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Speaker 1: Welcome to the show, fellow conspiracy realist. We are returning

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Speaker 1: to you with a very strange classic all the way

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Speaker 1: from twenty eighteen, The story of Ghostnets.

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Speaker 2: Yes, this is one of those long investigations that turned

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Speaker 2: up with a really cool name for the bad guys.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, yeah. What if in the age of the Internet,

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Speaker 1: you could create a new kind of army, something that

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Speaker 1: used viruses and software viruses, malware, you know, the same

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Speaker 1: way that other militaries use missiles and spies and bombs.

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Speaker 1: You know. Looking at this back in from twenty twenty

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Speaker 1: four from this vantage point, a lot of it is

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Speaker 1: surprisingly prescient.

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Speaker 2: It's weird how long ago twenty eighteen actually was. Stop

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Speaker 2: when it comes to technological advancements and just where we

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Speaker 2: find ourselves now, that was forever ago.

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Speaker 1: Oh gosh, yeah it was. However, we are airing this

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Speaker 1: classic because we hope that you, like us, will find

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Speaker 1: some strange things to appreciate from the vantage of the

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Speaker 1: modern day. Because you're right, Matt, it was a long

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Speaker 1: time ago.

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Speaker 2: Yes, let's discover ghost net and ghost rat together right now.

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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies, history is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know.

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Speaker 2: Welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, my

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Speaker 2: name is Nol.

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Speaker 1: They call me Ben. We are joined with our returning

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Speaker 1: guest super producer, Casey Pegram. Most importantly, you are here

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Speaker 1: that makes this stuff they don't want you to know.

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Speaker 1: Today's episode is about war. What is it good for?

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Speaker 1: A war that some people will tell you is just

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Speaker 1: a few years in the distance.

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Speaker 2: A ward that's already kind of happeningha.

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Speaker 1: A war that other people will argue has already begun.

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Speaker 1: Right here are the facts. So the state of war

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Speaker 1: is changing in decades and centuries past. Most of us

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Speaker 1: who are not hundreds of years have only seen this

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Speaker 1: depicted in film right and photographs and such. In the

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Speaker 1: past ages and past conflicts, there would be things like

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Speaker 1: Napoleonic warfare. Napoleonic warfare is one of the reasons that

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Speaker 1: the Civil War here in the US was such a

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Speaker 1: bloody conflict. It's that thing where people line up in

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Speaker 1: rows and they all hold guns or some kind of weapon,

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Speaker 1: and then somebody in charge stands in the back and

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Speaker 1: makes them all march toward each other and just continually

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Speaker 1: shoot and see who's left standing at the end.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a combination of the technology available to wage

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Speaker 2: war and the rules that are set in place or

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Speaker 2: agreed upon. Just as what is the correct thing to

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Speaker 2: do in war?

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Speaker 1: Right? Right? What is the ethical thing? The traditional thing?

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Speaker 1: How much do we value the lives of the people

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Speaker 1: we are sending to die? The answer in Napoleonic war

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Speaker 1: is with value. So war has changed, as you said, Matt,

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Speaker 1: and it is continually changing. There are a lot of

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Speaker 1: wonderful things we've talked about on the show that come

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Speaker 1: from war, usually advances in medical technology, but they're earned

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Speaker 1: through horrific experiences, and there are lots of other non

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Speaker 1: medical technological breakthroughs. Usually weaponize things that later have a

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Speaker 1: civilian use.

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Speaker 2: And that's everything from well, not really zippers, but kind

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Speaker 2: of zippers, like clothing, really lots and lots of different

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Speaker 2: types of and kinds of clothing, to what's something else, oh,

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Speaker 2: velcrow food, yeah, food storage, just every upperware.

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Speaker 1: Well, everything probably in some way descended.

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Speaker 2: Comes from innovation from war because you have needs.

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Speaker 1: So in this way, in just this relatively innocent, innovative way,

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Speaker 1: one could argue that war is an economic necessity. The

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Speaker 1: more realistic and way less inspiring ted talkie version of

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Speaker 1: war's and economic necessity is the one that admits that

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Speaker 1: despite all the ideological clap trap people are fed by

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Speaker 1: their leaders, war is typically going to be about dominance

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Speaker 1: and resource extraction, controlling the stage, the theater in which

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Speaker 1: these blood drenched plays occur. And now we have moved

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Speaker 1: past long past napoleonic warfare to what we would have

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Speaker 1: considered modern warfare, which would be smaller groups of people

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Speaker 1: or larger groups dividing into smaller groups, practicing things that

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Speaker 1: were once seen as very dishonorable, like guerrilla tactics, you know, hide, shoot,

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Speaker 1: avoid rents, and repeat and use information available to better

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Speaker 1: target things. That's why we have now we live in

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Speaker 1: a world of unmanned aerial vehicles that in theory are

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Speaker 1: targeting specific threats and never getting it wrong, not once.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: A lot of the technology is very much one sided,

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Speaker 2: which is why being at the top of the technology

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Speaker 2: game is so important.

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Speaker 1: Yeah yeah, And it's hard to overstate that. And a

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Speaker 1: lot of nations, even the very advanced nations, are working

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Speaker 1: with these strangely uneven levels of sophistication computers in one

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Speaker 1: part or in one department could be top notch, bleeding

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Speaker 1: edge sci fi stuff that the public won't see for

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Speaker 1: another ten to fifteen years. But the same country, maybe

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Speaker 1: even in the same building, could have computers that are

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Speaker 1: doing equally important tasks that are hopelessly outdated, like they're

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Speaker 1: pre windows. They're on IBM, you know, like all the

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Speaker 1: Hacker film screens in the nineties.

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Speaker 2: The greens with the monocolored Yes, yeah, those do still exist,

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Speaker 2: and Windows ninety five machines in highly important like water

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Speaker 2: treatment plants, something as simple as that, even if it's

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Speaker 2: not war.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. I don't remember if which show this was on,

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Speaker 1: but I think we did an episode before either here

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Speaker 1: on car stuff about how distressingly easy it is to

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Speaker 1: compromise infrastructure, like all the traffic If you were in

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Speaker 1: the US and you're listening to this, unless you're in

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Speaker 1: a very, very large city, the odds are that most

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Speaker 1: of your traffic lights are controlled by a central thing,

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Speaker 1: and you can you can hack into it, don't you're

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Speaker 1: not telling you to.

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Speaker 2: And the terminals are usually immediately there, next to right, So.

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Speaker 1: You cannot just mess up one traffic light. You can

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Speaker 1: mess up all of them.

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Speaker 3: Did you ever see that episode of mcguiver where he

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Speaker 3: like uses like a credit card and sticks it inside

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Speaker 3: and you know, he opens up the traffic box and

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Speaker 3: he like gets the lights to change on command by

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Speaker 3: like you know, using some kind of plastic device to

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Speaker 3: like break the circuit. I can't remember that what he did,

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Speaker 3: it was very mcgivory, but yeah, he called he basically

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Speaker 3: it was kind of messed up because he actually caused

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Speaker 3: a pretty catastrophic looking pile up.

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Speaker 4: And as like mcguiver, that's not cool.

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Speaker 1: You don't kill mcguver y. Yeah, uh that's and that

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Speaker 1: is for the record, the original mcguiver, the good one,

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Speaker 1: hot take. Yeah, sure, fine, no regrets, but it's true

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Speaker 1: where we have uneven progress as a species, especially in

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Speaker 1: this field, and according to prominent think tanks like the

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Speaker 1: Rand Corporation, this new face of war, we're evolving past

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Speaker 1: guerrilla tactics, past just sending people out with good human

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Speaker 1: intel or sigent signal intelligence.

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Speaker 2: And it's less about who has the biggest gun.

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Speaker 1: Right exactly, It's more about who has the best information.

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Speaker 1: So all of the think tanks are more or less agreeing.

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Speaker 1: In this post nuclear society, we have everybody still has nukes, right,

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Speaker 1: but a lot of people you don't want to use them.

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Speaker 1: That's political suicide. So now we're trying to find better

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Speaker 1: ways to steal, bag or borrow information, and that leads

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Speaker 1: us to something called strategic information warfare. This is the

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Speaker 1: term the US eggheads prefer to use. It has another

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Speaker 1: term in other places. It's one subgenre of what we

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Speaker 1: would call asymmetrical warfare. If we're three different nations, sorry,

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Speaker 1: if we're four different nations and we're in a conflict

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Speaker 1: and one of us, Matt, let's say you're America and

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Speaker 1: you have the world's most powerful navy.

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Speaker 2: I most certainly do.

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Speaker 1: There's no reason for US other countries to spend billions

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Speaker 1: and billions and billions of dollars trying to catch up

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Speaker 1: with you when we can just leapfrog you and build

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Speaker 1: a battleship killer or an aircraft carrier killer, something that

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Speaker 1: is less expensive to build and almost impossible for you

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Speaker 1: to defend against.

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Speaker 3: Matt, why are you always flexing that superior navy and air.

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Speaker 2: Force because I can print dollars getting a little too.

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Speaker 4: Big for them pants.

