1 00:00:01,720 --> 00:00:08,200 Speaker 1: Also media, Welcome back to Behind the Bastards, a podcast 2 00:00:08,280 --> 00:00:10,920 Speaker 1: about how everyone might die in nuclear hell fire. This 3 00:00:11,039 --> 00:00:13,400 Speaker 1: is part four of our series on the bastards who 4 00:00:13,400 --> 00:00:16,279 Speaker 1: built the doomsday device that we all currently live under, 5 00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:18,800 Speaker 1: the looming sword of Damocles above all of our heads, 6 00:00:19,200 --> 00:00:22,080 Speaker 1: the several thousand nuclear weapons ready at a moment's notice 7 00:00:22,160 --> 00:00:24,919 Speaker 1: to destroy everything any of us have ever loved or 8 00:00:24,960 --> 00:00:28,319 Speaker 1: cared about. Back with me to really get into some shit, 9 00:00:28,320 --> 00:00:31,000 Speaker 1: because I did not expect it to take this long 10 00:00:31,080 --> 00:00:33,560 Speaker 1: to get to the mid fifties. But there's a lot 11 00:00:33,600 --> 00:00:36,560 Speaker 1: to talk about. Margaret Kiljoy, how are you doing. 12 00:00:37,280 --> 00:00:39,680 Speaker 2: I'm good. I've come up with a strategy and the 13 00:00:39,720 --> 00:00:43,560 Speaker 2: strategies I've decided. I believe you are telling me Warhammer 14 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:45,479 Speaker 2: forty k lore that. 15 00:00:45,440 --> 00:00:46,800 Speaker 1: Would make this a lot more comforting. 16 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:50,839 Speaker 2: Huh. Yeah, this is just something that some space orcs 17 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:52,080 Speaker 2: have decided to do. 18 00:00:52,200 --> 00:00:54,400 Speaker 1: There are orcs in space and Warhammer that's a very 19 00:00:54,440 --> 00:01:05,200 Speaker 1: important part of the setting. So I'm going to start 20 00:01:05,240 --> 00:01:07,920 Speaker 1: this episode with something that happened concurrent to the last 21 00:01:08,000 --> 00:01:09,960 Speaker 1: couple of years that we've talked about in part three, 22 00:01:10,120 --> 00:01:12,880 Speaker 1: right as you know, the kind of fallout from the 23 00:01:12,959 --> 00:01:15,840 Speaker 1: Korean War is going on, and the US and the 24 00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:19,679 Speaker 1: Soviet nuclear stockpiles are ballooning from the hundreds to the thousands. 25 00:01:20,080 --> 00:01:23,040 Speaker 1: Curtis LeMay had, as I noted, become obsessed with the 26 00:01:23,080 --> 00:01:25,360 Speaker 1: idea of being able to land a first strike that 27 00:01:25,400 --> 00:01:28,560 Speaker 1: would compromise or cripple the Soviet ability to strike back. 28 00:01:29,240 --> 00:01:32,480 Speaker 1: In public, President Eisenhower was very careful to only discuss 29 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:35,639 Speaker 1: a US nuclear response in defensive terms, but in nineteen 30 00:01:35,720 --> 00:01:39,240 Speaker 1: fifty four, the Eisenhower Dulles Declaration announced that the US 31 00:01:39,319 --> 00:01:44,000 Speaker 1: would respond to Soviet provocation anywhere, even using conventional weapons 32 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:47,440 Speaker 1: quote at places and with means of our own choosing. 33 00:01:48,000 --> 00:01:52,000 Speaker 1: The term massive retaliation came to symbolize the Eisenhower administration's 34 00:01:52,040 --> 00:01:55,400 Speaker 1: promise to the Soviet Union. Right, basically, if you provoke us, 35 00:01:55,400 --> 00:01:58,560 Speaker 1: if you fuck with us, we'll kill everybody. Right, that's 36 00:01:58,680 --> 00:02:00,440 Speaker 1: kind of the idea. You know, that's not exact, but 37 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:04,000 Speaker 1: it's we will retaliate massively. And that that that isn't 38 00:02:04,040 --> 00:02:06,120 Speaker 1: that means nuclear, right. 39 00:02:06,640 --> 00:02:08,359 Speaker 2: Trying to have a fist fight with someone who has 40 00:02:08,360 --> 00:02:10,120 Speaker 2: like a suicide vest on and you're. 41 00:02:09,919 --> 00:02:12,240 Speaker 1: Just in a room, which, by the way, is the 42 00:02:12,280 --> 00:02:14,240 Speaker 1: best way to get into a fist fight, which is 43 00:02:14,240 --> 00:02:15,880 Speaker 1: why if you want to buy one of our patented 44 00:02:15,919 --> 00:02:19,760 Speaker 1: suicide vests today, you know, never get beat up again. Yeah, 45 00:02:20,080 --> 00:02:22,280 Speaker 1: or get beat up exactly one more time. It's probably 46 00:02:22,320 --> 00:02:23,640 Speaker 1: a more accurate way to look at the way the 47 00:02:23,639 --> 00:02:24,560 Speaker 1: suicide vest works. 48 00:02:24,760 --> 00:02:27,640 Speaker 2: Well, we've actually we've workshopped it. They're called lifefests, now. 49 00:02:27,639 --> 00:02:31,519 Speaker 1: Called life vest. Now we're currently suing the boat people 50 00:02:31,560 --> 00:02:33,560 Speaker 1: over their life vest. But I think this is going 51 00:02:33,639 --> 00:02:34,440 Speaker 1: to work out well for us. 52 00:02:34,520 --> 00:02:36,720 Speaker 2: The lawsuit worked really well because we went in wearing 53 00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:37,440 Speaker 2: our product. 54 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:39,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, we wore our product and we can't. We brought 55 00:02:39,720 --> 00:02:40,440 Speaker 1: a life rate. 56 00:02:40,320 --> 00:02:41,600 Speaker 3: To by stopping. 57 00:02:43,760 --> 00:02:47,800 Speaker 1: Oh man. So this whole idea of the Eisenower Dolus declaration, 58 00:02:47,880 --> 00:02:51,000 Speaker 1: it's not a promise that we actually keep, right Eisenhower, 59 00:02:51,360 --> 00:02:53,919 Speaker 1: I think there's a degree to which I mean elements 60 00:02:53,919 --> 00:02:55,360 Speaker 1: of this are things that the US will do at 61 00:02:55,400 --> 00:02:59,639 Speaker 1: other times without using nuclear weapons. But Ike is fundamentally 62 00:02:59,639 --> 00:03:03,839 Speaker 1: a guy who he has some respect for human life. Right. 63 00:03:04,160 --> 00:03:07,160 Speaker 1: So there's this big conflict between Taiwan and the People's 64 00:03:07,160 --> 00:03:10,399 Speaker 1: Republic of China that comes very close during his presidency 65 00:03:10,400 --> 00:03:13,839 Speaker 1: to exploding into nuclear hostilities. Like we're seriously considering using 66 00:03:13,919 --> 00:03:19,320 Speaker 1: nukes to like basically like clear Taiwan's flanks, right, because 67 00:03:19,320 --> 00:03:22,600 Speaker 1: they're in a rough strategic situation for US to respond 68 00:03:22,639 --> 00:03:26,360 Speaker 1: to with anything else. But Eisenower proves less willing to 69 00:03:26,400 --> 00:03:29,800 Speaker 1: massively retaliate than he was willing to talk about massive retaliation, 70 00:03:29,919 --> 00:03:33,280 Speaker 1: and the situation eventually resolves without the use of nuclear weapons, 71 00:03:33,320 --> 00:03:36,080 Speaker 1: thank fucking God. Right, Yeah, So it is this situation 72 00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:39,520 Speaker 1: where Eisenhower is he wants to, he wants that threat 73 00:03:39,560 --> 00:03:42,160 Speaker 1: to be out there, but he really does not, and 74 00:03:42,520 --> 00:03:45,640 Speaker 1: none of our presidents really do. After Truman, they don't 75 00:03:45,680 --> 00:03:50,440 Speaker 1: want a nuke. People, they're really anti nuke because they're 76 00:03:50,800 --> 00:03:54,320 Speaker 1: not insane as a general rule, like Nixon kind of is, 77 00:03:54,360 --> 00:03:56,720 Speaker 1: but even he's not that crazy for the most part, Right, 78 00:03:57,760 --> 00:04:00,800 Speaker 1: for the most part. The evolving nature of nuclear warfare 79 00:04:00,840 --> 00:04:03,040 Speaker 1: it meant that units across the globe are now by 80 00:04:03,040 --> 00:04:05,240 Speaker 1: the mid to late fifties armed with nukes meant for 81 00:04:05,280 --> 00:04:08,640 Speaker 1: defensive purposes. This becomes an obsession for the military as 82 00:04:08,640 --> 00:04:10,840 Speaker 1: a whole. The idea was that nuclear weapons could be 83 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:13,360 Speaker 1: launched to air burst and destroy entire fleets of Soviet 84 00:04:13,440 --> 00:04:16,040 Speaker 1: bombers or naval vessels at a time. Now by the 85 00:04:16,080 --> 00:04:18,839 Speaker 1: mid nineteen fifties, every American was well aware of the 86 00:04:18,839 --> 00:04:21,279 Speaker 1: horrors of nuclear war, and one of the few comforting 87 00:04:21,320 --> 00:04:23,520 Speaker 1: thoughts they could rely on was the fact that only 88 00:04:23,560 --> 00:04:27,000 Speaker 1: the president could order a nuclear attack. That was a lie. 89 00:04:27,200 --> 00:04:30,720 Speaker 1: Turns out that was not true. In the book Fifteen Minutes, L. 90 00:04:30,760 --> 00:04:32,880 Speaker 1: Douglas Keeney reveals, and I think this is the thing 91 00:04:32,920 --> 00:04:35,240 Speaker 1: that was came to light while he was writing his 92 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:38,280 Speaker 1: book as a result of like information requests and stuff 93 00:04:38,320 --> 00:04:41,080 Speaker 1: that he was filing. But in nineteen fifty seven, this 94 00:04:41,240 --> 00:04:44,160 Speaker 1: was not known until very recently. In nineteen fifty seven, 95 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:48,279 Speaker 1: President Eisenhower issued a presidential authorization that provided instructions for 96 00:04:48,400 --> 00:04:52,760 Speaker 1: field commanders to use nuclear weapons in specific defensive situations 97 00:04:52,800 --> 00:04:56,840 Speaker 1: without any outside approval. A small number of authorizing commanders 98 00:04:56,839 --> 00:04:59,320 Speaker 1: in chief even had the ability to launch and command 99 00:04:59,360 --> 00:05:02,279 Speaker 1: a retalian nuclear strike on the Soviet Union after a 100 00:05:02,320 --> 00:05:06,000 Speaker 1: direct attack on the United States. Right, it was never 101 00:05:06,279 --> 00:05:09,240 Speaker 1: really true during this period of time, like, at least 102 00:05:09,240 --> 00:05:12,559 Speaker 1: not after the middle of the Eisenhower administration, that only 103 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:14,800 Speaker 1: the president could order a nuclear strike. For one thing, 104 00:05:14,839 --> 00:05:17,440 Speaker 1: there's no governor on these so theoretically anybody who had 105 00:05:17,480 --> 00:05:22,000 Speaker 1: one could have made the decision, but also Eisenhower gives 106 00:05:22,040 --> 00:05:24,720 Speaker 1: field commanders the ability and this is mainly meant for 107 00:05:24,920 --> 00:05:26,520 Speaker 1: with the exception of those guys who had that small 108 00:05:26,600 --> 00:05:28,560 Speaker 1: number of guys who could do a retaliatory strike. Most 109 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:30,760 Speaker 1: of these are guys who if they see a fleet 110 00:05:30,760 --> 00:05:35,279 Speaker 1: of bombers incoming, they can fire anti aircraft nuclear artillery, right, Like, 111 00:05:35,320 --> 00:05:37,679 Speaker 1: it's that sort of thing. So it's not as crazy 112 00:05:37,680 --> 00:05:40,880 Speaker 1: as it could have been, but it's pretty crazy, right this. 113 00:05:40,960 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 2: Like this does have Would that have brought on like 114 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:45,600 Speaker 2: if we had been like, oh, fuck these bombers and 115 00:05:45,920 --> 00:05:48,640 Speaker 2: nuked them in the sky, would that have like brought 116 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:50,680 Speaker 2: on USSR's retaliation. 117 00:05:51,200 --> 00:05:53,479 Speaker 1: I mean, at that point, they were already sending a 118 00:05:53,480 --> 00:05:56,760 Speaker 1: bomber fleet over right, So I mean they probably would 119 00:05:56,800 --> 00:05:59,320 Speaker 1: have continued to fight. 120 00:05:59,120 --> 00:05:59,240 Speaker 2: Right. 