WEBVTT - Here’s Why Iran’s Unaccounted for Uranium Worries Experts 0:00:02.440 --> 0:00:09.440 Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio news. I'm Stephen Carroll and 0:00:09.480 --> 0:00:11.800 this is Here's Why, where we take one new story 0:00:11.840 --> 0:00:13.720 and explain it in just a few minutes with our 0:00:13.760 --> 0:00:15.240 experts here at Bloomberg. 0:00:20.120 --> 0:00:24.160 Our objective was the destruction of Arrange nuclear and richimid 0:00:24.320 --> 0:00:28.440 capacity and a stop to the nuclear threat posed by 0:00:28.480 --> 0:00:31.960 the world's number one stage sponsor of terror. Tonight, I 0:00:31.960 --> 0:00:35.040 can report to the world that the strikes were a 0:00:35.120 --> 0:00:38.200 spectacular military success. 0:00:39.680 --> 0:00:43.880 It was an unprecedented series of strikes against Iran's nuclear ambitions. 0:00:44.200 --> 0:00:47.760 The United States targeted facilities at four dough, Natanz and 0:00:47.880 --> 0:00:51.120 Isfahan in a thirty seven hour operation that included one 0:00:51.240 --> 0:00:55.560 hundred and twenty five aircraft, submarine launched Tomahawk missiles, and 0:00:55.640 --> 0:01:00.400 fourteen thousand kilogram bombs. While the effectiveness of those strikes 0:01:00.400 --> 0:01:04.039 as still being assessed, they've compounded another problem. The UN's 0:01:04.120 --> 0:01:08.840 nuclear inspectors don't know where Iran's highly enriched uranium is now. 0:01:09.480 --> 0:01:12.320 I'm not so sure. At a time of war, all 0:01:12.640 --> 0:01:18.440 nuclear sites are closed, so our inspectors who are still 0:01:18.760 --> 0:01:22.600 i must say still in Iran, although they are in 0:01:22.640 --> 0:01:26.600 a protected place. As you can imagine, no inspection, normal 0:01:26.640 --> 0:01:28.120 activity can take place. 0:01:28.600 --> 0:01:31.960 That's the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Raphael 0:01:32.000 --> 0:01:41.600 Mariano Grossi. So here's why Iran's unaccounted for uranium worries experts. 0:01:42.920 --> 0:01:45.840 Jonathan Turne, who covers nuclear diplomacy for Bloomberg, joins me. 0:01:45.880 --> 0:01:49.760 Now for more, Jonathan, First of all, how much uranium 0:01:49.920 --> 0:01:52.480 does Iran have and how dangerous is it? 0:01:53.120 --> 0:01:56.320 Uran has various stockpiles. The most concerning is the four 0:01:56.400 --> 0:02:01.240 hundred and nine kilograms of highly enriched uranium. That material 0:02:01.320 --> 0:02:03.560 is equivalent to the amount needed to make about ten 0:02:03.840 --> 0:02:06.840 nuclear weapons if it was further enriched to ninety percent. 0:02:07.200 --> 0:02:11.240 That material was last seen a few days before Israel's 0:02:11.280 --> 0:02:15.000 bombing commenced on June thirteenth. It was stored in underground 0:02:15.080 --> 0:02:20.320 tunnels at Isfahan complex. However, Rafael Mariano Grussi, the IEA 0:02:20.440 --> 0:02:23.639 Director General, told us on June eighteenth that his inspectors 0:02:23.639 --> 0:02:26.080 had lost track of that material. They were no longer 0:02:26.120 --> 0:02:29.960 to verify its location. The concerns compounded because even before 0:02:30.000 --> 0:02:34.120 the bombing began, Iranian diplomats had told the IAEA that 0:02:34.240 --> 0:02:36.840 if Israel and he did attack, they would move that 0:02:36.919 --> 0:02:40.680 material to an undeclared location. So at this point we 0:02:40.800 --> 0:02:45.280 don't have any visibility on the inventory of nuclear material 0:02:45.560 --> 0:02:48.280 that was existing at the site before. But we're looking 0:02:48.320 --> 0:02:51.560 at about ten days now of that material being out 0:02:51.560 --> 0:02:54.400 of contact with international verification measures. 