1
00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680
Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

2
00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

3
00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079
Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

4
00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,200
Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio, Welcome back to the show.

5
00:00:25,320 --> 00:00:28,000
Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is Noel. They called

6
00:00:28,080 --> 00:00:31,000
Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer

7
00:00:31,120 --> 00:00:35,800
Speaker 1: Alexis code named Doc Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you.

8
00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:38,880
Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this stuff they don't

9
00:00:39,000 --> 00:00:43,000
Speaker 1: want you to know. It's time for our weekly listener

10
00:00:43,240 --> 00:00:47,800
Speaker 1: Male segment and full disclosure. Folks. This is one of

11
00:00:47,840 --> 00:00:52,279
Speaker 1: those episodes where we all got together. We try to

12
00:00:52,360 --> 00:00:54,000
Speaker 1: give each other a little bit of a heads up

13
00:00:54,080 --> 00:00:58,800
Speaker 1: as we're going into these and sometimes will find things

14
00:00:58,840 --> 00:01:03,000
Speaker 1: that are so heavy we're disturbing from your fellow listeners

15
00:01:03,240 --> 00:01:05,560
Speaker 1: that we intentionally try to find things that are a

16
00:01:05,600 --> 00:01:09,280
Speaker 1: little bit lighter to to sort of balance this out

17
00:01:09,400 --> 00:01:13,839
Speaker 1: so that you don't leave feeling like an hour more

18
00:01:13,920 --> 00:01:17,960
Speaker 1: depressed than you were. But we were touching on some

19
00:01:18,040 --> 00:01:21,680
Speaker 1: things that are mysteries in the US, We're touching on

20
00:01:21,720 --> 00:01:25,840
Speaker 1: some things that are mysteries and tragedies and conspiracies abroad.

21
00:01:26,520 --> 00:01:30,280
Speaker 1: And then we're gonna we're gonna talk in your sleep

22
00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:32,640
Speaker 1: a little or we're gonna share a story about it. Also,

23
00:01:32,760 --> 00:01:35,840
Speaker 1: that's that is kind of a shout out to all

24
00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:40,520
Speaker 1: the very kind people who have left reviews on Apple Podcast,

25
00:01:40,760 --> 00:01:44,360
Speaker 1: giving us five stars and saying I love this podcast.

26
00:01:45,080 --> 00:01:48,960
Speaker 1: It puts me to sleep right away. Nice people have

27
00:01:48,960 --> 00:01:53,240
Speaker 1: been leaving reviews. Now this is a change. I love this.

28
00:01:53,960 --> 00:01:57,480
Speaker 1: Uh yeah yeah, And also nod to you, Mike, Mike,

29
00:01:58,760 --> 00:02:03,320
Speaker 1: Mike Pally. He knows who he is. Do you like

30
00:02:03,360 --> 00:02:05,440
Speaker 1: how I I didn't care if anybody else knew that

31
00:02:05,440 --> 00:02:11,960
Speaker 1: you were saying, Mike, Sorry about that, Mike. Okay, So yeah,

32
00:02:12,040 --> 00:02:14,680
Speaker 1: what do we want to do first? Ben? Uh, you

33
00:02:14,800 --> 00:02:18,640
Speaker 1: know it's tough. But here's what I think we do, Matt.

34
00:02:18,760 --> 00:02:22,839
Speaker 1: I think we we save our sleep stuff for our

35
00:02:22,960 --> 00:02:25,600
Speaker 1: third act. It's a nice bookend because we're talking about

36
00:02:25,600 --> 00:02:29,359
Speaker 1: sleep in the beginning. Everyone will be off by that. Okay,

37
00:02:29,600 --> 00:02:32,600
Speaker 1: five stars and I just want to I just wanna

38
00:02:33,160 --> 00:02:38,320
Speaker 1: like reiterate it was a nice five star review. Um.

39
00:02:38,520 --> 00:02:41,839
Speaker 1: So we have some mysteries of foot and there's one

40
00:02:41,919 --> 00:02:44,720
Speaker 1: that I'm sure some of our friends on. Here's where

41
00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:47,600
Speaker 1: it gets crazy of clocked. I clocked it as well,

42
00:02:47,880 --> 00:02:52,840
Speaker 1: and uh, you did too know the there was something

43
00:02:53,200 --> 00:02:57,040
Speaker 1: screwy of foot in the very like the literal very

44
00:02:57,240 --> 00:03:03,359
Speaker 1: end of the Trump administration. Yeah, it seems so. Um literally, like,

45
00:03:03,800 --> 00:03:11,119
Speaker 1: moments after Trump vacated the premises, Uh, this entire swath

46
00:03:11,800 --> 00:03:14,560
Speaker 1: of the Internet in the form of like, you know,

47
00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:19,600
Speaker 1: millions of IP addresses that were previously associated with the

48
00:03:19,639 --> 00:03:22,160
Speaker 1: White House but had been dormant, all of a sudden

49
00:03:22,280 --> 00:03:26,360
Speaker 1: came to life. What does this mean? So essentially it means,

50
00:03:26,400 --> 00:03:33,320
Speaker 1: after you know, twenty plus years of not using this swath,

51
00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:37,120
Speaker 1: this chunk of the Internet, the Pentagon has now given

52
00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:43,440
Speaker 1: over millions of IP addresses to a third party company, uh,

53
00:03:43,440 --> 00:03:49,840
Speaker 1: in an effort to identify cyber threats and vulnerabilities. It's

54
00:03:50,000 --> 00:03:54,920
Speaker 1: super strange. Um. The company is called Global Resource Systems

55
00:03:55,120 --> 00:04:00,640
Speaker 1: llc UM and it has now claimed fifty six million

56
00:04:00,760 --> 00:04:06,000
Speaker 1: I P addresses that are owned by the Pentagon. And

57
00:04:06,080 --> 00:04:08,600
Speaker 1: this is what happened pretty much instantly after Trump left

58
00:04:08,640 --> 00:04:11,880
Speaker 1: office and then um this is according to a great

59
00:04:11,920 --> 00:04:15,480
Speaker 1: report from The Washington Post by Craig Timberg and Paul

60
00:04:15,600 --> 00:04:20,800
Speaker 1: Son about this development. UM And and according to their report,

61
00:04:21,560 --> 00:04:25,279
Speaker 1: about a hundred and seventy five million is now the

62
00:04:25,320 --> 00:04:30,239
Speaker 1: total number of these IP addresses, which is about six

63
00:04:30,360 --> 00:04:36,159
Speaker 1: percent um of a section of the Internet called i

64
00:04:36,400 --> 00:04:39,920
Speaker 1: p v four, which is this is a little over

65
00:04:39,920 --> 00:04:42,320
Speaker 1: my head. I'm not like a I T guy, but

66
00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:46,800
Speaker 1: it is according to uh. Wikipedia very rarely cite this,

67
00:04:46,839 --> 00:04:50,120
Speaker 1: but I think this is appropriate use of Wikipedia. It

68
00:04:50,200 --> 00:04:53,880
Speaker 1: is an Internet Protocol Version four essentially, so it's the

69
00:04:53,880 --> 00:04:57,560
Speaker 1: fourth version of the Internet Protocol UM. It is a

70
00:04:57,560 --> 00:05:02,880
Speaker 1: core protocol of what's referred to as standards based Internetworking

71
00:05:02,960 --> 00:05:07,839
Speaker 1: Methods UM and other forms of networking involving packet switching.

72
00:05:08,160 --> 00:05:11,599
Speaker 1: It is just the latest iteration of this very core

73
00:05:12,080 --> 00:05:15,159
Speaker 1: protocol for Internet browsing and Internet story. And by the way,

74
00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:17,400
Speaker 1: I was treating this like a strange news episode, that

75
00:05:17,520 --> 00:05:19,600
Speaker 1: is not what this is today. This is a listener

76
00:05:19,640 --> 00:05:23,440
Speaker 1: mail episode where we highlight messages from the most important

77
00:05:23,480 --> 00:05:25,040
Speaker 1: part of the show, which is you. And this one

78
00:05:25,360 --> 00:05:28,520
Speaker 1: comes from K Dog seventy seven. This is what this

79
00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:30,960
Speaker 1: individual asked to be referred to, and I'm more than

80
00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:34,240
Speaker 1: happy to oblige U. K Dog rights. Hey, guys, love

81
00:05:34,320 --> 00:05:37,560
Speaker 1: Love Love three loves the show. Feel free to use

82
00:05:37,600 --> 00:05:41,200
Speaker 1: my name as K Dog seventy seven. Done. Appreciate it

83
00:05:41,279 --> 00:05:43,280
Speaker 1: and all you guys do. I found your show about

84
00:05:43,279 --> 00:05:45,799
Speaker 1: a year ago, and no, man, you've helped me stay

85
00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:48,200
Speaker 1: sane for the most part and helped me navigate through

86
00:05:48,240 --> 00:05:51,080
Speaker 1: some of the most difficult moments in my life. UM,

87
00:05:51,600 --> 00:05:54,120
Speaker 1: we're right there with you. Um k Dog you have

88
00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:57,000
Speaker 1: done the same for us, uh and and all of

89
00:05:57,040 --> 00:05:59,640
Speaker 1: your fellow conspiracy realists. We can't thank you enough for

90
00:05:59,680 --> 00:06:03,520
Speaker 1: all the wonderful emails and messages and suggestions for topics

91
00:06:03,520 --> 00:06:05,960
Speaker 1: and this new listener mail segment that has just become

92
00:06:06,360 --> 00:06:09,880
Speaker 1: one of my favorite parts of the week. UM to continue.

93
00:06:10,440 --> 00:06:12,680
Speaker 1: You've also helped me to feel more comfortable with my

94
00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:15,839
Speaker 1: nerd persona and those nerdy things I like. So again,

95
00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:18,360
Speaker 1: thank you to all of you. So I came across

96
00:06:18,360 --> 00:06:20,400
Speaker 1: the below in my news feed and thought this would

97
00:06:20,400 --> 00:06:22,839
Speaker 1: be something you might be interested in. Seems to me

98
00:06:22,960 --> 00:06:26,520
Speaker 1: that we as a country could have made some serious

99
00:06:26,560 --> 00:06:29,320
Speaker 1: money if we were going to sell these IP addresses.

100
00:06:29,520 --> 00:06:31,560
Speaker 1: I feel like these are going to be used against

101
00:06:31,640 --> 00:06:36,800
Speaker 1: us for some wonderfully uncomfortable reason. Best gents, stay safe,

102
00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:41,040
Speaker 1: keep keeping it real, Ky Dog seventy seven. Nice Thanks

103
00:06:41,120 --> 00:06:44,240
Speaker 1: Kate Dog, Yeah very much so. And it's true that

104
00:06:44,279 --> 00:06:47,280
Speaker 1: was the part I was getting to before I realized

105
00:06:47,320 --> 00:06:50,240
Speaker 1: that I needed to to talk about k Dog. So

106
00:06:50,320 --> 00:06:53,360
Speaker 1: that's done. Thank you again. Uh, And it's true this

107
00:06:53,760 --> 00:06:55,760
Speaker 1: portion of the Internet, these I P dresses, you know

108
00:06:55,800 --> 00:06:58,839
Speaker 1: how I mean to buy it an IP addresses. I mean, again,

109
00:06:58,880 --> 00:07:01,800
Speaker 1: I'm not forgiving oversimplifying, but you know, it's like it's

110
00:07:01,800 --> 00:07:07,360
Speaker 1: a domain. It is a piece of storage on the Internet. UM,

111
00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:10,760
Speaker 1: I believe you know, you could be a server. Individual

112
00:07:10,800 --> 00:07:13,880
Speaker 1: computer users have i P addresses about what are individual

113
00:07:13,920 --> 00:07:19,200
Speaker 1: computers if not just slightly more uh rudimentary or basic servers.

114
00:07:19,320 --> 00:07:21,440
Speaker 1: You know, a server is literally just a computer that

115
00:07:21,560 --> 00:07:24,920
Speaker 1: is designed to do nothing but store and serve massive

116
00:07:24,920 --> 00:07:27,760
Speaker 1: amounts of data. And that is basically what the Internet is.

117
00:07:28,240 --> 00:07:30,800
Speaker 1: And I'm sure there's some tech people out there that

118
00:07:30,840 --> 00:07:34,720
Speaker 1: would uh you know, begrudge me for perhaps oversimplifying, but

119
00:07:34,840 --> 00:07:37,840
Speaker 1: I think that's basically right. The Internet, it consists of

120
00:07:38,200 --> 00:07:41,800
Speaker 1: millions of these server computers that are stored in these

121
00:07:41,840 --> 00:07:45,080
Speaker 1: massive farms, um that are facilities that are just rows

122
00:07:45,160 --> 00:07:47,679
Speaker 1: and rows and rows and rows of these rack server

123
00:07:48,000 --> 00:07:52,200
Speaker 1: units that all represent different swaths of the Internet. Uh.

124
00:07:52,240 --> 00:07:55,800
Speaker 1: Amazon obviously is huge, uh purveyor of these with their

125
00:07:55,920 --> 00:08:00,000
Speaker 1: Amazon Web Services. Um. And you know there's a core

126
00:08:00,080 --> 00:08:02,880
Speaker 1: other ones. But the point that the article and k

127
00:08:03,080 --> 00:08:07,720
Speaker 1: dog makes is that this portion of the Internet potentially

128
00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:11,840
Speaker 1: worth a hell of a lot of money. Fifty six million,

129
00:08:12,360 --> 00:08:16,040
Speaker 1: seventy five million I p addresses. Uh, it's six percent

130
00:08:16,160 --> 00:08:20,320
Speaker 1: again of this traditional section of Internet real estate, this

131
00:08:20,440 --> 00:08:25,520
Speaker 1: I p v four which is worth billions of dollars

132
00:08:25,560 --> 00:08:30,040
Speaker 1: on the open market. So what's going on? Um? And

133
00:08:30,320 --> 00:08:33,520
Speaker 1: just just to mention again, you know, we talked about Amazon,

134
00:08:33,640 --> 00:08:37,280
Speaker 1: but there are companies like A T and T, China

135
00:08:37,320 --> 00:08:40,840
Speaker 1: Telecom and Verizon, uh that are you know, that are

136
00:08:41,240 --> 00:08:46,839
Speaker 1: mega conglomo companies that own the largest portions of the Internet. Um.

