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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noah.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Dylan the Tennessee pal Fagan. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are here, and that makes this the stuff they don't

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Speaker 3: want you to know. Just gonna walk down the street

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Speaker 3: real quick for this one. Money's kind of weird, right,

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Speaker 3: are you guys into money?

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Speaker 4: It's not real.

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Speaker 2: It is a requirement, at least to some extent, a

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Speaker 2: necessary evil.

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Speaker 3: And you guys will recall several years ago put out

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Speaker 3: a standing challenge to all of our fellow conspiracy realists

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Speaker 3: in the crowd. We said, can you delineate or determine

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Speaker 3: any meaningful difference between the concept of economy or money

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Speaker 3: and the trappings of religion? And just an accountability check here,

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Speaker 3: I'm pretty sure no one can prove a difference.

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Speaker 4: Thanks for being our accountability buddy.

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Speaker 3: Ben.

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Speaker 2: I keep trying to think of like, Nope, it's just

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Speaker 2: it's kind of makes them up, make them up seats.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, because it's articles of faith at some point, after

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Speaker 3: some certain threshold. I mean, look at the stock market.

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Speaker 3: Not to get too topical, uh, but the thing is,

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Speaker 3: despite being all kinds of malarchy, the human world does

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Speaker 3: move at the whims of money and of those who

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Speaker 3: control it. So money can make you powerful, but you

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Speaker 3: also get a disadvantage. It can make you a target.

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Speaker 3: That's tonight's conspiracy. It's a twisting thing we barely touch

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Speaker 3: in a strange news segment. We didn't have time to

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Speaker 3: get to it. But the nation of China has hacked

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Speaker 3: the US Treasury, which is crazy because that's one of

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Speaker 3: the most important financial institutions across the planet.

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Speaker 4: But it was fine, right, Everything's okay, everything's great. No

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Speaker 4: question is great question for you guys. Do you think

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Speaker 4: it's possible to manipulate the stock market by announcing tariffs

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Speaker 4: and then pulling them back at the last minute. Do

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Speaker 4: you think that's intentional? That's what I told him to do,

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Speaker 4: so yeah, you know, you guys.

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Speaker 3: Are tight, just wondering.

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Speaker 4: We were talking about manipulation of currency, of this idea

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Speaker 4: of wealth and of value, and I just think, you know,

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Speaker 4: that's sort of an interesting thing to point to how easily,

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Speaker 4: given enough power, these things are changeable.

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Speaker 3: M H.

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Speaker 2: And today we are talking about specifically a time that

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Speaker 2: some people hacked into the US Treasury Department last year,

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Speaker 2: in early December of last year. But it is not

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Speaker 2: something that just occurred, you know, that one time. It

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Speaker 2: is an ongoing situation.

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Speaker 3: Yes, well said, And that brings us to our question

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Speaker 3: what happens next? To learn more will have to start

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Speaker 3: from the beginning, not like the beginning beginning, but you know,

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Speaker 3: a mid beginning.

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Speaker 4: First, let's take a quick word from our sponsor, and

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Speaker 4: then we'll jump right in.

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Speaker 3: Here are the facts. Let's be honest, most people across

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Speaker 3: the planet, including residents of these United States, we have

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Speaker 3: some understandable misconceptions about the United States Treasury, the provenance

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Speaker 3: of it, the function, the mission, you could say it.

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Speaker 3: We even a few years back, I remember when we

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Speaker 3: were all collectively surprised to learn that the Secret Service

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Speaker 3: functions under the Treasury. That was that was kind of creepy, honestly.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, until they got moved into Homeland Security.

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Speaker 3: Cool, which is totally not a weird.

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Speaker 2: Amorphous thing that's different.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah, And I appreciate you saying arms instead

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Speaker 3: of tentacles. That is accurate. The maybe we do like

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Speaker 3: an origin story of the US Treasury because one thing

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Speaker 3: that might surprise a lot of our American conspiracy realists

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Speaker 3: tonight in Canada, Mexico, the US, and the Caribbean is

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Speaker 3: that the Treasury is actually super old. It's like one

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Speaker 3: of the first things the founding fathers put in their

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Speaker 3: paperwork or in their pitch, in their look book for

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Speaker 3: I mean.

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Speaker 4: How are you going to do capitalism without a really

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Speaker 4: tight US Treasury?

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Speaker 3: And this was wars need funding also true.

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Speaker 4: And this was established in seventeen eighty nine as an

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Speaker 4: executive division of the federal government. Its jobs to advise

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Speaker 4: the president on financial physical matters, and perform certain.

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Speaker 3: Law enforcement activities.

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Speaker 4: Manufacturing currency as well as stamp which I believe it

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Speaker 4: wasn't more stamps at one point I'll referred to as

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Speaker 4: legal tender in some way. Yeah, I guess that's right.

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Speaker 3: Anyhow, I mean, that's that money in religion. Everything's money

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Speaker 3: if you believe in it hard enough, that's for sure.

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Speaker 2: Just on stamps because they hold a certain value, right,

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Speaker 2: And it is a bit amorphous, a bit strange when

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Speaker 2: they changed over to forever stamps, and right, that's kind

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Speaker 2: of I don't know. I still don't fully get that

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Speaker 2: because I used to watch as the price of stamps

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Speaker 2: would kind of incrementally increase.

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Speaker 4: Maybe that is the move or the reason I was

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Speaker 4: thinking about that, because it's that change certainly made that

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Speaker 4: not be as much of a thing anymore. You know,

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Speaker 4: the idea of the value of stamps, there's got to

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Speaker 4: be some index that can be observed, you know, for

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Speaker 4: like what the value of forever stamps in general. Arm No,

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Speaker 4: but that that you pay once and then they're good forever.

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Speaker 4: It's not the whole deal.

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Speaker 3: That's Yeah, that's the idea increasingly uh increasing for the government.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, maybe, I don't know, maybe a bad deal for us.

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Speaker 3: Well, they also run treasury bonds, so treasury bonds are

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Speaker 3: another example of something kind of like a forever stamp. Uh,

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Speaker 3: you got a limited time window and Uncle Sam says,

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Speaker 3: you know, I'll gladly pay you back for a Hamburger

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Speaker 3: on Wednesday if you give me the money for it

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Speaker 3: on Monday.

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Speaker 4: I've heard that they're a pretty good investment right now.

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Speaker 3: They were they were for sure for a minute. Well, okay, god, yeah,

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Speaker 3: true though true though they're in trouble. But in theory

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Speaker 3: it makes sense for the Treasury to do this sort

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Speaker 3: of stuff. They're the money guys, the money boffins. They

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Speaker 3: also supervised national banks, and a lot of the agencies

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Speaker 3: you hear about in the United States are under the

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Speaker 3: Treasury Department. The greatest hits like the Bureau of Engraving

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Speaker 3: and Printing, the blas Q, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Trade Bureau.

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Speaker 3: The US meant and of course are good friends at

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Speaker 3: the IRS, see you guys in April.

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Speaker 4: So there's an Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.

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Speaker 4: But also what is it alcohol, tobacco and firearms?

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Speaker 3: Is that? Are they related? No?

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Speaker 2: No, that one is for taxing and the other one

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Speaker 2: is for getting you.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, the other one's forgetting you and these guys. This

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Speaker 3: is a common misconception everything we're describing. As far as

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Speaker 3: the US Treasury goes. It is not the Federal Reserve.

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Speaker 3: That is a different branch of bureaucracy and conspiracy. They

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Speaker 3: do hang out, though they kick it pretty hard.

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Speaker 4: And the Reserve are the ones of the officials there

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Speaker 4: who adjust interest rates and things like that, right, and

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Speaker 4: make vague speeches about that make it easy. They can

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Speaker 4: also instantly affect the markets just by talking about your set,

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Speaker 4: just by a whiff of a change.

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Speaker 2: Coming go back and watch our videos on the Federal Reserve,

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Speaker 2: and I believe we've.

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Speaker 3: Covered it in a full episode at least once.

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Speaker 4: That's no, it was about the National Bank, wasn't it.

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Speaker 3: And we did.

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Speaker 4: We definitely did a live show about the establishment of

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Speaker 4: the National Bank.

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Speaker 3: Look, as long as these folks keep doing shenanigans, it

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Speaker 3: is our remit to cover those shenanigans.

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Speaker 2: Yes, so I believe it's the creature from Jekyl Island. Yes,

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Speaker 2: a good search term if you wish to go down

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Speaker 2: that rabbit hole.

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Speaker 3: Shout out to nineteen thirteen. Uh so in short for

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Speaker 3: well over two centuries now, which is, you know, a

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Speaker 3: big amount of time for the US. The Treasury has

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Speaker 3: been the main institution for Uncle Sam's money. Big big

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Speaker 3: tip of the tricorn hat to Alexander Hamillon, most famous

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Speaker 3: now for a musical based on loosely on his life,

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Speaker 3: but before that he was he was one of the

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Speaker 3: big financial movers of the Founding Fathers.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it is that situation. If you are going to

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Speaker 2: fight a major war, you have to get funding, and

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Speaker 2: all of this is I mean, this isn't directly tied

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Speaker 2: back to the funding that those revolutionary fellows secured in

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Speaker 2: order to fight back against the British, but it is

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Speaker 2: an interesting.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, it isn't.

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Speaker 2: Let's say, it's a it's a curious thread to follow,

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Speaker 2: just the funding, the outside funding that comes into a

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Speaker 2: country as it's attempting to fight some major war.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and then the funding that the or the debt

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Speaker 3: that the individual states racked up. And without getting two

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Speaker 3: into the weeds. That was one of the things that

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Speaker 3: Hamilton went ten toes down on, you know, was saying

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Speaker 3: that the federal government, if a United States exist as

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Speaker 3: an entity, then at some point it has to bear

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Speaker 3: the costs that say, your Virginia's or your Delawar's rack up.

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Speaker 4: I guess what I get kind of my mind blown

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Speaker 4: about when we're talking about the reality of money or

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Speaker 4: like the value of money or money as a religion.

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Speaker 4: Like you were saying, Ben, is the amount of debt

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Speaker 4: that countries carry and like, at what point does that

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Speaker 4: become a real thing. A note that is called in

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Speaker 4: and which never seems to really happen. It all just

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Speaker 4: seems kind of like soft diplomacy and threats to like

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Speaker 4: have countries kind of do what you want, but the

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Speaker 4: money never really changes hands or the debts are never

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Speaker 4: really repaid. I don't know.

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Speaker 2: It's wild to me in my mind the way it functions,

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Speaker 2: and I may be way off base here, but as

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Speaker 2: long as everybody is paying their debts, you know, those

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Speaker 2: little payments, right, the interest in all that stuff. As

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Speaker 2: long as everybody is paying everybody else, then money continues

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Speaker 2: to flow, and everybody can kind of do their thing

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Speaker 2: that they want to do. And people who are getting

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Speaker 2: paid most by others who owe them, right, they can

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Speaker 2: do the most things that they want to do. It.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yes, it does, and I think that's well put.

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Speaker 3: They can Also, those people are entities and power. They

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Speaker 3: can wield great influence beyond just a spreadsheet. And that's

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Speaker 3: where that's where we get to some of the big

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Speaker 3: controversies of the Treasury Department. Given given its position, it's

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Speaker 3: its high functionality, right, and given the length of time

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Speaker 3: this institution has existed, it's not a surprise that they have,

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Speaker 3: you know, stepped a little off the hedge path or

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Speaker 3: the hedgerow every so often, and uh two, great consequence

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Speaker 3: and a great detriment to the average person. But again,

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Speaker 3: the average person, and I want to be very honest here,

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Speaker 3: is not involved in these conversations. You can vote all

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Speaker 3: the live long day, but you do not have direct

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Speaker 3: influence on the US Treasury. It's sort of like if

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Speaker 3: you're a second grader, you don't get to determine who

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Speaker 3: becomes principal next year.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you got to pay extra for that.

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Speaker 3: Now.

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Speaker 2: Two, you can vote for the people or person who

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Speaker 2: has the people around them who will appoint the person.

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Speaker 3: You can vote for a person who will tell you,

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Speaker 3: if you catch them on a good day, that they

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Speaker 3: will do what you believe will make the United States better. Yes, spoiler,

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Speaker 3: they're probably not going to call you every three PM.

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Speaker 4: Are not going to check in and check in.

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Speaker 3: You have to get above a certain threshold. I mean,

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Speaker 3: there's no arguing this though. It's It's like so many

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Speaker 3: other The US Treasury is a fundamental part of the

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Speaker 3: United States. Whatever kind of treasury or financial overseer system

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Speaker 3: exists in any nation, it is a fundamental piece of

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Speaker 3: the overall organism in the US. All of the institutions

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Speaker 3: we have are both imperfect and necessary. And it's funny

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Speaker 3: we talk about this all the time. All sorts of

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Speaker 3: people have all kinds of ideas about how to improve

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Speaker 3: the treasury. You ask people, especially in DC, and you're

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Speaker 3: going to encounter some pretty hard sell pitches, and you'll

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Speaker 3: encounter people who are not even being insincere, they're being

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Speaker 3: quite genuine when they say, we know how to fix this, right,

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Speaker 3: here's what you do step A through Z. But the

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Speaker 3: issue is these ideas are often contradictory. There are ulterior

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Speaker 3: motives at play. If you took everybody's ideas, you put

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Speaker 3: them all together and rolled them out at once, the

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Speaker 3: immediate result would be chaos. And that's why the US overall,

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Speaker 3: especially in the world of finance, it has a surprisingly

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Speaker 3: like ad hoc patch together sort of jazz approach to infrastructure.

