1 00:00:03,720 --> 00:00:08,320 Speaker 1: On this episode of Newsworld, I'm really delighted to welcome 2 00:00:08,440 --> 00:00:11,960 Speaker 1: Craig Whitlocke of The Washington Post. His new book, The 3 00:00:12,000 --> 00:00:16,239 Speaker 1: Afghanistan Papers, A Secret History of the War, is by 4 00:00:16,360 --> 00:00:18,680 Speaker 1: far one of the most in depth accounts of our 5 00:00:18,680 --> 00:00:22,000 Speaker 1: twenty year war with Afghanistan and had asked the fundamental 6 00:00:22,079 --> 00:00:26,320 Speaker 1: question what went wrong in Afghanistan. The book was published 7 00:00:26,360 --> 00:00:30,440 Speaker 1: August thirty first and does not cover the recent disastrous withdrawal. 8 00:00:30,960 --> 00:00:33,839 Speaker 1: But as somebody who lived through this entire period and 9 00:00:34,240 --> 00:00:36,080 Speaker 1: spent a good bit of the early years in the 10 00:00:36,120 --> 00:00:41,000 Speaker 1: Pentagon working First Secretary rumso I am really interested in 11 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:45,239 Speaker 1: how this fits together and in Craig's perspective on this. 12 00:00:45,680 --> 00:00:48,440 Speaker 1: There are many new revelations in the book from people 13 00:00:48,440 --> 00:00:51,040 Speaker 1: who played a direct role in the war, and they 14 00:00:51,040 --> 00:00:54,640 Speaker 1: admit that the US government strategies were a mess, Statistics 15 00:00:54,640 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 1: were distorted, the nation building project was a colossal failure, 16 00:00:58,240 --> 00:01:01,440 Speaker 1: and the drugs and corruption intolt rated our allies in 17 00:01:01,480 --> 00:01:04,240 Speaker 1: the Afghan government. So here to talk about his book. 18 00:01:04,240 --> 00:01:08,560 Speaker 1: As Washington Post investigative reporter, Craig whitlock a three time 19 00:01:08,640 --> 00:01:11,840 Speaker 1: poll a surprise finalist, he has covered the global war 20 00:01:11,920 --> 00:01:14,800 Speaker 1: on terrorism, for the Post since two thousand and one 21 00:01:14,880 --> 00:01:19,880 Speaker 1: as a foreign correspondent, Pentagon reporter, and national security specialist. 22 00:01:28,440 --> 00:01:31,640 Speaker 1: Craig Whitlock, thank you for joining me. If you don't mind, 23 00:01:31,640 --> 00:01:35,520 Speaker 1: I want to start with your two nineteen investigative report 24 00:01:35,880 --> 00:01:38,640 Speaker 1: for The Washington Post, which I understand you had to 25 00:01:38,680 --> 00:01:43,560 Speaker 1: sue the federal government to obtain access to previously undisclosed documents. 26 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:46,959 Speaker 1: That's right. It took us three years in federal court 27 00:01:47,520 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 1: to obtain about two thousand pages of notes and transcripts 28 00:01:51,640 --> 00:01:55,240 Speaker 1: of interviews that a little known agency called this Special 29 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:59,800 Speaker 1: Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction had conducted with more than 30 00:01:59,840 --> 00:02:03,200 Speaker 1: four hundred people who had played roles in the wars, 31 00:02:03,240 --> 00:02:06,080 Speaker 1: starting in two thousand and one with the Bush administration 32 00:02:06,320 --> 00:02:08,480 Speaker 1: all the way up to the start of the Trump administration. 33 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:11,320 Speaker 1: And the purpose of these interviews was for a project 34 00:02:11,320 --> 00:02:14,480 Speaker 1: called Lessons Learned to try and learn from the mistakes 35 00:02:14,560 --> 00:02:17,800 Speaker 1: made in Afghanistan. But for the most part, the Inspector 36 00:02:17,840 --> 00:02:22,120 Speaker 1: General kept all these interviews private, kept them secret, not classified, 37 00:02:22,240 --> 00:02:24,600 Speaker 1: but kept them out of the public's hands. And we 38 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:27,320 Speaker 1: felt that there was a very compelling public interest in 39 00:02:27,440 --> 00:02:30,399 Speaker 1: knowing what these people had said about what went wrong 40 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:33,080 Speaker 1: in Afghanistan. So we pursued it pretty hard, but it 41 00:02:33,080 --> 00:02:37,200 Speaker 1: took three years deprive them lose from that agency. It 42 00:02:37,440 --> 00:02:40,679 Speaker 1: was it a sense the agency should have been very 43 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:43,680 Speaker 1: committed to educating the public. Mothers, how else are you 44 00:02:43,680 --> 00:02:46,480 Speaker 1: going to get lessons learned out if you don't share 45 00:02:46,520 --> 00:02:48,720 Speaker 1: them with people. Tells you a lot about the whole 46 00:02:49,200 --> 00:02:53,239 Speaker 1: current model of national security that it very often doesn't 47 00:02:53,240 --> 00:02:56,840 Speaker 1: tell us things that the other side obviously knows. Well, 48 00:02:56,880 --> 00:02:59,280 Speaker 1: that's right, And in this case, the Inspector General was 49 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:02,760 Speaker 1: issuing public reports for this lessons learned program, but they 50 00:03:03,160 --> 00:03:08,679 Speaker 1: omitted or sanitized all the biggest revelations from their interviews, 51 00:03:08,720 --> 00:03:13,320 Speaker 1: all the striking admissions of failure or missteps or where 52 00:03:13,320 --> 00:03:16,720 Speaker 1: they got things wrong, the most stunning quotes, they kept 53 00:03:16,760 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 1: all that suppressed. I think they were concerned that this 54 00:03:20,000 --> 00:03:21,959 Speaker 1: was too hot for them to handle in a way, 55 00:03:22,000 --> 00:03:24,400 Speaker 1: and so they put out a water down report instead 56 00:03:24,440 --> 00:03:27,680 Speaker 1: of what people were really truly saying about what went wrong. 57 00:03:28,200 --> 00:03:30,880 Speaker 1: You know, we started out with enormous energy and drive 58 00:03:31,080 --> 00:03:34,160 Speaker 1: because we were so shocked by nine to eleven. I mean, 59 00:03:34,200 --> 00:03:37,240 Speaker 1: the House voted four hundred and twenty to one, and 60 00:03:37,240 --> 00:03:41,240 Speaker 1: then the Senate voted ninety eight zero to authorize the 61 00:03:41,320 --> 00:03:44,760 Speaker 1: US to go to war not just an Afghanistan, but 62 00:03:44,920 --> 00:03:48,520 Speaker 1: in an open ended commitment against quote those responsible for 63 00:03:48,520 --> 00:03:52,600 Speaker 1: the recent attacks launched against the United States. Representing Barbaralye 64 00:03:52,640 --> 00:03:55,840 Speaker 1: of California cast the only vote posed the war. In 65 00:03:55,920 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 1: a sense, at the opening moment, we seem to be 66 00:04:00,040 --> 00:04:03,560 Speaker 1: are unified, and at the same time, ironically, NATO invoked 67 00:04:03,640 --> 00:04:07,480 Speaker 1: Article five, which is the alliance's collective commitment to defend 68 00:04:07,560 --> 00:04:10,080 Speaker 1: any of its member states under attack. I don't think 69 00:04:10,120 --> 00:04:14,160 Speaker 1: anybody who created NATO back in nineteen forty nine expected 70 00:04:14,520 --> 00:04:16,840 Speaker 1: that the first time they would invoke Article five it 71 00:04:16,920 --> 00:04:19,440 Speaker 1: was on behalf of the United States. So it was 72 00:04:19,480 --> 00:04:22,840 Speaker 1: an amazing moment. Within twelve days of nine to eleven, 73 00:04:22,880 --> 00:04:27,680 Speaker 1: on October seventh, we began bombing Afghanistan. The Taliban surrendered 74 00:04:27,680 --> 00:04:31,760 Speaker 1: in Kandahar on December ninth, and the US began to 75 00:04:31,760 --> 00:04:34,080 Speaker 1: fight them again in Earnest on March of two thousand 76 00:04:34,080 --> 00:04:39,039 Speaker 1: and two. I'm curious, as you looked at it, did 77 00:04:39,040 --> 00:04:41,960 Speaker 1: we really have any kind of coherent strategy for what 78 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:44,920 Speaker 1: we were going to do? Well. No, And in fact, 79 00:04:44,920 --> 00:04:47,479 Speaker 1: when you read the transcripts of these interviews. The thing 80 00:04:47,480 --> 00:04:51,119 Speaker 1: that was most surprising to me is I think people 81 00:04:51,200 --> 00:04:53,840 Speaker 1: knew obviously the war hadn't been going well for some time. 82 00:04:54,279 --> 00:04:57,599 Speaker 1: But most Americans, I think, assumed there's some kind of plan, 83 00:04:58,240 --> 00:05:01,119 Speaker 1: that there was some kind of strategy. It just maybe 84 00:05:01,120 --> 00:05:03,640 Speaker 1: it was misguided or going in the wrong direction. But 85 00:05:04,000 --> 00:05:07,000 Speaker 1: in those early years of the Bush administration, there were 86 00:05:07,040 --> 00:05:11,039 Speaker 1: actually some commanding generals who said we didn't have a strategy. 