2>spread to compensate you for a more challenged economy.

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<v Speaker 3>Do you think there kindly does to be slowing down,

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<v Speaker 3>which suggests to me that there might be more defaults

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<v Speaker 3>coming up. Do you feel like that's correctly priced in

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<v Speaker 3>in especially in the high yield and leavised loan markets.

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<v Speaker 3>And also what do you think about recoveries, because they've

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<v Speaker 3>been pretty drastically low in the US but a bit

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<v Speaker 3>higher in Europe.

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<v Speaker 2>So as to whether the future default environment is appropriately priced,

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<v Speaker 2>I think, you know, it's implied by the fact that

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<v Speaker 2>you know, we think there's probably room for spreads to

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<v Speaker 2>widen a little bit here, that it's it's possibly not

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<v Speaker 2>as fully priced as it might be. You know, you

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<v Speaker 2>look around the cell side and strategists, I think most

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<v Speaker 2>people are calling for a pickup in in defaults given

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<v Speaker 2>the higher rate environment, and given the slowing we're seeing

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<v Speaker 2>in macro, it would be somewhat surprising with that not

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<v Speaker 2>to eventuate. I think we've certainly been calling for and

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<v Speaker 2>seeing more dispersion in credit outcomes. You know, you've now

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<v Speaker 2>got a market where you know, there's really a real

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<v Speaker 2>sense of winners and losers, and obviously some of those

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<v Speaker 2>losers are gonna gonna tip over the edge into defaults,

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<v Speaker 2>So it makes sense to me that directionally you're probably

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<v Speaker 2>going to see a little bit more in terms of

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<v Speaker 2>in terms of recoveries. Yes, we've seen lower recoveries at

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<v Speaker 2>the moment, the sample size we're dealing with is still

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<v Speaker 2>pretty small, right, We're still in the early stages, so

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<v Speaker 2>it's relatively hard to draw super firm conclusions about why

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<v Speaker 2>those recoveries are lower and how durable that's likely to be.

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<v Speaker 2>Look across the Atlantic, we've definitely seen more of these

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<v Speaker 2>aggressive liability management exercises going on, which are going to

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<v Speaker 2>tend to depress recoveries. In Europe that hasn't as yet

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<v Speaker 2>been a material feature of the market, and all things equal,

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<v Speaker 2>can can militate for recoveries being a little bit better

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<v Speaker 2>on the side of the Atlantic.

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<v Speaker 1>On the private credit side, though, Tristan, you mentioned the

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<v Speaker 1>big yield pick up there, We've had people tell us

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<v Speaker 1>that it's not enough to compensate for the lack of

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<v Speaker 1>transparency and the potential increase to fault risk, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you just don't know what's going on there. Can you

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<v Speaker 1>kind of put some numbers on it? Can you quantify

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<v Speaker 1>like how much more of a pickup, how much more

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<v Speaker 1>compensation are you getting for that extra risk.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, Look, i'd say the way i'd i'd look at

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<v Speaker 2>at the moment as follows. I think your proper looking

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<v Speaker 2>at a four fifty market for a for a standard

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<v Speaker 2>syndicated single B so four to fifty in spread, and

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<v Speaker 2>you're looking at six twenty five six fifty maybe for

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<v Speaker 2>similar quality corporates in the in the private debt market.

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<v Speaker 2>So to the extent you can perform like for like,

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<v Speaker 2>and it's challenging because there are reasons companies are going

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<v Speaker 2>one route or the other. But to the extent you

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<v Speaker 2>can do like for like, I think you're probably getting

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<v Speaker 2>almost two hundred basis points of pickup for being on

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<v Speaker 2>the on the private side of things, which for us

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<v Speaker 2>feels ample compensation when additionally you're generally getting slightly better documentation,

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<v Speaker 2>you're close to it, you have a real bilateral dialogue

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<v Speaker 2>with the issuer and the sponsor. You know, that's a

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<v Speaker 2>pretty compelling setup for US versus being in a super

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<v Speaker 2>loosely documented syndicated loan, and.

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<v Speaker 1>The relative liquidity doesn't bother you.

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<v Speaker 2>Look, obviously, that's part of what you're getting paid for.

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<v Speaker 2>It's a much less liquid product or even a wholey

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<v Speaker 2>liquid product. But when you put your credit underwriting at

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<v Speaker 2>the center of your process in the way we do,

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<v Speaker 2>you know we have the confidence in our credit views

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<v Speaker 2>and to lean into them. And when we're getting two

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<v Speaker 2>hundred basis points that a pick up to give up

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<v Speaker 2>liquidity in something which we've underwritten and we're super confident in,

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<v Speaker 2>then you know that's something that is a trade that

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<v Speaker 2>I think you're meant to do.

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<v Speaker 3>These private credit deals are getting larger and larger in Europe.

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<v Speaker 3>We have one that could possibly be the biggest ever

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<v Speaker 3>in this market. As these loans get bigger, do you

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<v Speaker 3>worry that there'll be a confluence between leverage loans and

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<v Speaker 3>some of the documentations will weaken, some of the terms

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<v Speaker 3>will weaken, or do you think there's still a differentiation.

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<v Speaker 2>There's still a delta for sure at the moment between

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<v Speaker 2>the terms you're getting in even the large UNITRNE and

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<v Speaker 2>direct lending deals versus where the syndicated market is. So

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<v Speaker 2>that convergence hasn't happened yet. I think it's true that

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<v Speaker 2>the two markets are coming closer together. You know, you're

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<v Speaker 2>seeing a direct lending market that's able to speak for

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<v Speaker 2>bigger and bigger deals is able to you know, price

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<v Speaker 2>really material slugs of debt, and you know, is another

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<v Speaker 2>option for all but the very very largest companies. So

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<v Speaker 2>I think we're seeing the syndicated and direct lending markets

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<v Speaker 2>coming closer together. The way we've set up our credit

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<v Speaker 2>business in Europe is really allowing us to pivot with

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<v Speaker 2>issuers between the two. So if you look at some

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<v Speaker 2>of the biggest financings we've done on both sides of

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<v Speaker 2>the Atlantic this year, they've been in kind of public

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<v Speaker 2>private structures, So deals like the as the deal that

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<v Speaker 2>we did here in Europe that was a direct piece

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<v Speaker 2>of financing. But for a company with a high your

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<v Speaker 2>bond curve, I think you're going to see more and

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<v Speaker 2>more of that, and I think setting up your business

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<v Speaker 2>to be able to pivot with issuers between the multiple

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<v Speaker 2>sources of funding is a really compelling offering to partner

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<v Speaker 2>with them.