0:02:54.680 --> 0:02:57.480 Why is it that we don't know more about where 0:02:57.520 --> 0:02:57.960 it is? 0:02:58.639 --> 0:03:03.360 Well before the bombing began, International Aconomic Energy Agency monitors 0:03:03.360 --> 0:03:06.680 were in Iran every day. The IAEA has two hundred 0:03:06.680 --> 0:03:09.280 and seventy four monitors that are going in and out 0:03:09.320 --> 0:03:12.520 of Iran constantly, So all of that material was under 0:03:12.600 --> 0:03:16.000 what's called safeguards. They're under seal of the IAEA. The 0:03:16.040 --> 0:03:19.280 International community and inspectors were going in and out of 0:03:19.320 --> 0:03:22.200 those facilities inspecting an average at one point four a 0:03:22.320 --> 0:03:26.480 day last year once the bombing began, for obvious reasons, 0:03:26.520 --> 0:03:28.880 because you know, the IAEA is not going to be 0:03:29.000 --> 0:03:31.839 entering onto a site under active attack. You know, once 0:03:31.880 --> 0:03:35.920 the attacks began, you eliminated the ability to verify the 0:03:36.160 --> 0:03:39.800 location of that material. Compounding that problem is that Iran 0:03:39.840 --> 0:03:43.400 had informed the IAEA that if Israel did begin to attack, 0:03:43.480 --> 0:03:46.880 it would remove that material to an undisclosed location, and 0:03:46.920 --> 0:03:50.760 as of yesterday, the Iranians still had not told the 0:03:50.800 --> 0:03:53.800 IAEA where they had put it, and you know, just 0:03:53.960 --> 0:03:57.120 to go a step further, Iranians are also making a 0:03:57.160 --> 0:04:02.119 move to restrict IAEA movements and country going forward. They're 0:04:02.160 --> 0:04:05.120 talking about leaving the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which is 0:04:05.160 --> 0:04:10.640 the bedrock legal arrangement that imposes IAEA inspections in Iran. 0:04:10.880 --> 0:04:15.520 If Iran bars IAEA or leaves the treaty, then we 0:04:15.720 --> 0:04:19.560 face the potential of losing sight of that four hundred 0:04:19.560 --> 0:04:23.240 and kilograms of highly iriched material that could be quickly 0:04:23.240 --> 0:04:26.839 turned into bomb material for a long time, and that 0:04:27.080 --> 0:04:32.599 questions the metrics of success for the attacks. So while 0:04:32.640 --> 0:04:35.119 there's no doubt that there was a grave damage dealt 0:04:35.200 --> 0:04:37.920 to the above ground facilities, perhaps some of the underground 0:04:37.920 --> 0:04:41.160 in Richmond's facilities, the attacks did not take account of 0:04:41.160 --> 0:04:44.120 the existing inventory of Iran's nuclear material. 0:04:44.279 --> 0:04:46.560 I want to come box the framework in a moment 0:04:46.760 --> 0:04:50.080 that underpins all of this that you mentioned, But how 0:04:50.120 --> 0:04:53.520 far could this uranium have been moved? In theory? How 0:04:53.560 --> 0:04:54.880 easily transport able is. 0:04:54.800 --> 0:04:58.159 This There's a vast body of scientific literature about the 0:04:58.200 --> 0:05:01.400 amount of material that be packed to into a canister 0:05:01.520 --> 0:05:04.799 when it's at that enrichment level because there are safety 0:05:04.839 --> 0:05:09.479 concerns about criticality incidents. Basically, that material is limited to 0:05:09.560 --> 0:05:11.960 a canister about the side of a scuba tank that 0:05:12.000 --> 0:05:15.480 can carry about twenty five kilograms of this highly enriched uranium. 0:05:15.520 --> 0:05:18.760 That means, for all practical purposes, an individual or a 0:05:18.839 --> 0:05:22.440 small vehicle, could you know, carry that out and spirit 0:05:22.440 --> 0:05:26.719 it away to an undisclosed location. The handling requirements of 0:05:28.240 --> 0:05:31.839 enriched uranium are not that complicated. It's only after the 0:05:31.880 --> 0:05:34.880 fuel has been irradiated instead of a reactor or in 0:05:34.960 --> 0:05:38.640 a bomb, that you know you're facing a real radiological risk. 0:05:38.760 --> 0:05:42.520 So this is not a complicated task to bring those 0:05:42.560 --> 0:05:46.240 canisters out and put them into a place that has 0:05:46.279 --> 0:05:47.080 not been declared. 0:05:47.440 --> 0:05:52.040 Let's return to the monitoring that was possible before this 0:05:52.440 --> 0:05:56.360 war erupted. How effective was that system thought to have 0:05:56.440 --> 0:05:57.520 been beforehand. 0:05:58.160 --> 0:06:02.160 There's a very dispute about the declared nuclear material in Iran. 0:06:02.440 --> 0:06:07.040 The IAEA has been keeping track to gram levels of 0:06:07.040 --> 0:06:10.120 this vast volume of enriched material that Iran has and 0:06:10.240 --> 0:06:12.880 less I forget it's not just the four hundred nine 0:06:12.920 --> 0:06:15.880 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. They also have thousands of 0:06:15.960 --> 0:06:20.320 kilograms of lower enriched uranium, So that was never the dispute. 