87 00:05:11,240 --> 00:05:13,600 Speaker 1: One of the first generals was a guy named Dan McNeil. 88 00:05:14,000 --> 00:05:17,359 Speaker 1: It was an Army three star who was commanding troops 89 00:05:17,360 --> 00:05:20,000 Speaker 1: in Afghanistan in two thousand and two two thousand and three, 90 00:05:20,160 --> 00:05:22,279 Speaker 1: he was interviewed and he said, we didn't have a 91 00:05:22,320 --> 00:05:25,560 Speaker 1: campaign plan. My orders were to go kill terrorists and 92 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:28,640 Speaker 1: that was about it. And I thought maybe he was exaggerating, 93 00:05:28,640 --> 00:05:30,560 Speaker 1: because what kind of general admits they don't have a 94 00:05:30,560 --> 00:05:34,000 Speaker 1: plan or a strategy. But later on one of his successors, 95 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:36,760 Speaker 1: a British general named David Richards, who was in charge 96 00:05:36,800 --> 00:05:40,279 Speaker 1: of US and NATO troops, also said we didn't have 97 00:05:40,320 --> 00:05:42,919 Speaker 1: a strategy. We had a lot of tactics, but we 98 00:05:42,960 --> 00:05:46,000 Speaker 1: didn't have a proper strategy. And to me, I'm not 99 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:49,480 Speaker 1: a trained military historian. But if you're commanding generals or 100 00:05:49,520 --> 00:05:53,279 Speaker 1: admitting they didn't have a functional strategy, that's pretty alarming 101 00:05:53,320 --> 00:05:57,159 Speaker 1: and really says just how a drift things were. I 102 00:05:57,240 --> 00:05:59,760 Speaker 1: happen to think that's accurate technically, but we did not 103 00:05:59,839 --> 00:06:03,600 Speaker 1: have a strategy. But there's somebody who's worked with the 104 00:06:03,680 --> 00:06:07,760 Speaker 1: American military since nineteen seventy nine. In a sense, the 105 00:06:07,800 --> 00:06:09,840 Speaker 1: generals who were complaining about it are the guys who 106 00:06:09,839 --> 00:06:13,160 Speaker 1: were supposed to design a strategy. They had every opportunity 107 00:06:13,200 --> 00:06:17,000 Speaker 1: to go back and say, shouldn't this be our strategy? Well, 108 00:06:17,000 --> 00:06:19,200 Speaker 1: that's right, and that's certainly fair comment. I mean, it's 109 00:06:19,240 --> 00:06:22,880 Speaker 1: not like they're powerless. Along those lines. One of the 110 00:06:22,920 --> 00:06:25,920 Speaker 1: next generals as a guy named David Barnow, another three star. 111 00:06:26,040 --> 00:06:29,120 Speaker 1: He came into Afghanistan about two thousand and three, and 112 00:06:29,160 --> 00:06:32,159 Speaker 1: he said he recognized at that time that they needed 113 00:06:32,160 --> 00:06:34,440 Speaker 1: to do strategy. It wasn't just a matter of hunting 114 00:06:34,480 --> 00:06:38,359 Speaker 1: down members of al Qaeda or old Taliban leaders. He 115 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:41,440 Speaker 1: saw that the Taliban was slowly starting to regroup in 116 00:06:41,480 --> 00:06:44,200 Speaker 1: Pakistan and along the border, and he said, rather than 117 00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:48,000 Speaker 1: just a counter terrorism strategy, we need a counterinsurgency strategy, 118 00:06:48,120 --> 00:06:51,320 Speaker 1: meaning we need to get the Afghan people on our 119 00:06:51,360 --> 00:06:56,120 Speaker 1: side and essentially combat this insurgency, this guerrilla war that 120 00:06:56,240 --> 00:06:59,760 Speaker 1: was picking up an intensity. The irony is He said 121 00:07:00,279 --> 00:07:04,320 Speaker 1: the Army hadn't taught counterinsurgency since Vietnam, and that he 122 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:07,000 Speaker 1: had to go back to his textbooks for when he 123 00:07:07,040 --> 00:07:09,320 Speaker 1: was a student at West Point in the early nineteen 124 00:07:09,400 --> 00:07:13,440 Speaker 1: seventies to come up with a counterinsurgency strategy. And then 125 00:07:13,480 --> 00:07:15,480 Speaker 1: he said, on top of that, of course they had 126 00:07:15,640 --> 00:07:18,680 Speaker 1: difficulty gained the resources they need in Afghanistan because of 127 00:07:18,720 --> 00:07:20,880 Speaker 1: what was going on in the Rock. So he was 128 00:07:20,960 --> 00:07:23,720 Speaker 1: casting about for his strategy. But when you're having to 129 00:07:23,800 --> 00:07:27,360 Speaker 1: consult your textbooks from thirty years earlier, you know that's 130 00:07:27,360 --> 00:07:30,040 Speaker 1: probably not a good sign either. By the way, as 131 00:07:30,080 --> 00:07:32,040 Speaker 1: on a side, I had done a one time with 132 00:07:32,120 --> 00:07:37,320 Speaker 1: Curtis LeMay and asked him about his very famous decision 133 00:07:37,800 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: to have the B seventeens flies straight and ignore German 134 00:07:42,240 --> 00:07:45,240 Speaker 1: Anni aircraft. He said it was based on cooling out 135 00:07:45,520 --> 00:07:50,800 Speaker 1: his nineteen twenty nine Ohio State University ROTC textbook on 136 00:07:50,840 --> 00:07:54,440 Speaker 1: our Chillery and looking at it and realizing that all 137 00:07:54,480 --> 00:07:57,000 Speaker 1: the German Anni aircraft was all random. So there's no 138 00:07:57,080 --> 00:07:59,360 Speaker 1: point in dodging back and forth because they weren't aiming. 139 00:07:59,640 --> 00:08:02,840 Speaker 1: And he said when he met with his officers and 140 00:08:02,880 --> 00:08:05,160 Speaker 1: he convinced them that they're going to fly straight, and 141 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:07,760 Speaker 1: they said, we can't fly straight. That'll make us too 142 00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:10,440 Speaker 1: easy to shoot at. And he said, well, if you're 143 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:13,200 Speaker 1: not hitting anything dodging and weaving, so if you don't 144 00:08:13,200 --> 00:08:14,880 Speaker 1: want to fly straight, we're going to ground all the 145 00:08:14,920 --> 00:08:19,280 Speaker 1: airplanes and save the taxpayer all about gasoline money. And 146 00:08:19,360 --> 00:08:21,760 Speaker 1: they said, all right, we'll fly straight. And so he 147 00:08:21,840 --> 00:08:24,520 Speaker 1: led the first raid, which I think was a Schweinfurt, 148 00:08:24,520 --> 00:08:27,000 Speaker 1: about a thousand planes, and he was the lead plane. 149 00:08:27,040 --> 00:08:29,080 Speaker 1: He said, I'm gonna I'll fly straight, and you guys 150 00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 1: follow me. He said, I have to tell you, I 151 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:35,520 Speaker 1: was really worried as we approached Schweinfurt, and I thought 152 00:08:35,559 --> 00:08:40,040 Speaker 1: to myself, God, I hope that textbook is right. So 153 00:08:40,640 --> 00:08:43,760 Speaker 1: sometimes these guys do go back to the basics in 154 00:08:43,840 --> 00:08:45,440 Speaker 1: order to figure out. In his case, it was a 155 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:49,120 Speaker 1: huge enormous change and what we were doing. Well, I 156 00:08:49,200 --> 00:08:51,400 Speaker 1: guess they have some pretty good textbooks at West Point. 157 00:08:51,400 --> 00:08:54,000 Speaker 1: They live an impression on the guys who would come generals. 158 00:08:54,040 --> 00:08:56,080 Speaker 1: That's a good thing. Well, you know, I don't know 159 00:08:56,080 --> 00:08:59,360 Speaker 1: if you've ever read Nagle's book on Eating Soup with 160 00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:03,320 Speaker 1: a knife. Yeah, I had his counterinsurgency book about what 161 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:06,080 Speaker 1: the British faced in Malaysia in other cases, the degree 162 00:09:06,120 --> 00:09:09,320 Speaker 1: to which we just could not adjust. In Vietnam, we 163 00:09:09,360 --> 00:09:13,440 Speaker 1: could not figure out how to apply a genuine counterinsurgency strategy. 