1 00:00:02,320 --> 00:00:03,440 Speaker 1: Also media. 2 00:00:05,040 --> 00:00:17,599 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to Better Offline. I'm your host edzit Charn. Yes, 3 00:00:20,320 --> 00:00:23,000 Speaker 2: and today I'm joined by Jason Kent, the CEO of 4 00:00:23,000 --> 00:00:25,919 Speaker 2: the Trade Association DC. And Jason, thank you for joining me. 5 00:00:26,560 --> 00:00:27,960 Speaker 1: Pleased to be here, Thanks for having me. 6 00:00:28,480 --> 00:00:31,560 Speaker 2: So Jason is joining us today and we'll be joining 7 00:00:31,640 --> 00:00:35,280 Speaker 2: us more regularly to talk through the massive antitrust trial 8 00:00:35,360 --> 00:00:37,960 Speaker 2: going on with Google, the second of them. Jason, why 9 00:00:37,960 --> 00:00:40,199 Speaker 2: don't you set the scene of what's going on? 10 00:00:40,760 --> 00:00:43,479 Speaker 1: Yeah? Sure, thanks Ed. Yeah, we just wrapped up getting 11 00:00:43,479 --> 00:00:47,040 Speaker 1: the opinion on the first trial, which was the search trial, 12 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:54,040 Speaker 1: where Judge Meta decided an issued an opinion that Google 13 00:00:54,080 --> 00:00:56,480 Speaker 1: has a monopoly in search and a monopoly and search 14 00:00:57,120 --> 00:01:00,480 Speaker 1: text ads. So this is trial number two. It's going 15 00:01:00,480 --> 00:01:03,480 Speaker 1: to be starting on Monday the ninth in the Eastern 16 00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:06,760 Speaker 1: District of Virginia. And this one is focused on the 17 00:01:06,800 --> 00:01:10,600 Speaker 1: ad tech part of Google's business and everything related to it. 18 00:01:10,920 --> 00:01:12,880 Speaker 2: So how does that How is that different because a 19 00:01:12,880 --> 00:01:16,480 Speaker 2: lot of people see them kind of as one homogeneous entity. 20 00:01:16,920 --> 00:01:19,640 Speaker 1: Sure, yeah, I mean the advertising for people to understand, 21 00:01:19,640 --> 00:01:24,160 Speaker 1: the advertising business for digital has now become almost entirely 22 00:01:24,240 --> 00:01:27,680 Speaker 1: a live kind of auction marketplace. Where if you think 23 00:01:27,680 --> 00:01:30,920 Speaker 1: of all these ad units across the web, they are 24 00:01:30,959 --> 00:01:33,840 Speaker 1: being bought and sold in near real time to the 25 00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:38,000 Speaker 1: highest bidder. And Google as a company has both the 26 00:01:38,040 --> 00:01:41,480 Speaker 1: software and a lot of the data that powers the 27 00:01:41,560 --> 00:01:44,480 Speaker 1: decision making. And so if you think about kind of 28 00:01:44,480 --> 00:01:46,880 Speaker 1: on the buy side, a bunch of companies bidding on 29 00:01:47,000 --> 00:01:50,920 Speaker 1: advertising units that they want to own to get in 30 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:53,160 Speaker 1: front of consumers, and on the other end, you've got 31 00:01:53,560 --> 00:01:56,280 Speaker 1: the owners of those units, whether it be publishers or 32 00:01:56,320 --> 00:02:00,280 Speaker 1: Google itself. Google is the largest player on both sides 33 00:02:00,320 --> 00:02:02,640 Speaker 1: of those transactions, and they also run most of the 34 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:03,440 Speaker 1: auctions too. 35 00:02:04,720 --> 00:02:06,559 Speaker 2: So what is happening in this trial? 36 00:02:07,720 --> 00:02:11,760 Speaker 1: So the Department of Justice started investing in Google back 37 00:02:11,800 --> 00:02:17,760 Speaker 1: in twenty eighteen, and they spent a few years doing it. 38 00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:21,680 Speaker 1: The state attorneys General, led by Texas filed a lawsuit 39 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:25,080 Speaker 1: back at the end of twenty twenty saying that Google's 40 00:02:25,120 --> 00:02:29,440 Speaker 1: ad tech business violating I trust laws, and since then, 41 00:02:29,480 --> 00:02:32,560 Speaker 1: the Department of Justice filed its own lawsuit back in 42 00:02:32,680 --> 00:02:35,920 Speaker 1: January of twenty twenty three, so just eighteen months ago. 43 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:39,880 Speaker 1: And they did it in Virginia, where it's kind of 44 00:02:39,880 --> 00:02:43,200 Speaker 1: known as the nickname is the Rocket docket because it 45 00:02:43,240 --> 00:02:46,000 Speaker 1: moves so fast, and so in less than eighteen months, 46 00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:48,400 Speaker 1: this one's gone. It's gotten to the point where now 47 00:02:48,400 --> 00:02:52,320 Speaker 1: we're about to have a trial starting on Monday, and 48 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:56,120 Speaker 1: they'll present their arguments to take about four weeks, and 49 00:02:56,440 --> 00:02:58,920 Speaker 1: the look the judge there, the district judge, will determine 50 00:02:59,280 --> 00:03:02,560 Speaker 1: an issue, our opinion on whether or not the various 51 00:03:04,080 --> 00:03:07,639 Speaker 1: charges that are in the complaint she agrees with them, 52 00:03:07,680 --> 00:03:09,799 Speaker 1: and and whether or not they'll be remedies for it. 53 00:03:10,120 --> 00:03:12,560 Speaker 2: And what are the judges roughly speaking. 54 00:03:13,200 --> 00:03:18,000 Speaker 1: The judge judge, what are the charges? Yes, that Google 55 00:03:18,040 --> 00:03:22,160 Speaker 1: has a monopoly and I believe three different areas of 56 00:03:22,200 --> 00:03:26,960 Speaker 1: the advertising supply chain. And so that's the software that 57 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:32,079 Speaker 1: publishers use, that's the software that runs the auctions, and 58 00:03:32,120 --> 00:03:36,400 Speaker 1: that's the software on the buy side that's being used 59 00:03:36,400 --> 00:03:40,000 Speaker 1: to bid on the on the ads. And in those 60 00:03:40,040 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 1: areas that they've also abused that monopoly power. 61 00:03:42,960 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 2: How have they been abusing it? Let's get into it, 62 00:03:45,360 --> 00:03:47,920 Speaker 2: get into it. Well, you know, let's let's see how 63 00:03:47,920 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 2: they're abusing I. 64 00:03:48,880 --> 00:03:52,400 Speaker 1: Think, I mean, I think one thing that's helpful and 65 00:03:52,640 --> 00:03:57,080 Speaker 1: and you know, fortunately and maybe unfortunately for Google, their 66 00:03:57,120 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 1: own employees and some of the discovery for the lawsuits 67 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:02,920 Speaker 1: did a comparison to the stock market. When you think 68 00:04:02,920 --> 00:04:07,400 Speaker 1: about this kind of live marketplace, anybody that's all flashboys 69 00:04:07,480 --> 00:04:11,560 Speaker 1: and or read the book on high speed trading, this 70 00:04:11,680 --> 00:04:14,280 Speaker 1: is is that plus maybe even more intense. 71 00:04:14,040 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 2: And say a little bit about what that means for 72 00:04:16,960 --> 00:04:17,599 Speaker 2: those who might know. 73 00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:20,760 Speaker 1: Of sure, that means that if you think about these 74 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:25,479 Speaker 1: advertising units that sit there across the web, that there 75 00:04:25,560 --> 00:04:28,560 Speaker 1: is incredibly high speed trading of those units that are 76 00:04:28,560 --> 00:04:32,960 Speaker 1: happening in milliseconds, meaning that you know, in a blink 77 00:04:33,279 --> 00:04:36,600 Speaker 1: of the eye, there are parties that are both bidding 78 00:04:36,640 --> 00:04:39,760 Speaker 1: on and then delivering on ad units based on a 79 00:04:39,800 --> 00:04:44,920 Speaker 1: whole range of targeting requirements and pricing, and then there's 80 00:04:45,000 --> 00:04:49,039 Speaker 1: rules around those auctions. And so if you think about 81 00:04:49,440 --> 00:04:51,200 Speaker 1: kind of the way a stock market works, which is 82 00:04:51,240 --> 00:04:54,200 Speaker 1: also happens and in real time, people are buying and 83 00:04:54,240 --> 00:04:58,200 Speaker 1: selling stock using machine, entirely using machines that have been 84 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:04,600 Speaker 1: programmed to handle the bidding and the marketplace. Google is 85 00:05:04,640 --> 00:05:07,560 Speaker 1: doing that for the entire supply chain, both the buy 86 00:05:07,640 --> 00:05:11,280 Speaker 1: side and the cell side. And so you know, the 87 00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:14,479 Speaker 1: comparison that the Google employee made and also the Assistant 88 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:17,560 Speaker 1: Attorney General did when they announced the lawsuit was to 89 00:05:17,640 --> 00:05:20,760 Speaker 1: the stock market as if Google, you know, was both buying, 90 00:05:21,120 --> 00:05:23,600 Speaker 1: was leading and on a majority of the software, both 91 00:05:23,600 --> 00:05:27,000 Speaker 1: for buying and for selling and for running the actual 92 00:05:27,040 --> 00:05:27,920 Speaker 1: auctions themselves. 93 00:05:28,640 --> 00:05:30,800 Speaker 2: And so what's happened so far? You've been so you're 94 00:05:30,880 --> 00:05:33,480 Speaker 2: quite close that you're about twenty minutes in the courthouse Rougher. 95 00:05:33,400 --> 00:05:36,400 Speaker 1: Maybe about twenty minutes. Like what else? There's been a 96 00:05:36,520 --> 00:05:38,880 Speaker 1: number of pre what they call pre trial motions for 97 00:05:38,920 --> 00:05:41,919 Speaker 1: a variety of things to kind of figure out the 98 00:05:41,960 --> 00:05:44,120 Speaker 1: rules of the road for the trial when it starts Monday. 99 00:05:44,279 --> 00:05:46,360 Speaker 1: Some of that's just logistics. Some of that's really important 100 00:05:46,360 --> 00:05:48,560 Speaker 1: in terms of like what evidence will be allowed and 101 00:05:48,640 --> 00:05:52,080 Speaker 1: not allowed, who will testify and not testify, et cetera. 