1 00:00:09,280 --> 00:00:13,360 Speaker 1: Okay, so this episode is partially about protests, but not 2 00:00:13,400 --> 00:00:17,240 Speaker 1: necessarily a specific one. It's not really about Trump's military 3 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:20,520 Speaker 1: parade on Saturday, or the No King's protest and response 4 00:00:20,560 --> 00:00:23,159 Speaker 1: to that. It's not about the ice raids or the 5 00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:25,400 Speaker 1: protests that have been going on in response to that 6 00:00:25,520 --> 00:00:28,320 Speaker 1: for almost two weeks at this point. I'm sure you've 7 00:00:28,320 --> 00:00:31,560 Speaker 1: seen all that online. But just to start us off, 8 00:00:31,960 --> 00:00:34,320 Speaker 1: i live in Los Angeles where some of the biggest 9 00:00:34,320 --> 00:00:37,479 Speaker 1: protests have been happening, and I've been out every day 10 00:00:37,520 --> 00:00:40,720 Speaker 1: with my camera covering the protests. Most of the time, 11 00:00:40,840 --> 00:00:45,559 Speaker 1: it's pretty calm and peaceful. Despite that, law enforcement presence 12 00:00:45,600 --> 00:00:49,159 Speaker 1: has been massive, and it's not just the LAPD. The 13 00:00:49,280 --> 00:00:53,240 Speaker 1: National Guard is here and so are the Marines. Officials 14 00:00:53,320 --> 00:00:56,200 Speaker 1: estimated that this deployment would cost one hundred and thirty 15 00:00:56,240 --> 00:01:09,039 Speaker 1: four million dollars. It does get hectic. I've seen tear 16 00:01:09,040 --> 00:01:12,760 Speaker 1: gas canisters launched a protesters' heads. I've seen police horses 17 00:01:12,800 --> 00:01:16,600 Speaker 1: nearly trample multiple people, and an unhoused person who didn't 18 00:01:16,640 --> 00:01:19,479 Speaker 1: seem to understand what was even going on being beaten 19 00:01:19,560 --> 00:01:21,639 Speaker 1: up with a baton. And that was in the space 20 00:01:21,680 --> 00:01:25,039 Speaker 1: of half an hour on Saturday. Afternoon. This stuff is 21 00:01:25,200 --> 00:01:28,679 Speaker 1: usually aimed at protesters, but journalists are not exempt from 22 00:01:28,680 --> 00:01:31,640 Speaker 1: being pushed, having tear gas thrown at him, or even 23 00:01:31,680 --> 00:01:34,160 Speaker 1: being shot at with one of those less lethal rounds. 24 00:01:34,720 --> 00:01:36,920 Speaker 1: I can confirm that because I've been hit by one 25 00:01:36,920 --> 00:01:41,679 Speaker 1: of those rounds twice. But again, this episode isn't about 26 00:01:41,720 --> 00:01:45,319 Speaker 1: me or journalists in general. It's also not even really 27 00:01:45,319 --> 00:01:48,920 Speaker 1: about the protesters. It's about the tools that are being 28 00:01:49,040 --> 00:01:52,080 Speaker 1: used to watch all of them, and about surveillance and 29 00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:55,080 Speaker 1: protests in general, and a trend that we're starting to 30 00:01:55,080 --> 00:01:58,680 Speaker 1: see take shape. If you're listening to this in June 31 00:01:58,680 --> 00:02:01,160 Speaker 1: of twenty twenty five, the things you're about to hear 32 00:02:01,160 --> 00:02:04,560 Speaker 1: in this episode might sound concerning to you. If you're 33 00:02:04,560 --> 00:02:08,080 Speaker 1: listening after that, all this might just sound kind of quaint. 34 00:02:09,000 --> 00:02:10,280 Speaker 1: But let's get into it. 35 00:02:10,560 --> 00:02:11,359 Speaker 2: I'm time. 36 00:02:25,360 --> 00:02:30,519 Speaker 1: From Kaleidoscope and iHeart podcasts. This is kill Switch. I'm 37 00:02:30,560 --> 00:02:41,799 Speaker 1: Dexter Thomas. Goodbye. On Tuesday, June tenth, Joseph Cox over 38 00:02:41,800 --> 00:02:44,880 Speaker 1: at four or four Media noticed something weird going on 39 00:02:44,919 --> 00:02:46,720 Speaker 1: in the flight data over LA. 40 00:02:47,440 --> 00:02:52,080 Speaker 3: When the protests started over the weekend. I did what 41 00:02:52,200 --> 00:02:55,440 Speaker 3: I often do when there's a protest or some sort 42 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:59,360 Speaker 3: of large event is I go and check flight data 43 00:03:00,280 --> 00:03:06,880 Speaker 3: to adsb exchange dot com. It's a website where volunteers 44 00:03:07,120 --> 00:03:11,880 Speaker 3: they run basically little sensors that can detect flight traffic. 45 00:03:12,320 --> 00:03:15,640 Speaker 3: The website then makes this freely available. But what I 46 00:03:15,720 --> 00:03:18,120 Speaker 3: usually do is I go and I start seeing what 47 00:03:18,280 --> 00:03:22,320 Speaker 3: aircraft are in the sky above this protest or this event. 48 00:03:22,400 --> 00:03:25,600 Speaker 3: And in this case, the skies were busy. There was 49 00:03:25,639 --> 00:03:27,440 Speaker 3: a lot going on up there. 50 00:03:27,639 --> 00:03:30,400 Speaker 2: Zerre one traffic couble clock one droll ma ab direction, 51 00:03:30,480 --> 00:03:36,000 Speaker 2: another Troy Q nine to two drum seven three traffic 52 00:03:36,040 --> 00:03:39,600 Speaker 2: cover clock eight miles the direction, another Troy nine two 53 00:03:39,680 --> 00:03:40,160 Speaker 2: three drunk. 54 00:03:40,880 --> 00:03:42,960 Speaker 3: I'm sure people on the ground would have noticed this 55 00:03:43,000 --> 00:03:45,560 Speaker 3: as well, But there were aircraft up there that you 56 00:03:45,600 --> 00:03:47,839 Speaker 3: would have heard, would have seen, and then I think 57 00:03:47,920 --> 00:03:50,640 Speaker 3: many others do you may not have even noticed as well. 58 00:03:50,880 --> 00:03:55,320 Speaker 3: So there are sort of two suspicious flight paths. The 59 00:03:55,360 --> 00:03:58,800 Speaker 3: first time, I was doing circles and I followed where 60 00:03:58,840 --> 00:04:02,120 Speaker 3: it took off, and it took off and eventually landed 61 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:06,320 Speaker 3: from March Air Reserve Base, which is to the east 62 00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:09,640 Speaker 3: of LA. We don't fully actually know what that flight is. 63 00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:13,720 Speaker 3: I think it's a larger DHS plane. I haven't fully 64 00:04:13,840 --> 00:04:16,160 Speaker 3: verified that. But the other one which we have verified 65 00:04:16,360 --> 00:04:19,320 Speaker 3: is that there were these other really interesting flight patterns 66 00:04:19,720 --> 00:04:22,600 Speaker 3: above downtown LA and Paramount, but they were in this 67 00:04:22,839 --> 00:04:29,200 Speaker 3: very distinctive hexagonal pattern and it was a much higher altitude. 