137
00:08:46,920 --> 00:08:50,679
Speaker 1: But now there is another company in the mix called

138
00:08:50,720 --> 00:08:55,800
Speaker 1: Global Resource Systems, which is a company that only began

139
00:08:55,880 --> 00:09:01,160
Speaker 1: operating in September and has no publicly reported federal contracts

140
00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:06,239
Speaker 1: or any kind of public facing presence on the Internet. Hmmm.

141
00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:08,880
Speaker 1: And they're the ones that are now in control of

142
00:09:08,920 --> 00:09:11,320
Speaker 1: all these IP addresses that are worth billions and billions

143
00:09:11,360 --> 00:09:14,360
Speaker 1: of dollars. Yeah, it doesn't smell like a front company

144
00:09:14,480 --> 00:09:19,040
Speaker 1: that at all. Global Resource Systems come on, that's might

145
00:09:19,120 --> 00:09:23,280
Speaker 1: as well be illumination. Global unlimited. I mean, hey, hey, hey,

146
00:09:24,760 --> 00:09:28,040
Speaker 1: I'm saying as far as front companies go, that's that's

147
00:09:28,080 --> 00:09:35,480
Speaker 1: that's the big dog. Well they're they're behind the company exactly. UM. Yeah,

148
00:09:35,520 --> 00:09:38,720
Speaker 1: it's it's bizarre. And they did they did this with

149
00:09:38,840 --> 00:09:41,839
Speaker 1: very little fanfare. It wasn't like it was some sort

150
00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:45,600
Speaker 1: of big initiative that was announced that some sort of presser. UM.

151
00:09:45,640 --> 00:09:49,800
Speaker 1: It only became kind of public info because the Global

152
00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:55,920
Speaker 1: Resource Systems UH takeover of the Pentagon addresses UH took

153
00:09:55,960 --> 00:10:00,760
Speaker 1: place in something called Border Gateway Protocol, which is a

154
00:10:00,800 --> 00:10:05,920
Speaker 1: messaging system that tells different Internet providers how and where

155
00:10:05,920 --> 00:10:09,200
Speaker 1: to route Internet traffic throughout the world. Consider it like

156
00:10:09,440 --> 00:10:15,120
Speaker 1: air traffic control for the Internet. UM. And information began

157
00:10:15,480 --> 00:10:18,400
Speaker 1: piling up that these I P addresses, which which were

158
00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:21,199
Speaker 1: assigned you know, there's ownership associated with all these I

159
00:10:21,440 --> 00:10:25,640
Speaker 1: dresses to the Pentagon UM, but had been dead essentially,

160
00:10:25,679 --> 00:10:28,800
Speaker 1: you know, with zero traffic, not used for any purpose.

161
00:10:29,360 --> 00:10:33,040
Speaker 1: And now this message in this uh, this you know,

162
00:10:33,800 --> 00:10:38,240
Speaker 1: Border Gateway Protocol system said that they could now accept traffic,

163
00:10:38,679 --> 00:10:41,959
Speaker 1: but that the traffic needed to be rerouted to g

164
00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:46,960
Speaker 1: RS Global Resource Systems UM. So this is when all

165
00:10:46,960 --> 00:10:51,400
Speaker 1: the kind of chatter started among network admins, people talking

166
00:10:51,440 --> 00:10:54,319
Speaker 1: about how what what like what does this mean that

167
00:10:54,400 --> 00:10:58,040
Speaker 1: they considered this to be uh. The most dramatic shifts

168
00:10:58,080 --> 00:11:01,160
Speaker 1: again from the from the the post article in I

169
00:11:01,360 --> 00:11:08,600
Speaker 1: P address space allotment history since um the eighties, which

170
00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:10,560
Speaker 1: is obviously like, you know, the earliest days of the

171
00:11:10,559 --> 00:11:15,160
Speaker 1: internet period. Yeah, and these addresses. Another strange thing about them,

172
00:11:15,200 --> 00:11:18,480
Speaker 1: if we if we didn't hit this before, is that

173
00:11:19,240 --> 00:11:23,880
Speaker 1: they were in a way they were empty houses for decades, right,

174
00:11:23,960 --> 00:11:29,160
Speaker 1: So the timing itself of feels it's easy to understand

175
00:11:29,240 --> 00:11:32,800
Speaker 1: how that can be suspicious, even without a front company

176
00:11:33,120 --> 00:11:35,520
Speaker 1: like It's It's tough to draw conclusions at this point.

177
00:11:35,800 --> 00:11:38,920
Speaker 1: But uh, let's tell you, k dog, it does not

178
00:11:40,760 --> 00:11:42,720
Speaker 1: It doesn't look good, you know what I mean. If

179
00:11:42,760 --> 00:11:45,800
Speaker 1: we were lawyers who were going into conspiracy court to

180
00:11:45,880 --> 00:11:50,120
Speaker 1: say that this was not, uh suspicious, we would lose

181
00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:54,240
Speaker 1: that case. There's a lot of circumstantial stuff here. I'm

182
00:11:54,240 --> 00:11:57,440
Speaker 1: not gonna say that there's definitely something to miss, but

183
00:11:57,559 --> 00:12:01,040
Speaker 1: this is unusual and and again this is this is unprecedented.

184
00:12:01,040 --> 00:12:04,160
Speaker 1: This dude named Doug Marjorie, who's the director of Internet

185
00:12:04,200 --> 00:12:07,720
Speaker 1: analysis for a company called Kentech, which monitors this type

186
00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:10,679
Speaker 1: of thing for a living. He said that this is

187
00:12:11,559 --> 00:12:14,560
Speaker 1: bigger than anything in the history ever in the history

188
00:12:14,600 --> 00:12:17,920
Speaker 1: of the Internet than a blog post recently. UM and

189
00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:20,520
Speaker 1: there's a lot of theories that that's that's the beauty

190
00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:21,920
Speaker 1: of this. There's a lot of speculation because there have

191
00:12:22,040 --> 00:12:26,680
Speaker 1: hasn't been an official announcement UM. One theory is that

192
00:12:26,720 --> 00:12:32,160
Speaker 1: perhaps someone at the Department of Defense UM sold off

193
00:12:32,520 --> 00:12:38,560
Speaker 1: a portion of these I P addresses as Trump uh

194
00:12:38,960 --> 00:12:44,040
Speaker 1: took off as as Trump left office. Another potential theory

195
00:12:44,280 --> 00:12:49,240
Speaker 1: is this notion that the Pentagon UM acted on pressure

196
00:12:49,440 --> 00:12:54,040
Speaker 1: they've been under for years to unload these IP addresses

197
00:12:54,720 --> 00:12:57,520
Speaker 1: that the military just been sitting on for for many,

198
00:12:57,559 --> 00:13:01,920
Speaker 1: many many years and not using. We did get something

199
00:13:02,280 --> 00:13:08,800
Speaker 1: approaching an answer recently. UM. This article is from April four,

200
00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:13,960
Speaker 1: so this is all very fresh and this is what

201
00:13:14,000 --> 00:13:17,160
Speaker 1: we got. It's not much, but but it's something. There

202
00:13:17,360 --> 00:13:21,800
Speaker 1: is a unit, an elite unit in the Pentagon called

203
00:13:21,800 --> 00:13:27,320
Speaker 1: the Defense Digital Service UM, which reports directly to the

204
00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:30,520
Speaker 1: Secretary of Defense UM and I love this. According to

205
00:13:30,559 --> 00:13:34,600
Speaker 1: the Washington Post article, this group affectionately refers to themselves

206
00:13:34,640 --> 00:13:38,920
Speaker 1: as a swat team of nerds UH. And essentially they

207
00:13:39,000 --> 00:13:44,840
Speaker 1: are kind of the first responders for any uh, you know,

208
00:13:45,559 --> 00:13:52,920
Speaker 1: significant information breach or running experiments UM to help the

209
00:13:52,960 --> 00:13:58,400
Speaker 1: military achieve you know, information superiority essentially. And it's a

210
00:13:58,440 --> 00:14:02,200
Speaker 1: pretty new unit AT which makes sense because government tends

211
00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:05,480
Speaker 1: to move slower than technology. But it was established in

212
00:14:07,000 --> 00:14:11,360
Speaker 1: UM and it has a very state of the art

213
00:14:11,440 --> 00:14:16,160
Speaker 1: office within the Pentagon UM and for the last several

214
00:14:16,280 --> 00:14:20,760
Speaker 1: years have been working on things ranging from like biometric

215
00:14:21,520 --> 00:14:27,560
Speaker 1: measurement applications UH to help identify like friendlies in combat

216
00:14:28,120 --> 00:14:31,080
Speaker 1: UM and differentiate them from enemies, which can be a problem,

217
00:14:31,160 --> 00:14:35,200
Speaker 1: especially when you're conducting combat from a distance, right UM.

218
00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:39,040
Speaker 1: So this would help eliminate you know, collateral damage or

219
00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:42,200
Speaker 1: at the very least reduce it. And also uh you know,

220
00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:45,880
Speaker 1: working on encryption, you know, making sure that Pentagon emails

221
00:14:45,920 --> 00:14:52,720
Speaker 1: are encrypted at the most uh secure levels imaginable. UH.

222
00:14:52,760 --> 00:14:56,360
Speaker 1: So there was a statement from the director of this unit,

223
00:14:56,560 --> 00:15:00,280
Speaker 1: guy named Brett Goldstein, who said that his author some

224
00:15:00,320 --> 00:15:06,000
Speaker 1: sort of pilot program UH that would utilize the IP

225
00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:09,560
Speaker 1: address the IP addresses in question UH and he said

226
00:15:09,600 --> 00:15:13,480
Speaker 1: the pilot will assess, evaluate and prevent unauthorized uses of

227
00:15:13,600 --> 00:15:18,160
Speaker 1: d O d I p address space. Additionally, this pilot

228
00:15:18,200 --> 00:15:21,800
Speaker 1: may identify potential vulnerabilities. So is the I think guys,

229
00:15:21,880 --> 00:15:24,920
Speaker 1: the implication here is that these dormant ip addresses could

230
00:15:24,920 --> 00:15:27,320
Speaker 1: have been like you mentioned them as empty house has

231
00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:30,400
Speaker 1: been and maybe means some people were like squatting in them. Yes,

232
00:15:30,520 --> 00:15:33,480
Speaker 1: So when I had first heard about this story, um,

233
00:15:33,560 --> 00:15:36,560
Speaker 1: which as you said, broke just a few days ago,

234
00:15:37,360 --> 00:15:39,960
Speaker 1: that was that was one of the first questions. So

235
00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:42,840
Speaker 1: with these are kind of empty houses or you know,

236
00:15:43,640 --> 00:15:46,000
Speaker 1: vacant parking spots, whatever you want to call them. If

237
00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:52,480
Speaker 1: their placeholders, then why are they suddenly interesting right to

238
00:15:52,480 --> 00:15:55,160
Speaker 1: to an organization the size of the Pentagon and to

239
00:15:55,280 --> 00:15:59,520
Speaker 1: these specialized divisions. I've read some fascinating theories and it's

240
00:15:59,600 --> 00:16:05,120
Speaker 1: sound is like they may have encountered a ton of

241
00:16:05,800 --> 00:16:11,360
Speaker 1: unexpected traffic, which means, to keep with the empty house analogy,

242
00:16:11,400 --> 00:16:13,440
Speaker 1: there might not be any furniture in the house or

243
00:16:13,440 --> 00:16:16,360
Speaker 1: any people living there, but that doesn't stop anyone from

244
00:16:16,400 --> 00:16:19,000
Speaker 1: coming and trying to knock on the door trying to

245
00:16:19,080 --> 00:16:24,120
Speaker 1: get in. So it's possible that they may be uh

246
00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:26,840
Speaker 1: doing this just to clean up the space to sell

247
00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:30,440
Speaker 1: it later, or that they're cleaning it up for their

248
00:16:30,480 --> 00:16:34,920
Speaker 1: own use later, or that they're doing it entirely too

249
00:16:35,720 --> 00:16:42,080
Speaker 1: circumvent whatever potential hijacking is going on, and maybe maybe

250
00:16:42,080 --> 00:16:45,600
Speaker 1: they're working on something where or maybe their aim is

251
00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:50,120
Speaker 1: rather to gather intelligence, because if you if you look

252
00:16:50,160 --> 00:16:52,480
Speaker 1: at this and you're not an expert, which none of

253
00:16:52,560 --> 00:16:57,880
Speaker 1: us are in this field, then it seems plausible that

254
00:16:57,960 --> 00:17:03,160
Speaker 1: they might suspect other nations militaries or other nations spot

255
00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:07,760
Speaker 1: teams of nerds for trying to get get in that way. Yeah,

256
00:17:07,760 --> 00:17:12,240
Speaker 1: I would say that feels like the most likely scenario here.

257
00:17:12,600 --> 00:17:16,240
Speaker 1: Imagine if you could hijack some of these I P addresses,

258
00:17:16,760 --> 00:17:19,000
Speaker 1: you could make it look as though you were coming

259
00:17:19,040 --> 00:17:22,159
Speaker 1: from the Pentagon to access maybe other parts of the

260
00:17:22,200 --> 00:17:29,960
Speaker 1: Pentagon's infrastructure there, maybe to access other sensitive government cyber assets.

