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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff you Should Know from how Stuff Works

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Speaker 1: dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh Clark.

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Speaker 1: There's Charles w Chuck Bryant, there's Jerry over there. So

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Speaker 1: this is stuff you should know, like ever expanding law

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Speaker 1: Enforcement edition yet another Yeah we just did when didn't we?

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Speaker 1: Yeah we uh yeah, I can't remember which one it was.

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Speaker 1: They'll run together now. Yeah, Well we've done a lot yep.

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Speaker 1: Body cameras. Uh, and I kind of want to pick

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Speaker 1: this one out. Thought, well, I don't know if there's

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Speaker 1: a whole lot there, but it ended up being a

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Speaker 1: little more interesting than I thought to be. Yeah, there's

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Speaker 1: a lot there, at least culturally too. Totally. So, um,

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Speaker 1: we're talking body cameras, and they're pretty straightforward at their base. Um,

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Speaker 1: but once you kind of start looking at like the

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Speaker 1: cultural baggage associated with them, why they're being used, it

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Speaker 1: is a pretty mushrooming topic for sure. And apparently back

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Speaker 1: in two thou five the Brits started using them and

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Speaker 1: they ran some Yeah, because I mean, like the city

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Speaker 1: of London, I don't think there's a square inch that

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Speaker 1: isn't under surveillance, you know. Yeah, they're just pretty uh technologically,

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Speaker 1: um forward, I think sure, Like the first cell phone

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Speaker 1: I ever saw was in London. Really yeah, obviously of

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Speaker 1: like Japan and Korea for that kind of stuff. Well

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Speaker 1: maybe there too, but I didn't go to either one

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Speaker 1: of those places in the early nineties, I got you,

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Speaker 1: So you're like, London's in your head for that. So

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Speaker 1: um with with I guess the UK in particular, once

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Speaker 1: they started using body cameras, they started using them more

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Speaker 1: and more and more. And that's definitely the case with

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Speaker 1: the United States more recently. Um And apparently there's a

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Speaker 1: there's a pilot program that really started the whole thing

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Speaker 1: off back in two thousand and twelve in a little

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Speaker 1: town called Rialto, California, which is about fifty miles east

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Speaker 1: of Los Angeles. Yeah, and in Rialto, I'm not sure

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Speaker 1: what the impetus was, but the police chief and a

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Speaker 1: criminologist got together and said, let's let's try this. They

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Speaker 1: gave half of the police force body cameras to wear,

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Speaker 1: and then switched and gave the other half I guess

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Speaker 1: the second half of the year, throughout all of two

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Speaker 1: thousand twelve, Yeah, and what they were mainly tracking were

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Speaker 1: two different things. Uh, incidences police force and then civilian

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Speaker 1: complaints against officers. UM, generally after use the police force,

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Speaker 1: but just complaints period. Yeah, basically, and the results are

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Speaker 1: pretty surprising. I think. Yeah, they the officers who wore

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Speaker 1: the cameras used force half as often just generally would

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Speaker 1: use I get well, not less force. That's a little misleading.

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Speaker 1: They would use force less of the of the time. Um.

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Speaker 1: And then the complaints filed, they said they couldn't really Um,

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Speaker 1: there were so few complaints that couldn't really draw a

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Speaker 1: good statistical conclusion. But there was a nine reduction compared

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Speaker 1: with two thousand eleven of complaints. And they found out

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Speaker 1: other stuff too. I looked into the study. UM, and

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Speaker 1: this is just the commentary from the research team. These

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Speaker 1: aren't like facts and figures. But you know, you do

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Speaker 1: a study like this and then they analyze it, then

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Speaker 1: they say, well, this is what I think. Um. They

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Speaker 1: say that their research shows that people tend to adhere

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Speaker 1: to social norms and change your conduct once they're aware

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Speaker 1: that their behavior is being observed. Um. And the body

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Speaker 1: worn cameras can bey a straightforward, pragmatic message. You were

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Speaker 1: being watched a videotape and expected to follow the rules.

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Speaker 1: And apparently this uh, what they call a self awareness

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Speaker 1: effect is a neutral third eye that works on both sides.

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Speaker 1: They said it suspect tend to cool down their aggressive

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Speaker 1: actions more and it deters officers from reacting excessively or

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Speaker 1: unnecessarily with force. So it kind of works both ways.

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Speaker 1: And uh, the final thing I thought was really interesting

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Speaker 1: was had what they called a spillover effect, which was

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Speaker 1: even officers that weren't using the cameras because they did,

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Speaker 1: like you said, with half the force at a time,

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Speaker 1: they had fewer incidences of force used. And they speculate

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Speaker 1: that they just think there's a conscious effort than going

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Speaker 1: on to make uh, to improve their behavior, so that

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Speaker 1: the the officers that had the cameras being watched didn't

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Speaker 1: like have an advantage or a disadvantage, Like they sort

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Speaker 1: of normalize the whole thing, even if they weren't wearing

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Speaker 1: a camera at all. Yeah, I mean it's a speculation,

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Speaker 1: but it sort of makes sense. Well, so this the

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Speaker 1: rialto study is really um often I died because it

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Speaker 1: was the first of its kind in the United States

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Speaker 1: and because the results were so surprising, and then so

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Speaker 1: we also the city immediately was like, Okay, all officers

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Speaker 1: now have body cameras. After the results came in, and

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Speaker 1: it just so happened that this took place. The study

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Speaker 1: took place um right before a couple of very high

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Speaker 1: profile police involved deaths, Eric Garner UM and then Michael Brown.

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Speaker 1: And Michael Brown's death in particular raised the issue of

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Speaker 1: body warren cameras, which is in the general term for

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Speaker 1: the cameras police are wearing UM. Because Darren Wilson, who

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Speaker 1: shot Michael Brown, the police officer who shot him six

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Speaker 1: times UM what gave one account of the story and

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Speaker 1: witnesses gave another account of the story. And so when

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Speaker 1: Michael Brown's death kind of became part of a national conversation,

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Speaker 1: and especially with Eric Garner's death to which immediately proceeded

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Speaker 1: I think like a month before, back in two thousand fourteen, UM.

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Speaker 1: Eric Garner's death was full on video taped by a

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Speaker 1: guy who was standing there recording it on a cell phone,

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Speaker 1: and it got out and it was released to the public,

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Speaker 1: and it started this national conversation about police brutality UM

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Speaker 1: and but it also had this other real aspect to

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Speaker 1: it that this conversation might not be happening were it

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Speaker 1: not for video documentation of these of Eric Garner's death.