121 00:05:59,400 --> 00:06:02,520 Speaker 1: It's you know, at this point, because we don't have ICBMs, 122 00:06:02,960 --> 00:06:04,840 Speaker 1: we still might have had a nuclear war that didn't 123 00:06:04,920 --> 00:06:07,680 Speaker 1: kill everybody, right, because you could have theoretically had one 124 00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:10,000 Speaker 1: that was devastating enough that the major powers are not 125 00:06:10,080 --> 00:06:12,640 Speaker 1: able to keep fighting. But everything doesn't get expended because 126 00:06:12,680 --> 00:06:16,000 Speaker 1: we can't just launch thousands of ICBMs at a moment's notice, Right, 127 00:06:16,040 --> 00:06:19,960 Speaker 1: That's not really an option right now. What makes this dangerous, though, 128 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:22,640 Speaker 1: is that by the late nineteen fifties, there are nuclear 129 00:06:22,680 --> 00:06:26,560 Speaker 1: weapons US nuclear weapons fucking everywhere all over the world 130 00:06:26,640 --> 00:06:29,920 Speaker 1: at all times. Curtis LeMay had insisted from the beginning 131 00:06:29,960 --> 00:06:33,160 Speaker 1: because he's really obsessed with the SAC's readiness, right, and 132 00:06:33,240 --> 00:06:36,640 Speaker 1: so he from the jump is like, our bomber crews 133 00:06:36,720 --> 00:06:40,680 Speaker 1: have to train regularly by flying test missions with functional 134 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons on board. It's not a real test if 135 00:06:43,520 --> 00:06:47,239 Speaker 1: they don't have an actual nuke on the plane, right. 136 00:06:47,240 --> 00:06:49,240 Speaker 2: Okay, I don't understand why, but. 137 00:06:49,240 --> 00:06:51,839 Speaker 1: Sure, well, because he's the craziest man who ever lived. 138 00:06:51,839 --> 00:06:53,960 Speaker 1: Our second text to MacArthur, maybe. 139 00:06:53,720 --> 00:06:56,159 Speaker 2: Yeah, you can only dry fire with bullets in. 140 00:06:56,160 --> 00:06:59,320 Speaker 1: The right, right, it's fucking insane. And what this means 141 00:06:59,320 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 1: practically is that from this point on, thousands of nuclear 142 00:07:02,440 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 1: weapons are flying across the US and the world. Every year. 143 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:08,200 Speaker 1: There are always nukes flying around at all times, tons 144 00:07:08,279 --> 00:07:12,000 Speaker 1: of them. It's so scary, it's fucking insane. 145 00:07:12,360 --> 00:07:15,280 Speaker 2: That's okay, soviy, this is warhammer, yeah, warhammer lore. 146 00:07:16,160 --> 00:07:19,200 Speaker 1: In the early nineteen fifties, LeMay had developed the beginning 147 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:21,080 Speaker 1: of a strategy to keep what he called an air 148 00:07:21,120 --> 00:07:24,520 Speaker 1: fleet in readiness, with planes always armed and always in 149 00:07:24,600 --> 00:07:27,000 Speaker 1: the air, with nukes ready to divert their course to 150 00:07:27,040 --> 00:07:29,960 Speaker 1: attack the Soviet heartland or other targets at a moment's notice. 151 00:07:30,480 --> 00:07:33,200 Speaker 1: The reasoning for this seemed sound to the men doing it. 152 00:07:33,440 --> 00:07:35,640 Speaker 1: If the Soviets knew that they could get away with 153 00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:38,280 Speaker 1: a first strike on the US, they might try. The 154 00:07:38,320 --> 00:07:40,520 Speaker 1: best way to make sure they never did was by 155 00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:42,880 Speaker 1: always having bombers in the air and ready to fight 156 00:07:42,960 --> 00:07:46,440 Speaker 1: at all times, which meant at all times dozens to 157 00:07:46,560 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 1: hundreds to even thousands of nukes might be out in 158 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:52,280 Speaker 1: the world, and this meant there would always be nukes 159 00:07:52,320 --> 00:07:56,160 Speaker 1: going missing. Right, h If you are flying thousands of 160 00:07:56,160 --> 00:07:59,680 Speaker 1: flights a year that have nukes on them, a percentage 161 00:07:59,680 --> 00:08:02,280 Speaker 1: of those bombers are going to crash or are going 162 00:08:02,360 --> 00:08:04,280 Speaker 1: to need to drop their nukes in order to deal 163 00:08:04,320 --> 00:08:06,680 Speaker 1: with some sort of like engine trouble that is going 164 00:08:06,720 --> 00:08:09,520 Speaker 1: to happen. And it does, in fact happen, right, I'm 165 00:08:09,520 --> 00:08:12,240 Speaker 1: gonna guess people are aware that this has happened once 166 00:08:12,360 --> 00:08:15,560 Speaker 1: or twice, generally like a couple there was one off 167 00:08:15,560 --> 00:08:20,480 Speaker 1: like the coast of Spain. The reality is it happened constantly. 168 00:08:20,920 --> 00:08:24,080 Speaker 1: This happens so much more often than you would have 169 00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:27,080 Speaker 1: gett It's fucking shocking how many nukes we just straight 170 00:08:27,160 --> 00:08:30,600 Speaker 1: up lose. LeMay and his successor at the SAC General 171 00:08:30,640 --> 00:08:33,680 Speaker 1: Power considered it a necessity that the US always have 172 00:08:33,880 --> 00:08:36,320 Speaker 1: armed nuclear bombers in the air, and a consequence of 173 00:08:36,360 --> 00:08:38,280 Speaker 1: that is, of course, all these things getting lost. I'm 174 00:08:38,280 --> 00:08:41,360 Speaker 1: gonna provide you with two examples. Operation Reflex was an 175 00:08:41,480 --> 00:08:45,040 Speaker 1: ESSAC training mission to switch crews on ground alert every 176 00:08:45,080 --> 00:08:48,200 Speaker 1: twenty one days. This is kind of the start of 177 00:08:48,240 --> 00:08:50,720 Speaker 1: what allowed. Like, we always have a fleet of bombers 178 00:08:50,720 --> 00:08:53,320 Speaker 1: that are like six to fifteen minutes away from being 179 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:55,520 Speaker 1: in the air. They have a nuke on them, they're 180 00:08:55,559 --> 00:08:57,400 Speaker 1: loaded up and fueled up on the tarmac. They have 181 00:08:57,440 --> 00:08:59,440 Speaker 1: a crew and a bunker nearby that can run onto 182 00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:01,240 Speaker 1: the plane and take off at a moment's notice. Right, 183 00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:03,800 Speaker 1: And we also have I think it's like ten or 184 00:09:03,840 --> 00:09:06,680 Speaker 1: eleven percent of those planes are flying with a bomb 185 00:09:06,679 --> 00:09:08,920 Speaker 1: in them at any given time. Right, That's what operates. 186 00:09:08,960 --> 00:09:11,520 Speaker 1: It starts as a testing plan to see if this 187 00:09:11,559 --> 00:09:14,000 Speaker 1: is feasible, and in July of nineteen fifty seven, we 188 00:09:14,080 --> 00:09:17,560 Speaker 1: make this like the SAC standard Plan each B forty 189 00:09:17,600 --> 00:09:20,880 Speaker 1: seven bomber flying out on reflex overseas or heading home 190 00:09:21,160 --> 00:09:24,559 Speaker 1: carried a six thousand pound four megaton Mk thirty nine 191 00:09:24,679 --> 00:09:29,040 Speaker 1: hydrogen bomb. These are these thermonuclear depth machines. That same month, 192 00:09:29,240 --> 00:09:32,440 Speaker 1: a B forty seven in Texas crashed, killing the four 193 00:09:32,480 --> 00:09:35,280 Speaker 1: man crew. The crash listed the bomber as part of 194 00:09:35,280 --> 00:09:37,839 Speaker 1: the emergency war plan load, but as Kini notes in 195 00:09:37,880 --> 00:09:40,560 Speaker 1: the book fifteen minutes, as of this writing, No nineteen 196 00:09:40,600 --> 00:09:43,240 Speaker 1: fifty seven bomber crash in Texas is included in any 197 00:09:43,280 --> 00:09:48,200 Speaker 1: official document disclosing accents evolving nuclear weapons. And there are 198 00:09:48,240 --> 00:09:50,640 Speaker 1: several of these where, well, we know that plane crashed, 199 00:09:51,120 --> 00:09:53,640 Speaker 1: and based on how it was coded, we know it 200 00:09:53,720 --> 00:09:55,480 Speaker 1: should have had a nuke on it, but they never 201 00:09:55,559 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 1: reported losing a nuke because they covered it up. So 202 00:09:59,480 --> 00:10:02,960 Speaker 1: this new presumably just blew up in Texas and they 203 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:04,240 Speaker 1: kind of they covered it up. 204 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:07,240 Speaker 2: You know, how often are they just being like, oh, whoops, 205 00:10:07,240 --> 00:10:09,600 Speaker 2: it fell off the back of the truck. All off 206 00:10:09,600 --> 00:10:10,360 Speaker 2: the back of the truck. 207 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:12,319 Speaker 1: No, not off a truck. They're falling out a plane. 208 00:10:12,400 --> 00:10:14,679 Speaker 2: Oh so I mean, like, are they being stolen? Like 209 00:10:15,000 --> 00:10:15,839 Speaker 2: are they ever like. 210 00:10:16,400 --> 00:10:18,560 Speaker 1: Not that we know not that we know that there's 211 00:10:18,600 --> 00:10:21,959 Speaker 1: not evidence of that. What's actually happening is much dumber 212 00:10:22,040 --> 00:10:25,600 Speaker 1: than if they like someone stealing a nuke, and scarier, 213 00:10:25,640 --> 00:10:28,560 Speaker 1: to be honest. There are several examples like this, you know, 214 00:10:28,600 --> 00:10:31,160 Speaker 1: where a bomber that we know should have been loaded 215 00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:33,400 Speaker 1: with a nuke crashed and no report was ever made 216 00:10:33,600 --> 00:10:37,520 Speaker 1: of a nuke getting lost. But cover ups weren't always possible. 217 00:10:37,840 --> 00:10:40,880 Speaker 1: The same month that General Power takes over sac command 218 00:10:40,880 --> 00:10:43,360 Speaker 1: from LeMay, who goes on himself become the vice chief 219 00:10:43,360 --> 00:10:45,360 Speaker 1: of Staff and then Chief of Staff or the Air Force, 220 00:10:46,600 --> 00:10:49,840 Speaker 1: a C four cargo plane bound for an air base 221 00:10:49,840 --> 00:10:53,560 Speaker 1: in Morocco with three atom bombs encountered engine trouble between 222 00:10:53,559 --> 00:10:57,520 Speaker 1: Rehoboth Beach and Cape May, New Jersey. The pilot ejected 223 00:10:57,600 --> 00:11:00,440 Speaker 1: two out of three nuclear bombs on his plane to 224 00:11:00,559 --> 00:11:04,160 Speaker 1: lighten the load. These fall in the ocean, and the 225 00:11:04,240 --> 00:11:07,600 Speaker 1: Navy searches for the bombs and doesn't find any of 226 00:11:07,640 --> 00:11:10,079 Speaker 1: them ever, even though the ocean is just one hundred 227 00:11:10,080 --> 00:11:12,120 Speaker 1: and fifty feet deep at some parts of the potential 228 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:15,360 Speaker 1: drop zone. So at like New Treasure questus, yes this 229 00:11:15,520 --> 00:11:18,680 Speaker 1: is dropped. There are folks listeners. If you live in 230 00:11:18,720 --> 00:11:21,280 Speaker 1: the Jersey area. You could be the owner of an 231 00:11:21,400 --> 00:11:24,360 Speaker 1: Mk five atom bomb if you just spend some time 232 00:11:24,480 --> 00:11:25,840 Speaker 1: swimming around in the ocean. 233 00:11:25,920 --> 00:11:26,080 Speaker 3: You know. 234 00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:29,600 Speaker 1: And once you've got a nuke for one thing, you're 235 00:11:29,640 --> 00:11:31,600 Speaker 1: not paying taxes anymore. I'll tell you that much, brother. 236 00:11:33,400 --> 00:11:35,280 Speaker 1: Can you got a lot of You got a lot 237 00:11:35,280 --> 00:11:37,079 Speaker 1: of leverage if you get your if you become a 238 00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:43,400 Speaker 1: nuclear armed state in and of yourself, it always goes well. Yeah, 239 00:11:43,440 --> 00:11:46,840 Speaker 1: so again, both three thousand pound Mk five bombs are missing. 