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Speaker 2: The only thing everybody agrees on is more military spending.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. The people who are allowed to speak in Congress

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Speaker 3: the one thing they agree on.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's just some people say more military spending and

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Speaker 2: others say more.

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Speaker 3: Military spending, and then another guy goes, I completely disagree.

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Speaker 3: What we need to do is spend more on the military. Also,

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Speaker 3: well said sir, Yeah, it's crucial to remember when we

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Speaker 3: talk about the US Treasury in particular, this money makes you,

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Speaker 3: makes you powerful. It also makes you a target for

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Speaker 3: high level espionage and high level politicians. Domestically, this is

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Speaker 3: a golden goose. This single entity has vast influence over

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Speaker 3: the way US money moves, which means it has vast

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Speaker 3: influence over the way money moves throughout the world.

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Speaker 4: And I mean, if there's one thing that I think

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Speaker 4: we've learned from the Doge situation, whatever you think about

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Speaker 4: what they're ultimately doing, is that a lot of these

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Speaker 4: systems are pretty antiquated and potentially vulnerable to this kind

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Speaker 4: of thing.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and also remember just the number of government grants,

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Speaker 2: the number of payments that the US government makes. When

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Speaker 2: a deal is made, especially with a foreign entity, with

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Speaker 2: either a corporation and a state, anything like that, there

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Speaker 2: are usually press releases or you know, some big announcement

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Speaker 2: in the press when money is moving, especially across borders

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Speaker 2: of the United States to another country. But the specifics

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Speaker 2: of anything to do with that, you know, the drilled

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Speaker 2: down specifics of where that money is moving, is often

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Speaker 2: not discussed. That is like highly controlled information by design.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it has to. It's opseche at that point like,

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Speaker 3: that's I love that point because that gets us to

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Speaker 3: I would say one of the axioms that is fundamental

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Speaker 3: to this episode. At least in my opinion, it's not

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Speaker 3: so much what the money is or what the money does.

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Speaker 3: I think it's more what kind of tea leaves you

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Speaker 3: can read, what sort of actions one can predict and

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Speaker 3: then if necessary prevent right. It gives you a little

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Speaker 3: heads up, a little bit of prognostication ability. And that's

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Speaker 3: why that's why we see the real danger of compromising

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Speaker 3: the US Treasury Department. It has a wait for it,

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Speaker 3: treasure trove. Thank you, Dylan, I appreciate the drummer. If

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Speaker 3: they're of data, yes, a wealth of knowledge, wealth of

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Speaker 3: knowledge that could, if compromised, easily make things go south

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Speaker 3: in a serious way. As we record this evening, folks,

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Speaker 3: true story don't be full. Twenty four was just a

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Speaker 3: few months ago, not too long ago. The US Treasury

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Speaker 3: got hacked hard, arguably twice.

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Speaker 4: You'll one two punch.

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Speaker 2: Yep, and then we're gonna tell you all about that

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Speaker 2: hard hacking.

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Speaker 3: Right after this hard hack's.

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Speaker 4: Gonna come, y'all.

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Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy. All right, let's be honest.

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Speaker 3: All right, we're talking about like the first hack? What

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Speaker 3: was the real first hack? For decades, we talked like

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Speaker 3: even before we started doing this strange show, the United

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Speaker 3: States has repeatedly, often consistently accused rival powers, especially our

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Speaker 3: pals in China and in Russia, of trying to hack

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Speaker 3: into their stuff.

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Speaker 2: Yep, and lest we forget North Korea, we've heard that

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Speaker 2: many a time.

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Speaker 4: And you know, there's a certain amount of kind of

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Speaker 4: chef's chest puffing, you know, saber rattling here when it

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Speaker 4: comes to politicians trying to seem like they're kind of

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Speaker 4: keyed into what's going on, trying to earn points with

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Speaker 4: their constituency or with other politicians. But it is important

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Speaker 4: to realize that this stuff isn't coming from thin air

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Speaker 4: at all. This is a very real threat and has

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Speaker 4: been for a very long time.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I love that, because, look, folks, we know politics

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Speaker 3: can be sensitive, as as can any other sort of

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Speaker 3: religious ideology. But this is not an episode about politics.

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Speaker 3: This is an episode about espionage. This is an episode

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Speaker 3: about trade craft, and it's one that we all need

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Speaker 3: to be aware of, right, And this is where we

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Speaker 3: go to journalists like David D. Sanger and Julian E. Barnes,

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Speaker 3: Singer is going to show up a couple of times

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Speaker 3: because he just did some kick ass work for the

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Speaker 3: New York Times. He's going to show up a couple

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Speaker 3: of New York Times in tonight's episode. In November of

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Speaker 3: twenty twenty four, Singer and Barnes described the mission creep

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Speaker 3: of Chinese espionage in specific applied to the United States.

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Speaker 2: The quote is, at first, the biggest worry was the

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Speaker 2: theft of intellectual property such as chip designs and plans

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Speaker 2: for military equipment. Yummy, And just coming out of the quote,

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Speaker 2: we've talked about that many times.

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Speaker 3: What do they call it? Corporate espionage or industrial espionage?

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Speaker 3: And that's it. Hey, hang it out. We just can't

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Speaker 3: hang it out.

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Speaker 2: Well.

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Speaker 4: I think I mentioned like the synthesizer that I have,

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Speaker 4: there's these chips inside of it that are when they

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Speaker 4: were made, they had a defect basically because they were

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Speaker 4: covered with this like polyurethane material and it was literally

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Speaker 4: a process that made the chips more vulnerable to moisture

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Speaker 4: and stuff, but was designed to protect against people being

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Speaker 4: able to scope out what the chip design looked like.

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Speaker 4: You know, and take a photo of it from the

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Speaker 4: factory floor or whatever to prevent industrial espionage.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, so chis chips are one thing. Some things

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Speaker 2: like nuclear power generation way back in the day. All

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Speaker 2: kinds of things like that were just new technologies, right,

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Speaker 2: were always and have always been ripe fruit to be

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Speaker 2: picked from anybody who was good at this type of

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Speaker 2: espionage propriety stuff. Yes, so let's jump back to the quote.

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Speaker 2: We're talking about military equipment, chip designs, intellectual property quote.

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Speaker 2: Those included the F thirty five, America's most advanced fighter jet,

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Speaker 2: whose blueprints China stole from American military contractors.

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Speaker 3: True story. Oh dear.

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Speaker 2: Then during the Bush and Obama administrations, China's focus turned

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Speaker 2: to understanding American government officials, including the theft of the

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Speaker 2: security clearance files of more than twenty two million Americans.

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Speaker 3: WHOA, this was not ideal. Just by the way, I'm

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Speaker 3: being very bep or Dylan, I am being extremely fucking diplomatic,

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Speaker 3: And everybody who heard that line, well, please please please.

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Speaker 2: I believe it. It was not ideal.

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Speaker 3: Recognize the diplomacy there, because now we're getting past like, okay,

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Speaker 3: for anybody who's ever been in a weird personal relationship,

360
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Speaker 3: sometimes somewhat toxic or somewhat just curious. Cats will will

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Speaker 3: do deep internet you know, searching. We'll we'll joke and

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Speaker 3: call it internet stalking on other people to figure out

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Speaker 3: what their aims are, what their providence is, what their

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Speaker 3: mission is. China now is doing this on a macro level,

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Speaker 3: as a a with all the powers of one of

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Speaker 3: the most important nations and one of the most dangerous

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Speaker 3: nations on the planet. They might be looking at you

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Speaker 3: and saying like, oh, what did you what did you

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Speaker 3: do Tuesday?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and these are in individuals with security clearance, which

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Speaker 2: means they have access to those files that not all

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Speaker 2: of us have access to.

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Speaker 3: And then extrapolate that toward the larger web, right leveraging

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Speaker 3: five eyes, which is clearly compromised at this point. And

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Speaker 3: then you can now construct a model or a decision

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Speaker 3: tree where you say something like, Hey, I'm thinking of

377
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Speaker 3: an innocuous name. Hey, Tiffany, Tiffany Blue Jens or whatever

378
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Speaker 3: has a security clearance, right, and we know she hangs

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Speaker 3: out here, and she knows she has an interest in

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Speaker 3: this thing, and so maybe we can have a accidental

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Speaker 3: meeting where a conversation ensues and we can learn a

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Speaker 3: little bit.

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Speaker 4: More or even potentially compromise somebody like that.

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Speaker 3: Right, Well, yeah, that's what I'm talking about.

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Speaker 4: But I mean, like compromisation, well not not just eavesdropping

386
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Speaker 4: or like you know, probing for information, but even making

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Speaker 4: them an asset POTENTI ting.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, that's where.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and when you have twenty two million of them,

390
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Speaker 2: you can maybe see somebody who's like third down the

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Speaker 2: line of who's gonna get notified when action X occurs?

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Speaker 3: Right, feeling a little.

393
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Speaker 4: Underappreciated, maybe you know, yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 3: Leverage the weaknesses, right, find the gaps in the armor.

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Speaker 3: So we already see like that excellent quote describes, we

396
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Speaker 3: see an expansion of scope mission creep, earlier hacks, earlier

397
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Speaker 3: compromise attempts, espionage, tradecraft attempts, relatively constrained. Let me get

398
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Speaker 3: the blueprints, let me get out. Let me see if

399
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Speaker 3: I can leave a proverbial window open so I can

400
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Speaker 3: break in later. Uh. And just side note, that's a

401
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Speaker 3: reference to typical B and E strategy for anybody who

402
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Speaker 3: knows what they're doing. You break into a house or

403
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Speaker 3: a structure the first time. What you want to do

404
00:23:54,480 --> 00:23:58,840
Speaker 3: is leave some sort of just unlatch a window or

405
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Speaker 3: something and hope no one notices it, because it makes

406
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Speaker 3: it easier for you to do a second round of crimes. Also,

407
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Speaker 3: we don't do that.

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Speaker 2: Well, especially when you're talking about doing some kind of

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Speaker 2: espionage through a computer interface, right or through a network Leaving,

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Speaker 2: leaving an escape patch open is a little easier than

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Speaker 2: you know, physically unlatching a window when there's a big

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Speaker 2: investigation or something, right like, sometimes not always, but it is.

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Speaker 2: It is definitely the strategy.

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Speaker 3: As you said, Ben, what we're saying is everybody go

415
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Speaker 3: check your windows right now, especially ones you don't check often. Yes,

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Speaker 3: those those are the ones. And that that applies to

417
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Speaker 3: security online and electronic infrastructure as well. So the next

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Speaker 3: question is like, what how do we make this bigger? Right?

419
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Speaker 3: Hackers are asking and they're saying, if we steal access

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Speaker 3: to one thing, why don't we leverage that to gain

421
00:24:59,359 --> 00:25:02,879
Speaker 3: access to some other thing or place like? Ultimately, you

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Speaker 3: don't want to steal just the key to the front door.

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Speaker 3: You want to steal the key to the room where

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Speaker 3: someone makes all the other keys.

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Speaker 4: If it's a give a man a fist, teach a

426
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Speaker 4: man to fish kind of scenario.

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Speaker 3: Which is an example that comes up later. Yes, absolutely so.

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Speaker 2: I wonder if it's weird. I feel like the treasurery

429
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Speaker 2: Department might be the biggest get you can almost imagine.

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Speaker 3: One of for sure, as especially as far as world

431
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Speaker 3: powers go, these like we were saying, these attacks are occurring.

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Speaker 3: They are occurring much more often than the average member

433
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Speaker 3: of the public might assume, especially if you remember the

434
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Speaker 3: public in China, because as we'll see later, they disagree

435
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Speaker 3: with some of the allegations of conspiracy that we're going

436
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Speaker 3: to explore. But we will tell you things that the

437
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Speaker 3: United States and the world at large, other than the PRC,

438
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Speaker 3: the People's Republic of China consider proven right now, and

439
00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:03,600
Speaker 3: you don't have to look far. Let's just like start

440
00:26:03,640 --> 00:26:07,600
Speaker 3: with July of twenty twenty four, not too long ago.

441
00:26:07,720 --> 00:26:12,479
Speaker 3: We were all, I guess, easy breezy summer girls or whatever,

442
00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:17,600
Speaker 3: and then China, China broke into everybody's phones.

443
00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:22,119
Speaker 4: Yeah, PRC sponsored hackers broke into at least nine separate

444
00:26:22,160 --> 00:26:23,280
Speaker 4: telecom systems.

445
00:26:24,119 --> 00:26:25,480
Speaker 3: And you know, this is also one of those things

446
00:26:25,520 --> 00:26:26,040
Speaker 3: too where we.

447
00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:29,000
Speaker 4: Say PRC sponsored, but there is still kind of plausible

448
00:26:29,000 --> 00:26:32,520
Speaker 4: deniability from the government. Right, it's like we didn't, you know,

449
00:26:33,200 --> 00:26:35,280
Speaker 4: hire these people. They were acting on their own.

