WEBVTT - Perry Mehrling Explains Why "The Money View" Is Key To Understanding Financial Markets

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the ad Thoughts Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Allaway and I'm Joe. Wisn't thal Joe? We

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<v Speaker 1>like to talk about money on this show, don't we? We?

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<v Speaker 1>We sure do both sort of things that are implicitly

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<v Speaker 1>about money, which is everything, and then also explicitly about money,

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<v Speaker 1>which is what, what is it? Where does it come from?

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<v Speaker 1>What are some different theories of how it exists? Definitely,

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<v Speaker 1>I would say it's one of our favorite topics. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and we also like to talk about the repo market.

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<v Speaker 1>And one other thing we like to talk about is

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<v Speaker 1>the inadequacies of traditional economic models. So what if we

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<v Speaker 1>were going to talk about all three of those in

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<v Speaker 1>one big episode? Oh? I like that, like a true trifecta.

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<v Speaker 1>Like we had a recent episode on the repo market

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<v Speaker 1>with the Alton posts Are that was great. We had

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<v Speaker 1>UH We talked to Lord Skidelski recently on the failure

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<v Speaker 1>of traditional UH in traditional economists to understand money, and

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<v Speaker 1>as you mentioned, we talked about money all the time.

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<v Speaker 1>So I agree that if we could sort of combine

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<v Speaker 1>all of these themes economist failures, money, repo, all these things,

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<v Speaker 1>that would be a very satisfying discussion. All right, well,

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<v Speaker 1>I have a feeling you're in for a satisfying discussion

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<v Speaker 1>because our guest today is funny that you should mention

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<v Speaker 1>Sultan Posar, but it's someone who has worked with Sultan

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<v Speaker 1>in the past, someone who result In actually quoted when

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<v Speaker 1>he did that episode of All Bots back in November,

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<v Speaker 1>and someone who Sulton says, has informed his thinking on

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<v Speaker 1>the repo market and the reason we're sort of focused

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<v Speaker 1>on the repo market particularly. But and it's going to

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<v Speaker 1>become clear as we embark on this conversation, but there

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<v Speaker 1>was this moment during the big rebo madness in September

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<v Speaker 1>where even though we had repo rates shoot up to

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<v Speaker 1>ten cent, we didn't see market participants come in and

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<v Speaker 1>actually take advantage of that rate and actually arbitrage it out.

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<v Speaker 1>And this was one of the big questions of that event,

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<v Speaker 1>like why didn't JP Morgan come in and earn ten

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<v Speaker 1>percent overnight in September in the repo market? Right that

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<v Speaker 1>whole incident. So we got through the year without another

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<v Speaker 1>major hiccup. Obviously, the FED sort of realized that things

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<v Speaker 1>were problematic, that there was a shortage of liquidity and

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<v Speaker 1>so on. And so they took a number of steps

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<v Speaker 1>basically in the final quarter of to prevent another blow

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<v Speaker 1>up like we saw an early September. But that doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>take away from the fact that that incident in early September,

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<v Speaker 1>when REPO rates sword, raised a whole host of new

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<v Speaker 1>questions about the current structure of this sort of bank

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<v Speaker 1>liquidity system and whether it's adequate and whether people really

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<v Speaker 1>understand it well. So even in the absence of another

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<v Speaker 1>blow up, there's still just tons of discussion about what

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<v Speaker 1>really needs to be done to um to address flaws

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<v Speaker 1>in the plumbing of the system. That's exactly right, and

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to be looking at that particular REPO example

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<v Speaker 1>through the prism of money and also an economic model

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<v Speaker 1>that takes into account a sort of new definition of money. So,

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<v Speaker 1>without further ado, why don't I bring on our guests.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm very excited. It's Perry Maryland, the professor of International

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<v Speaker 1>Political Economy at the Party School of Global Studies at

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<v Speaker 1>Boston University. Perry, thanks for coming on. Nice to be here. So, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you can tell Joe and I are both excited to

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<v Speaker 1>talk with you, and we have a lot to get through.

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<v Speaker 1>But maybe just to begin with you walk us through

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<v Speaker 1>your definition of what money actually is and how your

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<v Speaker 1>you call it the money view. How does that differ

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<v Speaker 1>from a traditional economic model? UM, Well, the money view

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<v Speaker 1>U is an approach to thinking about UM economic interactions

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<v Speaker 1>that emphasizes when you when you say it's a different

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<v Speaker 1>view of money, it treats money. The essential quality of

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<v Speaker 1>money is that it's a means of settlement. It means

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<v Speaker 1>a payment of settling bills. UM that most of the

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<v Speaker 1>economy is organized as an interlocking UH set of balance

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<v Speaker 1>sheets promises to pay, and what you're promising to pay

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<v Speaker 1>is money. So the settlement constraint is the essential constraint

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<v Speaker 1>on the economy as a whole that keeps it sort

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<v Speaker 1>of coherent that people are focusing their minds on I'm

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<v Speaker 1>not going to actually satisfy that promise that I've made,

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<v Speaker 1>and so clearing and settlement becomes very central. Now you

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<v Speaker 1>you mentioned in the intro that that's something that he's

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<v Speaker 1>not really central in standard economics. UM. Standard economics is

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<v Speaker 1>thinking about intertemporal budget constraints and and essentially a wealth

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<v Speaker 1>constraint that that if you have wealth, then you can

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<v Speaker 1>convert that wealth into consumption or investment or whatever, and

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<v Speaker 1>it it pretty much assumes an economy of infinite liquidity

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<v Speaker 1>that you can convert from one form of wealth to

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<v Speaker 1>another form of wealth with no problem at all. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>now that's a useful abstraction for some purposes. Um. But

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<v Speaker 1>if what you're interested in is money, Uh, it's not

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<v Speaker 1>a useful thing. It's abstracting for money essentially, and looking

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<v Speaker 1>behind the veil of money. The money view says, let's

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<v Speaker 1>look at the veil of money. The veil of money

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<v Speaker 1>is the essence of what's happening in the economy, not

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<v Speaker 1>something that's obscuring what's happening at some deeper level. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>So we look at the plumbing as a very serious

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<v Speaker 1>piece of instrumentation for a market economy, and that settlement

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<v Speaker 1>constraint is is the first key thing that we focus on.

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<v Speaker 1>So we were talking recently with the economist Robert Skidelski,

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<v Speaker 1>and there's this recurring theme that mainstream economists, still more

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<v Speaker 1>or less in their head, think of the economy as

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<v Speaker 1>a barter system. You have a couple of bananas, I

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<v Speaker 1>have some apples, and uh, money solves for the dual

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<v Speaker 1>coincidences of wants in case there's some sort of you know,

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<v Speaker 1>time lag issue. Maybe I don't want bananas, so we

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<v Speaker 1>find someone with pairs and so on, and money solves.

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<v Speaker 1>In the mainstream view of economics more or less, money

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<v Speaker 1>just sort of lubricates barter. And he sort of explained

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<v Speaker 1>all the reasons why this is a flawed view. And

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<v Speaker 1>I guess what you're saying is the money view, which

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<v Speaker 1>is the framework that you put in really makes the

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<v Speaker 1>money the central part. That our lives are not about

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<v Speaker 1>exchanging bananas for pairs or oranges or apples or whatever,

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<v Speaker 1>but about meeting a series of financial obligations. Yes, that's right, um,

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<v Speaker 1>And I would what Satowski is referring to there is

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<v Speaker 1>that in standard economics, money is treated as a medium

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<v Speaker 1>of exchange, okay, And that's what you're saying between the

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<v Speaker 1>bananas and apples on so forth, Um, that it's just

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<v Speaker 1>greasing the wheels, um, not means of payment. So that's

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<v Speaker 1>that's the contrast that I'm trying to make and the media.

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<v Speaker 1>This this money view, I should mention, is by no

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<v Speaker 1>means an invention of my own. There's there's it's a

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<v Speaker 1>long tradition in in economics of people thinking in this way. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>and I've learned a great deal from them, but it's

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<v Speaker 1>always been a kind of minority position. There seems to

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<v Speaker 1>be something attractive about looking through the veil of money

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<v Speaker 1>to see something deeper. Um and Uh, but that does

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<v Speaker 1>prevent you from seeing what's right in your face, and

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<v Speaker 1>sometimes it's very much in your face. Um. As this

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<v Speaker 1>repo business that you were mentioning, Um, suddenly the only

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<v Speaker 1>thing that's important is means of payment? Is means of payment?

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<v Speaker 1>Can you just clarify something you said, what is the

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<v Speaker 1>difference between money as a means of payment versus money

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<v Speaker 1>as a settlement mechanism? You sort of drew a distinction.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure if I totally the same thing I'm meaning.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm meaning that to be settling a debt is paying

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<v Speaker 1>the debt saying yeah, So I'm just using different words

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<v Speaker 1>that might appeal to different people or different intuition. So

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<v Speaker 1>I definitely want to dig into the repo market. But

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<v Speaker 1>before we do, UM, I wondered if you could talk

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit more about how the money view informs

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<v Speaker 1>your understanding of capital markets, Because if we think that

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<v Speaker 1>money is sort of a promise to pay, and that

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<v Speaker 1>every day those promises need to be settled, which means

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<v Speaker 1>every day, you know, ideally you have a balance between

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<v Speaker 1>the promises or the io use that were made and

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<v Speaker 1>the actual cash inflows that are coming into the system.

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<v Speaker 1>But I think on most days you wouldn't have that.

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<v Speaker 1>You would always have some sort of borrower in the

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<v Speaker 1>financial system that doesn't have enough cash on hand to

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<v Speaker 1>satisfy it's promised to pay or it's iou. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of where the capital market comes in. Well that's

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<v Speaker 1>where so so let me make a distinction here between

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<v Speaker 1>the capital market and the money market. Um. If you

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<v Speaker 1>are on on on in today, um that your cash

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<v Speaker 1>inflows are uh not sufficient to meet your cash commitments. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>then you are a deficit agent at the settlement and

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<v Speaker 1>you have to find a way to meet that deficit,

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<v Speaker 1>and that might be borrowing overnight okay in the money market, um,

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<v Speaker 1>in order to in order to meet that. So you're

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<v Speaker 1>just pushing off that day of settlement by one day.