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Speaker 2: You'll never know my black budgets.

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Speaker 1: Yes, it's true. It's all true. And Matt, you know,

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Speaker 1: those are great pants Matt.

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Speaker 4: Has they have their American flag pants.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, Matt's taking awaaring his uncle Sam outfit just twenty

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Speaker 1: four seven, which just has to weird out your kid.

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Speaker 2: You know. He comes to love it and he calls

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Speaker 2: me Sammy. He says, Sammy, what are we doing today?

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Speaker 2: And I'm like, we're gonna find some natives and we're

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Speaker 2: gonna take all their landowna their blankets with the plague. Oh,

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Speaker 2: I'm sorry. I think I was roll playing a little

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Speaker 2: too hard. Now, America there for it. America is great.

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Speaker 1: Well, America is a country, and all countries have blood

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Speaker 1: on their hands. I would challenge anybody. It's the name

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Speaker 1: one that does not.

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Speaker 4: That's actually my favorite song of the moment.

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Speaker 1: It's called Country Blood, Country Blood by Toby Keith. That

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Speaker 1: sounds great. Sounds Uh sounds great Toby Keith. Uh probably

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Speaker 1: would fit oddly enough. This is soft track, but Toby

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Speaker 1: Keith would fit in more into psyops, right, propaganda warfare.

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Speaker 1: If you want to freak out people in foreign country,

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Speaker 1: play your own music really loud, sounds very patriotic, and

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Speaker 1: then play it for hours like the Barney so has

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Speaker 1: often been used when law enforcement is making a siege

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Speaker 1: of some kind of compound or commune anyway. So now

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Speaker 1: we've got the basic logic, why bother to try to

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Speaker 1: build a battleship when you can build something that kills

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Speaker 1: a battleship, or you can build something that teaches you

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Speaker 1: how to kill a battleship, and you can do it

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Speaker 1: for a lot less money. This is why we get

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Speaker 1: this is how we get to information warfare. This is

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Speaker 1: why hacking is so important. Stealing information from another country

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Speaker 1: or from another business, you know what, forget about Uncle Sam.

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Speaker 1: Let's just say go to Northrop Grumming, figure out what

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Speaker 1: they've got going on, right, And there are a million

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Speaker 1: ways to do it.

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Speaker 2: And I just would say hacking that that kind of

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Speaker 2: tactic really is an underdog tactic because it's it requires

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Speaker 2: that there is someone that has something that is worth stealing, right,

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Speaker 2: And I completely see that logic, I understand it's it's God,

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Speaker 2: I don't want to get into it too much, but

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Speaker 2: the psychology of a suicide bombing or a kamakaze, right

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Speaker 2: when you get into that idea of we do not

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Speaker 2: have the technology to meet this group in warfare. Like

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Speaker 2: you're saying, battleships and build battleships, but we can do

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Speaker 2: something that destroys a battleship.

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Speaker 1: Right, Yeah, I see what you're saying.

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Speaker 2: And that's essentially what this is. We cannot build this thing,

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Speaker 2: but we can take the information, and we can know

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Speaker 2: what you're doing, and we can basically use some of

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Speaker 2: the other guerrilla tactics and things because now we know

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Speaker 2: what you're doing.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, that's absolutely correct. And the US in particular is

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Speaker 1: seen as very vulnerable to these sorts of hacking attempts

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Speaker 1: because operational security is such a tough thing for the

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Speaker 1: world's largest military to be. You know, it's it's like

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Speaker 1: you could get ninety here on something, but that other

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Speaker 1: ten percent is devilishly difficult. And this is where we

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Speaker 1: see the emergence of things that have been called, often

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Speaker 1: by various journalists pundits I think I even did it

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Speaker 1: a few years back, have been called hacking armies, state

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Speaker 1: sponsored well kind of kind of a state sponsored groups

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Speaker 1: used to compromise the security of rival governments, obtain intelligence,

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Speaker 1: and in a lot of cases target high value individuals

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Speaker 1: such as officials in the military, key industries, or officials

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Speaker 1: in political campaigns and so on. So for example, of

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Speaker 1: that super producer Casey Pegram is a general and he

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Speaker 1: has some kind of he has some kind of intimate

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Speaker 1: knowledge of something, then he would be he would be

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Speaker 1: a target worth looking as an individual. Good news is

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Speaker 1: most people are not most people. He just it doesn't matter.

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Speaker 1: The primary thing is where you work and what your

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Speaker 1: position is there, and maybe maybe maybe if you're related

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Speaker 1: to somebody really important. And the thing is, most of

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Speaker 1: these hacker armies operate in their home countries in a

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Speaker 1: way that their sponsors, their patrons can claim plausible deniability

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Speaker 1: if they're caught or suspected. So there was that Russian

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Speaker 1: botnet army that influenced Western social media. The story broke

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Speaker 1: in the wake of the previous presidential election. But this

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Speaker 1: botnet army was active on things, on a lot of

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Speaker 1: things for much longer, you know, like even on subreddits,

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Speaker 1: which is weird, and definitely on YouTube, which is weird.

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Speaker 1: And you have to wonder what their priorities are. But

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Speaker 1: according to Russia, the actual Federated States of Russia, their

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Speaker 1: official position is yet not with us. You know, if

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Speaker 1: they were doing some pro Russia only pro Russia is

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Speaker 1: personal feeling, not like we're not paying them to do it.

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Speaker 1: It's just they just like us so much, you know.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, they're doing it out of their own fields.

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Speaker 1: And we have not paid it. And this is a

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Speaker 1: very familiar line from Russia. It's oddly enough, it's one

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Speaker 1: we don't see us too often on the US side,

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Speaker 1: because the US has a really bad time as a

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Speaker 1: really tough time getting the top notch hackers often.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, just.

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Speaker 1: Because mainly because of the drug use policy for security clearance,

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Speaker 1: which I think they've walked back. So maybe it's I

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Speaker 1: don't know, maybe the really good US hackers are just

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Speaker 1: all completely secret and never commented on. Maybe the US

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Speaker 1: has a group of patriotic hackers, but Russia is clearly

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Speaker 1: playing paying these people, paying and playing paying to play

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Speaker 1: these people. So also, thank you man. So now we

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Speaker 1: have to ask about the other countries who has the

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Speaker 1: most effective hacker army. Most people, most of us in

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Speaker 1: the West, would just, like an a knee jerk reaction, say, well,

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Speaker 1: it's the USA. Obviously, it's the USA. Partner. You know,

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Speaker 1: we have the we've got the money, we've got the means,

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Speaker 1: we've got the motives, America bald eagles, rock flag and eagle.

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Speaker 2: You know, yeah, but America hasn't been an underdog for

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Speaker 2: a long time.

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Speaker 1: And I think you raised a very important point regarding

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Speaker 1: that perspective. So then maybe other people would say, oh,

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Speaker 1: it's it's Russia. Clearly it's Russia. They would say, look,

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Speaker 1: it's we know about the botnet. It's Russia. And then

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Speaker 1: other people would say, no, no, you guys are being ridiculous.

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Speaker 1: Pay attention. Look past the illusion of the single nation state.

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Speaker 1: Look at international surveillance. These cooperatives like five Eyes, which

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Speaker 1: is terrifying.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, because that's that's a bunch of countries working together,

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Speaker 2: combining forces and then saying, hey, we got all this land,

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Speaker 2: and we got all this sea around the land. Let's

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Speaker 2: just monitor.

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Speaker 1: Everything, and let's do it in such a way that

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Speaker 1: we're never actually technically breaking our own domestic laws.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, we just happened to share some information.

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Speaker 1: It's brilliant. It is so immoral and brilliant.

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Speaker 2: We've all got Gmail drafts open in accounts that we

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Speaker 2: share right.

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Speaker 1: Right, oh for portray us. So with all this stuff,

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Speaker 1: the problem is people tend to overlook the role of

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Speaker 1: China's digital superspies. And we want to be really careful

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Speaker 1: in this episode because there's so much when the nationalism

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Speaker 1: stuff comes into play, there's so many people fall in

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Speaker 1: this slippery slope of racism, you know, and jingoism. And

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Speaker 1: it's important to note that even the smallest countries are

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Speaker 1: full of people with different viewpoints. Very very very rarely

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Speaker 1: does an entire country move in lockstep and agree on something.

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Speaker 1: You know, is there are a ton of people here

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Speaker 1: in the US that completely don't think China is a threat,

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Speaker 1: don't want some sort of war, and that problem that

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Speaker 1: that variety of views is even larger in China. But

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Speaker 1: they're also probably they're also probably the biggest culprit or

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Speaker 1: biggest propagator of digital warfare today.

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Speaker 2: And we've seen that already in when we were talking

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Speaker 2: about infiltration and corporate infiltration and the use of getting

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Speaker 2: into systems, taking intellectual property from other countries and then

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Speaker 2: kind of building your own version of it. China. Again,

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Speaker 2: it's hard to even speak about it, but groups in

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Speaker 2: China have a very long history of doing.

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Speaker 4: This that's almost like on the level of corporate Esponi and.