240 00:11:46,840 --> 00:11:49,320 Speaker 1: To this day, these are never found. The number of 241 00:11:49,360 --> 00:11:53,600 Speaker 1: times this happens is fucking shocking. Nineteen fifty seven is 242 00:11:53,640 --> 00:11:55,559 Speaker 1: a key year for our story because it is the 243 00:11:55,679 --> 00:11:58,520 Speaker 1: year that we start being fifteen to thirty minutes away 244 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:01,960 Speaker 1: from nuclear catastrophe at any given time. On August twenty six, 245 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:06,440 Speaker 1: the Kremlin announces their first successful ICBM test. Their new missile, 246 00:12:06,480 --> 00:12:10,000 Speaker 1: the SS six Sapwood, could travel six thousand miles carrying 247 00:12:10,040 --> 00:12:13,800 Speaker 1: a warhead. Soviet premiere Nikita Krushchev bragged could make Europe 248 00:12:13,880 --> 00:12:17,520 Speaker 1: or the United States quote a veritable cemetery. A couple 249 00:12:17,520 --> 00:12:20,520 Speaker 1: of months later, in October, Spudnik entered orbit. If you're 250 00:12:20,559 --> 00:12:23,040 Speaker 1: wondering why that freaked out Americans so much. This is 251 00:12:23,040 --> 00:12:24,880 Speaker 1: one of those things I actually I have a little 252 00:12:24,920 --> 00:12:27,600 Speaker 1: more under empathy for, like why so many people because Oh, 253 00:12:27,640 --> 00:12:30,480 Speaker 1: because they also fired an ICBM right before that. Yeah, 254 00:12:30,600 --> 00:12:35,079 Speaker 1: that's a little scary, Okay, So they invented the ICBM, 255 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:38,240 Speaker 1: they get they have a functional ICBM before we do. 256 00:12:38,280 --> 00:12:41,080 Speaker 1: They have a successful test before we do, not long before, 257 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:43,920 Speaker 1: because between those two events. In September of nineteen fifty seven, 258 00:12:44,120 --> 00:12:48,480 Speaker 1: the u SO, after the Soviets launched their ICBM before Spudnik, 259 00:12:48,640 --> 00:12:52,679 Speaker 1: the US Air Force tests its first Atlas ICBM successfully. 260 00:12:53,120 --> 00:12:55,920 Speaker 1: Now it can't really hit things accurately yet, but the 261 00:12:55,960 --> 00:12:58,160 Speaker 1: idea is you're going to stick a thermonuclear bomb on 262 00:12:58,200 --> 00:13:01,200 Speaker 1: this thing, probably, So it doesn't really if you're off 263 00:13:01,240 --> 00:13:03,440 Speaker 1: by a couple by a mile or two even, Yeah, 264 00:13:03,440 --> 00:13:07,320 Speaker 1: but you'll do some damage. Probably. In November of that year, 265 00:13:07,440 --> 00:13:09,880 Speaker 1: General Power revealed to the public for the first time 266 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:12,199 Speaker 1: that the Air Force was maintaining a fleet of ground 267 00:13:12,240 --> 00:13:15,280 Speaker 1: alert bombers in a permanent state of readiness. Eleven percent 268 00:13:15,280 --> 00:13:17,760 Speaker 1: of the SAC's fleet was always parked on a runway, 269 00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:19,560 Speaker 1: loaded with a live nuke, ready to take off in 270 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:22,120 Speaker 1: less than fifteen minutes, and a certain number of bombers 271 00:13:22,160 --> 00:13:24,160 Speaker 1: were kept up in the air at all times when 272 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:26,679 Speaker 1: they admitted they are bombed up and they don't carry 273 00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:27,800 Speaker 1: bows and arrows. 274 00:13:28,440 --> 00:13:29,960 Speaker 2: Bombed up, bombed up. 275 00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:33,079 Speaker 1: Maybe, Yeah, it sounds like he's because like he's kind 276 00:13:33,080 --> 00:13:37,079 Speaker 1: of horny for these things. Yeah, in this period after 277 00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:39,520 Speaker 1: the ice So the ICBMs exist now, but they're not 278 00:13:39,559 --> 00:13:41,559 Speaker 1: a viable weapons system yet. Right, We've had we have 279 00:13:41,600 --> 00:13:44,560 Speaker 1: our proof of concept, but we don't We don't immediately 280 00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:48,040 Speaker 1: go from testing an ICBM to having them ready to fire, right. 281 00:13:48,080 --> 00:13:49,800 Speaker 1: It takes a little bit of time. You know, that's 282 00:13:49,840 --> 00:13:54,480 Speaker 1: just science. Right, So during this kind of awkward inner 283 00:13:54,559 --> 00:13:57,920 Speaker 1: still period, the actual odds of an accidental nuclear war 284 00:13:57,960 --> 00:14:00,960 Speaker 1: are extremely low. For one reason. The only way to 285 00:14:00,960 --> 00:14:03,319 Speaker 1: deliver an atom bomb is by air, right, I mean, 286 00:14:03,360 --> 00:14:05,320 Speaker 1: you could drive it somewhere, set it off on the ground, 287 00:14:05,360 --> 00:14:07,880 Speaker 1: but really, like realistically you're going to be using like 288 00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:10,920 Speaker 1: a bomber or a tailler's you can't launch it across 289 00:14:10,960 --> 00:14:14,120 Speaker 1: continents yet, right, unless you're flying it. That means that 290 00:14:14,240 --> 00:14:17,120 Speaker 1: you could theoretically, if you send out a bomber fleet 291 00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:19,960 Speaker 1: to start a nuclear war, you could because you're in 292 00:14:20,040 --> 00:14:23,840 Speaker 1: contact with these guys, you could theoretically recall that bomber 293 00:14:23,840 --> 00:14:26,000 Speaker 1: fleet right up to the last moment. You can't do 294 00:14:26,080 --> 00:14:28,360 Speaker 1: that with ICBMs. People think you can. People think you 295 00:14:28,400 --> 00:14:30,800 Speaker 1: can do it with like the sub mounted nukes, we cannot. 296 00:14:31,000 --> 00:14:33,360 Speaker 1: It is not possible once they're launched there heading for 297 00:14:33,360 --> 00:14:36,560 Speaker 1: their targets, right, that's how these things work. But you 298 00:14:36,600 --> 00:14:39,200 Speaker 1: can recall bombers if you can reach them up until 299 00:14:39,240 --> 00:14:42,280 Speaker 1: the last minute, right now, if you can reach them 300 00:14:42,600 --> 00:14:45,000 Speaker 1: is a key part of this, because that presents a 301 00:14:45,000 --> 00:14:47,760 Speaker 1: conundrum to the SAC. This is the fucking late fifties. 302 00:14:48,640 --> 00:14:50,720 Speaker 1: Coms aren't as good as they're going to be. That 303 00:14:50,760 --> 00:14:53,080 Speaker 1: we're starting to figure out stuff that will allow us 304 00:14:53,120 --> 00:14:55,760 Speaker 1: to stay in regular contact, you know, in all sorts 305 00:14:55,760 --> 00:14:58,960 Speaker 1: of situations, but it's not nearly good enough for us 306 00:14:59,000 --> 00:15:01,840 Speaker 1: to gamble the survival of the human race on right. 307 00:15:02,560 --> 00:15:05,640 Speaker 1: And the SAC has another problem, which is that nobody 308 00:15:05,640 --> 00:15:08,440 Speaker 1: outside of their weird little death cult is comfortable yet 309 00:15:08,440 --> 00:15:10,880 Speaker 1: with the idea of nukes being sent off without a 310 00:15:10,880 --> 00:15:13,240 Speaker 1: way to recall them. And while radio code, you know, 311 00:15:13,760 --> 00:15:16,320 Speaker 1: it's just not there's not a great, perfect way to 312 00:15:16,360 --> 00:15:19,160 Speaker 1: guarantee you can reach these bombers. And that's really important. 313 00:15:19,680 --> 00:15:21,920 Speaker 1: And this brings us to one of the most interesting 314 00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:27,080 Speaker 1: innovations in nuclear war and it's honestly the simplest. This 315 00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:31,400 Speaker 1: doesn't require any technology whatsoever, and it's maybe it may 316 00:15:31,400 --> 00:15:33,800 Speaker 1: have saved the world. Right, we may all exist because 317 00:15:33,800 --> 00:15:38,560 Speaker 1: of this. It's called Project fail Safe now rather than 318 00:15:38,600 --> 00:15:42,000 Speaker 1: relying on technology which could fail. The way failsafe worked 319 00:15:42,040 --> 00:15:46,280 Speaker 1: is that all dispatched bombers were under permanent orders to 320 00:15:46,480 --> 00:15:49,960 Speaker 1: return without dropping their payloads, no matter what they were 321 00:15:50,080 --> 00:15:54,080 Speaker 1: ordered to do, unless they were transmitted to GO code. Right. 322 00:15:54,360 --> 00:15:57,920 Speaker 1: The innovation of fail safe isn't that a got This 323 00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:03,120 Speaker 1: is important. The go code does not trigger the bombing, right. Instead, 324 00:16:03,360 --> 00:16:07,240 Speaker 1: the default is in all instances, return home without bombing 325 00:16:07,440 --> 00:16:11,000 Speaker 1: unless you're given the code. And that's a meaningful distinction, right. 326 00:16:11,240 --> 00:16:13,760 Speaker 1: That means there's no room for a bomber public. Well, 327 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 1: they didn't give us the go code, but right over 328 00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:17,880 Speaker 1: the target, should we do it? No, you fly home 329 00:16:17,960 --> 00:16:21,120 Speaker 1: unless you get the code, right, yeah, And that's tech proof. 330 00:16:21,160 --> 00:16:23,560 Speaker 1: It doesn't matter if your coms are out right, and 331 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:26,680 Speaker 1: that means the default assumption is we should err on 332 00:16:26,720 --> 00:16:28,720 Speaker 1: the side of not dropping the bombs. 333 00:16:28,920 --> 00:16:31,920 Speaker 2: Right. No, that seems so obvious in retrospect, but it 334 00:16:32,080 --> 00:16:34,640 Speaker 2: makes sense that that was like literally a technological development. 335 00:16:34,840 --> 00:16:36,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, it was an It was a development by a 336 00:16:36,760 --> 00:16:40,720 Speaker 1: single dude at the Rand Corporation named Albert Wolstetter. He 337 00:16:40,880 --> 00:16:43,560 Speaker 1: visualized failsafe, and again you could argue this guy might 338 00:16:43,640 --> 00:16:44,800 Speaker 1: have saved all of humanity. 339 00:16:44,840 --> 00:16:45,520 Speaker 2: Was doing so. 340 00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:49,320 Speaker 1: Good idea. Thank you, Albert. 341 00:16:50,560 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 2: The opposite of a dead man's switch, you know, yeah, yeah, 342 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:55,800 Speaker 2: it's a it's a I guess, a live man switch. 343 00:16:55,800 --> 00:16:59,720 Speaker 1: I don't know. Speaking of a dead man switched, I 344 00:16:59,800 --> 00:17:03,920 Speaker 1: have one that will launch a nuclear attack unless you 345 00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:07,760 Speaker 1: spend money on the products and services advertise on the show. 346 00:17:08,359 --> 00:17:17,760 Speaker 1: Oh boy, we're back. So we've just hit the point 347 00:17:17,760 --> 00:17:20,800 Speaker 1: where failsafe has been implemented and. 348 00:17:20,760 --> 00:17:22,560 Speaker 2: Which were fit on your knuckles. I'm just going to 349 00:17:22,600 --> 00:17:23,159 Speaker 2: point out. 350 00:17:23,080 --> 00:17:26,240 Speaker 1: Right, Oh actually, yeah, that's a pretty good idea. Yeah yeah, 351 00:17:26,280 --> 00:17:29,120 Speaker 1: I've been meaning to get a knuckle tattoo. So yeah, 352 00:17:29,359 --> 00:17:31,920 Speaker 1: we've now reduced the risk of some guys starting World 353 00:17:31,960 --> 00:17:34,080 Speaker 1: War three because the radio goes out right, which is 354 00:17:34,119 --> 00:17:37,280 Speaker 1: a good thing to do. Now, in February of nineteen 355 00:17:37,320 --> 00:17:40,240 Speaker 1: fifty eight, the Strategic Air Command has another nuclear error, 356 00:17:40,600 --> 00:17:42,880 Speaker 1: a bomber and a fighter wing in Florida. We're doing 357 00:17:42,920 --> 00:17:45,359 Speaker 1: a training mission which for some reason required a trio 358 00:17:45,400 --> 00:17:47,240 Speaker 1: of fighters to try and intercept a pair of B 359 00:17:47,359 --> 00:17:50,480 Speaker 1: forty seven bombers armed with actual one point six megaton 360 00:17:50,680 --> 00:17:54,280 Speaker 1: Mk fifteen nuclear bombs. One of these fighters fucked up 361 00:17:54,320 --> 00:17:57,080 Speaker 1: and crashed into one of the bombers, damaging its engines. 362 00:17:57,480 --> 00:17:59,760 Speaker 1: The bomber had to come in for an emergency landing, 363 00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:02,399 Speaker 1: but the nearest airfield was under construction, and to make 364 00:18:02,440 --> 00:18:04,480 Speaker 1: a long story short, the pilot was worried that when 365 00:18:04,560 --> 00:18:06,680 Speaker 1: landing they would crash into something that would send the 366 00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:09,920 Speaker 1: nuke in their bombay launching forward like a bullet into 367 00:18:09,960 --> 00:18:12,600 Speaker 1: the crew cabin. In order to protect the crew, the 368 00:18:12,640 --> 00:18:16,480 Speaker 1: pilot dropped a nuclear bomb somewhere over the Wasauce Sound, 369 00:18:16,600 --> 00:18:19,520 Speaker 1: east of Savannah, Georgia. It may have been two bombs. 