261
00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:31,879
Speaker 1: I love. I love when the government in the United

262
00:17:31,880 --> 00:17:36,800
Speaker 1: States uses the term cyber. Love when they just use

263
00:17:36,880 --> 00:17:39,440
Speaker 1: it by itself, like that's something that Trump did often,

264
00:17:39,480 --> 00:17:42,400
Speaker 1: or he was always talking about cyber it's the most important,

265
00:17:42,400 --> 00:17:45,560
Speaker 1: Like it just sounds like Grandpa talking about computers. It's

266
00:17:45,560 --> 00:17:49,560
Speaker 1: a disease of ceo s, honestly, high level executives. I

267
00:17:49,560 --> 00:17:53,840
Speaker 1: mean specifically, because if you've ever been in conversations with

268
00:17:54,880 --> 00:17:59,800
Speaker 1: investment bankers or people the more esoteric level, higher esoteric

269
00:17:59,840 --> 00:18:02,720
Speaker 1: levels of business, they talk about these things in such

270
00:18:02,720 --> 00:18:05,760
Speaker 1: a weird way. It's it's the it sounds like the

271
00:18:05,880 --> 00:18:08,960
Speaker 1: same sort of stuff you would hear um from high

272
00:18:09,040 --> 00:18:13,600
Speaker 1: level military members sometimes where they're like, oh yeah, I uh.

273
00:18:13,880 --> 00:18:16,159
Speaker 1: I had some conversation with a guy who is like,

274
00:18:16,520 --> 00:18:19,080
Speaker 1: I work in water, and I was like, what is that?

275
00:18:19,920 --> 00:18:21,719
Speaker 1: What do you mean? It's like, oh, I'm a banker,

276
00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:24,480
Speaker 1: Like this is more confusing. Are you a lifeguard at

277
00:18:24,480 --> 00:18:27,639
Speaker 1: the bank pool or you like, do you give people

278
00:18:27,760 --> 00:18:30,720
Speaker 1: at your bank water? Are you the water boy for

279
00:18:31,040 --> 00:18:34,680
Speaker 1: Morgan Chase or like and and no, entirely, here's a

280
00:18:34,720 --> 00:18:37,080
Speaker 1: whole job is to like talk at a high level

281
00:18:37,119 --> 00:18:41,160
Speaker 1: way about water and then throw money at things. Nice, nice,

282
00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:45,119
Speaker 1: Well in this case, you guys, I'm really imagining this

283
00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:48,879
Speaker 1: scenario where the Pentagon discovered a ton of traffic, like

284
00:18:48,920 --> 00:18:52,720
Speaker 1: you said, been going to a swath of these of

285
00:18:52,800 --> 00:18:55,920
Speaker 1: these IP addresses. They just realized one day, oh wait,

286
00:18:56,119 --> 00:18:58,840
Speaker 1: aren't isn't all that dormant? We're not None of those

287
00:18:58,840 --> 00:19:01,919
Speaker 1: are turned on. Why is there activity showing up or

288
00:19:01,960 --> 00:19:06,160
Speaker 1: they you know, they were investigating someone in some other

289
00:19:06,320 --> 00:19:10,399
Speaker 1: country and they found multiple IP addresses that are actually

290
00:19:10,400 --> 00:19:14,480
Speaker 1: Pentagon IP addresses being used you know, at a in

291
00:19:14,600 --> 00:19:19,360
Speaker 1: an an even HQ somewhere UM and then they realized,

292
00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:22,280
Speaker 1: oh god, wait, we need to check this out. And

293
00:19:22,320 --> 00:19:24,520
Speaker 1: they did it secretly. In this way, they got a

294
00:19:24,560 --> 00:19:28,119
Speaker 1: front company. They send it through that messaging system to

295
00:19:28,200 --> 00:19:31,520
Speaker 1: just turn on those those um IP addresses again and

296
00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:35,320
Speaker 1: send the traffic back to an internal server somewhere via

297
00:19:35,440 --> 00:19:38,600
Speaker 1: that front company. Then it's it was like a net.

298
00:19:38,640 --> 00:19:41,200
Speaker 1: It was just like shook. We got all of that traffic.

299
00:19:41,240 --> 00:19:43,879
Speaker 1: We know where it's coming from, where it's going, or

300
00:19:43,960 --> 00:19:47,919
Speaker 1: at least according to their VPNs and whatever else are using.

301
00:19:48,000 --> 00:19:51,040
Speaker 1: I would say, we have to be careful of our

302
00:19:51,240 --> 00:19:54,879
Speaker 1: domestic blinders, because it's quite possible that Uncle Sam is

303
00:19:54,920 --> 00:19:58,280
Speaker 1: not necessarily the good guy in this scenario. They might

304
00:19:58,320 --> 00:20:01,359
Speaker 1: not be the homeowner. What you say about front companies,

305
00:20:01,800 --> 00:20:04,840
Speaker 1: that's another thing I was thinking about too, because if

306
00:20:04,880 --> 00:20:08,520
Speaker 1: it's just a front company, then the Pentagon could still

307
00:20:08,520 --> 00:20:13,200
Speaker 1: clearly control it. And let's say they want to, uh,

308
00:20:13,240 --> 00:20:16,919
Speaker 1: they want to do something unethical slash illegal, slash shady

309
00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:21,560
Speaker 1: with like China or Russia's military. Then let's say you

310
00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:25,000
Speaker 1: have because they have their own version right of this structure.

311
00:20:25,320 --> 00:20:29,080
Speaker 1: And so what if they get a weird routing notice

312
00:20:29,680 --> 00:20:31,800
Speaker 1: from a third party company in the U S and

313
00:20:31,840 --> 00:20:35,080
Speaker 1: they've never heard of The question is like, if there

314
00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:38,200
Speaker 1: is something like that going on, Uh, could the US

315
00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:43,680
Speaker 1: hackers cyber warriors, excuse me get away with that sort

316
00:20:43,680 --> 00:20:47,560
Speaker 1: of wolf in sheep's clothing disguise for long enough to

317
00:20:47,560 --> 00:20:51,480
Speaker 1: get something actionable or worthwhile. Yes, I think it's a possibility.

318
00:20:51,520 --> 00:20:55,119
Speaker 1: And I only use that phrase evil layer as in like,

319
00:20:55,240 --> 00:20:59,000
Speaker 1: that's what somebody from the Pentagon. That's how, I don't

320
00:20:59,000 --> 00:21:02,080
Speaker 1: know whatever, that's how. That's how Group A would describe

321
00:21:02,600 --> 00:21:06,679
Speaker 1: the opposition force. I mean, they're pro layer at the

322
00:21:06,760 --> 00:21:10,040
Speaker 1: at the top. These guys are all very pro layer.

323
00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:14,240
Speaker 1: It's a giant Pentagon, you guys. It is a ridiculous

324
00:21:14,240 --> 00:21:18,560
Speaker 1: flex world's largest office building. It's very strange. It's very strange.

325
00:21:18,560 --> 00:21:20,280
Speaker 1: Did you guys We've talked about this, but there was

326
00:21:20,320 --> 00:21:22,679
Speaker 1: a whole effort to like levitate the Pentagon by this

327
00:21:22,720 --> 00:21:26,280
Speaker 1: sort of hippie was the hippies, but it was Kenneth Anger.

328
00:21:26,320 --> 00:21:27,919
Speaker 1: I believe it was like an artist and kind of

329
00:21:27,960 --> 00:21:32,160
Speaker 1: like an activist and also like sort of a satirical

330
00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:36,080
Speaker 1: practitioner of black magic and filmmaker. But yeah, this whole

331
00:21:36,119 --> 00:21:38,280
Speaker 1: like the you know, like the Levitation of the Pentagon,

332
00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:40,560
Speaker 1: it was kind of a hippie kind of loving, sort

333
00:21:40,600 --> 00:21:44,040
Speaker 1: of psychedelic happening. Um. But yeah, man, this is a

334
00:21:44,080 --> 00:21:47,880
Speaker 1: really interesting story. I'm asked. I'm wondering, so like this

335
00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:49,720
Speaker 1: has to I mean, you know, let's let's just a

336
00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:54,080
Speaker 1: picture like the the nineties visual equivalent of the Internet,

337
00:21:54,240 --> 00:21:57,320
Speaker 1: you know, like in hackers or something. I'm picturing myself

338
00:21:57,359 --> 00:22:01,040
Speaker 1: like as a you know, uh, digital version of myself,

339
00:22:01,040 --> 00:22:05,040
Speaker 1: like navigating all these millions of IP addresses. It'd be

340
00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:07,400
Speaker 1: really it's like a needle in a haystack situation, right,

341
00:22:07,720 --> 00:22:10,680
Speaker 1: So to like differentiate you know, the good traffic from

342
00:22:10,680 --> 00:22:13,280
Speaker 1: the bad traffic would be very difficult. Or is all

343
00:22:13,320 --> 00:22:16,440
Speaker 1: traffic suspect because it should there shouldn't be any right,

344
00:22:16,520 --> 00:22:18,879
Speaker 1: is that kind of I'm making sure I'm understanding what

345
00:22:18,960 --> 00:22:21,320
Speaker 1: the red flag was here, but we don't know yet.

346
00:22:21,320 --> 00:22:24,040
Speaker 1: We don't have enough information. We've got some pretty basic

347
00:22:25,000 --> 00:22:28,560
Speaker 1: pr essentially from the Pentagon in the form of statements

348
00:22:28,600 --> 00:22:32,400
Speaker 1: from people like Brett Goldstein, who's there at the Defense

349
00:22:32,520 --> 00:22:38,280
Speaker 1: Digital Service. He's the director there at the Defense Digital Service,

350
00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:42,879
Speaker 1: team of nerds well servicing all of the cyber assets

351
00:22:43,600 --> 00:22:46,920
Speaker 1: that the DoD has. But you know that they're just saying, hey, yeah,

352
00:22:46,960 --> 00:22:49,200
Speaker 1: we're doing a thing, so don't worry about it. It's cool.

353
00:22:49,240 --> 00:22:54,119
Speaker 1: We're gonna strengthen our defense and just don't worry about it.

354
00:22:54,440 --> 00:22:58,000
Speaker 1: We're good. Okay. I will take their word for it

355
00:22:58,040 --> 00:23:03,199
Speaker 1: and move on. I'm just kidding. But definitely something to

356
00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:05,119
Speaker 1: keep an eye on, right. Uh and and is I

357
00:23:05,160 --> 00:23:07,520
Speaker 1: think the application here too is we would never have

358
00:23:07,600 --> 00:23:10,800
Speaker 1: heard about it if it wasn't for some like eagle

359
00:23:10,840 --> 00:23:15,760
Speaker 1: eyed I T folks. Yeah, for sure, for sure, thank

360
00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:19,280
Speaker 1: you DARPA for creating the Internet or ARPA or what

361
00:23:19,359 --> 00:23:23,760
Speaker 1: Ben was it ARPA or DARPA when the Internet is

362
00:23:23,800 --> 00:23:26,480
Speaker 1: the name for the precursor. And yeah, thank you, thank you,

363
00:23:26,560 --> 00:23:28,840
Speaker 1: kay Dyke, I think this could to pay how it

364
00:23:28,880 --> 00:23:30,760
Speaker 1: shakes out, This could be an episode in the future.

365
00:23:31,040 --> 00:23:33,320
Speaker 1: I think you mean, Al Gore, thank you for the Internet,

366
00:23:33,600 --> 00:23:36,840
Speaker 1: the tubes, all the trucks going through the tube and

367
00:23:37,000 --> 00:23:39,920
Speaker 1: exactly I would love to to take a ride through

368
00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:42,359
Speaker 1: those tubes. Um, but yeah, I definitely want to keep

369
00:23:42,400 --> 00:23:45,440
Speaker 1: an eye on This is fascinating stuff and absolutely thank

370
00:23:45,480 --> 00:23:48,199
Speaker 1: you to k Dog for turning us on to this story.

371
00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:51,240
Speaker 1: And we're gonna hear from some more listeners just like you.

372
00:23:51,320 --> 00:24:00,680
Speaker 1: And we hop back from a quick break and we

373
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:04,879
Speaker 1: have returned. We have not returned alone. Now for the

374
00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:10,240
Speaker 1: next few minutes, we are accompanied by Knockout Ned, which

375
00:24:10,280 --> 00:24:13,960
Speaker 1: is a great name. That's a knockout nickname, ned tongue

376
00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:18,800
Speaker 1: twister future mental note. So, knockout Ned wrote to us

377
00:24:19,119 --> 00:24:24,320
Speaker 1: twice over this month with some information about a troubling

378
00:24:24,359 --> 00:24:28,600
Speaker 1: thing that candidly is going to be a personal matter

379
00:24:28,920 --> 00:24:32,840
Speaker 1: to a lot of our fellow listeners in the audience today. Uh.

380
00:24:32,880 --> 00:24:38,880
Speaker 1: And it examines a tragedy that remains somewhat mysterious and

381
00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:44,440
Speaker 1: in truth may never actually be solved. Um, I knockout Ned,

382
00:24:44,480 --> 00:24:48,480
Speaker 1: I am going to read some excerpts from your emails,

383
00:24:49,040 --> 00:24:52,040
Speaker 1: But if you want to hear the whole story after

384
00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:54,919
Speaker 1: after you learn some of these revelations, and you'd like

385
00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:58,840
Speaker 1: to read knockout Ned's emails and full please just hit

386
00:24:58,920 --> 00:25:02,800
Speaker 1: us up at can yours see at iHeart radio dot com. Uh,

387
00:25:02,840 --> 00:25:07,640
Speaker 1: and I'm glad to share the full story while preserving, uh,

388
00:25:07,840 --> 00:25:13,040
Speaker 1: preserving this knockouts anonymity. So uh, knockout ned. You said

389
00:25:13,160 --> 00:25:15,720
Speaker 1: you all must do a piece on the Special Operations

390
00:25:15,720 --> 00:25:19,040
Speaker 1: Group or s o G of the Vietnam War. Ultimately,

391
00:25:19,160 --> 00:25:21,520
Speaker 1: these were a bunch of army rangers who worked with

392
00:25:21,600 --> 00:25:25,120
Speaker 1: indigenous forces in Vietnam and ran top secret missions into

393
00:25:25,200 --> 00:25:28,520
Speaker 1: Laos and Cambodia when we were not supposed to be there.