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<v Speaker 1>Private credit really is the hot thing this year. People

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<v Speaker 1>are talking about the Golden Age and we just tell

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<v Speaker 1>a story. We're showing showing that, you know, there's five

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<v Speaker 1>hundred billion dollars of new money raised for it and

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<v Speaker 1>not a lot to buy. How do you kind of

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<v Speaker 1>find opportunities and do you have a kind of sector focus.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, do you have anything you particularly like at

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<v Speaker 1>the moment in terms of sector.

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<v Speaker 2>So, look, we definitely agree it's a golden age. I

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<v Speaker 2>think there's a few nuances in terms of the way

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<v Speaker 2>we look at private credit versus a lot.

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<v Speaker 3>Of our peers.

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<v Speaker 2>You know, you'll have heard our CEO, Mark Rowan talking

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<v Speaker 2>about the way we think of private credit not just

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<v Speaker 2>in terms of financing LBOs, but but really a much

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<v Speaker 2>broader opportunity set, so including lots and lots of investment

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<v Speaker 2>grade opportunities. If you look at investment grade issuers in Europe,

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of them are looking to diversify their funding

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<v Speaker 2>sources away from the bond market. You look at it

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<v Speaker 2>deals like the deal we did with Venovia in the

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<v Speaker 2>in the spring of this year, where you know, the

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<v Speaker 2>company had really good assets but was seeking to protect

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<v Speaker 2>its rate and by speaking you know, in scale and

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<v Speaker 2>being thoughtful around structure, we were able to do something

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<v Speaker 2>which was protective to their rating and you know, very

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<v Speaker 2>very attractive for us. So I think that's really an

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<v Speaker 2>important angle for us in terms of what we look

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<v Speaker 2>to do in private credit rather than exclusively in the

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<v Speaker 2>in the kind of traditional unit change space in terms

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<v Speaker 2>of sectors. Look, it's it's probably a bit a bit

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<v Speaker 2>glib and interesting to say that with macro data slowing

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<v Speaker 2>the way it is, we're steering clear of anything that's

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<v Speaker 2>going to cycle super hard. For example, a lot of

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<v Speaker 2>the post COVID winners, you know, the travel, the revenge

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<v Speaker 2>travel dynamic, you saw, a lot of that stuff has

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<v Speaker 2>done super well. Pricing has been pushed enormously in a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of those issuers, and I think it's something we'd

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<v Speaker 2>probably seek to to steer clear of. You know, there's

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<v Speaker 2>there's plenty of returns to be made top of capital

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<v Speaker 2>structure in non sectical businesses where your ability to be

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<v Speaker 2>speaking in size, quick to execute, and sophisticated in your

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<v Speaker 2>underwright really is enough of an edge.

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<v Speaker 1>And when you look across the board at everything, I

0:12:05.760 --> 0:12:09.360
<v Speaker 1>mean you cover quite a broad sworth of credit globally.

0:12:10.160 --> 0:12:13.160
<v Speaker 1>Is private credit the best opportunity let's take it on

0:12:13.160 --> 0:12:15.960
<v Speaker 1>a twelve month horizon. Is that the best thing to

0:12:16.000 --> 0:12:16.800
<v Speaker 1>look at right now?

0:12:18.200 --> 0:12:22.079
<v Speaker 2>Yes, Look, there's a ton of opportunity across the credit market.

0:12:23.120 --> 0:12:25.240
<v Speaker 2>You know, there's some very interesting features to the high

0:12:25.280 --> 0:12:27.520
<v Speaker 2>your bond market in Europe, given how short dated that

0:12:27.559 --> 0:12:32.079
<v Speaker 2>market's got, So we're super engaged in looking at you know,

0:12:32.320 --> 0:12:34.959
<v Speaker 2>the names that need to refine will and won't be

0:12:35.000 --> 0:12:37.160
<v Speaker 2>able to et cetera. But if I had to pick

0:12:37.240 --> 0:12:40.079
<v Speaker 2>a single area that I think you're mental lean into

0:12:40.400 --> 0:12:43.360
<v Speaker 2>and frankly where we're seeing, where we're seeing clients lean

0:12:43.400 --> 0:12:45.360
<v Speaker 2>into as well, it is private credit.

0:12:45.880 --> 0:12:48.320
<v Speaker 1>And is it mostly in the Europe or mostly in

0:12:48.400 --> 0:12:51.000
<v Speaker 1>the US or any particular geographic focus.

0:12:52.720 --> 0:12:56.000
<v Speaker 2>No, Look, I think I think you're seeing attractive opportunities

0:12:56.000 --> 0:13:00.360
<v Speaker 2>on both sides of the Atlantic. You know, I struggle

0:13:00.440 --> 0:13:02.760
<v Speaker 2>really to differentiate in terms of there being one market

0:13:02.760 --> 0:13:06.559
<v Speaker 2>that's outright compelling versus the others. There's probably a little

0:13:06.559 --> 0:13:09.120
<v Speaker 2>bit more spread still in Europe in a lot of

0:13:09.160 --> 0:13:12.640
<v Speaker 2>private credit, but as we touched it at the beginning, that's,

0:13:13.080 --> 0:13:15.640
<v Speaker 2>you know, possibly for good reason, given slightly softer macro here.

0:13:15.920 --> 0:13:18.560
<v Speaker 2>So I don't think there's like a standout relative value

0:13:18.559 --> 0:13:21.000
<v Speaker 2>in terms of private credit product on either side of

0:13:21.000 --> 0:13:21.480
<v Speaker 2>the Atlantic.