0:06:20.440 --> 0:06:23.400 What was the dispute, and the reason that Iran on 0:06:23.520 --> 0:06:26.680 June twelfth was found in non compliance of its safeguards 0:06:26.680 --> 0:06:31.560 agreements was because the agency had detected trace elements of 0:06:31.960 --> 0:06:35.800 uranium at several locations that had not been declared. Now, 0:06:36.000 --> 0:06:40.239 these trace isotopes that were detected were decades of years old, 0:06:40.320 --> 0:06:43.440 I mean they go back to the early two thousands, 0:06:43.640 --> 0:06:46.600 so this was not a smoking gun, so to speak. 0:06:46.960 --> 0:06:51.560 But the standards of verification are so high at the IAEA, 0:06:51.800 --> 0:06:54.039 not just in Iran but in every country that any 0:06:54.080 --> 0:06:58.440 anomaly prompts an investigation, and the Iranians were not cooperating 0:06:58.480 --> 0:07:04.000 in this investigation. The Iranians considered that their cooperation leading 0:07:04.040 --> 0:07:07.360 into the twenty fifteen nuclear agreement that the US left 0:07:07.400 --> 0:07:10.200 in twenty eighteen had sufficed that it was under no 0:07:10.280 --> 0:07:15.640 obligation to continue cooperating in these old investigations, and they 0:07:15.680 --> 0:07:19.640 were basically stonewalling the IAEA, which then resulted earlier this 0:07:19.720 --> 0:07:22.240 month in this finding give non compliance. But in terms 0:07:22.240 --> 0:07:26.280 of the actual enriched uranium, we've always had a good 0:07:26.360 --> 0:07:29.280 bead on what that inventory actually looks like. 0:07:29.520 --> 0:07:31.680 Okay, well, then I suppose what does the future of 0:07:31.760 --> 0:07:35.800 the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the structure that underpins all 0:07:35.840 --> 0:07:38.400 of this inspection system, What does the future of that 0:07:38.520 --> 0:07:39.440 framework look like? 0:07:39.520 --> 0:07:43.400 Now, well, that's the good question. And frankly, IAEID Director 0:07:43.440 --> 0:07:46.640 General Raphael Mariano Grossi has been warning about this four 0:07:46.720 --> 0:07:50.400 months because it's been a slow motion train wreck in 0:07:50.440 --> 0:07:52.800 the eyes of people who are paying close attention to this. 0:07:52.920 --> 0:07:54.960 The Iranians have been warning, you know, for at least 0:07:55.000 --> 0:07:59.840 the last year that if this escalates diplomatically, never mind militarily, 0:08:00.080 --> 0:08:02.840 they were prepared to trigger their so called Article ten 0:08:02.960 --> 0:08:06.040 rights under the NPT that would give the IAEA three 0:08:06.120 --> 0:08:08.240 month notice that they were going to be withdrawing from 0:08:08.240 --> 0:08:13.120 that treaty. If they withdraw, that essentially ends IAEA inspections, 0:08:13.320 --> 0:08:19.520 and that is a massively escalatory move in light of 0:08:19.680 --> 0:08:23.520 the conflict we've just witnessed. And let's not forget I mean, 0:08:23.600 --> 0:08:26.960 even in the best case scenario where Iran remains within 0:08:27.000 --> 0:08:30.400 the treaty and inspections continue, it is going to take 0:08:30.680 --> 0:08:36.600 years for the IAEA to re establish a material accountancy baseline. 0:08:36.640 --> 0:08:40.400 There's so much localized chemical and radiological hazards it's going 0:08:40.480 --> 0:08:42.360 to take a while for them even to get back 0:08:42.400 --> 0:08:46.720 on site doing investigations, doing inspections, and once they're in there, 0:08:47.240 --> 0:08:50.200 they're going to have to basically start from point zero 0:08:50.440 --> 0:08:54.320 and rebuilding their data on Iran stockpile. This has caused 0:08:54.480 --> 0:08:58.720 a massively complex challenge to the non proliferation regime. 0:08:59.440 --> 0:09:02.840 Okay and run our nuclear diplomacy reporter. Thank you. For 0:09:02.960 --> 0:09:05.560 more explanations like this from our team of three thousand 0:09:05.679 --> 0:09:08.199 journalists and analysts around the world, go to Bloomberg dot 0:09:08.240 --> 0:09:12.679 com slash explainers. I'm Stephen Carroll. This is Here's why. 0:09:12.880 --> 0:09:15.280 I'll be back next week with more. Thanks for listening.