68 00:04:29,279 --> 00:04:32,080 Speaker 3: It was like over ten thousand feet something like that. 69 00:04:32,480 --> 00:04:35,440 Speaker 3: There's something in the sky at around ten thousand feet 70 00:04:35,680 --> 00:04:38,240 Speaker 3: flying these hexagonal patterns. Doesn't have a call sign. 71 00:04:38,320 --> 00:04:40,880 Speaker 1: What is a call sign? Why would you expect a 72 00:04:40,880 --> 00:04:42,720 Speaker 1: call sign from an aircraft? 73 00:04:42,839 --> 00:04:46,040 Speaker 3: I'll try my best because I'm definitely on an aviation expert, okay, 74 00:04:46,080 --> 00:04:50,279 Speaker 3: but I am incredibly interested in it journalistically. So a 75 00:04:50,360 --> 00:04:55,440 Speaker 3: col sign is basically unique code and aircraft is going 76 00:04:55,480 --> 00:05:00,159 Speaker 3: to broadcast, be assigned so it can identify itself of 77 00:05:00,560 --> 00:05:03,359 Speaker 3: two other planes and to air traffic control. So to 78 00:05:03,400 --> 00:05:06,719 Speaker 3: be able to effectively organize air traffic, you need to 79 00:05:06,760 --> 00:05:10,360 Speaker 3: know which plane is which. You'll have Delta flight seven 80 00:05:10,400 --> 00:05:12,160 Speaker 3: oh two or whatever, and obviously that's going to be 81 00:05:12,160 --> 00:05:14,920 Speaker 3: a Delta one the DHS call sign or one that 82 00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:19,720 Speaker 3: they often uses Troy Troo y. So this is how 83 00:05:19,760 --> 00:05:22,920 Speaker 3: planes identify themselves and how ATC can manage them. If 84 00:05:22,920 --> 00:05:26,719 Speaker 3: you don't have a call sign, that's interesting because it's 85 00:05:27,080 --> 00:05:29,120 Speaker 3: obviously raised the question of why don't you want this 86 00:05:29,200 --> 00:05:33,640 Speaker 3: plane to be identified? And it does make it harder 87 00:05:34,120 --> 00:05:39,560 Speaker 3: to figure out what agency is behind this craft. Not impossible, yeah, 88 00:05:39,760 --> 00:05:42,680 Speaker 3: but that information is out there and you cross reference it. 89 00:05:42,880 --> 00:05:46,800 Speaker 3: You'll look up FAA registration records, and that's usually how 90 00:05:46,800 --> 00:05:49,560 Speaker 3: you'll go, oh, that's registered to DHS. Oh that's registered 91 00:05:49,640 --> 00:05:51,960 Speaker 3: to California Highway Patrol or something like that. 92 00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:54,559 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's kind of like driving that a license plate, 93 00:05:54,800 --> 00:05:57,560 Speaker 1: which yeah, I suppose some agencies can do, yeah in 94 00:05:57,560 --> 00:05:59,280 Speaker 1: the sky, driving with a licensed plane in the sky, 95 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:00,640 Speaker 1: that would raise them questions From. 96 00:06:00,480 --> 00:06:03,760 Speaker 3: Me, I'm immediately interested because I've seen those hexagans before, 97 00:06:04,200 --> 00:06:08,000 Speaker 3: and that was when DHS flew predator drones above Minneapolis 98 00:06:08,080 --> 00:06:11,680 Speaker 3: during the BLM protests in twenty twenty. So that is 99 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:15,960 Speaker 3: immediately really interesting. It's very distinctive, like you don't normally 100 00:06:16,000 --> 00:06:17,599 Speaker 3: see those patterns on flight data. 101 00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:21,560 Speaker 1: Joseph started connecting the dats and he wrote an article 102 00:06:21,600 --> 00:06:23,880 Speaker 1: on four or four media saying that it looked like 103 00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:27,440 Speaker 1: two very similar drones were flying over the anti ice 104 00:06:27,520 --> 00:06:31,000 Speaker 1: protests in LA and that these might belong to DHS, 105 00:06:31,400 --> 00:06:34,919 Speaker 1: the Department of Homeland Security fly in a hexagon. 106 00:06:35,560 --> 00:06:38,479 Speaker 3: Yeah. So again this is where the limit of my 107 00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:42,840 Speaker 3: expertise shows itself. I can't necessarily say they're flying exactly 108 00:06:42,839 --> 00:06:45,720 Speaker 3: in a hexagon, or is that how the data is 109 00:06:45,760 --> 00:06:49,440 Speaker 3: being interpreted by ADBs exchange or something like that. But 110 00:06:49,880 --> 00:06:52,520 Speaker 3: it appears as a hexagon, and that is an immediate 111 00:06:52,520 --> 00:06:54,840 Speaker 3: red flag of that might be a predator drone. 112 00:06:55,080 --> 00:06:58,000 Speaker 1: In case that phrase predator drone sounds familiar to you, 113 00:06:58,480 --> 00:07:01,800 Speaker 1: we're talking generally here about a series of unmanned aircraft 114 00:07:01,880 --> 00:07:06,720 Speaker 1: developed by General Atomics, the MQ one, the Predator, and 115 00:07:06,760 --> 00:07:10,760 Speaker 1: the MQ nine the Reaper. These have been used for surveillance, 116 00:07:11,000 --> 00:07:14,080 Speaker 1: including along the border between the US and Mexico, but 117 00:07:14,120 --> 00:07:17,720 Speaker 1: they've also been used for so called targeted strikes and 118 00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:20,920 Speaker 1: launching air to ground missiles to kill people in places 119 00:07:20,960 --> 00:07:24,840 Speaker 1: like Afghanistan and Iraq. Most people wouldn't expect that one 120 00:07:24,840 --> 00:07:28,240 Speaker 1: of these drones were flying over a major American city. 121 00:07:28,560 --> 00:07:30,720 Speaker 1: You think of predator drones, you think of this as, oh, 122 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:33,320 