370 00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:22,199 Speaker 1: It's a little unclear to me. These are never found. 371 00:18:22,359 --> 00:18:25,399 Speaker 1: This bomb is never found. It is theoretically still some 372 00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:27,400 Speaker 1: east east of Savannah to this day. 373 00:18:28,440 --> 00:18:31,280 Speaker 2: Oh my god, I'm gonna write terrible fiction about a 374 00:18:31,359 --> 00:18:33,160 Speaker 2: crew of people who go and find these things. 375 00:18:33,280 --> 00:18:35,280 Speaker 1: Go new Cutting, Let's go find up. Let's get us 376 00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:37,480 Speaker 1: a nuke yeah, yeah, we could be the we could 377 00:18:37,480 --> 00:18:40,399 Speaker 1: be at finally a nuclear armed podcast. This is this 378 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:44,879 Speaker 1: is what podcasting has been missing. So it's obviously big 379 00:18:44,920 --> 00:18:47,920 Speaker 1: news that we dropped atomic bombs on our own Georgia, 380 00:18:48,000 --> 00:18:50,480 Speaker 1: not even the one overseas, and the good people of 381 00:18:50,480 --> 00:18:53,000 Speaker 1: that state expected the Air Force to recover the nuke. 382 00:18:53,720 --> 00:18:56,359 Speaker 1: A study of the Air Force press releases around this 383 00:18:56,440 --> 00:18:59,600 Speaker 1: matter is useful. Their first message denounced the jettisoning of 384 00:18:59,680 --> 00:19:02,240 Speaker 1: a portion of a nuclear weapon and added that no 385 00:19:02,280 --> 00:19:04,840 Speaker 1: one knew quote whether the nuclear device landed in the 386 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:09,280 Speaker 1: sea or on land. Great, there's a chance some hillbilly 387 00:19:09,320 --> 00:19:11,879 Speaker 1: has just been passing this nuke down to his kids 388 00:19:11,920 --> 00:19:15,000 Speaker 1: for the last like, that's. 389 00:19:14,800 --> 00:19:16,439 Speaker 2: What I want. Now they'll be like, you take some 390 00:19:16,480 --> 00:19:20,399 Speaker 2: pride in our family. We are incular power. Yeah. 391 00:19:20,480 --> 00:19:23,000 Speaker 1: Now, don't don't touch it too much. I don't really 392 00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:23,679 Speaker 1: know how it works. 393 00:19:24,640 --> 00:19:24,920 Speaker 2: Yeah. 394 00:19:25,000 --> 00:19:27,920 Speaker 1: Now, when they dropped these this bomb or bombs, both 395 00:19:27,960 --> 00:19:31,440 Speaker 1: pilots took coordinates down for where they thought they were 396 00:19:31,520 --> 00:19:34,479 Speaker 1: when they dropped it. But they both write down different 397 00:19:34,520 --> 00:19:37,399 Speaker 1: sets of coordinates, which is a real watermark for the 398 00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:41,200 Speaker 1: competency of our brave boys in the sac. After several 399 00:19:41,280 --> 00:19:43,440 Speaker 1: days of searching with no luck. The Air Force issued 400 00:19:43,440 --> 00:19:46,200 Speaker 1: another press release elaborating that the bomb had been carried 401 00:19:46,200 --> 00:19:51,080 Speaker 1: in transportable condition. This means nothing. The Air Force defined 402 00:19:51,160 --> 00:19:54,680 Speaker 1: that when asked what transportable condition means as a form 403 00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:58,800 Speaker 1: carried for safety reasons, which again means nothing. If you're 404 00:19:58,840 --> 00:20:02,000 Speaker 1: wondering what they might have been trying to avoid saying, 405 00:20:02,200 --> 00:20:05,480 Speaker 1: here's another excerpt from fifteen minutes. Those in Savannah made 406 00:20:05,520 --> 00:20:07,359 Speaker 1: little sense of this warding, but they took it to 407 00:20:07,400 --> 00:20:09,760 Speaker 1: mean that the weapon was perhaps disassembled or in crates, 408 00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:11,960 Speaker 1: or perhaps it shouldn't be considered a weapon at all. 409 00:20:12,240 --> 00:20:15,119 Speaker 1: The second press release, however, vague, nonetheless seems to have 410 00:20:15,119 --> 00:20:17,920 Speaker 1: had the intended effect. It was calming. But then the 411 00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:21,320 Speaker 1: Navy announced that another ship, the USS Bowers, had arrived. 412 00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:23,760 Speaker 1: The Bowers brought with it fourteen more divers and men 413 00:20:23,800 --> 00:20:27,080 Speaker 1: from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit in Cedar Keys, Florida. 414 00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:29,560 Speaker 1: The Air Force explained the stepped up activity by saying 415 00:20:29,560 --> 00:20:32,880 Speaker 1: that the ejective component was a very expensive piece of equipment. 416 00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:34,640 Speaker 1: So the Air Force is like, ah, it's not even 417 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:36,639 Speaker 1: a real bomb. We are sending the bomb squad in 418 00:20:36,680 --> 00:20:39,639 Speaker 1: though there the bomb squad is actually absolutely looking for 419 00:20:39,680 --> 00:20:43,320 Speaker 1: this thing. Trust, this not a functional bomb. Definitely, we 420 00:20:43,359 --> 00:20:46,359 Speaker 1: do fly exclusively with functional bombs permissions like this, but 421 00:20:46,400 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: this one isn't. Right, You're good, Yeah, no, right, yeah, 422 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:50,760 Speaker 1: I mean and they did sometimes they would have like 423 00:20:50,800 --> 00:20:53,119 Speaker 1: the physile material outside of the bomb so that when 424 00:20:53,119 --> 00:20:55,679 Speaker 1: they dropped it, they're just but that didn't happen in 425 00:20:55,720 --> 00:20:57,399 Speaker 1: a lot of cases, and we don't know that it 426 00:20:57,440 --> 00:20:58,280 Speaker 1: happened in this case. 427 00:20:58,560 --> 00:21:02,199 Speaker 2: What is their argument for, Like, clearly a dummy that 428 00:21:02,680 --> 00:21:06,760 Speaker 2: is exactly the same size, no weight, is the only 429 00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:10,240 Speaker 2: thing that makes sense. I can't understand the argument. 430 00:21:10,680 --> 00:21:13,760 Speaker 1: Lemayan powers want them to be training with real nukes, 431 00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:16,280 Speaker 1: and they want them to be testing those nukes regularly 432 00:21:16,359 --> 00:21:18,600 Speaker 1: to make sure they will go off at a moment's notice. 433 00:21:19,920 --> 00:21:21,680 Speaker 1: That is very important to them. 434 00:21:21,760 --> 00:21:23,560 Speaker 2: I'm going to invite him to a paintball game with 435 00:21:23,840 --> 00:21:25,120 Speaker 2: AR fifteen, right, what. 436 00:21:25,440 --> 00:21:28,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, it's crazy, it's crazy, But this is like, 437 00:21:28,680 --> 00:21:32,000 Speaker 1: there's this is super important to both LeMay and Power. Right, 438 00:21:32,040 --> 00:21:33,919 Speaker 1: we're kind of in this period where they're transitioning at 439 00:21:33,920 --> 00:21:37,440 Speaker 1: the SAC So by this point it should be clear 440 00:21:37,480 --> 00:21:40,280 Speaker 1: to you we don't know and never will know how 441 00:21:40,320 --> 00:21:46,159 Speaker 1: many nuclear bombs are government lost on US soil. But 442 00:21:46,280 --> 00:21:49,680 Speaker 1: there's a couple at least just start of lying around. 443 00:21:50,119 --> 00:21:54,360 Speaker 1: So again, folks, get your metal detectors out. Yeah, yeah, 444 00:21:54,720 --> 00:21:58,080 Speaker 1: have some fun with it. What could go wrong? 445 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:00,440 Speaker 2: That's what we call our scavenger. 446 00:22:00,240 --> 00:22:03,439 Speaker 1: What could go wrong? No, you asked earlier about stealing 447 00:22:03,520 --> 00:22:07,320 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, and I don't. I've seen no evidence that 448 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:10,879 Speaker 1: that happened. But it could have very easily. It was 449 00:22:10,920 --> 00:22:14,760 Speaker 1: for a long time startlingly easy to hijack a nuclear weapon. 450 00:22:15,760 --> 00:22:18,679 Speaker 1: The only thing stopping it from happening, if indeed it 451 00:22:18,800 --> 00:22:20,680 Speaker 1: was stopped from happening, is that no one was ever 452 00:22:20,720 --> 00:22:23,720 Speaker 1: crazy enough to try. In her book Nuclear War, Annie 453 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:26,480 Speaker 1: Jacobson tells a story about a visit a Los Alamos 454 00:22:26,480 --> 00:22:30,520 Speaker 1: scientist named Harold Agnew paid to NATO base in Europe 455 00:22:30,520 --> 00:22:33,119 Speaker 1: in December of nineteen fifty nine. This was one of 456 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:35,520 Speaker 1: the bases where US nukes were in NATO hands, as 457 00:22:35,520 --> 00:22:39,000 Speaker 1: they are to this day. Jacobson writes, quote, during the 458 00:22:39,040 --> 00:22:41,240 Speaker 1: trip to the NATO Bass, Agnew noticed something that made 459 00:22:41,280 --> 00:22:44,760 Speaker 1: him wary. I observed four f eighty four f aircraft 460 00:22:44,880 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 1: sitting on the end of a runway. Each was carrying 461 00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:49,359 Speaker 1: two Mark seven nuclear gravity bombs. He wrote in a 462 00:22:49,400 --> 00:22:52,480 Speaker 1: document declassified in twenty twenty three. What this meant was 463 00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:55,080 Speaker 1: that custody of the Mark sevens was under the watchful 464 00:22:55,119 --> 00:22:57,720 Speaker 1: eye of one very young US Army private armed with 465 00:22:57,760 --> 00:23:00,920 Speaker 1: an M one rifle with eight rounds of ammunition. Agnew 466 00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:04,200 Speaker 1: told his colleagues the only safeguard against unauthorized use of 467 00:23:04,200 --> 00:23:07,199 Speaker 1: a nuclear bomb was this single gi surrounded by a 468 00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:10,160 Speaker 1: large number of foreign troops on foreign territory, with thousands 469 00:23:10,160 --> 00:23:12,960 Speaker 1: of Soviet troops just miles away. Maybe a bad idea, 470 00:23:13,040 --> 00:23:14,919 Speaker 1: Like I feel like I've got a decent chance of 471 00:23:14,920 --> 00:23:18,080 Speaker 1: stealing a nuke from that guy, right, I one eighteen 472 00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:23,879 Speaker 1: year old with a rifle like like those odds, And 473 00:23:23,960 --> 00:23:26,080 Speaker 1: this is all part of the whole. All that matters 474 00:23:26,119 --> 00:23:29,200 Speaker 1: is bombers. All that matters is the nukes, right Because 475 00:23:30,119 --> 00:23:32,040 Speaker 1: one of the things that guys like LeMay and Power 476 00:23:32,080 --> 00:23:33,480 Speaker 1: are doing that the ESAC is doing is like, we 477 00:23:33,480 --> 00:23:35,119 Speaker 1: don't need to be putting money in the infantry. We 478 00:23:35,119 --> 00:23:37,200 Speaker 1: don't need to have like dudes on the ground doing 479 00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:40,399 Speaker 1: stuff like watching our nukes and planes. That's a waste 480 00:23:40,440 --> 00:23:43,359 Speaker 1: of resources. More nukes, more planes, less guards. 