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Speaker 1: So the fact that this is happening at a time

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Speaker 1: right after rialto has had this study, people are looking

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Speaker 1: around saying this. There's entire swaths these communities, UM have

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Speaker 1: had this what was called a simmering distrust of the police,

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Speaker 1: and they've had it forever. But now all of a sudden,

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Speaker 1: the rest of the nation's paying attention to this very

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Speaker 1: important issue. UM and this, these body cameras work so

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Speaker 1: well for this little town in east of Los Angeles,

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Speaker 1: maybe we should start to institute those. And all of

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Speaker 1: a sudden, the Department of Justice starts showing out forty

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Speaker 1: three million dollars in grants for local law enforcement to

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Speaker 1: buy body cameras. And there was this this idea that good,

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Speaker 1: the problem solved. But to a lot of people, and

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Speaker 1: at least impart myself included, it kind of seems like

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Speaker 1: this could just be a bandied Does it actually solve

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Speaker 1: anything or does it actually just underscore the distrust on

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Speaker 1: both sides, Like I don't trust that you're not gonna

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Speaker 1: file a false report about me being brutal on you,

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Speaker 1: so I'm recording you and I have to wear this

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Speaker 1: because the federal government knows that you don't trust me,

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Speaker 1: and I might beat you up extra judiciously. So if

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Speaker 1: if neither side trusts one another and you just have

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Speaker 1: a video camera observing the whole thing, does that actually

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Speaker 1: solve anything or does it just underscore the trust. That's

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Speaker 1: that's probably the biggest question to me that came out

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Speaker 1: of researching this episode. Yeah, I think for me, it's

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Speaker 1: it's not a magic pill by any means, but it's

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Speaker 1: another tool that can help. But but what I think

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Speaker 1: that then the issue to me then is you can't

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Speaker 1: just overly rely on that one tool. I think it

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Speaker 1: kind of has a tendency to lull people into complacency, like, Okay,

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Speaker 1: we've got this tool out there now, we don't have

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Speaker 1: to worry about the actual underlying issues. Yeah, and we'll

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Speaker 1: get into I mean, there's a bunch of reasons why

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Speaker 1: it's not a magic pill. We'll get into all those later.

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Speaker 1: But um, as of right now, it was hard to

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Speaker 1: get statistics, but I got one from about a year

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Speaker 1: ago that said forty three of the sixty eight major

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Speaker 1: cities now, have you know that what they call the

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Speaker 1: major police forces in the US now use body cameras. However,

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Speaker 1: U say that they will begin to use them, and

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Speaker 1: are you know, taking steps to do so. Um. But

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Speaker 1: however they here and this is one of the issues

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Speaker 1: of why it's not a magic pill. Um. Only three

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Speaker 1: percent of these and this is a survey, only three

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Speaker 1: percent of the officers reported recording seven plus hours per day.

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Speaker 1: And that's in a in a typical I think, what

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Speaker 1: do they work generally twelve hours at a time? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I might, I understand. So only three percent recording seven

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Speaker 1: of those hours recorded? Uh, less than recorded three or

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Speaker 1: fewer hours per day. UM. So that's one of the

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Speaker 1: big issues is some departments, well, I mean, and it

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Speaker 1: varies from department in locality to locality on what the

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Speaker 1: rules are. Some of them say, all right, well, here's

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Speaker 1: your body camera, but you don't have to use it. Um.

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Speaker 1: Some of them say use it during any um, confrontation

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Speaker 1: with a citizen, any call you have to make. Some say, well,

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Speaker 1: you gotta turn them off when you go into a

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Speaker 1: private residence because, as we'll talk about a little later,

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Speaker 1: the a c l U. You know, it's a privacy

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Speaker 1: issue when you're filming people without their consent. That could

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Speaker 1: potentially be released, but surprisingly a little bit the a

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Speaker 1: c l U eventually kind of said, no, we will.

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Speaker 1: We would rather have the officers where these even though

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Speaker 1: it's a privacy issue for citizens. It's a tricky, tricky thing.

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Speaker 1: Oh man, it is a can of worms like no other. Um.

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Speaker 1: But we I mean, I think everyone knows what these are.

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Speaker 1: We haven't even said yet. These are cameras that police

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Speaker 1: officers wear on their body. Um. The ones I've mostly seen,

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Speaker 1: they were sort of on their chest, yeah, like where

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Speaker 1: there CB used to be. Yeah. Some of them though,

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Speaker 1: are on the shoulder, on the helmet, um or on

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Speaker 1: the collar. But mostly I've seen the one that it

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Speaker 1: kind of actually looks like a little C, B H

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Speaker 1: whatever you call it. Not a CB handle because that's

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Speaker 1: rubber Ducky in the in the truck. What you know,

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Speaker 1: the CB handle is what your name is. And rubber

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Speaker 1: Ducky was from Convoy. I think when was it? I

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Speaker 1: think so the movie or the song the movie, well

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Speaker 1: the songs from them, Oh man, those guys are great.

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Speaker 1: So what the receiver? But you're talking to it the mouthpiece? Okay,

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Speaker 1: I just call it the walkie talkie part. The walkie

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Speaker 1: talkie part anyway, it's generally mounted on the chest and uh,

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Speaker 1: there are many manufacturers that make these now, um, some

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Speaker 1: of them or wire wireless. Some of them have high death,

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Speaker 1: some of them have one touch activation and ultra wide angle.

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Speaker 1: Because that's one of the issues why it's not a

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Speaker 1: magic pill. Like the view that they get if it's

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Speaker 1: not a wide angle, is a chest high view of

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Speaker 1: whatever the officer's body is pointed at, not necessarily what

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Speaker 1: their faces looking at, where their eyes are looking. Um,

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Speaker 1: it's it's okay, but you know it's not. It's not

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Speaker 1: solve for everything in all issues. No, it's not, because

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Speaker 1: we'll get into later. You know, if if something happens

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Speaker 1: off camera that hasn't captured, like a suspect reaching for

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Speaker 1: a gun and but on camera, all of a sudden,

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Speaker 1: the cops just standing there and then the next thing

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Speaker 1: you know, he pulls his gun out and shoots the guy,

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Speaker 1: it's like, well that that cop just went berserk because

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Speaker 1: the camera didn't capture that thing. Most of them have

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Speaker 1: a time and date stamp. Some of them have the

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Speaker 1: badge number of the cop. Some of them have GPS coordinates.

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Speaker 1: Some of them take still photos some stream to remote devices.

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Speaker 1: Very few of them can you actually is it like

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Speaker 1: a iPhone where you can as a screen that you

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Speaker 1: can watch it, But some of them can hook up

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Speaker 1: to an app to your phone where you can watch it. Yeah, advanced.

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Speaker 1: I read this article about the one that Taser's putting out.

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Speaker 1: It was largely about that was by It was a

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Speaker 1: Motherboard article by Alex Pasternak, and he um talks about

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Speaker 1: how one of the big concerns is in the addition

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Speaker 1: of facial recognition, like computer facial recognition, because supposedly, I

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Speaker 1: didn't know this, half of Americans have their face in

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Speaker 1: a facial recognition database already. So if you're just somebody

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Speaker 1: walking past one of these cameras and it has facial

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Speaker 1: recognition attached to it, it will say, oh, well there

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Speaker 1: when Josh Clark, he was here on this date at

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Speaker 1: this time and he's wanted for murder, right, Well, that

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Speaker 1: was part of the point. It's like, well, you know,

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Speaker 1: the camera can pick it up and then the database can,

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Speaker 1: let you know, go get that guy he's wanted for murder. Um.

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Speaker 1: But also, if you're as a private citizen, as you're

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Speaker 1: the you're right against unlawful search and seizure being UM

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Speaker 1: violated by that kind of thing, and apparently that is

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Speaker 1: definitely a direction that that UM these cameras are starting

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Speaker 1: to go now, like facial recognition will soon be the

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Speaker 1: next step as they're deployed further and further, it's going

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Speaker 1: to be like a common UM feature on them. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Another feature that uh, most of these cameras have now,

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Speaker 1: and this is a very interesting one because it's kind

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Speaker 1: of played out recently to be significant, is a buffering

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Speaker 1: pre record. So if this cameras on, it's recording, but

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Speaker 1: it records in thirty second or sixty second intervals with

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Speaker 1: no audio most of the time. So what's happening is

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Speaker 1: even if the cop has not pressed record, it's recording

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Speaker 1: and a racing over itself constantly, um if it's turned on.