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<v Speaker 1>The overnight rate of interest is essentially the cost of

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<v Speaker 1>delaying settlement by one day in the money view. That's

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<v Speaker 1>how you think of it. Now, the capital markets come

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<v Speaker 1>in because there are longer term assets there are bonds,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, um which are not promises to pay tomorrow right,

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<v Speaker 1>their promises to pay in ten years or various coupons

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<v Speaker 1>over the next ten years. But they have a certain

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<v Speaker 1>market value today. So their value today is as collateral okay,

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<v Speaker 1>that you can use that that their form of wealth

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<v Speaker 1>that you can use as collateral for borrowing overnight to

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<v Speaker 1>make your settlement. So there's this connection between money markets

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<v Speaker 1>and capital markets that that the capital values are collateral

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<v Speaker 1>for borrowing overnight in the money markets, and that's basically

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<v Speaker 1>what a repo is. So repo is side going back

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<v Speaker 1>to just this key question of this of the money

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<v Speaker 1>view as you put it, you're not really the first

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<v Speaker 1>originator of this view, but that it's kind of been

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<v Speaker 1>my minority view all along. How would you describe, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>the negative consequences to economics and to the understanding of

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<v Speaker 1>our system from uh the veil perspective, from the traditional

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<v Speaker 1>perspective on economics and banking which sort of abstracts away money.

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<v Speaker 1>What are the what are the downfalls of that system

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<v Speaker 1>of that approach? Well, to follow up just from where

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<v Speaker 1>we were talking about the capital markets, there's one in particular,

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<v Speaker 1>which is that you wind up having an an adequate

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<v Speaker 1>theory of where asset prices come from. That asset prices,

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<v Speaker 1>the price of these capital assets is formed in dealer

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<v Speaker 1>markets UM by dealers who are quoting buy and sell prices.

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<v Speaker 1>UM and are and and and so that the economics

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<v Speaker 1>of the dealer function is key for understanding the market

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<v Speaker 1>value of of of of these capital assets and hence

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<v Speaker 1>the collateral that can be used in burrowing overnight UM.

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<v Speaker 1>This is another thing UM that the standard economics view

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<v Speaker 1>abstracts from. There are no dealers right in standard economics.

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<v Speaker 1>It's supply and demand. There are the people who want

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<v Speaker 1>the assets and the people who want to sell the assets.

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<v Speaker 1>There's no one in between them that's making markets. So

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<v Speaker 1>this market making function of dealers is a second key

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<v Speaker 1>piece of the money view. They're really that those are

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<v Speaker 1>the two key pieces. One is the settlement constraint and

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<v Speaker 1>the second is the dealer function. UM. Bringing those up

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<v Speaker 1>to the center of attention things that have been abstracted

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<v Speaker 1>away in in standard economics. You said the economics of

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<v Speaker 1>the dealer function are are crucial to understanding what's happening here.

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<v Speaker 1>Can you walk us through exactly how you incorporate those

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<v Speaker 1>into your model, and the thing I'm trying to get it,

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<v Speaker 1>or the thing that I'm curious about, is whether or

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<v Speaker 1>not you're sort of looking at the dealers from a

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<v Speaker 1>behavioral perspective in the sense that they might all react

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<v Speaker 1>in a not necessarily logical or rational way because of

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<v Speaker 1>some behavioral pattern um that they've experienced before, or are

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<v Speaker 1>you incorporating them from a sort of purely economic technical standpoint,

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<v Speaker 1>how are you actually doing that? Well, so you bring

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<v Speaker 1>up the topic of behavioral economics. The the money view

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<v Speaker 1>is is not a an argument that people are irrational

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<v Speaker 1>or something like that. What the money view emphasizes is

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<v Speaker 1>that a lot of the behavior of people is what

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<v Speaker 1>we would call in mathematics a corner solution. That you're

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<v Speaker 1>forced to do something. You know, that's what the settlement

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<v Speaker 1>constraint does. Right, you have to pay, and you promised

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<v Speaker 1>to pay, and now you have to pay, and if

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<v Speaker 1>you don't pay, you are out of the game. Liquidity

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<v Speaker 1>kills you quick. And so that means that in order

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<v Speaker 1>to meet that settlement, you might have to pay ten

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<v Speaker 1>percent overnight. That the it's not a it's not a choice, right,

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<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a corner solution in order to keep

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<v Speaker 1>in the keeping the game. Now, why is it a

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<v Speaker 1>corner solution. Okay, it's because the economy as it actually

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<v Speaker 1>exists in reality is not an intertemporal general equilibrium. It

0:14:15.840 --> 0:14:20.320
<v Speaker 1>is period by period, day by day settlement by settlement. Um.

0:14:20.400 --> 0:14:23.400
<v Speaker 1>If people behaved in the actual world the way they

0:14:23.440 --> 0:14:25.560
<v Speaker 1>behave in economic models, they would be out of the

0:14:25.600 --> 0:14:29.120
<v Speaker 1>game very soon. So it's irrational to be a rational

0:14:29.160 --> 0:14:32.320
<v Speaker 1>actor in the real world. In the real world, the

0:14:32.360 --> 0:14:36.320
<v Speaker 1>settlement constraint actually exists. You can abstract away from it

0:14:36.480 --> 0:14:39.120
<v Speaker 1>in an economic model, but not in the real world.

0:14:39.640 --> 0:14:43.400
<v Speaker 1>In the real world, prices are formed by in dealer markets.

0:14:43.560 --> 0:14:46.360
<v Speaker 1>You can abstract from dealers in the in the in

0:14:46.400 --> 0:14:49.840
<v Speaker 1>the abstract economic model, you cannot abstract from from dealer

0:14:49.880 --> 0:14:53.920
<v Speaker 1>from the dealer function in actual in actual performance and

0:14:54.120 --> 0:14:57.600
<v Speaker 1>dealing in the real world. So this is what people

0:14:57.720 --> 0:15:00.240
<v Speaker 1>get people. This is what attracts people to the money view,

0:15:00.560 --> 0:15:04.280
<v Speaker 1>that it's very much more rooted in the reality of

0:15:04.400 --> 0:15:07.520
<v Speaker 1>market practice. And that's why the money view, as I say,

0:15:07.680 --> 0:15:10.640
<v Speaker 1>is not an invention by me um. It's a natural

0:15:10.720 --> 0:15:13.320
<v Speaker 1>point of view of people who live in the world

0:15:13.360 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 1>where you're facing these settlement constraints where you are you

0:15:17.080 --> 0:15:19.280
<v Speaker 1>are a dealer, you're you're you're carrying on a dealer

0:15:19.320 --> 0:15:23.479
<v Speaker 1>function or or something like that. You are a central banker. Um,

0:15:23.520 --> 0:15:26.320
<v Speaker 1>this is the natural point of view for somebody who

0:15:26.360 --> 0:15:29.080
<v Speaker 1>lives in that part of the system. They can't abstract

0:15:29.080 --> 0:15:50.400
<v Speaker 1>away from these things because that's their business. I remember

0:15:50.480 --> 0:15:53.880
<v Speaker 1>when we did our interview with Sulton, he talked about

0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:57.040
<v Speaker 1>repo being I think he described it how you live

0:15:57.120 --> 0:15:59.280
<v Speaker 1>to see another day. And of course that's very similar

0:15:59.320 --> 0:16:02.120
<v Speaker 1>to what you're saying. Go talk talk to us a

0:16:02.160 --> 0:16:05.200
<v Speaker 1>little bit about the financial crisis, because something you hear

0:16:05.240 --> 0:16:09.440
<v Speaker 1>from a lot of people is that mainstream economist, traditional

0:16:09.480 --> 0:16:12.920
<v Speaker 1>economics was ill equipped to see the financial crisis coming

0:16:13.200 --> 0:16:16.160
<v Speaker 1>to explain it. It didn't fit into their sort of

0:16:16.480 --> 0:16:20.360
<v Speaker 1>general equilibrium models and so forth. Connect the dots for

0:16:20.480 --> 0:16:25.440
<v Speaker 1>us between the sort of corner solutions that absolute requirements

0:16:25.520 --> 0:16:27.480
<v Speaker 1>of the dealers to do whatever they had to do

0:16:27.560 --> 0:16:31.120
<v Speaker 1>to survive another day, and the money viewers perspective on

0:16:31.200 --> 0:16:35.400
<v Speaker 1>how the financial crisis came about. Um. Well, I've written

0:16:35.560 --> 0:16:39.480
<v Speaker 1>a book about the financial crisis, The New Lombard Street. Um.

0:16:39.520 --> 0:16:42.320
<v Speaker 1>The short answer is that to understand you're talking about

0:16:42.320 --> 0:16:47.280
<v Speaker 1>the two thousand nine. Yeah. Yeah. So the way that

0:16:47.320 --> 0:16:50.720
<v Speaker 1>I would understand this is that this was a test

0:16:51.120 --> 0:16:55.160
<v Speaker 1>of this emerging market based credit system UM, sometimes called

0:16:55.160 --> 0:16:58.800
<v Speaker 1>shadow banking UM. And the the the notion of shadow

0:16:58.800 --> 0:17:01.400
<v Speaker 1>banking that I would urge UM on your listeners is

0:17:01.440 --> 0:17:04.439
<v Speaker 1>to understand shadow banking as money market funding of capital

0:17:04.520 --> 0:17:07.320
<v Speaker 1>market lending. It's the form of banking that's sort of

0:17:07.400 --> 0:17:11.920
<v Speaker 1>natural for a modern globalized, financialized economy. UM. Where you're

0:17:11.920 --> 0:17:15.760
<v Speaker 1>talking about the money market funding UM is wholesale funding

0:17:16.080 --> 0:17:20.359
<v Speaker 1>in money markets UM, not deposits right as in banks. UM.