481 00:23:44,840 --> 00:23:47,880 Speaker 2: This is like how they're treating AI like. It's just like, yes, 482 00:23:47,920 --> 00:23:50,400 Speaker 2: we don't need anything else, Yes we just need this. 483 00:23:50,480 --> 00:23:53,600 Speaker 1: No guardrails, no governors, make it illegal to put any 484 00:23:53,600 --> 00:23:57,399 Speaker 1: safety measures in Fuck it now. After returning home, this 485 00:23:57,520 --> 00:23:59,520 Speaker 1: is actually how we get the nuclear football. It takes 486 00:23:59,520 --> 00:24:01,600 Speaker 1: a while, but this is what starts that process because 487 00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:04,480 Speaker 1: once he gets home, having this startling moment, Agnew pairs 488 00:24:04,520 --> 00:24:07,120 Speaker 1: up with an engineer at Sandia Laboratories and they try 489 00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:09,760 Speaker 1: to figure out how to insert an electronic lock into 490 00:24:09,800 --> 00:24:12,720 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons that would prevent a rando from arming a 491 00:24:12,760 --> 00:24:15,800 Speaker 1: bomb they gained access to. This eventually led to a 492 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,760 Speaker 1: lock and coded switch, which required a three digit code 493 00:24:18,760 --> 00:24:20,840 Speaker 1: to be entered to arm the weapon. It would take 494 00:24:20,920 --> 00:24:23,840 Speaker 1: several years until the Kennedy administration for the President to 495 00:24:23,960 --> 00:24:26,640 Speaker 1: actually order these locks placed on bombs. Right, But that's 496 00:24:26,680 --> 00:24:29,640 Speaker 1: where this leads, right, that's why we get the nuclear 497 00:24:29,640 --> 00:24:31,959 Speaker 1: football in the system we have now where you have 498 00:24:32,000 --> 00:24:35,000 Speaker 1: to use codes to activate the ability to deploy these weapons. 499 00:24:35,040 --> 00:24:35,240 Speaker 3: Right. 500 00:24:35,480 --> 00:24:38,600 Speaker 1: That starts with Agnew realizing like, oh, fuck, someone can 501 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:42,159 Speaker 1: just take these There's like a kid standing in a 502 00:24:42,200 --> 00:24:48,960 Speaker 1: field with a rifle and there's four nukes. Shit, eight 503 00:24:49,000 --> 00:24:51,720 Speaker 1: fucking bullets. At least give him another couple of clips. 504 00:24:51,840 --> 00:24:56,840 Speaker 2: Jesus Christ, totally send a unit of people you hate first, 505 00:24:56,840 --> 00:24:57,280 Speaker 2: and then. 506 00:24:57,440 --> 00:25:00,440 Speaker 1: Jesus, yes, send more guys. Fuck it, there had to 507 00:25:00,520 --> 00:25:04,240 Speaker 1: be more eighteen year olds. My god, I'm getting ahead 508 00:25:04,240 --> 00:25:06,960 Speaker 1: of myself here. Because we don't immediately put the it 509 00:25:07,000 --> 00:25:09,280 Speaker 1: takes some time to figure out how to build these locks. Right, 510 00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:12,959 Speaker 1: There are two key inventions from the late nineteen fifties 511 00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:16,240 Speaker 1: that help set the doomsday device into motion. The first 512 00:25:16,280 --> 00:25:18,800 Speaker 1: is what we'll spend the least time discussing in these episodes, 513 00:25:18,840 --> 00:25:21,200 Speaker 1: and it's the distributed system of radar stations in the 514 00:25:21,200 --> 00:25:23,720 Speaker 1: middle of the ocean and other inaccessible points that first 515 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:27,560 Speaker 1: provided us with an effective early warning system of Soviet attack. Obviously, 516 00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:29,760 Speaker 1: the Soviets are building their own versions of this too, right, 517 00:25:29,840 --> 00:25:33,280 Speaker 1: but the early warning systems right, These aren't a major 518 00:25:33,359 --> 00:25:36,000 Speaker 1: topic of these episodes, because just wanting to know if 519 00:25:36,040 --> 00:25:38,359 Speaker 1: someone's about to murder you isn't really fucked up in 520 00:25:38,359 --> 00:25:41,840 Speaker 1: the same way as, for example, building twelve thousand nuclear weapons. 521 00:25:42,040 --> 00:25:44,320 Speaker 1: But all of these early warning systems are flawed and 522 00:25:44,359 --> 00:25:46,840 Speaker 1: capable of generating false positives, and in fact, we have 523 00:25:47,040 --> 00:25:51,120 Speaker 1: both us and the USSR have several near nuclear catastrophes 524 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:54,879 Speaker 1: because we get false positives, like one of these radar 525 00:25:54,920 --> 00:25:57,960 Speaker 1: installations thinks it sees missiles coming in or thinks it 526 00:25:58,000 --> 00:26:00,879 Speaker 1: sees bombers coming in, and its problems. 527 00:26:00,560 --> 00:26:03,760 Speaker 2: Right, and it's like geese or some shit, right right, right. 528 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:06,720 Speaker 1: All these early warning systems are flawed, you know that, 529 00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:10,040 Speaker 1: And that's still the case to this day, right, And 530 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:13,280 Speaker 1: so it's both understandable that you'd want to have these, 531 00:26:13,640 --> 00:26:15,520 Speaker 1: but also the fact that these are flawed, and the 532 00:26:15,560 --> 00:26:19,879 Speaker 1: fact that our strategy increasingly becomes launch on warn moves 533 00:26:19,920 --> 00:26:23,520 Speaker 1: us a lot closer to midnight right. So, by far, 534 00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:26,680 Speaker 1: the most influential move from an approaching the apocalypse point 535 00:26:26,680 --> 00:26:29,720 Speaker 1: of view was the deployment of ICBMs. These made it 536 00:26:29,760 --> 00:26:32,399 Speaker 1: possible to launch nuclear weapons in a way that could 537 00:26:32,440 --> 00:26:36,399 Speaker 1: not be recalled. There was and is no fail safe 538 00:26:36,480 --> 00:26:40,480 Speaker 1: for ICBMs. The idea that we can cancel them is 539 00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:44,040 Speaker 1: just disinformation. If we or anyone else launches an ICBM, 540 00:26:44,280 --> 00:26:47,040 Speaker 1: they are almost impossible to stop. You can only really 541 00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:49,359 Speaker 1: stop them by shooting them down, and we're terrible at it. 542 00:26:49,520 --> 00:26:53,679 Speaker 1: Right there, we have this thing, the bullet basically that 543 00:26:53,720 --> 00:26:56,479 Speaker 1: we use to shoot them down and it works about 544 00:26:56,480 --> 00:26:59,080 Speaker 1: half the time in tests, and we have like forty 545 00:26:59,080 --> 00:27:03,080 Speaker 1: four of them. 546 00:27:03,320 --> 00:27:06,120 Speaker 2: Yeah, i'd want more magazines than like, i'd probably want 547 00:27:06,119 --> 00:27:08,560 Speaker 2: to bullets is enough if it's that's not a lot 548 00:27:08,760 --> 00:27:11,640 Speaker 2: you have to stop the end of the world. Here's 549 00:27:11,640 --> 00:27:13,280 Speaker 2: a magazine and a half of bullets. 550 00:27:13,280 --> 00:27:16,040 Speaker 1: The enemy it has three thousand missiles or something like that. 551 00:27:16,320 --> 00:27:19,159 Speaker 2: Yeah, so good luck private. 552 00:27:20,040 --> 00:27:22,920 Speaker 1: Now our first ICBM is kind of a piece of shit. 553 00:27:23,000 --> 00:27:24,960 Speaker 1: The only good thing about the Atlas C, which is 554 00:27:25,000 --> 00:27:28,280 Speaker 1: declared operational in September of nineteen fifty nine, is that 555 00:27:28,359 --> 00:27:30,600 Speaker 1: it can't be kept fueled for long periods of time. 556 00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:33,119 Speaker 1: It has to be fueled right before launch, something to 557 00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:34,920 Speaker 1: do with the kind of fuel that they're using right, 558 00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:37,960 Speaker 1: which means that you can't have these things ready to 559 00:27:38,000 --> 00:27:39,720 Speaker 1: go in a matter of minutes, you know, like you 560 00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:43,159 Speaker 1: need more lead time to do that. Atlases are stored 561 00:27:43,160 --> 00:27:46,199 Speaker 1: above ground. Also, we're starting to build hardened silos, that 562 00:27:46,320 --> 00:27:49,160 Speaker 1: is the plan, but those are not constructed yet. US 563 00:27:49,280 --> 00:27:51,440 Speaker 1: war planners were worried that the USSR would be able 564 00:27:51,480 --> 00:27:54,040 Speaker 1: to see our arsenal because we've got these ICBMs just 565 00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:57,440 Speaker 1: parked out like on bases and stuff, and they are 566 00:27:57,480 --> 00:28:00,280 Speaker 1: the Soviets are a They have you know, survey lens 567 00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:02,119 Speaker 1: and stuff. They are able to see them. But this 568 00:28:02,200 --> 00:28:06,119 Speaker 1: also causes another near calamity because the Soviets don't assume 569 00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:07,840 Speaker 1: that we just have these things parked in the open 570 00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:10,600 Speaker 1: because we're not finished building silos. They assume we had 571 00:28:10,640 --> 00:28:12,239 Speaker 1: them in the open because we plan to use them 572 00:28:12,240 --> 00:28:15,639 Speaker 1: as a first strike weapon, right right, So this is 573 00:28:15,680 --> 00:28:20,000 Speaker 1: another thing that like ramps up the paranoia between everybody 574 00:28:20,200 --> 00:28:22,679 Speaker 1: because the Atlas was such a shit weapon system and 575 00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:25,520 Speaker 1: it is a bad ICBM. By the nineteen fifty nine, 576 00:28:25,560 --> 00:28:27,800 Speaker 1: the US was already hard at work at its replacement, 577 00:28:28,000 --> 00:28:31,080 Speaker 1: the Minuteman. This was a missile with a stable fuel 578 00:28:31,119 --> 00:28:33,640 Speaker 1: mixture that could be stored for long periods of time 579 00:28:33,720 --> 00:28:36,439 Speaker 1: and launch ready conditions, so you can have a minute 580 00:28:36,440 --> 00:28:38,120 Speaker 1: man ready to fire. And in fact, it's called a 581 00:28:38,120 --> 00:28:40,280 Speaker 1: minute man because you can literally from the moment you 582 00:28:40,280 --> 00:28:41,840 Speaker 1: get the order, you can have it in the air 583 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:46,520 Speaker 1: in a minute or less. Right again, they're just starting 584 00:28:46,640 --> 00:28:49,760 Speaker 1: to explore this technology. This is very new and they 585 00:28:49,760 --> 00:28:52,520 Speaker 1: don't have the kinks out right, which is a problem 586 00:28:52,600 --> 00:28:54,680 Speaker 1: because they're going to be immediately putting nukes on these 587 00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:59,080 Speaker 1: things and putting them underground. So there's a whole aspect 588 00:28:59,120 --> 00:29:00,560 Speaker 1: of they have to figure out. None of this is 589 00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:03,280 Speaker 1: immediately obvious, right, how this is going to work, how 590 00:29:03,400 --> 00:29:05,920 Speaker 1: nuclear silos are going to work, how our warning system 591 00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:08,000 Speaker 1: will work, how these things will be triggered to fire 592 00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:10,680 Speaker 1: under what conditions? Right, It is important to remember there's 593 00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:14,040 Speaker 1: no locks on these missiles yet, right, So every minute 594 00:29:14,120 --> 00:29:18,760 Speaker 1: man is stored launch ready and every minute on silo 595 00:29:19,880 --> 00:29:22,120 Speaker 1: no locks at all. Right, Well, there's a lock in 596 00:29:22,120 --> 00:29:25,760 Speaker 1: that in order to fire it. So you have you 597 00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:28,400 Speaker 1: have like these two man teams and like a command bunker, 598 00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:32,320 Speaker 1: and each of these two man teams can launch ten missiles, right, 599 00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:34,440 Speaker 1: that are each held in separate silos that are like 600 00:29:34,480 --> 00:29:36,480 Speaker 1: a decent distance from each other. So you can't stop 601 00:29:36,480 --> 00:29:38,200 Speaker 1: them all if you nuke them, right, if you nuke 602 00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:41,520 Speaker 1: the silos, that's one of the reasons. So each two 603 00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:44,960 Speaker 1: man team, if they if both men turn a key 604 00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:47,880 Speaker 1: at the same time, it will fire the missile. Right, 605 00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:50,840 Speaker 1: And then as we'll talk about the it will start 606 00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:53,160 Speaker 1: a process of firing all of the other missiles. So 607 00:29:53,200 --> 00:29:58,440 Speaker 1: that means two guys have the ability if they both 608 00:29:58,440 --> 00:30:02,200 Speaker 1: decide to turn a key to fire ten nuclear missiles 609 00:30:02,520 --> 00:30:04,520 Speaker 1: across the world into Russia. 