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Speaker 2: Is corporate, but then if you imagine it we're just

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Speaker 2: kind of moving it over a couple of steps to

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Speaker 2: military espionage in this way.

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Speaker 3: Especially since because, like you said at the top of

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Speaker 3: the show, so much of the technology is created at

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Speaker 3: the military level before it, you know, ends up in

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Speaker 3: the public sphere.

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Speaker 4: So it's just a way of like getting proprietary technology early.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: And one of the main factors here is that China

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Speaker 2: is home to one point four billion people. It's the

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Speaker 2: most populous country, and they've been doing this for a long,

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Speaker 2: long long time. They see it's right, and it's hard

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Speaker 2: to even speak about it.

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Speaker 1: Well, China is that they and the stuff they don't

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Speaker 1: want you to know of this episode.

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Speaker 2: It is China's government.

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Speaker 1: We could call it the PRC if that.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that's that is that is good? The People's Republic

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Speaker 2: of China. Yeah. Yes. And they also made something. They

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Speaker 2: created a program, a group of networks and a network

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Speaker 2: of people that is doing something and it's called.

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Speaker 1: Ghost Net. Oh, GhostNet pretty good? Huh yeah, great, Dame.

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Speaker 4: I love it.

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Speaker 2: At least that's what it's called.

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Speaker 3: Isn't that the the name of a Mission Impossible movie?

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Speaker 3: Or is that that Ghost Nation?

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Speaker 1: Ghost It's something?

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Speaker 4: Rogue Nation?

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Speaker 3: What was it called I thought ghost protocol, ghost protocol maybe,

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Speaker 3: and there was also like a Tom Clancy video game

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Speaker 3: called ghost Recon I believe nice.

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Speaker 1: So we we have to we have to figure out

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Speaker 1: what that is. Hey, god, it's impossible. Okay, it's ghost protocol,

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Speaker 1: ghost protocol.

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Speaker 2: There you go.

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Speaker 1: I'm a fan of that. Are you a fan of that?

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Speaker 2: Oh?

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Speaker 3: They're fun so much running, a lot of running and jumping,

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Speaker 3: and you know, you can really tell that Cruz takes

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Speaker 3: doing his own stunts very seriously. There's a lot of

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Speaker 3: one takes, you know, not a lot of cutting, slicing

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Speaker 3: and dicing.

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Speaker 2: That's good stuff.

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Speaker 1: And it's still not as dangerous as again, to return

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Speaker 1: to our original tone, ghost net. But what is it?

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Speaker 1: We'll tell you after a word from our sponsor. Here's

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Speaker 1: where it gets crazy. So commercial fisher fishing people, members

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Speaker 1: of the commercial fishing industry who listen to the show.

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Speaker 1: It's a shout out to a very specific part of

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Speaker 1: the demographic here.

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Speaker 2: Deadly as catch.

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Speaker 1: Yes, yes, you all will be familiar with ghost net.

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Speaker 1: From a different perspective, ghost net can mean one of

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Speaker 1: two things in the world of commercial fishing. Ghost nets

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Speaker 1: or ghost gear are lost or discarded fishing nets that

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Speaker 1: float through the ocean, and every year they trap and

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Speaker 1: kill millions and millions and millions of marine animals. It's

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Speaker 1: a tragedy. The ocean ecosystem is collapsing. Your grandchildren may

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Speaker 1: not be able to eat fish. But that's the story

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Speaker 1: for another day.

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Speaker 2: Which what are you gonna do? Go out there and

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Speaker 2: capture all the nets?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, good luck, good luck. You try to capture the net,

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Speaker 1: but the net will capture you. Did it without making

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Speaker 1: it a Soviet Russia joke, at least in the world

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Speaker 1: of hacking, however. The ghost Net no Spaces is a

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Speaker 1: sophisticated program operating in China designed to capture information from

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Speaker 1: Ministries of Foreign Affairs, embassies, international organizations, high value target

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Speaker 1: type individuals, news media institutions and NGOs non government organizations.

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Speaker 2: Basically high value everything.

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Speaker 1: So how do we find out about this?

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Speaker 3: So ghost net was discovered when the office of Get This,

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Speaker 3: the Dali Lama in Darmasala, India, contacted experts to investigate

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Speaker 3: if this facility was being bugged, and a researcher at Cambridge,

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Speaker 3: a guy named Ross Anderson and also Shashir not Garaga

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Speaker 3: at the University of Illinois wrote this about this event.

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Speaker 2: Quote.

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Speaker 3: The Office of the Dalai Lama started to suspect it

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Speaker 3: was under surveillance while setting up meetings between his Holiness.

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Speaker 4: I wish people will call me his Holiness. That'd be awesome.

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Speaker 4: What do you have to do to get that title?

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Speaker 5: You have to be the Dali Lama or maybe a

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Speaker 5: pope their holiness. Yeah, yeah, so yeah, his Holiness and

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Speaker 5: foreign dignitaries. They were looking to surveil these meetings between

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Speaker 5: His Holiness, the Dalai Lama and foreign dignitaries, so they

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Speaker 5: sent an email invitation on behalf of the Dalai Lama

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Speaker 5: to a foreign diplomat, but before anyone was able to

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Speaker 5: follow up with a phone call, the diplomat's office was

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Speaker 5: contacted by the Chinese government and Warren not to go

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Speaker 5: ahead with the meeting.

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Speaker 1: So this is important because it means one of two

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Speaker 1: things happened. Either when the Office of the Dalai Lama

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Speaker 1: sent that email, the government of China knew what was happening, right, yes, somehow,

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Speaker 1: or when the embassy received the email, the government of

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Speaker 1: China found it and knew what was happening.

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Speaker 2: So yeah, they had one side of it. At least one.

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Speaker 1: Side right, and so mister Nagaraja travels to Dharamsala. Then

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Speaker 1: September of two thousand and eight, I believe and discovers

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Speaker 1: that the Tibetan computer system had been breached from inside China.

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Speaker 1: These computers contained details about the locations of refugees, Tibetan

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Speaker 1: refugees and the location of schools that were possible targets

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Speaker 1: for the Chinese. Assimilation is one way to say it,

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Speaker 1: assimilation tactics, but also the repression of Tibetan culture. So

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Speaker 1: they got hacked and then they launched into an investigation

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Speaker 1: that took almost a year before they reached their conclusions.

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Speaker 2: Yes, in two thousand and nine, it was a ten

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Speaker 2: month investigation by the Monk Center for International Studies in Toronto,

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Speaker 2: and they revealed that this thing, ghost net, not only

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Speaker 2: taps into their emails, but it also turns them into

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Speaker 2: giant listening devices.

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Speaker 1: Like a like an Amazon Alexa, right.

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Speaker 2: Yes, oh my god, or a Google Home or whatever

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Speaker 2: else you've just got sitting in your living room like me.

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Speaker 3: Wait, wait to like but like a reverse that thing, right,

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Speaker 3: because it's not it's not assisting you, it's not personally

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Speaker 3: assisting you. It's more personally helping itself to your information

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Speaker 3: and passing it on to whoever has.

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Speaker 1: Control, which which Alexa is doing as well.

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Speaker 4: Right, we just have the illusion that we control it.

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Speaker 1: Just don't get intimate around it. And here's a fun

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Speaker 1: one for the one who has one of these devices

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Speaker 1: in your house as you're listening to this podcast. Uh,

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Speaker 1: I'll do the one for Alexis someone do the one

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Speaker 1: for Google. Don't know what happens, hey, Alexa, tell us

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Speaker 1: Amazon's official privacy policy. It's not gonna do it. No,

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Speaker 1: there's no way to make it happen.

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Speaker 4: Hey Google, when's Lady Gaga's birthday?

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Speaker 1: I feel like that's way less important.

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Speaker 2: That's you, Hey Google, erase all of your records? There

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Speaker 2: you go.

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Speaker 4: I just can't do that, you know, I can't do that?

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Speaker 2: All right? Whatever?

439
00:26:18,320 --> 00:26:20,480
Speaker 1: Google, Hey Alexa, play desposito.

440
00:26:21,040 --> 00:26:23,720
Speaker 3: No, do you realize we've alienated literally everyone that's listening

441
00:26:23,760 --> 00:26:25,080
Speaker 3: to us on any of the devices right now?

442
00:26:25,160 --> 00:26:25,320
Speaker 2: Yeah?

443
00:26:25,440 --> 00:26:31,400
Speaker 1: No, absolutely, that's part of the show. And I don't

444
00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:34,320
Speaker 1: think it'll work if you're listening to it all one

445
00:26:34,359 --> 00:26:35,560
Speaker 1: of those devices already.

446
00:26:37,400 --> 00:26:38,680
Speaker 2: I don't. Yeah, I don't.

447
00:26:38,880 --> 00:26:41,680
Speaker 1: Write in and let us know and we hope that

448
00:26:41,680 --> 00:26:44,520
Speaker 1: that harmless prank hasn't done anything. The only reason I

449
00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:50,359
Speaker 1: bring it up is because those listening devices themselves are

450
00:26:50,480 --> 00:26:56,680
Speaker 1: notoriously imperfect at answering questions. There's a wealth of research

451
00:26:56,760 --> 00:27:00,400
Speaker 1: going on now to make these devices better at answering questions.