0:13:22.559 --> 0:13:27.200
<v Speaker 3>You mentioned refinancings. So far, within this higher rate environment,

0:13:27.240 --> 0:13:29.160
<v Speaker 3>there hasn't been that much of a need because a

0:13:29.200 --> 0:13:33.080
<v Speaker 3>lot of companies pushed out maturities doing COVID and right afterwards.

0:13:33.440 --> 0:13:35.680
<v Speaker 3>But now the matuary wall is starting to build and

0:13:35.720 --> 0:13:37.840
<v Speaker 3>people are companies that are going to have to deal

0:13:37.880 --> 0:13:39.959
<v Speaker 3>with it next year and the year after. Do you

0:13:40.000 --> 0:13:44.160
<v Speaker 3>think there's enough capital and appetite to refinance all these firms?

0:13:44.440 --> 0:13:46.760
<v Speaker 3>Given the higher interest rate which seems to be staying

0:13:46.840 --> 0:13:50.520
<v Speaker 3>higher for longer, they might not be able. Many companies

0:13:50.559 --> 0:13:52.520
<v Speaker 3>might not be able to hold the debt burdens that

0:13:52.559 --> 0:13:54.720
<v Speaker 3>they have now. So can you address that a bit?

0:13:55.240 --> 0:13:57.400
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's what's so interesting. So if you look at

0:13:57.440 --> 0:13:59.760
<v Speaker 2>the European high yield market at the moment, it's the

0:13:59.760 --> 0:14:02.320
<v Speaker 2>short to status that's ever been. The waighted average life

0:14:02.480 --> 0:14:04.160
<v Speaker 2>of the European h how your market is about three and

0:14:04.200 --> 0:14:07.320
<v Speaker 2>a half years, So for these companies, the time really

0:14:07.400 --> 0:14:11.240
<v Speaker 2>is now. It made sense that they weren't refinancing all

0:14:11.280 --> 0:14:14.680
<v Speaker 2>that proactively, given both credit spreads and rates were higher.

0:14:15.120 --> 0:14:18.480
<v Speaker 2>But over the next couple of years, in the next

0:14:18.480 --> 0:14:20.560
<v Speaker 2>three years, fifty percent of the European high your market

0:14:20.560 --> 0:14:22.680
<v Speaker 2>has got to refinance, and they're going to refinance that

0:14:22.800 --> 0:14:26.400
<v Speaker 2>higher all in cost of funding. That's a super interesting

0:14:26.520 --> 0:14:30.240
<v Speaker 2>dynamic for us because if you're buying bonds materially below

0:14:30.280 --> 0:14:34.440
<v Speaker 2>par on average, they're taking out sixteen months ahead of maturity,

0:14:34.720 --> 0:14:37.480
<v Speaker 2>So you've got a real pull to part story there.

0:14:37.960 --> 0:14:40.480
<v Speaker 2>But you've got to get it right because some of

0:14:40.480 --> 0:14:42.800
<v Speaker 2>these companies aren't going to be able to and you

0:14:42.840 --> 0:14:45.680
<v Speaker 2>haven't got very much time, you know, if something goes wrong,

0:14:45.720 --> 0:14:48.080
<v Speaker 2>you haven't got very much time to correct your mistake

0:14:48.120 --> 0:14:50.640
<v Speaker 2>to get yourself into a refinance of our shape. So

0:14:50.880 --> 0:14:52.840
<v Speaker 2>we think there's this is why you're going to start

0:14:52.840 --> 0:14:56.840
<v Speaker 2>to see even more dispersion because the maturity is the

0:14:57.120 --> 0:15:01.080
<v Speaker 2>best catalyst for establishing whether you know credit is viable

0:15:01.160 --> 0:15:04.240
<v Speaker 2>or not. In terms of whether there's enough capital out there. Yeah,

0:15:04.240 --> 0:15:07.880
<v Speaker 2>I think there is across across private, private debt and

0:15:08.120 --> 0:15:11.240
<v Speaker 2>public markets that there's still a lot of capital. There's

0:15:11.240 --> 0:15:14.560
<v Speaker 2>an enormous amount of appetite for credit generally because of

0:15:14.600 --> 0:15:16.800
<v Speaker 2>the way risk reward has improved at the top of

0:15:16.840 --> 0:15:20.040
<v Speaker 2>the capital structure. But that's going to be pointed at

0:15:20.080 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 2>the viable businesses, the capital structures that work, and for

0:15:23.640 --> 0:15:27.800
<v Speaker 2>those who are just two levered running into refinancing, you know,

0:15:28.000 --> 0:15:30.400
<v Speaker 2>they're not all going to make it, and that kind

0:15:30.400 --> 0:15:33.440
<v Speaker 2>of catalyst the environment is something that's very invigorating for

0:15:33.520 --> 0:15:35.520
<v Speaker 2>us as a fundamental driven credit house.

0:15:35.880 --> 0:15:37.960
<v Speaker 1>So Christian. Before we talk to Matt Gooynder over at

0:15:38.000 --> 0:15:40.320
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Intelligence, I just kind of wanted to push a

0:15:40.360 --> 0:15:43.080
<v Speaker 1>bit on the risks. Obviously, this is a credit show.

0:15:43.120 --> 0:15:45.240
<v Speaker 1>We credit guys. We worry about stuff all the time,

0:15:45.280 --> 0:15:49.320
<v Speaker 1>and there's so much macro stress, there's so much political stress,

0:15:49.360 --> 0:15:53.280
<v Speaker 1>there's so much you know, fundamental stress. Frankly, what really

0:15:53.400 --> 0:15:55.840
<v Speaker 1>keeps you up at night worrying about credit at the moment,

0:15:55.880 --> 0:15:57.240
<v Speaker 1>what are you most concerned about?