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Speaker 1: So what happens when the cop hits record is it's

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Speaker 1: gonna have that thirty or sixty seconds tagged onto it

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Speaker 1: and that gets saved, which can be a big asset

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Speaker 1: if the cop. Uh you know a lot of times

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Speaker 1: a cop will see something and turn it on, but

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Speaker 1: they have just missed what's happened, but it'll grab that

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Speaker 1: thirty seconds, which can be a big help, or in

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Speaker 1: the case of Baltimore, it can bust a cop planning evidence. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I saw that too, So that to me was more

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Speaker 1: like interpretation of video. What is your what was your

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Speaker 1: take on it? Well, no, there were two of them.

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Speaker 1: The most recent one was interpretation of video. I think

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Speaker 1: there was one previous to that where it actually caught

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Speaker 1: the cop planning evidence because he didn't know that the

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Speaker 1: thirty second buffer was happening. Oh really, I didn't see

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Speaker 1: that one. Uh. And then that may have been I'm

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Speaker 1: not sure in this case, but sometimes it's uploaded to

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Speaker 1: a cloud and it's there right. The second one I

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Speaker 1: think was what it looks like is that the cops

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Speaker 1: took a made a concerted effort to organize and deploy

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Speaker 1: their cameras at specific times to get away with planning evidence.

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Speaker 1: So that's the speculation. This is all very brand new

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Speaker 1: in the news. But you know, their cops saying like,

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Speaker 1: do you have yours on? You're not supposed to have

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Speaker 1: yours on yet, saying things like that, and of course

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Speaker 1: the a c, L, EU and and the prosecutors are

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Speaker 1: saying this is clearly the cops trying to coordinate this

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Speaker 1: thing with their cameras staging with reality. Yeah, and that's

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Speaker 1: something that is going to start happening more and more.

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Speaker 1: I mean, ideally all all cops are doing really good work, uh,

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Speaker 1: and you don't have to worry about that. But you know,

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Speaker 1: there's been plenty of cases over the years of bad

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Speaker 1: cops doing bad things, and now these body cameras, they're

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Speaker 1: gonna have to find a way to get around it. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and I want to can I just say something real quick? So,

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Speaker 1: so the the whole issue to me is this, right, Like, um,

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Speaker 1: I think I've probably come off as distrustful of cops

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Speaker 1: sometimes and to me, um, so, as society, we give

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Speaker 1: cops like a tremendous amount of power over us, right,

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Speaker 1: and we give it to them in exchange for them up,

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Speaker 1: you know, upholding the law and protecting us right. Right.

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Speaker 1: But the problem is is if that trust is broken,

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Speaker 1: then that's a huge issue because as you go suddenly

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Speaker 1: from because you can't do anything about it, and you

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Speaker 1: go from being a protected citizen to being a hostage

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Speaker 1: of the state. Right. So that means to me that

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Speaker 1: police have to be like above reproach, that they they

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Speaker 1: have to be as angelic as possible right, and that

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Speaker 1: if they're there, um, if they're that, if they're called

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Speaker 1: into question for something, there shouldn't even be the slightest

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Speaker 1: hint that they're being protected or it's being covered up

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Speaker 1: or anything like that, and government needs to step in

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Speaker 1: and do something about it. And that has not been

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Speaker 1: the case. Government has broken down in its role of

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Speaker 1: overseeing police when the question of trust is brought up,

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Speaker 1: and what you're left with then is a citizenry that

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Speaker 1: it says I don't trust the cops any longer, and

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Speaker 1: just as bad as that, I don't trust the governments

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Speaker 1: to root out back cops. Um when the trust is broken,

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Speaker 1: but the power structure is still there. That doesn't exactly exactly,

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Speaker 1: So we're all hostages now to the cops. That's it's

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Speaker 1: clearer than ever. Now. That's that's my problem. I'm not

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Speaker 1: saying that that is necessarily the case, or that even

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Speaker 1: if it is the case, it's the case across the board.

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Speaker 1: I think there are plenty of plenty and plenty of

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Speaker 1: good cops out there who really do hold themselves to

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Speaker 1: a very high stenator. But the fact is there are

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Speaker 1: bad cops out there too, And I don't believe that

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Speaker 1: bad cops are rooted out and prosecuted like they should be,

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Speaker 1: and that the trust between the citizens and the police

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Speaker 1: has eroded as a result, and the government has totally

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Speaker 1: dropped the ball in in repairing that. Yeah, and especially

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Speaker 1: tough too when like every uh, every bad cop documentary

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Speaker 1: you've ever seen of them, the first thing you hear

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Speaker 1: cops saying as well, the first rule is you gotta

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Speaker 1: cover for your buddy cops. Like, even if you don't

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Speaker 1: agree with them, you don't ride out a cop. And

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Speaker 1: so then you're like, I think cops also subscribe almost

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Speaker 1: across the board to what's right is right though, you

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Speaker 1: know what I mean, and that they do kind of

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Speaker 1: tend to to to go toward that. I like to

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Speaker 1: think that I want to think that. Um, and I

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Speaker 1: hope I'm not being naive and thinking that you wanna

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Speaker 1: take a break. Yeah, all right, let's do it. We'll

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Speaker 1: talk a little more about body cameras. All right, we're

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Speaker 1: back with a little more of the mundane, which is

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Speaker 1: the cost of these things. Uh. They can go up

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Speaker 1: to about nine bucks or as low as the low hundreds. UM,

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Speaker 1: let's such just say an average of four bucks for

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Speaker 1: a system. UM, and if you have a large police

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Speaker 1: force of six cops, that's a lot of dough, Um

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Speaker 1: it is. But Uncle Sam is offsetting a lot of that. Yeah. Sure,

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Speaker 1: And and I think everyone is in favor of these

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Speaker 1: And I think our article points out in a very

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Speaker 1: astute way, like ideally these things can provide clarity, but

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Speaker 1: at the very least it's just another measure in place

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Speaker 1: to help protect citizens and police. Yes, but there's a

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Speaker 1: group who say, no, these are kind of a bad idea.

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Speaker 1: And I find it's suspicious that the government is um

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Speaker 1: supporting this so so wholeheartedly, that it's just um advancing

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Speaker 1: the surveillance state that much more normalizing the idea of

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Speaker 1: people being recorded everywhere they go all the time, even

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Speaker 1: in interacting with other people. Yeah, so I think there

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Speaker 1: are some people who just don't even like the idea

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Speaker 1: of of body war and cameras at all. Well, citizens

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Speaker 1: and cops probably, right, Um, So another big problem or not, Well,

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Speaker 1: I guess it is sort of a problem or challenge

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Speaker 1: at least, is is how to store this information, um,

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Speaker 1: depending on where you are, Like they use Oakland as

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Speaker 1: a as an example in this article. Six hundred cops,

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Speaker 1: six hundred body cameras generates about seven terabytes of video

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Speaker 1: every month and UM Storing the stuff is a big

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Speaker 1: challenge because depending on where you are, you have a

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Speaker 1: lot of rules in place because this is evidence potentially

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Speaker 1: and it's you know, you can't just store it anyway

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Speaker 1: you like in Oakland they have to keep it for

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Speaker 1: two years of anything that's involved in an investigation. It's

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Speaker 1: longer than that. Uh. Duluth Minnesota they point out thirty days. Laurel,

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Speaker 1: Maryland has six six months. Like that's a lot of data.