164 00:09:13,559 --> 00:09:15,559 Speaker 1: I called him one day and I said, you know, 165 00:09:16,080 --> 00:09:19,640 Speaker 1: how did this affect your career having written such a 166 00:09:19,640 --> 00:09:21,959 Speaker 1: tough book. And he said, well, it didn't hurt it 167 00:09:22,000 --> 00:09:26,560 Speaker 1: at all because nobody in the army read, so nobody 168 00:09:26,679 --> 00:09:29,280 Speaker 1: understood what he was saying. But what he was saying 169 00:09:29,360 --> 00:09:32,400 Speaker 1: is I think still to this day true, and that is, 170 00:09:32,440 --> 00:09:38,160 Speaker 1: we do not have a coherent, effective counterinsurgency strategy, even 171 00:09:38,200 --> 00:09:41,199 Speaker 1: though we're probably involved in twenty or thirty insurgencies around 172 00:09:41,240 --> 00:09:44,200 Speaker 1: the world right this minute, places like Boko Haram in 173 00:09:44,280 --> 00:09:49,000 Speaker 1: northern Nigeria or al Shabab in Somalia. So it's fascinating 174 00:09:49,160 --> 00:09:53,199 Speaker 1: and you're looking at what I think was twenty years 175 00:09:53,280 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 1: of enormous effort at a tactical level with zero strategic overlay. Well, 176 00:09:59,440 --> 00:10:01,160 Speaker 1: I think you're write, though, mystery speaker. I think you 177 00:10:01,320 --> 00:10:04,000 Speaker 1: bring up actually a much bigger point, which is we 178 00:10:04,040 --> 00:10:08,400 Speaker 1: haven't figured out an effective counterinsurgency strategy anywhere. Afghanistan has 179 00:10:08,400 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 1: been getting all the focus, but we faced these insurgencies 180 00:10:13,200 --> 00:10:16,880 Speaker 1: in parts of Africa, North Africa and Middle East Afghanistan, 181 00:10:17,280 --> 00:10:20,160 Speaker 1: and not once have we really figured out a truly 182 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:23,520 Speaker 1: effective way of countering it. Despite all the resources at 183 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:27,000 Speaker 1: our disposal, and despite these last twenty years, it's hard 184 00:10:27,040 --> 00:10:29,400 Speaker 1: to say that we figured out a model for applying 185 00:10:29,400 --> 00:10:32,200 Speaker 1: it in new places that might come up. And not 186 00:10:32,280 --> 00:10:34,720 Speaker 1: to me, that's pretty sobering. It's not just the mistakes 187 00:10:34,720 --> 00:10:37,680 Speaker 1: we made in Afghanistan, but we still haven't figured out 188 00:10:37,720 --> 00:10:40,720 Speaker 1: what to do in these situations which will inevitably arise 189 00:10:40,760 --> 00:10:44,720 Speaker 1: somewhere else. You had been actively and aggressively covering the war, 190 00:10:45,280 --> 00:10:48,040 Speaker 1: and in the summer of twenty sixteen you got this 191 00:10:48,160 --> 00:10:51,280 Speaker 1: chip about the Office of the Special Inspector General for 192 00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:56,200 Speaker 1: Afghanistan Reconstruction. How did it feel to suddenly discover, after 193 00:10:56,240 --> 00:10:58,720 Speaker 1: you've already been looking at this thing for over a decade, 194 00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:02,720 Speaker 1: that the US was sitting there doing something that actually 195 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:06,040 Speaker 1: fits perfectly into what you're trying to do. Well. The 196 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:08,760 Speaker 1: antenna went up right because we had been thinking at 197 00:11:08,760 --> 00:11:12,360 Speaker 1: that point. In twenty sixteen, President Obama, as you recall, 198 00:11:12,760 --> 00:11:15,080 Speaker 1: had promised to end the war bring home all US 199 00:11:15,160 --> 00:11:17,160 Speaker 1: troops by the end of his second term. He failed 200 00:11:17,160 --> 00:11:19,800 Speaker 1: to do that, but the assumption was at that point 201 00:11:19,800 --> 00:11:23,200 Speaker 1: that the war was winding down, that the US involvement 202 00:11:23,240 --> 00:11:27,600 Speaker 1: would be minimal, if not gone completely. So journalistically, I 203 00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:30,000 Speaker 1: was looking for a way to say, Okay, let's get 204 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:32,840 Speaker 1: our arms around what happened in Afghanistan, what went wrong? 205 00:11:32,880 --> 00:11:34,680 Speaker 1: But how do we report that? How do we tell 206 00:11:34,679 --> 00:11:37,200 Speaker 1: that story? Because the war has been going on for 207 00:11:37,240 --> 00:11:39,679 Speaker 1: so long and normally, if your reporter, you go out 208 00:11:39,720 --> 00:11:41,719 Speaker 1: and you interview a bunch of people, but there were 209 00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:44,520 Speaker 1: so many people involved, you know, we wanted to have 210 00:11:44,559 --> 00:11:47,120 Speaker 1: some focus to our efforts. So when I found out 211 00:11:47,160 --> 00:11:50,959 Speaker 1: the Inspector General had been conducting these interviews, I thought, well, 212 00:11:51,000 --> 00:11:53,640 Speaker 1: maybe that's a structure for us to get a story end. 213 00:11:54,000 --> 00:11:58,280 Speaker 1: What approach were they taking? Were these interviewees being blunt? 214 00:11:58,320 --> 00:12:00,840 Speaker 1: And that's what I'd heard that the Spector General had 215 00:12:00,840 --> 00:12:03,880 Speaker 1: actually done an interview with Michael Flynn, who at that 216 00:12:03,920 --> 00:12:07,160 Speaker 1: time was becoming more well known publicly because it was 217 00:12:07,240 --> 00:12:11,120 Speaker 1: support for President Trump during the twenty sixteen campaign, and 218 00:12:11,200 --> 00:12:13,680 Speaker 1: I knew Flynn when he was in the military. He 219 00:12:13,720 --> 00:12:16,200 Speaker 1: had a pretty good reputation for speaking his mind and 220 00:12:16,280 --> 00:12:19,199 Speaker 1: being blunt. He had been in charge of US and 221 00:12:19,280 --> 00:12:22,280 Speaker 1: NATO intelligence in Afghanistan, so I was really interested to 222 00:12:22,280 --> 00:12:24,920 Speaker 1: see what he said. That was really the genesis for 223 00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:27,960 Speaker 1: the whole thing. We had to sue under Foya to 224 00:12:28,040 --> 00:12:31,720 Speaker 1: get the notes and transcripts of his interviews. He was 225 00:12:31,840 --> 00:12:34,200 Speaker 1: very blunt. He talked about, you know, for years, we 226 00:12:34,240 --> 00:12:37,240 Speaker 1: always say we're winning in Afghanistan, but when I'm on 227 00:12:37,280 --> 00:12:40,240 Speaker 1: the ground or I get the reports from the unit level, 228 00:12:40,679 --> 00:12:43,240 Speaker 1: nobody says we're winning. It doesn't feel like we're winning. 229 00:12:43,240 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 1: So why do we keep saying we are? You know, 230 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:48,679 Speaker 1: he was willing to get past the rhetoric and have 231 00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:51,680 Speaker 1: a pretty blunt assessment. So once I saw his interview, 232 00:12:52,080 --> 00:12:53,880 Speaker 1: I knew we had to get the rest because if 233 00:12:53,920 --> 00:12:57,719 Speaker 1: the rest were anywhere near as open and revelatory as 234 00:12:57,760 --> 00:13:00,079 Speaker 1: his was, that was going to be an important story. 