102 00:05:52,960 --> 00:05:55,760 Speaker 2: So what have you actually witnessed so far, like what 103 00:05:56,320 --> 00:05:59,160 Speaker 2: you've been in a few of these pre trial motions? 104 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:03,440 Speaker 1: Even yeah, I mean, well that's one thing. I just 105 00:06:03,440 --> 00:06:08,240 Speaker 1: start with the judge because this actually a little bit 106 00:06:08,320 --> 00:06:11,599 Speaker 1: in the weeds here. But this lawsuit originally start out 107 00:06:12,040 --> 00:06:14,640 Speaker 1: it was going to go before a jury of Americans 108 00:06:14,680 --> 00:06:17,279 Speaker 1: to make the decision. So you think about the just 109 00:06:17,320 --> 00:06:20,839 Speaker 1: Department having to explain this topic to the average American 110 00:06:22,279 --> 00:06:25,839 Speaker 1: that that changed a few months ago based on a 111 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:28,880 Speaker 1: legal maneuver that Google did. And so now the judge 112 00:06:28,960 --> 00:06:31,279 Speaker 1: is going to be actually the one that will issue 113 00:06:31,320 --> 00:06:34,560 Speaker 1: the verdict and make the decision. And you know, my 114 00:06:34,720 --> 00:06:38,680 Speaker 1: observation is she is incredibly experienced. She's been a judge 115 00:06:38,680 --> 00:06:41,680 Speaker 1: for quite some time, and she's had some you know, 116 00:06:42,160 --> 00:06:47,279 Speaker 1: very very significant cases over her career, you know, involving 117 00:06:47,560 --> 00:06:51,719 Speaker 1: from al Qaeda terrorists on down to to you know, 118 00:06:52,680 --> 00:06:58,360 Speaker 1: nine to eleven related cases. So she's not intimidated at 119 00:06:58,360 --> 00:07:00,960 Speaker 1: all by anybody in the room, including Google for sure, 120 00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:05,039 Speaker 1: and so in that regard, you know, I'm very optimimistic. 121 00:07:05,440 --> 00:07:08,120 Speaker 1: She seems to only care about the law and justice, 122 00:07:08,160 --> 00:07:09,680 Speaker 1: which is what you want to see from a judge. 123 00:07:10,880 --> 00:07:13,600 Speaker 1: You know, Google, like with the Search trial, has the 124 00:07:13,640 --> 00:07:17,080 Speaker 1: best and the brightest attorneys that are out there. You know, 125 00:07:17,160 --> 00:07:19,320 Speaker 1: three or four firms working for them, and they've got 126 00:07:19,320 --> 00:07:22,800 Speaker 1: half the room full of their people. This is really 127 00:07:22,800 --> 00:07:24,880 Speaker 1: really important to them. The Just Department wants to break 128 00:07:24,960 --> 00:07:26,680 Speaker 1: up I mean, the outcome they want is they want 129 00:07:26,680 --> 00:07:29,679 Speaker 1: to break up Google, and so that's what this trial 130 00:07:29,720 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: is all about. 131 00:07:30,840 --> 00:07:32,880 Speaker 2: How do you think how do you see that chances? 132 00:07:34,120 --> 00:07:36,400 Speaker 1: You know, if you asked me, and I'm sure I 133 00:07:36,480 --> 00:07:38,840 Speaker 1: was on the record about this back a year ago, 134 00:07:38,880 --> 00:07:40,800 Speaker 1: I would have said that the chances for this one 135 00:07:40,840 --> 00:07:44,160 Speaker 1: were higher than the search the search lawsuit that they 136 00:07:44,240 --> 00:07:48,240 Speaker 1: just won. And so I also felt pretty optimistic about 137 00:07:48,240 --> 00:07:51,920 Speaker 1: the search lawsuits once they finished closing arguments, because I 138 00:07:51,920 --> 00:07:54,120 Speaker 1: thought they did a really good job explaining their case. 139 00:07:54,760 --> 00:07:57,640 Speaker 1: This one, I think it's even more obvious going in, 140 00:07:57,680 --> 00:08:00,760 Speaker 1: I mean to put in real numbers around. I mean, 141 00:08:00,800 --> 00:08:05,480 Speaker 1: they they the just Department's analysis and their experts analysis 142 00:08:05,600 --> 00:08:11,000 Speaker 1: is that Google has over ninety percent of the software 143 00:08:11,080 --> 00:08:14,360 Speaker 1: that publishers use to serve the ads, and then they've 144 00:08:14,360 --> 00:08:17,800 Speaker 1: got over they've got ninety eight percent of the mobile queries. 145 00:08:18,000 --> 00:08:20,760 Speaker 1: We learned that from the last decision. And so on 146 00:08:20,800 --> 00:08:23,440 Speaker 1: the buy side, they've got you know, almost you know, 147 00:08:23,520 --> 00:08:27,280 Speaker 1: ninety eight percent of the advertising demand that's coming through 148 00:08:27,320 --> 00:08:30,680 Speaker 1: from search ads. So like on both sides of the market, 149 00:08:30,840 --> 00:08:32,880 Speaker 1: they've you know, and then they get to write the rules. 150 00:08:33,160 --> 00:08:35,000 Speaker 1: So it's a problem. 151 00:08:35,920 --> 00:08:39,320 Speaker 2: And as far as the original allegations go, can you 152 00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:42,679 Speaker 2: kind of break those down at all and explain what 153 00:08:42,880 --> 00:08:46,320 Speaker 2: the what the specific things that you would consider the 154 00:08:46,320 --> 00:08:47,640 Speaker 2: most important parts of this trial. 155 00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:54,199 Speaker 1: Yeah, sure, you know that one that they took the 156 00:08:54,960 --> 00:09:00,719 Speaker 1: market power that they had on the advertising demand side, 157 00:09:01,080 --> 00:09:05,560 Speaker 1: and that they used that in order to create market 158 00:09:05,600 --> 00:09:08,920 Speaker 1: power dominance, if you will, in other parts of the 159 00:09:09,000 --> 00:09:13,200 Speaker 1: supply chain. And so one that I think is really 160 00:09:13,240 --> 00:09:16,200 Speaker 1: important is that we now have a decision from the 161 00:09:16,240 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 1: other court on that dominance on the demand side. And 162 00:09:20,200 --> 00:09:23,040 Speaker 1: so you know, JUDGMENTA already did the work of saying, 163 00:09:23,720 --> 00:09:26,280 Speaker 1: you know, he believes that Google. You know, they proved 164 00:09:26,320 --> 00:09:29,120 Speaker 1: the case just part of the case that Google has 165 00:09:29,480 --> 00:09:33,800 Speaker 1: a monopoly in search and in search text ads and 166 00:09:33,920 --> 00:09:36,800 Speaker 1: that they abuse that. And so that decision is no 167 00:09:36,840 --> 00:09:41,120 Speaker 1: longer just allegations as it relates to Google, and this 168 00:09:41,240 --> 00:09:45,920 Speaker 1: case claims that they use that market power to to 169 00:09:46,000 --> 00:09:49,000 Speaker 1: create dominance elsewhere. And so they walk in I think 170 00:09:49,080 --> 00:09:51,600 Speaker 1: in a much better place based on the prior opinion 171 00:09:51,600 --> 00:09:55,679 Speaker 1: that came out in August. You know, second thing I'll 172 00:09:55,720 --> 00:09:58,040 Speaker 1: hit on is that they tied you know that to 173 00:09:58,280 --> 00:10:00,320 Speaker 1: other parts of the business. So the exchange in the 174 00:10:01,080 --> 00:10:05,240 Speaker 1: in the ad server business in order to so basically 175 00:10:05,240 --> 00:10:08,560 Speaker 1: to force people to use the other products. So as 176 00:10:08,559 --> 00:10:12,120 Speaker 1: an example, you know, the argument or the allegation is. 177 00:10:12,080 --> 00:10:16,400 Speaker 3: That you weren't able to get access to any of 178 00:10:16,400 --> 00:10:20,880 Speaker 3: that demand unless you use Google's addex product, right, And 179 00:10:20,960 --> 00:10:24,480 Speaker 3: so you know, the evidence looks pretty clear on that, 180 00:10:24,520 --> 00:10:28,160 Speaker 3: but they're gonna have to present that case, you know. 181 00:10:28,240 --> 00:10:30,600 Speaker 1: I think a third area that hit on is that 182 00:10:30,600 --> 00:10:33,760 Speaker 1: that the market itself is properly defined. That's always important 183 00:10:33,760 --> 00:10:37,400 Speaker 1: for NIT trust trials in cases. And so this case 184 00:10:37,480 --> 00:10:41,480 Speaker 1: is all about something called open web display advertising, and 185 00:10:41,600 --> 00:10:45,160 Speaker 1: Google will try to to blur that line, but I 186 00:10:45,160 --> 00:10:46,320 Speaker 1: think that's also what's is. 187 00:10:46,240 --> 00:10:47,800 Speaker 2: Open web display advertizing? 188 00:10:48,080 --> 00:10:50,080 Speaker 1: Well, I guess it's easier to explain the way it's not. 189 00:10:50,360 --> 00:10:52,680 Speaker 1: And that's what that's what bothers Google is. You know, 190 00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:56,559 Speaker 1: it's not closed platforms. So it's not advertising on TikTok 191 00:10:56,760 --> 00:11:01,800 Speaker 1: or not advertising on Facebook. It's advertise that's available over 192 00:11:02,360 --> 00:11:07,760 Speaker 1: the web browser in which companies can participate in auctions 193 00:11:07,840 --> 00:11:11,280 Speaker 1: on the buy side or they can participate auctions on 194 00:11:11,320 --> 00:11:14,760 Speaker 1: the cell side. And you know, and those are auctions 195 00:11:14,760 --> 00:11:18,080 Speaker 1: that are happening for display advertising units on websites. 196 00:11:19,000 --> 00:11:20,920 Speaker 2: So it's a good time to actually take a step 197 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:23,800 Speaker 2: back and ask how does Google make money from advertising? 198 00:11:23,840 --> 00:11:26,880 Speaker 2: What are their advertising units? Because you've mentioned there's the 199 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:30,240 Speaker 2: bidding process. But where do we see Google advertising? 