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Speaker 1: And the security standards are really uh strict, and they

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Speaker 1: gotta figure out how to store this stuff, how to

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Speaker 1: do it safely. And because people that know how to

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Speaker 1: make money are are behind this. There are companies that's

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Speaker 1: very smartly are coming up with complete systems that will

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Speaker 1: offer a police department and say hey, we got you covered.

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Speaker 1: We will take care of your storage, we will comply

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Speaker 1: with all your rules and regulations, will train your people

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Speaker 1: because you gotta hire in house people just to keep

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Speaker 1: track of the data. Uh, and we'll do it all

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Speaker 1: for you, exactly like Taser apparently has one heck of

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Speaker 1: a system where when the when the UM officer puts

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Speaker 1: there embody warrn camera on the dock to charge it

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Speaker 1: simultaneously starts uploading um all of the all of the

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Speaker 1: day's recording, right, So yeah, and it goes to the

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Speaker 1: cloud um and multiple people have access to it. But

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Speaker 1: it's any interaction with the video is logged automatically by

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Speaker 1: the system. If somebody goes to delete it, like only

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Speaker 1: certain people have access to delete file aisles, but again

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Speaker 1: multiple people do, and so if somebody goes to delete it,

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Speaker 1: they they're the other people who have the ability ability

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Speaker 1: to delete it are notified. So it's spreads Yeah, it

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Speaker 1: spreads out accountability. So it's like, well, wait a minute,

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Speaker 1: I'm going down to for letting you delete it. If so,

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Speaker 1: what are you deleting this for kind of thing? Um,

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Speaker 1: it's a pretty smart system. Like from what I read

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Speaker 1: from Pastor Neck in particular his article, it was like

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Speaker 1: Taser's got it going on. But if you if you

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Speaker 1: take the software away from it and the you know,

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Speaker 1: the LED light attached to it and all that stuff,

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Speaker 1: it's really what you have is basically a GoPro camera.

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Speaker 1: It's the it's the highly encrypted and protected software that

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Speaker 1: goes along with it that really makes it like law

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Speaker 1: enforcement specific. Yeah. I think in a lot of these

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Speaker 1: places the d A even has access remotely to this footage,

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Speaker 1: which is pretty interesting. The thing that that worries me

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Speaker 1: a little bit is the the situations where the local

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Speaker 1: police department has their own employees who are responsible for

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Speaker 1: keeping and maintaining and storing the video. It should be

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Speaker 1: it should be larger than that. You know, that's too localized. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean this, it's sort of like it makes me

399
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Speaker 1: think of all the movies I've seen where the the

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Speaker 1: evidence locker is guarded by like a dude, and someone

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Speaker 1: comes down there and they're like, uh, you know her

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Speaker 1: in the movie. It's you know her jacked up my hand, man,

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Speaker 1: I can't sign in today. Just let me in. I

404
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Speaker 1: gotta look at look at something for my gaze. And

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Speaker 1: then they they're in there, you know, taking a part

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Speaker 1: of gun and putting it in their pants to take out.

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Speaker 1: What movie was that pounds of cocaine? That's every movie? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's every movie ever made. And yeah, absolutely that Frog's

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Speaker 1: movie you're talking about that had it in there. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it was right. Apparently I added a superfluous exclamation point. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: what's it called? Just frogs, not frogs. It's just frogs?

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Speaker 1: Was it? Frogs? Frogs? So um. One of the criticisms

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Speaker 1: I've seen though, is it's like, well, wait a minute,

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Speaker 1: why why don't you trust us? Surely we can police

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Speaker 1: our own video, be trusted to police our own video.

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Speaker 1: It's like, no, the very fact that the video exists

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Speaker 1: means that you aren't trusted. So no, you shouldn't have

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Speaker 1: full jurisdiction over it. Because if this video is meant

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Speaker 1: to if it's meant because we don't trust you the citizens,

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Speaker 1: and we don't trust you the cops, but you, the

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Speaker 1: cops are the ones who are actually in control of

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Speaker 1: this video. That's lopsided. That's not a good solution. It's

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Speaker 1: not a full solution, I should say, right, because they

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Speaker 1: wouldn't turn that over to the citizens. So why don't

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Speaker 1: you keep track of this? No, that's a big issue too,

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Speaker 1: is who gets to see it? Yeah, well, a lot

427
00:25:57,160 --> 00:26:00,200
Speaker 1: of a lot of cities have have law in the

428
00:26:00,200 --> 00:26:04,000
Speaker 1: books where if you like a like a TV station

429
00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:05,600
Speaker 1: can ask for it and they have to give it

430
00:26:05,600 --> 00:26:10,240
Speaker 1: to him. Yeah, through uh, not FOIA, but local state

431
00:26:10,440 --> 00:26:14,679
Speaker 1: um disclosure lass, which is another big can of worms.

432
00:26:15,400 --> 00:26:18,720
Speaker 1: It is because you got to give the other side

433
00:26:18,720 --> 00:26:22,440
Speaker 1: as well too, right, So like if a if a

434
00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:24,800
Speaker 1: police officer dies in the line of duty and their

435
00:26:24,800 --> 00:26:29,480
Speaker 1: body cameras recording it, which happened in Arizona, I did.

436
00:26:29,520 --> 00:26:32,199
Speaker 1: It was his head anxiety the whole time watching it.

437
00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:35,240
Speaker 1: It was an officer named Tyler Stewart. Yeah, very sad.

438
00:26:35,520 --> 00:26:37,960
Speaker 1: It was extremely sad to see he was murdered by

439
00:26:38,040 --> 00:26:40,600
Speaker 1: some guy named Robert Smith who just drew a gun

440
00:26:40,680 --> 00:26:43,240
Speaker 1: after like three minutes of questioning. Yeah, and I didn't.

441
00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:45,000
Speaker 1: I don't know about you, but I didn't see that coming.

442
00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:48,520
Speaker 1: I didn't either. It was just like everything's normal, normal. Yeah,

443
00:26:48,520 --> 00:26:51,560
Speaker 1: it looks like super shady. Uh. And then of course

444
00:26:51,640 --> 00:26:53,400
Speaker 1: you find out afterwards that like he had been kind

445
00:26:53,400 --> 00:26:56,560
Speaker 1: of plating suicide and he you know, like the reason

446
00:26:56,600 --> 00:26:58,520
Speaker 1: he was there is because he trashed his girlfriend's apartment

447
00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:01,520
Speaker 1: and he had a lot of problems going on. But yeah,

448
00:27:01,560 --> 00:27:04,040
Speaker 1: I mean I was putting myself in the cop shoes,

449
00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:06,800
Speaker 1: and I'm like, I would have not suspected anything out

450
00:27:06,800 --> 00:27:10,680
Speaker 1: of this guy. Now, he was disarming, for sure, but

451
00:27:10,840 --> 00:27:15,760
Speaker 1: the but Tyler officer Stewart recorded his own death at

452
00:27:15,760 --> 00:27:20,320
Speaker 1: the hands of this guy and the local media was like, well,

453
00:27:20,400 --> 00:27:23,800
Speaker 1: we want to see it, and apparently Arizona has um

454
00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:28,439
Speaker 1: foil laws that are um that'd say, okay, well the

455
00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:30,639
Speaker 1: media gets it. You have to you have to release that,

456
00:27:30,680 --> 00:27:33,880
Speaker 1: which is apparently pretty rare. But in this case, it's

457
00:27:33,880 --> 00:27:38,040
Speaker 1: like it doesn't. Doesn't the doesn't the family of the

458
00:27:38,560 --> 00:27:41,520
Speaker 1: of the officer have any rights to be spared? This

459
00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:44,160
Speaker 1: being out there on the internet for any anybody who

460
00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:47,240
Speaker 1: wants to see this guy's death, you know, forever? Yeah,

461
00:27:47,280 --> 00:27:50,960
Speaker 1: I mean, of course they cut it, but still, you know,

462
00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:53,360
Speaker 1: like if anyone can look this up on YouTube, that's

463
00:27:53,400 --> 00:27:56,240
Speaker 1: just three I don't know. It's shameful. So the the

464
00:27:56,320 --> 00:27:59,199
Speaker 1: issue cuts both ways, especially privacy, like you do you

465
00:27:59,240 --> 00:28:01,760
Speaker 1: protect the citizen? Since privacy? Do you protect the cops?