0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:24.439
<v Speaker 1>And the capital market lending is is capital markets you know.

0:17:24.520 --> 0:17:28.240
<v Speaker 1>This is again wholesale pricing in dealer markets UM, not

0:17:28.640 --> 0:17:32.080
<v Speaker 1>bank loans you know that are that are specific to

0:17:32.359 --> 0:17:36.560
<v Speaker 1>the relationship between a bank and and the borrower. UM.

0:17:36.600 --> 0:17:40.760
<v Speaker 1>This is the modern form of of banking that evolved

0:17:40.800 --> 0:17:45.080
<v Speaker 1>as we were globalizing, UM the market system, but we

0:17:45.160 --> 0:17:48.600
<v Speaker 1>hadn't yet developed the systems for backstopping it and supporting it,

0:17:48.640 --> 0:17:51.280
<v Speaker 1>and so we had a little crisis there where when

0:17:51.359 --> 0:17:54.800
<v Speaker 1>you're doing shadow banking money market funding a capital market lending,

0:17:55.119 --> 0:17:58.280
<v Speaker 1>that means that periodically you have to roll your funding.

0:17:58.440 --> 0:18:00.560
<v Speaker 1>And if you can't roll your funding. You have to

0:18:00.640 --> 0:18:04.240
<v Speaker 1>sell your asset um and that's a fire sale, and

0:18:04.520 --> 0:18:08.080
<v Speaker 1>that's the liquidity aspect of it. The central banks put

0:18:08.240 --> 0:18:11.359
<v Speaker 1>a floor on this crisis basically by taking the shadow

0:18:11.359 --> 0:18:14.320
<v Speaker 1>banking system onto their own balance sheet, doing shadow banking

0:18:14.720 --> 0:18:16.800
<v Speaker 1>on the balance sheet of the central bank, and that

0:18:16.920 --> 0:18:18.800
<v Speaker 1>put a floor on it. But it took a while

0:18:19.000 --> 0:18:22.280
<v Speaker 1>to to sort all this out, and meanwhile there is

0:18:22.280 --> 0:18:25.240
<v Speaker 1>a bit of a crisis. So what are the implications

0:18:25.320 --> 0:18:31.359
<v Speaker 1>for financial stability now? Based on your definition of shadow banking,

0:18:31.440 --> 0:18:36.680
<v Speaker 1>so money market funding of capital market lending, when when

0:18:36.720 --> 0:18:40.720
<v Speaker 1>most regulators talk about shadow banking, they usually use a

0:18:40.720 --> 0:18:46.080
<v Speaker 1>definition that's something like financial intermediation by non bank entities,

0:18:46.119 --> 0:18:50.520
<v Speaker 1>which basically sounds like it's a bunch of unregulated activity

0:18:50.840 --> 0:18:54.800
<v Speaker 1>that it's probably nefarious in some way. But your definition

0:18:54.880 --> 0:19:00.440
<v Speaker 1>seems much more neutral. You're basically talking about extending credit

0:19:00.720 --> 0:19:04.560
<v Speaker 1>just through a slightly different channel. So how shall we

0:19:04.600 --> 0:19:08.160
<v Speaker 1>be thinking of that in terms of financial stability. Well,

0:19:08.200 --> 0:19:13.560
<v Speaker 1>that my definition is meant to um include that form

0:19:13.720 --> 0:19:15.640
<v Speaker 1>of lending if it's even if it's on a bank

0:19:15.680 --> 0:19:18.600
<v Speaker 1>balance sheet, which in most cases in two thousand seven

0:19:18.880 --> 0:19:21.560
<v Speaker 1>it was on bank balance sheet in Europe, okay, but

0:19:21.600 --> 0:19:23.119
<v Speaker 1>it was not on the bank balance sheet of the

0:19:23.160 --> 0:19:26.640
<v Speaker 1>United States, and that had to do with regulation, okay, Um,

0:19:26.680 --> 0:19:29.920
<v Speaker 1>But the economics of it was very similar whether it's

0:19:29.920 --> 0:19:31.960
<v Speaker 1>on a bank balance sheet or on some other bank

0:19:31.960 --> 0:19:34.040
<v Speaker 1>balance or some other balance sheet. That's why I want

0:19:34.119 --> 0:19:38.320
<v Speaker 1>to use that definition, so that we're not reaffying sort

0:19:38.359 --> 0:19:42.600
<v Speaker 1>of regulatory categories, but thinking about economic categories. So in

0:19:42.600 --> 0:19:46.960
<v Speaker 1>in in today's world, the important place where you see

0:19:47.840 --> 0:19:50.600
<v Speaker 1>money market funding of capital market lending is in fact

0:19:50.680 --> 0:19:53.960
<v Speaker 1>in the emerging market. UM. As you, as I'm sure

0:19:54.000 --> 0:19:58.159
<v Speaker 1>your listeners know, the the major amount of credit growth

0:19:58.200 --> 0:20:00.600
<v Speaker 1>since the financial crisis has re we've been in the

0:20:00.640 --> 0:20:04.879
<v Speaker 1>periphery in the emerging markets. These are these are dollar borrowers, UM,

0:20:05.160 --> 0:20:08.360
<v Speaker 1>long term dollar borrowers. But the actual funding of that

0:20:08.480 --> 0:20:11.440
<v Speaker 1>has been happening in the global money market dollar money

0:20:11.440 --> 0:20:14.960
<v Speaker 1>market system, sometimes using for exchange swaps in order to

0:20:15.240 --> 0:20:19.359
<v Speaker 1>in order to move it into domestic domestic funding in

0:20:19.400 --> 0:20:22.600
<v Speaker 1>other currencies. UM. This is the system that's been building

0:20:22.680 --> 0:20:26.920
<v Speaker 1>up since the since the financial crisis of two thousand seven. UM.

0:20:27.080 --> 0:20:29.080
<v Speaker 1>And this is a system that it seems to me

0:20:29.200 --> 0:20:32.359
<v Speaker 1>is most likely to be tested in in the next

0:20:32.680 --> 0:20:36.040
<v Speaker 1>uh critical moments of the of the system, and hopefully

0:20:36.080 --> 0:20:38.240
<v Speaker 1>we'll get through that and we'll find out where it

0:20:38.280 --> 0:20:41.000
<v Speaker 1>breaks and we'll fix that. So that's the place that

0:20:41.080 --> 0:20:44.639
<v Speaker 1>I'm watching. So let's just to spell it out for

0:20:44.680 --> 0:20:48.840
<v Speaker 1>the listeners. We're talking about. Okay, money market funding of

0:20:48.920 --> 0:20:53.600
<v Speaker 1>capital markets activities. You're seeing it growing in emerging markets globally,

0:20:54.200 --> 0:20:59.880
<v Speaker 1>so essentially people borrowing short term overnight in dollars then

0:21:00.080 --> 0:21:03.879
<v Speaker 1>using that funding for longer term projects. Talk to us

0:21:03.960 --> 0:21:06.719
<v Speaker 1>about uh, you know, you're saying, this is what you're watching.

0:21:06.840 --> 0:21:10.560
<v Speaker 1>What are the stresses that you're looking for, and what

0:21:11.119 --> 0:21:14.560
<v Speaker 1>you know from a financial stability perspective, what kind of

0:21:15.040 --> 0:21:18.159
<v Speaker 1>red flags or yellow yellow light should people be on

0:21:18.200 --> 0:21:21.440
<v Speaker 1>alert for. Well, what I watch is this sort of

0:21:21.720 --> 0:21:26.119
<v Speaker 1>circular loop where just imagine the following that you have

0:21:26.440 --> 0:21:30.439
<v Speaker 1>a let us say a Brazilian national champion firm that

0:21:30.600 --> 0:21:35.359
<v Speaker 1>is borrowing five year bond dollar bond okay um, and

0:21:35.400 --> 0:21:40.240
<v Speaker 1>they're using those funds for whatever their businesses. Okay, that

0:21:40.440 --> 0:21:43.600
<v Speaker 1>that bond, where does the money come from? Okay, that

0:21:43.640 --> 0:21:49.200
<v Speaker 1>bond is bought let's say by some uh Asian bank

0:21:49.520 --> 0:21:52.120
<v Speaker 1>that is then going to fund that in three months

0:21:52.640 --> 0:21:55.760
<v Speaker 1>dollar money markets. It's borrowing from some French bank that's

0:21:55.800 --> 0:21:59.600
<v Speaker 1>issuing that's buying that three month paper, which is funding

0:21:59.640 --> 0:22:03.879
<v Speaker 1>in overnight repo in in in global money markets, which

0:22:04.320 --> 0:22:07.119
<v Speaker 1>or maybe in the eurodollar market. And then the Central

0:22:07.119 --> 0:22:11.119
<v Speaker 1>Bank of Brazil is acquiring dollar balances as its reserves.