200 00:11:31,040 --> 00:11:33,160 Speaker 1: Well, they, you know, a majority of the advertising, and 201 00:11:33,200 --> 00:11:36,760 Speaker 1: it's become more and more over each year, is actually 202 00:11:36,800 --> 00:11:40,360 Speaker 1: on Google's own properties, so entertained out that's where they 203 00:11:40,360 --> 00:11:42,640 Speaker 1: make the most money because they don't have to share 204 00:11:42,640 --> 00:11:45,760 Speaker 1: it with anybody else, right, And so so you've got 205 00:11:45,840 --> 00:11:48,079 Speaker 1: the ads on Search, you've got the ads on Gmail, 206 00:11:48,120 --> 00:11:51,000 Speaker 1: you've got the ads on YouTube. So it's on what 207 00:11:51,040 --> 00:11:55,280 Speaker 1: they call their owned and operated properties. And then also 208 00:11:55,400 --> 00:11:59,360 Speaker 1: Google serves ads across the rest of the web, and 209 00:11:59,400 --> 00:12:01,800 Speaker 1: that's where they get a lot of scale and a 210 00:12:01,800 --> 00:12:05,440 Speaker 1: lot of data. And then they take a percentage of 211 00:12:05,480 --> 00:12:07,959 Speaker 1: the action on the byside, percentage of the action cell side, 212 00:12:08,000 --> 00:12:10,720 Speaker 1: percentage of the action and the auctions, and that all 213 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:14,760 Speaker 1: adds up so that they're taking you know, allegedly thirty 214 00:12:14,960 --> 00:12:19,280 Speaker 1: to thirty two percent of the revenue or just the 215 00:12:19,400 --> 00:12:22,920 Speaker 1: technology that's being used in order to serve those ads. 216 00:12:23,240 --> 00:12:26,079 Speaker 2: Does the suit suggest does it give any idea of 217 00:12:26,160 --> 00:12:27,920 Speaker 2: what the balance so that you said that most of 218 00:12:27,960 --> 00:12:31,600 Speaker 2: their advertising goes through their own properties, does it balance 219 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:32,920 Speaker 2: that out? It's all? Does it explain? 220 00:12:33,920 --> 00:12:36,439 Speaker 1: Yeah, I think it's it's in there, and it's certainly 221 00:12:36,440 --> 00:12:39,560 Speaker 1: in their sec filings. You know, I think you know, 222 00:12:39,720 --> 00:12:42,480 Speaker 1: this gets to kind of one of the arguments I 223 00:12:42,480 --> 00:12:45,160 Speaker 1: think you'll hear Google make, and that certainly their their 224 00:12:45,200 --> 00:12:48,560 Speaker 1: proxies and kind of their advocates are making, is that 225 00:12:49,320 --> 00:12:53,720 Speaker 1: the part of their revenue that serves on other people's 226 00:12:53,760 --> 00:12:58,920 Speaker 1: properties on publisher sites is only about fifteen you know, 227 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,480 Speaker 1: it's say fifteen percent or so of the revenue, and 228 00:13:01,520 --> 00:13:05,360 Speaker 1: it's declining the last couple of years, so it's not growing, 229 00:13:05,520 --> 00:13:07,680 Speaker 1: it's flat to declining. It's not that material. 230 00:13:08,280 --> 00:13:09,760 Speaker 2: That's the off property revenue. 231 00:13:09,880 --> 00:13:11,040 Speaker 1: That's off property revenue. 232 00:13:11,440 --> 00:13:13,400 Speaker 2: That's very bad for them. 233 00:13:13,800 --> 00:13:17,160 Speaker 1: But the common sense piece, well, yeah, but that's where 234 00:13:17,160 --> 00:13:18,880 Speaker 1: they also have the lower margin because they don't have 235 00:13:18,920 --> 00:13:21,760 Speaker 1: they have to share it with people. The common sense 236 00:13:21,840 --> 00:13:25,120 Speaker 1: piece is that, well, one, if that wasn't that important 237 00:13:25,120 --> 00:13:27,319 Speaker 1: to them, then they'd be offloading it, right because why 238 00:13:27,320 --> 00:13:30,280 Speaker 1: would you want to go get suited by the United 239 00:13:30,280 --> 00:13:33,959 Speaker 1: States j JUSTAHS Department and potentially broken up if it's 240 00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:38,760 Speaker 1: not that important to you. And then two that ignores 241 00:13:38,920 --> 00:13:41,360 Speaker 1: that's just the revenue piece. But I think it's important 242 00:13:41,360 --> 00:13:43,439 Speaker 1: to understand it that like and this will come out. 243 00:13:43,480 --> 00:13:45,840 Speaker 1: I think in a lot of the documents that the 244 00:13:45,960 --> 00:13:50,680 Speaker 1: data that they get from those auctions and from serving 245 00:13:50,720 --> 00:13:54,280 Speaker 1: ads across the web and from tracking users across the web. 246 00:13:54,679 --> 00:13:56,640 Speaker 1: I mean, there's this important moment in time that will 247 00:13:56,640 --> 00:13:59,960 Speaker 1: come up in the trial. I believe we're in twenty sixteen. 248 00:14:00,760 --> 00:14:03,840 Speaker 1: Google merged all of the ad tech data they have, 249 00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:06,240 Speaker 1: with all the search data they have, with all the 250 00:14:06,640 --> 00:14:09,720 Speaker 1: location data they have, with all the Android data, and 251 00:14:09,800 --> 00:14:12,839 Speaker 1: all the Chrome browsing data into one single profile, which 252 00:14:12,880 --> 00:14:14,640 Speaker 1: they promised they wouldn't do, and they went ahead and 253 00:14:14,640 --> 00:14:17,160 Speaker 1: did it. And if you think about the value of 254 00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:19,960 Speaker 1: that data that underpins it, that's really important. 255 00:14:20,200 --> 00:14:24,840 Speaker 2: So when you say unites those profiles, is they have 256 00:14:24,880 --> 00:14:27,600 Speaker 2: a profile on you and me? Is it? Do we 257 00:14:27,680 --> 00:14:28,160 Speaker 2: just not know? 258 00:14:29,800 --> 00:14:32,240 Speaker 1: I mean we expect that they know whether it's a 259 00:14:32,280 --> 00:14:36,800 Speaker 1: synonymous indicator or a placeholder for that user, But they 260 00:14:37,400 --> 00:14:42,920 Speaker 1: know enough that it's this device which is attached to 261 00:14:42,960 --> 00:14:46,200 Speaker 1: a person, and I know all this other information about it. 262 00:14:46,240 --> 00:14:49,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, this person may resemble that because I see in 263 00:14:49,280 --> 00:14:54,560 Speaker 2: twenty sixteen they dumped a ban on PII personally identify 264 00:14:54,640 --> 00:14:57,320 Speaker 2: them information. But is this separate to that? Is it 265 00:14:57,920 --> 00:14:59,760 Speaker 2: the combination of everything else. 266 00:15:00,200 --> 00:15:02,880 Speaker 1: That I mean, that's what the reporting was in twenty sixteen, 267 00:15:02,920 --> 00:15:06,720 Speaker 1: and that's what the evidence that's starting to bubble up was. 268 00:15:06,720 --> 00:15:09,040 Speaker 1: Was this they call it Project Narnia is what we 269 00:15:09,160 --> 00:15:13,280 Speaker 1: just learned it. But that they merged, they dropped their 270 00:15:13,280 --> 00:15:16,720 Speaker 1: ban on PII being merged with search. Juliet Anglin from 271 00:15:16,760 --> 00:15:19,640 Speaker 1: public and I think did the report and and so 272 00:15:20,680 --> 00:15:23,040 Speaker 1: that you know, that was removing the guardrails basically, and 273 00:15:23,440 --> 00:15:25,080 Speaker 1: at least in my mind, and I think that will 274 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:26,640 Speaker 1: be a part of the evidence. 275 00:15:36,680 --> 00:15:41,240 Speaker 2: So within this, is there anything particularly surprising within the 276 00:15:41,280 --> 00:15:44,080 Speaker 2: first few Well, actually, let me take that back. I'm 277 00:15:44,080 --> 00:15:47,280 Speaker 2: sure there's surprising stuff, But what happens now? So we're 278 00:15:47,280 --> 00:15:50,560 Speaker 2: pushing this episode out on September ninth, the day of 279 00:15:50,600 --> 00:15:53,240 Speaker 2: the first trial. So what happens then and what happens 280 00:15:53,240 --> 00:15:53,600 Speaker 2: after that? 281 00:15:54,480 --> 00:15:56,600 Speaker 1: Yeah, So the first couple of weeks, the just Department 282 00:15:56,680 --> 00:15:59,040 Speaker 1: will present what they call their case in chief. It's there, 283 00:15:59,520 --> 00:16:02,240 Speaker 1: you know, their evidence. So they're going to have a 284 00:16:02,320 --> 00:16:08,200 Speaker 1: slew of witnesses that have already been identified, both Google employees, 285 00:16:08,320 --> 00:16:12,680 Speaker 1: ex Google employees, you know, CEOs and top founders of 286 00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:16,400 Speaker 1: a lot of the competitive at tech companies, experts, et 287 00:16:16,480 --> 00:16:19,880 Speaker 1: cetera that you know probably have already been deposed and 288 00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:23,600 Speaker 1: will will now answer questions on the witness stand, and 289 00:16:23,640 --> 00:16:26,400 Speaker 1: they'll have a ton of exhibits that you know, we've 290 00:16:26,440 --> 00:16:29,120 Speaker 1: probably seen less than five percent of them, i'd say 291 00:16:29,200 --> 00:16:33,560 Speaker 1: at this point to prove their case, and Google have 292 00:16:33,560 --> 00:16:35,840 Speaker 1: a chance to ask questions too throughout, and then they'll 293 00:16:35,840 --> 00:16:39,440 Speaker 1: present their defense. I expect you'll take about four weeks total. 