450
00:26:35,160 --> 00:26:40,560
Speaker 3: Isn't that correct? Yeah, hacking for hire. It's it's a

451
00:26:40,640 --> 00:26:42,880
Speaker 3: thing we'll get into later as well. And I think

452
00:26:42,880 --> 00:26:46,840
Speaker 3: that's excellent foreshadowing. There's a degree of a hidden hand, right,

453
00:26:46,920 --> 00:26:50,400
Speaker 3: plausible deniability, we would call it in the US when

454
00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:54,080
Speaker 3: we do it, because spoiler, we super do that, oh

455
00:26:54,119 --> 00:26:54,760
Speaker 3: all the time.

456
00:26:54,880 --> 00:26:56,720
Speaker 4: Well, in the hacker group that we're talking about here

457
00:26:56,840 --> 00:27:00,640
Speaker 4: for hire. Otherwise they're got to really sick.

458
00:27:00,520 --> 00:27:03,000
Speaker 3: Name if you ask me, salt typhoon.

459
00:27:03,359 --> 00:27:08,679
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's pretty cool, but is it salt typhoon food? Wow?

460
00:27:08,840 --> 00:27:11,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, they did not they do not call themselves that.

461
00:27:12,720 --> 00:27:18,320
Speaker 3: They were known as APT twenty seven h Advanced Persistent

462
00:27:18,400 --> 00:27:21,719
Speaker 3: Threat twenty seven, and then Microsoft called them salt typhoon.

463
00:27:21,840 --> 00:27:24,280
Speaker 4: Okay, well, good on you, Microsoft. That's a pretty sick nickname.

464
00:27:24,320 --> 00:27:27,119
Speaker 4: It's like the way the press sort of like nicknames

465
00:27:27,119 --> 00:27:28,399
Speaker 4: a serial killer or something.

466
00:27:28,440 --> 00:27:29,080
Speaker 3: That's interesting.

467
00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:32,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, and now the reported purpose of this hack was

468
00:27:33,080 --> 00:27:40,439
Speaker 2: specifically to spy on US government officials, including then I

469
00:27:40,480 --> 00:27:43,640
Speaker 2: believe it was Donald Trump as he's running.

470
00:27:43,440 --> 00:27:45,199
Speaker 3: For president for a president elect.

471
00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:49,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, yes, And there was like other just high level

472
00:27:49,440 --> 00:27:52,240
Speaker 2: government officials that they wanted to just literally see what

473
00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:53,200
Speaker 2: they're doing on their.

474
00:27:53,040 --> 00:27:59,119
Speaker 3: Phones, compromise cabinet level stuff, and then the unelected bureaucrats

475
00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:03,040
Speaker 3: that can make some power powerful decisions with global consequence.

476
00:28:03,720 --> 00:28:06,800
Speaker 3: There have been other breaches and breach attempts by this

477
00:28:06,880 --> 00:28:10,480
Speaker 3: group back before Microsoft called them Salt Typhoon, and they

478
00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:14,320
Speaker 3: were against public entities as well as private big enough companies,

479
00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:21,080
Speaker 3: especially in the defense industry, especially in certain I will

480
00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:27,359
Speaker 3: say biomedicine applications. Right, So they're touching universities, they're touching healthcare,

481
00:28:27,440 --> 00:28:30,520
Speaker 3: they're touching the right kind of grants, and they're doing

482
00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:34,080
Speaker 3: human int as well, so they're human intelligence. So they're

483
00:28:34,119 --> 00:28:38,000
Speaker 3: also you know, they found out what Miss Blue Jeans

484
00:28:38,320 --> 00:28:42,120
Speaker 3: is doing later and they sent someone to have a chat.

485
00:28:42,560 --> 00:28:46,480
Speaker 3: I wonder if they found the cloning facilities. They found

486
00:28:46,480 --> 00:28:51,720
Speaker 3: a clone of the cloning facilities. An instance, an instance,

487
00:28:51,760 --> 00:28:55,200
Speaker 3: an iteration thereof this telecom breach that Noel's mentioning there

488
00:28:55,360 --> 00:29:01,960
Speaker 3: is astonishing because it teaches the the hackers, the aggressors,

489
00:29:03,600 --> 00:29:06,880
Speaker 3: more about the structure than it does about the specific

490
00:29:07,040 --> 00:29:11,240
Speaker 3: heistore monitoring observation attempt. At this point, they're not trying

491
00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:14,680
Speaker 3: to shake the waters. They're trying to get their ears

492
00:29:14,720 --> 00:29:20,240
Speaker 3: and eyes inside of people's activities and people's minds and motivations.

493
00:29:20,480 --> 00:29:22,960
Speaker 3: But then they find a lot more about the structure

494
00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:27,160
Speaker 3: and they say, holy spokes, this thing is terrible. This

495
00:29:27,280 --> 00:29:29,800
Speaker 3: is like a roller coaster built in the nineteen fifties.

496
00:29:30,000 --> 00:29:32,720
Speaker 3: How has someone not beaaten us to this yet?

497
00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:35,000
Speaker 4: They're like casing the joint at this point, you know,

498
00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:37,920
Speaker 4: checking for those unlatched windows that you were talking.

499
00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:40,560
Speaker 2: About, well, yeah, and figuring out the web of who

500
00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:41,640
Speaker 2: to target when.

501
00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:44,480
Speaker 3: And for what. Yeah, they get access to not just

502
00:29:44,600 --> 00:29:48,920
Speaker 3: text communicate but also phone conversations, and they get real

503
00:29:49,000 --> 00:29:51,160
Speaker 3: close to being able to do it in real time.

504
00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:53,600
Speaker 4: And that would be a great way to gather that

505
00:29:53,680 --> 00:29:56,160
Speaker 4: kind of compromand on these individuals. Not only are you

506
00:29:56,240 --> 00:30:00,640
Speaker 4: learning potentially actionable intelligence items, but you might find someone

507
00:30:00,680 --> 00:30:03,600
Speaker 4: doing something they're not supposed to, that's in a position

508
00:30:03,680 --> 00:30:05,440
Speaker 4: that you might want to take advantage of, and then

509
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:08,600
Speaker 4: you've got everything you need to flip them.

510
00:30:08,720 --> 00:30:13,520
Speaker 3: Check out our earlier episodes, because look, we're not spilling

511
00:30:13,560 --> 00:30:18,720
Speaker 3: beans outside of the barrel here. This is known tactics,

512
00:30:18,760 --> 00:30:22,320
Speaker 3: and they are deployed by all high level world powers.

513
00:30:22,320 --> 00:30:27,040
Speaker 3: So initially the Biden administration. This happened while Joe Biden

514
00:30:27,680 --> 00:30:31,160
Speaker 3: was the President of the US. The Biden administration acknowledged

515
00:30:31,200 --> 00:30:36,200
Speaker 3: this hack from July twenty twenty four, but members of Congress,

516
00:30:36,400 --> 00:30:40,680
Speaker 3: members of Joe Biden's own ostensible political party, they came

517
00:30:40,800 --> 00:30:44,560
Speaker 3: forward pretty soon after and they said, look, you guys

518
00:30:44,600 --> 00:30:47,120
Speaker 3: are making this sound like it's not a big deal,

519
00:30:47,360 --> 00:30:49,440
Speaker 3: and it is a huge deal.

520
00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:51,880
Speaker 4: Yeah, I'm not gonna lie. I mean, I remember that

521
00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:55,200
Speaker 4: pr kind of line that they pushed out, and maybe

522
00:30:55,440 --> 00:30:57,680
Speaker 4: just because I wanted to be blissfully ignorant to it,

523
00:30:57,720 --> 00:31:00,120
Speaker 4: I sort of was like, Okay, it's probably fine. I'm

524
00:31:00,160 --> 00:31:02,520
Speaker 4: sure a lot of people did the same thing, which was.

525
00:31:03,960 --> 00:31:06,239
Speaker 2: I don't want to spoil the lead here. We were

526
00:31:06,280 --> 00:31:11,040
Speaker 2: pretty straightforward and saying the Treasury Department got hacked hard.

527
00:31:11,520 --> 00:31:14,760
Speaker 2: But if you read the official, you know, statements, it

528
00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:15,880
Speaker 2: was it's not a big deal.

529
00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:19,560
Speaker 3: We'll talk about that. But that was that was definitely the.

530
00:31:19,600 --> 00:31:25,040
Speaker 2: Forward facing message, not a big deal, tiny, tiny, little breach.

531
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:30,080
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, you know, everybody sometimes pushes a fart too

532
00:31:30,120 --> 00:31:31,840
Speaker 3: hard you and can get a little juice in your paper.

533
00:31:31,880 --> 00:31:34,200
Speaker 3: Oh my god, that's what they were saying. They had

534
00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:36,400
Speaker 3: a little juice. That's what they were saying. That was

535
00:31:36,600 --> 00:31:38,240
Speaker 3: actually in the official release.

536
00:31:39,360 --> 00:31:41,200
Speaker 4: Yes, language they chose to go with.

537
00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:45,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, but we do have we do have a let's say,

538
00:31:45,960 --> 00:31:49,920
Speaker 2: a sentiment from Senator Mark Warner of Virginia about this

539
00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:52,959
Speaker 2: specific hack under the Biden administration when they were in charge,

540
00:31:53,200 --> 00:31:54,720
Speaker 2: and he at the time was the chairman of the

541
00:31:54,760 --> 00:31:58,840
Speaker 2: Senate Intelligence Committee. Uh, he was pretty messed up about it,

542
00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:02,080
Speaker 2: like he thought, this is way worse than we're all

543
00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:03,040
Speaker 2: saying out loud.

544
00:32:03,840 --> 00:32:06,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, he said he was stunned by the scope and

545
00:32:06,680 --> 00:32:10,239
Speaker 3: depth of the breach. And again, look, politics aside, this

546
00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:13,520
Speaker 3: guy is also a Democrat. For anybody outside of the US,

547
00:32:13,680 --> 00:32:16,840
Speaker 3: Joe Biden was and I assume is a Democrat. So

548
00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:19,760
Speaker 3: these guys are on the same, you know, political team.

549
00:32:20,040 --> 00:32:24,120
Speaker 3: And this dude, Senator Warter is saying, no, it's not

550
00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:28,680
Speaker 3: just some juice. These attacks are going to lead to

551
00:32:28,960 --> 00:32:33,480
Speaker 3: more attacks unless there is a serious inventory of our

552
00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:37,960
Speaker 3: security on the US side. And being from Virginia and

553
00:32:38,040 --> 00:32:40,920
Speaker 3: being a politician, just to be fair, obviously he's going

554
00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:43,640
Speaker 3: to lean into like folksy idioms because he wants to

555
00:32:43,680 --> 00:32:46,360
Speaker 3: get re elected, so he says, the bound door is

556
00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:48,880
Speaker 3: still wide open, mostly open.

557
00:32:50,480 --> 00:32:53,000
Speaker 4: Is this not part of the mandate or mission of

558
00:32:53,040 --> 00:32:56,920
Speaker 4: the whole elon musk Doge crew like to prevent stuff

559
00:32:56,920 --> 00:32:59,000
Speaker 4: like I mean again, whatever they're actually up to to

560
00:32:59,080 --> 00:33:01,960
Speaker 4: prevent stuff like that is to tighten up security on

561
00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:03,680
Speaker 4: these antiquated computer systems.

562
00:33:04,280 --> 00:33:07,120
Speaker 3: Unfortunately, No, they're I think they'd be a good.

563
00:33:06,960 --> 00:33:08,880
Speaker 4: Selling point though, you know, like, how are they going

564
00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:09,600
Speaker 4: to help us?

565
00:33:10,560 --> 00:33:10,760
Speaker 2: Now?

566
00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:14,680
Speaker 3: Their thing is to help the America. Their stated purpose

567
00:33:14,800 --> 00:33:17,960
Speaker 3: is to help the American public by eliminate wasteful government

568
00:33:17,960 --> 00:33:19,080
Speaker 3: spending and fraud.

569
00:33:19,480 --> 00:33:22,520
Speaker 2: Well, yeah, and remember these are these are private telecoms

570
00:33:22,880 --> 00:33:25,800
Speaker 2: that were targeted in this specific instance, right, So that

571
00:33:26,120 --> 00:33:27,680
Speaker 2: is not government at all, that's.

572
00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:29,920
Speaker 4: True, but it was it did have tendrils that reached

573
00:33:29,960 --> 00:33:32,280
Speaker 4: into government, which is what we're going to get further.