0:15:58.720 --> 0:16:02.320
<v Speaker 2>Well, look, the the higher rates environment is part of

0:16:02.320 --> 0:16:05.880
<v Speaker 2>the opportunity here, but as Lisa just touched on it,

0:16:05.880 --> 0:16:08.640
<v Speaker 2>it's also part of the threat. You know, all these

0:16:08.720 --> 0:16:11.360
<v Speaker 2>capital structures that were put in place in a very

0:16:11.400 --> 0:16:15.080
<v Speaker 2>different rates environment and frankly speaking normally a lower spread environment,

0:16:15.280 --> 0:16:19.560
<v Speaker 2>have now got to reset their debtor. Their capital structures

0:16:19.760 --> 0:16:22.280
<v Speaker 2>at are much much higher all in interest cost. If

0:16:22.280 --> 0:16:25.640
<v Speaker 2>that's happening at a time when macro is deteriorating fast

0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:28.880
<v Speaker 2>and you're unable to improve your earnings, that obviously can

0:16:28.920 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 2>be a very uncomfortable vice that these companies are put in.

0:16:31.880 --> 0:16:35.160
<v Speaker 2>So the macro slowdown, combined with the fact that at

0:16:35.280 --> 0:16:38.840
<v Speaker 2>least so far in Europe, you haven't seen rates collapse.

0:16:39.720 --> 0:16:41.760
<v Speaker 2>Is an uncomfortable place for the market to be in.

0:16:41.920 --> 0:16:45.240
<v Speaker 2>It's providing a huge array of opportunities, it's providing great

0:16:45.280 --> 0:16:47.160
<v Speaker 2>all in returns to credit, which they say, on the

0:16:47.160 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 2>medium term we think are ultra attractive and you're meant

0:16:50.000 --> 0:16:52.520
<v Speaker 2>to be in. But you've got to be relying on

0:16:52.520 --> 0:16:55.200
<v Speaker 2>your credit selection making sure you're not going to find

0:16:55.200 --> 0:16:58.160
<v Speaker 2>yourself in one of these capital structures where with this

0:16:58.240 --> 0:17:00.120
<v Speaker 2>confluence of factors it just doesn't work inn.

0:17:01.000 --> 0:17:03.080
<v Speaker 1>So the best head is just to avoid what could

0:17:03.080 --> 0:17:03.520
<v Speaker 1>blow up.

0:17:04.560 --> 0:17:07.800
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, look, it's a glib thing to say, and you'll

0:17:07.840 --> 0:17:11.399
<v Speaker 2>always find fundamentals driven credit managers like us saying that

0:17:12.119 --> 0:17:15.200
<v Speaker 2>it's the most important thing. But it's more the most

0:17:15.200 --> 0:17:17.199
<v Speaker 2>important thing now than it has been for most of

0:17:17.200 --> 0:17:19.280
<v Speaker 2>the ten years, the last ten years. Rather because the

0:17:19.320 --> 0:17:22.359
<v Speaker 2>last ten years have seen you know, endlessly falling rates,

0:17:23.240 --> 0:17:27.280
<v Speaker 2>easy refinancing conditions, generally speaking, very tight spreads. That period

0:17:27.320 --> 0:17:30.520
<v Speaker 2>is over, so it really really matters now. And as

0:17:30.520 --> 0:17:32.720
<v Speaker 2>I said, because of the relatively short dated nature of

0:17:32.760 --> 0:17:35.399
<v Speaker 2>the market, and that's in both high yield and leverage loans.

0:17:36.280 --> 0:17:39.080
<v Speaker 2>The you know that the test of all these capital

0:17:39.080 --> 0:17:41.000
<v Speaker 2>structures is coming sooner rather than later.

0:17:41.960 --> 0:17:44.959
<v Speaker 1>Great stuff. Christram Leach, co head of European Credit at Apollo,

0:17:45.119 --> 0:17:46.439
<v Speaker 1>thank you so much for joining us.

0:17:46.880 --> 0:17:49.280
<v Speaker 2>Thank you very much, indeed, and Lisa lu.

0:17:49.240 --> 0:17:51.120
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg News in London. Brilliant to see you again.

0:17:51.240 --> 0:17:53.199
<v Speaker 3>Cheers, thanks, bye bye.

0:17:54.920 --> 0:17:56.680
<v Speaker 1>So, as I mentioned earlier, we were joined by Matt

0:17:56.720 --> 0:17:59.640
<v Speaker 1>Ginner with Bloomberg Intelligence in New York. How's it going, Matt,

0:18:00.000 --> 0:18:02.640
<v Speaker 1>Everything's going good. Thanks for having me on again, appreciate

0:18:02.680 --> 0:18:04.520
<v Speaker 1>it great. So last time you were on the show,

0:18:04.520 --> 0:18:07.600
<v Speaker 1>we talked about revenge spending. We all did it. Maybe

0:18:07.640 --> 0:18:10.199
<v Speaker 1>it's cooling off a bit now, but today we're going

0:18:10.280 --> 0:18:12.639
<v Speaker 1>to look at pensions. Most of us have one, or

0:18:12.640 --> 0:18:15.359
<v Speaker 1>at least some kind of savings plan. But why do

0:18:15.440 --> 0:18:17.960
<v Speaker 1>we care about pensions in the context of credit Matt?

0:18:18.359 --> 0:18:22.000
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, So our team we recently did some work trying

0:18:22.040 --> 0:18:24.320
<v Speaker 4>to assess the potential impact of the surge and rates

0:18:24.359 --> 0:18:26.960
<v Speaker 4>that we've seen for companies within the S and P

0:18:27.040 --> 0:18:31.000
<v Speaker 4>five hundred, they have some of the largest underfunded pension positions,

0:18:31.040 --> 0:18:33.520
<v Speaker 4>So there's a lot of inputs that sort of get

0:18:33.520 --> 0:18:37.320
<v Speaker 4>distilled down into coming up with total assets within the pension,

0:18:38.080 --> 0:18:42.480
<v Speaker 4>total liabilities, and those assets need to fund into future.

0:18:42.920 --> 0:18:44.879
<v Speaker 4>So despite all that, there's a couple of levers that

0:18:44.960 --> 0:18:47.960
<v Speaker 4>can really get these liabilities moving one way or the other.