294 00:16:40,240 --> 00:16:42,800 Speaker 1: I think important things for people to know going into 295 00:16:42,800 --> 00:16:45,160 Speaker 1: the trial. You know I already covered that. I think 296 00:16:45,160 --> 00:16:47,960 Speaker 1: the judges is perfect for a case like this, so 297 00:16:48,000 --> 00:16:52,480 Speaker 1: that's very optimistic at this point. Also, I would say 298 00:16:52,520 --> 00:16:56,040 Speaker 1: it's very important to know that there was an important, 299 00:16:56,160 --> 00:17:01,880 Speaker 1: important hearing last week in which it's happened with multiple 300 00:17:01,960 --> 00:17:06,520 Speaker 1: lawsuits against Google, where Google guid in trouble for not 301 00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:12,199 Speaker 1: preserving documents. I was going to say, yeah, yeah, and 302 00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:16,760 Speaker 1: so Google at a point a number of years ago 303 00:17:17,359 --> 00:17:21,080 Speaker 1: issued a memo from their chief league officer and change 304 00:17:21,119 --> 00:17:24,400 Speaker 1: their systems so that any chat messages would by default 305 00:17:24,400 --> 00:17:27,480 Speaker 1: delete after twenty four hours, is the way it's been alleged, 306 00:17:27,920 --> 00:17:32,919 Speaker 1: and unless the employee actually proactively turned on their history 307 00:17:32,920 --> 00:17:36,920 Speaker 1: and turned off that purging because they run her a 308 00:17:36,920 --> 00:17:41,400 Speaker 1: litigation hole. Then the evidence was lost, and so the judge, 309 00:17:42,119 --> 00:17:46,320 Speaker 1: the judge very much expressed her concern about this had 310 00:17:46,359 --> 00:17:48,919 Speaker 1: happened and that probably a lot of evidence had been 311 00:17:48,960 --> 00:17:53,440 Speaker 1: deleted and that throughout the trials she's going to have 312 00:17:53,520 --> 00:17:56,239 Speaker 1: to take that into account whenever Google sends somebody up 313 00:17:56,240 --> 00:17:58,639 Speaker 1: to this with a stand that she's going to have 314 00:17:58,720 --> 00:18:01,000 Speaker 1: to have her own informtays and whether or not this 315 00:18:01,119 --> 00:18:04,240 Speaker 1: is a reliable testimony and whether or not there's you know, 316 00:18:04,320 --> 00:18:07,240 Speaker 1: information and exhibits that were not available to her because 317 00:18:07,280 --> 00:18:10,680 Speaker 1: of this policy. That's like really bad for Google going 318 00:18:10,720 --> 00:18:15,720 Speaker 1: into a trial, you know, like there already well, I 319 00:18:15,760 --> 00:18:18,880 Speaker 1: think that you know, ultimately she could decide to infer 320 00:18:19,680 --> 00:18:22,400 Speaker 1: that what they call a verse inferences, She could basically 321 00:18:22,440 --> 00:18:26,960 Speaker 1: decide that that there has been evidence that's been purged 322 00:18:27,040 --> 00:18:31,200 Speaker 1: in her mind, and therefore therefore Google was trying to 323 00:18:31,320 --> 00:18:33,560 Speaker 1: hide stuff that would have been incriminating to them or 324 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:34,960 Speaker 1: prove the case of this department. 325 00:18:35,200 --> 00:18:39,400 Speaker 2: So doesn't that weaken the case potentially on like appeal 326 00:18:39,520 --> 00:18:41,040 Speaker 2: if she does that a lot, or would it be 327 00:18:41,359 --> 00:18:42,520 Speaker 2: very carefully used? 328 00:18:42,760 --> 00:18:44,800 Speaker 1: It would probably be carefully used. I think, you know, 329 00:18:45,160 --> 00:18:49,160 Speaker 1: anderstanding off. Judge Meta had the same concern and decision 330 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:53,040 Speaker 1: you know, coming out of the search opinion, but he 331 00:18:53,119 --> 00:18:55,400 Speaker 1: said that he didn't need it, you know, he didn't 332 00:18:55,400 --> 00:18:57,840 Speaker 1: actually need to rely on it, that he was going 333 00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:00,919 Speaker 1: to find against Google, that it would monopoly and abused 334 00:19:00,960 --> 00:19:04,199 Speaker 1: its power without it, So he didn't need to have 335 00:19:04,240 --> 00:19:06,960 Speaker 1: that intent. She says, the intent is really important a 336 00:19:07,000 --> 00:19:09,159 Speaker 1: case like this, So we'll see how she how heavily 337 00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:10,240 Speaker 1: she weighs on it. 338 00:19:10,359 --> 00:19:13,199 Speaker 2: At the end of the day. So on the ninth, 339 00:19:13,280 --> 00:19:15,800 Speaker 2: they are going the Homement of Justice will make their 340 00:19:15,800 --> 00:19:18,040 Speaker 2: first will begin making that case. 341 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:20,160 Speaker 1: They will, they will. Yep. 342 00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:24,480 Speaker 2: So has anything interesting come out yet as far as 343 00:19:25,080 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 2: the initial motion and have we seen any e any 344 00:19:28,640 --> 00:19:30,679 Speaker 2: of the exhibits provided in ad once. 345 00:19:30,960 --> 00:19:32,840 Speaker 1: Sure, Yeah, we've seen, I mean even their initial the 346 00:19:33,200 --> 00:19:37,159 Speaker 1: original complaint. We've seen and through reporting we've seen some 347 00:19:37,320 --> 00:19:40,679 Speaker 1: of the the evidence in details on a lot of 348 00:19:40,760 --> 00:19:43,880 Speaker 1: projects that Google had. This one's a lot of there's 349 00:19:43,880 --> 00:19:46,119 Speaker 1: a lot of code name projects which will make it 350 00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 1: hard to keep up to, but keep up with. But 351 00:19:49,560 --> 00:19:52,520 Speaker 1: there's things like you know, Perot and Bernanki and all 352 00:19:52,520 --> 00:19:54,359 Speaker 1: these like fancy names Belle and they each have a 353 00:19:54,400 --> 00:19:58,600 Speaker 1: little clever story behind them. Jedi Jedi Blue. 354 00:19:57,760 --> 00:20:03,560 Speaker 4: And behind those fancy names are typically experiments, they would 355 00:20:03,560 --> 00:20:06,920 Speaker 4: call it. Where Google is testing making changes to its 356 00:20:06,920 --> 00:20:10,880 Speaker 4: auctions in order to drive some sort of outcome, whether 357 00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:12,840 Speaker 4: it be more revenue for Google, whether it be more 358 00:20:12,840 --> 00:20:17,359 Speaker 4: market power or more business for Google, you know, driving 359 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:19,760 Speaker 4: more revenue to the publishers or the advertisers. Like it's 360 00:20:19,760 --> 00:20:22,560 Speaker 4: them playing with the auctions. 361 00:20:22,600 --> 00:20:24,920 Speaker 1: And so we've seen some of the details of those. 362 00:20:25,760 --> 00:20:27,040 Speaker 1: I think what we're going to see now is some 363 00:20:27,080 --> 00:20:29,919 Speaker 1: of the intent behind them and some of the communications 364 00:20:29,920 --> 00:20:31,000 Speaker 1: internally about them. 365 00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,720 Speaker 2: I'd be interested. So Jedi Blue, that was the collusion 366 00:20:34,720 --> 00:20:36,000 Speaker 2: with Facebook. 367 00:20:35,520 --> 00:20:38,959 Speaker 1: Right, that was the alleged collusion with Facebook. It's very 368 00:20:39,080 --> 00:20:39,960 Speaker 1: much still around. 369 00:20:40,960 --> 00:20:44,640 Speaker 2: Well I thought that that got kind of dismissed in Europe. 370 00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:50,760 Speaker 1: Yeah, so Google has made that communication argument through some 371 00:20:50,840 --> 00:20:55,320 Speaker 1: of their proxies. It actually was dismissed in the the state. 372 00:20:55,359 --> 00:20:57,679 Speaker 1: AGS had their own case I mentioned was filed at 373 00:20:57,680 --> 00:21:00,359 Speaker 1: the end of twenty twenty in the Eastern District, Texas, 374 00:21:00,400 --> 00:21:02,600 Speaker 1: which was then moved to New York Southern just New York, 375 00:21:02,920 --> 00:21:07,280 Speaker 1: and while it was there that was dismissed from the case. 376 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:11,080 Speaker 1: I won't go into why or when that was accurate, 377 00:21:12,440 --> 00:21:17,400 Speaker 1: but it was that specific charge which had potential criminal 378 00:21:19,680 --> 00:21:24,520 Speaker 1: criminal implications for them was dismissed. That the complaint then 379 00:21:24,800 --> 00:21:28,080 Speaker 1: and the lawsuit then moved back to Texas for a 380 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:34,000 Speaker 1: different reason, and that discovery was reopened up about four 381 00:21:34,040 --> 00:21:38,080 Speaker 1: months ago, i'd say, on Facebook. And it also led 382 00:21:38,080 --> 00:21:42,240 Speaker 1: to a deposition of Sudar Pakai, the CEO of Google, 383 00:21:42,400 --> 00:21:44,359 Speaker 1: because he has unique knowledge about that deal. 384 00:21:45,320 --> 00:21:47,639 Speaker 2: It also led and what was the deal. 385 00:21:48,080 --> 00:21:54,320 Speaker 1: The deal as alleged was that Google Jedi. Project Jedi was, 386 00:21:54,680 --> 00:21:59,720 Speaker 1: as we understand, it was Google's attempt to match or 387 00:22:00,280 --> 00:22:03,280 Speaker 1: have their version of what's called header bitting, which was 388 00:22:03,320 --> 00:22:07,200 Speaker 1: this coding layer at the top of a web page 389 00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:09,920 Speaker 1: that opened up auctions so that other parties could compete 390 00:22:09,920 --> 00:22:13,000 Speaker 1: and participate in auctions, live auctions. And it was a 391 00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:16,600 Speaker 1: threat to Google's business because it meant that a publisher 392 00:22:16,680 --> 00:22:20,200 Speaker 1: could could participate put on their header of their web 393 00:22:20,240 --> 00:22:24,199 Speaker 1: page this code which would allow them to open up 394 00:22:24,200 --> 00:22:26,600 Speaker 1: their auctions to outside parties, so it didn't have to 395 00:22:26,600 --> 00:22:31,120 Speaker 1: go through Google Jedi Blue. So if you think about 396 00:22:31,119 --> 00:22:33,320 Speaker 1: that as a threat to Google, Jedi Blue was a 397 00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:36,800 Speaker 1: way to keep to do a deal with Facebook, as alleged, 398 00:22:36,800 --> 00:22:40,800 Speaker 1: so that Facebook would not support header bitting, that Facebook 399 00:22:40,840 --> 00:22:44,480 Speaker 1: would instead not participate in header evading, which would be 400 00:22:44,480 --> 00:22:47,760 Speaker 1: bad for header bitting, and would instead, you know, exchange 401 00:22:47,840 --> 00:22:50,159 Speaker 1: value with Google. And that value, as I understood it 402 00:22:50,200 --> 00:22:54,720 Speaker 1: from the complaints was and the reporting was that Facebook 403 00:22:54,760 --> 00:22:59,840 Speaker 1: would get additional matching of users and the auctions that 404 00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:04,000 Speaker 1: Google ran, and they would get speed preferences in the auction. 