235 00:13:00,640 --> 00:13:03,920 Speaker 1: Jake Chapper wrote a very interesting book called The Outpost, 236 00:13:04,600 --> 00:13:08,520 Speaker 1: and the wife of the captain at the Outpost actually 237 00:13:08,520 --> 00:13:10,280 Speaker 1: worked with us for over a year while he was 238 00:13:10,360 --> 00:13:13,640 Speaker 1: here going to Georgetown, and so I had a sort 239 00:13:13,640 --> 00:13:16,640 Speaker 1: of personal interest in the book. But what really struck 240 00:13:16,679 --> 00:13:19,240 Speaker 1: me about the book was, here you have the most 241 00:13:19,280 --> 00:13:22,440 Speaker 1: powerful nation in the world, and because we're trying to 242 00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:24,640 Speaker 1: do all this on the shoe string, and we had 243 00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:28,680 Speaker 1: diverted so many resources to Iraq, we had small numbers 244 00:13:28,679 --> 00:13:32,280 Speaker 1: of troops out here at a massive disadvantage for no 245 00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:35,600 Speaker 1: good reason. I mean, we had the sheer capacity if 246 00:13:35,600 --> 00:13:39,560 Speaker 1: we wanted to to totally dominate, and we kept nickel 247 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:43,440 Speaker 1: and diming ourselves so that in a way, we stayed marginally. 248 00:13:43,559 --> 00:13:45,400 Speaker 1: It's a little bit like looking at some of the 249 00:13:45,440 --> 00:13:49,120 Speaker 1: Western Wars between the US cavalry and Native Americans, where 250 00:13:49,480 --> 00:13:51,720 Speaker 1: there were so few cavalry at some of those stages, 251 00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:55,000 Speaker 1: not because this huge country back east didn't have a 252 00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:57,559 Speaker 1: lot more people, but it was just the politicians were 253 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:01,480 Speaker 1: being cheap. And yet a similar feel here that we 254 00:14:01,480 --> 00:14:06,400 Speaker 1: were putting young men and women at enormous risk because 255 00:14:06,400 --> 00:14:09,280 Speaker 1: of the way that the bureaucracy decided to divide up 256 00:14:09,280 --> 00:14:12,000 Speaker 1: its resources. And I don't know to what extent that 257 00:14:12,040 --> 00:14:15,160 Speaker 1: shows up and the report that was done, but it 258 00:14:15,240 --> 00:14:17,600 Speaker 1: was both we didn't have a strategy. Well, now, we 259 00:14:17,640 --> 00:14:21,000 Speaker 1: didn't surge enormously at one point under Obama. But as 260 00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:23,360 Speaker 1: a general rule, we tried to get by on the 261 00:14:23,440 --> 00:14:27,280 Speaker 1: cheap in Afghanistan against an enemy, so we almost reduced 262 00:14:27,320 --> 00:14:30,240 Speaker 1: ourselves to making sure it was a fair fight for 263 00:14:30,320 --> 00:14:33,240 Speaker 1: the Taliban, which it didn't have to be, That's right. 264 00:14:33,320 --> 00:14:35,760 Speaker 1: And in doing my research for the book and for 265 00:14:35,880 --> 00:14:39,600 Speaker 1: our Afghanistan Peepers series in the Post, we also obtained 266 00:14:39,840 --> 00:14:44,000 Speaker 1: thousands and thousands of memos that former Defense Secretary Donald 267 00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:47,920 Speaker 1: rumsfeld had dictated, and we sorted out the ones about Afghanistan. 268 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:51,440 Speaker 1: And you'll remember this. You had been sending a number 269 00:14:51,480 --> 00:14:53,920 Speaker 1: of memos to Rumsfeldt from when you were on the 270 00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:56,920 Speaker 1: Defense Policy Board, I believe at the time, and I 271 00:14:56,960 --> 00:14:59,240 Speaker 1: recalled distinctly, there were a few memos from you to 272 00:14:59,360 --> 00:15:03,600 Speaker 1: Runseld saying, look, the war in Afghanistan is underresourced. You're 273 00:15:03,640 --> 00:15:06,640 Speaker 1: not devoting enough there to accomplish what we need to do. 274 00:15:06,720 --> 00:15:10,120 Speaker 1: And certainly during the first Bush administration up till two 275 00:15:10,160 --> 00:15:12,280 Speaker 1: thousand and four, that was a case. That was the 276 00:15:12,360 --> 00:15:15,360 Speaker 1: time when the Taliban was at its weakest and when 277 00:15:15,600 --> 00:15:18,400 Speaker 1: the Afghan government needed the most help to build up, 278 00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:21,760 Speaker 1: and when we needed to accelerate our efforts to build 279 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:24,640 Speaker 1: up an Afghan army and police force, but we did 280 00:15:24,640 --> 00:15:26,560 Speaker 1: it on the cheap, and that was the moment when 281 00:15:26,600 --> 00:15:29,440 Speaker 1: perhaps we might have had the most effect. But when 282 00:15:29,480 --> 00:15:32,600 Speaker 1: we waited several more years later to under Obama to 283 00:15:32,680 --> 00:15:35,840 Speaker 1: try and fix those problems, it was almost too late. 284 00:15:52,840 --> 00:15:56,400 Speaker 1: There's a theory about change where you're sort of ice, 285 00:15:56,920 --> 00:16:00,040 Speaker 1: you fall out into water, and then you refreeze in 286 00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:03,920 Speaker 1: a new configuration. And in a sense, we had a 287 00:16:03,920 --> 00:16:07,160 Speaker 1: brief moment where we could have defined what it was 288 00:16:07,200 --> 00:16:10,000 Speaker 1: going to come back as. But one of the challenges 289 00:16:10,040 --> 00:16:12,400 Speaker 1: I'm really curious to get your reaction to this. I 290 00:16:12,440 --> 00:16:18,680 Speaker 1: don't know what we do in a place where opium 291 00:16:18,800 --> 00:16:21,680 Speaker 1: is a major source of revenue and enormous, so maybe 292 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:25,320 Speaker 1: a third of the GDP, and where the politicians are 293 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:29,080 Speaker 1: endemically corrupt as a matter of the whole nature of 294 00:16:29,120 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 1: the culture, and so it's very hard to build a 295 00:16:33,120 --> 00:16:37,880 Speaker 1: Western style of military if everybody above the private soldiers 296 00:16:38,040 --> 00:16:40,920 Speaker 1: is on the take. And I'm curious what your thoughts are, 297 00:16:40,920 --> 00:16:43,480 Speaker 1: because it does seem to me that having picked Car's 298 00:16:43,480 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 1: eye and then staying with Car's eye, no matter how 299 00:16:45,640 --> 00:16:51,040 Speaker 1: corrupt he was, and then watching the bureaucracies sort of 300 00:16:51,120 --> 00:16:54,560 Speaker 1: loot the Western aid in ways that were culturally totally 301 00:16:54,600 --> 00:16:58,480 Speaker 1: appropriate for the Afghan history, but made it impossible to 302 00:16:58,520 --> 00:17:01,840 Speaker 1: really build the kind of system that we had fantasized 303 00:17:01,880 --> 00:17:04,119 Speaker 1: we could build. Do you have any thoughts of that, 304 00:17:05,160 --> 00:17:08,399 Speaker 1: whether there was an alternative that might have worked, You know, 305 00:17:08,480 --> 00:17:10,840 Speaker 1: that's a million dollar question. What was the alternative? But 306 00:17:10,920 --> 00:17:13,199 Speaker 1: certainly the way we went about it was kind of 307 00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:15,439 Speaker 1: ham handed, and I think we never settled on a 308 00:17:15,480 --> 00:17:19,760 Speaker 1: consistent approach, certainly not one that was effective. But the 309 00:17:19,800 --> 00:17:22,960 Speaker 1: problem is we kept bouncing around. One minute, we'd decide 310 00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:26,040 Speaker 1: that corruption was a major focus, very important, and we'd 311 00:17:26,320 --> 00:17:28,560 Speaker 1: spend about a year trying to do something about it. 312 00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:30,960 Speaker 1: Then we decide that it's too hard, so we're going 313 00:17:31,000 --> 00:17:34,280 Speaker 1: to give up. And same with opium. Afghanistan is the 314 00:17:34,320 --> 00:17:39,400 Speaker 1: world's largest supplier of opium used for heroin, and yet 315 00:17:39,440 --> 00:17:41,399 Speaker 1: we could never really figure out what to do about it. 316 00:17:41,400 --> 00:17:43,399 Speaker 1: In the early years, the British were in charge of 317 00:17:43,400 --> 00:17:45,920 Speaker 1: trying to deal with it, and they would offer Afghan 318 00:17:45,960 --> 00:17:49,840 Speaker 1: farmers cash to destroy their crops. So the Afghans, being 319 00:17:49,920 --> 00:17:53,040 Speaker 1: very clever, planted more and more opium because they knew 320 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:54,760 