610 00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:07,280 Speaker 2: Right, yeah, or one guy who like, are they in 611 00:30:07,320 --> 00:30:08,880 Speaker 2: the same place? Or the keys next week show the 612 00:30:08,960 --> 00:30:10,520 Speaker 2: like in movies because in which guys it's like that's 613 00:30:10,600 --> 00:30:12,360 Speaker 2: or one guy beats up his front. 614 00:30:12,440 --> 00:30:14,480 Speaker 1: That's a great that's a great point you brought up, 615 00:30:14,520 --> 00:30:16,600 Speaker 1: because the Air Force did consider this, right that this 616 00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:18,680 Speaker 1: is an immediate problem as soon as they start planning this. 617 00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:20,680 Speaker 1: What if a crazy person winds up in a silo, 618 00:30:20,720 --> 00:30:22,360 Speaker 1: would he just be able to start World War three 619 00:30:22,360 --> 00:30:24,600 Speaker 1: on his own? And the answer is no, because the 620 00:30:24,640 --> 00:30:26,560 Speaker 1: Air Force comes up with a brilliant deterrent to that 621 00:30:26,640 --> 00:30:27,280 Speaker 1: kind of behavior. 622 00:30:27,320 --> 00:30:27,720 Speaker 3: Margaret. 623 00:30:28,080 --> 00:30:31,200 Speaker 1: Both guys in the silo have guns and they're separated 624 00:30:31,200 --> 00:30:38,440 Speaker 1: from bulletproof glass, so they're just ready to go and say, yeah, 625 00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:40,720 Speaker 1: this way, one guy can't threaten to shoot the other 626 00:30:40,720 --> 00:30:42,640 Speaker 1: guy if he doesn't launch a missng right, Like, that's 627 00:30:42,680 --> 00:30:44,720 Speaker 1: literally the plan is like we'll give both guns and 628 00:30:44,720 --> 00:30:46,960 Speaker 1: put them behind bulletprook glass. It's fine. 629 00:30:47,040 --> 00:30:50,440 Speaker 2: Also, it's like people can hot wire cars, right, this 630 00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:52,520 Speaker 2: is an electrical system on some level. 631 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:55,520 Speaker 1: Oh, it's so much worse than that, Margaret. 632 00:30:55,800 --> 00:30:58,280 Speaker 2: Okay, I feel like you could probably figure out a 633 00:30:58,280 --> 00:31:02,240 Speaker 2: way to give the positives signal over this electrical wire. 634 00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:04,720 Speaker 1: It's good that you bring that up. That's what we're 635 00:31:04,720 --> 00:31:06,440 Speaker 1: going to be talking about a lot of the rest 636 00:31:06,440 --> 00:31:09,040 Speaker 1: of this episode, because this is so much worse than 637 00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:13,040 Speaker 1: you're guessing. So another issue with the Minuteman program is 638 00:31:13,080 --> 00:31:16,560 Speaker 1: that because of some errors and how they construct this thing, 639 00:31:16,840 --> 00:31:20,640 Speaker 1: they basically make what is potentially an automatic doomsdate device. 640 00:31:21,200 --> 00:31:24,240 Speaker 1: This is not known by Air Force planners when they 641 00:31:24,280 --> 00:31:28,000 Speaker 1: start putting this stuff out and constructing these silos and 642 00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:29,480 Speaker 1: putting out the plans of how they're going to use it, 643 00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:31,360 Speaker 1: because they don't like thinking about this sort of thing. 644 00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: We only know about the immediate, the initial problems with 645 00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:37,640 Speaker 1: the Minuteman system because of a confessional that was written 646 00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:39,720 Speaker 1: in two thousand and eight by one of the architects 647 00:31:39,760 --> 00:31:43,640 Speaker 1: of our nuclear war infrastructure, John H. Rubel, and Rubel 648 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:46,520 Speaker 1: is he's both a hero and a victim in this story. 649 00:31:46,560 --> 00:31:48,320 Speaker 1: He's one of these guys who may have saved all 650 00:31:48,360 --> 00:31:50,240 Speaker 1: of our lives because of the story about to tell, 651 00:31:50,440 --> 00:31:53,720 Speaker 1: but he also is an integral part of building this system. 652 00:31:54,040 --> 00:31:56,760 Speaker 1: Born in nineteen twenty to a wealthy Jewish German family 653 00:31:56,800 --> 00:31:59,640 Speaker 1: in Chicago. Rubelle moved to Los Angeles as a kid 654 00:31:59,680 --> 00:32:03,160 Speaker 1: after his father died. He graduated as an engineer from Caltech. 655 00:32:03,200 --> 00:32:06,240 Speaker 1: In nineteen forty two, his older brother died in action 656 00:32:06,360 --> 00:32:08,640 Speaker 1: fighting the Nazis, and Rebel was inspired to do his 657 00:32:08,680 --> 00:32:11,000 Speaker 1: bit for the war by moving to Schenectady with his 658 00:32:11,080 --> 00:32:14,320 Speaker 1: wife and becoming a junior engineer at GOE. After the war, 659 00:32:14,360 --> 00:32:16,880 Speaker 1: he moved back to Los Angeles to work for Lockheed Martin. 660 00:32:17,280 --> 00:32:20,360 Speaker 1: By nineteen fifty six, Rubel was a successful executives at 661 00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:24,880 Speaker 1: Hughes Electronics, directing their avionics business. That's Howard Hughes's company right. 662 00:32:25,280 --> 00:32:27,800 Speaker 1: He was featured in an ad by his employer which 663 00:32:27,800 --> 00:32:31,320 Speaker 1: described him as America's new kind of man. This meant 664 00:32:31,360 --> 00:32:33,640 Speaker 1: he was an expert and a successful professional in a 665 00:32:33,640 --> 00:32:36,320 Speaker 1: field that had not existed just a couple years earlier, 666 00:32:36,480 --> 00:32:40,040 Speaker 1: defense electronics. And from that ad at Hughes, we have 667 00:32:40,080 --> 00:32:41,960 Speaker 1: twenty seven hundred of these men in our research and 668 00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:45,120 Speaker 1: development laboratories, men like John H. Rubell, brought together from 669 00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:47,280 Speaker 1: all over the country to solve urgent new problems of 670 00:32:47,360 --> 00:32:50,440 Speaker 1: national defense. They have already successfully carried out developments that 671 00:32:50,520 --> 00:32:53,120 Speaker 1: rank among the most formidable scientific achievements of our time, 672 00:32:53,360 --> 00:32:55,080 Speaker 1: and the work they have done is so basic, it 673 00:32:55,200 --> 00:32:58,160 Speaker 1: is already contributing vitally to the peaceful use of electronics. 674 00:32:58,760 --> 00:33:00,400 Speaker 1: And Soviey's going to show you the ad just because 675 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:02,240 Speaker 1: I want everyone watching the video to see what a 676 00:33:02,320 --> 00:33:04,200 Speaker 1: thirty six year old man looked like in the mid 677 00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:10,000 Speaker 1: nineteen fifties. Look at those crows feet. That's what you 678 00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:14,520 Speaker 1: get when you're just consuming led every day, just puffing 679 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:19,719 Speaker 1: it right off the back of a car. It's beautiful stuff. Wow. Yeah. 680 00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:22,720 Speaker 1: So anyway, three years after this photo was taken, in 681 00:33:22,760 --> 00:33:25,720 Speaker 1: early nineteen fifty nine, Rubel left Hughes Aircraft to become 682 00:33:25,760 --> 00:33:28,800 Speaker 1: the Assistant Director of Research and Engineering for Strategic Weapons 683 00:33:28,840 --> 00:33:31,880 Speaker 1: over at the Pentagon. He would receive several promotions over 684 00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:34,760 Speaker 1: the next four years, becoming the sole Deputy and Assistant 685 00:33:34,800 --> 00:33:37,920 Speaker 1: Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in nineteen sixty one. 686 00:33:38,040 --> 00:33:42,120 Speaker 1: He is a very highly placed civilian within our military 687 00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:46,840 Speaker 1: research and defense infrastructure. Right This rapid advance was because 688 00:33:46,840 --> 00:33:48,720 Speaker 1: he was the only guy at the Pentagon who was 689 00:33:48,720 --> 00:33:50,840 Speaker 1: at all concerned about whether or not we might be 690 00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:54,240 Speaker 1: about to kill the whole planet accidentally. In nineteen fifty nine, 691 00:33:54,320 --> 00:33:57,440 Speaker 1: he starts sitting down for presentations by the Air Force, 692 00:33:57,680 --> 00:34:00,360 Speaker 1: because the Air Force, as they're getting ready to deploy 693 00:34:00,400 --> 00:34:02,800 Speaker 1: the Minute Man, they have this missile designed, and they 694 00:34:02,840 --> 00:34:06,920 Speaker 1: have these silos under construction, but they're not operational yet. 695 00:34:07,120 --> 00:34:08,839 Speaker 1: And so the Air Force is sitting down with high 696 00:34:08,920 --> 00:34:12,560 Speaker 1: ranking civilian DoD employees and explaining all their different nuclear 697 00:34:12,560 --> 00:34:17,080 Speaker 1: retaliation systems, including Minuteman. According to Rubel, he has conversations 698 00:34:17,080 --> 00:34:20,480 Speaker 1: with a number of military officers and he comes to 699 00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:24,040 Speaker 1: realize that their primary fear is a fatal surprise attack, 700 00:34:24,320 --> 00:34:28,720 Speaker 1: right and if an adversary again. The logic the military 701 00:34:28,760 --> 00:34:31,280 Speaker 1: has is that if an adversary thinks they can survive 702 00:34:32,600 --> 00:34:35,239 Speaker 1: launching a surprise attack against us, they might do it. 703 00:34:35,400 --> 00:34:37,400 Speaker 1: So the only way to avoid a nuclear war is 704 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:39,960 Speaker 1: to have quote first strike capability and the way to 705 00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:46,040 Speaker 1: use it aka launch on warning quote from Rubel's piece. Consider, however, 706 00:34:46,120 --> 00:34:50,640 Speaker 1: launch on warning almost necessitates an automated response. The electronic 707 00:34:50,680 --> 00:34:53,359 Speaker 1: warning signal itself in the scenario would trigger our first 708 00:34:53,400 --> 00:34:55,160 Speaker 1: strike missiles, many of them ready to go in a 709 00:34:55,200 --> 00:34:57,719 Speaker 1: minute or so. The will to use the strategy would 710 00:34:57,719 --> 00:35:02,040 Speaker 1: require no high level decision making or intervaent. Now, fuck, 711 00:35:02,200 --> 00:35:05,840 Speaker 1: this is extremely dangerous. And this is the thing that 712 00:35:05,960 --> 00:35:08,719 Speaker 1: leads to the minute Man. Right, And when Rubel talks 713 00:35:08,719 --> 00:35:10,880 Speaker 1: about the minute Man, he's referring to both a single 714 00:35:10,960 --> 00:35:13,440 Speaker 1: missile and quote to the aggregate of more than a 715 00:35:13,520 --> 00:35:16,160 Speaker 1: thousand of them, comprising a system of missiles and control 716 00:35:16,239 --> 00:35:18,880 Speaker 1: centers spread across hundreds of miles of prairie lands in 717 00:35:18,920 --> 00:35:22,279 Speaker 1: states like North Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. Right, that's what 718 00:35:22,360 --> 00:35:24,520 Speaker 1: the Minuteman system is. It's about a thousand of these 719 00:35:24,560 --> 00:35:27,800 Speaker 1: missiles split up into groups of like ten and fifty 720 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:30,720 Speaker 1: and spread out all over these kind of plane states. 721 00:35:30,800 --> 00:35:32,480 Speaker 2: Right, that makes sense. 