0:22:11.119 --> 0:22:13.879
<v Speaker 1>So that's you see how that's a round trip. Okay,

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:18.800
<v Speaker 1>So Brazil as a country is borrowing five year in dollars,

0:22:18.840 --> 0:22:22.880
<v Speaker 1>that's its on the non financial corporate um and lending

0:22:23.359 --> 0:22:26.440
<v Speaker 1>um in the in the global dollar money markets as

0:22:26.520 --> 0:22:31.360
<v Speaker 1>the central bank reserves. So all of that loop work okay,

0:22:31.640 --> 0:22:34.920
<v Speaker 1>until it doesn't. Their number of links right that we're

0:22:34.920 --> 0:22:37.800
<v Speaker 1>looking at, and any one of those lengths that if

0:22:37.800 --> 0:22:41.000
<v Speaker 1>it were to fail, would cause a would cause problems

0:22:41.000 --> 0:22:43.080
<v Speaker 1>in the system as a whole that that loop has

0:22:43.119 --> 0:22:46.480
<v Speaker 1>to close in order for in order for the system

0:22:46.520 --> 0:22:50.320
<v Speaker 1>to be maintained. One place that loop might not close

0:22:50.600 --> 0:22:55.199
<v Speaker 1>is that Brazil is is borrowing long and lending shorts, okay,

0:22:55.440 --> 0:22:58.920
<v Speaker 1>and the rest of the world is is lending long

0:22:58.960 --> 0:23:01.919
<v Speaker 1>and borrowing short. Thing, So the rest of the world

0:23:02.280 --> 0:23:06.040
<v Speaker 1>is acting like a bank for Brazil, right, and and

0:23:06.080 --> 0:23:09.960
<v Speaker 1>Brazil's source of liquidity is its deposits in that rest

0:23:09.960 --> 0:23:12.320
<v Speaker 1>of the World Bank, which is which is not in

0:23:12.320 --> 0:23:14.680
<v Speaker 1>the United States at all. By the way, you noticed

0:23:14.760 --> 0:23:17.320
<v Speaker 1>that I haven't mentioned the United States. Okay, it's all

0:23:17.359 --> 0:23:19.600
<v Speaker 1>in dollars, but it's not in the United States. So

0:23:19.640 --> 0:23:22.199
<v Speaker 1>there's another little link. What is the link between the

0:23:22.280 --> 0:23:25.959
<v Speaker 1>lender of last resort, the actual source of dollars, the FED, okay,

0:23:26.040 --> 0:23:30.480
<v Speaker 1>and this global dollar system that is offshore. So all

0:23:30.520 --> 0:23:34.480
<v Speaker 1>of these links are, they exist, there are lengths um

0:23:34.520 --> 0:23:37.840
<v Speaker 1>and they will be tested. That's what financial crisis are

0:23:38.160 --> 0:23:43.240
<v Speaker 1>for at some high level, to to to see if

0:23:43.320 --> 0:23:46.480
<v Speaker 1>you have the proper links and to and to improve them.

0:23:46.520 --> 0:23:49.639
<v Speaker 1>That we learn in each crisis where exactly is the

0:23:49.640 --> 0:23:52.199
<v Speaker 1>weak link, and then we fix that link and we

0:23:52.320 --> 0:23:55.160
<v Speaker 1>go on and then we find out where the next

0:23:55.160 --> 0:23:57.760
<v Speaker 1>week oft link is. And this is how the system works.

0:23:59.560 --> 0:24:02.120
<v Speaker 1>I've forgot to mention at the beginning. There's actually a

0:24:02.200 --> 0:24:06.800
<v Speaker 1>fourth major odd thoughts topic that your research also touches on,

0:24:06.880 --> 0:24:09.399
<v Speaker 1>and that is the dominance of the US dollar in

0:24:09.480 --> 0:24:12.600
<v Speaker 1>the global financial system. Of course, and we've spoken to

0:24:13.080 --> 0:24:16.480
<v Speaker 1>people like Hun Song Shin from the Bank for International

0:24:16.520 --> 0:24:22.960
<v Speaker 1>Settlements about this centrality of the dollar in global markets.

0:24:23.000 --> 0:24:27.640
<v Speaker 1>Mostly via funding markets and capital markets. As you point out, UM,

0:24:27.680 --> 0:24:29.760
<v Speaker 1>I do want to talk about the repo market. But

0:24:30.440 --> 0:24:32.399
<v Speaker 1>before we do, and since we're on the topic of

0:24:32.440 --> 0:24:37.439
<v Speaker 1>emerging markets, what is the money view actually say about China?

0:24:38.040 --> 0:24:41.200
<v Speaker 1>About China? I guess one of the things that I've

0:24:41.200 --> 0:24:44.240
<v Speaker 1>said about China is that the notion that the R

0:24:44.320 --> 0:24:48.280
<v Speaker 1>and B is going to be the global currency is

0:24:48.359 --> 0:24:51.960
<v Speaker 1>not any time soon. UM. I think that's now the

0:24:52.119 --> 0:24:54.919
<v Speaker 1>usual point of view. But when I was writing about

0:24:54.920 --> 0:24:58.320
<v Speaker 1>this or five years ago, UM, maybe you remember, there

0:24:58.400 --> 0:25:02.880
<v Speaker 1>was some excitement about R and B replacing the dollar. UM.

0:25:02.920 --> 0:25:05.879
<v Speaker 1>But I think that's because people saw that China was

0:25:05.920 --> 0:25:10.160
<v Speaker 1>a large country and they were not understanding what what

0:25:10.160 --> 0:25:12.200
<v Speaker 1>what what does it mean to be a global reserve

0:25:12.240 --> 0:25:15.640
<v Speaker 1>currency that all of the plumbing, all of the apparatus.

0:25:15.680 --> 0:25:18.520
<v Speaker 1>Are you really prepared to do all of that stuff? Um?

0:25:19.160 --> 0:25:23.160
<v Speaker 1>And the answers basically no. So the the the the

0:25:23.160 --> 0:25:27.760
<v Speaker 1>the world system is still global dollar system. UM. And

0:25:27.840 --> 0:25:31.439
<v Speaker 1>I I'm glad you mentioned hun Shin. UM. I learned

0:25:31.560 --> 0:25:33.960
<v Speaker 1>very much from the reports of the b I S

0:25:34.160 --> 0:25:36.800
<v Speaker 1>and from and from hun Shin and his whole group,

0:25:37.160 --> 0:25:40.480
<v Speaker 1>so they are I view them as fellow travelers in

0:25:40.480 --> 0:25:43.480
<v Speaker 1>the money view. Um, we're on the same point of view.

0:25:43.480 --> 0:25:46.200
<v Speaker 1>And as I said, that's because it's a natural point

0:25:46.200 --> 0:25:48.199
<v Speaker 1>of view for people who are in central banks. And

0:25:48.240 --> 0:25:50.440
<v Speaker 1>what's more central banking than the b I s, it's

0:25:50.520 --> 0:25:53.560
<v Speaker 1>the it's the place where the central banks I'll talk

0:25:53.640 --> 0:25:58.760
<v Speaker 1>to each other. Well, so you gave that example of

0:25:58.800 --> 0:26:02.919
<v Speaker 1>the Brazilian company going out and borrowing for five years

0:26:02.960 --> 0:26:06.200
<v Speaker 1>maybe from an Asian bank, which then gets its funding

0:26:06.280 --> 0:26:08.800
<v Speaker 1>from a French bank and so on, and as you

0:26:08.840 --> 0:26:12.320
<v Speaker 1>pointed out, you could have this entire dollar system without

0:26:12.359 --> 0:26:17.119
<v Speaker 1>it actually without any involvement of a US financial entity.

0:26:17.480 --> 0:26:20.600
<v Speaker 1>And speaking of the centrality of the dollar, that was

0:26:20.640 --> 0:26:24.560
<v Speaker 1>actually Mark Carney's speech at Jackson Hole about how this

0:26:24.640 --> 0:26:27.359
<v Speaker 1>is becoming a problem so speak, because the US is

0:26:27.400 --> 0:26:31.440
<v Speaker 1>becoming a smaller and smaller share of GDP around the globe,

0:26:31.880 --> 0:26:35.119
<v Speaker 1>and yet the dollar and therefore the influence of the

0:26:35.160 --> 0:26:38.840
<v Speaker 1>FED is taking this outside role. Does that concern you,

0:26:39.000 --> 0:26:42.000
<v Speaker 1>I mean, do you share that view that ultimately there's

0:26:42.080 --> 0:26:46.359
<v Speaker 1>an instability there and that the longer it goes on

0:26:46.480 --> 0:26:50.280
<v Speaker 1>without some sort of next thing or post dollar multi

0:26:50.280 --> 0:26:54.040
<v Speaker 1>currency world, that that creates a problem or is that

0:26:54.880 --> 0:26:58.199
<v Speaker 1>more or less sustainable. I think it can work. I

0:26:58.200 --> 0:27:01.000
<v Speaker 1>think it is. It is potentially sustain annable. UM. I

0:27:01.040 --> 0:27:04.320
<v Speaker 1>would I would point you to a key piece of

0:27:04.400 --> 0:27:08.320
<v Speaker 1>this UM at the moment are the liquidity swaps between

0:27:08.359 --> 0:27:11.840
<v Speaker 1>the major central banks UM which connect the dollar with

0:27:11.880 --> 0:27:15.000
<v Speaker 1>all the other currencies UM as as a backstop for

0:27:15.040 --> 0:27:18.560
<v Speaker 1>this global dollar system. The fact that the United States

0:27:19.240 --> 0:27:23.000
<v Speaker 1>is it is a shrinking fraction of a larger global economy, okay,

0:27:23.240 --> 0:27:26.800
<v Speaker 1>does not seem to me necessarily to say that therefore

0:27:27.119 --> 0:27:29.480
<v Speaker 1>we need a multi currency system or that we can't

0:27:29.520 --> 0:27:32.440
<v Speaker 1>have a global dollar system. It's just that what's happening

0:27:32.520 --> 0:27:36.080
<v Speaker 1>is the internationalization of the dollar, okay. UM that the

0:27:36.160 --> 0:27:39.679
<v Speaker 1>dollar is not just the United States problem. It's everyone's problem.

0:27:39.800 --> 0:27:43.879
<v Speaker 1>It's everyone's currency, and so it's a political challenge, I

0:27:43.920 --> 0:27:47.320
<v Speaker 1>think more than an economic challenge. Like that, the management

0:27:47.359 --> 0:27:50.359
<v Speaker 1>of the global dollar system is not just the Fed's problem.