574
00:33:32,040 --> 00:33:37,400
Speaker 3: Into long lines. Building. Yes, love it, love it. Imagine

575
00:33:37,400 --> 00:33:40,520
Speaker 3: a skyscraper with no windows. If you live in Manhattan, boy,

576
00:33:40,560 --> 00:33:43,719
Speaker 3: do we have news for you. Also, by the way,

577
00:33:43,960 --> 00:33:48,960
Speaker 3: this is how unprepared Uncle Sam was. The federal government,

578
00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:54,240
Speaker 3: the folks who run the world's most dangerous military still

579
00:33:54,960 --> 00:33:58,480
Speaker 3: in all of known existence, technically, they did not discover

580
00:33:58,600 --> 00:34:01,120
Speaker 3: this on their own. They were too big. They were

581
00:34:01,160 --> 00:34:05,040
Speaker 3: like a They were like a blue whale that didn't

582
00:34:05,120 --> 00:34:10,480
Speaker 3: know it had some parasites on its tail. They instead

583
00:34:10,520 --> 00:34:16,160
Speaker 3: got word about this from Microsoft Private Company. Their cybersec

584
00:34:16,280 --> 00:34:21,440
Speaker 3: team discovered the first hack, the telecom hack. Right. We

585
00:34:21,480 --> 00:34:24,359
Speaker 3: say first, because that's the one they discovered first, and

586
00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:28,400
Speaker 3: they're the ones who gave us that sick name salt Typhoon. Again,

587
00:34:28,480 --> 00:34:30,920
Speaker 3: it does sound like one of those giant robots, a

588
00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:36,440
Speaker 3: Jaeger from Pacific rim. Well done, fellow nerds. The US government,

589
00:34:36,560 --> 00:34:39,520
Speaker 3: even after they knew they were trying to picture the

590
00:34:39,560 --> 00:34:42,120
Speaker 3: whale trying to turn around and look at its own tail,

591
00:34:42,560 --> 00:34:46,839
Speaker 3: they still didn't understand the following things. They're really dangerous. First,

592
00:34:46,920 --> 00:34:49,680
Speaker 3: they didn't understand how China was able to obtain this

593
00:34:49,800 --> 00:34:54,200
Speaker 3: information in the first place. Second, they didn't understand how

594
00:34:54,239 --> 00:34:59,160
Speaker 3: this breach allowed them to target and monitor conversations with

595
00:34:59,200 --> 00:35:03,080
Speaker 3: those high value targets. And then they also didn't understand

596
00:35:03,960 --> 00:35:08,360
Speaker 3: the full ways in which this had implications for the future.

597
00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:11,239
Speaker 2: Yeah, oh yeah. And they didn't know the specifics of

598
00:35:11,280 --> 00:35:14,080
Speaker 2: what was taken. They just knew it had been happening

599
00:35:14,120 --> 00:35:17,400
Speaker 2: for a certain amount of time. So you then have

600
00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:20,680
Speaker 2: to just assume that anything and everything that was discussed

601
00:35:20,680 --> 00:35:25,160
Speaker 2: by everybody, every one like seriously, was just swept up.

602
00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:31,040
Speaker 3: M Yeah. They initially they say, okay, these hackers used

603
00:35:31,280 --> 00:35:35,640
Speaker 3: stolen passwords, honestly, very easy. We don't say this with

604
00:35:35,760 --> 00:35:37,960
Speaker 3: any like great pride, and we're not trying to be

605
00:35:38,080 --> 00:35:41,360
Speaker 3: a dix about it. But a lot of people used

606
00:35:41,400 --> 00:35:44,520
Speaker 3: really dumb passwords like one, two, three, four, five, you know,

607
00:35:45,680 --> 00:35:49,359
Speaker 3: in their government jobs. And then they focused on these

608
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:54,040
Speaker 3: systems that would function under stuff like the FISA court. Right,

609
00:35:54,200 --> 00:35:56,919
Speaker 3: you know, get get the warrant such that you are

610
00:35:57,280 --> 00:36:02,000
Speaker 3: legally allowed to monitor phone calls text. But it looks

611
00:36:02,040 --> 00:36:04,640
Speaker 3: like as soon as to your point about observation, as

612
00:36:04,680 --> 00:36:08,520
Speaker 3: soon as they realized that they have been discovered, the

613
00:36:08,600 --> 00:36:12,840
Speaker 3: Salt Typhoon and co. Retreated right they left the house,

614
00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:17,400
Speaker 3: They left some windows unlocked, they suspended their activities because

615
00:36:17,520 --> 00:36:22,560
Speaker 3: if they're not observed, that means it is incredibly difficult

616
00:36:22,840 --> 00:36:25,440
Speaker 3: to gauge the amounts of damage done, to know what

617
00:36:25,480 --> 00:36:30,160
Speaker 3: they touched. To keep with our like B and E comparison,

618
00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:34,520
Speaker 3: I would say think of it as hearing the sirens

619
00:36:34,560 --> 00:36:37,279
Speaker 3: in the distance while you're still inside the house and

620
00:36:37,360 --> 00:36:40,480
Speaker 3: having enough time to wipe down as much stuff as possible.

621
00:36:40,680 --> 00:36:43,839
Speaker 3: You remove your fingerprints or shredding the.

622
00:36:43,840 --> 00:36:48,640
Speaker 2: Docks, putting them drills through your hard drives.

623
00:36:48,960 --> 00:36:50,439
Speaker 4: Oh yeah, that's a good one.

624
00:36:51,200 --> 00:36:53,440
Speaker 3: That's a good one. Yeah, that's an old favorite of us.

625
00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:56,160
Speaker 3: It's stuff they'll watch you to know it. Brought to

626
00:36:56,160 --> 00:36:57,040
Speaker 3: you by Big Drill.

627
00:36:57,640 --> 00:37:01,040
Speaker 4: But now we sit as we record on March seventh

628
00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:05,560
Speaker 4: of twenty twenty five, and a little bit more information

629
00:37:05,880 --> 00:37:09,880
Speaker 4: has come out about what really went down during these hacks.

630
00:37:10,480 --> 00:37:12,399
Speaker 4: We're going to tell you all about that right after

631
00:37:12,440 --> 00:37:14,200
Speaker 4: we take a quick word from our sponsor.

632
00:37:22,280 --> 00:37:27,560
Speaker 3: We've returned fast forward December four, just a few months ago,

633
00:37:27,719 --> 00:37:30,439
Speaker 3: as weird as that is to say, because a lot

634
00:37:30,480 --> 00:37:33,880
Speaker 3: has happened. We are to your point, Noel, starting to

635
00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:39,759
Speaker 3: learn more about what transpired. Somehow, we're still officially not

636
00:37:39,880 --> 00:37:44,239
Speaker 3: sure how. The hackers of Salt Typhoon they snagged a

637
00:37:44,360 --> 00:37:49,239
Speaker 3: nearly comprehensive list of phone numbers that DOJ has actively

638
00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:53,600
Speaker 3: wire tapped, which means, for the purposes of the PRC,

639
00:37:54,400 --> 00:37:59,320
Speaker 3: they got a list of like eighty to ninety percent

640
00:37:59,600 --> 00:38:05,640
Speaker 3: of every individual the DOJ thinks might be spying. Wow

641
00:38:05,960 --> 00:38:08,960
Speaker 3: again not ideal, Yeah, or a.

642
00:38:08,920 --> 00:38:12,480
Speaker 2: Part of some criminal syndicate, right, that's moving money or

643
00:38:12,560 --> 00:38:17,759
Speaker 2: functioning through investments through a series of front companies or

644
00:38:17,800 --> 00:38:22,719
Speaker 2: something like that. I mean we're talking. So basically, they

645
00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:26,040
Speaker 2: they figured out who we think the bad guys are.

646
00:38:26,440 --> 00:38:29,359
Speaker 2: So now they know which bad guys that they might

647
00:38:29,520 --> 00:38:35,080
Speaker 2: be associated with are under investigation. Which you've seen movies,

648
00:38:35,160 --> 00:38:38,960
Speaker 2: you've seen TV shows. Once you know you're under investigation,

649
00:38:39,680 --> 00:38:40,840
Speaker 2: the whole game changes.

650
00:38:41,160 --> 00:38:45,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, your behaviors change, right, and you can again decision

651
00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:49,920
Speaker 3: tree people toward actions that are preferable to use. So

652
00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:54,080
Speaker 3: we saw then diagram. Right, China has a list of assets.

653
00:38:54,160 --> 00:38:57,840
Speaker 3: And to be completely fair and to exercise empathy, it

654
00:38:57,960 --> 00:39:01,160
Speaker 3: is known that quite a few people who are functioning

655
00:39:01,200 --> 00:39:04,399
Speaker 3: as Chinese assets abroad are not doing so of their

656
00:39:04,400 --> 00:39:07,000
Speaker 3: own free will. They are being coerced with threats to

657
00:39:07,040 --> 00:39:11,200
Speaker 3: their family and intimidation and extortion, you know, all the hits.

658
00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:15,160
Speaker 3: And again the US does this too. I hate to

659
00:39:15,200 --> 00:39:17,560
Speaker 3: say it, but it's true. So you nailed it, Matt.

660
00:39:17,640 --> 00:39:21,080
Speaker 3: One of the logical primary goals of attaining this list

661
00:39:21,800 --> 00:39:26,479
Speaker 3: is not to immediately people, right, the Chinese boffins don't

662
00:39:26,480 --> 00:39:28,760
Speaker 3: love a third story window as much as our friends

663
00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:33,160
Speaker 3: in Russia, but they do want that information. And perhaps

664
00:39:33,160 --> 00:39:36,360
Speaker 3: the most important thing is when you're able to compare

665
00:39:36,440 --> 00:39:39,160
Speaker 3: those two lists, right, the one we have, the one

666
00:39:39,239 --> 00:39:41,439
Speaker 3: China has, or the one the US has and one

667
00:39:41,480 --> 00:39:45,040
Speaker 3: we have, you can find the coolest part the real

668
00:39:45,200 --> 00:39:48,880
Speaker 3: umami who do we know works for us? That has

669
00:39:49,040 --> 00:39:52,880
Speaker 3: yet to be clocked? Right? Where is the gap? But

670
00:39:52,920 --> 00:39:54,960
Speaker 3: where's the missing piece, the blind spot?

671
00:39:55,200 --> 00:39:57,160
Speaker 2: And let's find a way to get them in on

672
00:39:57,200 --> 00:39:58,040
Speaker 2: the investigation.

673
00:39:59,040 --> 00:40:02,600
Speaker 3: Let's have the me Lo Jens lady. Right, Yeah, and

674
00:40:02,640 --> 00:40:05,080
Speaker 3: maybe they can you know, maybe they can get at

675
00:40:05,080 --> 00:40:08,160
Speaker 3: the right conference, maybe they can get assigned to the

676
00:40:08,239 --> 00:40:08,960
Speaker 3: right project.

677
00:40:09,239 --> 00:40:12,560
Speaker 2: Because it's not get them elected to some official office.

678
00:40:13,000 --> 00:40:17,560
Speaker 3: Yeah yeah, it's never looks by movies always want you

679
00:40:17,600 --> 00:40:20,160
Speaker 3: to think it's a big push. It's hardly ever a

680
00:40:20,200 --> 00:40:23,759
Speaker 3: big push. It's a series of little nudges. Right. You

681
00:40:23,800 --> 00:40:29,719
Speaker 3: seek to erode people, You seek to normalize very not

682
00:40:29,880 --> 00:40:33,480
Speaker 3: normal stuff over time, and do it in such a

683
00:40:33,480 --> 00:40:38,160
Speaker 3: way that you can never be held responsible and always

684
00:40:38,320 --> 00:40:41,000
Speaker 3: at the worst say oh, I'm surprised as you are.

685
00:40:41,080 --> 00:40:43,400
Speaker 3: You know, I thought everybody was being cool. Why are

686
00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:49,320
Speaker 3: you not being cool about this? Yikes, yikes, big ikes.

687
00:40:50,080 --> 00:40:55,239
Speaker 3: But fortunately we do have some announcements, you know, they

688
00:40:55,320 --> 00:40:59,200
Speaker 3: come to us from the Treasury and the DOJ. Whatever.

689
00:40:59,239 --> 00:41:03,239
Speaker 3: These hackers, it appears they didn't compromise just these high

690
00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:08,760
Speaker 3: value targets. They also compromised more than one hundred US organizations,

691
00:41:08,800 --> 00:41:14,160
Speaker 3: private and public. The Treasury went forward to the masses

692
00:41:14,440 --> 00:41:16,840
Speaker 3: at the end of the Biden administration when there was

693
00:41:16,880 --> 00:41:19,600
Speaker 3: a lot of other stuff going on, and they said, look,

694
00:41:19,760 --> 00:41:23,839
Speaker 3: here's what happened. These hackers that we think are definitely

695
00:41:23,920 --> 00:41:27,759
Speaker 3: based in China and definitely working for China in some capacity.

696
00:41:27,840 --> 00:41:31,239
Speaker 3: To your point, nol, we think that they gained access

697
00:41:31,360 --> 00:41:37,319
Speaker 3: to our employees workstations aka computers, database, and at the

698
00:41:37,520 --> 00:41:42,400
Speaker 3: very least they got some documents. And someone said what

699
00:41:42,480 --> 00:41:45,839
Speaker 3: kind of documents did they get? And the Treasury said, no, further,

700
00:41:46,000 --> 00:41:51,840
Speaker 3: we're not taking questions. Yep, yep.