452
00:27:00,520 --> 00:27:03,320
Speaker 1: But I maintained that there's some questions they are simply

453
00:27:03,359 --> 00:27:08,280
Speaker 1: refusing to answer. Oh yes, such as privacy questions. What

454
00:27:08,440 --> 00:27:11,440
Speaker 1: happens to those recordings if you do think you have

455
00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:12,160
Speaker 1: erased them?

456
00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:14,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, the built in answers to a lot of those

457
00:27:14,960 --> 00:27:18,560
Speaker 2: questions have changed, especially as they get as they become

458
00:27:18,640 --> 00:27:22,040
Speaker 2: memes online. By the way, we just forgot to mention Siri,

459
00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:24,000
Speaker 2: the one that's like sitting on the desk and looking

460
00:27:24,040 --> 00:27:26,960
Speaker 2: at Siri right there, there's one in my pocket. Yeah,

461
00:27:28,280 --> 00:27:32,240
Speaker 2: Casey's got one out there, pretty sure. Oh lord, yep.

462
00:27:32,480 --> 00:27:34,040
Speaker 2: They're just in everybody's pocket now.

463
00:27:34,080 --> 00:27:36,240
Speaker 1: So it's true we have become the eyes and ears

464
00:27:36,240 --> 00:27:39,760
Speaker 1: that we feared our parents did. But the thing about

465
00:27:39,760 --> 00:27:43,160
Speaker 1: this program, ghost Net, is that it did not even

466
00:27:43,280 --> 00:27:49,240
Speaker 1: have the It did not even have the the pretense

467
00:27:50,080 --> 00:27:54,120
Speaker 1: of control or privacy concerns. It didn't even have the

468
00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:56,920
Speaker 1: theater of that that we see in Amazon and Google

469
00:27:57,680 --> 00:28:01,280
Speaker 1: because there was there was that no need. People weren't

470
00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:05,879
Speaker 1: supposed to know about this. The report stopped short of

471
00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:11,920
Speaker 1: outright accusing the government of the PRC for creating this network,

472
00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:16,040
Speaker 1: and instead they said everything, but they said the vast

473
00:28:16,080 --> 00:28:20,479
Speaker 1: majority of these attacks originate from inside China. What they

474
00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:25,000
Speaker 1: meant was, all of these attacks originate from inside China.

475
00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:28,320
Speaker 2: But they could be independently operating. They just happened to

476
00:28:28,400 --> 00:28:29,879
Speaker 2: be in China.

477
00:28:29,560 --> 00:28:33,760
Speaker 1: Right right, right. Someone is very patriotic, and they say,

478
00:28:34,080 --> 00:28:38,840
Speaker 1: you know what, not only am I a supremely talented

479
00:28:40,240 --> 00:28:44,920
Speaker 1: computer whiz, but I'm also not just patriotic, but I'm

480
00:28:44,920 --> 00:28:49,520
Speaker 1: plugged into the internal, often unstated policy goals of the

481
00:28:49,640 --> 00:28:53,240
Speaker 1: Chinese military and government just because I like the country

482
00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:55,600
Speaker 1: so much. So I'm just going to do this even

483
00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:58,240
Speaker 1: though the government has come forward and said that it's

484
00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:03,600
Speaker 1: a crime to go to jail due to breaking the

485
00:29:03,680 --> 00:29:06,280
Speaker 1: laws of the country I love, and the country I

486
00:29:06,280 --> 00:29:07,800
Speaker 1: love is going to put me into You know what

487
00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:13,000
Speaker 1: I mean is it's a lot of that's a lot

488
00:29:13,040 --> 00:29:17,680
Speaker 1: of It's just a lot in general to try to digest. Right,

489
00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:21,960
Speaker 1: So again, we have to be fair. It's unclear whether

490
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,800
Speaker 1: they're independent or state sponsored. But that goes back to

491
00:29:24,840 --> 00:29:29,000
Speaker 1: the idea of plausible deniability. And another thing that's important

492
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:31,200
Speaker 1: here too is that it's a little bit of a

493
00:29:31,240 --> 00:29:35,200
Speaker 1: lower simmer because a lot of other countries like Russia,

494
00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:41,520
Speaker 1: the US, Israel, or whatever, will have cyber attacks or

495
00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:47,320
Speaker 1: digital attacks that are blatantly violent, targeting things and in

496
00:29:47,360 --> 00:29:49,840
Speaker 1: many cases have a little bit of a little bit

497
00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:51,920
Speaker 1: of a style on them, a little bit of swag,

498
00:29:52,400 --> 00:29:55,120
Speaker 1: so that despite official deniability, it can be an open

499
00:29:55,160 --> 00:29:59,600
Speaker 1: secret about who did this. Like stuck'snet, clearly Israel US

500
00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:05,520
Speaker 1: right to cripple or at least mitigate the progress of

501
00:30:05,720 --> 00:30:11,320
Speaker 1: the Iranian nuclear program, Russia taking out various power grids

502
00:30:11,760 --> 00:30:14,480
Speaker 1: and then saying, oh, no, it's very sad.

503
00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:18,320
Speaker 2: That's weird. Well, yeah, a lot of times what at

504
00:30:18,440 --> 00:30:21,720
Speaker 2: least I'm seeing, And please write in and correct me

505
00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:25,360
Speaker 2: if I'm incorrect about this, Oh I will, Because with

506
00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:29,280
Speaker 2: these kinds of cyber attacks and security threats, where the

507
00:30:29,480 --> 00:30:34,040
Speaker 2: or originating or the area where an attack originates physically

508
00:30:34,480 --> 00:30:37,760
Speaker 2: is harder. It's becoming harder and harder to understand or

509
00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:41,360
Speaker 2: to verify, I guess, so you really have to look

510
00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:45,080
Speaker 2: at motive, like you're saying, ben like who what power

511
00:30:45,080 --> 00:30:47,560
Speaker 2: would want this to happen or want this area to

512
00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:51,520
Speaker 2: be infected or you know, this sector in this military

513
00:30:51,600 --> 00:30:52,400
Speaker 2: or something.

514
00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:54,680
Speaker 1: And then is this some weird star trek four D

515
00:30:54,920 --> 00:30:59,840
Speaker 1: level chess. It's interesting because one researcher said, this could

516
00:30:59,840 --> 00:31:03,600
Speaker 1: be happening in China without the knowledge of any Chinese nationals.

517
00:31:03,640 --> 00:31:07,880
Speaker 1: We can't forget that there are no clean nor ethical

518
00:31:08,120 --> 00:31:12,760
Speaker 1: intelligence agencies. That's not how intelligence works. Instead, Okay, so

519
00:31:12,880 --> 00:31:17,360
Speaker 1: Ronald Dibart, one of the researchers said, and I quote here,

520
00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:20,760
Speaker 1: we were a bit careful about it, knowing the nuance

521
00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:24,280
Speaker 1: of what happens in subterranean realms. Whoa you could tell

522
00:31:24,280 --> 00:31:28,400
Speaker 1: this guys, yeah whatever. This could also well be the

523
00:31:28,440 --> 00:31:31,480
Speaker 1: CIA or the Russians. It's a murky realm. We're lifting

524
00:31:31,480 --> 00:31:34,600
Speaker 1: the lid on, right, And at first I was very

525
00:31:34,600 --> 00:31:38,320
Speaker 1: skeptical about that, but it's a really good point, yes,

526
00:31:38,720 --> 00:31:41,880
Speaker 1: because if you wanted to make the government of China

527
00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:46,080
Speaker 1: look bad, dysreputable, or terrible, then just send some of

528
00:31:46,080 --> 00:31:49,080
Speaker 1: your own dirty boys in there to do an operation.

529
00:31:49,200 --> 00:31:50,880
Speaker 4: Gotta get them dirty boys on the scene.

530
00:31:51,000 --> 00:31:55,000
Speaker 1: I know, I like that phrase. So The US has

531
00:31:55,040 --> 00:32:01,440
Speaker 1: also repeatedly warned about China's increasing capabilities in the realm

532
00:32:01,560 --> 00:32:06,160
Speaker 1: of electronic warfare. But we're I don't know, we're setting

533
00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:12,000
Speaker 1: the context. We should probably walk everyone through how this happens,

534
00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:15,920
Speaker 1: because right now, the way it happens might surprise you.

535
00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:17,880
Speaker 1: It feels relatively simplistic.

536
00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:21,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, so you know what, let's take a word from

537
00:32:21,280 --> 00:32:23,560
Speaker 2: our sponsor and then we'll go through the what an

538
00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:37,120
Speaker 2: attack looks like. Okay, so the GhostNet is attempting to

539
00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 2: infect you. Here's what's going to happen.

540
00:32:41,360 --> 00:32:43,880
Speaker 1: First, you get an email, Casey, can we get an

541
00:32:43,960 --> 00:32:48,480
Speaker 1: email cube? But it's an email from someone you know.