722 00:35:33,200 --> 00:35:36,120 Speaker 1: Yeah, minute Man was not yet an effect. Right, that 723 00:35:36,120 --> 00:35:38,960 Speaker 1: doesn't happen until sixty one. But two aspects of the program, 724 00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:41,160 Speaker 1: the wide dispersal of missile silos and the fact that 725 00:35:41,200 --> 00:35:43,799 Speaker 1: each silo is hardened to withstand anything but a direct 726 00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:47,720 Speaker 1: nuclear hit, came from suggestions made by RAND thinkers. Rubel 727 00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:50,279 Speaker 1: makes the important point that all these defense nerds and 728 00:35:50,280 --> 00:35:52,640 Speaker 1: all the high ranking Air Force officers behind these plans 729 00:35:52,920 --> 00:35:57,200 Speaker 1: are only concerned in using automation to guarantee that we 730 00:35:57,239 --> 00:35:59,640 Speaker 1: would be able to fire our nukes if the government 731 00:35:59,719 --> 00:36:03,719 Speaker 1: was to he writes, quote equally important considerations such as 732 00:36:03,760 --> 00:36:06,400 Speaker 1: flexibility of command and control of these weapons, provisions to 733 00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:10,000 Speaker 1: prevent unauthorized or accidental launch, design provisions to ensure the 734 00:36:10,040 --> 00:36:13,040 Speaker 1: malfunction or failure of a critical component would not result 735 00:36:13,080 --> 00:36:16,359 Speaker 1: in a missile launch or some comparably dreadful catastrophe were 736 00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:17,839 Speaker 1: treated little or not at all. 737 00:36:18,960 --> 00:36:21,800 Speaker 2: Right, I was expecting this sense to end very differently. 738 00:36:22,480 --> 00:36:28,279 Speaker 1: It's unethical and wrong to even try to delay this 739 00:36:28,360 --> 00:36:31,239 Speaker 1: system and make it safer, because anything that you do 740 00:36:31,920 --> 00:36:35,880 Speaker 1: to like make the Minuteman system less dangerous is reducing 741 00:36:35,920 --> 00:36:39,440 Speaker 1: its automation, right, which is increasing the odds that we 742 00:36:39,560 --> 00:36:43,960 Speaker 1: don't fire back if we're all killed. And that's unacceptable, right, 743 00:36:44,360 --> 00:36:46,680 Speaker 1: partly because the game theory thing is that they need 744 00:36:46,719 --> 00:36:49,560 Speaker 1: to know that even if they kill a president and 745 00:36:50,200 --> 00:36:54,080 Speaker 1: whoever comes after that, yeah, they still lose too. As 746 00:36:54,080 --> 00:36:56,719 Speaker 1: a result, all these officers get extremely angry when people 747 00:36:56,719 --> 00:36:59,120 Speaker 1: are like, well, but like, are you not worried about 748 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:02,600 Speaker 1: maybe something going wrong and the missiles all launching accidentally, 749 00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:04,160 Speaker 1: And they're like, well, that's not nearly as scary as 750 00:37:04,160 --> 00:37:07,120 Speaker 1: the missile's not launching, you know, that really is how 751 00:37:07,120 --> 00:37:09,640 Speaker 1: all these guys are thinking and you know who else 752 00:37:09,640 --> 00:37:10,160 Speaker 1: thinks that way? 753 00:37:10,200 --> 00:37:13,320 Speaker 2: Margaret, Well, is it the life Fest? 754 00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:17,640 Speaker 1: Yes? Yes, the makers of the new Life Fest get 755 00:37:17,680 --> 00:37:20,839 Speaker 1: one today, you know, get two, get three, get one 756 00:37:20,880 --> 00:37:23,120 Speaker 1: for the whole family. You know, everyone should have one 757 00:37:23,120 --> 00:37:27,280 Speaker 1: of these vests. A society where everyone's wearing a suicide 758 00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:29,239 Speaker 1: vest at all times is a polite society. 759 00:37:29,840 --> 00:37:31,520 Speaker 2: Probably, That's what everyone says. 760 00:37:31,920 --> 00:37:37,840 Speaker 1: We'll see what happens, you know, We'll see what happens 761 00:37:41,040 --> 00:37:44,960 Speaker 1: and we're back. Yeah, Margaret, how you take in this revelation? 762 00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:49,799 Speaker 2: I you know, okay, so I can't remember we talked 763 00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:52,000 Speaker 2: about on mic or not, but we talked about the 764 00:37:52,320 --> 00:37:57,239 Speaker 2: dark forest theory and the yeah, the books I can't 765 00:37:57,239 --> 00:37:57,960 Speaker 2: remember the name of. 766 00:37:58,320 --> 00:38:01,200 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, by the that Chinese sci fi 767 00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,560 Speaker 1: author about yeah yeah yeah. The dark forest theory. Folks, 768 00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:06,960 Speaker 1: if you're not aware, is this basically this idea that 769 00:38:07,000 --> 00:38:10,520 Speaker 1: if there's life out there, the chance that it's hostile 770 00:38:10,719 --> 00:38:13,279 Speaker 1: is so high that everyone would be basically be trying 771 00:38:13,320 --> 00:38:17,200 Speaker 1: to either hide or fuck up other life first, right, 772 00:38:17,320 --> 00:38:19,880 Speaker 1: Like it's a bunch of hunters wandering around a dark forest. 773 00:38:19,960 --> 00:38:21,399 Speaker 1: Is kind of where the name comes from, but it's 774 00:38:21,640 --> 00:38:24,240 Speaker 1: it's more game theory stuff, right, but trying to imagine 775 00:38:24,239 --> 00:38:27,080 Speaker 1: how aliens would think. I actually don't entirely agree with it. 776 00:38:27,040 --> 00:38:30,280 Speaker 2: But whatever, No, I don't either, And it's not shocking 777 00:38:30,280 --> 00:38:33,320 Speaker 2: that it's a right wing author, but like, yeah, it 778 00:38:33,480 --> 00:38:37,319 Speaker 2: doesn't make the opinion in it wrong necessarily, But I'm 779 00:38:37,360 --> 00:38:38,200 Speaker 2: just like not surprised. 780 00:38:38,280 --> 00:38:40,920 Speaker 1: No, No, people speak very highly of the books. I 781 00:38:40,920 --> 00:38:43,440 Speaker 1: thought the show was good, Like, I don't have to 782 00:38:43,480 --> 00:38:45,719 Speaker 1: agree with someone's politics to be interested in there. 783 00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:48,799 Speaker 2: Yeah, And I find it so interesting because it is 784 00:38:48,960 --> 00:38:50,880 Speaker 2: so much of it is around this idea of like, 785 00:38:51,560 --> 00:38:56,239 Speaker 2: whoever is controlling the mutually assured destruction button, we need 786 00:38:56,280 --> 00:38:58,680 Speaker 2: to make sure that they're reliable, and by reliable we 787 00:38:58,719 --> 00:39:03,280 Speaker 2: mean not think, not thinking about the consequences of their actions. 788 00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:05,680 Speaker 2: And it's like, because to me, I clearly shouldn't be 789 00:39:05,680 --> 00:39:07,759 Speaker 2: in charge of mutually a shared destruction because I'm like, 790 00:39:08,000 --> 00:39:12,600 Speaker 2: I would rather I die and everyone I know die 791 00:39:13,000 --> 00:39:16,360 Speaker 2: than all humanity die. Like it just yeah, it just 792 00:39:16,400 --> 00:39:18,600 Speaker 2: seems so obvious to me, you know. 793 00:39:18,800 --> 00:39:22,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, like I don't. I don't, And this, I guess 794 00:39:22,600 --> 00:39:26,240 Speaker 1: is just the difference between different kind of value systems. 795 00:39:26,719 --> 00:39:29,120 Speaker 1: I don't think American lives are worth more than any 796 00:39:29,160 --> 00:39:30,080 Speaker 1: other kind of life. 797 00:39:30,440 --> 00:39:32,360 Speaker 2: Nope, right, yep. 798 00:39:32,200 --> 00:39:34,040 Speaker 1: I don't think they're worth more than Russian lives or 799 00:39:34,160 --> 00:39:37,759 Speaker 1: Chinese lives or Latvian lives and nope, I guess I 800 00:39:37,760 --> 00:39:39,920 Speaker 1: don't want to get nuked. But my preference would be 801 00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:43,759 Speaker 1: if someone's going to get nuked, that not everyone gets nuked. Right, 802 00:39:43,840 --> 00:39:47,839 Speaker 1: That's better to me than anyway. That is not how 803 00:39:47,880 --> 00:39:48,640 Speaker 1: these people think. 804 00:39:49,000 --> 00:39:52,040 Speaker 2: Right. Even if the leaders of another country are my enemy, 805 00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:55,040 Speaker 2: that doesn't make every single person who whatever anyway. 806 00:39:55,120 --> 00:39:57,359 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, the leaders of every country are my enemy. 807 00:39:57,360 --> 00:40:00,880 Speaker 1: They're all assholes. But I still don't want nukes firing. 808 00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:05,160 Speaker 2: Off, I know, get them in a room anyway, yep, yeah, yeah. Wow. 809 00:40:05,440 --> 00:40:07,640 Speaker 1: So one of the things that I think is valuable 810 00:40:07,680 --> 00:40:10,239 Speaker 1: here to get into is Rubelle talks about when he 811 00:40:10,280 --> 00:40:13,759 Speaker 1: starts realizing how this system works. He has this realization, 812 00:40:13,840 --> 00:40:16,719 Speaker 1: which is that our whole nuclear deterrence system is what 813 00:40:16,840 --> 00:40:21,480 Speaker 1: he describes as dangerously unstable. Right, And this is valuable 814 00:40:21,520 --> 00:40:23,879 Speaker 1: just in terms of understanding how like military planners think 815 00:40:23,920 --> 00:40:26,000 Speaker 1: and kind of the logic that this guy's going through 816 00:40:26,000 --> 00:40:27,400 Speaker 1: as he's trying to deal with this problem. 817 00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:27,759 Speaker 3: Right. 818 00:40:28,040 --> 00:40:32,640 Speaker 1: Quote from Rebel Instability arises most dangerously in the contemporary 819 00:40:32,640 --> 00:40:35,880 Speaker 1: world when fast arsenals of horrendously destructive weapons end up 820 00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:38,440 Speaker 1: ready to go in minutes. If one side does go 821 00:40:38,520 --> 00:40:40,680 Speaker 1: for any reason, or even for none, the other is 822 00:40:40,719 --> 00:40:44,759 Speaker 1: set to respond and must respond. Strategic weapons, I soon realized, 823 00:40:44,800 --> 00:40:49,480 Speaker 1: could often determine policy by their very design. Military instability 824 00:40:49,520 --> 00:40:52,880 Speaker 1: arises when the actions of one side will, unless countered 825 00:40:52,920 --> 00:40:56,080 Speaker 1: in a timely manner, give it a decisive military advantage. 826 00:40:56,160 --> 00:40:58,799 Speaker 1: It is worsened as the interval defining a timely manner 827 00:40:58,880 --> 00:41:02,040 Speaker 1: shrinks to almost nothing, as it does in the missile age. Right, 828 00:41:02,320 --> 00:41:05,279 Speaker 1: he's describing this doomsday device that's being built. Right, it's 829 00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:10,000 Speaker 1: an unstable system, right, because of how fast everything works 830 00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:13,240 Speaker 1: and how destructive these weapons are. Rubell, in no uncertain 831 00:41:13,320 --> 00:41:16,880 Speaker 1: terms described the ideology behind launch on warning as quote 832 00:41:16,920 --> 00:41:19,399 Speaker 1: flawed and terrifying, and quoted Herman Khan. 833 00:41:19,800 --> 00:41:24,400 Speaker 3: Shit guy, yeah, my guy, yeah. 834 00:41:24,480 --> 00:41:27,440 Speaker 1: He quoted Herman khn and calling this arrangement a doomsday machine. 835 00:41:27,440 --> 00:41:29,680 Speaker 1: And he discussed he wrote about something that happened in 836 00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:32,200 Speaker 1: World War One as an example for like why he 837 00:41:32,280 --> 00:41:34,399 Speaker 1: considered all this so frightening. And I'm going to quote 838 00:41:34,440 --> 00:41:37,200 Speaker 1: an extended piece here. On a visit to France in 839 00:41:37,280 --> 00:41:39,520 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three, I came across the remains of a 840 00:41:39,560 --> 00:41:42,080 Speaker 1: World War One catastrophe and you're a small village along 841 00:41:42,080 --> 00:41:45,240 Speaker 1: the Canal de Nord northeast of Paris. There one discovers 842 00:41:45,239 --> 00:41:47,160 Speaker 1: a crater about fifty feet deep and a couple of 843 00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:50,000 Speaker 1: hundred feet in diameter. Postcards on sale in the village 844 00:41:50,040 --> 00:41:53,600 Speaker 1: identify it as Le tournaire, a melancholy reminder of what 845 00:41:53,680 --> 00:41:57,000 Speaker 1: happened in a pre war landmark and its unfortunate human occupants. 