701
00:41:53,080 --> 00:41:56,120
Speaker 2: You may remember this. We talked about it close to

702
00:41:56,280 --> 00:41:58,640
Speaker 2: around the time. I think we mentioned it in Strange

703
00:41:58,680 --> 00:42:04,640
Speaker 2: News in December at some point twenty twenty four, because

704
00:42:04,760 --> 00:42:07,640
Speaker 2: it was pretty shocking. So in a statement that the

705
00:42:07,680 --> 00:42:10,920
Speaker 2: Department of Treasury made, they said that on December eighth,

706
00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:13,920
Speaker 2: they were made known that there was some kind of

707
00:42:14,160 --> 00:42:18,200
Speaker 2: hack that occurred via a third party software service they

708
00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:19,880
Speaker 2: use called Beyond.

709
00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:21,760
Speaker 3: Trust all one word. Yep.

710
00:42:22,200 --> 00:42:25,360
Speaker 2: This is a This is a company that provides things

711
00:42:25,480 --> 00:42:31,200
Speaker 2: like remote access for governmental employees there at the Department

712
00:42:31,239 --> 00:42:36,680
Speaker 2: of Treasury, and Beyond Trust said some hacker group hackers

713
00:42:37,320 --> 00:42:41,719
Speaker 2: gained access by obtaining a security key, and then they

714
00:42:41,840 --> 00:42:45,919
Speaker 2: used that to get into specific not even not very

715
00:42:45,960 --> 00:42:50,480
Speaker 2: many individuals, machines and materials, but they used that single

716
00:42:50,520 --> 00:42:53,759
Speaker 2: security key to make it seem like they were trustworthy

717
00:42:54,239 --> 00:42:59,279
Speaker 2: and were able to remotely access essentially desktops slash laptops.

718
00:42:59,320 --> 00:43:02,560
Speaker 3: And in doing so perhaps make more keys. For about

719
00:43:02,600 --> 00:43:05,600
Speaker 3: seventy two hours at least, as far as we understand,

720
00:43:05,719 --> 00:43:10,080
Speaker 3: Beyond Trust was able to monitor these activities. During that time.

721
00:43:10,120 --> 00:43:15,919
Speaker 3: They saw these operators create accounts, change passwords, change your passwords.

722
00:43:16,280 --> 00:43:18,080
Speaker 3: Make sense. Of course you would do that, but it

723
00:43:18,160 --> 00:43:21,279
Speaker 3: heightens your risk of being apprehended. Right, So ideally what

724
00:43:21,360 --> 00:43:24,279
Speaker 3: you want to do is create a new account that

725
00:43:24,320 --> 00:43:27,600
Speaker 3: you control, right and make it look native. Right, throw

726
00:43:27,640 --> 00:43:30,239
Speaker 3: some wool over your wolf and have it run with

727
00:43:30,280 --> 00:43:33,839
Speaker 3: the sheep. Yep, but hey, this should be known.

728
00:43:33,920 --> 00:43:38,920
Speaker 2: According to the official statements at that time, the Department

729
00:43:38,960 --> 00:43:41,240
Speaker 2: of Treasury said, Hey, the only things that were taken

730
00:43:41,280 --> 00:43:43,240
Speaker 2: were unclassified files.

731
00:43:43,480 --> 00:43:48,040
Speaker 3: Oh tight, they are unclassified guys. Oh they broke into

732
00:43:48,080 --> 00:43:50,400
Speaker 3: my house, but don't worry. They just stole the trash.

733
00:43:51,280 --> 00:43:53,400
Speaker 4: Yeah, but you can find a lot of interesting stuff

734
00:43:53,400 --> 00:43:55,480
Speaker 4: digging around in people's trash now, uh.

735
00:43:59,040 --> 00:44:03,040
Speaker 3: Well, put yeah they did. They also I love the

736
00:44:03,080 --> 00:44:06,520
Speaker 3: point they did not specify the nature of these unclassified

737
00:44:07,160 --> 00:44:10,840
Speaker 3: troves of information. They didn't say what kind of files

738
00:44:10,840 --> 00:44:14,800
Speaker 3: were taken. They didn't say when or for how long

739
00:44:14,920 --> 00:44:17,560
Speaker 3: the hack took place other than that seventy two hour

740
00:44:17,719 --> 00:44:23,120
Speaker 3: monitoring window. They also didn't say how confidential or how

741
00:44:23,560 --> 00:44:27,279
Speaker 3: you know, protected these systems are supposed to be. They

742
00:44:27,320 --> 00:44:30,440
Speaker 3: also pulled like they also gathered ranks, and they didn't

743
00:44:30,480 --> 00:44:34,080
Speaker 3: say how senior the staff was. And that last part

744
00:44:34,120 --> 00:44:35,960
Speaker 3: is super important, you know what I mean.

745
00:44:36,840 --> 00:44:39,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, seems like it probably wasn't the interns.

746
00:44:40,520 --> 00:44:43,080
Speaker 3: Doesn't feel like the interns. Just to be honest, it

747
00:44:43,160 --> 00:44:46,440
Speaker 3: does not feel like it was the person in charge

748
00:44:46,440 --> 00:44:49,200
Speaker 3: of scheduling, you know, the in office birthday party.

749
00:44:49,719 --> 00:44:52,359
Speaker 2: Ooh, but you know an assistant that's oh gosh, that's

750
00:44:52,440 --> 00:44:53,040
Speaker 2: an assistance.

751
00:44:53,040 --> 00:44:55,040
Speaker 3: Is what you go for you never go, don't go.

752
00:44:55,320 --> 00:44:58,200
Speaker 3: I mean going for the top, folks is five. It

753
00:44:58,239 --> 00:45:02,200
Speaker 3: works in fiction, it's fun like Tinker Tailor's Soldier, Spy

754
00:45:02,320 --> 00:45:06,160
Speaker 3: or whatever. But really what you want is the boring people.

755
00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:08,799
Speaker 3: You want the people a couple steps down, you know

756
00:45:08,800 --> 00:45:11,160
Speaker 3: what I mean, Maybe not the person who does the

757
00:45:11,960 --> 00:45:15,319
Speaker 3: birthday parties, but the person who asked to know enough

758
00:45:15,360 --> 00:45:18,160
Speaker 3: about what's being discussed in a meeting to figure out

759
00:45:18,280 --> 00:45:23,000
Speaker 3: who goes into that meeting. Yep, the scheduler. We're putting

760
00:45:23,000 --> 00:45:26,840
Speaker 3: you on game, folks. We do know there was a

761
00:45:26,840 --> 00:45:32,320
Speaker 3: pickle here, a bag of badgers. Because investigators private and public,

762
00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:39,160
Speaker 3: like from beyond trust and from the US, they were baffled.

763
00:45:39,680 --> 00:45:43,040
Speaker 3: Whomever was doing this did not seem to be despite

764
00:45:43,080 --> 00:45:45,799
Speaker 3: accessing the Treasury Department, they did not seem to be

765
00:45:45,920 --> 00:45:50,160
Speaker 3: directly attempting to steal money. Again, they broke into a

766
00:45:50,200 --> 00:45:52,839
Speaker 3: house with a lot of valuables. They did not take

767
00:45:53,360 --> 00:45:57,320
Speaker 3: super immediately valuable stuff. That made a lot of folks

768
00:45:57,360 --> 00:46:00,680
Speaker 3: assume this was straight up espionage. You know what I mean,

769
00:46:00,800 --> 00:46:04,560
Speaker 3: it's it's uh, what does our friend Heath Ledger say,

770
00:46:04,920 --> 00:46:07,840
Speaker 3: It's not about money. It's about sending a message something

771
00:46:07,840 --> 00:46:08,200
Speaker 3: like that.

772
00:46:08,800 --> 00:46:13,560
Speaker 4: I think that's right, Yeah, as the joker character.

773
00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:16,840
Speaker 2: Yeah, all right, all right, speaking about bringing into a

774
00:46:16,880 --> 00:46:19,000
Speaker 2: place with the valuables. Did you see there's a recent

775
00:46:19,040 --> 00:46:22,120
Speaker 2: statement from Oh I can't remember if it was directly

776
00:46:22,239 --> 00:46:25,360
Speaker 2: from Elon Musk or Donald Trump, but it was something

777
00:46:25,360 --> 00:46:28,320
Speaker 2: about it was questioning whether or not Fork Knox actually

778
00:46:28,320 --> 00:46:29,400
Speaker 2: has gold in it still.

779
00:46:29,480 --> 00:46:31,919
Speaker 4: Yeah, Oh, that's the big thing that does is talking

780
00:46:31,960 --> 00:46:34,840
Speaker 4: about Right, they're going to do a big reveal like

781
00:46:34,920 --> 00:46:38,440
Speaker 4: that Heraldo thing with the faults and it was just

782
00:46:38,520 --> 00:46:40,720
Speaker 4: like a candy wrapper was in there or something. Wouldn't

783
00:46:40,719 --> 00:46:43,799
Speaker 4: that be funny though, because I actually wanted to bring

784
00:46:43,800 --> 00:46:45,000
Speaker 4: this up at the top of the show when we

785
00:46:45,000 --> 00:46:47,640
Speaker 4: were talking about the nature of debt and the value

786
00:46:47,640 --> 00:46:50,000
Speaker 4: of money and stuff like we're not on a gold

787
00:46:50,040 --> 00:46:54,600
Speaker 4: standard anymore, but still matters that there's tons of gold.

788
00:46:54,680 --> 00:46:56,280
Speaker 4: The idea of it matters.

789
00:46:56,360 --> 00:47:00,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, because it's a tangible representation of value. That's the

790
00:47:00,239 --> 00:47:02,720
Speaker 3: only reason, like, the only reason people got into gold

791
00:47:02,760 --> 00:47:05,560
Speaker 3: in the beginning was because it's ductile. I think we

792
00:47:05,719 --> 00:47:06,560
Speaker 3: talked about this.

793
00:47:06,440 --> 00:47:09,760
Speaker 4: In an earlier pound in or stretch it into.

794
00:47:10,680 --> 00:47:13,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, you can you can make a little necklace

795
00:47:13,400 --> 00:47:16,239
Speaker 3: and tell people, you know that you're better than that.

796
00:47:16,719 --> 00:47:19,000
Speaker 4: But like to the point of like confidence or whatever,

797
00:47:19,080 --> 00:47:21,320
Speaker 4: and like manipulating the markets and like, you know, people

798
00:47:21,360 --> 00:47:24,759
Speaker 4: saying stuff could be enough to change the wins of finance.

799
00:47:25,000 --> 00:47:27,719
Speaker 4: Like if what if we were to discover that Fort

800
00:47:27,800 --> 00:47:29,839
Speaker 4: Knox was a ruse and there was nothing in there?

801
00:47:29,840 --> 00:47:33,200
Speaker 3: Would it like that we would immediately republish our episode

802
00:47:33,200 --> 00:47:36,600
Speaker 3: from years ago. Well we asked this question, and obviously

803
00:47:36,719 --> 00:47:39,040
Speaker 3: Doge listens to this show, Well, that's what I was

804
00:47:39,080 --> 00:47:40,240
Speaker 3: gonna say.

805
00:47:39,840 --> 00:47:43,160
Speaker 2: The conspiracy theorists are at the helm now, which is

806
00:47:43,200 --> 00:47:44,479
Speaker 2: so much was just so fun.

807
00:47:47,480 --> 00:47:52,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's true and there are and part of the

808
00:47:52,080 --> 00:47:55,440
Speaker 3: reason that exists is because there is a lack of transparency,

809
00:47:55,760 --> 00:47:59,480
Speaker 3: you know what I mean. It would have been just objectively,

810
00:47:59,760 --> 00:48:03,600
Speaker 3: it would have been easy on an operational level for

811
00:48:04,480 --> 00:48:08,440
Speaker 3: some sanctioned government department to say, hey, we're going to

812
00:48:08,520 --> 00:48:11,600
Speaker 3: have a you know, a quick little documentary and we're

813
00:48:11,600 --> 00:48:13,840
Speaker 3: going to walk you around four knocks and stuff like

814
00:48:13,880 --> 00:48:16,560
Speaker 3: that happened in the past. But then people began to

815
00:48:16,680 --> 00:48:19,359
Speaker 3: question the sources, and that was aided and embedded by

816
00:48:20,040 --> 00:48:24,680
Speaker 3: asymmetric foreign info war attempts, right, not an Alex Jones thing,

817
00:48:24,760 --> 00:48:29,520
Speaker 3: the actual way of warging, Yes, waging war through information.

818
00:48:29,840 --> 00:48:32,840
Speaker 2: Let's undermine people's belief in the power of the United

819
00:48:32,840 --> 00:48:35,640
Speaker 2: States by saying things like there's no gold in fork knocks.

820
00:48:36,280 --> 00:48:41,359
Speaker 3: And if you undermine the belief in an institution, then

821
00:48:41,400 --> 00:48:46,719
Speaker 3: that also puts the institution itself a tremendous disadvantage. Right.

822
00:48:46,760 --> 00:48:50,600
Speaker 3: It puts it on its back its back heels. I

823
00:48:50,600 --> 00:48:54,239
Speaker 3: guess all heels are back heels, but you know it

824
00:48:53,800 --> 00:48:56,359
Speaker 3: puts it puts you on your back foot because then

825
00:48:56,560 --> 00:48:59,720
Speaker 3: you have to respond to allegations and you're just losing

826
00:48:59,800 --> 00:49:02,200
Speaker 3: more more time during that great gish gallop.

827
00:49:03,120 --> 00:49:06,080
Speaker 2: Oh, I like that gish gallop. I like that a lot.