405 00:23:04,160 --> 00:23:07,119 Speaker 1: So if you think about the timing of bids. 406 00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:09,240 Speaker 2: But auctions within Google's ad. 407 00:23:09,119 --> 00:23:11,760 Speaker 1: Product, within Google system. Yeah, so that is. 408 00:23:11,680 --> 00:23:15,560 Speaker 2: An obvious that's an obvious use of monopoly power that 409 00:23:15,640 --> 00:23:18,199 Speaker 2: one feels. How has that being I'm shocked that that 410 00:23:18,240 --> 00:23:19,880 Speaker 2: hasn't caused more problems for them. 411 00:23:19,960 --> 00:23:22,639 Speaker 1: Well, and where it got the Smiths it was it 412 00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:27,280 Speaker 1: was narrowly read by the judge as normal. You know, 413 00:23:27,280 --> 00:23:29,120 Speaker 1: these are two companies that are competing with each other 414 00:23:29,160 --> 00:23:31,880 Speaker 1: still at the end of the day, and and they 415 00:23:31,880 --> 00:23:35,000 Speaker 1: were both getting a value exchange that that made sense 416 00:23:35,040 --> 00:23:37,960 Speaker 1: for them, and Facebook was acting the best interest of 417 00:23:38,840 --> 00:23:43,679 Speaker 1: its business. You know, it was a questionable ruling, but 418 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:46,560 Speaker 1: what's important to understand is that still it is part 419 00:23:46,600 --> 00:23:49,240 Speaker 1: of the conduct for the just Department case starting next week. 420 00:23:49,600 --> 00:23:51,119 Speaker 1: It's a part of the conduct for the State a 421 00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:56,240 Speaker 1: g case and Sinndarbakai has now been deposed about it 422 00:23:56,280 --> 00:24:01,120 Speaker 1: in the last two months, and the attorneys all flew 423 00:24:01,160 --> 00:24:05,080 Speaker 1: over the night Kingdom to depose Facebook's project manager on it, 424 00:24:05,480 --> 00:24:08,560 Speaker 1: who also believed Mark Zuckerberg ahead of his met with Sundarbakai. 425 00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:12,560 Speaker 1: And so you know, it's very much in the in 426 00:24:12,600 --> 00:24:15,080 Speaker 1: the documents. When you dig in, there's stuff moving very 427 00:24:15,119 --> 00:24:16,920 Speaker 1: quickly that Facebook was trying to fight and we was 428 00:24:16,960 --> 00:24:20,680 Speaker 1: trying to fight, and that project manager from Facebook is 429 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:23,240 Speaker 1: is on the witness list for the Justice Department in the. 430 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:26,280 Speaker 2: Next few baby. I could not wait for that. As 431 00:24:26,359 --> 00:24:29,560 Speaker 2: discussed listeners, Jyson is going to be back quite a 432 00:24:29,560 --> 00:24:31,640 Speaker 2: few times in the next few weeks to discuss the stuff. 433 00:24:31,680 --> 00:24:35,560 Speaker 2: I'm quite excited by this. So, what are some other 434 00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:39,600 Speaker 2: any other like notable projects on there, notable like Perroh 435 00:24:39,680 --> 00:24:40,880 Speaker 2: and such that you mentioned. 436 00:24:41,480 --> 00:24:45,520 Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, there's there's there's a project in which 437 00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:49,320 Speaker 1: the you know, I don't know how much you went 438 00:24:49,359 --> 00:24:52,560 Speaker 1: get into like the way auctions work, but typically okay, 439 00:24:53,000 --> 00:24:55,520 Speaker 1: so a lot of these auctions and and certainly Google's 440 00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:58,080 Speaker 1: auctions for their search ads from the very beginning, I've 441 00:24:58,080 --> 00:25:02,359 Speaker 1: always been second price auctions. So so the company that 442 00:25:02,440 --> 00:25:05,920 Speaker 1: the bidder that bids the highest doesn't actually pay their bid. 443 00:25:06,000 --> 00:25:10,440 Speaker 1: They pay the second highest bid plus a penny. Chymically 444 00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,320 Speaker 1: how it happens, right, And so there's all sorts of 445 00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:18,040 Speaker 1: rationale behind that. And so there's a project in which 446 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:22,320 Speaker 1: the actual price that was paid was basically the third 447 00:25:23,200 --> 00:25:27,840 Speaker 1: the third highest, and then the dollar amounts. So they 448 00:25:27,840 --> 00:25:29,840 Speaker 1: paid the second highest, I'm sorry, and then they delivered 449 00:25:30,040 --> 00:25:33,879 Speaker 1: the third highest, and so they kept the margin in 450 00:25:33,920 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 1: between and then reinvested it back into boosting other auctions 451 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:44,719 Speaker 1: basically bids. It was called Bernanke I think that was 452 00:25:44,840 --> 00:25:47,639 Speaker 1: the plane Bernanky, and then there was another flavor of that, 453 00:25:48,440 --> 00:25:51,119 Speaker 1: but it basically was like, you know, re routing some 454 00:25:51,160 --> 00:25:55,359 Speaker 1: of the margin between the second and third highest back 455 00:25:55,400 --> 00:25:58,080 Speaker 1: into the system to increase other bids. 456 00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:03,280 Speaker 2: That makes sense, so but sorry if I misunderstand. How 457 00:26:03,320 --> 00:26:05,720 Speaker 2: did that benefit Google upon Mike. 458 00:26:06,160 --> 00:26:10,640 Speaker 1: Well, it it allowed them. The allegations are that by 459 00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:13,400 Speaker 1: then rerouting that money back in and boosting other bids, 460 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:19,720 Speaker 1: it allowed Google's system to win more auctions. So it 461 00:26:19,760 --> 00:26:22,200 Speaker 1: was the same money flowing, but it allowed them to 462 00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:24,120 Speaker 1: win more auctions which help them take market share. 463 00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:28,199 Speaker 2: That's it's crazy. It's crazy that it seems not just 464 00:26:28,400 --> 00:26:31,680 Speaker 2: it seems like an outright cone in so many places. 465 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:34,720 Speaker 1: I mean, you know, Google will try to argue for 466 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:38,720 Speaker 1: each of these some sort of benefit to the advertisers 467 00:26:38,840 --> 00:26:40,960 Speaker 1: or to the publishers on one side or the other. 468 00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:44,360 Speaker 1: But I think ultimately what we'll see and I think 469 00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:46,800 Speaker 1: will be most damage into Google will there's there's likely 470 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:49,800 Speaker 1: to be evidence that will show both of those considerations, 471 00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:52,919 Speaker 1: going into some math to say how does this help Google? 472 00:26:53,400 --> 00:26:55,360 Speaker 1: You know, And so you know, if you're if you're 473 00:26:55,359 --> 00:26:57,840 Speaker 1: able to see both sides of the transaction, you have 474 00:26:57,880 --> 00:27:01,679 Speaker 1: a clear conflict of interest and you're able to to 475 00:27:02,080 --> 00:27:05,600 Speaker 1: you know, manipulate the both sides of the business rather 476 00:27:05,600 --> 00:27:07,760 Speaker 1: than acting the best interests of both sides of the 477 00:27:07,760 --> 00:27:10,520 Speaker 1: business individually in a way to benefit yourself. 478 00:27:10,640 --> 00:27:12,800 Speaker 2: So do we know yet who's going to get the 479 00:27:12,840 --> 00:27:14,240 Speaker 2: post or a cross examined. 480 00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:17,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, we have, we have a witness list for sure. 481 00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:19,520 Speaker 2: Yeah, who you're looking forward to. 482 00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:25,639 Speaker 1: You know, there's a couple ex Googlers that actually tried 483 00:27:25,640 --> 00:27:31,719 Speaker 1: to get their testimonies uh quashed. But that didn't happen today, 484 00:27:32,480 --> 00:27:36,840 Speaker 1: I mean so last week, I guess now so. But 485 00:27:36,960 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 1: there's a few ex employees. 486 00:27:39,080 --> 00:27:40,800 Speaker 5: That know a lot about the advents that have been 487 00:27:40,800 --> 00:27:44,440 Speaker 5: around a long time. I think it's like Lesala, There's 488 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:49,040 Speaker 5: a guy named Chris Scott Spencer. They just know a lot. 489 00:27:49,160 --> 00:27:53,680 Speaker 5: And uh, you know Neil Mohan who ran the double 490 00:27:53,720 --> 00:27:56,000 Speaker 5: click business that was then bought by Google and ran 491 00:27:56,040 --> 00:27:58,760 Speaker 5: the ad business for a long time. I think will 492 00:27:58,800 --> 00:28:00,159 Speaker 5: be super interesting. 493 00:28:00,240 --> 00:28:03,560 Speaker 1: I think the Facebook witness that I mentioned just to 494 00:28:03,640 --> 00:28:06,040 Speaker 1: get an answer whether or not Jedi Blue was a 495 00:28:06,080 --> 00:28:07,920 Speaker 1: problem or not once in for all, I think will 496 00:28:07,920 --> 00:28:11,119 Speaker 1: be interesting. So there's a long list. There's you know, 497 00:28:11,119 --> 00:28:14,760 Speaker 1: there's key players from the ad tech business that have 498 00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:17,439 Speaker 1: competed against Google over the years or tried to the 499 00:28:17,480 --> 00:28:23,600 Speaker 1: guy that ran app Nexus, the guy that runs index Exchange. 500 00:28:23,880 --> 00:28:27,760 Speaker 1: These are like, you know, people that are very, very 501 00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:30,560 Speaker 1: knowledgeable in the entire history of the att tech business 502 00:28:31,200 --> 00:28:32,359 Speaker 1: that will be on the standard. 