394
00:25:28,920 --> 00:25:32,520
Speaker 1: Side note that is true that has proven their casualty

395
00:25:32,640 --> 00:25:37,240
Speaker 1: rate was over a hundred percent. That bears some scrutiny.

396
00:25:37,359 --> 00:25:40,000
Speaker 1: They were instructed not to speak about their missions for

397
00:25:40,040 --> 00:25:43,760
Speaker 1: at least twenty years. These guys were crazy, knockout ned.

398
00:25:43,880 --> 00:25:46,960
Speaker 1: You recommend that we listened to Jocko will Nick's podcast

399
00:25:46,960 --> 00:25:50,040
Speaker 1: episode two hundred and five, and I promise you will

400
00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:52,399
Speaker 1: not believe what you hear. These guys are worth a

401
00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:54,879
Speaker 1: full episode. They went into combat with no dog tags,

402
00:25:54,920 --> 00:25:57,800
Speaker 1: sterile uniforms, told if they were caught they were on

403
00:25:57,840 --> 00:26:02,360
Speaker 1: their own, always behind to many lines, always outnumbered missions

404
00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:06,119
Speaker 1: directly from the White House or the CIA. And then

405
00:26:07,160 --> 00:26:11,200
Speaker 1: we gotta follow up from you, ned, where you said

406
00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:15,520
Speaker 1: you did an episode on whether America left soldiers behind Vietnam,

407
00:26:15,720 --> 00:26:18,040
Speaker 1: and if some of those missing soldiers were left due

408
00:26:18,080 --> 00:26:21,440
Speaker 1: to the clandestine nature of their top secret missions. Well,

409
00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:24,600
Speaker 1: the s o G, the Studies and Observation Group where

410
00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:27,200
Speaker 1: the soldiers you were thinking about. There's stories that when

411
00:26:27,200 --> 00:26:29,720
Speaker 1: an s o G team went missing and couldn't be located,

412
00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:32,600
Speaker 1: a B fifty two would bomb the last known areas

413
00:26:32,760 --> 00:26:35,399
Speaker 1: as it was understood that these guys could not be

414
00:26:35,560 --> 00:26:38,600
Speaker 1: taken alive. There are high priority targets for the Vietcong,

415
00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:41,600
Speaker 1: and when they learned about them, they created s o

416
00:26:41,720 --> 00:26:44,560
Speaker 1: G Killed teams where they use human trackers and bloodhounds

417
00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:47,680
Speaker 1: to hunt them. Many of them disappeared and were never found.

418
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:52,160
Speaker 1: Uh and then knockout Ned you you continue with this,

419
00:26:52,320 --> 00:26:55,920
Speaker 1: and you also explain that interesting part of having an

420
00:26:55,920 --> 00:27:00,800
Speaker 1: over casualty rate by saying the act that s o

421
00:27:00,920 --> 00:27:04,040
Speaker 1: G teams were seven maybe nine members and they were

422
00:27:04,080 --> 00:27:07,359
Speaker 1: usually facing an enemy with numbers in the hundreds only

423
00:27:07,440 --> 00:27:11,120
Speaker 1: adds to the lure, the allure, the mythology of this.

424
00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:14,520
Speaker 1: And then knockout Ned ends by saying you have to

425
00:27:14,560 --> 00:27:16,679
Speaker 1: do an episode on these guys. They're now able to

426
00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:18,840
Speaker 1: tell their stories, so there should be no shortage of

427
00:27:18,880 --> 00:27:21,320
Speaker 1: information out there. You can probably get one to come

428
00:27:21,359 --> 00:27:24,240
Speaker 1: onto your show. I'm telling you go into a dark

429
00:27:24,320 --> 00:27:27,119
Speaker 1: room and turn off all the lights and listen to

430
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:30,119
Speaker 1: Dick Thompson speak in that podcast I referenced in my

431
00:27:30,160 --> 00:27:35,480
Speaker 1: first email. It will blow your mind. It's a hell

432
00:27:35,480 --> 00:27:37,720
Speaker 1: of a story. Do you guys remember when we looked

433
00:27:37,760 --> 00:27:44,120
Speaker 1: into the very very strange things that were occurring, especially

434
00:27:44,119 --> 00:27:46,600
Speaker 1: towards the close of the Vietnam War, Yes, I do.

435
00:27:47,000 --> 00:27:51,080
Speaker 1: And there are a lot of tales, their stories that

436
00:27:51,119 --> 00:27:56,119
Speaker 1: have been told in popular media about the Vietnam War.

437
00:27:56,240 --> 00:27:57,920
Speaker 1: We we've mentioned a lot of these in the past,

438
00:27:57,960 --> 00:28:00,960
Speaker 1: and there are a lot of tales about soldiers who

439
00:28:00,960 --> 00:28:03,440
Speaker 1: were left behind or got stuck there for one reason

440
00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:06,560
Speaker 1: or another. And when we covered it before, it's still

441
00:28:06,720 --> 00:28:11,000
Speaker 1: felt like something that again you we just we just

442
00:28:11,080 --> 00:28:13,919
Speaker 1: talked about you want to believe your country is going

443
00:28:13,960 --> 00:28:15,440
Speaker 1: to be the good guy. You want to believe your

444
00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:18,399
Speaker 1: team is the right team. You know, those blinders that

445
00:28:18,480 --> 00:28:22,760
Speaker 1: were mentioning, And more and more we learned that the

446
00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:28,040
Speaker 1: nature of warfare is so gray. There's so many awful

447
00:28:28,119 --> 00:28:31,040
Speaker 1: things that happened to everybody when when there's a hot

448
00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:35,480
Speaker 1: war going on and this whole topic that I think

449
00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:39,720
Speaker 1: is it Special Operations Group or studies an observation group

450
00:28:39,920 --> 00:28:41,760
Speaker 1: he he calls it a couple of different things in

451
00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:47,480
Speaker 1: his emails. But whatever, whatever it was, these soldiers, if

452
00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:49,440
Speaker 1: they were real and I'm sure you're gonna tell me

453
00:28:49,440 --> 00:28:52,880
Speaker 1: if they were or not been, uh you know, going

454
00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:55,360
Speaker 1: into lousing Cambodia, and they shouldn't be there doing these

455
00:28:55,880 --> 00:29:01,240
Speaker 1: secret things. The government had to keep that distance, had

456
00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:04,800
Speaker 1: to like act like it wasn't it wasn't truly happening,

457
00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:06,960
Speaker 1: or wasn't their idea. It was just a couple of

458
00:29:06,960 --> 00:29:10,600
Speaker 1: bad apples that found the found themselves in Cambodia while

459
00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:15,320
Speaker 1: Vietnam was was facing the conflict. It's just awful to

460
00:29:15,360 --> 00:29:18,000
Speaker 1: think about it that way because the individual person is

461
00:29:18,560 --> 00:29:21,760
Speaker 1: or that three Americans and all of the you know,

462
00:29:22,560 --> 00:29:28,480
Speaker 1: the Laotian or Cambodian UH citizens are being affected. Yeah, yeah,

463
00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:32,960
Speaker 1: and you're right, Matt, this is definitely a real group. Specifically,

464
00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:37,040
Speaker 1: it's mac V s o G Military Assistance Commands, Vietnam

465
00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:44,040
Speaker 1: DASH Studies and Observations Group. This this letter, you know,

466
00:29:44,200 --> 00:29:48,040
Speaker 1: then knockout Nedum. We really appreciate going back and checking

467
00:29:48,080 --> 00:29:52,640
Speaker 1: out that earlier episode, there had been a few things.

468
00:29:52,960 --> 00:29:57,320
Speaker 1: Let's see that was twenty probably maybe I'm just guessing,

469
00:29:57,680 --> 00:30:05,440
Speaker 1: uh there. Unfortunately, after multiple congressional investigations, the official conclusion

470
00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:08,000
Speaker 1: of the U. S. Government is that there were no

471
00:30:08,320 --> 00:30:12,560
Speaker 1: people left behind alive. But if you talk to a

472
00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:16,520
Speaker 1: lot of Vietnam veterans, you will see that many do

473
00:30:16,560 --> 00:30:20,840
Speaker 1: not believe that official story. It is, it is true,

474
00:30:20,880 --> 00:30:24,360
Speaker 1: It isn't arguable that some bodies had never been recovered

475
00:30:24,680 --> 00:30:29,840
Speaker 1: from Vietnam. On both sides, people disappeared in the tragic

476
00:30:29,880 --> 00:30:34,080
Speaker 1: circumstances of war. But the big question is were any

477
00:30:34,360 --> 00:30:37,840
Speaker 1: soldiers left alive? And this could happen for a number

478
00:30:37,840 --> 00:30:41,280
Speaker 1: of reasons. One, if it is a clandestine mission and

479
00:30:42,480 --> 00:30:47,720
Speaker 1: plausible deniability the clean hands principle takes precedent. Then the

480
00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:50,200
Speaker 1: argument there is that those folks got left behind, but

481
00:30:50,240 --> 00:30:52,800
Speaker 1: they knew what they were signing up for before things

482
00:30:52,800 --> 00:30:57,600
Speaker 1: went south. The second idea is that someone would be caught, captured,

483
00:30:57,680 --> 00:31:01,600
Speaker 1: kept as a pow uh, and kept alive, which is

484
00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:04,720
Speaker 1: strange to think about because you have to ask yourself

485
00:31:04,760 --> 00:31:08,560
Speaker 1: about the logic there, right, like, why would you if

486
00:31:08,600 --> 00:31:13,360
Speaker 1: you are holding an American pow in your captivity. Why

487
00:31:13,560 --> 00:31:17,719
Speaker 1: would you keep them alive? As brutal and cold as

488
00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:20,480
Speaker 1: it sounds, would it not be more politically convenient to

489
00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:23,600
Speaker 1: either release them in a gesture of goodwill or pull

490
00:31:23,600 --> 00:31:27,400
Speaker 1: a quick pro quo, or too simply quietly end their lives,

491
00:31:27,800 --> 00:31:31,080
Speaker 1: which is brutal, but that that is sometimes the calculus

492
00:31:31,160 --> 00:31:35,760
Speaker 1: of war. The third one, perhaps more interesting, is the

493
00:31:35,800 --> 00:31:41,680
Speaker 1: idea of a US soldier voluntarily stay right while just saying, hey,

494
00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:44,720
Speaker 1: stuff in the US wasn't quite you know, I didn't

495
00:31:44,840 --> 00:31:47,280
Speaker 1: enjoy it. There, this is my chance to start over it.

496
00:31:47,280 --> 00:31:52,520
Speaker 1: There's my chance to escape. It happened once. Uh, an

497
00:31:52,560 --> 00:31:55,680
Speaker 1: episode on this I feel like ringing a bell. Yeah,

498
00:31:56,080 --> 00:32:01,440
Speaker 1: Ben just mentioned it. It was it was, oh, lord

499
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:06,160
Speaker 1: of the title, did the US abandoned soldiers in Southeast Asia? Well,

500
00:32:06,200 --> 00:32:08,000
Speaker 1: I was thinking of something else, even, maybe like a

501
00:32:08,080 --> 00:32:11,440
Speaker 1: history thing, like about someone who kind of like basically

502
00:32:11,480 --> 00:32:15,080
Speaker 1: switched sides and then kind of got found out later.

503
00:32:15,160 --> 00:32:17,360
Speaker 1: So I'm sorry, I'm it's a little hazy, but but

504
00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:20,560
Speaker 1: this all is very much ringing about. Well, there's another

505
00:32:20,680 --> 00:32:25,920
Speaker 1: story that's not Vietnam related. It's uh, James Joseph Dresknock.

506
00:32:26,440 --> 00:32:32,920
Speaker 1: He joined the North Korean military in so there are

507
00:32:32,960 --> 00:32:36,720
Speaker 1: there are reports, multiple reports of U. S. Service members

508
00:32:37,560 --> 00:32:40,840
Speaker 1: defecting to North Korea, people like Joseph T. White, people

509
00:32:40,880 --> 00:32:45,160
Speaker 1: like we just mentioned and in our previous episode that

510
00:32:45,200 --> 00:32:49,800
Speaker 1: we're just talking about regarding the Vietnam War. Uh, what

511
00:32:49,840 --> 00:32:54,600
Speaker 1: we found was disturbing because we see a discrepancy in

512
00:32:54,640 --> 00:33:01,240
Speaker 1: the stories, and that itself is not uncommon. But what

513
00:33:01,240 --> 00:33:05,000
Speaker 1: what is circumstantially troubling here is that we know in

514
00:33:05,080 --> 00:33:09,920
Speaker 1: the circumstances of at least a few operations that are

515
00:33:09,960 --> 00:33:11,760
Speaker 1: known to the public now, and at least a few

516
00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:15,560
Speaker 1: of those operations, plausible deniability was a huge thing. These

517
00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:19,959
Speaker 1: people were literally told, if this goes wrong, then you

518
00:33:20,080 --> 00:33:23,920
Speaker 1: have died. Even if you haven't died, you have died,

519
00:33:24,760 --> 00:33:29,000
Speaker 1: and your last known location right, and we shall sow

520
00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:33,760
Speaker 1: the earth with assault of bombs and bullets. This hasn't

521
00:33:33,800 --> 00:33:38,960
Speaker 1: ever really gone cold. And the the idea of solving

522
00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:42,280
Speaker 1: this mystery, improving whether or not people were left in

523
00:33:42,360 --> 00:33:46,680
Speaker 1: Vietnam or abandoned to die is it's still very much

524
00:33:47,120 --> 00:33:51,680
Speaker 1: a concern for people who have survived the Vietnam War,

525
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:56,160
Speaker 1: or for people who lost relatives to it, or for

526
00:33:56,320 --> 00:34:01,200
Speaker 1: people you know whose whose parents or their siblings were involved.