Speaker 1: this is something used in wartime, this is use for war. 123 00:07:34,080 --> 00:07:38,320 Speaker 1: Just a backup, what usually would you associate a predator with? 124 00:07:38,760 --> 00:07:43,640 Speaker 3: I would usually associate a predator just broadly speaking, flying 125 00:07:43,680 --> 00:07:49,960 Speaker 3: over a country like Afghanistan during the US's war on terror, 126 00:07:50,280 --> 00:07:54,640 Speaker 3: I would associate it with maybe a convoy of cars 127 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:58,760 Speaker 3: is driving from one location to another, and intelligence of 128 00:07:58,920 --> 00:08:01,680 Speaker 3: some veracity set that there is some sort of insurgent 129 00:08:02,400 --> 00:08:07,119 Speaker 3: or some sort of al kaeda isis Taliban whoever leader 130 00:08:07,160 --> 00:08:10,240 Speaker 3: inside this vehicle. We're now going to fire the health 131 00:08:10,240 --> 00:08:13,040 Speaker 3: fire missile and we're going to destroy that vehicle. That 132 00:08:13,120 --> 00:08:15,240 Speaker 3: would be the standard way of thinking about it. And 133 00:08:15,360 --> 00:08:17,840 Speaker 3: I think, of course, with the US's drone wars, it 134 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:21,640 Speaker 3: has targeted weddings as well. Is done so called double 135 00:08:21,680 --> 00:08:25,680 Speaker 3: tap processes, where you fire a drone strike, it kills people, 136 00:08:25,920 --> 00:08:28,120 Speaker 3: people then go to help you, then fire a second 137 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:30,720 Speaker 3: missile because you want to get those as well. These 138 00:08:30,760 --> 00:08:34,760 Speaker 3: are weapons of assassination and weapons of war, and now 139 00:08:34,800 --> 00:08:37,839 Speaker 3: those are flying above US soil. To be clear, I'm 140 00:08:37,880 --> 00:08:40,280 Speaker 3: pretty sure that DHS ones are not armed, so I 141 00:08:40,360 --> 00:08:42,400 Speaker 3: want to be very clear about that. But they are 142 00:08:42,440 --> 00:08:48,480 Speaker 3: still incredibly powerful surveillance apparatus. They have very high powers 143 00:08:48,559 --> 00:08:53,600 Speaker 3: cameras on them. They can potentially have very sophisticated electronic 144 00:08:53,800 --> 00:08:56,520 Speaker 3: surveillance technology as well. We don't know whether that's being 145 00:08:56,600 --> 00:08:59,440 Speaker 3: used above these protests, but at. 146 00:08:59,320 --> 00:09:02,520 Speaker 1: This point Joseph wasn't one hundred percent sure who these 147 00:09:02,559 --> 00:09:05,840 Speaker 1: aircraft belonged to. And this is where a community of 148 00:09:05,880 --> 00:09:09,480 Speaker 1: people who study this stuff come in. An aviation enthusiast 149 00:09:09,520 --> 00:09:13,120 Speaker 1: named aero Scout did some digging and finally helped connect 150 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:14,040 Speaker 1: that final dat. 151 00:09:14,679 --> 00:09:17,000 Speaker 3: I tried to see where it took off. I can't 152 00:09:17,000 --> 00:09:20,040 Speaker 3: figure it out. Maybe it had this transponder off or 153 00:09:20,120 --> 00:09:24,360 Speaker 3: whatever before that. Eventually I see it flies to the 154 00:09:24,480 --> 00:09:28,400 Speaker 3: US Mexican border, which is obviously where US Customs and 155 00:09:28,400 --> 00:09:31,760 Speaker 3: Border Protection hangs out and stores some of their drones. 156 00:09:32,240 --> 00:09:35,800 Speaker 3: So they were very smart and they followed the flight 157 00:09:35,840 --> 00:09:37,880 Speaker 3: path of what looked like the drone. They found the 158 00:09:37,880 --> 00:09:41,640 Speaker 3: relevant atc Audio, and in that haystack they found a 159 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:45,280 Speaker 3: couple of needles, including the mention of Troy, which is 160 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:47,480 Speaker 3: the DHS call sign. Even though this drone is not 161 00:09:47,520 --> 00:09:51,199 Speaker 3: broadcasting a call sign, it's mentioned there. And then crucially, 162 00:09:51,600 --> 00:09:53,559 Speaker 3: some of the audio says a Q nine, which is 163 00:09:53,640 --> 00:09:56,640 Speaker 3: shorthand for the MQ nine, which is the official name 164 00:09:56,760 --> 00:09:59,840 Speaker 3: for a Predator or a reaper drone. So cross referencing 165 00:10:00,200 --> 00:10:05,920 Speaker 3: it was confirmed. I actually emailed Customs and Border protection. First, 166 00:10:06,280 --> 00:10:08,839 Speaker 3: when I first saw the hexagons, I was like, oh, 167 00:10:08,920 --> 00:10:11,600 Speaker 3: I mean I have to immediately approach the comment. Now. 168 00:10:11,880 --> 00:10:14,840 Speaker 3: They took several days to get back to me, like 169 00:10:14,880 --> 00:10:17,800 Speaker 3: an unusually long time. But then they got back to 170 00:10:17,840 --> 00:10:20,760 Speaker 3: me and they confirmed that their MQ nine predators are 171 00:10:20,800 --> 00:10:24,439 Speaker 3: supporting federal law enforcement in the Greater Los Angeles area, 172 00:10:24,840 --> 00:10:28,360 Speaker 3: including quote, Immigration and Customs enforcement with aerial support of 173 00:10:28,400 --> 00:10:29,199 Speaker 3: their operations. 174 00:10:29,400 --> 00:10:30,640 Speaker 1: Okay, so specifically ICE. 175 00:10:30,720 --> 00:10:34,480 Speaker 3: Also yes, because I asked, are you flying these for 176 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:39,280 Speaker 3: yourselves or you flying them for another agency? This statement says, yes, 177 00:10:39,360 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 3: we are flying them for ICE. Interestingly, CBB says it 178 00:10:44,640 --> 00:10:49,000 Speaker 3: is not engaged in the surveillance of First Amendment activities. 179 00:10:49,160 --> 00:10:52,480 Speaker 3: End quote, which is, well, you're flying above a protest, 180 00:10:53,000 --> 00:10:55,480 Speaker 3: I hope, Like, are you just not gonna You're gonna 181 00:10:55,520 --> 00:10:58,079 Speaker 3: not point the camera at the protest? 