503 00:28:33,359 --> 00:28:35,800 Speaker 2: So there's a dumb question, how big a deal is this? 504 00:28:36,400 --> 00:28:40,200 Speaker 2: How as far as his history of the tech industry goes, 505 00:28:40,320 --> 00:28:41,320 Speaker 2: how big is this? 506 00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:47,520 Speaker 1: Well, I mean the Google antitrust suits themselves actually use 507 00:28:47,560 --> 00:28:52,440 Speaker 1: the description of the Assistant Attorney General cant Or. He 508 00:28:52,440 --> 00:28:56,080 Speaker 1: He described it as on the mount rushmore of anti 509 00:28:56,120 --> 00:28:59,480 Speaker 1: trust cases. You know, I think with Standard Oil, AT 510 00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:03,320 Speaker 1: and T and Microsoft was was Google. You know, this 511 00:29:03,440 --> 00:29:10,040 Speaker 1: is their advertising business, and you know, the actual advertising 512 00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:13,240 Speaker 1: revenue business is two hundred and fifty billion dollars quarter 513 00:29:13,240 --> 00:29:16,240 Speaker 1: of a trillion dollars. They'll argue this is just their 514 00:29:16,240 --> 00:29:18,160 Speaker 1: ad tech part of the business, so they'll say it's 515 00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:22,240 Speaker 1: thirty or forty billion. You know, as I mentioned, I 516 00:29:22,240 --> 00:29:25,640 Speaker 1: think the data fuels and I think this enables the 517 00:29:25,640 --> 00:29:28,600 Speaker 1: rest of their business in any way. So this is 518 00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:30,440 Speaker 1: a really big deal. And this is you know, this 519 00:29:30,480 --> 00:29:33,320 Speaker 1: is what funds journalism, entertainment across the internet. 520 00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:37,080 Speaker 2: Good that not in turn, I'm not I'm not I 521 00:29:37,080 --> 00:29:39,680 Speaker 2: think Google should get broken up. But is there a 522 00:29:39,720 --> 00:29:42,920 Speaker 2: world where this is better for journalism if. 523 00:29:42,800 --> 00:29:45,000 Speaker 1: They get broken up? I think absolutely. Yeah. I think 524 00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:51,560 Speaker 1: there's short term concerns in any breakup outcome, because it's 525 00:29:51,600 --> 00:29:53,840 Speaker 1: going to be a headache and you know, the benefits 526 00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:56,680 Speaker 1: are going to take some time to start to play out. 527 00:29:56,760 --> 00:30:00,600 Speaker 1: But if you just if you just use the man sense, 528 00:30:00,640 --> 00:30:02,600 Speaker 1: do you think about the stock market or any sort 529 00:30:02,640 --> 00:30:06,720 Speaker 1: of marketplace having a company that's on the buy side 530 00:30:06,760 --> 00:30:10,200 Speaker 1: and the cell side and developing the rules. Ultimately, they're 531 00:30:10,200 --> 00:30:11,640 Speaker 1: going to take more and more money out of the 532 00:30:11,800 --> 00:30:15,560 Speaker 1: supply chain, right and so so. A world in which 533 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:17,920 Speaker 1: the company on the buy side or the company on 534 00:30:17,920 --> 00:30:19,800 Speaker 1: the sell side have to act in the best interest 535 00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:22,840 Speaker 1: of the advertiser, whether it be the small, small mom 536 00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:26,920 Speaker 1: and pop store buying advertising, or the publisher on the 537 00:30:26,960 --> 00:30:29,840 Speaker 1: other end, being the local newspaper or national player or whatever, 538 00:30:30,640 --> 00:30:33,360 Speaker 1: you know, having to act in their best interests is 539 00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:38,720 Speaker 1: a really really important, you know, and common sense sort 540 00:30:38,760 --> 00:30:44,520 Speaker 1: of marketplace rule where you actually have competition that are 541 00:30:44,560 --> 00:30:46,160 Speaker 1: serving the best interests of the parties. 542 00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:01,760 Speaker 2: Do you think that this could kill Google? Because I 543 00:31:01,800 --> 00:31:05,480 Speaker 2: have this ongoing theory about this company that they can't 544 00:31:05,480 --> 00:31:08,480 Speaker 2: survive without their monopolies. I just don't. I don't know anything. Yeah, 545 00:31:09,120 --> 00:31:11,560 Speaker 2: in the sense that they make more than half of 546 00:31:11,600 --> 00:31:14,080 Speaker 2: their revenue from a from search, which they have a 547 00:31:14,120 --> 00:31:16,560 Speaker 2: monopoly on, connect to ads, which they have a monopoly 548 00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:19,040 Speaker 2: on where they hold all the data and completely rig 549 00:31:19,120 --> 00:31:22,400 Speaker 2: the dice for themselves. I don't see how Google survives 550 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:25,600 Speaker 2: this in its current form. I don't even mean just 551 00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:27,480 Speaker 2: breaking them up. I just mean, if they are no 552 00:31:27,560 --> 00:31:30,400 Speaker 2: longer allowed to rig dice quite how they've been rigging them? 553 00:31:30,960 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: Yeah to a quite. I mean, you know, in a 554 00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:37,080 Speaker 1: breakup scenario, then I think your answer is right that 555 00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:39,520 Speaker 1: they don't survive it. And you know, and maybe it's 556 00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:42,480 Speaker 1: best for shareholders anyway, if you if you study you know, 557 00:31:42,520 --> 00:31:46,360 Speaker 1: AT and T and other standard oil et cetera, you 558 00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:49,320 Speaker 1: know it could release more value anyway, if there's if 559 00:31:49,320 --> 00:31:52,200 Speaker 1: YouTube separated or any of the ad tech businesses separated, 560 00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:56,440 Speaker 1: how reliant are they? I mean that takes me back 561 00:31:56,480 --> 00:31:58,080 Speaker 1: a little bit aded to the search trial. I mean, 562 00:31:58,200 --> 00:32:01,480 Speaker 1: my my biggest obs arevation out of the search trial, 563 00:32:01,480 --> 00:32:03,680 Speaker 1: and I spent a lot of time studying it and 564 00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:07,200 Speaker 1: being in the courtroom that I think hasn't been totally 565 00:32:07,280 --> 00:32:13,280 Speaker 1: appreciated yet. Is that how important Google's scale in terms 566 00:32:13,320 --> 00:32:17,240 Speaker 1: of search queries is. And so they have ninety eight 567 00:32:17,280 --> 00:32:21,880 Speaker 1: percent of the mobile search queries eight percent, and. 568 00:32:22,880 --> 00:32:25,440 Speaker 2: That ability search market the. 569 00:32:25,480 --> 00:32:28,959 Speaker 1: Queries themselves being asked into search prompts on mobile. 570 00:32:29,520 --> 00:32:32,160 Speaker 2: And so just to be clear, you mean across every 571 00:32:32,200 --> 00:32:33,200 Speaker 2: single search engine? 572 00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:36,360 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, sorry, yes, across general search engines. 573 00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:38,640 Speaker 2: Is the way it was defined that is completely insane 574 00:32:38,720 --> 00:32:39,520 Speaker 2: and so I and. 575 00:32:39,520 --> 00:32:43,760 Speaker 1: You think about the scale of that, and importantly for 576 00:32:43,880 --> 00:32:47,040 Speaker 1: what they call tail queries. So a tail query for 577 00:32:47,080 --> 00:32:50,000 Speaker 1: the listeners, if they're not aware, is a query that's 578 00:32:50,040 --> 00:32:52,680 Speaker 1: never been asked before, right. 579 00:32:52,680 --> 00:32:55,600 Speaker 2: And that makes up like what certain amount, like this 580 00:32:55,800 --> 00:32:56,960 Speaker 2: surprisingly large amount of. 581 00:32:57,040 --> 00:32:59,680 Speaker 1: Fifteen percent is what you know, what we learn in 582 00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:02,560 Speaker 1: a the UK's investigation of Google was that fifteen percent 583 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:06,840 Speaker 1: of the queries any given day are tail queries. And 584 00:33:07,760 --> 00:33:10,080 Speaker 1: you know, those are the things I've never been asked 585 00:33:10,120 --> 00:33:13,520 Speaker 1: before in a search prompt. And so Judge Meta used 586 00:33:13,760 --> 00:33:16,760 Speaker 1: several times during the trial and the fall, used the 587 00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:21,160 Speaker 1: example of Taylor Swift and Travis Kelsey like that there 588 00:33:21,160 --> 00:33:22,880 Speaker 1: was a moment in time where nobody had ever put 589 00:33:22,920 --> 00:33:27,120 Speaker 1: those two names together in a prompt before, right, And 590 00:33:27,240 --> 00:33:30,040 Speaker 1: I don't know how quick it was after they started dating, 591 00:33:30,080 --> 00:33:33,120 Speaker 1: but it was a new query and unless you actually 592 00:33:33,120 --> 00:33:36,520 Speaker 1: had some context for it, you didn't know what it meant. 593 00:33:37,120 --> 00:33:39,400 Speaker 1: And so if you take that to the fifteen percent 594 00:33:39,480 --> 00:33:43,320 Speaker 1: of the billions of queries they're happying, you know, maybe 595 00:33:43,320 --> 00:33:47,320 Speaker 1: given a week on Google, their ability to understand those 596 00:33:47,400 --> 00:33:51,560 Speaker 1: queries and because of their scale and to decide what 597 00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:53,960 Speaker 1: to do with them in terms of driving clicks where 598 00:33:53,960 --> 00:33:57,680 Speaker 1: they go to satisfy the users and to target advertising 599 00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:05,200 Speaker 1: is extraordinary, very relative to anyone else, including nineteen times 600 00:34:05,560 --> 00:34:08,160 Speaker 1: on mobile, nineteen times more than the rest of the 601 00:34:08,200 --> 00:34:12,160 Speaker 1: market combined. And the rest of the market includes Microsoft right, 602 00:34:12,239 --> 00:34:13,560 Speaker 1: a three trillion dollar company. 