0:18:48.640 --> 0:18:51.080
<v Speaker 4>Those being the discount rate used to measure the pension

0:18:51.119 --> 0:18:54.960
<v Speaker 4>liabilities owed and the return on assets within the pension plan,

0:18:55.440 --> 0:18:58.479
<v Speaker 4>the difference, if any, when the liabilities exceed the pension

0:18:58.480 --> 0:19:01.080
<v Speaker 4>plan assets being referred to as the underfunded portion.

0:19:01.560 --> 0:19:02.960
<v Speaker 1>Let me just start you that because it's getting very

0:19:03.040 --> 0:19:05.879
<v Speaker 1>very technical, very very quickly break it down for us,

0:19:06.160 --> 0:19:09.040
<v Speaker 1>for those who don't know how this stuff works. How

0:19:09.080 --> 0:19:12.120
<v Speaker 1>does it work in practice? I mean, you mentioned underfunded,

0:19:12.480 --> 0:19:15.359
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned discount rate. Break it down in really basic

0:19:15.400 --> 0:19:15.920
<v Speaker 1>terms for us.

0:19:16.240 --> 0:19:19.320
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, So the mechanics of the discount rate is pretty straightforward.

0:19:19.359 --> 0:19:22.440
<v Speaker 4>So the higher the potential rate you can theoretically earn,

0:19:22.840 --> 0:19:26.920
<v Speaker 4>the lower the future payments would be, and vice versa.

0:19:27.080 --> 0:19:30.800
<v Speaker 4>So the yield on the Moody's Double A index is

0:19:30.840 --> 0:19:33.880
<v Speaker 4>what's typically used as a proxy for where discount rates

0:19:33.880 --> 0:19:36.800
<v Speaker 4>could end up when these companies snap the line or

0:19:36.840 --> 0:19:39.880
<v Speaker 4>take their measurement, which happens at year end. So we've

0:19:39.880 --> 0:19:44.120
<v Speaker 4>seen yields on the double A index continue to climb,

0:19:44.840 --> 0:19:46.879
<v Speaker 4>which started in twenty twenty one, as the FED has

0:19:46.920 --> 0:19:49.920
<v Speaker 4>aggressively raised so for contacts last year, the surgeon rates

0:19:50.000 --> 0:19:55.399
<v Speaker 4>helps drive down total underfunding by about forty percent. So

0:19:55.520 --> 0:19:58.199
<v Speaker 4>using the EQS function that we have available on the terminal,

0:19:58.200 --> 0:20:02.800
<v Speaker 4>were identified the top fIF teen most underfunded pension plans

0:20:02.800 --> 0:20:06.360
<v Speaker 4>that could stand a benefit by revising upward their discount

0:20:06.480 --> 0:20:09.400
<v Speaker 4>rate that they use to measure those liabilities. The guys

0:20:09.400 --> 0:20:13.920
<v Speaker 4>at surface to the top were ge Lockheed, Boeing, Exxon,

0:20:14.040 --> 0:20:17.840
<v Speaker 4>and AT and T. With the entirety of those underfunded

0:20:17.880 --> 0:20:21.280
<v Speaker 4>pension obligations totally about eighty five billion, and those top

0:20:21.320 --> 0:20:23.720
<v Speaker 4>fifteen comprising a little over half of that figure.

0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:26.320
<v Speaker 1>But in really basic terms of these are large companies

0:20:26.359 --> 0:20:28.840
<v Speaker 1>in the US that are basically saying to their employees

0:20:29.200 --> 0:20:32.120
<v Speaker 1>paying to some plan, and when you retire, will give

0:20:32.119 --> 0:20:35.360
<v Speaker 1>you x amount as a recurring payment over time.

0:20:35.520 --> 0:20:36.359
<v Speaker 4>That's exactly correct.

0:20:36.359 --> 0:20:38.600
<v Speaker 1>And what we're talking about is how the funds that

0:20:38.600 --> 0:20:42.360
<v Speaker 1>the companies have available in those funds in the pension pools.

0:20:42.480 --> 0:20:45.040
<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to use funds because it's confusing, is

0:20:45.680 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>not sufficient to cover what they need to pay in

0:20:47.760 --> 0:20:49.760
<v Speaker 1>the future, or it has not been sufficient in the past,

0:20:49.920 --> 0:20:51.919
<v Speaker 1>but now because of higher rates, they're catching.

0:20:51.680 --> 0:20:54.200
<v Speaker 4>Up, that's correct, So there would be the underfunded portion

0:20:54.400 --> 0:20:57.360
<v Speaker 4>or the shortfall, so the rise in rates would help

0:20:57.480 --> 0:20:59.879
<v Speaker 4>effectively shrink that gap.

0:21:00.240 --> 0:21:03.479
<v Speaker 1>And when rates were effectively zero for such a long time,

0:21:04.320 --> 0:21:06.240
<v Speaker 1>companies were running short by how much.

0:21:06.280 --> 0:21:08.160
<v Speaker 4>Yeah they were they were getting, they were getting pretty big.

0:21:08.280 --> 0:21:10.800
<v Speaker 4>So for that forty percent figure, that was over one

0:21:10.840 --> 0:21:13.879
<v Speaker 4>hundred and forty billion just last year. So the yield

0:21:13.920 --> 0:21:17.160
<v Speaker 4>on the double A index is hovering around six percent

0:21:17.240 --> 0:21:20.160
<v Speaker 4>right now, and that's relative to five percent to start

0:21:20.200 --> 0:21:23.560
<v Speaker 4>the year, which will provide a potential tailwind for financial

0:21:23.640 --> 0:21:27.199
<v Speaker 4>risk profiles and adjusted leverage all us being equal, And

0:21:27.240 --> 0:21:30.680
<v Speaker 4>that's important because raiders include those obligations in their deck

0:21:30.680 --> 0:21:33.960
<v Speaker 4>calculations as these are a liabilities or obligations that are owed.