542
00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:51,120
Speaker 1: It's not like, what's a made up name?

543
00:32:52,240 --> 00:32:54,239
Speaker 2: Uh, Lauren vogelbamb.

544
00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:58,040
Speaker 1: That's a great example. Actually, Okay, let's say it is

545
00:32:58,120 --> 00:33:01,080
Speaker 1: Lauren Vogela is someone you know. So you get this

546
00:33:01,120 --> 00:33:04,440
Speaker 1: email from someone you know, maybe someone you work with,

547
00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:08,160
Speaker 1: maybe a family member, but it's someone you trust, and

548
00:33:08,200 --> 00:33:10,840
Speaker 1: most importantly, it's someone that you have had a previous,

549
00:33:10,920 --> 00:33:15,360
Speaker 1: ongoing conversation with via these email addresses. And the email

550
00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:21,040
Speaker 1: itself is not going to be something blatantly like a scam.

551
00:33:21,040 --> 00:33:25,600
Speaker 1: It's actually going to be pretty pretty nuanced and sophisticated,

552
00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:29,200
Speaker 1: so it wouldn't be an email from Lauren. By the way,

553
00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:31,960
Speaker 1: for longtime listeners, you all you all know her from

554
00:33:32,000 --> 00:33:34,360
Speaker 1: our previous episode on Diamonds. We'll probably have her on

555
00:33:34,400 --> 00:33:37,160
Speaker 1: the show a little bit later as well. Longtime friend

556
00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:39,840
Speaker 1: of our show, personal friend of all of us, host

557
00:33:39,880 --> 00:33:43,959
Speaker 1: of Savor correct brain stuff. So maybe we receive an

558
00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:48,080
Speaker 1: email from her and it says instead of like, hey, omg,

559
00:33:48,320 --> 00:33:51,440
Speaker 1: lull click this crazy link, it says something like.

560
00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:52,360
Speaker 2: Because that's pretty blatant.

561
00:33:52,360 --> 00:33:55,160
Speaker 1: We've all seen those nouns, right, kitty emoji, right right,

562
00:33:55,520 --> 00:34:00,400
Speaker 1: it says something like it says, suddenly, hey, Ben. Earlier

563
00:34:00,560 --> 00:34:04,480
Speaker 1: last week, we were talking about, uh, you know, we

564
00:34:04,480 --> 00:34:10,320
Speaker 1: were talking about the differences between types of camels, or

565
00:34:10,360 --> 00:34:13,839
Speaker 1: between lamas and al pockets. And I'll think, oh, yeah,

566
00:34:13,880 --> 00:34:16,360
Speaker 1: I talked about that. I found this great interviewer. I

567
00:34:16,400 --> 00:34:18,360
Speaker 1: found this great article about this, and I thought you

568
00:34:18,360 --> 00:34:20,840
Speaker 1: would like to read it, like, oh man, yeah, okay,

569
00:34:20,880 --> 00:34:24,680
Speaker 1: I want to learn more about lamas a pacas. I'm in, yeah,

570
00:34:24,680 --> 00:34:27,120
Speaker 1: I'll pacas whatever. I need to know these things. And

571
00:34:27,160 --> 00:34:30,160
Speaker 1: then you click on a word documentary PDF that's there,

572
00:34:30,440 --> 00:34:34,640
Speaker 1: and when it opens up, it is actually about the

573
00:34:34,719 --> 00:34:36,480
Speaker 1: difference between lamas and our pockets.

574
00:34:36,520 --> 00:34:38,840
Speaker 2: Ye, And it actually opens up with word or whatever

575
00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:40,279
Speaker 2: in Adobe.

576
00:34:39,840 --> 00:34:41,400
Speaker 1: And it looks legit and you read it and you

577
00:34:41,440 --> 00:34:43,680
Speaker 1: think like, oh, what a great friend. Following up on that.

578
00:34:43,640 --> 00:34:46,520
Speaker 4: This operates as expected. Nothing amiss here.

579
00:34:46,520 --> 00:34:50,479
Speaker 1: Not at all. But if we could get a sound

580
00:34:50,560 --> 00:34:53,160
Speaker 1: cue that indicates a pivotal shift in tone here.

581
00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:56,080
Speaker 4: But that was good man.

582
00:34:56,719 --> 00:34:59,719
Speaker 1: What's actually happening as you're reading this is that a

583
00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:05,120
Speaker 1: virus is downloading very quickly into your computer. This virus,

584
00:35:05,360 --> 00:35:09,880
Speaker 1: a trojan, often a trojan called ghost rats, will allow

585
00:35:09,960 --> 00:35:14,200
Speaker 1: the hackers based in China, access to your camera, your microphone,

586
00:35:14,840 --> 00:35:18,799
Speaker 1: access to screenshots, access to your files, and it will

587
00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:23,000
Speaker 1: also be able to log keystrokes. That last part is

588
00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:24,120
Speaker 1: incredibly important.

589
00:35:24,239 --> 00:35:28,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, key logging. Let's just I think we glossed over

590
00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:32,240
Speaker 2: it a little bit. Ben Ghost Rat G H zero

591
00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:34,000
Speaker 2: S T R A T.

592
00:35:34,280 --> 00:35:36,880
Speaker 3: I love that Forrest Whitaker movie Ghost Rat in the

593
00:35:36,880 --> 00:35:37,799
Speaker 3: Way of the Samurai.

594
00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:40,200
Speaker 4: Oh yeah, Jim Jarmush directed number.

595
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:42,920
Speaker 2: It was a little slow for me, but overall I

596
00:35:43,000 --> 00:35:43,360
Speaker 2: enjoyed it.

597
00:35:43,360 --> 00:35:46,520
Speaker 3: It's gonna say ghost Dog, Okay, I think there is

598
00:35:46,560 --> 00:35:49,040
Speaker 3: a did the soundtrack though, and stuff that I want

599
00:35:49,080 --> 00:35:49,360
Speaker 3: you to know.

600
00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:49,839
Speaker 2: That's right.

601
00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:55,839
Speaker 1: And yeah, so this this thing happens. You're learning about

602
00:35:55,920 --> 00:36:02,680
Speaker 1: Loma's alpacas and then you are unwittingly becoming a an

603
00:36:02,760 --> 00:36:06,799
Speaker 1: alexa for these people. You're like a node a serie. Yeah,

604
00:36:06,840 --> 00:36:12,600
Speaker 1: you're a node. And ghost Rat itself is interesting because

605
00:36:12,600 --> 00:36:16,239
Speaker 1: it was very, very successful. We also should mention, Noel,

606
00:36:16,280 --> 00:36:18,200
Speaker 1: I think you alluded to this a little bit earlier,

607
00:36:18,440 --> 00:36:24,440
Speaker 1: that this occurs in the civilian world as well. Numerous voyeurs, hackers,

608
00:36:24,480 --> 00:36:27,880
Speaker 1: people with a crush or something. We'll hack into a

609
00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:32,839
Speaker 1: victim's webcam just to watch them, you know what I mean.

610
00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:35,879
Speaker 1: I can't remember. We're talking about this on air off air,

611
00:36:35,920 --> 00:36:40,520
Speaker 1: but not to steal nuclear secrets or something. What's different

612
00:36:40,520 --> 00:36:43,120
Speaker 1: here with ghost Rat and with ghost net is a

613
00:36:43,280 --> 00:36:46,799
Speaker 1: their names are way cooler and b Civilian webcams are

614
00:36:46,840 --> 00:36:49,320
Speaker 1: not typically going to give away things like troop movement

615
00:36:49,840 --> 00:36:54,400
Speaker 1: or the new design for a jet engine, or nuclear

616
00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:56,000
Speaker 1: payloads and their locations.

617
00:36:56,400 --> 00:36:58,480
Speaker 2: Yeah, we'll just call those ghost creeps.

618
00:36:58,840 --> 00:37:04,040
Speaker 1: Those are just ghost creeps. The Chinese government again officially

619
00:37:04,080 --> 00:37:08,560
Speaker 1: denies any involvement with cyber Spine. Spokesman for the Chinese

620
00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:11,839
Speaker 1: embassy in London in two thousand and nine, when this

621
00:37:12,080 --> 00:37:16,080
Speaker 1: was first breaking news, said Beijing had also fallen victim

622
00:37:16,120 --> 00:37:18,800
Speaker 1: to hackers and dismissed this report as part of the

623
00:37:18,880 --> 00:37:23,640
Speaker 1: Dali Lama's media and propaganda campaign. So it was just

624
00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:28,400
Speaker 1: a it was a frame job by the Dali Lama himself. Wow,

625
00:37:29,960 --> 00:37:34,600
Speaker 1: But yeah, that's that's how he It wasn't the numerous

626
00:37:34,600 --> 00:37:39,440
Speaker 1: allegations and proven instances of human rights abuses by the PRC.