603 00:34:13,640 --> 00:34:16,799 Speaker 2: So so they just have this massive dates or advantage 604 00:34:16,840 --> 00:34:18,640 Speaker 2: that no one else could possibly have. 605 00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:23,080 Speaker 1: Right, And it's in particularly valuable in terms of recency 606 00:34:23,160 --> 00:34:26,120 Speaker 1: of data and queries like the new stuff. 607 00:34:26,120 --> 00:34:29,120 Speaker 2: That being a yeah, so you can anticipate what adds 608 00:34:29,200 --> 00:34:30,040 Speaker 2: people might be. 609 00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:32,920 Speaker 1: Right or just where they want to go on the 610 00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:34,280 Speaker 1: internet when that search happens. 611 00:34:35,480 --> 00:34:37,600 Speaker 2: But how can they use that dates to help themselves? 612 00:34:37,760 --> 00:34:42,160 Speaker 1: Well, one, it locks them in because there's nothing more 613 00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:45,840 Speaker 1: frustrating than searching for something that's a new, fresh search. 614 00:34:46,239 --> 00:34:49,120 Speaker 1: You know, it's typically really interesting, it's typically related to news, right, 615 00:34:49,160 --> 00:34:51,879 Speaker 1: it's things that are happening in society in a given 616 00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:55,399 Speaker 1: day that probably journalists are actually the ones doing all 617 00:34:55,400 --> 00:34:58,120 Speaker 1: the work and carrying the cost and burden of And 618 00:34:58,200 --> 00:35:00,840 Speaker 1: then you know, if the search engine know the answer, 619 00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:03,279 Speaker 1: or if it gives you back results that aren't very good, 620 00:35:03,760 --> 00:35:06,279 Speaker 1: you get frustrated, right, So you end up back on 621 00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:09,839 Speaker 1: Google because they're better at it and they just lock 622 00:35:09,960 --> 00:35:13,200 Speaker 1: that in. And so you know that ninety eight percent 623 00:35:13,520 --> 00:35:15,480 Speaker 1: if you take that and apply it to the future, 624 00:35:15,520 --> 00:35:18,400 Speaker 1: and it's particularly AI world where everybody talks about in 625 00:35:18,400 --> 00:35:22,520 Speaker 1: the AI world how valuable capital is, right, so, and 626 00:35:22,560 --> 00:35:26,360 Speaker 1: how valuable compute is Amazon Meta. You know, these companies 627 00:35:26,400 --> 00:35:31,480 Speaker 1: have enormous compute, Microsoft, Google and enormous capital. But what 628 00:35:31,520 --> 00:35:33,320 Speaker 1: they don't have is what Google has, which is that 629 00:35:33,840 --> 00:35:38,080 Speaker 1: that query scale. And so Google's ability, when it wants 630 00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:41,799 Speaker 1: to to entrench itself even further is pretty significant in 631 00:35:41,880 --> 00:35:46,160 Speaker 1: terms of training large language models and and you know, 632 00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:49,279 Speaker 1: being able to respond appropriately to a prompt in the 633 00:35:49,320 --> 00:35:52,879 Speaker 1: AI world. And so they could ultimately and I think, 634 00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:54,440 Speaker 1: you know, based on what I was seeing, they could 635 00:35:54,440 --> 00:35:58,319 Speaker 1: squash even Microsoft and open AI when they want to, right, 636 00:35:58,480 --> 00:36:00,040 Speaker 1: and so. 637 00:35:59,320 --> 00:36:00,879 Speaker 2: So do you think that they'll do? Do you think 638 00:36:00,920 --> 00:36:03,240 Speaker 2: that this could have wider ramifications than just Google. 639 00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:05,440 Speaker 1: I think it could. 640 00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:05,839 Speaker 4: Yeah. 641 00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:07,879 Speaker 1: I mean I think if you're watching this in your 642 00:36:07,920 --> 00:36:12,279 Speaker 1: Microsoft or your Apple, for sure you're thinking really hard 643 00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:15,040 Speaker 1: about how this could unlock opportunity for you. So I 644 00:36:15,080 --> 00:36:16,080 Speaker 1: think this is a big one. 645 00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:19,560 Speaker 2: So what are you excited about What is the part 646 00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:21,239 Speaker 2: of the trial as we go into this, what are 647 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:23,799 Speaker 2: you really looking forward to as a sports fan. 648 00:36:25,239 --> 00:36:28,760 Speaker 1: As a sports fan, you know, I think the great 649 00:36:28,840 --> 00:36:31,920 Speaker 1: challenge and I think the just Department did a phenomenal 650 00:36:32,040 --> 00:36:34,959 Speaker 1: job of this and the Search trial is being able 651 00:36:34,960 --> 00:36:37,920 Speaker 1: to tell the story and explain it to the judge 652 00:36:37,920 --> 00:36:40,800 Speaker 1: in the room right into the public, explain their case. 653 00:36:40,880 --> 00:36:42,840 Speaker 1: And I think, you know, they did that in the 654 00:36:42,880 --> 00:36:47,120 Speaker 1: complaint very very well. I think people should know as 655 00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:50,080 Speaker 1: much as as much as there's this reputation that goes 656 00:36:50,120 --> 00:36:54,120 Speaker 1: back a long time that people in DC, whether it 657 00:36:54,200 --> 00:36:59,520 Speaker 1: be lawmakers or regulators, don't really understand technology. I would 658 00:36:59,560 --> 00:37:03,520 Speaker 1: just really strongly suggests that they're wrong on this one. 659 00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:06,960 Speaker 1: And the attorneys that are involved, and they were involved 660 00:37:07,000 --> 00:37:08,640 Speaker 1: in the Search trial and now involved in this ad 661 00:37:08,640 --> 00:37:12,879 Speaker 1: tech trial, they really have done their homework. These are 662 00:37:13,000 --> 00:37:17,680 Speaker 1: you know, these are really really strong, you know, strong 663 00:37:18,680 --> 00:37:21,879 Speaker 1: and competently tech, you know, technical folks that can dive 664 00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:24,040 Speaker 1: in and understand how things work. And they've they've done 665 00:37:24,080 --> 00:37:26,920 Speaker 1: their homework over the years. The questions that they were 666 00:37:26,960 --> 00:37:30,600 Speaker 1: asking back in twenty eighteen were already pretty impressive. I mean, 667 00:37:30,600 --> 00:37:33,200 Speaker 1: they are the questions that that the top ad tech 668 00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:35,600 Speaker 1: company people wouldn't be asking, you know, the people into 669 00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:37,719 Speaker 1: the industry would be asking. And then they've been you know, 670 00:37:37,880 --> 00:37:41,160 Speaker 1: studying that for now almost five you know, five years 671 00:37:41,239 --> 00:37:44,479 Speaker 1: before they filed their lawsuit, and so I'm really interested 672 00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:46,440 Speaker 1: in how they present their case and tell the story 673 00:37:46,920 --> 00:37:50,719 Speaker 1: for sure. You know, one thing that also will be 674 00:37:50,760 --> 00:37:53,600 Speaker 1: interesting is the chill I guess I described as the 675 00:37:53,680 --> 00:37:55,720 Speaker 1: chill over the room. 676 00:37:56,640 --> 00:37:56,800 Speaker 4: You know. 677 00:37:56,880 --> 00:37:59,400 Speaker 1: I I don't think it's a secret that I was 678 00:37:59,440 --> 00:38:02,160 Speaker 1: involved or or you had means with the just Department 679 00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:05,200 Speaker 1: over the years on this on this case. And one 680 00:38:05,200 --> 00:38:07,880 Speaker 1: of the things I told them very early on was 681 00:38:08,040 --> 00:38:11,759 Speaker 1: that probably the greatest symptom would just be the lack 682 00:38:11,840 --> 00:38:15,719 Speaker 1: of people willing to talk to them. Right that everybody 683 00:38:15,840 --> 00:38:19,160 Speaker 1: does business with Google, and Google is probably the most 684 00:38:19,200 --> 00:38:22,799 Speaker 1: important business partner for most companies in terms of their 685 00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:25,880 Speaker 1: news and information being found, in terms of their advertising 686 00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:30,360 Speaker 1: being delivered, et cetera, et cetera. So you're gonna have 687 00:38:30,360 --> 00:38:33,040 Speaker 1: a lot of witnesses that are under subpoenas and and 688 00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:35,719 Speaker 1: are there because they were ordered by the court to 689 00:38:35,760 --> 00:38:38,720 Speaker 1: be there, and they're gonna have to testify to the facts, 690 00:38:39,520 --> 00:38:41,480 Speaker 1: and that will be interesting to see. I don't think 691 00:38:41,480 --> 00:38:44,360 Speaker 1: they'll be talking much in the press about about these issues. 692 00:38:45,040 --> 00:38:47,840 Speaker 2: And do you think you've kind of hinted the press 693 00:38:47,880 --> 00:38:50,000 Speaker 2: hasn't been covering like they've been covering it, Just to 694 00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,200 Speaker 2: be clear, But why do you think that this is 695 00:38:52,680 --> 00:38:55,160 Speaker 2: This feels like it should be the only story everywhere, 696 00:38:55,160 --> 00:38:58,000 Speaker 2: But it's quite quiet out there. Again, people are still 697 00:38:58,080 --> 00:38:58,640 Speaker 2: covering it. 698 00:39:01,880 --> 00:39:04,080 Speaker 1: I mean, I think that the chill piece plays into 699 00:39:04,080 --> 00:39:09,680 Speaker 1: that too, and and so you know both. I don't 700 00:39:09,680 --> 00:39:11,759 Speaker 1: want to say they're fearful of covering it, but at 701 00:39:11,880 --> 00:39:14,880 Speaker 1: least some of the trade press. Google is an important 702 00:39:14,960 --> 00:39:18,440 Speaker 1: advertiser for their events and for their for their publications 703 00:39:19,880 --> 00:39:22,239 Speaker 1: the d C Press. Google is probably one of the 704 00:39:22,239 --> 00:39:25,799 Speaker 1: biggest sponsors of of their their sites and their newsletters, 705 00:39:26,360 --> 00:39:30,839 Speaker 1: and so that doesn't motivate them probably to be there. 