182 00:10:58,400 --> 00:11:01,640 Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm sorry. Not read that sentence to me again. 183 00:11:02,040 --> 00:11:03,000 Speaker 1: I need to partse that again. 184 00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:06,439 Speaker 3: This is the four quote. Additionally, they are providing officers 185 00:11:06,480 --> 00:11:11,679 Speaker 3: safety surveillance ren requested by officers air and marine operations. 186 00:11:11,760 --> 00:11:16,199 Speaker 3: Is not engaged in the surveillance First Amendment activities. 187 00:11:17,200 --> 00:11:22,959 Speaker 1: First Amendment activities, I would certainly associate with the protest. 188 00:11:23,440 --> 00:11:25,040 Speaker 1: That is interesting, Okay. 189 00:11:25,480 --> 00:11:27,320 Speaker 3: I would say it's a few different ways to interpret it. 190 00:11:27,520 --> 00:11:30,720 Speaker 3: The one would be that, oh, no, we were asked 191 00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:34,560 Speaker 3: by ICE to fly and provide situational awareness for the 192 00:11:34,559 --> 00:11:36,800 Speaker 3: protection of our employee. Is that sort of thing, and 193 00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:42,360 Speaker 3: maybe we incidentally filmed people protesting. That's one very charitable interpretation. 194 00:11:42,720 --> 00:11:45,960 Speaker 3: Another one would be that we don't view the protests's 195 00:11:46,040 --> 00:11:49,520 Speaker 3: First Amendment protected speech because they're all violent or whatever. 196 00:11:50,040 --> 00:11:54,440 Speaker 3: And again this is me extrapolating from the statement. But 197 00:11:54,520 --> 00:11:59,040 Speaker 3: when you marry that statement with drone footage like DHS 198 00:11:59,080 --> 00:12:04,040 Speaker 3: posted on Twitter, it says these protests that they are violent, 199 00:12:04,360 --> 00:12:06,880 Speaker 3: California needs to get this under control. And there's footage 200 00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:08,880 Speaker 3: from a drone. They don't say predator. By'm going to 201 00:12:08,960 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 3: presume it's the predator and it's specifically of the protest 202 00:12:12,280 --> 00:12:14,199 Speaker 3: like it shows Peel protesting. So I don't know. It's 203 00:12:14,280 --> 00:12:16,240 Speaker 3: very hard to square that statement with the fact that 204 00:12:16,280 --> 00:12:20,160 Speaker 3: a predator drone flew not just above downtown LA, but 205 00:12:20,360 --> 00:12:22,720 Speaker 3: also flew above Paramount. It flew above the two areas 206 00:12:22,720 --> 00:12:23,680 Speaker 3: where the protests were. 207 00:12:23,840 --> 00:12:26,480 Speaker 1: Let's talk real briefly if we could about this site 208 00:12:26,480 --> 00:12:29,280 Speaker 1: where you're able to actually track stuff. This data is 209 00:12:29,679 --> 00:12:32,120 Speaker 1: basically freely available to anybody who wants to look at it. 210 00:12:32,320 --> 00:12:37,280 Speaker 3: Yeah, you can go to adsb exchange dot com right now. 211 00:12:37,640 --> 00:12:41,080 Speaker 3: You can then move your cursor over Los Angeles and 212 00:12:41,080 --> 00:12:43,800 Speaker 3: then you can see the air traffic coming in and out. 213 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:49,240 Speaker 3: But it is an amazing tool journalistically for researchers as well, 214 00:12:49,640 --> 00:12:52,920 Speaker 3: and this information is available to anybody. It's just a 215 00:12:52,960 --> 00:12:55,720 Speaker 3: barrier to entry for interpreting it. And again I'm absolutely 216 00:12:55,760 --> 00:12:58,240 Speaker 3: non expert. I'm just good enough to go that looks 217 00:12:58,280 --> 00:13:00,719 Speaker 3: like a drone to me people who are a lot 218 00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:01,480 Speaker 3: better than me. 219 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:03,680 Speaker 1: So at first, there's a flight pattern that looks like 220 00:13:03,720 --> 00:13:07,920 Speaker 1: it's a hexagon. This looks like Minneapolis twenty twenty. And 221 00:13:07,960 --> 00:13:11,319 Speaker 1: actually tipping back to twenty twenty, when you first realized 222 00:13:11,400 --> 00:13:14,760 Speaker 1: that there was a predator flying over Minneapolis, were you 223 00:13:14,800 --> 00:13:15,480 Speaker 1: surprised at all? 224 00:13:15,960 --> 00:13:18,360 Speaker 3: I was entirely shocked, and that was the first time 225 00:13:18,440 --> 00:13:21,199 Speaker 3: I had seen it. My co founder, Jason Kubler has 226 00:13:21,280 --> 00:13:24,120 Speaker 3: been covering drones is and years. He may have been 227 00:13:24,240 --> 00:13:26,760 Speaker 3: less surprised, but I think I almost had a benefit 228 00:13:26,800 --> 00:13:29,960 Speaker 3: of coming in sort of clear eyed about it because 229 00:13:30,120 --> 00:13:34,240 Speaker 3: they're flying predator drones for protests. That's insane to me, 230 00:13:34,520 --> 00:13:37,800 Speaker 3: as somebody way back when I was actually an intern 231 00:13:38,120 --> 00:13:41,560 Speaker 3: at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in London, and I 232 00:13:41,760 --> 00:13:44,240 Speaker 3: was one of my jobs was you need to enter 233 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:47,800 Speaker 3: into a spreadsheet the drone strikes from Obama's drone war 234 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:51,040 Speaker 3: inside Yemen and then subsequent administrations as well. So for 235 00:13:51,120 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 3: me journalistically, predator drones, reaper drones, they are a weapon 236 00:13:55,520 --> 00:13:58,280 Speaker 3: for war, they are a weapon for assassination, and now 237 00:13:58,280 --> 00:14:01,679 Speaker 3: they're flying essentially that same technology over protests inside the 238 00:14:01,760 --> 00:14:04,960 Speaker 3: United States. I was blown away by that. I confirmed 239 00:14:05,000 --> 00:14:07,520 Speaker 3: it with DHS at the time, and then I started 240 00:14:07,559 --> 00:14:11,199 Speaker 3: to go back and look through more flight data