0:21:34.800 --> 0:21:38.359
<v Speaker 4>So each company's sensitivity is different, so the potential upside

0:21:38.359 --> 0:21:41.280
<v Speaker 4>can vary by company. So for example, a company I

0:21:41.320 --> 0:21:43.640
<v Speaker 4>cover is Boeing, so their discount rate is about five

0:21:43.640 --> 0:21:46.800
<v Speaker 4>point four percent, so that's a little over fifty basis

0:21:46.840 --> 0:21:50.480
<v Speaker 4>points below where yields currently are with their sensitivity to

0:21:50.720 --> 0:21:53.240
<v Speaker 4>just a twenty five basis point increase in that discount

0:21:53.320 --> 0:21:55.640
<v Speaker 4>rate equivalent to an almost one point three billion dollar

0:21:55.720 --> 0:21:58.960
<v Speaker 4>improvement in underfunding. So you know, with all the puts

0:21:58.960 --> 0:22:01.560
<v Speaker 4>in takes, we calculated more and having of these liabilities

0:22:01.600 --> 0:22:03.960
<v Speaker 4>for the OEM, which given some of the issues they're

0:22:03.960 --> 0:22:06.520
<v Speaker 4>contending with now related to the max and pressure on

0:22:07.240 --> 0:22:09.400
<v Speaker 4>delivers here in near term related to the app bole

0:22:09.480 --> 0:22:13.040
<v Speaker 4>cet issue, the improvement can help drive some financial flexibility

0:22:13.080 --> 0:22:17.000
<v Speaker 4>as they look to complete rework without incurring the potential

0:22:17.040 --> 0:22:19.400
<v Speaker 4>for more negative rating activity.

0:22:19.680 --> 0:22:23.080
<v Speaker 1>Okay, so again you're throwing out indexes and double as

0:22:23.119 --> 0:22:24.680
<v Speaker 1>and that sort of thing. I'm just going to ask

0:22:24.720 --> 0:22:26.800
<v Speaker 1>the dumb question again, So why do we look at

0:22:26.840 --> 0:22:29.680
<v Speaker 1>that index particularly? Is that what the companies in their

0:22:29.680 --> 0:22:31.560
<v Speaker 1>pension plans are invested in or is that what the

0:22:31.600 --> 0:22:32.280
<v Speaker 1>companies are raising.

0:22:32.520 --> 0:22:34.600
<v Speaker 4>Yes, so it's used as a proxy for what they

0:22:34.600 --> 0:22:38.200
<v Speaker 4>could potentially earn. It's a high quality basket of bonds.

0:22:39.440 --> 0:22:42.360
<v Speaker 4>So you know, as I mentioned earlier earlier, the big

0:22:42.440 --> 0:22:45.440
<v Speaker 4>lever that they could drive underfunding wire lower also includes

0:22:45.480 --> 0:22:49.159
<v Speaker 4>those returns on pension plan assets. So those moneies are

0:22:49.160 --> 0:22:53.000
<v Speaker 4>invested in different types of assets which generate hopefully positive

0:22:53.000 --> 0:22:55.640
<v Speaker 4>returns for the year, which would in theory increase assets

0:22:55.680 --> 0:22:59.080
<v Speaker 4>and leus reduce your underfunding. So those returns could prove

0:22:59.119 --> 0:23:01.439
<v Speaker 4>more muted this year based on our analysis of a

0:23:01.640 --> 0:23:04.720
<v Speaker 4>sort of broad array of benchmark indicties with mixed performance

0:23:04.760 --> 0:23:07.879
<v Speaker 4>across various asset classes, but that would still be better

0:23:08.440 --> 0:23:11.160
<v Speaker 4>than the significantly negative returns that we saw in twenty

0:23:11.200 --> 0:23:13.960
<v Speaker 4>twenty two. So we saw that sea of red which

0:23:14.040 --> 0:23:16.159
<v Speaker 4>offset some of the benefits that were derived from the

0:23:16.200 --> 0:23:19.800
<v Speaker 4>higher discount rates, which this year may not have such

0:23:19.840 --> 0:23:23.920
<v Speaker 4>a sort of deleterious impact. So i'd highlight that you

0:23:24.000 --> 0:23:27.120
<v Speaker 4>know the discount rates pension returns, they can vary based

0:23:27.119 --> 0:23:30.320
<v Speaker 4>on asset allocations. In the case of Boeing, their investments

0:23:30.359 --> 0:23:33.240
<v Speaker 4>are heavily weighted toward fixed income at a little over

0:23:33.480 --> 0:23:36.280
<v Speaker 4>sixty percent the Moody Double A Index being a fixed

0:23:36.280 --> 0:23:40.639
<v Speaker 4>income INDUSICY and equities near fifteen percent, private equity and

0:23:40.680 --> 0:23:43.920
<v Speaker 4>real estate each under ten percent, and head funds the remainder,

0:23:44.000 --> 0:23:46.920
<v Speaker 4>whereas a guy like AT and T, who was also

0:23:46.960 --> 0:23:50.159
<v Speaker 4>in the list, is weighted forty five percent towards fixed income,

0:23:50.560 --> 0:23:53.760
<v Speaker 4>eleven percent equities, thirty percent between real estate and private equity,

0:23:53.760 --> 0:23:56.560
<v Speaker 4>and the remainder is sort of a hodgepodge of different

0:23:57.320 --> 0:23:58.800
<v Speaker 4>asset holdings and.

0:23:58.760 --> 0:24:02.560
<v Speaker 1>When in the past these pension funds were actually running

0:24:03.119 --> 0:24:06.280
<v Speaker 1>underfunded and there was a big gap. How much was

0:24:06.320 --> 0:24:09.520
<v Speaker 1>the credit market penalizing them for that? Did it matter?