828
00:49:06,160 --> 00:49:07,360
Speaker 2: I don't even know what that is.

829
00:49:07,880 --> 00:49:10,680
Speaker 3: Gish gallop is where you kind of just freestyle a

830
00:49:10,680 --> 00:49:13,240
Speaker 3: bunch of nonsense and maybe one out of ten things

831
00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:16,360
Speaker 3: is true, but you just level a bunch of a

832
00:49:16,440 --> 00:49:20,640
Speaker 3: bunch of statements or accusations that the receiver rival party

833
00:49:21,320 --> 00:49:24,640
Speaker 3: tries to answer in an orderly fashion, and then you

834
00:49:24,760 --> 00:49:26,480
Speaker 3: just keep going and you don't listen to them.

835
00:49:26,640 --> 00:49:29,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, oh god, that sounds familiar.

836
00:49:30,120 --> 00:49:36,880
Speaker 3: Hm, it's sure, it sure does it? Sure does. You

837
00:49:36,920 --> 00:49:39,200
Speaker 3: could say there were several debates about it not too

838
00:49:39,200 --> 00:49:43,839
Speaker 3: long ago. So look, that's the thing, though, are they

839
00:49:43,880 --> 00:49:46,759
Speaker 3: if they're not automatically stealing money? Right, if they're not

840
00:49:46,840 --> 00:49:52,520
Speaker 3: automatically moving funds, then what are they doing? Why? We

841
00:49:52,600 --> 00:49:58,040
Speaker 3: already know China's top intelligence and security boffins, good luck

842
00:49:58,040 --> 00:50:00,360
Speaker 3: to you guys. They have a deep interest in the

843
00:50:00,360 --> 00:50:05,600
Speaker 3: Treasury because it oversees all those financial systems. It implements

844
00:50:05,600 --> 00:50:10,560
Speaker 3: sanctions importantly. So if you can get into the Treasury

845
00:50:11,120 --> 00:50:14,520
Speaker 3: and you can see what the Treasury is prioritizing, it's

846
00:50:14,840 --> 00:50:19,360
Speaker 3: very close to a limited form of telepathy regarding the

847
00:50:19,480 --> 00:50:24,880
Speaker 3: United States overall. Now we can predict priorities, and perhaps

848
00:50:24,960 --> 00:50:27,640
Speaker 3: if we play our cards right, we can take action

849
00:50:27,840 --> 00:50:34,960
Speaker 3: to prevent upcoming moves. Cough cough Taiwan, cough cough you okay,

850
00:50:35,040 --> 00:50:35,440
Speaker 3: bless you.

851
00:50:35,760 --> 00:50:38,200
Speaker 4: I have blessed people when they cough. If people think.

852
00:50:38,080 --> 00:50:42,479
Speaker 3: It's weird, aya at you, fellongong sneeze one more time.

853
00:50:45,960 --> 00:50:49,920
Speaker 3: It's great. That's real. I'm telling you, we're saying it.

854
00:50:50,120 --> 00:50:51,680
Speaker 3: I mean, this is what we can say for sure.

855
00:50:51,719 --> 00:50:53,920
Speaker 3: The next few months are going to be a wild ride.

856
00:50:54,080 --> 00:50:57,240
Speaker 3: That's the only thing the public knows. It's an ongoing story.

857
00:50:57,400 --> 00:50:59,520
Speaker 3: Like we kept saying, we can give you a few

858
00:50:59,560 --> 00:51:03,520
Speaker 3: additional updates, which happened. Get this, folks, just a few

859
00:51:03,680 --> 00:51:07,360
Speaker 3: days before we came to record here with you tonight

860
00:51:07,400 --> 00:51:12,360
Speaker 3: on March seventh. On Thursday and Wednesday of this week,

861
00:51:12,840 --> 00:51:17,440
Speaker 3: we got some full criminal charges against twelve Chinese nationals

862
00:51:17,600 --> 00:51:22,440
Speaker 3: who are currently not apprehended today. But hey, bounty hunter style,

863
00:51:22,960 --> 00:51:26,759
Speaker 3: if you can get one and you survive, the US

864
00:51:26,840 --> 00:51:29,200
Speaker 3: government may give you as much as ten million dollars

865
00:51:29,400 --> 00:51:33,960
Speaker 3: asterisk sick. Well, it's minus taxes. It's after a conviction.

866
00:51:34,560 --> 00:51:35,879
Speaker 3: That's okay, and take a while.

867
00:51:35,960 --> 00:51:36,600
Speaker 4: I'm cool with that.

868
00:51:38,880 --> 00:51:42,839
Speaker 3: What did they say when they just released these statements

869
00:51:43,040 --> 00:51:46,719
Speaker 3: hunting these dirty dozen individuals?

870
00:51:47,000 --> 00:51:50,040
Speaker 2: They said that there were twelve individuals that attacked over

871
00:51:50,120 --> 00:51:55,280
Speaker 2: one hundred different organizations and it was actually a strategy

872
00:51:55,320 --> 00:52:00,280
Speaker 2: that went back as far as twenty thirteen. So this, oh,

873
00:52:00,440 --> 00:52:03,719
Speaker 2: you just imagine, you imagine a group that's just kind

874
00:52:03,760 --> 00:52:07,640
Speaker 2: of been waiting to implement the right attacks at the

875
00:52:07,719 --> 00:52:08,240
Speaker 2: right time.

876
00:52:08,320 --> 00:52:10,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, and this was one of the big ones.

877
00:52:09,800 --> 00:52:12,759
Speaker 4: Do in that recon lay in the groundwork all those

878
00:52:12,760 --> 00:52:13,520
Speaker 4: many years.

879
00:52:14,000 --> 00:52:17,080
Speaker 2: But well, the big question then, is was this attack

880
00:52:18,080 --> 00:52:22,759
Speaker 2: just another little stepping stone in whatever the big operation is.

881
00:52:23,480 --> 00:52:26,560
Speaker 3: Yeah, and if so, what is it? Right? That's the

882
00:52:27,239 --> 00:52:30,960
Speaker 3: trillion dollar question. The DOJ Department of Justice here in

883
00:52:30,960 --> 00:52:34,200
Speaker 3: the US says, all right, look, maybe some of these

884
00:52:34,600 --> 00:52:38,879
Speaker 3: twelve people, maybe they were acting on their own. Yeah,

885
00:52:39,280 --> 00:52:44,280
Speaker 3: maybe they said, we can prove that. I think about

886
00:52:44,320 --> 00:52:49,200
Speaker 3: eight of them were ordered to do this by entities

887
00:52:49,239 --> 00:52:52,320
Speaker 3: of the Chinese government, the Ministry of Public Security or

888
00:52:52,440 --> 00:52:56,319
Speaker 3: MPs and the Ministry of State Security MSS. And two

889
00:52:56,400 --> 00:53:00,440
Speaker 3: of the people that they specifically name in these accusations

890
00:53:01,120 --> 00:53:07,520
Speaker 3: are employees, like direct high ranking employees of these ministries.

891
00:53:08,600 --> 00:53:11,560
Speaker 3: But to your point, Noel, there is, as we talked

892
00:53:11,600 --> 00:53:14,480
Speaker 3: about in previous episodes on the fifty cent Army or whatever,

893
00:53:15,080 --> 00:53:18,400
Speaker 3: the nation of China has a complex and very clever

894
00:53:18,640 --> 00:53:23,319
Speaker 3: approach to denying state involvement in these operations through the

895
00:53:23,440 --> 00:53:27,440
Speaker 3: use of proxy, ostensibly private industries. And we have to

896
00:53:27,440 --> 00:53:30,120
Speaker 3: be really careful when we talk about this because a

897
00:53:30,120 --> 00:53:33,680
Speaker 3: lot of politicians use it to sound or to propagate

898
00:53:33,800 --> 00:53:38,680
Speaker 3: very racist statements and to make people like hate more

899
00:53:38,719 --> 00:53:41,400
Speaker 3: than a billion other folks just because they appen to

900
00:53:41,440 --> 00:53:44,440
Speaker 3: live in China. This is why we have to acknowledge

901
00:53:44,560 --> 00:53:49,200
Speaker 3: the United States does the exact same thing pretty often.

902
00:53:49,440 --> 00:53:54,200
Speaker 3: Check out Blackrocks recent exciting purchases of two ports in

903
00:53:54,320 --> 00:53:59,480
Speaker 3: Panama private industry. That's a good idea. Just happens to

904
00:53:59,560 --> 00:54:02,880
Speaker 3: be two of the ports that the US is currently

905
00:54:02,920 --> 00:54:04,840
Speaker 3: beefing with Panama about.

906
00:54:05,719 --> 00:54:10,040
Speaker 2: Hmmm when private, Yeah, I wonder kind of art they

907
00:54:10,120 --> 00:54:11,040
Speaker 2: keep in those points?

908
00:54:15,080 --> 00:54:19,479
Speaker 3: Only the best, straight up, only original drawings of Dick butt.

909
00:54:20,080 --> 00:54:27,440
Speaker 2: Oh god, do you guys remember dick But.

910
00:54:28,680 --> 00:54:32,120
Speaker 3: That's the real takeaway from this episode. That's what That's

911
00:54:32,120 --> 00:54:34,799
Speaker 3: what these hackers are looking for, the original drawing of

912
00:54:34,840 --> 00:54:38,480
Speaker 3: dick But be amazing of those, the whole thing. It's

913
00:54:38,520 --> 00:54:41,520
Speaker 3: the only thing in Fort Knox. There's no gold. There's

914
00:54:41,560 --> 00:54:46,240
Speaker 3: one framed drawing of dick butt. Yep. Yeah, it's.

915
00:54:49,000 --> 00:54:51,040
Speaker 4: Just on a scrap on a napkin, on the back

916
00:54:51,120 --> 00:54:53,960
Speaker 4: of a piece of trash, just a sketch of dick butt.

917
00:54:54,360 --> 00:54:59,920
Speaker 3: And it's not handwritten. It's dick written exactly. Oh wow, yeah,

918
00:55:00,080 --> 00:55:04,640
Speaker 3: dare to dream? Right, So how does this work? Though?

919
00:55:05,280 --> 00:55:09,800
Speaker 3: We This is where we learn about an ostensibly private

920
00:55:09,880 --> 00:55:15,239
Speaker 3: Chinese company called Eye Dash Soon I soon hopefully no

921
00:55:15,440 --> 00:55:20,400
Speaker 3: relation to iHeart one would hope, one hopes. So what

922
00:55:20,440 --> 00:55:22,000
Speaker 3: do we what do we know about IOO?

923
00:55:23,280 --> 00:55:26,680
Speaker 2: Well, they can compromise Gmail and Microsoft Outlook in boxes.

924
00:55:26,960 --> 00:55:31,560
Speaker 2: They can also easily compromise x slash Twitter. Uh why

925
00:55:31,560 --> 00:55:37,160
Speaker 2: would they do that? Well, who knows to what ends?

926
00:55:38,120 --> 00:55:42,280
Speaker 3: Shadow? The shadow shadows. Yeah.

927
00:55:42,320 --> 00:55:44,600
Speaker 2: Well, one of the reasons you might do this is

928
00:55:44,640 --> 00:55:49,600
Speaker 2: to monitor the opinions that are not stated publicly that

929
00:55:49,800 --> 00:55:53,719
Speaker 2: high level officials might have, right, the discussions that are

930
00:55:53,760 --> 00:55:57,160
Speaker 2: had between you know, high level individuals that are never

931
00:55:57,280 --> 00:55:58,520
Speaker 2: stated out loud.

932
00:56:00,200 --> 00:56:04,320
Speaker 3: Yeah. Like, imagine if you are working in a social

933
00:56:04,440 --> 00:56:08,920
Speaker 3: dynamic and you wonder what other people in that dynamic

934
00:56:09,040 --> 00:56:10,959
Speaker 3: might think of you, and you think, or they send

935
00:56:10,960 --> 00:56:13,560
Speaker 3: them messages about me on the side, what do they say?

936
00:56:13,600 --> 00:56:17,920
Speaker 3: If so, that's kind of what the Chinese government is

937
00:56:17,960 --> 00:56:23,400
Speaker 3: accused of looking for through Silk Typhoon and AP twenty seven.

938
00:56:23,560 --> 00:56:25,680
Speaker 3: Silk Typhoon, by the way, I canmemer if we mentioned this.

939
00:56:25,760 --> 00:56:29,359
Speaker 3: It's different from another hacker group called Vault Typhoon. Vault

940
00:56:29,440 --> 00:56:32,160
Speaker 3: Typhoon seeks to compromise US infrastructure.

941
00:56:32,200 --> 00:56:34,480
Speaker 4: Do you think Salt Typhoon and Vault who would win

942
00:56:34,520 --> 00:56:36,239
Speaker 4: in a fight between Salt Typhoon and.

943
00:56:36,280 --> 00:56:38,760
Speaker 3: Vault Typhoon, you know, and Silk Typhoon.

944
00:56:38,840 --> 00:56:41,960
Speaker 4: Oh fair, yeah, yes, I'm talking about it if they

945
00:56:41,960 --> 00:56:45,800
Speaker 4: were the Jaegers, the Mechs, you know, Evangelians.