associated 241 00:14:11,240 --> 00:14:13,960 Speaker 3: with those drones and you could then go look through 242 00:14:14,080 --> 00:14:16,600 Speaker 3: historical data and figure out, oh, they're actually flying these 243 00:14:16,640 --> 00:14:20,400 Speaker 3: all over the country, sometimes over the one hundred mile 244 00:14:20,520 --> 00:14:23,960 Speaker 3: border limit above US cities. So this is actually happening 245 00:14:24,000 --> 00:14:27,760 Speaker 3: for a long time. It's just we don't necessarily understand 246 00:14:27,960 --> 00:14:31,040 Speaker 3: or see that. Customs and Border Protection published footage, so 247 00:14:31,040 --> 00:14:33,920 Speaker 3: that they said was drone footage, and it's very clear 248 00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:37,680 Speaker 3: you can see people running around and protesting and the 249 00:14:37,720 --> 00:14:41,000 Speaker 3: police response and all of that. So in this context, 250 00:14:41,200 --> 00:14:44,800 Speaker 3: they're being used as a situational awareness tool, is what 251 00:14:44,960 --> 00:14:49,280 Speaker 3: CPB told me. But I still think it's wild and 252 00:14:49,320 --> 00:14:52,040 Speaker 3: there's a big public interest in telling people there's like 253 00:14:52,040 --> 00:14:54,280 Speaker 3: a dot in the sky watching this, and you may 254 00:14:54,280 --> 00:14:56,520 Speaker 3: not realize that, and then we have a conversation about 255 00:14:56,520 --> 00:14:59,120 Speaker 3: whether we want that where we think it's proportionate. Some 256 00:14:59,120 --> 00:15:02,040 Speaker 3: people might be okay, but we can't have that conversation. 257 00:15:02,160 --> 00:15:04,120 Speaker 3: That's what digging free flight, DATCHA and finding out in 258 00:15:04,120 --> 00:15:04,720 Speaker 3: the first place. 259 00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:09,440 Speaker 1: So these situational awareness tools, that dot in the sky 260 00:15:09,560 --> 00:15:13,400 Speaker 1: might feel distant, but it is watching. That being said, 261 00:15:13,720 --> 00:15:17,120 Speaker 1: that's not the only way people are being watched. That's 262 00:15:17,160 --> 00:15:32,440 Speaker 1: after the break. If you go to a protest, whether 263 00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:35,000 Speaker 1: you're actually marching all day or you're just there for 264 00:15:35,040 --> 00:15:37,720 Speaker 1: a little bit to see what's going on, you're probably 265 00:15:37,720 --> 00:15:41,120 Speaker 1: aware that you're being watched more than normal. For some people, 266 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:45,280 Speaker 1: maybe that's comforting. For others that feels like a risk 267 00:15:45,440 --> 00:15:49,520 Speaker 1: that would make them uncomfortable. Surveillance is no longer theoretical. 268 00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:53,320 Speaker 1: It's over your head, it's in your pocket, and especially 269 00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:56,880 Speaker 1: at a protest, it's all around you. So this brings 270 00:15:56,920 --> 00:15:59,880 Speaker 1: me to another set of questions. Which is I've been 271 00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:03,360 Speaker 1: here physically out documenting protests as best as I can 272 00:16:03,440 --> 00:16:06,720 Speaker 1: on one person, and as I'm out here reporting on 273 00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:09,640 Speaker 1: the protests, actually physically going to the protests. And I've 274 00:16:09,640 --> 00:16:14,800 Speaker 1: covered protests before where people are increasingly concerned about their security. Right, 275 00:16:14,960 --> 00:16:17,960 Speaker 1: especially in twenty twenty, people were already wearing masks because 276 00:16:17,960 --> 00:16:20,400 Speaker 1: of COVID, which you didn't see too much of before 277 00:16:20,440 --> 00:16:22,440 Speaker 1: that it would really sort of a select group of 278 00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:24,560 Speaker 1: people who would wear masks to a protest. You saw 279 00:16:24,560 --> 00:16:27,000 Speaker 1: that more than twenty twenty, and you certainly see that now. 280 00:16:27,240 --> 00:16:32,880 Speaker 1: But if there are drones in the sky, realistically, how 281 00:16:33,680 --> 00:16:35,840 Speaker 1: anonymous can one be at a protest? 282 00:16:36,000 --> 00:16:39,280 Speaker 3: And I'll preface this with I'm not necessarily giving advice 283 00:16:39,440 --> 00:16:43,240 Speaker 3: to one side or activists, law enforcement, to any It's 284 00:16:43,240 --> 00:16:46,920 Speaker 3: more just like a cold analysis of the technology itself. 285 00:16:47,280 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 3: I wouldn't say it's impossible, but I would say it 286 00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:54,800 Speaker 3: has got exponentially harder, just based on the sort of 287 00:16:54,840 --> 00:16:57,480 Speaker 3: technology that's going to be at one of these protests. So, 288 00:16:57,640 --> 00:17:01,000 Speaker 3: as we've said, you'll have prejudice drones with very high 289 00:17:01,040 --> 00:17:04,400 Speaker 3: powered cameras. I don't know whether footage from that would 290 00:17:04,440 --> 00:17:08,199 Speaker 3: be used in a criminal prosecution or anything like that. 291 00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:11,639 Speaker 3: But regardless, it's there and it's collecting data on the 292 00:17:11,680 --> 00:17:14,520 Speaker 3: ground or even sometimes in the drone. Maybe you will 293 00:17:14,640 --> 00:17:18,760 Speaker 3: have technologies such as imsy catchers, which are basically these 294 00:17:18,960 --> 00:17:23,640 Speaker 3: fake cell phone towers which broadcast a signal they trick 295 00:17:23,760 --> 00:17:27,159 Speaker 3: phones into connecting to them, and that can give up 296 00:17:27,280 --> 00:17:30,680 Speaker 3: unique identifiers associated with your phone. That can be sort 297 00:17:30,680 --> 00:17:33,920 Speaker 3: of a springboard for law enforcement to then go get 298 00:17:33,960 --> 00:17:37,919 