0:24:10.640 --> 0:24:13.080
<v Speaker 4>It does matter for some of the some of the

0:24:13.880 --> 0:24:17.000
<v Speaker 4>bigger guys, because obviously, at least from a credit standpoint,

0:24:17.040 --> 0:24:21.399
<v Speaker 4>you know, if you hypothetically had a bankruptcy, these obligations

0:24:21.400 --> 0:24:24.119
<v Speaker 4>would be sort of perry pursue with senior and scure bondholders,

0:24:24.160 --> 0:24:26.400
<v Speaker 4>which is sort of our bread and butter here at

0:24:26.760 --> 0:24:29.280
<v Speaker 4>BI Credit. So you know, that's definitely something that you

0:24:29.320 --> 0:24:31.760
<v Speaker 4>need to keep an eye on to understand that those

0:24:31.800 --> 0:24:35.080
<v Speaker 4>are also technically creditors of the company outside of just

0:24:35.119 --> 0:24:37.119
<v Speaker 4>what you would traditionally think of as a bondholder or

0:24:37.160 --> 0:24:38.160
<v Speaker 4>somebody who has loans.

0:24:38.560 --> 0:24:40.000
<v Speaker 1>So when you flip it now and you're looking at

0:24:40.000 --> 0:24:43.720
<v Speaker 1>the gap closing, how much are credit markets rewarding these

0:24:43.720 --> 0:24:45.080
<v Speaker 1>companies that are closing that gap.

0:24:47.520 --> 0:24:50.399
<v Speaker 4>That's a good question. It couldn't. I can't pinpoint it

0:24:50.440 --> 0:24:53.480
<v Speaker 4>down to an exact sort of science.

0:24:53.880 --> 0:24:56.040
<v Speaker 1>Is there relative value though in the companies that are

0:24:56.040 --> 0:24:59.199
<v Speaker 1>benefiting most potentially, you know, they have less of a

0:24:59.280 --> 0:25:01.840
<v Speaker 1>risk because they're to funk outs have been closed, Therefore

0:25:01.840 --> 0:25:04.000
<v Speaker 1>they are for better value potentially.

0:25:04.560 --> 0:25:08.080
<v Speaker 4>Well, certainly from a credit standpoint, because you would certainly

0:25:08.119 --> 0:25:11.280
<v Speaker 4>be improving your financial risk profile all else equally, you

0:25:11.280 --> 0:25:16.080
<v Speaker 4>would have lower adjusted leverage, all sort of driving relative

0:25:16.160 --> 0:25:18.680
<v Speaker 4>value views on some of the bonds, as those would

0:25:18.720 --> 0:25:21.680
<v Speaker 4>be obligations that were once larger are now smaller.

0:25:22.080 --> 0:25:24.119
<v Speaker 1>So higher rates are actually good. I mean, they've been

0:25:24.119 --> 0:25:26.640
<v Speaker 1>hammering bonds across the board because of duration, but higher

0:25:26.680 --> 0:25:30.479
<v Speaker 1>rates in this context are actually good for some companies.

0:25:30.560 --> 0:25:33.240
<v Speaker 4>Or the silver lining behind the surgeon rates that we've

0:25:33.280 --> 0:25:35.440
<v Speaker 4>seen ysa shrinking of these liabilities.

0:25:35.600 --> 0:25:37.000
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned a few of them, Are there any other

0:25:37.080 --> 0:25:37.920
<v Speaker 1>names that stand out?

0:25:38.960 --> 0:25:41.880
<v Speaker 4>So Steve Flynn, who's part of our team, our TMT team,

0:25:41.880 --> 0:25:45.199
<v Speaker 4>put together some work looking at relative impacts within the

0:25:45.240 --> 0:25:47.520
<v Speaker 4>TMT space, so AT and T could stand up benefit

0:25:47.560 --> 0:25:50.680
<v Speaker 4>as obligations owed at year end were the highest with

0:25:50.760 --> 0:25:52.960
<v Speaker 4>Intel co and that account for forty five percent of

0:25:52.960 --> 0:25:58.080
<v Speaker 4>the sector itself, with leverage ratios inclusive of pension shortfalls

0:25:58.080 --> 0:26:00.600
<v Speaker 4>having the biggest potential impacts for guys he covers like

0:26:00.640 --> 0:26:06.280
<v Speaker 4>Paramount or Lumen given their relatively lower absolute ebitabase and

0:26:06.640 --> 0:26:09.879
<v Speaker 4>Mike Campalone, who's part of our consumer team, rates to

0:26:09.880 --> 0:26:12.520
<v Speaker 4>guys like Kroger and Albertson's, which have a pending acquisition

0:26:12.600 --> 0:26:17.959
<v Speaker 4>in both maintaining significant multi employer pension plans as well

0:26:17.960 --> 0:26:21.280
<v Speaker 4>as some shelf insurance liabilities and some leases, which altogether

0:26:21.400 --> 0:26:24.920
<v Speaker 4>can increase the adjusted debt that raiders look at by

0:26:24.920 --> 0:26:27.320
<v Speaker 4>over eight billion, So we could see some potential improvement

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:30.960
<v Speaker 4>there in terms of those adjusted figures. So hopefully that

0:26:31.000 --> 0:26:34.359
<v Speaker 4>gives a little bit of flavor to everyone listening on

0:26:34.560 --> 0:26:36.960
<v Speaker 4>the importance of looking at the ads and rates and

0:26:37.320 --> 0:26:39.840
<v Speaker 4>the potential impact on financial risk profiles.

0:26:39.920 --> 0:26:42.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, and this closing of the gap, does it continue

0:26:42.520 --> 0:26:43.160
<v Speaker 1>at this pace?

0:26:44.119 --> 0:26:46.160
<v Speaker 4>If you have higher for longer? That's would certainly mean

0:26:46.200 --> 0:26:49.040
<v Speaker 4>that the rates that you set can sort of be

0:26:49.080 --> 0:26:51.480
<v Speaker 4>a more steady state. But well, I guess we'll have

0:26:51.480 --> 0:26:53.840
<v Speaker 4>to see what the what the future brings through through

0:26:53.880 --> 0:26:54.520
<v Speaker 4>mid decade.

0:26:54.760 --> 0:26:56.919
<v Speaker 1>Okay, So just to wrap things up, Mat, I mean,

0:26:56.960 --> 0:26:58.960
<v Speaker 1>what else are you looking at right now? You cover

0:26:59.000 --> 0:27:00.919
<v Speaker 1>a huge range of industry, But what else should we

0:27:00.960 --> 0:27:02.720
<v Speaker 1>be paying attention to? What's on your radar?