946
00:56:47,760 --> 00:56:52,040
Speaker 3: It's a good question. I don't know. Sorry, no it's not.

947
00:56:52,200 --> 00:56:55,200
Speaker 3: There are no dumb questions unless you think you have one.

948
00:56:55,280 --> 00:56:59,080
Speaker 3: For us, prove us wrong in this assumption conspiracydiheartradio dot com.

949
00:56:59,200 --> 00:57:02,760
Speaker 3: Think about silk Iphoon is that they have a jacket,

950
00:57:02,960 --> 00:57:06,319
Speaker 3: they have a track record. They've been continually accused of

951
00:57:06,360 --> 00:57:10,000
Speaker 3: being behind hacks of universities. Also easy to do that.

952
00:57:10,640 --> 00:57:15,880
Speaker 3: Healthcare systems also easy to do that. And the DOJ

953
00:57:16,160 --> 00:57:20,880
Speaker 3: says this company I Soon, which is functioning as sort

954
00:57:20,880 --> 00:57:24,960
Speaker 3: of a face for dirty things from the Chinese government.

955
00:57:25,240 --> 00:57:30,120
Speaker 3: They say these guys were essentially given bounties so they

956
00:57:30,160 --> 00:57:33,280
Speaker 3: would take this data and then they would sell it

957
00:57:33,960 --> 00:57:38,320
Speaker 3: to folks associated with the Chinese government or certain agencies.

958
00:57:38,680 --> 00:57:42,320
Speaker 3: A hacker for higher system. And that's brilliant because you know,

959
00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:45,240
Speaker 3: if you're you know, Uncle Ji, and you get caught,

960
00:57:45,600 --> 00:57:48,880
Speaker 3: you can say, oh my god, what the heck? You guys,

961
00:57:49,480 --> 00:57:52,200
Speaker 3: we're just as surprised as you. We're all trying to

962
00:57:52,400 --> 00:57:55,240
Speaker 3: find the guy who did this, you say, her hot

963
00:57:55,240 --> 00:57:56,000
Speaker 3: dog costume.

964
00:57:57,560 --> 00:58:00,000
Speaker 2: But let's make something really clear here, because I got

965
00:58:00,080 --> 00:58:03,440
Speaker 2: a little confused even looking through my research. Here, Salt

966
00:58:03,480 --> 00:58:07,200
Speaker 2: Typhoon is the group thought to be responsible for the

967
00:58:07,600 --> 00:58:11,920
Speaker 2: communications intrusion. Silk Typhoon is the group thought to be

968
00:58:11,960 --> 00:58:17,800
Speaker 2: responsible for the Treasury infiltration via what is the name

969
00:58:17,960 --> 00:58:19,640
Speaker 2: of the thing beyond trust?

970
00:58:20,800 --> 00:58:24,760
Speaker 3: Yeah, taking that API security key via beyond Trust. And

971
00:58:24,800 --> 00:58:30,520
Speaker 3: then volt Typhoon is possible attacks on US infrastructure, power stations,

972
00:58:30,680 --> 00:58:34,400
Speaker 3: stuff like that. So it's a multi pronged defense. We

973
00:58:34,440 --> 00:58:38,440
Speaker 3: can also say the legal defense, the oh my gosh,

974
00:58:38,520 --> 00:58:41,120
Speaker 3: I'm just another guy happening to wear a hot dog

975
00:58:41,160 --> 00:58:45,520
Speaker 3: costume in the store. That gets pretty flimsy. If you

976
00:58:45,600 --> 00:58:52,120
Speaker 3: can prove that I soon did attempt to sell stolen

977
00:58:52,480 --> 00:58:58,120
Speaker 3: data on US nationals right to China. For I think

978
00:58:58,160 --> 00:59:02,160
Speaker 3: it was not a bad price overall. In the Great Game,

979
00:59:02,240 --> 00:59:05,919
Speaker 3: It's like they were trying to sell something like ten

980
00:59:06,040 --> 00:59:12,560
Speaker 3: thousand to seventy five thousand US dollars per each email inbox,

981
00:59:12,800 --> 00:59:15,240
Speaker 3: so not per message. You kind of get a price break,

982
00:59:15,280 --> 00:59:19,120
Speaker 3: you know, Oh yeah, oh yeah, I feel like now

983
00:59:19,160 --> 00:59:22,280
Speaker 3: I'm selling US compromised email inboxes.

984
00:59:22,080 --> 00:59:25,080
Speaker 4: That should be a side hustleld.

985
00:59:25,120 --> 00:59:29,040
Speaker 3: We live in a gig economy, do we not? So dude?

986
00:59:29,360 --> 00:59:31,360
Speaker 3: Oh sorry, no, you got it. You got it, guys.

987
00:59:31,440 --> 00:59:33,959
Speaker 2: There's this other thing that I just wanted to throw

988
00:59:34,040 --> 00:59:36,960
Speaker 2: into here that was it was at least reported on

989
00:59:37,040 --> 00:59:43,160
Speaker 2: in January of this year about silk typhoons infiltration and

990
00:59:43,200 --> 00:59:50,960
Speaker 2: how they were potentially looking at foreign investments like companies

991
00:59:50,960 --> 00:59:55,360
Speaker 2: that assess security risks for foreign investments within the United States.

992
00:59:56,080 --> 00:59:57,000
Speaker 3: And I don't even.

993
00:59:56,920 --> 01:00:00,560
Speaker 2: If you guys remember we talked about there was a

994
01:00:00,640 --> 01:00:04,520
Speaker 2: Chinese investment group underneath a bunch of shell corporations that

995
01:00:04,600 --> 01:00:07,640
Speaker 2: was trying to buy huge swaths of land that were

996
01:00:08,600 --> 01:00:10,880
Speaker 2: It's not the one in California we talked about. It

997
01:00:10,920 --> 01:00:15,080
Speaker 2: was right near specific base like military base, but other

998
01:00:15,280 --> 01:00:19,000
Speaker 2: parts that were close to critical infrastructure in the United States.

999
01:00:19,440 --> 01:00:20,560
Speaker 3: And it ended up getting.

1000
01:00:20,320 --> 01:00:24,120
Speaker 2: Blocked because it was found that it was a Chinese

1001
01:00:24,200 --> 01:00:27,480
Speaker 2: investment that came under scrutiny and then they stopped it.

1002
01:00:28,040 --> 01:00:32,480
Speaker 2: But then you've got these guys in December looking at

1003
01:00:32,760 --> 01:00:36,800
Speaker 2: the foreign investment offices within the Department of Treasury. So

1004
01:00:36,800 --> 01:00:40,800
Speaker 2: it does make you wonder like what in the end

1005
01:00:40,960 --> 01:00:45,480
Speaker 2: or is it a strategy to find the loopholes and

1006
01:00:45,520 --> 01:00:49,360
Speaker 2: the weak points to be able to purchase large swaths

1007
01:00:49,400 --> 01:00:51,760
Speaker 2: of land for specific purposes?

1008
01:00:52,680 --> 01:00:56,320
Speaker 3: Partially guess, to be quite honest with you, that that

1009
01:00:56,440 --> 01:01:00,400
Speaker 3: is part of the rubric right, part of the tactic applied.

1010
01:01:01,120 --> 01:01:05,520
Speaker 3: The easier way to do it, obviously, is to go

1011
01:01:05,600 --> 01:01:08,560
Speaker 3: through a sovereign wealth fund. Shout out to Aaron Aronson.

1012
01:01:08,760 --> 01:01:12,400
Speaker 3: Go through as many proxies as you can, maybe find

1013
01:01:12,400 --> 01:01:16,840
Speaker 3: an individual who is already US national and work through

1014
01:01:16,880 --> 01:01:20,200
Speaker 3: them by hook or by crook, by carrot or by stick.

1015
01:01:21,280 --> 01:01:24,440
Speaker 3: This is yeah, this is tricky stuff and maybe one

1016
01:01:24,480 --> 01:01:27,320
Speaker 3: of the no maybe's. One of the most worrying factors

1017
01:01:27,400 --> 01:01:31,400
Speaker 3: here is all the all the hard leg work of

1018
01:01:31,440 --> 01:01:36,160
Speaker 3: these investigations show us that I Soon, that company, private

1019
01:01:36,160 --> 01:01:42,720
Speaker 3: company isn't just selling individual espionage fish via inboxes. Instead,

1020
01:01:42,880 --> 01:01:47,800
Speaker 3: the company is offering to teach direct employees, official employees

1021
01:01:47,840 --> 01:01:51,400
Speaker 3: of the PRC, to become fishermen in their own right.

1022
01:01:51,480 --> 01:01:55,439
Speaker 3: Their training employees on how to hack independently of I soon,

1023
01:01:55,920 --> 01:01:59,720
Speaker 3: and perhaps providing a suite of software tools. And then

1024
01:02:00,000 --> 01:02:02,520
Speaker 3: they are also you know, just give me the day

1025
01:02:02,560 --> 01:02:06,560
Speaker 3: one hacking methods like this is hey, go here. The

1026
01:02:06,640 --> 01:02:11,200
Speaker 3: password is one, two, three, four five. Uh. Yeah, it's happening.

1027
01:02:11,840 --> 01:02:15,360
Speaker 3: And we're talking about more than like Treasury Department made

1028
01:02:15,360 --> 01:02:18,560
Speaker 3: the news, but we're also talking technology companies, think tanks,

1029
01:02:18,760 --> 01:02:23,400
Speaker 3: law firms, defence contractors, your local government, check in on

1030
01:02:23,440 --> 01:02:26,880
Speaker 3: your comptroller. It's just a reason for us to say

1031
01:02:26,880 --> 01:02:30,600
Speaker 3: the word comptroller again. It's I wish it was a

1032
01:02:30,640 --> 01:02:33,520
Speaker 3: different job. It sounds way cooler than it is. There's

1033
01:02:33,560 --> 01:02:35,520
Speaker 3: a comptroller against just it's an accountant.

1034
01:02:35,600 --> 01:02:39,720
Speaker 4: Right, it's like a treasurer almost. Yeah, oh, even better,

1035
01:02:39,840 --> 01:02:42,960
Speaker 4: I think, Well, I mean insane potato potata. Oh, also

1036
01:02:43,040 --> 01:02:49,240
Speaker 4: religious organizations and private info of journalists, right, even yes, folks,

1037
01:02:49,280 --> 01:02:50,800
Speaker 4: even the journalist you don't like.

1038
01:02:51,520 --> 01:02:54,040
Speaker 3: They want to know all of it. And none of

1039
01:02:54,080 --> 01:02:56,840
Speaker 3: the defendants, no, those twelve people named, none of that

1040
01:02:56,880 --> 01:03:02,600
Speaker 3: dirty dozen are currently in US. So at this point,

1041
01:03:02,640 --> 01:03:06,000
Speaker 3: before we end, I think it's we have to do it.

1042
01:03:06,560 --> 01:03:10,040
Speaker 3: I feel we are ethically required to. What is the

1043
01:03:10,080 --> 01:03:15,680
Speaker 3: official response of China to like overall and specifically.

1044
01:03:16,200 --> 01:03:18,480
Speaker 2: Well, I'll tell you one.

1045
01:03:18,880 --> 01:03:19,600
Speaker 3: I'll tell you one.

1046
01:03:20,560 --> 01:03:24,680
Speaker 2: One response that they had very recently, not necessarily about this,

1047
01:03:25,320 --> 01:03:28,680
Speaker 2: but just a response in general. It was published in

1048
01:03:28,720 --> 01:03:33,280
Speaker 2: BBC on March fifth, as we record where China says, quote,

1049
01:03:33,320 --> 01:03:35,880
Speaker 2: it is ready for any type of war with the US,

1050
01:03:36,760 --> 01:03:38,880
Speaker 2: including a trade war or other.

1051
01:03:39,680 --> 01:03:42,960
Speaker 4: Right, but they never fully copped to doing this though right.

1052
01:03:43,240 --> 01:03:47,760
Speaker 3: Absolutely to that point denied anything related to yes, because

1053
01:03:47,760 --> 01:03:52,280
Speaker 3: it's private industry, right, Chinese officials may allude to the

1054
01:03:52,320 --> 01:03:56,600
Speaker 3: possibility of, say, a motivated patriot working on their own,

1055
01:03:56,760 --> 01:04:00,520
Speaker 3: you know, vigilante style. In this specific case, we can

1056
01:04:00,560 --> 01:04:04,360
Speaker 3: go to a spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, Mao Ning,

1057
01:04:05,000 --> 01:04:09,640
Speaker 3: who said, look, these allegations by Uncle Sam are groundless. Further,

1058
01:04:10,040 --> 01:04:13,720
Speaker 3: we oppose all forms of hacking attacks, and we're even

1059
01:04:13,840 --> 01:04:17,680
Speaker 3: more opposed to the spread of false information against China

1060
01:04:17,760 --> 01:04:23,520
Speaker 3: for political purposes and true story, representatives of the US

1061
01:04:23,640 --> 01:04:26,400
Speaker 3: Treasury traveled to China to hang out and have like

1062
01:04:26,440 --> 01:04:30,400
Speaker 3: a you know, clear the air discussion what corporate America

1063
01:04:30,440 --> 01:04:35,200
Speaker 3: would call a healthy conversation, because hey, maybe China is

1064
01:04:35,320 --> 01:04:38,400
Speaker 3: telling the truth. Dylan, could you give us a sarcastic

1065
01:04:38,440 --> 01:04:44,120
Speaker 3: sound cue, just go wild with it perfectly. Wow.