Speaker 3: more information about people. They can also in some cases 299 00:17:38,520 --> 00:17:42,919 Speaker 3: intercept text messages and phone calls as well, although with 300 00:17:43,080 --> 00:17:45,920 Speaker 3: upgrades to four G and five G like that may 301 00:17:45,960 --> 00:17:48,800 Speaker 3: not necessarily be the case. And then the big one 302 00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:50,639 Speaker 3: for me is that I don't think we've seen it 303 00:17:50,760 --> 00:17:53,320 Speaker 3: deployed by will be very interested if state or local 304 00:17:53,400 --> 00:17:57,199 Speaker 3: do use This is, of course, facial recognition technology, where 305 00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:00,440 Speaker 3: so many agencies across the United States by this tool 306 00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:04,840 Speaker 3: called CLEARVIEWAI that's built on a massive database of billions 307 00:18:04,840 --> 00:18:08,040 Speaker 3: of images of people's faces. They point a camera at 308 00:18:08,080 --> 00:18:10,280 Speaker 3: somebody on their phone. It's an app you installed on 309 00:18:10,280 --> 00:18:12,920 Speaker 3: the phone. A police officer does that, scans the face 310 00:18:12,960 --> 00:18:16,040 Speaker 3: and brings up their vembo or whatever it is, so 311 00:18:16,080 --> 00:18:19,399 Speaker 3: they can identify the person quite easily. Apparently it works 312 00:18:19,400 --> 00:18:22,320 Speaker 3: in some cases even when people are wearing masks, and 313 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:25,600 Speaker 3: it's sort of to hammer on that just cold analysis 314 00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:29,080 Speaker 3: of the tech. I think that might also be why 315 00:18:29,119 --> 00:18:32,840 Speaker 3: a lot of ice officers and well primarily ice officers 316 00:18:32,880 --> 00:18:36,840 Speaker 3: masking their faces right, may be concerned about there, because 317 00:18:37,240 --> 00:18:39,760 Speaker 3: there's actually tools that anybody can use in the same 318 00:18:39,800 --> 00:18:42,320 Speaker 3: sort of way anybody can access flight data. There are 319 00:18:42,359 --> 00:18:45,560 Speaker 3: facial recognition tools that anybody can access and you can 320 00:18:45,760 --> 00:18:47,399 Speaker 3: put faces through there. 321 00:18:47,600 --> 00:18:51,159 Speaker 1: Officers also being concerned about being identified themselves using the 322 00:18:51,160 --> 00:18:52,200 Speaker 1: same sort of technology. 323 00:18:52,280 --> 00:18:54,560 Speaker 3: But potentially, yeah, it's a dual use technology. It can 324 00:18:54,560 --> 00:18:57,040 Speaker 3: be used by anybody. Because the access to this tech 325 00:18:57,440 --> 00:19:00,159 Speaker 3: has filtered down. It's not just a tool for law 326 00:19:00,200 --> 00:19:03,040 Speaker 3: enforcements anymore. It's a tool for anybody with an Internet 327 00:19:03,040 --> 00:19:04,280 Speaker 3: connection and the smartphone. 328 00:19:04,760 --> 00:19:08,200 Speaker 1: There's really two things that we can be thinking about 329 00:19:08,400 --> 00:19:11,359 Speaker 1: when we're thinking about ones. I suppose the right to 330 00:19:11,400 --> 00:19:13,520 Speaker 1: privacy even just walking around on the street, and this 331 00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:15,399 Speaker 1: is something that you cover a lot just in general. 332 00:19:15,520 --> 00:19:17,320 Speaker 1: Do you have the right to privacy when you go 333 00:19:17,800 --> 00:19:21,080 Speaker 1: and buy chicken at the store or buy apples at 334 00:19:21,119 --> 00:19:23,679 Speaker 1: the store. And increasingly I think people are paying a 335 00:19:23,680 --> 00:19:25,800 Speaker 1: bit more attention to this they maybe haven't been in 336 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:29,239 Speaker 1: the past. But there's of course, when somebody hears there 337 00:19:29,240 --> 00:19:31,880 Speaker 1: are drones in the sky, I think immediately some people 338 00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:36,240 Speaker 1: might be immediately concerned, Hey, why is somebody spying on me? 339 00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:39,080 Speaker 1: Right immediately might think about that. There's also the fact 340 00:19:39,240 --> 00:19:43,040 Speaker 1: that there's so many cameras. There's so many cameras at 341 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:46,920 Speaker 1: a protest, you basically can't avoid being on cameras somewhere. 342 00:19:47,359 --> 00:19:50,080 Speaker 3: While I was looking at the flight data over the weekend, 343 00:19:50,400 --> 00:19:54,800 Speaker 3: I was pairing it with this sort of compilation of 344 00:19:54,920 --> 00:19:58,600 Speaker 3: live streams on tiktoks. Some YouTube channel had very handily 345 00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:00,840 Speaker 3: taken all of these people who are on TikTok or 346 00:20:00,880 --> 00:20:03,280 Speaker 3: over platforms and put it all on one screen. So 347 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:06,080 Speaker 3: I could watch like the LA protests from all of 348 00:20:06,119 --> 00:20:09,000 Speaker 3: these different angles at once, and I say, wow, this 349 00:20:09,119 --> 00:20:12,800 Speaker 3: is pretty useful actually, and it would switch audio of them. 350 00:20:12,840 --> 00:20:14,960 Speaker 3: But like I was only able to do that because 351 00:20:15,080 --> 00:20:16,760 Speaker 3: ordinary people are filming at live streaming. 