527
00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:06,040
Speaker 1: Another thing interesting about this s O G group in

528
00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:10,200
Speaker 1: Vietnam is that they were tasked with taking the fight

529
00:34:10,440 --> 00:34:13,239
Speaker 1: to the enemy quote unquote the enemy were regardless of

530
00:34:13,239 --> 00:34:16,640
Speaker 1: where they were, even if it was in Cambodia, Laos

531
00:34:16,760 --> 00:34:20,320
Speaker 1: or North Vietnam. That's where US troops were not supposed

532
00:34:20,360 --> 00:34:24,520
Speaker 1: to be, which means their specialty was breaking the laws

533
00:34:24,600 --> 00:34:27,520
Speaker 1: that the US had agreed to follow. This is the

534
00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:33,560
Speaker 1: definition of black bag operations. These guys were the real deal.

535
00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:38,280
Speaker 1: They were in the ship. As veterans would say. Uh,

536
00:34:38,480 --> 00:34:42,439
Speaker 1: but I wasn't quite like to knock out Ned's point.

537
00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:46,600
Speaker 1: I I listened back to our episode and we did.

538
00:34:46,880 --> 00:34:49,080
Speaker 1: We did a good job with the information we had,

539
00:34:49,120 --> 00:34:52,320
Speaker 1: I think, but at the time, you know, some of

540
00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:56,080
Speaker 1: these people still were probably not speaking, for one reason

541
00:34:56,160 --> 00:35:00,720
Speaker 1: or another about their experiences. So I did some digging,

542
00:35:01,000 --> 00:35:05,440
Speaker 1: and I reached out to some contacts and sources, some veterans,

543
00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:09,480
Speaker 1: and they stuff that. They said, I don't know if

544
00:35:09,520 --> 00:35:12,120
Speaker 1: it would surprise you all to hear it, but they

545
00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:15,439
Speaker 1: said they absolutely believe it's true. I think a lot

546
00:35:15,480 --> 00:35:19,000
Speaker 1: of veterans believe people were left behind in Vietnam and

547
00:35:19,080 --> 00:35:24,160
Speaker 1: with without you know, having having our episode notes handy

548
00:35:24,280 --> 00:35:28,200
Speaker 1: from as Matt said, what do you guys think when

549
00:35:28,200 --> 00:35:30,120
Speaker 1: you when you hear this, do you think that it

550
00:35:30,239 --> 00:35:34,120
Speaker 1: is possible that these people were purposely left behind? The

551
00:35:34,120 --> 00:35:37,320
Speaker 1: thing I think think about the conflict we're talking about

552
00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:42,440
Speaker 1: here in the Vietnam War. There were the brass knew

553
00:35:42,520 --> 00:35:46,520
Speaker 1: that there were war crimes happening on the ground in

554
00:35:46,640 --> 00:35:50,399
Speaker 1: Vietnam that were being perpetrated by US forces and US

555
00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:54,719
Speaker 1: supported forces. They knew that. Um. They also knew that

556
00:35:54,760 --> 00:35:57,399
Speaker 1: if they entered into other sovereign nations and the other

557
00:35:57,440 --> 00:36:02,600
Speaker 1: sovereign states like last Cambodia, that's just more stuff that

558
00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:05,000
Speaker 1: makes them look really, really bad, even if there were

559
00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:08,160
Speaker 1: strategic targets in those countries, or you know, there were

560
00:36:08,200 --> 00:36:11,399
Speaker 1: supplies coming from those countries that were aiding in this

561
00:36:11,440 --> 00:36:15,880
Speaker 1: case the quote enemy, Um, it's such a bad look.

562
00:36:16,600 --> 00:36:20,319
Speaker 1: And it makes complete sense to me that somebody at

563
00:36:20,360 --> 00:36:22,799
Speaker 1: the very top, very cold and calculated, would make the

564
00:36:22,840 --> 00:36:29,279
Speaker 1: decision two to make that um, the policy that you're

565
00:36:29,560 --> 00:36:32,200
Speaker 1: you will not be coming back if you get caught. Yeah,

566
00:36:32,360 --> 00:36:36,560
Speaker 1: And that that would explain the idea of bobbing uh

567
00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:39,759
Speaker 1: the area where they were last located, so that there

568
00:36:39,800 --> 00:36:43,479
Speaker 1: would literally be no physical proof of us presence there.

569
00:36:44,000 --> 00:36:47,319
Speaker 1: And this is you know this, This is one of

570
00:36:47,320 --> 00:36:50,040
Speaker 1: those arguments where you can picture the people in the

571
00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:54,440
Speaker 1: room saying, there is a greater good at play, but

572
00:36:54,680 --> 00:36:59,399
Speaker 1: a greater good pen oftentimes be dangerous or smaller good,

573
00:36:59,480 --> 00:37:04,319
Speaker 1: like goal safety. Here's the twist I looked into. Um.

574
00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:06,520
Speaker 1: You know, as I said, I reached out to some

575
00:37:06,560 --> 00:37:11,239
Speaker 1: folks who preferred to remain anonymous, but I wanted to

576
00:37:12,440 --> 00:37:16,680
Speaker 1: share this with you guys. Um. First, someone wrote to

577
00:37:16,719 --> 00:37:21,040
Speaker 1: me and told me that not that the odds of

578
00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:27,239
Speaker 1: military members getting rescued or hostages getting rescued, depending on

579
00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:29,439
Speaker 1: where you are in the world, is actually very low,

580
00:37:29,600 --> 00:37:34,120
Speaker 1: and I would disturbed the public to realize just this

581
00:37:34,200 --> 00:37:36,960
Speaker 1: is not necessarily negligence, but just to realize how difficult

582
00:37:37,120 --> 00:37:42,360
Speaker 1: it is to conduct an extraction mission like that safely. Um,

583
00:37:42,360 --> 00:37:47,759
Speaker 1: even even the hardcore pros might find the circumstances challenging.

584
00:37:48,840 --> 00:37:52,200
Speaker 1: And then I heard back from someone again wishing to

585
00:37:52,200 --> 00:37:56,160
Speaker 1: remain anonymous. Here's their take. They took this in a

586
00:37:56,320 --> 00:38:02,719
Speaker 1: totally different direction. They responded when I asked, do you

587
00:38:02,800 --> 00:38:06,960
Speaker 1: believe that people were intentionally left behind? Alive in Vietnam

588
00:38:07,080 --> 00:38:10,200
Speaker 1: or Southeast Asia in general. They said, I do not

589
00:38:10,320 --> 00:38:13,640
Speaker 1: believe that it was intentionally done, But in the late

590
00:38:13,719 --> 00:38:16,840
Speaker 1: sixties and early seventies, there were some rumors that people

591
00:38:16,920 --> 00:38:21,080
Speaker 1: who had contracted quote the black v D had been

592
00:38:21,120 --> 00:38:24,960
Speaker 1: purposely retained in Vietnam. On the other hand, there is

593
00:38:24,960 --> 00:38:27,440
Speaker 1: a solid possibility that a number of people were retained

594
00:38:27,440 --> 00:38:30,160
Speaker 1: by the North Vietnamese government, either because they knew things

595
00:38:30,200 --> 00:38:32,440
Speaker 1: about North Vietnam that were not the best interest of

596
00:38:32,480 --> 00:38:35,560
Speaker 1: the country, or because they had serious injuries caused by

597
00:38:35,680 --> 00:38:41,080
Speaker 1: interrogation techniques. And lastly, there were numerous stories about commanders

598
00:38:41,239 --> 00:38:45,720
Speaker 1: who had put their problem children on point continually because

599
00:38:45,800 --> 00:38:49,279
Speaker 1: if that individual was killed or captured, it was no

600
00:38:49,400 --> 00:38:53,080
Speaker 1: big loss. I have not seen firsthand data about these claims,

601
00:38:53,320 --> 00:38:55,600
Speaker 1: says this source. But I did know a couple of

602
00:38:55,600 --> 00:38:58,799
Speaker 1: guys who worked body recovery in the eighties, and they

603
00:38:58,840 --> 00:39:03,200
Speaker 1: refused to ven sure their opinions to me interesting black

604
00:39:03,280 --> 00:39:08,040
Speaker 1: VD even venereal disease, like some sort of infection. That's

605
00:39:08,080 --> 00:39:10,920
Speaker 1: the Yeah, that's the that's the twist. That's what stood

606
00:39:10,960 --> 00:39:13,440
Speaker 1: out to me as well. So I asked, which is

607
00:39:13,480 --> 00:39:16,520
Speaker 1: what is black VD? You know? We've got agent orange.

608
00:39:16,760 --> 00:39:22,520
Speaker 1: Isn't that enough? Black VD is of a venereal disease

609
00:39:22,640 --> 00:39:27,320
Speaker 1: that could not be cured, and supposedly quarian people believe

610
00:39:27,440 --> 00:39:31,279
Speaker 1: this theory. Uh, it may have been the first of

611
00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:37,200
Speaker 1: HIV contractions that people were aware of, which would absolutely

612
00:39:37,280 --> 00:39:40,760
Speaker 1: change the story of the progression of AIDS in HIV.

613
00:39:41,000 --> 00:39:43,480
Speaker 1: But the story is that there were some people went

614
00:39:43,560 --> 00:39:47,279
Speaker 1: on R and R in other countries or you know,

615
00:39:47,480 --> 00:39:51,320
Speaker 1: we're living the red light lifestyle when they weren't working,

616
00:39:52,600 --> 00:39:57,480
Speaker 1: and that they came back with something that doctors didn't

617
00:39:57,520 --> 00:40:01,440
Speaker 1: recognize other than the fact that was incurable. How about that?

618
00:40:01,840 --> 00:40:04,600
Speaker 1: So is the implication almost in the way that is

619
00:40:04,640 --> 00:40:10,560
Speaker 1: it like blaming Vietnam for AIDS. I'm not sure, well,

620
00:40:10,640 --> 00:40:13,480
Speaker 1: because specifically, the way the theory goes is that they

621
00:40:13,560 --> 00:40:17,160
Speaker 1: didn't contract it necessarily in Vietnam, they went to an

622
00:40:17,200 --> 00:40:24,319
Speaker 1: adjacent country. But it's if you're looking into the evolution

623
00:40:24,640 --> 00:40:29,600
Speaker 1: of AIDS itself. The official story is, at least according

624
00:40:29,640 --> 00:40:33,240
Speaker 1: to the c d C, that a San Francisco resident

625
00:40:33,640 --> 00:40:37,960
Speaker 1: named Ken Horne was the first person identified in the

626
00:40:38,040 --> 00:40:43,680
Speaker 1: nine eighties with having contracted AIDS. He's considered the first

627
00:40:43,680 --> 00:40:47,000
Speaker 1: patient of the AIDS epidemic in the US. But then,

628
00:40:47,080 --> 00:40:50,040
Speaker 1: like we did in our AIDS episode, we traced back

629
00:40:50,200 --> 00:40:53,920
Speaker 1: several other theories. Right, It's just strange that this lore

630
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:59,320
Speaker 1: has entered here as well. Um as I'm with you guys,

631
00:40:59,360 --> 00:41:03,400
Speaker 1: it is different to say for sure whether or not

632
00:41:04,040 --> 00:41:09,719
Speaker 1: people we're not consensually left alive in that country sacrificed

633
00:41:09,960 --> 00:41:12,919
Speaker 1: at the altar of the greater good. But at least

634
00:41:13,040 --> 00:41:14,600
Speaker 1: one other thing, And that's what I want to end

635
00:41:14,600 --> 00:41:17,440
Speaker 1: this on. The next thing, we have to think about

636
00:41:17,920 --> 00:41:19,799
Speaker 1: what are we going to learn Twenty years after the

637
00:41:19,840 --> 00:41:24,120
Speaker 1: Iraq War, the US is pulling out most of it's

638
00:41:24,960 --> 00:41:28,319
Speaker 1: the US play a lot of troops in Afghanistan in

639
00:41:28,400 --> 00:41:32,440
Speaker 1: the upcoming days, private contractors will remain. What are we

640
00:41:32,480 --> 00:41:34,880
Speaker 1: going to learn about that? You know what? What is

641
00:41:34,920 --> 00:41:37,120
Speaker 1: going to be the story about the so called Graveyard

642
00:41:37,120 --> 00:41:42,399
Speaker 1: of Empires? What other dirty secrets are going to come out?

643
00:41:42,680 --> 00:41:46,120
Speaker 1: And when will this end? To all the veterans in

644
00:41:46,160 --> 00:41:48,840
Speaker 1: the audience today, we hope this message finds you safe.

645
00:41:48,920 --> 00:41:51,840
Speaker 1: We hope this message finds you well. Uh, and we

646
00:41:51,880 --> 00:41:54,399
Speaker 1: would love to hear your take. Do you think this

647
00:41:54,520 --> 00:41:58,480
Speaker 1: is simply, you know, like an urban legend at this

648
00:41:58,560 --> 00:42:00,520
Speaker 1: point or is there a grain of truth to it?

649
00:42:00,719 --> 00:42:03,440
Speaker 1: Let us know. We're gonna pause for a word from

650
00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:07,200
Speaker 1: our sponsors, will be back with hopefully something a little

651
00:42:07,280 --> 00:42:09,560
Speaker 1: less heavy. I know I've been hyping you up this

652
00:42:09,600 --> 00:42:12,839
Speaker 1: whole episode. Bad this is this is gonna be It's

653
00:42:12,840 --> 00:42:15,560
Speaker 1: if you're worth of weight. Yeah, man, fluff your pillows.

654
00:42:15,640 --> 00:42:18,400
Speaker 1: It's sleepy time when we come back. I got my

655
00:42:18,600 --> 00:42:29,520
Speaker 1: weighted blanket and we're back. I love weighted blankets. Weird,

656
00:42:30,040 --> 00:42:34,439
Speaker 1: shouldn't work like that yet? What what? What's the deal?

657
00:42:34,520 --> 00:42:37,000
Speaker 1: It's just like the weight of it makes you feel

658
00:42:37,080 --> 00:42:40,399
Speaker 1: safe for something. Is it comforting? It is a comforting thing.