466
00:28:01,760 --> 00:28:04,320
Speaker 1: Privacy do you protect no? What? Do you take the

467
00:28:04,400 --> 00:28:09,320
Speaker 1: wiki leaks approach and protect nobody's privacy like it happened?

468
00:28:09,880 --> 00:28:14,000
Speaker 1: Just keep it raw and and and if it's open

469
00:28:14,040 --> 00:28:16,560
Speaker 1: new interpretation, then settle it in court kind of thing,

470
00:28:16,600 --> 00:28:20,960
Speaker 1: you know, who knows? All right, you wanna take another break, man,

471
00:28:21,320 --> 00:28:23,320
Speaker 1: I keep working to send a breakes man. I'm sorry,

472
00:28:23,359 --> 00:28:25,720
Speaker 1: you know you're doing great. All right, We'll take another

473
00:28:25,760 --> 00:28:28,560
Speaker 1: break and talk a little bit about how these things

474
00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:52,080
Speaker 1: work and um, why they're not magic pills. Right after this. Okay, Chuck,

475
00:28:52,120 --> 00:28:54,640
Speaker 1: we're back. You know, I'll tell you one thing. I

476
00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:59,960
Speaker 1: looked up Taser's stock. Yeah, if you bought in two

477
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:05,040
Speaker 1: ells and I think ten, you're doing pretty good. Yeah,

478
00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:08,080
Speaker 1: because of their body warn camera program. Yeah, it was

479
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:10,400
Speaker 1: like five dollars and before this, I think they just

480
00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:15,760
Speaker 1: only made like tasers and non lethal weapons. But when

481
00:29:15,760 --> 00:29:17,760
Speaker 1: they got into the body camera market, their stock went

482
00:29:17,800 --> 00:29:20,160
Speaker 1: from like five bucks. I think it peaked at like

483
00:29:20,480 --> 00:29:24,560
Speaker 1: thirty five or forty. Yeah. Not bad, not bad at all.

484
00:29:24,680 --> 00:29:28,200
Speaker 1: Good for them. Yeah, but and again I can't remember

485
00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:29,760
Speaker 1: the name of it, but if you read that as

486
00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:34,800
Speaker 1: Alec pass your nach article, it's it's really sharp system.

487
00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:37,600
Speaker 1: And I own zero stock and Taser, Like, I'm just

488
00:29:37,680 --> 00:29:40,560
Speaker 1: a fan. I'm not a fan even if their non

489
00:29:40,640 --> 00:29:43,320
Speaker 1: lethal weapons, but their their body warrn camera systems is

490
00:29:43,360 --> 00:29:46,120
Speaker 1: pretty smart. It seems like, Yeah, I mean, I'm a

491
00:29:46,120 --> 00:29:48,280
Speaker 1: fan of smart things. Sure, if you're going to design

492
00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:50,960
Speaker 1: a system, it should be full proof and work well

493
00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:54,640
Speaker 1: and story everything you needed to not break down. It

494
00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:58,440
Speaker 1: seems like they got it going on Um. So one

495
00:29:58,480 --> 00:30:02,680
Speaker 1: of the other reasons that uh, like I said earlier,

496
00:30:02,720 --> 00:30:05,200
Speaker 1: this is it's not a magic pill, because you're only

497
00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:08,800
Speaker 1: getting this one. It's not. Our article points out very

498
00:30:09,000 --> 00:30:13,160
Speaker 1: astute lee that it's not an unbiased view. Still, Um,

499
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:16,479
Speaker 1: if you had six or eight, like if you were

500
00:30:16,480 --> 00:30:18,640
Speaker 1: in London, you had six or eight cameras and different

501
00:30:18,640 --> 00:30:21,880
Speaker 1: angles on different light posts, and you could coordinate this

502
00:30:22,040 --> 00:30:27,000
Speaker 1: thing and fully see everything that happened, it may be unbiased, truly,

503
00:30:27,480 --> 00:30:31,200
Speaker 1: but just a single shot from a body camera sing

504
00:30:31,280 --> 00:30:36,040
Speaker 1: that single angle is not unbiased by any means. And

505
00:30:36,080 --> 00:30:38,880
Speaker 1: that's about it. Did you see the nurse wobbles arrest

506
00:30:39,640 --> 00:30:42,720
Speaker 1: m h The Utah nurse who refused to draw the

507
00:30:42,720 --> 00:30:46,560
Speaker 1: blood of the suspect was unconscious. So if you just

508
00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:52,960
Speaker 1: watched um, the arresting officers Jeff Paine's body camera, yeah,

509
00:30:53,920 --> 00:30:56,200
Speaker 1: I mean, like because it's up close and personal, it

510
00:30:56,280 --> 00:30:59,320
Speaker 1: goes like suddenly just basically goes dark when it's pressed

511
00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:03,120
Speaker 1: up against her act and it shows like very little

512
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:06,760
Speaker 1: of anything. It was because of the other officer that

513
00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:10,360
Speaker 1: was with him his body camera. Um, that you get like,

514
00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:15,080
Speaker 1: oh wow, that really was a lot of force, unnecessary

515
00:31:15,120 --> 00:31:17,800
Speaker 1: force that this guy was using on this lady that

516
00:31:18,040 --> 00:31:21,400
Speaker 1: you wouldn't have gotten just from the footage from his

517
00:31:21,520 --> 00:31:27,200
Speaker 1: body camera, and that having supporting video evidence definitely expands

518
00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:31,200
Speaker 1: the the context one way or the other. It's interesting, though,

519
00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:34,400
Speaker 1: we're getting to a point where you're gonna have, um,

520
00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:38,000
Speaker 1: I say, a crime on a on a officer stop

521
00:31:38,000 --> 00:31:42,880
Speaker 1: of a car with a car camera, dashboard camera, let's

522
00:31:42,880 --> 00:31:46,800
Speaker 1: say two officers, body cameras, the people inside the car

523
00:31:46,880 --> 00:31:50,640
Speaker 1: filming with their iPhones, let's say two, So you've got

524
00:31:50,680 --> 00:31:55,560
Speaker 1: five different points of view going on that people courts

525
00:31:55,560 --> 00:31:58,160
Speaker 1: and juries are gonna have to sift through. D a's

526
00:31:58,880 --> 00:32:01,400
Speaker 1: defendants are gonna have to look at all this stuff

527
00:32:01,760 --> 00:32:04,400
Speaker 1: and try and piece together what happened. And this is

528
00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:07,840
Speaker 1: all new like previously you did this from testimony only

529
00:32:08,280 --> 00:32:11,280
Speaker 1: exactly So, like, are we opening ourselves up to a

530
00:32:11,320 --> 00:32:16,600
Speaker 1: time when d A s are are less willing to

531
00:32:16,640 --> 00:32:19,920
Speaker 1: bring up charges unless there is footage? You know? Yeah,