0:27:50.440 --> 0:27:53.359
<v Speaker 1>It's the it's the problem of all the central banks

0:27:53.440 --> 0:27:56.280
<v Speaker 1>and the committee, if you will, of central banks working

0:27:56.320 --> 0:28:00.440
<v Speaker 1>together to to manage the global dollar system. Them It's

0:28:00.480 --> 0:28:04.600
<v Speaker 1>not just the USS dollar anymore, it's everyone's dollar. You

0:28:04.760 --> 0:28:08.320
<v Speaker 1>mentioned the coordinating role of the global central banks and

0:28:08.880 --> 0:28:11.800
<v Speaker 1>at Columbia. The professor Adam Two's wrote this wrote this

0:28:11.840 --> 0:28:14.800
<v Speaker 1>book crashed, and it really talked a lot about the

0:28:14.920 --> 0:28:18.200
<v Speaker 1>various UHC swap lines that the FED set up with

0:28:18.240 --> 0:28:22.680
<v Speaker 1>other central banks to ameliorate the dollar shortage UH during

0:28:22.760 --> 0:28:26.080
<v Speaker 1>the crisis. Do you worry about the politics of that? So,

0:28:26.160 --> 0:28:28.680
<v Speaker 1>let's say that needed to be fleshed out. I mean,

0:28:28.720 --> 0:28:34.199
<v Speaker 1>I'm trying to imagine in today's world, there's so much uh,

0:28:34.240 --> 0:28:39.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, and antipathy towards globalization. UH, this twitter world

0:28:39.360 --> 0:28:43.720
<v Speaker 1>we live in, whether politics could get in the way

0:28:44.120 --> 0:28:47.760
<v Speaker 1>of essentially creating the plumbing fixes that would need to

0:28:47.840 --> 0:28:51.640
<v Speaker 1>maintain the dollar standard on a global basis. Yes, making

0:28:51.720 --> 0:28:54.840
<v Speaker 1>his work politically is I think the biggest challenge. As

0:28:54.880 --> 0:28:58.440
<v Speaker 1>I said, The economics I think is pretty clear. Um,

0:28:58.520 --> 0:29:01.280
<v Speaker 1>once you get out of standard economics, as I say,

0:29:01.280 --> 0:29:03.280
<v Speaker 1>and you start to see this through the money view,

0:29:03.560 --> 0:29:06.120
<v Speaker 1>you understand you understand what this is about. UM. You

0:29:06.160 --> 0:29:08.080
<v Speaker 1>mentioned Adam too. He was my colleague when I was

0:29:08.280 --> 0:29:11.240
<v Speaker 1>at Colombia, and we talked a lot about these matters.

0:29:11.840 --> 0:29:14.240
<v Speaker 1>We we ran a project at the c GT together,

0:29:14.680 --> 0:29:18.040
<v Speaker 1>UM and he he this foreign exchange swap. He cites

0:29:18.080 --> 0:29:20.680
<v Speaker 1>my little article on foreign exchange swaps. So this is

0:29:20.760 --> 0:29:23.440
<v Speaker 1>this is another fellow traveler in the money view, I

0:29:23.440 --> 0:29:28.280
<v Speaker 1>would say, so this is very much compatible with UH.

0:29:28.320 --> 0:29:33.200
<v Speaker 1>And he is as a historian thinking about the politics

0:29:33.240 --> 0:29:35.920
<v Speaker 1>of this, Um, how is this going to be? What

0:29:36.040 --> 0:29:39.640
<v Speaker 1>is this? This is a challenge. This was a global crisis, right.

0:29:39.720 --> 0:29:43.080
<v Speaker 1>This was not just a domestic in the US crisis

0:29:43.120 --> 0:29:47.440
<v Speaker 1>in in the subprime mortgage market. It was global money markets,

0:29:47.440 --> 0:29:50.200
<v Speaker 1>global dollar money markets that froze up. That's why it

0:29:50.240 --> 0:29:53.560
<v Speaker 1>was a global crisis, and it took form in different

0:29:53.600 --> 0:29:56.479
<v Speaker 1>countries around the world, depending in a different form um,

0:29:56.560 --> 0:30:00.200
<v Speaker 1>depending on where and how they kind of tacked to

0:30:00.280 --> 0:30:03.040
<v Speaker 1>this global dollar system. That's the great thing about his

0:30:03.080 --> 0:30:06.600
<v Speaker 1>book is to really make clear um the global character

0:30:06.680 --> 0:30:09.440
<v Speaker 1>of this thing um and that it was global because

0:30:09.640 --> 0:30:12.360
<v Speaker 1>the dollar system is global, that this crisis was a

0:30:12.400 --> 0:30:15.680
<v Speaker 1>crisis of the dollar system. Well, let's talk about the

0:30:15.720 --> 0:30:18.800
<v Speaker 1>repo market blow up in September, because that was another

0:30:18.840 --> 0:30:23.280
<v Speaker 1>crisis in dollar funding markets that could conceivably have gone

0:30:23.280 --> 0:30:27.840
<v Speaker 1>global if the Federal Reserve hadn't acted UH relatively quickly.

0:30:28.400 --> 0:30:33.280
<v Speaker 1>What's your understanding of what happened in the repo market

0:30:33.480 --> 0:30:37.640
<v Speaker 1>and the conditions through the money view prism that led

0:30:37.720 --> 0:30:41.400
<v Speaker 1>up to it. Well, I guess I do think that

0:30:41.600 --> 0:30:46.800
<v Speaker 1>zoltan Posts analysis of this is basically right. Um I

0:30:46.960 --> 0:30:50.080
<v Speaker 1>would he's down in the weeds, you know, because he's

0:30:50.120 --> 0:30:53.160
<v Speaker 1>dealing directly with people who are trading in this market.

0:30:53.280 --> 0:30:55.840
<v Speaker 1>Let me just pull back to the feet view a

0:30:55.880 --> 0:31:00.120
<v Speaker 1>little bit, thinking about what the response of regular or

0:31:00.160 --> 0:31:04.080
<v Speaker 1>authorities was to the financial crisis, And to a large extent,

0:31:04.160 --> 0:31:07.960
<v Speaker 1>the response has been imagining that what we really need

0:31:08.040 --> 0:31:10.560
<v Speaker 1>to do is get more capital in this system. We need,

0:31:10.720 --> 0:31:14.480
<v Speaker 1>we need to We're thinking about this as a solvency problem,

0:31:14.480 --> 0:31:18.520
<v Speaker 1>not a liquidity problem, okay. And the way they they therefore,

0:31:18.560 --> 0:31:23.520
<v Speaker 1>the regulatory apparatus UH with Dodd Frank and others responded

0:31:23.840 --> 0:31:28.600
<v Speaker 1>was to try to kill unsecured money market credit and

0:31:28.680 --> 0:31:32.040
<v Speaker 1>to and to emphasize secured money market credit, which is

0:31:32.080 --> 0:31:34.520
<v Speaker 1>to say, to kill the Fed funds market, to kill

0:31:34.520 --> 0:31:36.280
<v Speaker 1>the your a dollar market, and to focus on the

0:31:36.320 --> 0:31:39.720
<v Speaker 1>repo market as a money market because repo is secured

0:31:39.760 --> 0:31:43.800
<v Speaker 1>overnight money. Right, there's some some some capital asset that

0:31:43.920 --> 0:31:47.280
<v Speaker 1>is collateral for this borrowing, whereas Fed funds and your

0:31:47.280 --> 0:31:49.080
<v Speaker 1>a dollar are not secured. These are these are just

0:31:49.160 --> 0:31:54.280
<v Speaker 1>interbank borrowing. So by shifting the emphasis in what is

0:31:54.320 --> 0:31:56.960
<v Speaker 1>the instrument that you're using as a death sit agent

0:31:57.360 --> 0:32:00.640
<v Speaker 1>to satis to live to fight another day, your seeing repo.

0:32:00.840 --> 0:32:04.320
<v Speaker 1>There's much much more emphasis on that kind of credit

0:32:04.480 --> 0:32:07.280
<v Speaker 1>now than there was ten years ago, and so the

0:32:07.400 --> 0:32:11.760
<v Speaker 1>shortage of collateral can cause problems. We this is now

0:32:11.800 --> 0:32:15.880
<v Speaker 1>the marginal source of overnight credit globally, so it's much

0:32:15.960 --> 0:32:21.120
<v Speaker 1>more important market than than it was formally and and

0:32:21.160 --> 0:32:23.320
<v Speaker 1>so all that's where the stresses are going to show up.

0:32:23.360 --> 0:32:25.560
<v Speaker 1>And that's what you saw in September, that that's where

0:32:25.600 --> 0:32:29.120
<v Speaker 1>the stresses showed up. It wouldn't have been so um

0:32:29.160 --> 0:32:32.320
<v Speaker 1>ten ten years ago because there would have been alternative

0:32:32.320 --> 0:32:35.720
<v Speaker 1>places where if you needed to borrow overnight you could

0:32:36.000 --> 0:32:38.719
<v Speaker 1>And that's less so. And some of that's because of

0:32:39.280 --> 0:32:43.400
<v Speaker 1>regulatory constraints. Some of that's misguided. They're not understanding that

0:32:43.480 --> 0:32:46.200
<v Speaker 1>there's a liquidity dimension to this thing that you need

0:32:46.240 --> 0:32:48.640
<v Speaker 1>to be you need to be paying attention to, and

0:32:48.640 --> 0:32:51.680
<v Speaker 1>that just making it safe, that is to say, secure

0:32:51.720 --> 0:32:55.360
<v Speaker 1>credit is safer than unsecured credit. UM, maybe making it

0:32:55.440 --> 0:32:59.080
<v Speaker 1>more fragile. Explain that further, because I don't think that's

0:32:59.240 --> 0:33:03.040
<v Speaker 1>an intuitive concept to people generally. But this idea, and

0:33:03.160 --> 0:33:05.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, for those who haven't listened to the past,

0:33:05.800 --> 0:33:08.520
<v Speaker 1>the repo market, you have to post collateral and then

0:33:08.560 --> 0:33:13.280
<v Speaker 1>you get liquidity, and in theory that's safer. But what

0:33:13.360 --> 0:33:15.760
<v Speaker 1>you're saying, and again this goes back to your original

0:33:15.800 --> 0:33:19.360
<v Speaker 1>point that it's not about wealth constraints or budget constraints,

0:33:19.360 --> 0:33:22.680
<v Speaker 1>it's about liquidity constraints or that's where the weakness in

0:33:22.720 --> 0:33:27.320
<v Speaker 1>the system is. Explain how uh sort of regulators may

0:33:27.360 --> 0:33:32.320
<v Speaker 1>have taken the wrong lesson from the crisis by misunderstanding

0:33:32.520 --> 0:33:36.320
<v Speaker 1>the money view, and how we still have things defects. Well,

0:33:36.400 --> 0:33:39.920
<v Speaker 1>some of this is about the politics of regulation, right.