627
00:37:39,680 --> 00:37:41,880
Speaker 1: Note he said that he thought the best way to

628
00:37:41,880 --> 00:37:45,520
Speaker 1: go at them would be a hacking accusation. Interesting, so

629
00:37:45,560 --> 00:37:49,600
Speaker 1: they said, this is smoke and mirrors, this is nothing,

630
00:37:50,320 --> 00:37:53,439
Speaker 1: pay no mind. But the problem is that a long

631
00:37:53,520 --> 00:37:57,440
Speaker 1: long time before that, the Chinese government decided to make

632
00:37:57,680 --> 00:38:01,640
Speaker 1: control of information one of them the main parts of

633
00:38:01,680 --> 00:38:04,960
Speaker 1: the country's policy. In two thousand and three, at the

634
00:38:04,960 --> 00:38:09,000
Speaker 1: tenth National People's Congress, the Chinese Army, which is controlled

635
00:38:09,000 --> 00:38:13,160
Speaker 1: by the Party. Very important difference here, the Chinese Army

636
00:38:13,160 --> 00:38:17,560
Speaker 1: announced the creation of information warfare units and a general

637
00:38:17,600 --> 00:38:21,400
Speaker 1: at the time, Dai ching Ming, said internet attacks would

638
00:38:21,640 --> 00:38:25,760
Speaker 1: always run in advance of any military operation to cripple enemies.

639
00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:27,600
Speaker 1: Said that in two thousand and three, and then in

640
00:38:27,600 --> 00:38:29,640
Speaker 1: two thousand and nine they're saying, we would never do

641
00:38:29,760 --> 00:38:32,799
Speaker 1: anything like that. The Dali Lama is trying to get

642
00:38:32,800 --> 00:38:35,480
Speaker 1: in your head. Yeah, Westerners.

643
00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:38,600
Speaker 2: Well it's really interesting in two thousand and three that's announced.

644
00:38:38,840 --> 00:38:42,480
Speaker 2: I'm trying to imagine how many full scale military conflicts

645
00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:45,920
Speaker 2: China has engaged in up into this time, and really

646
00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:49,000
Speaker 2: all I can think of is the South China Sea stuff,

647
00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:54,560
Speaker 2: but it's not really full military engagements. No, where they've

648
00:38:55,160 --> 00:38:59,920
Speaker 2: performed into internet attack in front of an actual military advance.

649
00:39:00,080 --> 00:39:05,160
Speaker 1: Well, they just said military operation, and a military operation

650
00:39:05,560 --> 00:39:09,600
Speaker 1: can also be a domestic operation or an operation on

651
00:39:09,640 --> 00:39:10,560
Speaker 1: the border.

652
00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:12,960
Speaker 2: So largely intelligency, it could be as well.

653
00:39:13,400 --> 00:39:15,839
Speaker 1: Yeah, sure, so it doesn't have to be an out

654
00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:20,560
Speaker 1: and out war, but it could easily be just like

655
00:39:20,640 --> 00:39:23,600
Speaker 1: you're saying, a series of small conflicts in the South

656
00:39:23,719 --> 00:39:29,440
Speaker 1: China Sea as they attempt to enlarge their maritime border

657
00:39:29,600 --> 00:39:32,440
Speaker 1: or excuse me, get everybody else to agree with what

658
00:39:32,520 --> 00:39:35,960
Speaker 1: they feel like their maritime border is that government feels.

659
00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:42,000
Speaker 1: So it's strange because we're hearing conflicting reports from government

660
00:39:42,000 --> 00:39:46,960
Speaker 1: officials depending on the situation. The Pentagon has been obsessed

661
00:39:47,040 --> 00:39:50,600
Speaker 1: with this and quite uncomfortable with it. They conducted a

662
00:39:50,719 --> 00:39:55,080
Speaker 1: number of investigations and one of the reports that they

663
00:39:55,320 --> 00:40:00,600
Speaker 1: issued said that Chinese progress in this sphere is pretty impressive.

664
00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:03,480
Speaker 1: They're scared, but they were impressed.

665
00:40:03,680 --> 00:40:06,440
Speaker 2: And I said, China has made steady progress in recent

666
00:40:06,520 --> 00:40:11,560
Speaker 2: years and developing offensive, nuclear, space, and cyber warfare capabilities,

667
00:40:11,840 --> 00:40:15,080
Speaker 2: the only aspects of China's armed forces that today have

668
00:40:15,200 --> 00:40:17,120
Speaker 2: the potential to be truly global.

669
00:40:18,800 --> 00:40:23,960
Speaker 1: So what they're saying there is that right now the

670
00:40:24,120 --> 00:40:28,560
Speaker 1: Chinese government, the Chinese military, the capacities that they have

671
00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:32,360
Speaker 1: in terms of military hardware are are making them a

672
00:40:32,480 --> 00:40:36,960
Speaker 1: regional power. Right in the economic sphere. They are truly

673
00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:40,319
Speaker 1: a global power, but if it comes down to you know,

674
00:40:40,960 --> 00:40:45,240
Speaker 1: guns and bombs and explosions, they can control a region,

675
00:40:45,360 --> 00:40:47,360
Speaker 1: but they can't lock down a globe.

676
00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:54,399
Speaker 2: Yeah, but they're focusing on nuclear, space and cyber which

677
00:40:54,400 --> 00:40:57,799
Speaker 2: are the three things that can reach pretty much anywhere

678
00:40:57,840 --> 00:40:58,400
Speaker 2: in the world.

679
00:40:58,680 --> 00:41:03,279
Speaker 1: They also are are building out a bluewater navy, yeah,

680
00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:05,880
Speaker 1: which is I think we talked about this in the past.

681
00:41:05,920 --> 00:41:07,600
Speaker 1: So there are not to get two in the weeds

682
00:41:07,600 --> 00:41:10,759
Speaker 1: with it, but there are three ways to rate the

683
00:41:10,880 --> 00:41:14,840
Speaker 1: navy of a country. The first is brownwater. Brownwater navy

684
00:41:14,960 --> 00:41:18,799
Speaker 1: is mainly at the coast. The second is greenwater. The

685
00:41:18,960 --> 00:41:25,080
Speaker 1: greenwater Navy can project force to other closer areas in

686
00:41:25,120 --> 00:41:27,520
Speaker 1: the region. It can go across a sea or something

687
00:41:27,560 --> 00:41:31,160
Speaker 1: like that. Right. A bluewater navy, which there are very few,

688
00:41:31,560 --> 00:41:34,319
Speaker 1: is able to project force anywhere across the globe. The

689
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:37,080
Speaker 1: US is the biggest bluewater navy, which is why you

690
00:41:37,160 --> 00:41:40,320
Speaker 1: hear about the US being involved in all sorts of

691
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:44,720
Speaker 1: maritime conflicts around the world. It's kind of where Britain

692
00:41:44,920 --> 00:41:48,320
Speaker 1: was during its days of naval glories.

693
00:41:48,520 --> 00:41:51,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, chances are chances and days of naval Yeah.

694
00:41:51,680 --> 00:41:54,759
Speaker 4: No ideas of naval glory and naval gazing.

695
00:41:54,840 --> 00:41:57,279
Speaker 1: Yeah, that's what it feels like, just.

696
00:41:57,280 --> 00:42:02,640
Speaker 2: The idea that there could be numerous, let's call them,

697
00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:07,080
Speaker 2: naval units deployed in anywhere in the world at any time,

698
00:42:07,480 --> 00:42:10,799
Speaker 2: and there probably are because there are bases. There are

699
00:42:10,840 --> 00:42:12,440
Speaker 2: naval bases throughout the world.

700
00:42:12,840 --> 00:42:13,319
Speaker 1: That's true.

701
00:42:13,360 --> 00:42:15,440
Speaker 2: We've got our stuff just parked and we've got the

702
00:42:16,200 --> 00:42:19,759
Speaker 2: supercarriers essentially that are out there that can just be

703
00:42:19,840 --> 00:42:21,160
Speaker 2: a base wherever you want it to be.

704
00:42:21,840 --> 00:42:26,000
Speaker 1: Yes, the US has eleven supercarriers, which are exactly if

705
00:42:26,080 --> 00:42:32,840
Speaker 1: you describe matt they're moving naval bases and now I

706
00:42:32,880 --> 00:42:37,120
Speaker 1: think because of twenty eighteen, officially China only has one

707
00:42:37,239 --> 00:42:41,680
Speaker 1: overseas logistics base. I think it's in Africa, and it

708
00:42:41,719 --> 00:42:46,000
Speaker 1: does have an aircraft carrier, or it's building one. It's

709
00:42:46,000 --> 00:42:49,160
Speaker 1: either building it or it's just built it. The point

710
00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:54,800
Speaker 1: is that stuff takes a much longer time ye become

711
00:42:55,520 --> 00:42:59,560
Speaker 1: to reach fruition. But this hacking stuff where all you

712
00:42:59,640 --> 00:43:04,719
Speaker 1: need or all you need are a few vulnerabilities in

713
00:43:04,160 --> 00:43:07,160
Speaker 1: one in one place and a few very very smart

714
00:43:07,160 --> 00:43:14,360
Speaker 1: people within internet connection in another. So everybody else's research,

715
00:43:14,480 --> 00:43:18,560
Speaker 1: all other government's research indicates this is the goal of China.