532
00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:22,080
Speaker 1: I wonder, but I mean it doesn't sound like there's

533
00:32:22,080 --> 00:32:24,200
Speaker 1: going to be much a lack of it. There's a

534
00:32:24,240 --> 00:32:28,760
Speaker 1: company called um Wolf Com who makes body warrant cameras

535
00:32:28,760 --> 00:32:32,719
Speaker 1: for police, is also releasing one for civilians. It's basically

536
00:32:32,760 --> 00:32:36,280
Speaker 1: the same thing without their police software that like just

537
00:32:36,360 --> 00:32:38,960
Speaker 1: somebody just wears it all times. Yeah, basically to film

538
00:32:39,000 --> 00:32:41,280
Speaker 1: the police while the police are filming them. And they

539
00:32:41,680 --> 00:32:46,480
Speaker 1: say it's perfect for protests, improving legality, and there's like, um,

540
00:32:46,520 --> 00:32:49,560
Speaker 1: there's like a button, the power button or stop or

541
00:32:49,560 --> 00:32:52,280
Speaker 1: the record button has to be pressed a certain way,

542
00:32:52,360 --> 00:32:55,680
Speaker 1: so even if like somebody bumping into your beating you up,

543
00:32:55,960 --> 00:32:59,680
Speaker 1: your camera won't stop recording. It's like, good lord, Like

544
00:32:59,760 --> 00:33:03,239
Speaker 1: the act that this is the climate that that's like

545
00:33:03,280 --> 00:33:08,040
Speaker 1: a selling point is really unsettling and sad, you know.

546
00:33:09,000 --> 00:33:12,080
Speaker 1: It is like, hey, everybody, come get your body warn

547
00:33:12,160 --> 00:33:14,240
Speaker 1: cameras because you need to film the people who are

548
00:33:14,280 --> 00:33:17,600
Speaker 1: filming you, because you can't trust the even this measure

549
00:33:18,120 --> 00:33:21,600
Speaker 1: that's being used to supposedly protect your rights. It's crazy

550
00:33:21,680 --> 00:33:26,760
Speaker 1: that it's crazy that we're in the state in this country.

551
00:33:27,160 --> 00:33:29,680
Speaker 1: That raised another point to me to chuck the idea

552
00:33:29,720 --> 00:33:34,000
Speaker 1: of having all these different points of view or video documentation.

553
00:33:34,320 --> 00:33:38,280
Speaker 1: This is also coming at a time when we are

554
00:33:38,320 --> 00:33:41,320
Speaker 1: starting to see editing software where you can kick video

555
00:33:41,400 --> 00:33:45,320
Speaker 1: and make it do anything. You can make it say anything,

556
00:33:45,440 --> 00:33:48,080
Speaker 1: you can make it, you can do anything with video.

557
00:33:48,880 --> 00:33:52,800
Speaker 1: The moon landing. How is that going to affect you know,

558
00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:56,160
Speaker 1: the use of video and in documentation for court cases

559
00:33:56,160 --> 00:33:59,160
Speaker 1: too well, and we've already seen just with Baltimore, you know,

560
00:33:59,240 --> 00:34:01,840
Speaker 1: what can happen and cops now have to wear these

561
00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:04,560
Speaker 1: and where they're trying to coordinate who's got who's camera on?

562
00:34:04,640 --> 00:34:06,800
Speaker 1: Did you have your camera on? What about that thirty

563
00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:11,799
Speaker 1: second buffer? Um? Geez. It's all just sad that we're

564
00:34:11,840 --> 00:34:15,160
Speaker 1: at that state now to where but you know, it's

565
00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:18,720
Speaker 1: also a good thing that, like, for how many years

566
00:34:18,880 --> 00:34:26,160
Speaker 1: were bad things happening without any uh citizen? Uh? I

567
00:34:26,160 --> 00:34:28,359
Speaker 1: mean there was no recourse, you know, for so long

568
00:34:28,840 --> 00:34:30,560
Speaker 1: and there still isn't to a large degree. This is

569
00:34:30,600 --> 00:34:32,840
Speaker 1: just a little small thing. No, it's true, But I

570
00:34:32,880 --> 00:34:36,520
Speaker 1: mean that has to be a certain level of at

571
00:34:36,600 --> 00:34:41,880
Speaker 1: least gratification among people who have lived with distrust of

572
00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:46,480
Speaker 1: the police or have been abused as a whole by police,

573
00:34:47,239 --> 00:34:51,120
Speaker 1: um for decades that people are now finally starting to

574
00:34:51,160 --> 00:34:53,680
Speaker 1: be like, oh man, this is crazy. You how long

575
00:34:53,719 --> 00:34:56,000
Speaker 1: has this been going on? You know, because there's a

576
00:34:56,080 --> 00:35:00,640
Speaker 1: light being shined on it, um. And so in that sense, yes,

577
00:35:00,719 --> 00:35:03,920
Speaker 1: it's crazy that we're at this state right now. In

578
00:35:03,960 --> 00:35:08,880
Speaker 1: our our country, but you know, maybe it's just a

579
00:35:08,960 --> 00:35:12,239
Speaker 1: growing pain towards moving to a better place. Yeah, you

580
00:35:12,239 --> 00:35:14,680
Speaker 1: know that rialto study too. And their summation, they also

581
00:35:14,760 --> 00:35:18,160
Speaker 1: said something about, um, I can't remember exactly only put it,

582
00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:21,439
Speaker 1: but something about how they found that it They think

583
00:35:21,520 --> 00:35:25,239
Speaker 1: that it also requires police to take to take more

584
00:35:25,320 --> 00:35:30,600
Speaker 1: verbal abuse from people, um, which you know isn't fun,

585
00:35:31,320 --> 00:35:34,600
Speaker 1: but sort of like the days are over where if

586
00:35:34,640 --> 00:35:37,160
Speaker 1: you're smart off to a cop, they can't just throw

587
00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:40,319
Speaker 1: your face on the ground and put their knees through

588
00:35:40,320 --> 00:35:44,799
Speaker 1: your cheekbone because you've smarted off to them. Um, So

589
00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:46,480
Speaker 1: they did. I don't think they weighed in either way

590
00:35:46,520 --> 00:35:48,600
Speaker 1: on what that means. They just said, what, you know,

591
00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:50,160
Speaker 1: it looks like cops are going to have to start

592
00:35:50,280 --> 00:35:53,719
Speaker 1: enduring a little more talk back from the drunk guy

593
00:35:53,760 --> 00:35:57,759
Speaker 1: at the bar without diving right into excessive force because

594
00:35:57,840 --> 00:36:01,080
Speaker 1: they were piste off. Now drunk kind of bar, notwithstandard

595
00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:05,200
Speaker 1: What are the big things that that these body cameras

596
00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:08,640
Speaker 1: are touted for, and I think you said it early on, um,

597
00:36:08,800 --> 00:36:11,880
Speaker 1: is that people behave differently when they know they're being recorded,

598
00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:15,600
Speaker 1: so that officers won't have to take verbal lashings from

599
00:36:15,640 --> 00:36:20,000
Speaker 1: people as often, and so that might that that the

600
00:36:20,120 --> 00:36:25,480
Speaker 1: very presence of the cameras supposedly um can keep situations

601
00:36:25,480 --> 00:36:28,319
Speaker 1: from escalating, or it can actually de escalate a situation.