0:33:40.040 --> 0:33:45.200
<v Speaker 1>The the what was pushing the regulatory reform was the

0:33:45.240 --> 0:33:49.200
<v Speaker 1>concern that the taxpayer not beyond the hook. Okay, And

0:33:49.320 --> 0:33:52.040
<v Speaker 1>so this is about solvency. We want to make we

0:33:52.080 --> 0:33:55.320
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure that the taxpayer is not is

0:33:55.320 --> 0:33:59.760
<v Speaker 1>not bailing out bankers, is not we're not taking wealth

0:34:00.400 --> 0:34:05.000
<v Speaker 1>from households like me, okay and giving it to large

0:34:05.040 --> 0:34:09.960
<v Speaker 1>banks that have made ridiculous ridiculous best. Okay. That's the politics, right,

0:34:10.040 --> 0:34:14.759
<v Speaker 1>That is about redistribution from the taxpayer to to some financiers.

0:34:14.800 --> 0:34:17.799
<v Speaker 1>Who have made bad bets, and so that's why the

0:34:17.840 --> 0:34:20.600
<v Speaker 1>focus was on getting more capital in the system as

0:34:20.600 --> 0:34:23.760
<v Speaker 1>a buffer that you can run through that you won't

0:34:23.800 --> 0:34:26.160
<v Speaker 1>have to rely on the taxpayer. That was the politics

0:34:26.160 --> 0:34:29.400
<v Speaker 1>of it. Okay. However, a great deal of this crisis

0:34:29.520 --> 0:34:33.600
<v Speaker 1>was not at all about UM losses. Like that. You

0:34:33.640 --> 0:34:36.719
<v Speaker 1>know that there that there were capital market assets that

0:34:36.800 --> 0:34:39.680
<v Speaker 1>that had a value of zero UM, and so therefore

0:34:39.719 --> 0:34:42.800
<v Speaker 1>there were losses to be absorbed. These were liquidity problems.

0:34:42.840 --> 0:34:47.320
<v Speaker 1>Liquidity problems which meant putting off the promise to pay

0:34:47.520 --> 0:34:51.000
<v Speaker 1>until tomorrow until you can pay it so ultimately it

0:34:51.040 --> 0:34:55.400
<v Speaker 1>can be paid, just not today. Okay, that's a liquidity problem.

0:34:55.560 --> 0:34:58.640
<v Speaker 1>A liquidity problem is when you can't make a payment today,

0:34:58.680 --> 0:35:01.560
<v Speaker 1>but you will be able to make attainment tomorrow or

0:35:01.600 --> 0:35:03.759
<v Speaker 1>in a week or in three months, and you need

0:35:04.400 --> 0:35:08.120
<v Speaker 1>money to bide you over UM. But that is not

0:35:08.239 --> 0:35:11.759
<v Speaker 1>money that's coming from the taxpayer, because it's repaid. It's

0:35:11.760 --> 0:35:14.759
<v Speaker 1>not a wealth transfer, right, it's just And so this

0:35:14.840 --> 0:35:16.719
<v Speaker 1>is this is the alchemy of banking that we use.

0:35:16.840 --> 0:35:20.560
<v Speaker 1>You expand balance sheets UM in order and by providing

0:35:20.640 --> 0:35:23.879
<v Speaker 1>extra means of payment today which you can then pull

0:35:23.960 --> 0:35:27.640
<v Speaker 1>back UM later on when when this when you get

0:35:27.680 --> 0:35:31.400
<v Speaker 1>a better alignment between the pattern of cash promises and

0:35:31.440 --> 0:35:34.560
<v Speaker 1>the cat pattern of actual cash flow. That's what a

0:35:34.640 --> 0:35:38.799
<v Speaker 1>liquidity That's what liquidity is about. Is about maintaining that

0:35:38.920 --> 0:35:42.640
<v Speaker 1>balance between the pattern across the economy as a whole,

0:35:42.680 --> 0:35:46.000
<v Speaker 1>across the world as a whole of of promises to

0:35:46.080 --> 0:35:48.680
<v Speaker 1>pay and the pattern across the economy as a whole

0:35:48.680 --> 0:35:51.840
<v Speaker 1>across the world of whole as a whole of actual

0:35:51.880 --> 0:35:55.719
<v Speaker 1>capacity to make those payments. Um and misalignment of that,

0:35:55.719 --> 0:35:59.040
<v Speaker 1>that's when you have a financial crisis. Right. So, post crisis,

0:35:59.080 --> 0:36:04.840
<v Speaker 1>regulators sort of focused on solvency, encouraging banks to hold

0:36:04.880 --> 0:36:08.759
<v Speaker 1>all this additional capital, and maybe arguably didn't focus enough

0:36:08.960 --> 0:36:13.200
<v Speaker 1>on liquidity and liquidity risks. Uh So, now we have

0:36:13.239 --> 0:36:17.680
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve that is injecting billions of dollars worth

0:36:17.719 --> 0:36:20.840
<v Speaker 1>of liquidity into the repo market. There's some talk also

0:36:20.920 --> 0:36:24.600
<v Speaker 1>about creating a standing repo facility. This is something that

0:36:25.440 --> 0:36:29.359
<v Speaker 1>I think it was Bill Dudley mentioned recently, what's your

0:36:29.920 --> 0:36:37.760
<v Speaker 1>preferred solution to repo market vulnerability at the moment. So again,

0:36:37.800 --> 0:36:40.760
<v Speaker 1>thirty thousand feet, let's back up. We've been shifting from

0:36:40.960 --> 0:36:45.960
<v Speaker 1>a bank lending credit system to a market based credit system.

0:36:46.040 --> 0:36:49.200
<v Speaker 1>These proposals that you're talking about are an attempt to

0:36:49.440 --> 0:36:53.520
<v Speaker 1>adapt the modern operations central banking to this new market

0:36:53.520 --> 0:36:57.400
<v Speaker 1>based credit system by operating in the instruments that the

0:36:57.440 --> 0:37:01.799
<v Speaker 1>market based credit system is using. So those two examples

0:37:01.840 --> 0:37:05.320
<v Speaker 1>you gave um that the FED can inject new liquid

0:37:05.400 --> 0:37:09.400
<v Speaker 1>more liquidity um, which it has done by by engaging

0:37:09.400 --> 0:37:13.279
<v Speaker 1>with dealers um. Or it could create a repo facility.

0:37:13.360 --> 0:37:15.279
<v Speaker 1>This is what we call in the economics of the

0:37:15.280 --> 0:37:17.520
<v Speaker 1>dealer function, the difference between the inside spread and the

0:37:17.560 --> 0:37:22.040
<v Speaker 1>outside spread. The the repo the repo facility that you're

0:37:22.080 --> 0:37:25.000
<v Speaker 1>talking about is an outside spread. It's saying if you

0:37:25.280 --> 0:37:27.920
<v Speaker 1>if there's a problem in the repo market, the FED

0:37:28.040 --> 0:37:31.600
<v Speaker 1>will do repo with you, but at an unfavorable price.

0:37:31.840 --> 0:37:34.640
<v Speaker 1>You know, it will go either way, it will. It's

0:37:34.640 --> 0:37:37.360
<v Speaker 1>a it's a like a by cell spread that the

0:37:37.440 --> 0:37:41.200
<v Speaker 1>FED is offering away from the market price. So normally

0:37:41.640 --> 0:37:45.520
<v Speaker 1>it's like the discount rate for for the bank lending system.

0:37:45.560 --> 0:37:48.520
<v Speaker 1>That's that's essentially what this is is an analog to

0:37:48.600 --> 0:37:52.000
<v Speaker 1>the discount window, but for the market based credit system,

0:37:52.040 --> 0:37:55.920
<v Speaker 1>that's what that's what this report facility is intended to

0:37:56.080 --> 0:37:59.360
<v Speaker 1>be exactly how to run that so that it doesn't

0:37:59.360 --> 0:38:02.160
<v Speaker 1>cause moral hazard problems. You know, we have a hundred

0:38:02.239 --> 0:38:04.960
<v Speaker 1>years of experience running a discount window in order to

0:38:05.000 --> 0:38:07.480
<v Speaker 1>make that work. We're just making it up right now

0:38:07.520 --> 0:38:10.160
<v Speaker 1>for the market based credit system. So it we can

0:38:10.239 --> 0:38:12.759
<v Speaker 1>learn things from the past. But but we need to

0:38:12.760 --> 0:38:15.719
<v Speaker 1>be a little humble and appreciate that we're inventing some

0:38:15.800 --> 0:38:19.879
<v Speaker 1>new thing for this new globalized market based credit system.

0:38:19.920 --> 0:38:24.960
<v Speaker 1>That's the context of these of these proposals. UM. The

0:38:25.120 --> 0:38:27.680
<v Speaker 1>right thing from my point of view, for the most

0:38:27.719 --> 0:38:30.040
<v Speaker 1>important thing for a central bank to be focusing on

0:38:30.520 --> 0:38:32.840
<v Speaker 1>is the dealer of last resort function. That it that

0:38:32.920 --> 0:38:36.880
<v Speaker 1>it is a backstop to prevent financial crises. That and

0:38:36.920 --> 0:38:39.920
<v Speaker 1>so that's why this repo facility to me, is the

0:38:39.960 --> 0:38:43.680
<v Speaker 1>more important thing. UM. When the when the set is

0:38:43.760 --> 0:38:47.719
<v Speaker 1>trading with the market, um injecting and and and pulling out.