Speaker 1: that the British would pay them more and more to 321 00:17:54,760 --> 00:17:58,320 Speaker 1: burn it. That obviously was a blunder. So then under 322 00:17:58,480 --> 00:18:01,680 Speaker 1: the Bush administration, we decided to eradicate the plants, where 323 00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:05,359 Speaker 1: we go into the fields higher Afghan laborers to whack 324 00:18:05,440 --> 00:18:08,879 Speaker 1: the plants with machetes or drag tractors through and physically 325 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:13,000 Speaker 1: try and destroy the opium poppy plants. Well, that of 326 00:18:13,000 --> 00:18:15,920 Speaker 1: course just backfire because then the farmers who were dependent 327 00:18:15,960 --> 00:18:19,240 Speaker 1: on this for their livelihood would join the Taliban or 328 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:24,240 Speaker 1: would support the insurgency. Under Obama, they took yet another approach, 329 00:18:24,280 --> 00:18:26,919 Speaker 1: which was, Okay, we're not going to punish the farmers, 330 00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:29,000 Speaker 1: We're just going to try and persuade them to grow 331 00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:32,080 Speaker 1: other crops like pomegranates and wheat and things like that. 332 00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:34,800 Speaker 1: And again we made it easier for them to grow 333 00:18:34,840 --> 00:18:37,960 Speaker 1: those other crops, but they still kept planning more opium poppies, 334 00:18:38,040 --> 00:18:41,240 Speaker 1: right because that's the most profitable crop of all. And 335 00:18:41,359 --> 00:18:44,520 Speaker 1: we never really understood that the only effective way to 336 00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:47,719 Speaker 1: do something about the problem, frankly, was to stabilize the country. 337 00:18:47,760 --> 00:18:51,080 Speaker 1: As long as the country was at war, as long 338 00:18:51,080 --> 00:18:54,800 Speaker 1: as their economy it wasn't peaceful. There what else could 339 00:18:54,840 --> 00:18:58,000 Speaker 1: farmers do other than grow a crop. That was the 340 00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:00,680 Speaker 1: easiest and best way to earn money for them and 341 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:03,280 Speaker 1: their family. So I think we tried all these approaches. 342 00:19:03,320 --> 00:19:06,320 Speaker 1: None of them work, but we kept bouncing around. So again, 343 00:19:06,359 --> 00:19:09,320 Speaker 1: there is no consistency, and that by itself is a 344 00:19:09,400 --> 00:19:12,879 Speaker 1: recipe for failure. I talked to a number of folks 345 00:19:12,960 --> 00:19:16,920 Speaker 1: who serve on the front lines. One of them was 346 00:19:16,960 --> 00:19:20,800 Speaker 1: a navy lieutenant who actually ended up working a town 347 00:19:21,440 --> 00:19:24,600 Speaker 1: very close to the Pakistani border, in an area that 348 00:19:24,760 --> 00:19:29,560 Speaker 1: was very, very traditional. You have to ask yourself, given 349 00:19:29,600 --> 00:19:31,440 Speaker 1: the size of our army, in our marine corps, why 350 00:19:31,440 --> 00:19:33,960 Speaker 1: do we end up with a naval officer leaving his 351 00:19:34,040 --> 00:19:36,080 Speaker 1: ship to go and sit there. But he did, and 352 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:38,840 Speaker 1: I was his assignment. But he said to me, he said, 353 00:19:38,840 --> 00:19:43,280 Speaker 1: we don't understand that the two primary sources of wealth 354 00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:47,840 Speaker 1: and prestige for an Afghan male are their goats and 355 00:19:47,920 --> 00:19:54,200 Speaker 1: their wives. And we killed their goats, and we threatened 356 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:58,399 Speaker 1: to liberate their wives, leaving them impoverished and totally in 357 00:19:58,440 --> 00:20:01,520 Speaker 1: a culture they have no understanding. And he said, and 358 00:20:01,560 --> 00:20:04,840 Speaker 1: we think somehow they're going to like us. And he said, 359 00:20:04,880 --> 00:20:06,880 Speaker 1: I spent a year and a half in the town watching. 360 00:20:07,240 --> 00:20:09,800 Speaker 1: For example, a woman would come in with her husband 361 00:20:10,080 --> 00:20:14,680 Speaker 1: and she would sit facing the wall while he shopped, 362 00:20:15,760 --> 00:20:19,160 Speaker 1: so that she would not be tempted, and she couldn't 363 00:20:19,160 --> 00:20:21,399 Speaker 1: move until he came back, and then she would follow 364 00:20:21,440 --> 00:20:23,919 Speaker 1: him and they'd go back to their farm or whatever. 365 00:20:24,600 --> 00:20:26,560 Speaker 1: And he said, the idea that we were somehow going 366 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:31,240 Speaker 1: to magically turn a switch and have them participate in 367 00:20:31,280 --> 00:20:34,080 Speaker 1: the twenty first century society, he said, they found that 368 00:20:34,160 --> 00:20:38,159 Speaker 1: as terrifying, not as an opportunity. Well, I think that's right, 369 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:41,679 Speaker 1: and this illustrates a bigger issue is our troops on 370 00:20:41,720 --> 00:20:43,680 Speaker 1: the front lines, the ones who are having the most 371 00:20:43,760 --> 00:20:47,199 Speaker 1: interactions with the Afghans. They saw the futility in a 372 00:20:47,200 --> 00:20:49,399 Speaker 1: lot of this. The idea that we could transform the 373 00:20:49,480 --> 00:20:54,320 Speaker 1: society was just not realistic, but still our overall approach 374 00:20:54,640 --> 00:20:56,840 Speaker 1: from the higher levels at the Pentagon or the White 375 00:20:56,840 --> 00:21:01,800 Speaker 1: House under multiple presidents was this assumption we could change Afghanistan, 376 00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:05,560 Speaker 1: that we could transform it into a Switzerland of South Asia. 377 00:21:05,600 --> 00:21:07,720 Speaker 1: As you will, and you know, I get it. The 378 00:21:07,760 --> 00:21:12,320 Speaker 1: intentions sometimes are noble, right, that the Taliban treat women terribly, 379 00:21:12,440 --> 00:21:15,880 Speaker 1: no question right, It's a brutal way that they deal 380 00:21:15,920 --> 00:21:18,920 Speaker 1: with women. In Afghanistan in large degree, and it's hard 381 00:21:18,960 --> 00:21:21,919 Speaker 1: to stand by and watch that happen. You want to 382 00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:25,359 Speaker 1: help the country modernize in that regard, but this wasn't 383 00:21:25,400 --> 00:21:28,040 Speaker 1: the purpose why we went to war in Afghanistan in 384 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:31,080 Speaker 1: two thousand and one. The mission was very clear. At first, 385 00:21:31,119 --> 00:21:34,639 Speaker 1: President Bush said We're going to Afghanistan to eliminate al 386 00:21:34,720 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: Qaeda and to prevent a repeat of September eleventh. And 387 00:21:38,359 --> 00:21:41,240 Speaker 1: for the first six months, that made sense and that worked. 388 00:21:41,760 --> 00:21:44,320 Speaker 1: But by the time we hit the spring of two 389 00:21:44,359 --> 00:21:46,439 Speaker 1: thousand and two and the Taliban was gone and al 390 00:21:46,520 --> 00:21:50,560 Speaker 1: Qaida's presence had disappeared from Afghanistan, that's when mission creeps 391 00:21:50,600 --> 00:21:53,440 Speaker 1: started to set in and we started seeing all these 392 00:21:53,480 --> 00:21:56,880 Speaker 1: other goals or noble objectives that we wanted to help with. 393 00:21:57,000 --> 00:22:00,040 Speaker 1: But you know, things got blurry. That wasn't why we 394 00:22:00,080 --> 00:22:05,399 Speaker 1: went to war was to modernize Afghanistan or for women's rights. 