706 00:39:31,360 --> 00:39:36,719 Speaker 1: And then on top of that, the resources are constrained 707 00:39:37,000 --> 00:39:39,359 Speaker 1: because Google sucked up a lot of the revenue, so 708 00:39:40,120 --> 00:39:42,120 Speaker 1: most newsrooms don't have enough back. We're now in the 709 00:39:42,200 --> 00:39:45,960 Speaker 1: day where all the local you know, Chicago, La, New York, 710 00:39:46,040 --> 00:39:49,839 Speaker 1: all these different publishers could all send their reporters, so 711 00:39:49,880 --> 00:39:52,719 Speaker 1: they instead rely on like the Associated Press or some 712 00:39:52,760 --> 00:39:58,040 Speaker 1: sort of wire reporter. Right, Yeah, so that's difficult. 713 00:39:58,239 --> 00:40:00,880 Speaker 2: It's a difficult. I find it's quite difficult to analyze 714 00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:03,359 Speaker 2: because even like asking you how is Google will use 715 00:40:03,400 --> 00:40:09,280 Speaker 2: this monopoly, it's a multifaceted answer, and it almost feels 716 00:40:09,360 --> 00:40:13,360 Speaker 2: like people don't really realize how big Google is despite 717 00:40:13,480 --> 00:40:16,279 Speaker 2: knowing it ninety eight you just so I'm clear to 718 00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:19,800 Speaker 2: repeat this, it's ninety eight percent of all searches on mobile. 719 00:40:20,040 --> 00:40:20,480 Speaker 1: That's right. 720 00:40:20,920 --> 00:40:25,080 Speaker 2: That is insane. Yeah, yeah, that is like Ford, every 721 00:40:25,400 --> 00:40:29,520 Speaker 2: every single truck being made by Ford other than like 722 00:40:29,800 --> 00:40:33,319 Speaker 2: a tiny amount, but also every road also being made. 723 00:40:33,520 --> 00:40:35,120 Speaker 2: It boggles the mind. 724 00:40:35,640 --> 00:40:38,000 Speaker 1: Yeah. Yeah. And then the data that comes with it. 725 00:40:38,280 --> 00:40:40,680 Speaker 1: They'll talk about the revenue from that, but then the 726 00:40:41,239 --> 00:40:43,560 Speaker 1: data is what underpins all of this, and it's in 727 00:40:43,640 --> 00:40:46,719 Speaker 1: the case throughout an end, and the importance of that 728 00:40:46,840 --> 00:40:47,640 Speaker 1: data and the. 729 00:40:47,560 --> 00:40:52,120 Speaker 2: Scale almost feels as if the money isn't quite as important, 730 00:40:52,480 --> 00:40:55,080 Speaker 2: or it is, but just the money is not enough 731 00:40:55,719 --> 00:40:56,360 Speaker 2: to analyze it. 732 00:40:56,400 --> 00:40:58,879 Speaker 1: I agree, I agree, I mean I think the data 733 00:40:58,920 --> 00:41:03,600 Speaker 1: pieces as every as important and and it informs and 734 00:41:03,640 --> 00:41:06,759 Speaker 1: gives unique advantages that no one else has. If you 735 00:41:06,840 --> 00:41:11,400 Speaker 1: think about being able to merge that mobile query data 736 00:41:11,480 --> 00:41:15,040 Speaker 1: with the att tech data, with the browsing data, you know, 737 00:41:15,480 --> 00:41:22,120 Speaker 1: with the Android data. So yeah, so the press, I 738 00:41:22,160 --> 00:41:24,879 Speaker 1: think I'm optimistic that there will be more trade press 739 00:41:24,920 --> 00:41:27,360 Speaker 1: because this is advertising specific that will show up at 740 00:41:27,440 --> 00:41:29,560 Speaker 1: least for the first week, and that will be good. 741 00:41:30,520 --> 00:41:33,480 Speaker 1: On the flip side, I think also it's important to 742 00:41:33,520 --> 00:41:36,480 Speaker 1: know that this courthouse is fairly unique in that it 743 00:41:36,520 --> 00:41:39,040 Speaker 1: doesn't allow any devices in the building. 744 00:41:39,440 --> 00:41:42,759 Speaker 2: Any any but you put them, you just don't bring them. 745 00:41:42,840 --> 00:41:44,560 Speaker 1: You don't you're not allowed to bring in the building. 746 00:41:44,800 --> 00:41:46,319 Speaker 2: And so jesus. 747 00:41:46,520 --> 00:41:49,160 Speaker 1: So there's no streaming, there's no recording, there's nothing. 748 00:41:50,320 --> 00:41:52,400 Speaker 2: Is there a live broadcast or anything. 749 00:41:53,000 --> 00:41:55,520 Speaker 1: There is an overflow room where they will have a 750 00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:57,960 Speaker 1: broadcast into the other room for people that are in 751 00:41:58,000 --> 00:41:59,080 Speaker 1: the overflow room. 752 00:41:59,080 --> 00:42:01,359 Speaker 2: But you can't a device to recall that. 753 00:42:01,480 --> 00:42:03,040 Speaker 1: You're not all the right device into the building. 754 00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:04,440 Speaker 2: What's the Russian now with that? 755 00:42:06,000 --> 00:42:11,319 Speaker 1: I think it's old school court rules and uh, you 756 00:42:11,360 --> 00:42:15,080 Speaker 1: know it does it limits the ability for the public 757 00:42:15,160 --> 00:42:19,000 Speaker 1: to watch the witnesses and get visions. And so I 758 00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:22,640 Speaker 1: think that way this this courthouse is you know, this 759 00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:25,760 Speaker 1: may be interesting from a Google perspective. I mean, it's 760 00:42:25,880 --> 00:42:28,960 Speaker 1: it sees a lot of very sensitive cases. It's in 761 00:42:29,000 --> 00:42:32,560 Speaker 1: northern Virginia. So I think the CIA, the Pentagon, like 762 00:42:33,000 --> 00:42:35,960 Speaker 1: this judge, you know, as I mentioned, dealt with some 763 00:42:35,960 --> 00:42:40,480 Speaker 1: pretty sensitive matters, criminal matters over the years, and so 764 00:42:40,480 --> 00:42:43,480 Speaker 1: so I think that's the way they're they're used to operating. 765 00:42:43,719 --> 00:42:45,319 Speaker 1: It was it was kind of an amusing moment this 766 00:42:45,400 --> 00:42:47,600 Speaker 1: morning when Google tried to put in the last minute 767 00:42:47,600 --> 00:42:50,880 Speaker 1: request to have an extra laptop or two in the 768 00:42:51,000 --> 00:42:53,000 Speaker 1: room for the lawyers to be able to look up 769 00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:55,759 Speaker 1: stuff really quickly exhibits, and she denied it, and oh, so. 770 00:42:55,760 --> 00:42:58,160 Speaker 2: It's gonna be it's gonna be like, just to be clear, 771 00:42:58,360 --> 00:43:02,279 Speaker 2: regular lawyers also print out stuff anyway, but it's going 772 00:43:02,320 --> 00:43:05,680 Speaker 2: to be just completely analog the whole way down. 773 00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:08,600 Speaker 1: Google will be allowed and the problem will be allowed 774 00:43:08,640 --> 00:43:12,120 Speaker 1: to have a device and a backup device to put 775 00:43:12,239 --> 00:43:14,640 Speaker 1: exhibits up on the screen so that people in the 776 00:43:14,640 --> 00:43:17,719 Speaker 1: courtroom will be able to see the visual exhibits on 777 00:43:17,760 --> 00:43:18,360 Speaker 1: the screens. 778 00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:21,120 Speaker 2: So you have to write down a lot, you have 779 00:43:21,120 --> 00:43:21,919 Speaker 2: to write down a line. 780 00:43:22,000 --> 00:43:24,200 Speaker 1: And she said that Google wasn't allowed to have any 781 00:43:24,239 --> 00:43:28,080 Speaker 1: other devices beyond those because that's not the way we 782 00:43:28,120 --> 00:43:28,719 Speaker 1: do things here. 783 00:43:28,840 --> 00:43:34,040 Speaker 2: So so just a clear for our listeners. Jason will 784 00:43:34,080 --> 00:43:37,520 Speaker 2: be joining me every week to go through the happenings 785 00:43:37,520 --> 00:43:39,239 Speaker 2: of this case because I feel like it's the most 786 00:43:39,239 --> 00:43:42,640 Speaker 2: important thing happening in tech while also being one of 787 00:43:42,719 --> 00:43:44,240 Speaker 2: the more difficult things to pull apart. 788 00:43:45,160 --> 00:43:47,240 Speaker 1: I agree, I agree. Well, thank you for the interest. 789 00:43:47,320 --> 00:43:51,279 Speaker 2: Yeah, of course. So Jason, where can people find you? 790 00:43:51,320 --> 00:43:53,440 Speaker 2: Because you're going to be following along and dropping stuff 791 00:43:53,440 --> 00:43:54,280 Speaker 2: on Twitter as well. 792 00:43:54,640 --> 00:43:57,640 Speaker 1: Yeah, it will be I'm mad, Jason underscore kin't knt. 793 00:43:58,440 --> 00:44:00,520 Speaker 1: I also would do a plug if you don't mind for. 794 00:44:00,640 --> 00:44:04,920 Speaker 2: Please, that's one we're asking US v Google ads dot com. 795 00:44:05,000 --> 00:44:09,239 Speaker 1: Us v Google ads dot Com. There's a coalition of 796 00:44:09,600 --> 00:44:12,160 Speaker 1: organizations that are trying to make sure that the public 797 00:44:12,200 --> 00:44:16,480 Speaker 1: interest is met to and so there's those exhibits are 798 00:44:16,480 --> 00:44:19,399 Speaker 1: being posted there, and witness lists and and all sorts 799 00:44:19,440 --> 00:44:22,799 Speaker 1: of documents that as they come out. So I think 800 00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:25,400 Speaker 1: the goal that of that website is to make sure 801 00:44:25,480 --> 00:44:27,600 Speaker 1: that you know some of the challenges in the search 802 00:44:27,640 --> 00:44:30,359 Speaker 1: trial are are overcome for this one. 803 00:44:31,080 --> 00:44:33,480 Speaker 2: Well, Jason, good luck in there, bring your pen and 804 00:44:33,560 --> 00:44:36,520 Speaker 2: paper and we'll speak next week and get an update. 805 00:44:37,040 --> 00:44:37,440 Speaker 1: Excellent. 806 00:44:37,440 --> 00:44:48,279 Speaker 2: Thanks for having me in, Thanks so much. Thank you 807 00:44:48,320 --> 00:44:51,000 Speaker 2: for listening to Better Offline. The editor and composer of 808 00:44:51,040 --> 00:44:54,000 Speaker 2: the Better Offline theme song is Matasowski. You can check 809 00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:57,000 Speaker 2: out more of his music and audio projects at Matasowski 810 00:44:57,040 --> 00:45:00,520 Speaker 2: dot com, M A T T O. 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