0:38:48.000 --> 0:38:50.200
<v Speaker 1>It's operating at the insides, but it's operating at the

0:38:50.239 --> 0:38:54.840
<v Speaker 1>market price, but the outside spread, which is its promise.

0:38:55.520 --> 0:38:59.439
<v Speaker 1>It's it's facility that usually in normal times doesn't get

0:38:59.520 --> 0:39:02.520
<v Speaker 1>used at all. It's just standing there and dealers know

0:39:02.640 --> 0:39:07.200
<v Speaker 1>it's there, and so they know that if there's a problem, um,

0:39:07.280 --> 0:39:09.080
<v Speaker 1>that's the price that they're going to have to pay

0:39:09.080 --> 0:39:11.640
<v Speaker 1>to get liquidity, and it's not a nice price. So

0:39:12.120 --> 0:39:15.440
<v Speaker 1>they try to organize their books and their business so

0:39:15.480 --> 0:39:17.719
<v Speaker 1>they don't have to go there. But if they have

0:39:17.840 --> 0:39:20.319
<v Speaker 1>to go there, they can go there. I want to

0:39:20.320 --> 0:39:22.399
<v Speaker 1>just step back for a second to something you said,

0:39:22.480 --> 0:39:24.359
<v Speaker 1>because I have a feeling there's a lot of people

0:39:24.360 --> 0:39:26.719
<v Speaker 1>who disagree, and I'm curious how you addressed it. When

0:39:26.760 --> 0:39:29.799
<v Speaker 1>you're talking about the crisis, You're like, Okay, regulators really

0:39:29.840 --> 0:39:34.279
<v Speaker 1>put a high emphasis on capital requirements and making sure

0:39:34.320 --> 0:39:37.799
<v Speaker 1>that banks are solvent, and that really they sort of

0:39:37.840 --> 0:39:42.239
<v Speaker 1>neglected the role of illiquidity in the crisis, And I

0:39:42.239 --> 0:39:46.040
<v Speaker 1>think in the popular conception, everyone would be like, look,

0:39:46.080 --> 0:39:48.760
<v Speaker 1>I saw that movie where they made really stupid loans

0:39:48.800 --> 0:39:51.319
<v Speaker 1>two people in Florida, and the loans were bad, and

0:39:51.360 --> 0:39:56.000
<v Speaker 1>obviously bankers were doing all these uh ninja loans and

0:39:56.600 --> 0:40:00.399
<v Speaker 1>sub prime borrowers, and obviously in the popular concept, it's

0:40:00.400 --> 0:40:04.200
<v Speaker 1>not about liquidity but just about bad underwriting and greed

0:40:04.400 --> 0:40:06.840
<v Speaker 1>and all that. How do you if someone were to

0:40:06.880 --> 0:40:10.919
<v Speaker 1>say that to you, how do you make the case that, yes,

0:40:11.040 --> 0:40:15.319
<v Speaker 1>that may all have existed, but still it really was

0:40:15.520 --> 0:40:18.880
<v Speaker 1>in large part a liquidity problem as opposed to a

0:40:19.000 --> 0:40:22.200
<v Speaker 1>capital shortfall problem problem. Well, I would say that person,

0:40:22.239 --> 0:40:24.719
<v Speaker 1>it's I've seen those movies too, Okay, And all of

0:40:24.719 --> 0:40:30.400
<v Speaker 1>that is true. All of that happened, and in exuberant periods,

0:40:30.800 --> 0:40:35.480
<v Speaker 1>crazy things happen, um, and an illegal things happen, um,

0:40:35.520 --> 0:40:38.279
<v Speaker 1>And you need to clean that up. Okay, But that

0:40:38.320 --> 0:40:42.640
<v Speaker 1>doesn't necessarily lead to a global financial crisis. Okay. That

0:40:42.719 --> 0:40:45.759
<v Speaker 1>happened to be the trigger, okay, but it actually was

0:40:45.800 --> 0:40:48.600
<v Speaker 1>not the substance of the of the global financial crisis.

0:40:48.640 --> 0:40:51.920
<v Speaker 1>If all it had been was just a subprime mortgage crisis,

0:40:52.280 --> 0:40:54.880
<v Speaker 1>there wouldn't have been a global financial crisis, um. And

0:40:54.920 --> 0:40:56.960
<v Speaker 1>we would have been able to clean that up. And

0:40:57.000 --> 0:41:00.000
<v Speaker 1>in cleaning that up, you do need to fix underwrite,

0:41:00.440 --> 0:41:04.360
<v Speaker 1>you do need to to to change some of that regulation.

0:41:04.480 --> 0:41:08.319
<v Speaker 1>All of that was a reasonable reaction to a subprime

0:41:08.680 --> 0:41:11.799
<v Speaker 1>evolution that got out of hand and ninja loans and

0:41:11.800 --> 0:41:14.040
<v Speaker 1>all of that. Um. So I agree with all of

0:41:14.040 --> 0:41:17.239
<v Speaker 1>that that that it wasn't that that that cleaning that

0:41:17.400 --> 0:41:22.160
<v Speaker 1>up was was useless. It's just that cleaning that up

0:41:22.400 --> 0:41:24.759
<v Speaker 1>was not all you needed to do. And it's and

0:41:24.960 --> 0:41:27.320
<v Speaker 1>cleaning it up is not going to prevent another global

0:41:27.320 --> 0:41:31.640
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis because what actually caused the global financial crisis

0:41:31.680 --> 0:41:34.360
<v Speaker 1>was the freeze up in global funding markets, and that

0:41:34.480 --> 0:41:38.640
<v Speaker 1>was a liquidity crisis largely. It was caused, I mean,

0:41:38.719 --> 0:41:40.640
<v Speaker 1>if you want to get down into weaves about this,

0:41:40.920 --> 0:41:43.719
<v Speaker 1>by the fact that a lot of these securitized mortgages

0:41:44.040 --> 0:41:47.680
<v Speaker 1>were funded overnight, you know, on the balance sheet of

0:41:47.680 --> 0:41:51.160
<v Speaker 1>of Deutsche Bank and UBS in Europe, okay, and they

0:41:51.200 --> 0:41:53.920
<v Speaker 1>then couldn't roll their funding, and they couldn't roll the

0:41:53.960 --> 0:41:56.440
<v Speaker 1>funding for that, They couldn't roll the funding for anything.

0:41:56.480 --> 0:42:00.560
<v Speaker 1>Global money markets froze up, and so there was contagion

0:42:00.640 --> 0:42:04.239
<v Speaker 1>across the whole world. That's what you need to need

0:42:04.320 --> 0:42:07.040
<v Speaker 1>to make sure it doesn't happen that if you have

0:42:07.600 --> 0:42:11.680
<v Speaker 1>a problem in some little area like subprime mortgages, it

0:42:11.760 --> 0:42:15.240
<v Speaker 1>doesn't lead to a global financial crisis. You just deal

0:42:15.280 --> 0:42:18.480
<v Speaker 1>with that little area and meanwhile put a floor under

0:42:18.520 --> 0:42:21.160
<v Speaker 1>the under the system as a whole so that it

0:42:21.239 --> 0:42:26.040
<v Speaker 1>doesn't proliferate. Um. It did deliferate, right, that's what we saw.

0:42:26.360 --> 0:42:30.040
<v Speaker 1>The politics of it meant that you could, um, you

0:42:30.040 --> 0:42:33.319
<v Speaker 1>could focus on the subprime cleaning that up, and we did,

0:42:33.560 --> 0:42:36.720
<v Speaker 1>and that's what And putting more more capital in banks

0:42:36.760 --> 0:42:39.840
<v Speaker 1>allows them to take losses if they make back bad loans.

0:42:39.880 --> 0:42:43.600
<v Speaker 1>That's all fine, okay, But but by itself, that's not

0:42:43.640 --> 0:42:46.440
<v Speaker 1>what caused what what led to the to the global

0:42:46.480 --> 0:42:49.040
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis. You may you may even remember at the

0:42:49.160 --> 0:42:51.840
<v Speaker 1>I mean I remember I was around when it was happening.

0:42:51.880 --> 0:42:55.880
<v Speaker 1>There were many economists who who shall me remain unnamed,

0:42:56.280 --> 0:42:59.560
<v Speaker 1>who who said when the when the subprime market was

0:42:59.680 --> 0:43:03.240
<v Speaker 1>melted down, don't worry about this. This is small money

0:43:03.239 --> 0:43:05.479
<v Speaker 1>compared to the size of the mortgage market as a whole.

0:43:05.680 --> 0:43:08.200
<v Speaker 1>It's small money compared to the size of capital markets

0:43:08.239 --> 0:43:10.759
<v Speaker 1>as a whole. It will it's just pennies on the dollar.

0:43:11.040 --> 0:43:14.040
<v Speaker 1>We can absorb this. They were right about that, but

0:43:14.160 --> 0:43:17.120
<v Speaker 1>that didn't mean that it didn't cause a global financial

0:43:17.160 --> 0:43:21.239
<v Speaker 1>crisis because of the interactions between that little crisis and

0:43:21.239 --> 0:43:23.480
<v Speaker 1>and and everything else, which they did not realize. They

0:43:23.480 --> 0:43:25.600
<v Speaker 1>were not right about that that this was not a

0:43:25.600 --> 0:43:28.160
<v Speaker 1>wealth problem. If it was a wealth problem, it would

0:43:28.160 --> 0:43:31.759
<v Speaker 1>have been easily solved because it wasn't very big. You know,

0:43:31.880 --> 0:43:34.279
<v Speaker 1>there were there was a lot of skullduggery, but it

0:43:34.360 --> 0:43:37.600
<v Speaker 1>wasn't very big compared to the size of the global market,

0:43:37.800 --> 0:43:39.560
<v Speaker 1>and so it seems like we should be able to

0:43:39.600 --> 0:43:43.840
<v Speaker 1>absorb this if it's just a wealth crisis. But it wasn't.