352 00:20:16,920 --> 00:20:19,080 Speaker 1: If you're able to watch it and other people are 353 00:20:19,080 --> 00:20:21,400 Speaker 1: able to watch it, of course law enforcement is able 354 00:20:21,440 --> 00:20:21,920 Speaker 1: to watch this. 355 00:20:22,320 --> 00:20:25,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, and they will then be able to archive that 356 00:20:25,920 --> 00:20:30,800 Speaker 3: footage potentially, and if they feel the need to for 357 00:20:30,840 --> 00:20:34,040 Speaker 3: whatever reason. You can also do facial recognition tech after 358 00:20:34,080 --> 00:20:35,920 Speaker 3: the fact. It's not just a live thing. You can 359 00:20:36,000 --> 00:20:39,840 Speaker 3: take a video that was uploaded or streamed to TikTok 360 00:20:39,920 --> 00:20:42,280 Speaker 3: or whatever and then run the technology on that after 361 00:20:42,320 --> 00:20:45,280 Speaker 3: the fact. This is why Laura enforcement are so attracted 362 00:20:45,280 --> 00:20:48,080 Speaker 3: to this and why clear View and other products have 363 00:20:48,119 --> 00:20:50,320 Speaker 3: been so popular across the US is that you can 364 00:20:50,359 --> 00:20:54,400 Speaker 3: take something as singular as someone's face and then use 365 00:20:54,400 --> 00:20:56,240 Speaker 3: that as a springboard for a criminal investigation. 366 00:20:57,480 --> 00:21:02,760 Speaker 1: I think one of the really fascinating things about protests 367 00:21:02,840 --> 00:21:05,080 Speaker 1: right now, if I can say that, is that, on 368 00:21:05,119 --> 00:21:07,840 Speaker 1: the one hand, you do have people, I think rightfully so, 369 00:21:08,160 --> 00:21:11,760 Speaker 1: who are concerned about surveillance of any type. Right there's 370 00:21:12,080 --> 00:21:16,480 Speaker 1: actual official, purposeful surveillance, say by a drone, and there 371 00:21:16,520 --> 00:21:19,359 Speaker 1: would be law enforce on watching somebody's TikTok of them. 372 00:21:19,520 --> 00:21:22,560 Speaker 1: On the flip side, there is a desire for documentation. 373 00:21:22,640 --> 00:21:25,320 Speaker 1: We've seen time and time again how difficult is it 374 00:21:25,359 --> 00:21:28,600 Speaker 1: to get police to release body cam footage and how 375 00:21:28,640 --> 00:21:32,440 Speaker 1: many things would have gone unreported, George Floyd's murder being 376 00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:35,520 Speaker 1: one of them if somebody were not there to document it. 377 00:21:35,600 --> 00:21:38,159 Speaker 1: And I've seen and filmed plenty of things that probably 378 00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:40,920 Speaker 1: a lot of people would not have known about had 379 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:43,560 Speaker 1: somebody not been there with a camera. Yeah, and there's 380 00:21:43,560 --> 00:21:46,920 Speaker 1: this kind of the dual concerns. I suppose the desire 381 00:21:47,040 --> 00:21:49,960 Speaker 1: for really everybody should be able to film something, the 382 00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:53,360 Speaker 1: public should know about things. But then everybody is filming 383 00:21:53,400 --> 00:21:56,760 Speaker 1: things and everyone, if we allow for the police to 384 00:21:56,760 --> 00:21:58,720 Speaker 1: be part of the public, can see it also. 385 00:21:59,280 --> 00:22:06,199 Speaker 3: Yeah, ubiquitous surveillance is absolutely a double edged sword. With 386 00:22:06,320 --> 00:22:08,120 Speaker 3: everything you've said, and I agree with all of it, 387 00:22:08,320 --> 00:22:11,720 Speaker 3: I guess I would lean towards Ultimately, I think it's 388 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:14,840 Speaker 3: probably a good thing that more people are able to 389 00:22:14,960 --> 00:22:18,720 Speaker 3: film more and more events over time. The idea that 390 00:22:18,840 --> 00:22:23,080 Speaker 3: anybody can see some sort of injustice happening, police brutality 391 00:22:23,359 --> 00:22:27,080 Speaker 3: or whatever and go and film it, I think, on 392 00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:30,760 Speaker 3: average hands out to be a good and powerful thing. 393 00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:32,719 Speaker 3: And I think you can see that where in some 394 00:22:32,800 --> 00:22:35,360 Speaker 3: of the ice raids or the ice activity you can 395 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:38,560 Speaker 3: overhear or people have reported that they will say, go 396 00:22:38,600 --> 00:22:40,520 Speaker 3: for the one with the camera. This is a very 397 00:22:40,560 --> 00:22:46,240 Speaker 3: powerful tool for the public and for everybody. Just people 398 00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:49,720 Speaker 3: may want to be careful about what they film, just 399 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:51,479 Speaker 3: in the same way I'm careful about. I'm not going 400 00:22:51,560 --> 00:22:54,240 Speaker 3: to go on Facebook and upload a bunch of photos 401 00:22:54,240 --> 00:22:56,280 Speaker 3: of myself and tag where they all were or something 402 00:22:56,359 --> 00:23:00,119 Speaker 3: like that, just from a purely personal privacy perspective as well. 403 00:23:00,640 --> 00:23:03,919 Speaker 1: So what are you going to be watching for. I 404 00:23:03,920 --> 00:23:06,680 Speaker 1: don't see these protests stopping. I don't see the momentum 405 00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:08,920 Speaker 1: go anywhere. What are you looking for? 406 00:23:09,560 --> 00:23:13,440 Speaker 3: Yeah, I'm going to keep looking at flight data if necessary, 407 00:23:14,119 --> 00:23:18,159 Speaker 3: dive into atc audio. I'll be looking above what happens. 408 00:23:18,200 --> 00:23:21,119 Speaker 3: If protests move to another city, and I believe some 409 00:23:21,200 --> 00:23:23,119 Speaker 3: are planned, I'll probably look at those as well. And 410 00:23:23,160 --> 00:23:27,520 Speaker 3: it's not that, oh my god, surveillance planes are always bad. 411 00:23:27,600 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 3: It's no. They can have very legitimate use cases. But 412 00:23:30,680 --> 00:23:35,840 Speaker 3: I think journalistically it's worth looking and analyzing and understanding, Okay, 413 00:23:36,200 --> 00:23:39,959 Speaker 3: is it proportionate to be flying a Predator drone above 414 00:23:40,280 --> 00:23:42,520 Speaker 3: this area of a protest or whatever the aircraft turns 415 00:23:42,520 --> 00:23:45,159 Speaker 3: out to be. And again, we can only have that 416 00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:49,159 Speaker 3: conversation if people are looking at the data and figuring 417 00:23:49,200 --> 00:23:51,159 Speaker 3: out what's going on. Yeah, in the same way, we 418 00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:53,320 Speaker 3: can only figure out what's going on with people like 419 00:23:53,359 --> 00:23:57,040 Speaker 3: yourselves when you're actually on the ground filming, talking to protests, 420 00:23:57,080 --> 00:24:00,359 Speaker 3: talking to law enforcement, and figuring out what's going on there. 