602
00:36:29,080 --> 00:36:31,520
Speaker 1: Just if if the officers like need you to know

603
00:36:31,560 --> 00:36:36,200
Speaker 1: you're being recorded right now, people supposedly straighten up. I

604
00:36:36,200 --> 00:36:39,360
Speaker 1: don't know if they have to or not. Well, we're

605
00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:42,520
Speaker 1: in such the early nascent days of this, it's um. Yeah,

606
00:36:42,600 --> 00:36:45,239
Speaker 1: this is sort of an early podcast to see what

607
00:36:45,520 --> 00:36:48,480
Speaker 1: ramifications are gonna happen later on, you know who knows. Yeah,

608
00:36:48,520 --> 00:36:50,359
Speaker 1: And one of the things that I saw was that

609
00:36:50,400 --> 00:36:53,440
Speaker 1: this is a situation. This is a technology that's gotten

610
00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:59,000
Speaker 1: a lot of press, but it's still very early on

611
00:36:59,120 --> 00:37:03,359
Speaker 1: in actual academic study of it, supposedly, and including the

612
00:37:03,440 --> 00:37:07,880
Speaker 1: rialto study. Most studies are not published in journals and

613
00:37:07,960 --> 00:37:12,360
Speaker 1: aren't peer reviewed. They're just you know, studies largely carried

614
00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:16,759
Speaker 1: out by like criminologists or scientists, but also by the

615
00:37:16,840 --> 00:37:20,719
Speaker 1: local police departments carrying the studies out on their own department.

616
00:37:20,840 --> 00:37:26,120
Speaker 1: Right There's supposedly only been two peer reviewed journal studies

617
00:37:26,160 --> 00:37:29,919
Speaker 1: published on body warrant cameras so far, UM, and one

618
00:37:29,920 --> 00:37:33,920
Speaker 1: of them was on the effect of giving an officer

619
00:37:34,040 --> 00:37:37,239
Speaker 1: leeway on wind to press record. How how does that

620
00:37:37,360 --> 00:37:42,160
Speaker 1: impact things like, um, the use of violence and this

621
00:37:42,160 --> 00:37:44,799
Speaker 1: This two thousand and sixteen study in the Journal of

622
00:37:44,840 --> 00:37:49,760
Speaker 1: Experimental Criminology found that, compared to the control group, UM,

623
00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:52,680
Speaker 1: if the officer had very little leeway and deciding wing

624
00:37:52,719 --> 00:37:54,920
Speaker 1: to record, meaning they had to record all the time,

625
00:37:55,840 --> 00:38:00,640
Speaker 1: UM that physical the use of physical violence decreased by

626
00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:05,120
Speaker 1: thirty seven. But in situations where officers had a lot

627
00:38:05,200 --> 00:38:07,400
Speaker 1: of leeway in deciding when to press record or not,

628
00:38:08,000 --> 00:38:13,319
Speaker 1: UM it was higher than the control group. Yeah, that

629
00:38:13,640 --> 00:38:15,840
Speaker 1: this whole win. Is it recording and when is it not?

630
00:38:16,040 --> 00:38:18,759
Speaker 1: Is the seems like the biggest sticking point right now?

631
00:38:19,400 --> 00:38:21,040
Speaker 1: And are we going to move to a future where

632
00:38:21,680 --> 00:38:25,640
Speaker 1: they are absolutely required to record any interaction with a

633
00:38:25,680 --> 00:38:30,399
Speaker 1: citizen or they get suspended or something like who knows

634
00:38:30,440 --> 00:38:32,840
Speaker 1: what we're headed towards. Yeah, Like it's a big deal

635
00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:35,920
Speaker 1: if they're not recording, not like a you know, you

636
00:38:36,000 --> 00:38:38,759
Speaker 1: gotta you're supposed to be recording kind of thing. I mean,

637
00:38:38,800 --> 00:38:40,759
Speaker 1: I guess it from a good cops point of view,

638
00:38:42,080 --> 00:38:44,279
Speaker 1: they should say, like, man, I want to record this

639
00:38:44,360 --> 00:38:46,920
Speaker 1: thing because this is what's gonna exonerate me in this

640
00:38:46,960 --> 00:38:49,600
Speaker 1: atmosphere we have today. Yeah, but I think it right.

641
00:38:49,800 --> 00:38:52,840
Speaker 1: I think cops are also scared that that that footage

642
00:38:53,800 --> 00:38:56,600
Speaker 1: that it could also be in like footage can be

643
00:38:56,680 --> 00:38:59,640
Speaker 1: used against them, even if it doesn't show anything. Yeah,

644
00:38:59,840 --> 00:39:02,680
Speaker 1: you know what I mean. I think Yeah, I think

645
00:39:02,719 --> 00:39:06,080
Speaker 1: it's a it's a man, it's just so fraught as

646
00:39:06,080 --> 00:39:10,440
Speaker 1: a technology to be to be used like this, you know.

647
00:39:10,680 --> 00:39:13,319
Speaker 1: And again the fact that we're using it says, hey,

648
00:39:13,480 --> 00:39:16,120
Speaker 1: you guys don't trust you guys, So we're gonna keep

649
00:39:16,160 --> 00:39:21,560
Speaker 1: these cameras here so everybody be cool. Like that solves anything.

650
00:39:22,480 --> 00:39:25,280
Speaker 1: I wonder when cars are gonna come equipped with built

651
00:39:25,280 --> 00:39:30,239
Speaker 1: in cameras that, you know, record all around the car.

652
00:39:30,320 --> 00:39:32,759
Speaker 1: Let's say, I mean the camera's already there with you

653
00:39:32,760 --> 00:39:36,239
Speaker 1: know a lot of these uh safety features. All that's

654
00:39:36,280 --> 00:39:39,320
Speaker 1: lacking as a record button. Well, the cops have those

655
00:39:39,400 --> 00:39:43,280
Speaker 1: for um, running license plates while they're driving down the street.

656
00:39:43,800 --> 00:39:46,200
Speaker 1: Their cameras are are just looking at license plates over

657
00:39:46,239 --> 00:39:49,520
Speaker 1: the cars they're driving past to to run them. And

658
00:39:49,600 --> 00:39:51,840
Speaker 1: there was one other thing I saw in that um

659
00:39:52,040 --> 00:39:56,560
Speaker 1: fast Co Motherboard pastor Knack article. Um he just kind

660
00:39:56,600 --> 00:40:01,120
Speaker 1: of casually made mention that department stores, how spittles airports,

661
00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:06,279
Speaker 1: they're already using video facial recognition systems. So if you

662
00:40:06,360 --> 00:40:10,120
Speaker 1: walk into like Macy's or something, I don't know this specifically,

663
00:40:10,200 --> 00:40:13,080
Speaker 1: but I'm just picking on Macy's that when you're on camera,

664
00:40:13,480 --> 00:40:15,960
Speaker 1: your face is being run against the database to see

665
00:40:16,000 --> 00:40:18,239
Speaker 1: if you're somebody that they should be worried about, or

666
00:40:18,239 --> 00:40:21,640
Speaker 1: maybe even call the cops about to say that somebody

667
00:40:21,680 --> 00:40:25,799
Speaker 1: that likes neckties. And they may have that too. It

668
00:40:25,880 --> 00:40:28,680
Speaker 1: depends on whether they got their software from Taser or

669
00:40:28,800 --> 00:40:33,080
Speaker 1: from Marcus. Yeah, I did not know that, and that

670
00:40:33,080 --> 00:40:37,319
Speaker 1: that just takes profiling to a higher level. Huh. Yeah, well,

671
00:40:37,440 --> 00:40:43,000
Speaker 1: or maybe not if they're getting good information. I mean,