0:27:04.240 --> 0:27:05.959
<v Speaker 4>What else is on my radar right now? I mean,

0:27:06.000 --> 0:27:08.840
<v Speaker 4>we're sort of in the thick of it with earnings.

0:27:08.840 --> 0:27:11.520
<v Speaker 4>So I think one of the more interesting stories is

0:27:11.560 --> 0:27:15.120
<v Speaker 4>the sort of retheon and the large defunded buyback that's

0:27:15.400 --> 0:27:16.960
<v Speaker 4>sort of doing so. I would expect them to be

0:27:16.960 --> 0:27:19.480
<v Speaker 4>coming to market here pretty soon to sort of turn

0:27:19.520 --> 0:27:21.920
<v Speaker 4>out the bridge loan that they took out as part

0:27:21.960 --> 0:27:25.160
<v Speaker 4>of their accelerated cherry purchases. They sort of grind through

0:27:25.240 --> 0:27:28.399
<v Speaker 4>the powdered metal contaminant issue that's sort of grounding some

0:27:28.440 --> 0:27:31.280
<v Speaker 4>of the GTF engines and accelerating some of those infections.

0:27:31.359 --> 0:27:34.679
<v Speaker 4>So it's probably one of the more interesting stories going on.

0:27:34.920 --> 0:27:38.199
<v Speaker 1>But raising debt to payback stockholders. That's not good for

0:27:38.240 --> 0:27:38.919
<v Speaker 1>the bonds, is it.

0:27:39.320 --> 0:27:42.480
<v Speaker 4>No, Generally, that's not a good thing. That's why the

0:27:42.840 --> 0:27:46.880
<v Speaker 4>BAA one tile plus ratings are now moved to negative

0:27:46.880 --> 0:27:50.639
<v Speaker 4>outlook to and to ensure that the GTF issues don't

0:27:51.040 --> 0:27:56.440
<v Speaker 4>materially spread beyond what's already assumed and more importantly that ratheon.

0:27:56.520 --> 0:27:58.879
<v Speaker 4>When they accelerate these cherry purchases, they'll turn around and

0:27:58.920 --> 0:28:01.840
<v Speaker 4>then deleverage the balance sheet through mid decade, in line

0:28:01.880 --> 0:28:04.520
<v Speaker 4>with what is sort of expected by both Moodies and

0:28:04.640 --> 0:28:04.960
<v Speaker 4>S and P.

0:28:05.240 --> 0:28:06.919
<v Speaker 1>Do we worry about a downgrade for them in the

0:28:06.920 --> 0:28:07.600
<v Speaker 1>short term?

0:28:08.200 --> 0:28:10.639
<v Speaker 4>In down grade, they've already gone to negative outlooks, So

0:28:10.680 --> 0:28:13.720
<v Speaker 4>I think right now they're probably okay. I think it

0:28:13.800 --> 0:28:18.040
<v Speaker 4>really becomes a question of funding mix when they turn

0:28:18.119 --> 0:28:20.680
<v Speaker 4>out the bridge one that they have, how much short

0:28:20.760 --> 0:28:24.080
<v Speaker 4>term debt do they expect to have in order to

0:28:24.119 --> 0:28:26.960
<v Speaker 4>pull a lever to be able to deleverage the balance

0:28:27.000 --> 0:28:29.680
<v Speaker 4>sheet and have absolute production. Some moody is expecting somewhere

0:28:29.680 --> 0:28:33.399
<v Speaker 4>around five billion dollars, which would be half of what

0:28:33.440 --> 0:28:36.720
<v Speaker 4>the total ASR is. And then you have some maturities

0:28:36.760 --> 0:28:39.840
<v Speaker 4>which is a little around three billion dollars, but they

0:28:39.880 --> 0:28:42.000
<v Speaker 4>could also pay down. And there also have some pending

0:28:42.320 --> 0:28:44.360
<v Speaker 4>asset sales which could bring in another three billion in

0:28:44.360 --> 0:28:47.200
<v Speaker 4>pro seeds. So they certainly have levers that they could

0:28:47.760 --> 0:28:50.280
<v Speaker 4>put in place and then pull to de leverage of

0:28:50.280 --> 0:28:52.959
<v Speaker 4>balance sheet. It's a matter of the magnitude and how

0:28:53.040 --> 0:28:54.840
<v Speaker 4>quickly they want to want to do it.

0:28:55.240 --> 0:28:57.400
<v Speaker 1>We'll definitely be keeping an eye on raytheon and we'll

0:28:57.440 --> 0:28:59.920
<v Speaker 1>be keeping an eye on your research and analysis. Mac

0:29:00.040 --> 0:29:01.840
<v Speaker 1>pointed with Bloomberg Intlligence in New York. Thank you so

0:29:01.920 --> 0:29:04.040
<v Speaker 1>much for joining us, Thanks for hammer appreciate it. Look

0:29:04.040 --> 0:29:05.760
<v Speaker 1>forward to having you back on the show very soon.

0:29:06.480 --> 0:29:08.719
<v Speaker 1>And thanks again to Tristram Leach with Apollo, as well

0:29:08.720 --> 0:29:11.320
<v Speaker 1>as Lisa Lee from Bloomberg News. Read all of Lisa's

0:29:11.360 --> 0:29:15.160
<v Speaker 1>great credit scoops on the terminal and at Bloomberg dot com,

0:29:15.200 --> 0:29:17.680
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0:29:17.680 --> 0:29:21.240
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0:29:21.280 --> 0:29:24.000
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0:29:24.040 --> 0:29:27.040
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot net. That's j c R O M B

0:29:27.200 --> 0:29:29.400
<v Speaker 1>I E as in my surname and the number eight

0:29:29.440 --> 0:29:32.920
<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg dot net. I'm James Crombie. It's been a

0:29:32.920 --> 0:29:35.280
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0:29:35.320 --> 0:29:36.680
<v Speaker 1>Credit Edge