716
00:43:19,040 --> 00:43:21,920
Speaker 1: If so, this is the stuff that the Chinese government

717
00:43:21,960 --> 00:43:25,600
Speaker 1: doesn't want you to know because they maintain that this

718
00:43:25,680 --> 00:43:29,880
Speaker 1: is not happening, depending on who they talk to. Because

719
00:43:29,920 --> 00:43:32,480
Speaker 1: as we know, if you're a politician, you're making a

720
00:43:32,520 --> 00:43:36,279
Speaker 1: speech to a domestic audience, it's very different from what

721
00:43:36,320 --> 00:43:40,279
Speaker 1: you'll say to the United Nations most times, well.

722
00:43:40,280 --> 00:43:43,319
Speaker 3: Totally, I mean, like a good example is with Donald Trump,

723
00:43:43,360 --> 00:43:46,359
Speaker 3: who recently did a speech for the United Nations and

724
00:43:46,680 --> 00:43:49,200
Speaker 3: caught some flak in the form of a little bit

725
00:43:49,239 --> 00:43:52,239
Speaker 3: of a laughing at a statement that he made. That

726
00:43:52,360 --> 00:43:54,799
Speaker 3: is not the kind of reception he would be even

727
00:43:54,840 --> 00:43:58,439
Speaker 3: as like a kind of controversial president. Any president would

728
00:43:58,440 --> 00:44:01,040
Speaker 3: be used to speaking in front of a more friendly

729
00:44:01,280 --> 00:44:03,919
Speaker 3: domestic audience, let alone an audience of their base.

730
00:44:05,239 --> 00:44:08,840
Speaker 1: Yeah, and that's usually why. One thing unusual about that

731
00:44:08,920 --> 00:44:14,000
Speaker 1: speech I was alluding to is that he was he

732
00:44:14,120 --> 00:44:17,279
Speaker 1: was speaking with the same talking points he would use

733
00:44:17,320 --> 00:44:19,919
Speaker 1: for his domestic base. Yeah doesn't fly right, Yeah, which

734
00:44:19,960 --> 00:44:23,840
Speaker 1: other which other presidents usually wouldn't do, regardless of what

735
00:44:23,920 --> 00:44:32,279
Speaker 1: country they are representing. But this means that right now, technically,

736
00:44:32,880 --> 00:44:38,080
Speaker 1: officially on the record is isually we cannot say the

737
00:44:38,120 --> 00:44:44,080
Speaker 1: government of China is currently sponsoring a ton of ongoing

738
00:44:44,560 --> 00:44:48,400
Speaker 1: attacks to compromise various businesses and countries.

739
00:44:48,560 --> 00:44:50,040
Speaker 2: We can't even say that they did it in two

740
00:44:50,040 --> 00:44:50,719
Speaker 2: thousand and nine.

741
00:44:51,120 --> 00:44:58,160
Speaker 1: But here's the thing, right, multiple attacks. Most of these attacks,

742
00:44:58,239 --> 00:45:00,719
Speaker 1: especially ghost NETT, but also with these other the programs

743
00:45:00,960 --> 00:45:03,720
Speaker 1: have been traced to an island in China called Hainan,

744
00:45:04,239 --> 00:45:08,800
Speaker 1: and this island is home to a signals intelligence facility

745
00:45:08,880 --> 00:45:11,359
Speaker 1: run by the government. Is also home to the third

746
00:45:11,400 --> 00:45:15,240
Speaker 1: Technical Department of the People's Liberation Army. Which is their

747
00:45:16,080 --> 00:45:20,399
Speaker 1: cyber one of their cyber warfare places. So it may

748
00:45:20,440 --> 00:45:24,080
Speaker 1: not be sponsored by them. May maybe yeah, I mean

749
00:45:24,120 --> 00:45:26,160
Speaker 1: you could tell that. I don't believe it, that's my opinion.

750
00:45:26,440 --> 00:45:30,239
Speaker 1: But it's certainly in the same neighborhood, so maybe it's

751
00:45:30,239 --> 00:45:33,719
Speaker 1: someone who works there and is so patriotic that they're

752
00:45:33,719 --> 00:45:37,040
Speaker 1: doing this on their free time somehow. And keep in

753
00:45:37,040 --> 00:45:41,120
Speaker 1: mind that ghost Net happened ten years ago, has discovered

754
00:45:41,160 --> 00:45:43,759
Speaker 1: ten years ago, So whatever is out there now is

755
00:45:43,960 --> 00:45:47,080
Speaker 1: whatever the successors are, they're far beyond that, and they're

756
00:45:47,120 --> 00:45:51,400
Speaker 1: probably far beyond most of the technology available to citizens

757
00:45:51,400 --> 00:45:54,800
Speaker 1: here in the West. One of the servers was verified

758
00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:57,600
Speaker 1: to be a Chinese government server, So for people who

759
00:45:57,640 --> 00:46:00,279
Speaker 1: believe this PRC, that's a smoking gun. Wow.

760
00:46:00,920 --> 00:46:04,160
Speaker 2: Okay, let's just for a little bit of perspective. This

761
00:46:04,280 --> 00:46:06,279
Speaker 2: is two thousand and eight, two thousand and nine when

762
00:46:06,360 --> 00:46:12,360
Speaker 2: this is occurring, when computers across the globe and sensitive

763
00:46:12,400 --> 00:46:16,880
Speaker 2: areas were turned into Amazon alexis. That occurred five years

764
00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:22,200
Speaker 2: before the Amazon Alexa premiered. So so whoever is doing

765
00:46:22,239 --> 00:46:26,560
Speaker 2: this was way ahead of the game, way way ahead

766
00:46:26,560 --> 00:46:27,319
Speaker 2: of the game, and they.

767
00:46:27,239 --> 00:46:30,960
Speaker 3: Figured out you think maybe some of the technology that

768
00:46:31,000 --> 00:46:34,000
Speaker 3: goes into like these lists, these Alexas and these personal

769
00:46:34,000 --> 00:46:38,920
Speaker 3: assistants may have had its origin and military technology.

770
00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:42,400
Speaker 2: I didn't say that. I don't think like a bugging

771
00:46:42,440 --> 00:46:47,040
Speaker 2: device was the reason companies wanted you to have a

772
00:46:47,080 --> 00:46:50,279
Speaker 2: bugging device in your home. I don't think military applications

773
00:46:50,280 --> 00:46:54,880
Speaker 2: of bugging devices had anything to do with voluntary bugging devices.

774
00:46:54,920 --> 00:46:56,680
Speaker 3: Just so we're on the same page, I mean, it

775
00:46:56,760 --> 00:46:58,919
Speaker 3: is just an extension of like stuff like Facebook, where

776
00:46:58,920 --> 00:47:00,760
Speaker 3: we just you know, no one even needs to surveil

777
00:47:00,800 --> 00:47:02,879
Speaker 3: us anymore because it is dumping all our information out

778
00:47:02,880 --> 00:47:05,560
Speaker 3: into the interwebs, right, So why would it not be

779
00:47:05,600 --> 00:47:09,080
Speaker 3: a logical next step that we would just actively and

780
00:47:09,200 --> 00:47:13,360
Speaker 3: voluntarily install bugging devices in our own homes, you know,

781
00:47:13,760 --> 00:47:18,120
Speaker 3: using our ingenious powers of free will, right right.

782
00:47:18,880 --> 00:47:24,000
Speaker 1: And the spookiest thing of it all is, you know,

783
00:47:24,120 --> 00:47:26,759
Speaker 1: to the point we just made, we don't know whatever's

784
00:47:26,840 --> 00:47:32,359
Speaker 1: happening now, technologically speaking, in terms of surveillance, we might

785
00:47:32,360 --> 00:47:36,280
Speaker 1: not know about it for another ten five ten years.

786
00:47:36,920 --> 00:47:39,200
Speaker 1: And ghost Neet, as far as we know, has been

787
00:47:39,239 --> 00:47:42,600
Speaker 1: responsible for a minimum of one two hundred and ninety

788
00:47:42,600 --> 00:47:48,080
Speaker 1: five computer system attacks on embassies for ministries, government offices

789
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:52,600
Speaker 1: pretty much every exile center for the Dalai Lama in London, India,

790
00:47:52,640 --> 00:47:56,440
Speaker 1: and New York City. It's only one of multiple similar

791
00:47:57,120 --> 00:48:00,520
Speaker 1: operations running out of China. There are tons, and they

792
00:48:00,560 --> 00:48:01,840
Speaker 1: all have really cool names.

793
00:48:02,040 --> 00:48:04,760
Speaker 3: Just on the side take away from today's episode Ghost

794
00:48:04,840 --> 00:48:06,440
Speaker 3: Neet just kind of spooky.