846 00:41:57,200 --> 00:41:59,400 Speaker 1: Before World War One, a small hill stood were only 847 00:41:59,440 --> 00:42:02,360 Speaker 1: the crater room. The little hill was a formidable obstacle 848 00:42:02,360 --> 00:42:03,920 Speaker 1: in the path of the French on one side and 849 00:42:03,920 --> 00:42:06,520 Speaker 1: the Germans on the other, each hold up in extensive trenches, 850 00:42:06,840 --> 00:42:08,400 Speaker 1: unable to see the enemy on the other side of 851 00:42:08,440 --> 00:42:10,080 Speaker 1: the hill, and likely to get blown away if they 852 00:42:10,160 --> 00:42:12,680 Speaker 1: dared peer over the top. An obvious solution occurred to 853 00:42:12,719 --> 00:42:15,399 Speaker 1: each side mine the other side and blow it up. 854 00:42:15,680 --> 00:42:18,239 Speaker 1: Each side began mining the hill. The process went on 855 00:42:18,280 --> 00:42:20,440 Speaker 1: for weeks as tons of earth was excavated to form 856 00:42:20,480 --> 00:42:23,000 Speaker 1: tunnels extending under the German side, dug by the French, 857 00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:25,800 Speaker 1: and under the French side dug by the Germans. Eventually 858 00:42:25,800 --> 00:42:27,680 Speaker 1: the tunnels were filled with t and t by each 859 00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:29,759 Speaker 1: side under the part of the hill occupied by the other. 860 00:42:30,160 --> 00:42:32,279 Speaker 1: Then one day somebody on one side or the other. 861 00:42:32,480 --> 00:42:34,600 Speaker 1: Nobody will ever know which side or who it was, 862 00:42:34,920 --> 00:42:37,359 Speaker 1: detonated a charge that ignited all the French in all 863 00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:40,320 Speaker 1: the German explosives. Who knows. Maybe it was an accident 864 00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:43,120 Speaker 1: either way, accident or on purpose. This little mountain with 865 00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:45,439 Speaker 1: hundreds of luckless humans and trenches on it or still 866 00:42:45,440 --> 00:42:48,319 Speaker 1: tunneling beneath it, was blown to Kingdom come, leaving only 867 00:42:48,360 --> 00:42:51,480 Speaker 1: an impressive crater to remind an occasional visitor forever what 868 00:42:51,640 --> 00:42:54,759 Speaker 1: military instability can mean. It was not too early in 869 00:42:54,840 --> 00:42:57,480 Speaker 1: nineteen fifty nine to envision a ghastly replay of this 870 00:42:57,480 --> 00:43:00,680 Speaker 1: little known drama on a global scale. 871 00:43:00,840 --> 00:43:03,440 Speaker 2: That's such a good metaphor, and it's such a shame. Yeah, 872 00:43:03,480 --> 00:43:05,439 Speaker 2: it's like a It took a lot of people dying 873 00:43:05,480 --> 00:43:06,480 Speaker 2: to give us that metaphor. 874 00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:10,439 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, yeah, but I mean he's right here now. 875 00:43:10,640 --> 00:43:11,120 Speaker 2: Yeah. 876 00:43:11,320 --> 00:43:14,520 Speaker 1: Rubel first sits down with the Minuteman project manager, who's 877 00:43:14,560 --> 00:43:17,320 Speaker 1: a former Hughes Aircraft guy named Bob Bennett. In the 878 00:43:17,360 --> 00:43:20,040 Speaker 1: spring of nineteen fifty nine, he noticed it. Despite their 879 00:43:20,040 --> 00:43:22,839 Speaker 1: friendly relationship, Bob was squirrely and didn't like to give 880 00:43:22,840 --> 00:43:25,919 Speaker 1: out information when asked basic questions like how do these 881 00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:30,399 Speaker 1: missiles actually fire? And how many missiles fire at once? Right? 882 00:43:31,000 --> 00:43:33,279 Speaker 1: At this point, the Minuteman system was being built as 883 00:43:33,280 --> 00:43:35,839 Speaker 1: a second strike system, but there was no reason you'd 884 00:43:35,840 --> 00:43:38,000 Speaker 1: need a weapon like the Minuteman for a second strike. 885 00:43:38,280 --> 00:43:40,160 Speaker 1: It was clearly meant for a first strike in a 886 00:43:40,239 --> 00:43:42,960 Speaker 1: launch on warn scenario. The Air Force was just lying 887 00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:45,960 Speaker 1: to everybody, right. In order to make this seem less dangerous, 888 00:43:46,440 --> 00:43:49,400 Speaker 1: each Minuteman was to be aimed at all times at 889 00:43:49,400 --> 00:43:52,399 Speaker 1: a different city in the USSR or China. We don't 890 00:43:52,400 --> 00:43:54,759 Speaker 1: have good computers back then, right, So the way these 891 00:43:54,800 --> 00:43:57,800 Speaker 1: things are targeted is there's a system of gyroscopes inside 892 00:43:57,800 --> 00:44:01,040 Speaker 1: each of these missiles, rotating on frictionless ball bearings at 893 00:44:01,040 --> 00:44:04,200 Speaker 1: all times, which will guide the missiles win launched towards 894 00:44:04,200 --> 00:44:07,920 Speaker 1: a specific set of coordinates. Missiles cannot be retargeted on 895 00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:10,600 Speaker 1: the fly. Once you fire these, no matter who you're 896 00:44:10,640 --> 00:44:12,839 Speaker 1: launching them at, no matter who starts the war. If 897 00:44:12,880 --> 00:44:16,000 Speaker 1: the missiles fire, they go towards the preset targets. Are 898 00:44:16,080 --> 00:44:17,719 Speaker 1: you seeing a problem potentially? 899 00:44:18,280 --> 00:44:21,319 Speaker 2: Yeah. Also, I'm impressed by that method of figuring out 900 00:44:21,320 --> 00:44:22,080 Speaker 2: how to aim things. 901 00:44:21,920 --> 00:44:23,320 Speaker 1: So it's incredibly impressive. 902 00:44:23,640 --> 00:44:23,839 Speaker 2: Yeah. 903 00:44:23,880 --> 00:44:25,960 Speaker 1: Like, these people are very smart and very stupid at 904 00:44:25,960 --> 00:44:26,520 Speaker 1: the same time. 905 00:44:26,719 --> 00:44:29,560 Speaker 2: Yep, yep, twentieth century engineering. 906 00:44:30,000 --> 00:44:33,719 Speaker 1: Yeah. Like, there's a very high chance with this that 907 00:44:33,960 --> 00:44:36,400 Speaker 1: we wind up nuking a country that has not fired 908 00:44:36,400 --> 00:44:38,479 Speaker 1: at us, because we're just launching all of our shit 909 00:44:38,520 --> 00:44:40,680 Speaker 1: and some of it's targeted towards them. Right, we'll talk 910 00:44:40,719 --> 00:44:44,640 Speaker 1: more about that in the last episode. Now, this is 911 00:44:44,640 --> 00:44:47,760 Speaker 1: a problem because each squadron of fifty missiles is divided 912 00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:50,200 Speaker 1: into five groups of ten, and each squadron of ten 913 00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:53,040 Speaker 1: would be fired by just two guys. If two men 914 00:44:53,120 --> 00:44:55,080 Speaker 1: chose to insert their keys at the same time, the 915 00:44:55,160 --> 00:44:57,719 Speaker 1: launch control center they were in would be considered to 916 00:44:57,800 --> 00:45:00,440 Speaker 1: have voted to launch, and all ten missile would fire. 917 00:45:00,760 --> 00:45:02,959 Speaker 1: If two or more centers voted yes within a short 918 00:45:02,960 --> 00:45:06,120 Speaker 1: period of time, all fifty missiles in the squadron would fire. 919 00:45:06,640 --> 00:45:09,120 Speaker 1: Each missile was targeted to a city, we have no 920 00:45:09,160 --> 00:45:11,840 Speaker 1: way of knowing who might provocus, which means, by default, 921 00:45:11,880 --> 00:45:15,080 Speaker 1: our automated response was to nuke both the USSR and China, 922 00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:17,560 Speaker 1: even if one of those nations did nothing to piss 923 00:45:17,640 --> 00:45:18,480 Speaker 1: us off or threaten us. 924 00:45:18,520 --> 00:45:20,640 Speaker 2: Oh my god, when did China get nukes? 925 00:45:22,239 --> 00:45:25,480 Speaker 1: China detonates their first nuke in October of nineteen sixty four, 926 00:45:25,840 --> 00:45:29,400 Speaker 1: so they don't have it yet. But you know, military 927 00:45:29,400 --> 00:45:31,840 Speaker 1: planners at this period of time before China has nukes 928 00:45:32,040 --> 00:45:35,520 Speaker 1: are thinking of China and the Soviet Union as one 929 00:45:35,719 --> 00:45:39,399 Speaker 1: unified communist block. They are not. As Nixon will make 930 00:45:39,600 --> 00:45:43,239 Speaker 1: very clear, those countries don't like each other, really like 931 00:45:43,480 --> 00:45:47,480 Speaker 1: they have a fraught history. But our assumption is we 932 00:45:47,480 --> 00:45:49,640 Speaker 1: got to start by nuke in them both. Right, So 933 00:45:50,760 --> 00:45:53,200 Speaker 1: it actually gets even worse than this, which we'll talk 934 00:45:53,239 --> 00:45:55,880 Speaker 1: about in the last episode. But I think this is 935 00:45:55,880 --> 00:45:58,800 Speaker 1: a good point to end here, just with the dread 936 00:45:58,840 --> 00:46:01,000 Speaker 1: of how fucking danger risk this system is. 937 00:46:02,040 --> 00:46:05,600 Speaker 2: My god, God, I'm so glad that this is just 938 00:46:05,640 --> 00:46:08,200 Speaker 2: in this weird nerd game that you play and called Warhammer. 939 00:46:09,880 --> 00:46:12,759 Speaker 1: Certainly not real, this was Yeah, this was real. This 940 00:46:12,760 --> 00:46:16,280 Speaker 1: would be like big Dude verifying what a nightmare? 941 00:46:17,120 --> 00:46:19,000 Speaker 2: Yeah? How does anyone sleep? 942 00:46:19,520 --> 00:46:22,399 Speaker 1: Yeah? If this was all real and people actually tried 943 00:46:22,440 --> 00:46:24,799 Speaker 1: to build it, built a system like this, we would 944 00:46:24,840 --> 00:46:27,840 Speaker 1: have to throw them all in prison, right, I assume 945 00:46:27,960 --> 00:46:30,880 Speaker 1: so we wouldn't let them retire with millions of dollars. 946 00:46:31,000 --> 00:46:36,759 Speaker 1: That would be crazy. No, all right, well, Margaret Pluggables. 947 00:46:37,160 --> 00:46:41,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, I have a substack. I write about the things 948 00:46:41,160 --> 00:46:43,240 Speaker 2: that I talk about on my show, and my substack 949 00:46:43,600 --> 00:46:45,319 Speaker 2: Margaret Kiljoy. You can find me on all of the 950 00:46:45,360 --> 00:46:47,759 Speaker 2: various Internet things that I'm on and not the ones 951 00:46:47,760 --> 00:46:50,439 Speaker 2: that I'm not on. And I'm not aware of any 952 00:46:50,440 --> 00:46:53,960 Speaker 2: other Margaret Kiljoy except apparently a Disney character where she 953 00:46:54,520 --> 00:46:57,480 Speaker 2: from the second Plantasia movie or something, or she's a 954 00:46:57,880 --> 00:47:01,279 Speaker 2: nag like a massogynist character that oh boom, I actually 955 00:47:01,320 --> 00:47:03,160 Speaker 2: could have these characters. It might be I might have 956 00:47:03,200 --> 00:47:06,040 Speaker 2: the movie wrong. I don't know. Someone just pointed out 957 00:47:06,080 --> 00:47:11,000 Speaker 2: to me recently, but I'm not a missogyny stereotype from Disney. 958 00:47:11,080 --> 00:47:15,080 Speaker 2: I am instead everyone's nightmare of if you're transphobed, I'm 959 00:47:15,120 --> 00:47:17,880 Speaker 2: your nightmare and you can find me by googly me. 960 00:47:18,520 --> 00:47:19,240 Speaker 2: That's what I got. 961 00:47:19,960 --> 00:47:22,680 Speaker 1: Yeah, I actually am a missogyous nightmare from a Disney movie. 962 00:47:22,719 --> 00:47:24,920 Speaker 1: I was the inspiration for guests on a lot of 963 00:47:24,920 --> 00:47:25,680 Speaker 1: people don't know that. 964 00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:32,239 Speaker 2: Comment. I don't have a counter argument. I've met you 965 00:47:32,280 --> 00:47:33,000 Speaker 2: in real life. 966 00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:41,560 Speaker 3: Podcasts is over all right. Behind the Bastards is a 967 00:47:41,600 --> 00:47:44,960 Speaker 3: production of cool Zone Media. For more from cool Zone Media, 968 00:47:45,120 --> 00:47:48,759 Speaker 3: visit our website cool Zonemedia dot com or check us 969 00:47:48,760 --> 00:47:51,759 Speaker 3: out on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 970 00:47:51,800 --> 00:47:55,400 Speaker 3: get your podcasts. Behind the Bastards is now available on YouTube, 971 00:47:55,640 --> 00:47:59,640 Speaker 3: new episodes every Wednesday and Friday. Subscribe to our channel 972 00:48:00,200 --> 00:48:02,960 Speaker 3: dot com slash at Behind the Bastards