1066
01:04:44,600 --> 01:04:46,680
Speaker 2: Well, of course all of this occurred before you know,

1067
01:04:46,800 --> 01:04:51,280
Speaker 2: the terriffs financial wars fully began between the United States

1068
01:04:51,320 --> 01:04:54,120
Speaker 2: and China, there's always been tensions and small things happening,

1069
01:04:54,120 --> 01:04:57,600
Speaker 2: but now we're officially embroiled in that, you know, along

1070
01:04:57,640 --> 01:04:59,920
Speaker 2: with Canada and Mexico and a lot of other countries.

1071
01:05:00,920 --> 01:05:04,600
Speaker 2: And just this concept of China coming out publicly and saying, hey,

1072
01:05:04,600 --> 01:05:07,240
Speaker 2: we're ready for war, and then you think about potentially

1073
01:05:07,280 --> 01:05:11,040
Speaker 2: the actions that were taken, whether on behalf of China

1074
01:05:11,120 --> 01:05:14,400
Speaker 2: as you know, a state or not, if they've got

1075
01:05:14,400 --> 01:05:18,320
Speaker 2: some of that information that makes them prepared to take

1076
01:05:18,360 --> 01:05:22,760
Speaker 2: strategic actions against the US. It just, especially when it

1077
01:05:22,760 --> 01:05:25,680
Speaker 2: comes to money and trade wars, it does feel like

1078
01:05:25,760 --> 01:05:30,960
Speaker 2: it's one big deck that's getting stacked somehow by people

1079
01:05:30,960 --> 01:05:34,200
Speaker 2: that we just don't know right or who are acting

1080
01:05:34,280 --> 01:05:40,600
Speaker 2: for what purpose besides winning at some point, right, because

1081
01:05:40,600 --> 01:05:41,919
Speaker 2: there's other stuff going on too.

1082
01:05:42,400 --> 01:05:43,200
Speaker 3: We talked about a.

1083
01:05:43,120 --> 01:05:45,240
Speaker 2: Sovereign wealth fund would be the way to get through

1084
01:05:45,280 --> 01:05:48,960
Speaker 2: that foreign investment into buying land. The United States just

1085
01:05:49,000 --> 01:05:52,600
Speaker 2: started a foreign a sovereign wealth fund.

1086
01:05:52,800 --> 01:05:54,439
Speaker 3: The what was it? Donald Trump?

1087
01:05:54,520 --> 01:05:58,760
Speaker 2: Want something he did in February he froze a law

1088
01:05:58,800 --> 01:06:02,640
Speaker 2: that banned the bribing of foreign officials. YEA, for one

1089
01:06:02,680 --> 01:06:03,479
Speaker 2: hundred and eighty days.

1090
01:06:03,480 --> 01:06:05,920
Speaker 3: Why would you do that? Yes? And also thanks man,

1091
01:06:06,840 --> 01:06:08,880
Speaker 3: oh yeah, yeah, good job man, get it.

1092
01:06:10,080 --> 01:06:17,600
Speaker 2: Oh oh well, but just the.

1093
01:06:15,680 --> 01:06:16,520
Speaker 3: The fact that.

1094
01:06:18,000 --> 01:06:20,400
Speaker 2: And what was there was sorry, one other thing, and

1095
01:06:21,040 --> 01:06:23,000
Speaker 2: it's I don't mean this in kind of some kind

1096
01:06:23,000 --> 01:06:25,160
Speaker 2: of anti Trump way. I just mean it seems like

1097
01:06:25,280 --> 01:06:28,800
Speaker 2: these things are coming together in a specific fashion to

1098
01:06:29,320 --> 01:06:33,120
Speaker 2: shore up corruption at the highest levels. Because there was

1099
01:06:33,160 --> 01:06:38,880
Speaker 2: another move that was disbanding the Foreign Interference in Elections

1100
01:06:40,240 --> 01:06:41,040
Speaker 2: Group that was.

1101
01:06:41,000 --> 01:06:42,240
Speaker 3: Investigating that stuff.

1102
01:06:42,720 --> 01:06:46,840
Speaker 2: Just all it does feel like, I don't know, the

1103
01:06:46,840 --> 01:06:50,760
Speaker 2: intrusion thing is happening deeper than just the Treasury Department.

1104
01:06:50,920 --> 01:06:54,960
Speaker 3: Absolutely absolutely. And that statement that you alluded to if

1105
01:06:55,000 --> 01:06:57,040
Speaker 3: war is what the US wants, be it a terriforia,

1106
01:06:57,120 --> 01:06:59,160
Speaker 3: trade war or any other type of war, We're ready

1107
01:06:59,200 --> 01:07:03,040
Speaker 3: to fight till the end does come officially from China's embassy,

1108
01:07:03,640 --> 01:07:10,320
Speaker 3: but was published on Twitter. So disappointing that such monumental

1109
01:07:10,360 --> 01:07:13,760
Speaker 3: moves will happen on social media. Those are the times

1110
01:07:13,760 --> 01:07:17,920
Speaker 3: of which we live. We mentioned a second hack at

1111
01:07:17,920 --> 01:07:20,880
Speaker 3: the top of the show this evening. The second hack

1112
01:07:20,960 --> 01:07:23,760
Speaker 3: that we're referring to might be controversial for some of

1113
01:07:23,840 --> 01:07:26,360
Speaker 3: us in the crowd. It is will give you the

1114
01:07:26,440 --> 01:07:29,800
Speaker 3: quick skinny. It is Doge the so called Department of

1115
01:07:29,840 --> 01:07:34,640
Speaker 3: Government Efficiency Governmental Efficiency Street named DOGE. Get it, it's wordplay.

1116
01:07:34,880 --> 01:07:37,360
Speaker 3: They came under fire for doing a lot of wild

1117
01:07:37,400 --> 01:07:41,680
Speaker 3: stuff recently. Specifically, an employee for DOGE named Marco Elez

1118
01:07:42,520 --> 01:07:46,360
Speaker 3: had the ability to alter code that controls trillions of

1119
01:07:46,400 --> 01:07:50,120
Speaker 3: dollars worth of federal spending, even though the White House

1120
01:07:50,160 --> 01:07:53,000
Speaker 3: and the US Treasury said he did not have this.

1121
01:07:53,200 --> 01:07:56,600
Speaker 3: They said he had read only access. People looked into that,

1122
01:07:57,280 --> 01:08:03,720
Speaker 3: whether through purposeful prevarication or whether through honest mistakes, that

1123
01:08:03,920 --> 01:08:07,720
Speaker 3: was incorrect. He did have the ability to write an

1124
01:08:07,760 --> 01:08:12,160
Speaker 3: altered code. A few days after these claims, that was rescinded.

1125
01:08:12,880 --> 01:08:17,320
Speaker 3: Critics are saying that DOGE is un American and is

1126
01:08:17,439 --> 01:08:23,000
Speaker 3: compromising people with due to conflicts of interest. Supporters say, yeah,

1127
01:08:23,080 --> 01:08:27,799
Speaker 3: Elon Musk is unelected, but his organization is uncovering massive

1128
01:08:27,800 --> 01:08:28,559
Speaker 3: amounts of fraud.

1129
01:08:32,479 --> 01:08:38,080
Speaker 4: I hope that's true. I don't think it's true.

1130
01:08:38,080 --> 01:08:41,320
Speaker 3: The whole thing feels really weird. It's super weird, you know.

1131
01:08:41,880 --> 01:08:46,439
Speaker 2: The other thing that the Silk Typhoon folks targeted was

1132
01:08:46,560 --> 01:08:52,320
Speaker 2: the one of the offices that specifically oversees foreign sanctions

1133
01:08:53,360 --> 01:08:55,720
Speaker 2: against Chinese companies, and the US has been making more

1134
01:08:55,760 --> 01:09:01,920
Speaker 2: and more moves sanctioning Chinese private companies for doing stuff

1135
01:09:01,960 --> 01:09:03,320
Speaker 2: that they consider is.

1136
01:09:05,280 --> 01:09:05,559
Speaker 3: Wrong.

1137
01:09:05,880 --> 01:09:09,400
Speaker 2: Let's say, sure, so now you get eyes on specifically

1138
01:09:09,560 --> 01:09:11,760
Speaker 2: not only who has already been targeted, but who is

1139
01:09:11,800 --> 01:09:13,320
Speaker 2: potentially going to be targeted.

1140
01:09:13,800 --> 01:09:17,200
Speaker 3: Right again, the prognostication being able to read the tea

1141
01:09:17,280 --> 01:09:21,439
Speaker 3: leaves to predict and maybe prevent future actions. That's the

1142
01:09:21,479 --> 01:09:24,160
Speaker 3: real Like Ham and the sandwich here, and one thing

1143
01:09:24,240 --> 01:09:25,960
Speaker 3: is for sure. We know we've gone a little bit

1144
01:09:26,000 --> 01:09:29,400
Speaker 3: long on this. One thing is for sure, folks. Anybody

1145
01:09:29,400 --> 01:09:33,880
Speaker 3: you look at in this game, they are holding some

1146
01:09:34,040 --> 01:09:37,599
Speaker 3: of their cards. No one is being fully transparent. China

1147
01:09:37,680 --> 01:09:41,679
Speaker 3: is denying everything. Uncle Sam doesn't want to expose what

1148
01:09:41,720 --> 01:09:47,280
Speaker 3: we call collection means and methods because doing so would

1149
01:09:47,280 --> 01:09:51,200
Speaker 3: play their hand out in the future. And obviously Doge

1150
01:09:51,520 --> 01:09:57,839
Speaker 3: is launching contradictory statements every other every other Wednesday. So

1151
01:09:58,640 --> 01:10:00,920
Speaker 3: the truth of the matter is this, no matter what

1152
01:10:00,960 --> 01:10:03,800
Speaker 3: your individual perspective is, no matter how we look at

1153
01:10:03,880 --> 01:10:09,240
Speaker 3: it objectively, everybody in this case has some serious stuff

1154
01:10:09,320 --> 01:10:12,280
Speaker 3: they don't want you to know, and we would love

1155
01:10:12,320 --> 01:10:14,240
Speaker 3: to hear from you. We try to be easy to

1156
01:10:14,320 --> 01:10:18,240
Speaker 3: find online, via telephone, via email, thank you so much

1157
01:10:18,240 --> 01:10:19,960
Speaker 3: for joining us this evening. It's right.

1158
01:10:20,000 --> 01:10:21,880
Speaker 4: You can find us at the handle of Conspiracy Stuff,

1159
01:10:21,880 --> 01:10:24,680
Speaker 4: where we exist all over the social media's. You can

1160
01:10:24,720 --> 01:10:28,040
Speaker 4: find us at that handle on x FKA, Twitter and

1161
01:10:28,240 --> 01:10:31,360
Speaker 4: on YouTube. We have video content Theodora for you to enjoy.

1162
01:10:31,640 --> 01:10:34,679
Speaker 4: Can also find us on Facebook. We have our Facebook

1163
01:10:34,720 --> 01:10:37,519
Speaker 4: group Here's where it gets crazy, on Instagram and TikTok

1164
01:10:37,520 --> 01:10:39,240
Speaker 4: work Conspiracy Stuff Show.

1165
01:10:40,400 --> 01:10:42,599
Speaker 2: We have a phone number. It is one eight three

1166
01:10:42,680 --> 01:10:47,120
Speaker 2: three STDWYTK. When you call in, it's a voicemail system,

1167
01:10:47,160 --> 01:10:49,120
Speaker 2: and give yourself a cool nickname and let us know

1168
01:10:49,160 --> 01:10:50,760
Speaker 2: within the message if we can use your name and

1169
01:10:50,800 --> 01:10:52,840
Speaker 2: message on the air. If you've got more to say

1170
01:10:52,840 --> 01:10:54,600
Speaker 2: than could fit in a three minute voicemail, why not

1171
01:10:54,600 --> 01:10:56,559
Speaker 2: instead send us a good old fashioned email.

1172
01:10:56,720 --> 01:10:59,920
Speaker 3: We are the entities that read every piece of correspondent

1173
01:11:00,120 --> 01:11:04,080
Speaker 3: we receive. Be well aware, yet unafraid. Sometimes the void

1174
01:11:04,280 --> 01:11:06,880
Speaker 3: writes back. In fact, we're catching up with a few

1175
01:11:06,880 --> 01:11:09,920
Speaker 3: of you later this evening, So if you've already written

1176
01:11:09,920 --> 01:11:12,680
Speaker 3: to us, stay tuned. If you haven't yet, take one

1177
01:11:12,680 --> 01:11:15,720
Speaker 3: step further, join us here in the dark conspiracy at

1178
01:11:15,720 --> 01:11:36,200
Speaker 3: iHeartRadio dot com.

1179
01:11:36,360 --> 01:11:38,400
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want You to Know is a production

1180
01:11:38,520 --> 01:11:43,080
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1181
01:11:43,160 --> 01:11:46,400
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.