795
00:48:08,120 --> 00:48:12,560
Speaker 1: Unlike other nations which tend to practice overt attacks, you know,

796
00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:17,319
Speaker 1: crippling power grids, China's programs seem much more focused on

797
00:48:17,640 --> 00:48:21,040
Speaker 1: just collecting sensitive information so that other parts of the

798
00:48:21,080 --> 00:48:24,320
Speaker 1: military can act on that. That's so far at least,

799
00:48:25,480 --> 00:48:29,440
Speaker 1: and odd mixed signals are coming. In twenty fifteen, then

800
00:48:29,480 --> 00:48:33,520
Speaker 1: President Obama with President Xi Jinping, who will be president

801
00:48:33,560 --> 00:48:36,360
Speaker 1: of China for a long long time now, to address

802
00:48:36,400 --> 00:48:41,040
Speaker 1: a range of issues. And they talked about economic espionage.

803
00:48:41,280 --> 00:48:43,439
Speaker 1: And when they talked about that, they said they reached

804
00:48:43,480 --> 00:48:46,319
Speaker 1: an agreement. They said neither government, the PRC, nor the

805
00:48:46,400 --> 00:48:51,160
Speaker 1: US will conduct or support cyber enabled theft of business

806
00:48:51,200 --> 00:48:58,000
Speaker 1: secrets that would provide competitive advantage to their commercial sectors. Importantly, disturbingly,

807
00:48:58,120 --> 00:49:02,280
Speaker 1: they did not agree to restrict government espionage because most

808
00:49:02,320 --> 00:49:05,759
Speaker 1: countries are cool with that, or most countries won't come

809
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:09,840
Speaker 1: out against it. Because they all do it exactly.

810
00:49:10,280 --> 00:49:13,200
Speaker 2: You can't be against something that you that everybody knows

811
00:49:13,200 --> 00:49:13,600
Speaker 2: you're doing.

812
00:49:13,760 --> 00:49:18,839
Speaker 1: Sure, you can against all kinds of stuff. And that's

813
00:49:18,880 --> 00:49:24,480
Speaker 1: the thing, of course I would I would propose to

814
00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:30,120
Speaker 1: you all and everyone listening, that all countries also support

815
00:49:31,600 --> 00:49:32,960
Speaker 1: theft of business secrets.

816
00:49:34,080 --> 00:49:36,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think so. It's just you can't. You're not

817
00:49:36,440 --> 00:49:39,160
Speaker 2: going to put the rubber stamp of your country on it.

818
00:49:39,239 --> 00:49:42,520
Speaker 2: You can. You've got a million different ways to obfuscate

819
00:49:42,760 --> 00:49:44,000
Speaker 2: who's actually doing that.

820
00:49:44,000 --> 00:49:46,799
Speaker 1: That's true. And I don't know this is more of

821
00:49:46,800 --> 00:49:53,799
Speaker 1: a socio philosophical perspective here. But the reason I think

822
00:49:54,320 --> 00:49:59,400
Speaker 1: all countries will also support or attempt to commit industrial

823
00:49:59,480 --> 00:50:04,040
Speaker 1: LESBIONA is because I think it's increasingly misleading and a

824
00:50:04,160 --> 00:50:07,960
Speaker 1: myth to pretend that business and government are separate. In

825
00:50:08,000 --> 00:50:12,759
Speaker 1: many cases, it just doesn't make sense. I mean, look

826
00:50:12,800 --> 00:50:15,720
Speaker 1: at Russian oligarchs for the most part, and the function

827
00:50:15,760 --> 00:50:20,880
Speaker 1: of Russian governance. Look at the largest companies in the

828
00:50:21,000 --> 00:50:26,480
Speaker 1: largest countries, and many times there's just so much bleedover

829
00:50:26,600 --> 00:50:30,360
Speaker 1: from who controls what that While it's comforting to say

830
00:50:30,719 --> 00:50:37,600
Speaker 1: that businesses and governments may be separate, while it's technically

831
00:50:37,680 --> 00:50:40,600
Speaker 1: supposed to be the case in practice, it really isn't.

832
00:50:40,960 --> 00:50:44,279
Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean you can donate as unlimited funds to

833
00:50:44,360 --> 00:50:48,400
Speaker 2: a campaign, when you can get government contracts for just

834
00:50:49,280 --> 00:50:54,040
Speaker 2: a number of military applications and other applications, when there's

835
00:50:54,080 --> 00:50:57,160
Speaker 2: a revolving door between business and government, I totally feel you.

836
00:50:57,320 --> 00:50:59,960
Speaker 1: And I'm saying it's I think you. I'm not even

837
00:51:00,719 --> 00:51:03,759
Speaker 1: I'm not even specifically talking about the US so talking

838
00:51:03,760 --> 00:51:06,640
Speaker 1: about well, I know global phenomenon, And.

839
00:51:06,719 --> 00:51:08,120
Speaker 2: I guess what I'm just saying is when you can

840
00:51:08,200 --> 00:51:11,680
Speaker 2: use the United States as an example like the one

841
00:51:11,880 --> 00:51:15,520
Speaker 2: for in a lot of ways, is the leader or

842
00:51:15,560 --> 00:51:19,440
Speaker 2: at least the main bully when we're doing it, then

843
00:51:19,480 --> 00:51:21,480
Speaker 2: it seems like you probably do it, or it's happening

844
00:51:21,520 --> 00:51:22,080
Speaker 2: everywhere else.

845
00:51:23,480 --> 00:51:26,600
Speaker 1: And then the question is what to do next? Do

846
00:51:26,600 --> 00:51:28,440
Speaker 1: you want to fight against it? Do you want to

847
00:51:29,719 --> 00:51:31,439
Speaker 1: do you want to fight against it? Do you want

848
00:51:31,480 --> 00:51:37,399
Speaker 1: to join the empire right? Or do we just think

849
00:51:37,400 --> 00:51:40,600
Speaker 1: about changing your password? Run in a couple of virus checks.

850
00:51:41,880 --> 00:51:44,600
Speaker 1: You'll probably be able to catch anything from two thousand

851
00:51:44,640 --> 00:51:48,960
Speaker 1: and nine. You know, even even something like Norton Anti

852
00:51:49,080 --> 00:51:53,080
Speaker 1: virus can find that. But what about the twenty eighteen stuff.

853
00:51:54,320 --> 00:51:58,120
Speaker 2: You just gotta kind of hope, cover up your cover

854
00:51:58,239 --> 00:52:02,000
Speaker 2: up your cameras. Yeah, as much as you can take

855
00:52:02,080 --> 00:52:04,920
Speaker 2: out the mics, because there's really no way to stop

856
00:52:04,960 --> 00:52:06,400
Speaker 2: that mic from getting turned on.

857
00:52:06,760 --> 00:52:07,000
Speaker 1: Yeah.

858
00:52:07,160 --> 00:52:11,800
Speaker 2: In case, yeah, you just have a white noise generator.

859
00:52:12,400 --> 00:52:14,759
Speaker 2: It's like shitting on your monitor where the mic is.

860
00:52:15,160 --> 00:52:17,759
Speaker 1: Well, we want to we want to hear what you think, folks. No,

861
00:52:17,880 --> 00:52:24,320
Speaker 1: obviously we are not ourselves professional black nor white hat hackers,

862
00:52:24,920 --> 00:52:28,720
Speaker 1: but we want to know if you believe there's propaganda

863
00:52:28,760 --> 00:52:32,479
Speaker 1: involved here? Is the government of China really sponsoring these things?

864
00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:35,840
Speaker 1: Are they just patriotic hackers? Is the West making it

865
00:52:35,880 --> 00:52:39,520
Speaker 1: look worse than it is to justify future military action?

866
00:52:39,880 --> 00:52:42,879
Speaker 2: What kind of programs is the West doing right now

867
00:52:42,960 --> 00:52:46,120
Speaker 2: to places like China? Do you have any info on that?

868
00:52:47,160 --> 00:52:49,800
Speaker 2: Tell us and not? You can tell us anonymously, Yeah

869
00:52:50,040 --> 00:52:51,440
Speaker 2: you can, you can.

870
00:52:52,160 --> 00:52:55,560
Speaker 1: You cannot tell us anonymously Instagram, Facebook, or Twitter. Yeah,

871
00:52:55,600 --> 00:52:57,600
Speaker 1: we'd love to. We'd love to hear from you. You can

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Speaker 1: find us on Here's where it gets crazy, But you

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00:53:00,520 --> 00:53:04,759
Speaker 1: can contact us anonymously, at least anonymously to us are

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Speaker 1: our long serving the hapless intern at the NSA we'll

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Speaker 1: probably know everything about you.

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Speaker 2: Shout out to you, Matt. Hopefully you've made it that far,

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Speaker 2: and that's the end of this classic episode. If you

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Speaker 2: have any thoughts or questions about this episode, you can

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00:53:21,920 --> 00:53:24,520
Speaker 2: get into contact with us in a number of different ways.

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00:53:24,719 --> 00:53:26,279
Speaker 2: One of the best is to give us a call.

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00:53:26,320 --> 00:53:31,160
Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three STDWYTK. If you

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00:53:31,160 --> 00:53:33,000
Speaker 2: don't want to do that, you can send us a

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Speaker 2: good old fashioned email.

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Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

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Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

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Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

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Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.