395 00:22:05,400 --> 00:22:07,880 Speaker 1: Those are nice things to have, but that isn't why 396 00:22:07,920 --> 00:22:10,399 Speaker 1: we went to war. And I think we lost focus 397 00:22:10,520 --> 00:22:12,920 Speaker 1: after the first six months and we never really figured 398 00:22:12,920 --> 00:22:15,320 Speaker 1: things out after that. Yeah, I'm sending to me that 399 00:22:15,359 --> 00:22:20,280 Speaker 1: both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, an expeditionary force strategy 400 00:22:20,800 --> 00:22:24,520 Speaker 1: of going in decisively, defeating your enemy and getting out, 401 00:22:25,320 --> 00:22:28,479 Speaker 1: then letting the country sort itself out and tolerating that 402 00:22:28,560 --> 00:22:30,560 Speaker 1: it's going to be whatever it's going to be because 403 00:22:31,000 --> 00:22:34,600 Speaker 1: you don't have the resources and the patients and the brutality. 404 00:22:34,760 --> 00:22:38,040 Speaker 1: Changing cultures like that requires a very high level of 405 00:22:38,080 --> 00:22:41,919 Speaker 1: force because that's what they're used to. People who defeated 406 00:22:41,960 --> 00:22:46,159 Speaker 1: the Soviet Union were not necessarily intimidated by US, and 407 00:22:46,280 --> 00:22:49,600 Speaker 1: I think we really misunderstood that. Well, it's interesting, I 408 00:22:49,600 --> 00:22:51,960 Speaker 1: think we understood it at the beginning. I mean you 409 00:22:52,080 --> 00:22:55,600 Speaker 1: see this in transcripts of interviews or public appearances with 410 00:22:55,680 --> 00:23:00,200 Speaker 1: President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld. They were very concerned about 411 00:23:00,240 --> 00:23:02,680 Speaker 1: too many troops to Afghanistan because they knew what had 412 00:23:02,680 --> 00:23:05,520 Speaker 1: happened to the Soviets in the nineteen eighties. They didn't 413 00:23:05,560 --> 00:23:08,439 Speaker 1: want to be seen as an occupying force. They wanted 414 00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:11,359 Speaker 1: allies to send some troops into help with reconstruction, but 415 00:23:11,640 --> 00:23:13,720 Speaker 1: they wanted to keep a light footprint because they were 416 00:23:13,760 --> 00:23:16,679 Speaker 1: mindful of what happened to the Russians, mindful of what 417 00:23:16,760 --> 00:23:19,200 Speaker 1: happened in Vietnam. They didn't want to stay too long 418 00:23:19,480 --> 00:23:22,320 Speaker 1: because they knew Afghanistan had a long history of not 419 00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:27,119 Speaker 1: tolerating foreign invaders or foreign occupation troops. But yet as 420 00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:29,720 Speaker 1: time went on, that's exactly the mistake we made. We 421 00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:33,240 Speaker 1: sent more troops, more troops, and the longer they stayed 422 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:36,919 Speaker 1: more Afghans who were either fence sitters or maybe they 423 00:23:36,920 --> 00:23:39,560 Speaker 1: didn't care about the government at Cobble, they didn't really 424 00:23:39,600 --> 00:23:43,600 Speaker 1: like the Taliban. But once they saw these foreign forces 425 00:23:43,960 --> 00:23:46,640 Speaker 1: their year after year after year and things weren't necessarily 426 00:23:46,640 --> 00:23:50,360 Speaker 1: getting better, it becomes much easier for the Taliban to say, 427 00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:54,880 Speaker 1: help us expel the foreign invaders, help us expel the infidels. Right, 428 00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:59,200 Speaker 1: that becomes an irresistible message. Even for Afghans in rural 429 00:23:59,240 --> 00:24:02,520 Speaker 1: areas who other didn't want the tanelel Ban. They didn't 430 00:24:02,560 --> 00:24:05,879 Speaker 1: see that the Americans were doing them much good. So, 431 00:24:06,080 --> 00:24:08,040 Speaker 1: you know, the longer we were there, the worse it got. 432 00:24:08,040 --> 00:24:11,720 Speaker 1: In that sense, Does it strike you the parallel in 433 00:24:11,880 --> 00:24:15,240 Speaker 1: that you quote several people as talking about data points 434 00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:18,040 Speaker 1: between Bob Crowley, who was an Army colonel serving as 435 00:24:18,040 --> 00:24:22,960 Speaker 1: a senior counterinsurgency advisor, told the interviewers that every data 436 00:24:23,040 --> 00:24:27,560 Speaker 1: point was altered to present the best picture possible. Surveys 437 00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:31,879 Speaker 1: for instance, were totally unreliable, but reinformed that everything we 438 00:24:31,880 --> 00:24:35,320 Speaker 1: were doing was right. That sounds so much like the 439 00:24:35,320 --> 00:24:39,040 Speaker 1: body count model we used in Vietnam under Westmoreland. I mean, 440 00:24:39,080 --> 00:24:42,600 Speaker 1: it's eerie to see the institution reverting to the same 441 00:24:42,640 --> 00:24:46,040 Speaker 1: bad practice as a generation later. And it wasn't just 442 00:24:46,320 --> 00:24:49,040 Speaker 1: at that level in the field. There were also some 443 00:24:49,119 --> 00:24:52,720 Speaker 1: documents and interviews with White House officials, including people on 444 00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:56,000 Speaker 1: the National Security Council under Obama. There was one in particular, 445 00:24:56,320 --> 00:24:59,080 Speaker 1: the prison's name was redacted and we're still fighting in 446 00:24:59,160 --> 00:25:02,480 Speaker 1: court to identify by this person. But this National Security 447 00:25:02,480 --> 00:25:06,600 Speaker 1: Council official under Obama said that this distortion of statistics 448 00:25:06,640 --> 00:25:08,480 Speaker 1: went all the way to the top. Whenever they were 449 00:25:08,480 --> 00:25:12,639 Speaker 1: presenting packages or talking points for the president or people 450 00:25:12,640 --> 00:25:16,040 Speaker 1: at the Cabinet, there was this deliberate effort to spin 451 00:25:16,160 --> 00:25:18,639 Speaker 1: or distort the metrics, as they call them, and you 452 00:25:18,760 --> 00:25:22,320 Speaker 1: would be these ridiculous explanations. If violence was going up 453 00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:26,360 Speaker 1: in Afghanistan, the spin would be, well, there's more targets 454 00:25:26,359 --> 00:25:28,919 Speaker 1: for the Taliban to shoot at because we sent more troops, 455 00:25:28,960 --> 00:25:31,879 Speaker 1: so that's why violence is getting worse. And then if 456 00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:34,440 Speaker 1: violence would keep getting worse or they'd have more and 457 00:25:34,520 --> 00:25:38,439 Speaker 1: more suicide attacks. The spin would be, well, the Talban's 458 00:25:38,520 --> 00:25:40,920 Speaker 1: desperate all they can do or suicide attacks because they 459 00:25:40,960 --> 00:25:44,280 Speaker 1: can't fight us in a conventional sense, right, So, no 460 00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:46,760 Speaker 1: matter what happened, there was always a way to make 461 00:25:46,800 --> 00:25:49,480 Speaker 1: it look like it was progress. And this was admitted 462 00:25:49,520 --> 00:25:52,760 Speaker 1: again by a White House official that this was deliberately 463 00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:54,679 Speaker 1: done and went all the way to the top. And 464 00:25:54,720 --> 00:25:57,960 Speaker 1: it's exactly the kind of thing that happened in Vietnam. 