672
00:40:43,040 --> 00:40:46,600
Speaker 1: that's not profiling, is it. It's ultra tailored profiling. If

673
00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:48,720
Speaker 1: someone walks in and they're like, well, this guy committed

674
00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:53,680
Speaker 1: three acts of of shoplifting in the past year, they

675
00:40:53,840 --> 00:40:56,640
Speaker 1: might want to watch him. Is that profiling? No, because

676
00:40:56,680 --> 00:40:59,680
Speaker 1: it's specific to you, not say your race or something

677
00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:03,080
Speaker 1: like so, yeah, it's it's difficult to argue that that

678
00:41:03,120 --> 00:41:05,520
Speaker 1: at that point of it. It's more just like the

679
00:41:05,960 --> 00:41:11,200
Speaker 1: man you know that being surveiled everywhere. So this is

680
00:41:11,239 --> 00:41:15,200
Speaker 1: a good one. Yeah, you got anything else. No, I'm

681
00:41:15,239 --> 00:41:17,520
Speaker 1: interested to see where this goes. Plenty of follow up

682
00:41:17,520 --> 00:41:20,839
Speaker 1: stories over the years. I'm sure ye will happen. Yes,

683
00:41:20,960 --> 00:41:24,279
Speaker 1: I'm sure as well. Um, if you want to know

684
00:41:24,320 --> 00:41:27,560
Speaker 1: more about body Warren cameras, police cameras, just look up

685
00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:30,160
Speaker 1: police body cameras. They'll bring up this really good article

686
00:41:30,200 --> 00:41:33,759
Speaker 1: by Julia Layton on how stuff works. Since I said

687
00:41:33,760 --> 00:41:38,360
Speaker 1: that it's time for listener mail, I'm gonna call this, well,

688
00:41:39,040 --> 00:41:41,120
Speaker 1: I'm gonna call it a very cute email from a

689
00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:45,160
Speaker 1: little kid. Maybe I shouldn't read that one on this one, right,

690
00:41:46,080 --> 00:41:47,960
Speaker 1: He's got a slog through this and be like, this

691
00:41:48,040 --> 00:41:50,000
Speaker 1: is the future I have ahead of me? All right?

692
00:41:50,040 --> 00:41:52,879
Speaker 1: So this was from Noah. He is five years old

693
00:41:53,160 --> 00:41:58,319
Speaker 1: and is Scottish. Um and his mom sort of supplemented

694
00:41:58,360 --> 00:42:00,759
Speaker 1: the email with some little thing here and there, and

695
00:42:00,800 --> 00:42:02,680
Speaker 1: then at the end she said, you know, he really

696
00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:05,360
Speaker 1: I wanted to write into you guys personally, so I

697
00:42:05,520 --> 00:42:08,719
Speaker 1: let him use my email account and otherwise it is

698
00:42:08,760 --> 00:42:12,719
Speaker 1: just his words. And then a PS from mom, Dear

699
00:42:13,000 --> 00:42:17,160
Speaker 1: Josh C h O s H. Very cute. I like

700
00:42:17,239 --> 00:42:19,120
Speaker 1: listening to your podcast. I listened to it in the

701
00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:22,840
Speaker 1: car and before I fall asleep. My favorite facts is

702
00:42:22,880 --> 00:42:25,719
Speaker 1: about an iceberg as big as Jamaica and what to

703
00:42:25,760 --> 00:42:29,399
Speaker 1: do in a tornado, And then mom says in parentheses,

704
00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:32,040
Speaker 1: he reminds me frequently to not go in a tunnel

705
00:42:32,120 --> 00:42:34,759
Speaker 1: during a tornado. We live in Scotland, where there are

706
00:42:34,800 --> 00:42:39,600
Speaker 1: no tornadoes. You're funny and I like learning about disasters

707
00:42:39,960 --> 00:42:43,160
Speaker 1: as long as they're not too scary. And my mama says,

708
00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:46,719
Speaker 1: I'm too little. Can you do an episode about the

709
00:42:46,719 --> 00:42:49,799
Speaker 1: different kinds of bridges and engineers? I listened to that

710
00:42:49,880 --> 00:42:52,480
Speaker 1: one you did, but I'd like another because I'm going

711
00:42:52,520 --> 00:42:57,919
Speaker 1: to be a structural engineer and build bridges. Love Noah parentheses.

712
00:42:58,040 --> 00:43:00,800
Speaker 1: I'm five and I live in Scotland, which is in Europe.

713
00:43:01,840 --> 00:43:05,480
Speaker 1: Thanks thanks for the tip. Noah, Noah, that is great.

714
00:43:05,640 --> 00:43:09,440
Speaker 1: You're wonderful. We appreciate you. The mom adds this, ps,

715
00:43:09,840 --> 00:43:11,959
Speaker 1: I'm afraid there's one in the family who's not a fan.

716
00:43:12,400 --> 00:43:14,600
Speaker 1: Every time Stuff you Should Know comes on in the car,

717
00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:18,640
Speaker 1: my three year old daughter cries, no, not Stuff you

718
00:43:18,680 --> 00:43:23,200
Speaker 1: should Know. I can't sing to that. Oh that's cute,

719
00:43:23,239 --> 00:43:25,400
Speaker 1: and she says, sorry, guys, you can't compete with Disney

720
00:43:25,480 --> 00:43:29,920
Speaker 1: and me personally Uh, Mom, if you can record your

721
00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:33,799
Speaker 1: daughter screaming about how she doesn't like stuff you should know,

722
00:43:35,000 --> 00:43:38,319
Speaker 1: and then record Noah talking about how he does love

723
00:43:38,360 --> 00:43:41,840
Speaker 1: stuff you should know in that lovely Scottish accent, I

724
00:43:42,000 --> 00:43:44,040
Speaker 1: for one would like to hear that. Yeah, same here

725
00:43:44,120 --> 00:43:48,080
Speaker 1: and we'll even play it. Um. Yeah, thanks a lot. No,

726
00:43:48,360 --> 00:43:51,920
Speaker 1: you're the bomb buddy in America. That means you're terrific.

727
00:43:53,120 --> 00:43:57,600
Speaker 1: Uh and thanks to mom too for fostering the email. Yes, wait,

728
00:43:57,640 --> 00:44:00,480
Speaker 1: wait to go? Mom is great. You're all great. If

729
00:44:00,520 --> 00:44:02,799
Speaker 1: you're a cute kid who wants to tell us high,

730
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:05,600
Speaker 1: we love hearing from you. Um. You can tweet to

731
00:44:05,719 --> 00:44:09,440
Speaker 1: us at josh um Clark or at s y s

732
00:44:09,480 --> 00:44:12,160
Speaker 1: K podcast. You can hang out with Chuck on Facebook

733
00:44:12,200 --> 00:44:15,200
Speaker 1: dot com slash stuff you Should Know or slash Charles W.

734
00:44:15,360 --> 00:44:18,439
Speaker 1: Chuck Bryant. You can take the traditional route and send

735
00:44:18,520 --> 00:44:22,239
Speaker 1: us an email at stuff Podcast. How stuff Works dot

736
00:44:22,239 --> 00:44:24,279
Speaker 1: com has always join us at our home on the web,

737
00:44:24,640 --> 00:44:30,960
Speaker 1: Stuff you Should Know dot com for more on this

738
00:44:31,160 --> 00:44:33,680
Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics. Is it how stuff Works

739
00:44:33,680 --> 00:44:44,560
Speaker 1: dot com