659
00:42:40,640 --> 00:42:45,040
Speaker 1: It's great. It's great for kids, for dogs, it's a

660
00:42:45,120 --> 00:42:48,359
Speaker 1: thunder vest for people, for anyone who's familiar with those

661
00:42:48,400 --> 00:42:51,359
Speaker 1: things for dog anxiety. But you have to be very,

662
00:42:51,440 --> 00:42:55,880
Speaker 1: very careful. They are they're graded for the weight, like

663
00:42:55,960 --> 00:42:59,000
Speaker 1: depending on the weight of the person is sleeping under

664
00:42:59,040 --> 00:43:02,040
Speaker 1: the blanket. You gotta be carefu how much weight inside

665
00:43:02,040 --> 00:43:04,080
Speaker 1: that blanket you put on top of somebody could be

666
00:43:04,120 --> 00:43:06,440
Speaker 1: a good way of making sure your kids don't get

667
00:43:06,440 --> 00:43:10,160
Speaker 1: out of bed. Right ties into this. So let's let's

668
00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:14,560
Speaker 1: listen to a message that was sent to us from Miller. Hello,

669
00:43:14,640 --> 00:43:20,680
Speaker 1: Matt ben Noel and super producer Alexis code name dot

670
00:43:20,680 --> 00:43:25,480
Speaker 1: Holiday Jackson. I have a topic for you. Um, I've

671
00:43:25,520 --> 00:43:29,239
Speaker 1: never heard anything really scientific about it, but it baffles

672
00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:34,040
Speaker 1: my mind. And that is talking in your sleep and

673
00:43:34,440 --> 00:43:38,319
Speaker 1: swinging your arms about in a violent manner, like my

674
00:43:38,400 --> 00:43:41,560
Speaker 1: six year old daughter does. She still likes to sleep

675
00:43:41,560 --> 00:43:45,080
Speaker 1: with daddy, being a single father. I find it comforting

676
00:43:45,560 --> 00:43:48,760
Speaker 1: shell start in her bed and always wind up in mind.

677
00:43:48,840 --> 00:43:51,799
Speaker 1: But I've woken up with many a buddy nose and

678
00:43:51,840 --> 00:43:54,600
Speaker 1: woken up in the middle of the night only to

679
00:43:54,719 --> 00:43:59,480
Speaker 1: hear many ramblings of a six year old and uh,

680
00:43:59,680 --> 00:44:02,919
Speaker 1: it just it's very amazing, and uh, I just want

681
00:44:02,960 --> 00:44:07,160
Speaker 1: to know what she's dreaming about. UM, this is Miller

682
00:44:07,280 --> 00:44:10,680
Speaker 1: from Central Illinois. I love you guys. You help me

683
00:44:10,719 --> 00:44:14,600
Speaker 1: get through. Hella stays, I'll tell you what thanks for

684
00:44:14,640 --> 00:44:18,360
Speaker 1: doing what you're doing and being who you are. And U,

685
00:44:18,640 --> 00:44:22,080
Speaker 1: I don't know, tell me stuff I don't. I want

686
00:44:22,080 --> 00:44:31,319
Speaker 1: to know. Oh that was great? Yeah, hell him stuff

687
00:44:31,360 --> 00:44:33,160
Speaker 1: He doesn't but but he doesn't want to know it.

688
00:44:33,239 --> 00:44:37,040
Speaker 1: We we we we want to be consensual here. Um,

689
00:44:37,080 --> 00:44:38,600
Speaker 1: it's not what we don't want you to know. It's

690
00:44:38,600 --> 00:44:41,680
Speaker 1: what they don't want you to know. It's it's whoever

691
00:44:41,920 --> 00:44:46,319
Speaker 1: is you know, haunting your daughter's dreams. Maybe it's something

692
00:44:46,400 --> 00:44:48,480
Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. Did either of you

693
00:44:48,520 --> 00:44:54,319
Speaker 1: guys have any experience with sleepwalking or or serious sleep talking? Yes? Same,

694
00:44:55,040 --> 00:44:58,040
Speaker 1: I was a gnarly sleepwalker. I slept walked to my

695
00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:01,680
Speaker 1: neighbor's house one time and knocked on the door. And

696
00:45:01,719 --> 00:45:03,799
Speaker 1: then I also slept walked into my dad's room and

697
00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:06,960
Speaker 1: pete in his bedside drawer. Ben, you you said it

698
00:45:07,080 --> 00:45:09,239
Speaker 1: very gravely. Do you do you have anything you want

699
00:45:09,239 --> 00:45:17,040
Speaker 1: to share? Are we talking killed the guy? Uh? Here's

700
00:45:17,040 --> 00:45:19,759
Speaker 1: the fun fact you might not want to know, Miller. Uh.

701
00:45:19,880 --> 00:45:22,960
Speaker 1: The for a long time, the subway, there was a

702
00:45:23,000 --> 00:45:27,239
Speaker 1: subway in the Pentagon, going back to Pentagon Facts, and uh,

703
00:45:27,480 --> 00:45:30,600
Speaker 1: that was the only subway in the world where employees

704
00:45:30,680 --> 00:45:33,560
Speaker 1: had to get a top secret security clearance, like they

705
00:45:33,600 --> 00:45:35,120
Speaker 1: had to get well, not top secret, they had to

706
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:37,799
Speaker 1: get a security clearance to work there, which seems like

707
00:45:37,880 --> 00:45:42,840
Speaker 1: such a hassle. Okay, come on, Miller, something happened to

708
00:45:42,880 --> 00:45:46,719
Speaker 1: Ben in the subway at the pen We're gonna get

709
00:45:46,719 --> 00:45:48,960
Speaker 1: to the bottom of this stuff. Doesn't want you to

710
00:45:49,000 --> 00:45:52,920
Speaker 1: know may or may not involve peeing like my like

711
00:45:53,040 --> 00:45:56,680
Speaker 1: my story, but uh, leaning towards may not. But no,

712
00:45:56,840 --> 00:45:59,080
Speaker 1: this is crazy. This is is interesting. I mean, I'm

713
00:45:59,160 --> 00:46:02,000
Speaker 1: sure there's have you found any studies on this, Matt,

714
00:46:02,040 --> 00:46:05,560
Speaker 1: what what did your research and cover into this topic.

715
00:46:06,080 --> 00:46:10,080
Speaker 1: There's a lot of interest and information and research out

716
00:46:10,120 --> 00:46:14,560
Speaker 1: there on different versions of parasamnia or different paras omnia's

717
00:46:15,280 --> 00:46:19,879
Speaker 1: sleep disorders, issues with humans and sleep. And we all

718
00:46:19,920 --> 00:46:23,200
Speaker 1: know how much Ben hate sleep. I'm not a huge

719
00:46:23,200 --> 00:46:30,080
Speaker 1: fan either. But but the reason, the Reasonmiliar, what I

720
00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:31,920
Speaker 1: really wanted to talk about this is because my five

721
00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:35,959
Speaker 1: year old son has some pretty serious sleep issues. It's

722
00:46:36,040 --> 00:46:40,360
Speaker 1: not life threatening, it's not scary, really, it's a little

723
00:46:40,400 --> 00:46:43,200
Speaker 1: disturbing though, and I'm sure that's probably what you're feeling

724
00:46:43,320 --> 00:46:46,520
Speaker 1: right now with your six year old. Um, I'll just

725
00:46:46,560 --> 00:46:48,960
Speaker 1: give you my example and then tell you a little

726
00:46:48,960 --> 00:46:51,840
Speaker 1: bit about what I've learned. My son talks into sleep

727
00:46:51,880 --> 00:46:54,919
Speaker 1: a lot, and much of the time is just completely

728
00:46:55,200 --> 00:46:59,600
Speaker 1: not understandable and comprehensible. But it seems to be associated

729
00:46:59,680 --> 00:47:03,759
Speaker 1: with of nightmares or at least unpleasant dreams of some

730
00:47:03,880 --> 00:47:07,960
Speaker 1: sort that he can't really recall, but he knows, he

731
00:47:08,000 --> 00:47:11,200
Speaker 1: knows it's not pleasant and there's sometimes a werewolf involved.

732
00:47:11,520 --> 00:47:13,120
Speaker 1: I actually had the same dream when I was a

733
00:47:13,160 --> 00:47:14,960
Speaker 1: kid about a werewolf and I couldn't sleep very well

734
00:47:14,960 --> 00:47:19,000
Speaker 1: as recurring. Um, but that definitely is occurring. So that's

735
00:47:19,040 --> 00:47:21,600
Speaker 1: why I was interested in all of this stuff even

736
00:47:21,640 --> 00:47:26,120
Speaker 1: prior to you calling into us. Let's talk about parasomnia.

737
00:47:26,160 --> 00:47:29,200
Speaker 1: We've talked about a couple of different versions on this show,

738
00:47:29,640 --> 00:47:33,120
Speaker 1: specifically the origins of nightmares. What that what those are?

739
00:47:33,320 --> 00:47:37,000
Speaker 1: Night terrors and sleep paralysis. We've really hit on those

740
00:47:37,040 --> 00:47:40,200
Speaker 1: before on this show. So let's go through. I'm on

741
00:47:40,640 --> 00:47:44,239
Speaker 1: the Sleep Foundation that Sleep Foundation dot org if you

742
00:47:44,239 --> 00:47:46,200
Speaker 1: want to go here, Miller to learn a little bit

743
00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:49,520
Speaker 1: more about what's going on. There are several types. One

744
00:47:49,680 --> 00:47:54,120
Speaker 1: is non rim related paras omnia. So this is just

745
00:47:54,239 --> 00:47:59,719
Speaker 1: a kind of a category of different types of parasomnia. Uh,

746
00:47:59,719 --> 00:48:04,279
Speaker 1: they're confusual arousals. This is a really interesting one. This

747
00:48:04,320 --> 00:48:07,840
Speaker 1: is one where it appears that someone who was asleep

748
00:48:08,080 --> 00:48:10,319
Speaker 1: and has woken up. They seem like they're awake a

749
00:48:10,360 --> 00:48:16,240
Speaker 1: little bit, but they're not really. They're doing some strange things. Um,

750
00:48:16,400 --> 00:48:20,640
Speaker 1: they've got an accelerated heartbeat, they're breathing differently, their pupils

751
00:48:20,640 --> 00:48:23,239
Speaker 1: are a little more dilated than usual, and there's a

752
00:48:23,280 --> 00:48:26,600
Speaker 1: confusion that's occurring. They're not really sure what's going on.

753
00:48:27,360 --> 00:48:31,280
Speaker 1: My son has displayed that, and it is a scary

754
00:48:31,360 --> 00:48:34,919
Speaker 1: situation because you're not sure, right, You're not sure if

755
00:48:34,960 --> 00:48:38,280
Speaker 1: if the person is awake or asleep, You're you can't

756
00:48:38,320 --> 00:48:41,440
Speaker 1: really speak to them. They're kind of aware that there's

757
00:48:41,600 --> 00:48:45,560
Speaker 1: things happening where they are, but not really strange. Does

758
00:48:45,600 --> 00:48:48,600
Speaker 1: he ever like talking the tony voice from the shining

759
00:48:49,640 --> 00:48:52,400
Speaker 1: you know, like I'm only half choking. I mean, I

760
00:48:52,520 --> 00:48:55,600
Speaker 1: certainly have encountered people in their sleep that do take

761
00:48:55,640 --> 00:49:01,520
Speaker 1: on a different vocal uh intonation mhm. I've never experienced

762
00:49:01,520 --> 00:49:04,120
Speaker 1: that with my son. But what he will do is

763
00:49:04,160 --> 00:49:07,040
Speaker 1: he'll start that way and then sleepwalk, which is just

764
00:49:07,200 --> 00:49:10,279
Speaker 1: he'll find his way out towards the bathroom, or think

765
00:49:10,360 --> 00:49:13,279
Speaker 1: he's going towards the bathroom, which comes into your whole

766
00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:15,919
Speaker 1: peeing in the drawer thing. My peeing on my dad's

767
00:49:15,920 --> 00:49:19,080
Speaker 1: speakers while he was listening to Vinyl on headphones had

768
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:22,680
Speaker 1: a story. I knew it wasn't alone, but he he'll

769
00:49:22,719 --> 00:49:26,160
Speaker 1: do that, but then he will speak, and he will

770
00:49:26,239 --> 00:49:30,440
Speaker 1: sometimes speak to something that is not there, or what

771
00:49:30,520 --> 00:49:34,120
Speaker 1: appears to be being that is not there, somewhere in

772
00:49:34,120 --> 00:49:38,719
Speaker 1: the corner, somewhere in the dark. And it's okay, you

773
00:49:38,719 --> 00:49:41,760
Speaker 1: You've got a very easy test for this, Matt. See

774
00:49:41,800 --> 00:49:45,080
Speaker 1: how you see how the dogoes are reacting like I

775
00:49:45,120 --> 00:49:49,120
Speaker 1: wouldn't you know for this for sleepwalkers, I do have

776
00:49:49,200 --> 00:49:52,919
Speaker 1: experience with this. I've only ever been freaked out if

777
00:49:52,960 --> 00:49:56,440
Speaker 1: like a household pet is also staring at the corner.