421 00:24:00,400 --> 00:24:01,200 Speaker 3: It's the same thing. 422 00:24:01,840 --> 00:24:04,399 Speaker 1: You said you were surprised when you saw this in 423 00:24:04,440 --> 00:24:06,560 Speaker 1: twenty twenty. You were surprised when you saw a drone 424 00:24:06,720 --> 00:24:10,879 Speaker 1: or reprodrone specifically or Minneapolis. You said you're less surprised 425 00:24:11,720 --> 00:24:16,800 Speaker 1: now in LA. Would it be reasonable to assume that 426 00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:19,440 Speaker 1: if there's a large protest, there might be one of 427 00:24:19,480 --> 00:24:21,840 Speaker 1: these things in the sky in the future here in 428 00:24:22,080 --> 00:24:22,800 Speaker 1: the United States? 429 00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:26,240 Speaker 3: Yeah, I think it's maybe not a given. Customs and 430 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:29,600 Speaker 3: Border Protection only has a fleet of I think ten drones. 431 00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:32,400 Speaker 3: I think they only have five land mission presents drones. 432 00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:34,639 Speaker 3: They can't be everywhere all at once, obviously, And I 433 00:24:34,720 --> 00:24:37,920 Speaker 3: guess what made it almost obvious that we're going to 434 00:24:37,960 --> 00:24:40,080 Speaker 3: fly a drone here is that there is a connection 435 00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:43,760 Speaker 3: and a nexus of course to DHS and ICE. These 436 00:24:43,800 --> 00:24:48,119 Speaker 3: are anti ice protests. Customs and Border Protection is also 437 00:24:48,160 --> 00:24:51,359 Speaker 3: a part of DHS. It would make absolute sense that 438 00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:54,439 Speaker 3: one arm of DHS is going to support the mission 439 00:24:54,840 --> 00:24:59,760 Speaker 3: of another one. So will we see them in other protests? Broadly, yes, 440 00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:03,520 Speaker 3: will we see these drones and other anti ice protests. 441 00:25:03,800 --> 00:25:06,240 Speaker 3: I think it's pretty likely, Yeah, depending on the size 442 00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:06,840 Speaker 3: and the response. 443 00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:10,080 Speaker 1: Thank you so much for making time for this. Thank 444 00:25:10,119 --> 00:25:11,000 Speaker 1: you so much for real. 445 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:14,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely, there. 446 00:25:14,200 --> 00:25:16,480 Speaker 1: Is a lot more we could say about the protests 447 00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:20,280 Speaker 1: that are happening right now, but again, this episode isn't 448 00:25:20,359 --> 00:25:23,720 Speaker 1: really about these protests in particular. But I do want 449 00:25:23,720 --> 00:25:26,080 Speaker 1: to mention one thing in the show notes, We've put 450 00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:28,000 Speaker 1: a link to a guide on how you can be 451 00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:30,680 Speaker 1: safe for the protest. This applies to you whether you're 452 00:25:30,680 --> 00:25:33,399 Speaker 1: a journalist, whether you're a protest to yourself, or just 453 00:25:33,440 --> 00:25:36,000 Speaker 1: someone who doesn't trust the news and you want to 454 00:25:36,040 --> 00:25:38,679 Speaker 1: turn off the TV, get off your phone and just 455 00:25:38,760 --> 00:25:41,840 Speaker 1: see for yourself what's happening outside. Again, that's in the 456 00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:44,640 Speaker 1: show notes. That's from Wired dot com and I've read 457 00:25:44,680 --> 00:26:05,040 Speaker 1: through it and I definitely recommend it for everyone. Thanks 458 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:07,520 Speaker 1: once again so much for listening to kill Switch. Let 459 00:26:07,600 --> 00:26:09,320 Speaker 1: us know what you think, and if there's something else 460 00:26:09,359 --> 00:26:11,640 Speaker 1: you'd like us to cover, let us know. You can 461 00:26:11,720 --> 00:26:14,720 Speaker 1: hit us up at kill Switch at Kaleidoscope dot NYC, 462 00:26:15,320 --> 00:26:17,800 Speaker 1: or you can hit me up personally at dex digi 463 00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:20,880 Speaker 1: that's d e x d I g I on Instagram 464 00:26:20,960 --> 00:26:23,359 Speaker 1: or on Blue Sky if that's your thing, and while 465 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:26,199 Speaker 1: you're at it on Apple podcast or Spotify, before you 466 00:26:26,280 --> 00:26:29,360 Speaker 1: close that app, leave us a review. It helps other 467 00:26:29,400 --> 00:26:31,920 Speaker 1: people find the show, which in turn helps us keep 468 00:26:31,920 --> 00:26:35,600 Speaker 1: doing our thing. Kill Switch is hosted by Me Dexter Thomas. 469 00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:40,000 Speaker 1: It's produced by Sena Ozaki, Darluk Potts, and Kate Osbourne. 470 00:26:40,359 --> 00:26:43,200 Speaker 1: Our theme song is by me and Kyle Murdoch and 471 00:26:43,359 --> 00:26:47,240 Speaker 1: Kyle also mixed the show. From Kaleidoscope, Our executive producers 472 00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:52,000 Speaker 1: are oz Lashin, Bungesh Hajigadur and Kate Osbourne. From iHeart, 473 00:26:52,040 --> 00:26:55,440 Speaker 1: our executive producers are Katrina Norvil and Nikki Etur