465 00:25:58,400 --> 00:26:00,800 Speaker 1: I can't say why we didn't learn our lessons from that, 466 00:26:00,880 --> 00:26:04,359 Speaker 1: but there's no question the same thing was going on well, 467 00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:09,440 Speaker 1: and my hunches that the current Pentagon has now cheerfully 468 00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:13,879 Speaker 1: given up thinking about counterinsurgency. You know, large bureaucracies dal 469 00:26:13,920 --> 00:26:16,800 Speaker 1: would make them comfortable. And if they really were to 470 00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:19,919 Speaker 1: stop and say this is my view, you may not agree, Craig, 471 00:26:19,920 --> 00:26:23,399 Speaker 1: but my view is that the most powerful nation in 472 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:26,199 Speaker 1: the world in the twenty first century in the end, 473 00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:30,560 Speaker 1: was defeated largely by a seventh century tribal faction. The 474 00:26:30,640 --> 00:26:32,760 Speaker 1: one line that the Taliban had that I thought was 475 00:26:32,880 --> 00:26:35,960 Speaker 1: almost perfect was that the Americans had the watches, but 476 00:26:36,080 --> 00:26:39,000 Speaker 1: we have the time. Well, that's right, and it's hard 477 00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:42,600 Speaker 1: to argue with your assessment. We weren't defeated. We weren't 478 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:46,280 Speaker 1: defeated in the traditional military sense that we weren't whipped 479 00:26:46,320 --> 00:26:49,680 Speaker 1: on the battlefield, you know, we didn't suffer a military loss. 480 00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:52,320 Speaker 1: But in terms of an insurgency, yeah, we lost. You 481 00:26:52,320 --> 00:26:55,480 Speaker 1: know because Luk who's in charge now, the Taliban controls 482 00:26:55,520 --> 00:26:57,919 Speaker 1: more of Afghanistan now than they ever did. They have 483 00:26:58,000 --> 00:27:01,200 Speaker 1: more fighters, people under arms than they did when they 484 00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:04,400 Speaker 1: controlled the country, So they're more powerful now in many 485 00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:07,840 Speaker 1: regards than they were twenty years ago. So certainly from 486 00:27:07,840 --> 00:27:11,160 Speaker 1: the town band's perspective, this was a clean cut victory 487 00:27:11,200 --> 00:27:13,520 Speaker 1: for them. Yes, it took twenty years, but they take 488 00:27:13,680 --> 00:27:17,240 Speaker 1: pride in that that they could outlast the American superpower. 489 00:27:17,600 --> 00:27:20,680 Speaker 1: And you're also right. I think the Pentagon, the Defense Department, 490 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:24,040 Speaker 1: still hasn't figured out what to do with insurgency, so 491 00:27:24,080 --> 00:27:27,280 Speaker 1: it's kind of sworn off counterinsurgency as a dirty word. 492 00:27:27,320 --> 00:27:29,480 Speaker 1: They don't want to deal with. They'd rather deal with 493 00:27:29,520 --> 00:27:32,800 Speaker 1: other conflicts. So we've not yet learned our lesson what 494 00:27:32,920 --> 00:27:35,480 Speaker 1: to do when this kind of conflict arises. And that's 495 00:27:35,560 --> 00:27:38,959 Speaker 1: unfortunate because you can see in other countries like Somalia 496 00:27:39,119 --> 00:27:41,879 Speaker 1: or Yemen, or other parts of the Middle East or 497 00:27:41,920 --> 00:27:45,320 Speaker 1: in North Africa. These insurgencies aren't going to go away, 498 00:27:45,359 --> 00:27:48,119 Speaker 1: and we still haven't figured out an effective way for 499 00:27:48,280 --> 00:27:52,879 Speaker 1: countering them. No, I think that's right. What's disturbing is 500 00:27:52,960 --> 00:27:57,800 Speaker 1: that the system itself, even at the peak of the 501 00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:01,080 Speaker 1: Iraq War and the Afghan War, there was a huge 502 00:28:01,160 --> 00:28:06,640 Speaker 1: underlying bias to minimize the investment and to protect the 503 00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:09,840 Speaker 1: traditional systems as though we were going to fight the 504 00:28:09,920 --> 00:28:15,160 Speaker 1: Russians in Central Germany. So you had this constant protectiveness 505 00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:20,480 Speaker 1: of training and say heavy armor as opposed to thinking 506 00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:22,520 Speaker 1: through what we really need to fight in a place 507 00:28:22,560 --> 00:28:27,240 Speaker 1: like Afghanistan. And it worries me because I don't see 508 00:28:28,200 --> 00:28:31,600 Speaker 1: any reaction that says, you know, we need to really 509 00:28:31,640 --> 00:28:37,680 Speaker 1: profoundly rethink both our counterinsurgency but also our underlying systems 510 00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:41,240 Speaker 1: of being honest about ourselves, because I think we're lying 511 00:28:41,280 --> 00:28:45,040 Speaker 1: about China at least as much as we lied about Afghanistan. 512 00:28:45,520 --> 00:28:48,560 Speaker 1: We've had three and four star admirals who have said 513 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:53,400 Speaker 1: every war game we fight with China, we lose. Now, 514 00:28:53,560 --> 00:28:55,320 Speaker 1: you would think that would lead to sort of a 515 00:28:55,360 --> 00:28:59,320 Speaker 1: crisis of thinking we'd better do things differently. So the 516 00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:03,640 Speaker 1: Afghanics experience of fudging the data in order to avoid 517 00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:06,840 Speaker 1: having to tell the truth about it and avoid having 518 00:29:06,840 --> 00:29:10,280 Speaker 1: to really rethink what you're doing that pervades the system 519 00:29:10,320 --> 00:29:13,640 Speaker 1: at large, not just on the counterinsurgency, but across the 520 00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:18,200 Speaker 1: whole system. I think it's a very deep systems problem 521 00:29:18,280 --> 00:29:20,880 Speaker 1: and a very deep cultural problem. And I think what 522 00:29:21,000 --> 00:29:23,920 Speaker 1: your book does, because you know, this is not you, 523 00:29:24,000 --> 00:29:27,520 Speaker 1: as an investigative reporter, giving us your opinion. This is 524 00:29:27,600 --> 00:29:32,040 Speaker 1: you calmly laying out what the military and the senior 525 00:29:32,080 --> 00:29:37,200 Speaker 1: officials said to themselves. And it's really sobering. Well it is, 526 00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:40,080 Speaker 1: And I think you're right about the Pentagon and Defense Department. 527 00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:42,640 Speaker 1: It can be a pretty high bound bureaucracy and they're 528 00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:46,800 Speaker 1: very good at protecting weapons programs and you know, at 529 00:29:46,800 --> 00:29:49,240 Speaker 1: a tactical level in terms of spending, and they aren't 530 00:29:49,240 --> 00:29:53,640 Speaker 1: really as concerned about future strategic threats, and this is 531 00:29:53,680 --> 00:29:56,120 Speaker 1: something that Pentagon's always had trouble with. Of course, what 532 00:29:56,240 --> 00:29:59,440 Speaker 1: it takes sometimes is for a new crisis to focus 533 00:29:59,480 --> 00:30:02,520 Speaker 1: the mind, and even then it's very difficult. I mean, 534 00:30:02,520 --> 00:30:06,200 Speaker 1: you'll recall Secretary rumself before September eleventh, two thousand and one. 535 00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:10,600 Speaker 1: He was pushing this quote unquote transformation agenda at the Pentagon, 536 00:30:10,640 --> 00:30:13,720 Speaker 1: where he was trying to switch from these old Cold 537 00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:17,760 Speaker 1: War weapons systems and bureaucracies and say, we need to 538 00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:22,680 Speaker 1: have a more nimble, responsive force that we can project overseas. 539 00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:26,320 Speaker 1: And you know, things got distracted a bit because of 540 00:30:26,320 --> 00:30:29,400 Speaker 1: what happened on nine to eleven. Although you know, part 541 00:30:29,400 --> 00:30:32,960 Speaker 1: of Rumsfeld's thinking in that Regard was better suited to 542 00:30:33,200 --> 00:30:37,680 Speaker 1: like wars in Afghanistan, to use special forces, special operation forces, 543 00:30:38,040 --> 00:30:42,000 Speaker 1: there were changes to use robotic aircraft, things like this. 544 00:30:42,320 --> 00:30:44,640 Speaker 1: So there were some changes made, but it was difficult. 545 00:30:44,800 --> 00:30:49,240 Speaker 1: His successor, Bob Gates, who was Defense Secretary under Obama, 546 00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:52,400 Speaker 1: and Bush said, you know, this was a constant problem 547 00:30:52,440 --> 00:30:55,080 Speaker 1: for him. He'd be in the Pentagon hallway saying, you know, 548 00:30:55,120 --> 00:30:57,920 Speaker 1: we're finding a war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but a 549 00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:00,640 Speaker 1: lot of the officers or civilians in the Pentagon were 550 00:31:00,840 --> 00:31:04,320 Speaker 1: detached from it. They were just focused on their legacy programs. 