778
00:49:56,880 --> 00:50:00,520
Speaker 1: And then that's the time where I think, maybe I'll

779
00:50:00,520 --> 00:50:02,439
Speaker 1: go out, you know what I mean, Maybe I'll maybe

780
00:50:02,440 --> 00:50:05,480
Speaker 1: I'll go to subway. This episode is brought to you

781
00:50:05,520 --> 00:50:10,719
Speaker 1: by kidding. Uh, so you're you're right, Like I think

782
00:50:10,920 --> 00:50:14,359
Speaker 1: one thing is the word paras omnia might seem very

783
00:50:14,480 --> 00:50:17,000
Speaker 1: niche to people, but as you said, it is an

784
00:50:17,080 --> 00:50:21,280
Speaker 1: umbrella term. And I am virtually certain that everybody listening

785
00:50:21,400 --> 00:50:24,640
Speaker 1: here has had an experience with parasomnia because of one

786
00:50:24,680 --> 00:50:27,040
Speaker 1: of the most frequent types of paras omnia, from what

787
00:50:27,040 --> 00:50:30,600
Speaker 1: I understand, is nightmares, the kind of the kind that

788
00:50:30,640 --> 00:50:33,520
Speaker 1: are so terrible that you wake up and like you

789
00:50:33,560 --> 00:50:38,520
Speaker 1: know that the ocean is actually made of water, you know,

790
00:50:38,640 --> 00:50:42,040
Speaker 1: that you bleed blood instead of spiders. But you just

791
00:50:42,280 --> 00:50:45,200
Speaker 1: you can't. It's three in the morning, you can't get

792
00:50:45,239 --> 00:50:48,080
Speaker 1: back to sleep, and you're really starting to consider if

793
00:50:48,120 --> 00:50:49,920
Speaker 1: you should look under the band aid or not, and

794
00:50:49,960 --> 00:50:51,960
Speaker 1: you just kind of try to get yourself in a

795
00:50:51,960 --> 00:50:55,960
Speaker 1: different mind state. That's paras omnia. Reality is really fuzzy

796
00:50:56,040 --> 00:51:00,000
Speaker 1: in that state between wake and sleep, and I personally, um,

797
00:51:00,080 --> 00:51:02,440
Speaker 1: I will share without getting into it, I will share

798
00:51:03,120 --> 00:51:05,080
Speaker 1: part of the reason I'm reticent to talk about it.

799
00:51:05,640 --> 00:51:09,600
Speaker 1: I had conversations I was not aware of that were

800
00:51:09,719 --> 00:51:15,880
Speaker 1: recorded while I was asleep, and they're super creepy. I

801
00:51:15,880 --> 00:51:18,880
Speaker 1: don't think there's anything supernatural, to be clear. I just

802
00:51:18,920 --> 00:51:21,759
Speaker 1: think it's super creepy to hear yourself like that. It

803
00:51:21,760 --> 00:51:24,200
Speaker 1: would be like if you guys had a video of

804
00:51:24,239 --> 00:51:32,480
Speaker 1: yourselves rousing from bed and somnambulating to urinate in these

805
00:51:32,600 --> 00:51:36,879
Speaker 1: various non non commods. Like, it's weird to watch that, right.

806
00:51:37,200 --> 00:51:41,160
Speaker 1: Can you imagine the TikTok views you could get boys,

807
00:51:41,160 --> 00:51:45,160
Speaker 1: Oh there is Actually I would ask my wife right now,

808
00:51:45,360 --> 00:51:50,080
Speaker 1: but she she she watches somebody on TikTok that allegedly,

809
00:51:50,160 --> 00:51:55,839
Speaker 1: I'm saying, allegedly films herself sleepwalking with her boyfriend in

810
00:51:55,880 --> 00:51:59,880
Speaker 1: the room all the time, and she does the wackiest stuff.

811
00:52:00,160 --> 00:52:04,080
Speaker 1: The feels scripted to me, and I'm I'm suspicious, but

812
00:52:04,239 --> 00:52:06,799
Speaker 1: I'm not saying that's what it is. I'm saying I

813
00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:12,040
Speaker 1: maybe don't personally believe that it's always genuine sleep walking.

814
00:52:12,160 --> 00:52:15,319
Speaker 1: This astrology all over again. All right, let me take

815
00:52:15,360 --> 00:52:18,840
Speaker 1: a crack at it. So I've seen I've seen at

816
00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:22,640
Speaker 1: least one person doing this on TikTok. I've seen, Uh,

817
00:52:22,760 --> 00:52:25,120
Speaker 1: I don't know if it's the same person, but the

818
00:52:25,160 --> 00:52:30,120
Speaker 1: clip I saw this individual she is, there's a caption

819
00:52:30,200 --> 00:52:32,520
Speaker 1: and says, you know, I sleepwalking or incord myself. That's

820
00:52:32,560 --> 00:52:36,919
Speaker 1: my thing, Hello Internet. And she talks in text about

821
00:52:36,960 --> 00:52:40,200
Speaker 1: the dreams she remembers having. And there's one where she

822
00:52:40,400 --> 00:52:44,480
Speaker 1: is like walking. You see it through um a living

823
00:52:44,560 --> 00:52:48,800
Speaker 1: room camera in the corner and she's walking carrying stuff

824
00:52:48,840 --> 00:52:52,399
Speaker 1: awkwardly from the kitchen. Right we talked about the same one,

825
00:52:52,440 --> 00:52:55,440
Speaker 1: like cans this stuff and she walks out to her

826
00:52:55,600 --> 00:52:58,400
Speaker 1: front porch and it's late at night, and that there's

827
00:52:58,480 --> 00:53:01,480
Speaker 1: a camera in the corner of the front porch and

828
00:53:01,560 --> 00:53:04,759
Speaker 1: she starts throwing this stuff into the yark. Is this

829
00:53:04,840 --> 00:53:07,759
Speaker 1: the same video? It's yeah, that's one of the ones

830
00:53:07,840 --> 00:53:10,640
Speaker 1: that my wife showed me. But you have to understand

831
00:53:10,680 --> 00:53:12,840
Speaker 1: the reason why I am suspicious is because it's not

832
00:53:12,920 --> 00:53:16,319
Speaker 1: just that one great video that was captured. It's now

833
00:53:16,360 --> 00:53:21,400
Speaker 1: a daily post. However, frequently post situation where it's like,

834
00:53:21,440 --> 00:53:25,759
Speaker 1: look at me, I'm still sleepwalking. But if they're hilarious,

835
00:53:25,800 --> 00:53:31,200
Speaker 1: it's great entertainment. Anyway. I want to jump back really quickly, Miller,

836
00:53:31,239 --> 00:53:33,960
Speaker 1: to your discussion with your daughter, because one of the

837
00:53:33,960 --> 00:53:37,239
Speaker 1: things you talked about is violent movements of arms in

838
00:53:37,320 --> 00:53:41,080
Speaker 1: her sleep. That to me is a bit troubling. That

839
00:53:41,280 --> 00:53:47,200
Speaker 1: is a slightly different disorder. That is a rim related parasomnia,

840
00:53:47,360 --> 00:53:53,320
Speaker 1: and it's it's often called rim sleep behavior disorder. Emphasis

841
00:53:53,360 --> 00:53:55,759
Speaker 1: on behavior there because it is something that you're you

842
00:53:55,760 --> 00:54:01,560
Speaker 1: are doing while you are asleep. This is this is

843
00:54:01,800 --> 00:54:07,439
Speaker 1: a very different situation, um, and it's it's kind of weird.

844
00:54:07,480 --> 00:54:08,920
Speaker 1: I don't know. To me, it's a I guess it's

845
00:54:08,960 --> 00:54:11,640
Speaker 1: not fully weird, but it's a little different that your daughter,

846
00:54:11,760 --> 00:54:15,040
Speaker 1: at six euros old has this. Because it's often observed

847
00:54:15,160 --> 00:54:18,799
Speaker 1: in older people. This is a fairly frequent thing in

848
00:54:18,960 --> 00:54:22,360
Speaker 1: at least according to the Sleep Foundation, in people aged

849
00:54:22,440 --> 00:54:26,040
Speaker 1: fifty and older, it's most common at least in that

850
00:54:26,120 --> 00:54:31,200
Speaker 1: age range. The sleep talking, however, is very common in

851
00:54:31,520 --> 00:54:35,200
Speaker 1: ages like early age. So I think three to ten

852
00:54:35,400 --> 00:54:39,520
Speaker 1: is the most common age range there to twelve. But yeah,

853
00:54:39,560 --> 00:54:43,560
Speaker 1: it's it's a young it's a young folks game. Yeah, exactly. Um,

854
00:54:43,600 --> 00:54:46,440
Speaker 1: and that's that's coming from different places. Web Md is

855
00:54:46,440 --> 00:54:49,919
Speaker 1: the one that says of children between three and ten

856
00:54:50,760 --> 00:54:57,840
Speaker 1: carry on conversations while asleep following conversations. Um. Yeah. You

857
00:54:57,840 --> 00:54:59,920
Speaker 1: can go to web md and there's a whole ar

858
00:55:00,080 --> 00:55:02,799
Speaker 1: called talking in your Sleep from twenty nineteen that goes

859
00:55:02,880 --> 00:55:05,960
Speaker 1: over a lot of this. It talks about some of

860
00:55:06,000 --> 00:55:09,239
Speaker 1: the you know, the different reasons for it. What you

861
00:55:09,280 --> 00:55:12,560
Speaker 1: should know right now is that it does not mean

862
00:55:12,600 --> 00:55:16,480
Speaker 1: there's anything wrong with your daughter. This is a while

863
00:55:16,520 --> 00:55:21,000
Speaker 1: not extremely everyday common, a common thing. The same deal

864
00:55:21,120 --> 00:55:24,520
Speaker 1: with the rim sleep disorder that your experience that she

865
00:55:24,600 --> 00:55:27,359
Speaker 1: may be experiencing where she's moving around a lot. Uh,

866
00:55:27,400 --> 00:55:30,799
Speaker 1: there's just a little restless sleep. So you know, this

867
00:55:30,880 --> 00:55:33,640
Speaker 1: is not medical advice, but I would talk to you know,

868
00:55:33,840 --> 00:55:37,439
Speaker 1: the pediatrician talk about things like diet, talking about things

869
00:55:37,520 --> 00:55:42,080
Speaker 1: like you know, what time she's eating certain things. I

870
00:55:42,080 --> 00:55:43,440
Speaker 1: don't know. That's one of the only things you can

871
00:55:43,520 --> 00:55:48,840
Speaker 1: really control as a pair, right yeah, yeah, uh. And

872
00:55:49,680 --> 00:55:51,319
Speaker 1: one of the big things before we close out here,

873
00:55:51,640 --> 00:55:54,960
Speaker 1: something to look into if you're interested, Miller or anybody

874
00:55:54,960 --> 00:55:58,200
Speaker 1: else out there, check out sleep Walk with Me. That's

875
00:55:58,239 --> 00:56:06,280
Speaker 1: that Mike ber big Mike Mike Burbiglia. Uh, fantastic writer

876
00:56:06,560 --> 00:56:10,279
Speaker 1: and comedian and actor, and Sleepwalk with Me is the

877
00:56:10,360 --> 00:56:15,560
Speaker 1: true story that he tells about his experience with REM's

878
00:56:15,960 --> 00:56:22,400
Speaker 1: behavior disorder. Anyway, it's it's really great and kind of chilling,

879
00:56:22,520 --> 00:56:26,000
Speaker 1: kind of sad, very cathartic. It's it's fantastic. You can't

880
00:56:26,040 --> 00:56:29,239
Speaker 1: recommend it enough. Oh and one other thing with Mike

881
00:56:29,239 --> 00:56:31,800
Speaker 1: pro Bigley, I think he's spoken about it publicly before.

882
00:56:31,920 --> 00:56:35,799
Speaker 1: It's a part of that Sleepwalk with Me. There are

883
00:56:35,840 --> 00:56:39,239
Speaker 1: some medications that you can go on, or you can

884
00:56:39,280 --> 00:56:42,200
Speaker 1: be put on, to help deal with things like that,

885
00:56:42,239 --> 00:56:44,640
Speaker 1: like moving in your sleep, or talking in your sleep,

886
00:56:44,719 --> 00:56:48,480
Speaker 1: or just having your REM or non REM cycles disrupted

887
00:56:48,719 --> 00:56:52,880
Speaker 1: by those kinds of behaviors and activities. I would, you know, again,

888
00:56:52,960 --> 00:56:56,160
Speaker 1: not medical advice. You probably don't want to give that

889
00:56:56,239 --> 00:56:59,880
Speaker 1: to a younger person. But you you should speak to

890
00:56:59,880 --> 00:57:02,840
Speaker 1: your doctor about that, um if it's a problem in

891
00:57:02,840 --> 00:57:07,400
Speaker 1: the future, but for now, just enjoy, enjoy those awesome

892
00:57:07,440 --> 00:57:10,120
Speaker 1: moments that you get with your kid while she's still

893
00:57:10,480 --> 00:57:14,719
Speaker 1: that age, right and all. Yeah, yeah, mine's already going

894
00:57:14,719 --> 00:57:17,200
Speaker 1: at the age where she doesn't really tell me anything anymore.

895
00:57:17,280 --> 00:57:20,200
Speaker 1: So hopefully, hopefully it comes back around. Guys, we used

896
00:57:20,200 --> 00:57:22,160
Speaker 1: to be so tight. Now I'm kidding, we are tight,

897
00:57:22,360 --> 00:57:26,640
Speaker 1: but um, kids, kids, kids have secrets. Kids have secrets

898
00:57:26,680 --> 00:57:30,040
Speaker 1: and and some of those things probably pop up in

899
00:57:30,040 --> 00:57:32,040
Speaker 1: their dreams. So probably a good way to get the

900
00:57:32,040 --> 00:57:33,480
Speaker 1: scoop on what's going on with your kid is he's

901
00:57:33,560 --> 00:57:37,280
Speaker 1: dropping on them with their sleep talkers. Maybe you should

902
00:57:37,280 --> 00:57:43,000
Speaker 1: record them and then you can keep those recordings. It's right, Yeah,

903
00:57:43,160 --> 00:57:47,000
Speaker 1: you know what, maybe salimni quis, which is the fancy

904
00:57:47,040 --> 00:57:52,680
Speaker 1: word for those uh maybe ye yeah, you know, I

905
00:57:52,960 --> 00:57:57,680
Speaker 1: would say, just respect people's privacy and in all those things.