0:43:44.480 --> 0:43:46.760
<v Speaker 1>It was a liquidity crisis, and it was a global

0:43:46.800 --> 0:43:50.480
<v Speaker 1>aquidity crisis. That's that's the piece of it that you

0:43:50.560 --> 0:43:53.960
<v Speaker 1>couldn't see looking at it from standard economics. But if

0:43:54.000 --> 0:43:57.200
<v Speaker 1>you knew how these things were being funded in the

0:43:57.200 --> 0:44:00.640
<v Speaker 1>shadow banking system, money market funding of capital market lending,

0:44:00.920 --> 0:44:02.919
<v Speaker 1>then you knew there was going to be a lot

0:44:02.960 --> 0:44:05.880
<v Speaker 1>more to this. It wasn't just about a wealth transfer

0:44:05.920 --> 0:44:09.239
<v Speaker 1>from people making god loans, um. You were going to

0:44:09.360 --> 0:44:12.799
<v Speaker 1>have a problem with rolling this funding. And it was,

0:44:13.040 --> 0:44:15.880
<v Speaker 1>and that's exactly what happened. It got a lot worse.

0:44:16.320 --> 0:44:19.640
<v Speaker 1>That's why economists didn't see it right because they weren't

0:44:19.640 --> 0:44:22.239
<v Speaker 1>paying attention to the plumbing. They were thinking of this

0:44:22.440 --> 0:44:26.680
<v Speaker 1>as as as a wealth problem, not as a liquidity problem.

0:44:26.719 --> 0:44:29.319
<v Speaker 1>And it was a wealth problem in part, okay, but

0:44:29.440 --> 0:44:32.160
<v Speaker 1>that's not what caused the crisis. It was a liquidity

0:44:32.160 --> 0:44:36.560
<v Speaker 1>problem that caused the crisis. Professor Perry Merling, thank you

0:44:36.640 --> 0:44:39.880
<v Speaker 1>so much for being on odds. I just gotta say, uh,

0:44:40.040 --> 0:44:41.920
<v Speaker 1>you know when I whenever I put out something on

0:44:41.960 --> 0:44:44.799
<v Speaker 1>Twitter saying who should we have on odd lots, your

0:44:44.920 --> 0:44:47.560
<v Speaker 1>name for like the last several months as all or

0:44:47.680 --> 0:44:50.200
<v Speaker 1>last year maybe is always one of the most frequent responses.

0:44:50.200 --> 0:44:52.320
<v Speaker 1>So I'm really glad we finally made it. Well. Um,

0:44:52.480 --> 0:44:54.920
<v Speaker 1>probably that's because, as you know, I have this online

0:44:54.960 --> 0:44:58.160
<v Speaker 1>course on course Era. So there's now half a million

0:44:58.160 --> 0:45:01.120
<v Speaker 1>people who have gone through that class and they so

0:45:01.239 --> 0:45:05.200
<v Speaker 1>they think about the world in this money view way, um,

0:45:05.239 --> 0:45:08.040
<v Speaker 1>but they don't see it in the media very much,

0:45:08.160 --> 0:45:11.479
<v Speaker 1>and so it's there. That's what they're pushing for. They're

0:45:11.480 --> 0:45:16.600
<v Speaker 1>pushing to see uh, that language moving into more more

0:45:16.640 --> 0:45:19.439
<v Speaker 1>more common usage. I'm gonna go ahead and take the course,

0:45:19.440 --> 0:45:23.800
<v Speaker 1>Sarah course, and I'm glad that it's free. Joe, It's free.

0:45:24.160 --> 0:45:27.040
<v Speaker 1>I know I'm gonna do it, I promised. Thank you.

0:45:27.160 --> 0:45:36.920
<v Speaker 1>That was great, Well, thank you for having me. Well, Joe,

0:45:37.080 --> 0:45:40.279
<v Speaker 1>I really enjoyed that conversation. As I said in the intro,

0:45:40.360 --> 0:45:43.640
<v Speaker 1>it's sort of brought together a lot of major macro

0:45:44.080 --> 0:45:47.920
<v Speaker 1>themes that we've seen on all thoughts recently. Uh, and

0:45:48.160 --> 0:45:50.160
<v Speaker 1>I named a few, but we even got a bonus

0:45:50.239 --> 0:45:53.160
<v Speaker 1>fourth one, which was the premisee of the dollar in

0:45:53.200 --> 0:45:56.279
<v Speaker 1>the global financial system. Yeah, no, I totally agree. I

0:45:56.320 --> 0:45:58.960
<v Speaker 1>feel like that was no It's like, no wonder so

0:45:59.000 --> 0:46:01.360
<v Speaker 1>many people have we've told us that we needed to

0:46:01.440 --> 0:46:06.120
<v Speaker 1>have Perry on because it really does. His work touches

0:46:06.160 --> 0:46:09.600
<v Speaker 1>on basically all of our big topics here. But I

0:46:09.640 --> 0:46:12.200
<v Speaker 1>really like that because obviously we recently, uh you know,

0:46:12.239 --> 0:46:15.960
<v Speaker 1>we talked to Skidelski recently about the failure of economists

0:46:15.960 --> 0:46:19.880
<v Speaker 1>to understand money, and I feel like, uh, Perry was

0:46:19.960 --> 0:46:24.080
<v Speaker 1>really able to drill down on this idea and put

0:46:24.120 --> 0:46:26.680
<v Speaker 1>some sort of meat on the bone about how important

0:46:26.680 --> 0:46:29.720
<v Speaker 1>it is to understand to place money at the center

0:46:29.760 --> 0:46:34.840
<v Speaker 1>of our understanding. So certainly if you follow finance, or

0:46:34.880 --> 0:46:37.480
<v Speaker 1>if you're involved in finance, and if you were in

0:46:37.560 --> 0:46:40.719
<v Speaker 1>any way following it back in two thousand eight, when

0:46:40.760 --> 0:46:44.640
<v Speaker 1>we have the financial crisis, this money view understanding of

0:46:44.719 --> 0:46:48.440
<v Speaker 1>everything just feels kind of intuitive. And I actually like

0:46:48.719 --> 0:46:52.239
<v Speaker 1>disagree with your last point about how lots of people

0:46:52.280 --> 0:46:55.400
<v Speaker 1>are going to think this is about insolvency and the

0:46:55.440 --> 0:46:59.279
<v Speaker 1>subprime crisis and greedy banks. It's definitely part of it.

0:46:59.360 --> 0:47:03.160
<v Speaker 1>But people who were following the issue very very closely

0:47:03.480 --> 0:47:06.200
<v Speaker 1>will know that it was actually caused by a massive

0:47:06.239 --> 0:47:09.200
<v Speaker 1>crunch in the shadow banking system and in the repo market.

0:47:09.320 --> 0:47:12.000
<v Speaker 1>And I don't know if you remember, but a previous

0:47:12.080 --> 0:47:16.000
<v Speaker 1>All Boughts guest, Matt King from City Group actually wrote

0:47:16.040 --> 0:47:20.160
<v Speaker 1>that amazing note in early September two tho, all about

0:47:20.239 --> 0:47:22.600
<v Speaker 1>repo market funding and how it was going to end

0:47:22.760 --> 0:47:25.839
<v Speaker 1>in tears for the broker dealers. Yeah. No, I mean,

0:47:26.239 --> 0:47:29.560
<v Speaker 1>certainly people who who were in the weeds on this

0:47:29.600 --> 0:47:33.920
<v Speaker 1>stuff or reported obviously understood the or many of them

0:47:33.960 --> 0:47:35.680
<v Speaker 1>I don't know actually if it's obvious, but many of

0:47:35.680 --> 0:47:38.600
<v Speaker 1>them did understand the centrality of the money market and

0:47:38.640 --> 0:47:41.399
<v Speaker 1>in short term funding to the crisis. But I still

0:47:41.440 --> 0:47:46.040
<v Speaker 1>think in the popular conception, and you know, as Perry

0:47:46.160 --> 0:47:49.279
<v Speaker 1>pointed out, and I think it's really important, um in

0:47:49.320 --> 0:47:53.440
<v Speaker 1>all these fixes or you can't ignore the politics of this.

0:47:53.920 --> 0:47:57.000
<v Speaker 1>And because in the popular conception, the crisis was about

0:47:57.360 --> 0:48:00.520
<v Speaker 1>greedy bankers making bad loans to people in Florida with

0:48:00.520 --> 0:48:03.640
<v Speaker 1>no jobs or no income, that did have a very

0:48:03.719 --> 0:48:07.560
<v Speaker 1>big impact on what the post regulation landscape looked like,

0:48:07.920 --> 0:48:11.160
<v Speaker 1>perhaps to our detriment, and perhaps the reason why we

0:48:11.200 --> 0:48:15.360
<v Speaker 1>still see these fragilities in the system. Yeah, for sure.

0:48:16.520 --> 0:48:19.400
<v Speaker 1>This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

0:48:19.520 --> 0:48:22.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:48:22.480 --> 0:48:25.640
<v Speaker 1>Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi isn't thought you could

0:48:25.640 --> 0:48:28.920
<v Speaker 1>follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart. And you should

0:48:29.200 --> 0:48:32.080
<v Speaker 1>follow Perry Maryland on Twitter. His handle is at p

0:48:32.440 --> 0:48:35.359
<v Speaker 1>Maryland and check out his Coursera course. I'm going to

0:48:35.400 --> 0:48:38.760
<v Speaker 1>do so because it's free, and be sure to follow

0:48:38.880 --> 0:48:43.320
<v Speaker 1>our producer on Twitter, Laura Carlson. She's at Laura M. Carlson.

0:48:43.920 --> 0:48:47.359
<v Speaker 1>Follow the Bloomberg head Of podcast on Twitter, Francesca Leavy,

0:48:47.440 --> 0:48:50.600
<v Speaker 1>She's at Francesca Today, and check out all of the

0:48:50.600 --> 0:48:55.280
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg podcasts under the handle at podcasts. Thanks for listening,

0:49:01.080 --> 0:49:01.120
<v Speaker 1>O