906
00:57:57,760 --> 00:57:59,400
Speaker 1: And then you know, if you if you're a parent,

907
00:57:59,720 --> 00:58:02,360
Speaker 1: there is the question like is it is there a

908
00:58:02,400 --> 00:58:05,960
Speaker 1: possibility that this would be the audio equivalent of a

909
00:58:06,040 --> 00:58:10,000
Speaker 1: cute picture your kid would enjoy in the future, or

910
00:58:10,120 --> 00:58:12,120
Speaker 1: are you going to be like that if your kids

911
00:58:12,160 --> 00:58:16,080
Speaker 1: starts dating instead of showing baby pictures. Are you going

912
00:58:16,160 --> 00:58:19,800
Speaker 1: to say, let me play you this crazy in conversation

913
00:58:20,400 --> 00:58:23,000
Speaker 1: that the person you're going to problem with had with

914
00:58:23,040 --> 00:58:26,360
Speaker 1: me when they were six. That's weird. That's a weird

915
00:58:26,400 --> 00:58:30,000
Speaker 1: flex and it could happen. And just remember, guys, we've

916
00:58:30,000 --> 00:58:34,000
Speaker 1: talked about this many time before. The that space that

917
00:58:34,080 --> 00:58:37,520
Speaker 1: you're in when you're sleeping, it's a little thin when

918
00:58:37,520 --> 00:58:42,320
Speaker 1: it comes to you know, the realities that exist out there,

919
00:58:42,120 --> 00:58:47,400
Speaker 1: the varying realms. So maybe if there's something important happening

920
00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:49,960
Speaker 1: on the other side, there could be a message coming

921
00:58:49,960 --> 00:58:52,959
Speaker 1: your way via your daughter or your son or someone

922
00:58:53,000 --> 00:58:57,440
Speaker 1: else young who is having a solemniquy or a soliloquy

923
00:58:57,600 --> 00:59:00,880
Speaker 1: on stage somewhere. But probably probably the other one. I'll

924
00:59:00,880 --> 00:59:02,680
Speaker 1: tell you guys, I have his recurring dream where I'm

925
00:59:02,680 --> 00:59:04,360
Speaker 1: in a play and I don't know any of my lines.

926
00:59:04,880 --> 00:59:06,960
Speaker 1: It's probably pretty common, but I've never really been on

927
00:59:07,000 --> 00:59:09,439
Speaker 1: a play before, so I'm a little confused. But it's

928
00:59:09,480 --> 00:59:13,400
Speaker 1: a it's very distressing dream I've got. It's weird all

929
00:59:13,440 --> 00:59:15,880
Speaker 1: my One of the reasons I don't care for sleep

930
00:59:15,960 --> 00:59:19,840
Speaker 1: is that all my dreams take place in an interconnected universe,

931
00:59:19,960 --> 00:59:23,360
Speaker 1: and stuff that happens in one effects, like the consequences

932
00:59:23,440 --> 00:59:28,360
Speaker 1: stay with it. So it's it's a complicated thing and

933
00:59:28,400 --> 00:59:31,120
Speaker 1: I can like draw the buildings and stuff. But I

934
00:59:31,160 --> 00:59:33,160
Speaker 1: still have you know, like you're saying, no, I still

935
00:59:33,200 --> 00:59:37,640
Speaker 1: have reoccurring sort of scenarios. Jonathan Strictlan ruined that word

936
00:59:37,680 --> 00:59:45,160
Speaker 1: for us. But I still have like these scenarios scenar Yes, exactly,

937
00:59:45,200 --> 00:59:50,680
Speaker 1: it's all of these scenarios scenarios. He won. He won.

938
00:59:51,600 --> 00:59:54,360
Speaker 1: It sounds very Alan wake to me. Are you are

939
00:59:54,360 --> 00:59:57,640
Speaker 1: you familiar with that? Uh? No, No, I like his

940
00:59:57,720 --> 01:00:03,120
Speaker 1: last name. You really aren't familiar with that one? Oh uh?

941
01:00:03,280 --> 01:00:10,120
Speaker 1: First of all video games? Yes, yes I do. I

942
01:00:10,280 --> 01:00:14,920
Speaker 1: learned about it from Control. Actually. Oh man, I want

943
01:00:14,920 --> 01:00:18,480
Speaker 1: to say there's a graphic novel. But maybe I'm completely wrong. Um,

944
01:00:19,120 --> 01:00:20,600
Speaker 1: I don't know. I think maybe it was just a

945
01:00:20,680 --> 01:00:23,520
Speaker 1: video game. But it was fantastic. God, I loved it.

946
01:00:24,120 --> 01:00:27,720
Speaker 1: So the thing that I don't know if this is

947
01:00:27,760 --> 01:00:32,439
Speaker 1: a common scenario for other people scenario in dreams, but

948
01:00:32,520 --> 01:00:35,360
Speaker 1: you know, we have these tropes like like no going

949
01:00:35,760 --> 01:00:38,200
Speaker 1: going to a place and feeling unprepared. Right, A lot

950
01:00:38,200 --> 01:00:41,280
Speaker 1: of people dream about high school way into adulthood and

951
01:00:41,360 --> 01:00:44,000
Speaker 1: sometimes you know, I don't know what's on the test alright, don't.

952
01:00:44,040 --> 01:00:45,800
Speaker 1: I don't know how to do this experiment. A lot

953
01:00:45,840 --> 01:00:49,000
Speaker 1: of people dream about losing teeth because that's a trippy

954
01:00:49,080 --> 01:00:52,600
Speaker 1: experience the vast majority of human beings go through. Um,

955
01:00:53,160 --> 01:00:56,000
Speaker 1: I have a reoccur I don't think it's will be

956
01:00:56,040 --> 01:00:58,840
Speaker 1: interesting to anyone, but you get it out. I have

957
01:00:58,880 --> 01:01:02,160
Speaker 1: a reoccurring dream I bleed spiders. I'm not joking, like

958
01:01:02,200 --> 01:01:06,440
Speaker 1: instead of blood, and it's not a nightmare. It's just

959
01:01:06,520 --> 01:01:09,480
Speaker 1: a thing that happens that is ancillary to the plot

960
01:01:09,560 --> 01:01:14,360
Speaker 1: of the dream. Wow, and with that, we wish you

961
01:01:14,400 --> 01:01:18,200
Speaker 1: good night. You wish you the best of dreams. You

962
01:01:18,240 --> 01:01:23,560
Speaker 1: guys have that too, Visions of blood spiders dance in

963
01:01:23,680 --> 01:01:26,000
Speaker 1: your heads. This you need to you need to have

964
01:01:26,040 --> 01:01:28,400
Speaker 1: a conversation with that dude from the National. I think

965
01:01:28,400 --> 01:01:33,200
Speaker 1: you guys have some pretty similar really mental imagery going

966
01:01:33,280 --> 01:01:36,800
Speaker 1: on to see do you think, well, everybody's dreams in

967
01:01:36,880 --> 01:01:40,560
Speaker 1: their own country, Like you said, realities thin and um,

968
01:01:40,720 --> 01:01:43,880
Speaker 1: you can also find it's very interest. Like we look

969
01:01:43,920 --> 01:01:47,120
Speaker 1: at the kids in reincarnation, you can the people who

970
01:01:47,120 --> 01:01:51,680
Speaker 1: believe in that you can find these strange anecdotes about

971
01:01:51,720 --> 01:01:55,280
Speaker 1: stuff their kids said like this. I think Parasomnia could

972
01:01:55,280 --> 01:01:59,520
Speaker 1: be a great full episode, as could again depending on

973
01:01:59,520 --> 01:02:02,800
Speaker 1: on what shakes out over there at the Pentagon, that

974
01:02:03,000 --> 01:02:06,720
Speaker 1: could be a full episode. Two. I mean, these are mysteries,

975
01:02:06,920 --> 01:02:10,160
Speaker 1: especially the Pentagon one. I the Pentagon what I think

976
01:02:10,200 --> 01:02:13,760
Speaker 1: we have a better chance of solving than the mystery

977
01:02:13,960 --> 01:02:17,160
Speaker 1: of Vietnam soldiers possibly left behind. It's funny. I was

978
01:02:17,200 --> 01:02:19,600
Speaker 1: looking at the headline or the you know sometimes the

979
01:02:19,760 --> 01:02:21,720
Speaker 1: you know, the headline of an article is different than

980
01:02:21,760 --> 01:02:24,240
Speaker 1: the uh what what it says at the top of

981
01:02:24,240 --> 01:02:26,120
Speaker 1: the browser, you know what I mean, because they need

982
01:02:26,160 --> 01:02:28,240
Speaker 1: to like, you know, conserve space so that you get

983
01:02:28,280 --> 01:02:30,720
Speaker 1: most of the text on the tab. But it's said

984
01:02:30,800 --> 01:02:33,560
Speaker 1: Florida mystery. And for a second I was like, is

985
01:02:33,600 --> 01:02:37,080
Speaker 1: that a typo? But the company in question with the

986
01:02:37,160 --> 01:02:39,200
Speaker 1: very generic name is based in Florida. But it was

987
01:02:39,240 --> 01:02:42,760
Speaker 1: an odd thing to lead with Florida mystery that the

988
01:02:42,800 --> 01:02:47,000
Speaker 1: same as a Florida man Florida mystery. The Florida mysteries

989
01:02:47,000 --> 01:02:50,919
Speaker 1: are many. I think Florida Mystery is also a very

990
01:02:51,360 --> 01:02:56,200
Speaker 1: uh specific move in bed what exactly I don't know.

991
01:02:56,360 --> 01:02:59,000
Speaker 1: Let us know you please let us know. Or maybe

992
01:02:59,000 --> 01:03:01,360
Speaker 1: it's some kind of are is sort of you know,

993
01:03:01,560 --> 01:03:09,080
Speaker 1: the genre of like detective novel the Florida or maybe

994
01:03:09,240 --> 01:03:12,720
Speaker 1: maybe maybe it's a flavor of Uh, maybe it's a

995
01:03:12,760 --> 01:03:15,680
Speaker 1: flavor of like slushy you can order. You can walk

996
01:03:15,680 --> 01:03:17,960
Speaker 1: into a seven eleven and just say, I'll have a

997
01:03:18,000 --> 01:03:21,440
Speaker 1: Florida mystery. It could be any of those three things

998
01:03:21,560 --> 01:03:24,240
Speaker 1: that we just named it. I don't know what else.

999
01:03:24,440 --> 01:03:26,160
Speaker 1: I don't know where else to go here we have

1000
01:03:26,200 --> 01:03:30,520
Speaker 1: gone away over time here. Uh if you like knock

1001
01:03:30,560 --> 01:03:36,720
Speaker 1: Out ned right Miller for sure, and yeah, thank you

1002
01:03:36,760 --> 01:03:39,760
Speaker 1: to Knockout ned k Dog and Miller, and thanks to

1003
01:03:39,800 --> 01:03:44,560
Speaker 1: everybody for tuning in these listener mails. Really, uh, the

1004
01:03:44,840 --> 01:03:47,800
Speaker 1: first part of an episode in our heads, the second

1005
01:03:47,880 --> 01:03:50,760
Speaker 1: part is when you write to us. You're the second

1006
01:03:50,800 --> 01:03:53,720
Speaker 1: part of this show. That's right, And of course the

1007
01:03:53,760 --> 01:03:56,439
Speaker 1: most important part of the show has evidenced by how

1008
01:03:56,600 --> 01:03:59,520
Speaker 1: much over time we are on today's episode, because you

1009
01:03:59,640 --> 01:04:02,040
Speaker 1: send us just the best stuff and we just really

1010
01:04:02,200 --> 01:04:04,760
Speaker 1: love you all. Uh, so please let us know what

1011
01:04:04,880 --> 01:04:09,240
Speaker 1: you think um of this episode and others entering the conversation.

1012
01:04:09,280 --> 01:04:11,400
Speaker 1: You can find us on the usual spots on the

1013
01:04:11,440 --> 01:04:16,320
Speaker 1: internet where we are conspiracy stuff on Twitter and Facebook,

1014
01:04:16,360 --> 01:04:20,080
Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff show on Instagram. That's right, and we have

1015
01:04:20,160 --> 01:04:22,240
Speaker 1: a phone number. If you don't like social media, you

1016
01:04:22,280 --> 01:04:25,360
Speaker 1: can use your phone to call us. It's crazy one

1017
01:04:25,600 --> 01:04:29,120
Speaker 1: eight three three st d w y t K. Leave

1018
01:04:29,240 --> 01:04:31,840
Speaker 1: us a message please at the very top tell us

1019
01:04:31,880 --> 01:04:34,160
Speaker 1: what you would like for us to call you. Doesn't

1020
01:04:34,200 --> 01:04:36,160
Speaker 1: have to be your real name, can if you want,

1021
01:04:36,520 --> 01:04:40,400
Speaker 1: but be careful, then leave your message. Please try to

1022
01:04:40,480 --> 01:04:42,360
Speaker 1: keep it within three minutes, because that's all you have

1023
01:04:42,480 --> 01:04:45,840
Speaker 1: for one message. At the end of that message, anything

1024
01:04:45,880 --> 01:04:49,080
Speaker 1: you want to say personally to us or to a producer,

1025
01:04:49,360 --> 01:04:51,640
Speaker 1: please put it there. That will be helpful for us

1026
01:04:51,680 --> 01:04:53,480
Speaker 1: to maybe edit it out of the episode if we

1027
01:04:53,560 --> 01:04:57,520
Speaker 1: have to. If for any reason, you've got a lot

1028
01:04:57,600 --> 01:05:00,400
Speaker 1: to tell us, a long story, maybe some are articles,

1029
01:05:00,400 --> 01:05:03,400
Speaker 1: some links, something else to share, we recommend you use

1030
01:05:03,520 --> 01:05:07,720
Speaker 1: our email address. We are conspiracy at i heart radio

1031
01:05:07,960 --> 01:05:28,560
Speaker 1: dot com. Stuff they Don't Want you to Know is

1032
01:05:28,600 --> 01:05:31,640
Speaker 1: a production of I Heart Radio. For more podcasts from

1033
01:05:31,640 --> 01:05:34,720
Speaker 1: my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1034
01:05:34,800 --> 01:05:36,680
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.