551 00:31:04,360 --> 00:31:07,040 Speaker 1: It was very difficult to get people to change their 552 00:31:07,040 --> 00:31:30,760 Speaker 1: mindset in by Regard Digest this Morning. Read Rumsfeld's September tenth, 553 00:31:31,320 --> 00:31:35,000 Speaker 1: two thousand and one speech on Transforming the Pentagon, I mean, 554 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:39,240 Speaker 1: the day before nine to eleven occurs. Rumsfeld is outlining 555 00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:44,959 Speaker 1: a very profound, fundamental reshaping of the Pentagon, which I 556 00:31:45,000 --> 00:31:49,800 Speaker 1: think was largely derailed because you couldn't ask the system 557 00:31:49,880 --> 00:31:53,960 Speaker 1: to simultaneously fight two wars and engage at the senior 558 00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:58,160 Speaker 1: levels in fundamentally rethinking what it's doing. We're still stuck 559 00:31:58,200 --> 00:32:01,160 Speaker 1: exactly where we were on September of the time. Who've 560 00:32:01,160 --> 00:32:04,120 Speaker 1: been very interesting to have an alternative world in which 561 00:32:04,240 --> 00:32:08,080 Speaker 1: there was no war and Rumsfeld was able to actually engage, 562 00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:11,040 Speaker 1: it would have been a titanic struggle. I mean, the 563 00:32:11,520 --> 00:32:14,840 Speaker 1: system is really big, and it's really dense, and it 564 00:32:14,880 --> 00:32:18,720 Speaker 1: really has huge number of lobbyists and the big producing companies. 565 00:32:19,320 --> 00:32:22,200 Speaker 1: The fight that that would have been would have been spectacular. 566 00:32:23,080 --> 00:32:25,720 Speaker 1: Congress also has a stake in the status quo, and 567 00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:28,720 Speaker 1: they don't like big disruptions and the way things work 568 00:32:28,800 --> 00:32:31,280 Speaker 1: because you know, they're concerned with jobs in their districts 569 00:32:31,320 --> 00:32:34,600 Speaker 1: and other connections. So it's not just the Pentagon, it's 570 00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:37,360 Speaker 1: Congress too. But even then, sometimes are some leaders in 571 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:41,640 Speaker 1: Congress who do try and modernize procurement systems and try 572 00:32:41,680 --> 00:32:44,240 Speaker 1: and change things, but it's just a really, really difficult 573 00:32:44,280 --> 00:32:47,680 Speaker 1: bureaucracy to transform. And sometimes you almost need a president 574 00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:51,000 Speaker 1: who could be in office for eight full years, who 575 00:32:51,240 --> 00:32:54,760 Speaker 1: doesn't have a war going on to institute the kind 576 00:32:54,800 --> 00:32:58,920 Speaker 1: of reforms or changes that might take root. Short of that, 577 00:32:58,960 --> 00:33:02,920 Speaker 1: the Pentagon bureau and you mentioned the Taliban having the 578 00:33:02,960 --> 00:33:05,640 Speaker 1: watches and all the time, that same could apply to 579 00:33:05,680 --> 00:33:08,760 Speaker 1: the Pentagon bureaucracy too. They know they can outlast whoever 580 00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:11,120 Speaker 1: is president. They're only going to be there a number 581 00:33:11,120 --> 00:33:13,520 Speaker 1: of years, then there will be somebody new in. It's 582 00:33:13,520 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 1: the same kind of a thing as senior Bush appointee 583 00:33:17,360 --> 00:33:19,720 Speaker 1: said to me one day. He said, the term in 584 00:33:19,800 --> 00:33:25,120 Speaker 1: the Pentagon for the political appointees is the summer help. Yeah, 585 00:33:25,200 --> 00:33:28,400 Speaker 1: that's right. And even then it takes many, many months 586 00:33:28,400 --> 00:33:30,880 Speaker 1: to get the summer help in place, right. They're not 587 00:33:30,960 --> 00:33:33,600 Speaker 1: there for four years. Even they're there for maybe three, 588 00:33:33,680 --> 00:33:37,320 Speaker 1: maybe two, maybe one. I think the average is eighteen months. Yeah, 589 00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:39,880 Speaker 1: I mean, that's no way to run a railroad, right, 590 00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:43,520 Speaker 1: It's not very effective in terms of not being defeated militarily. 591 00:33:44,040 --> 00:33:46,120 Speaker 1: One of the most interesting books to come out of 592 00:33:46,160 --> 00:33:49,080 Speaker 1: Vietnam was by Colonel Harry Summers in which he took 593 00:33:49,120 --> 00:33:53,880 Speaker 1: Clausewitz and rethought Vietnam in the context of Clausewitz's work. 594 00:33:54,320 --> 00:33:58,920 Speaker 1: And he got into it because as the war ended, 595 00:33:59,400 --> 00:34:02,280 Speaker 1: he got in conversation with the North Vietnamese colonel and 596 00:34:02,280 --> 00:34:06,040 Speaker 1: he said, you never defeated us on the battlefield. And 597 00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:09,200 Speaker 1: the colonel said, that was beside the point. Our job 598 00:34:09,320 --> 00:34:12,000 Speaker 1: was to win the war. That's right. And you know, 599 00:34:12,200 --> 00:34:15,800 Speaker 1: you could imagine any number of Taliban commanders thinking or 600 00:34:15,880 --> 00:34:19,840 Speaker 1: saying the exact same thing exactly. I actually got very sobered. 601 00:34:20,560 --> 00:34:22,800 Speaker 1: I think it was in the spring of two thousand 602 00:34:22,840 --> 00:34:26,080 Speaker 1: and three. Rum started asked me to come in specifically 603 00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:29,080 Speaker 1: to advise on transformation. Then I got involved in all 604 00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:33,200 Speaker 1: this other stuff and Killiston and I went to Ireland 605 00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:38,759 Speaker 1: and I spent some time looking at the Irish rebellion, 606 00:34:39,440 --> 00:34:42,160 Speaker 1: both in nineteen sixteen and then in the nineteen twenties, 607 00:34:43,000 --> 00:34:46,280 Speaker 1: and it just hit me that, I mean, the British 608 00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:48,920 Speaker 1: Empire in the end lacked the will and lacked the 609 00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:54,720 Speaker 1: capacity to defeat a very small number of Irish revolutionaries. 610 00:34:55,840 --> 00:34:58,520 Speaker 1: And I thought, you know, the idea that we're going 611 00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:01,560 Speaker 1: to go into a place like Afghan Sistan or Iraq 612 00:35:02,080 --> 00:35:07,760 Speaker 1: and have an easy time is just profound mistake because 613 00:35:07,800 --> 00:35:11,560 Speaker 1: that's not how the world works. And I really left 614 00:35:11,600 --> 00:35:15,399 Speaker 1: their deeply troubled by how hard these problems are to 615 00:35:15,440 --> 00:35:17,759 Speaker 1: try to solve and how some of them are not 616 00:35:17,840 --> 00:35:21,200 Speaker 1: very solvable. Well, I think that last part you mentioned 617 00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:25,440 Speaker 1: that's the truth in some instances, in one as a 618 00:35:25,480 --> 00:35:28,480 Speaker 1: country where we've never been able to accept, like in Afghanistan, 619 00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:31,520 Speaker 1: we always kind of thought that the more troops and 620 00:35:31,600 --> 00:35:33,719 Speaker 1: money we threw it the problem, we could fix it. 621 00:35:34,080 --> 00:35:36,960 Speaker 1: You know, with enough time, with enough persistence, we can 622 00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:39,960 Speaker 1: fix anything. And you know that spirit is laudable in 623 00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:42,600 Speaker 1: the military in some sense that can do spirit that 624 00:35:43,000 --> 00:35:46,080 Speaker 1: there aren't problems, there's only challenges, right, That's something you 625 00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:48,239 Speaker 1: hear a lot in the army. But you know, after 626 00:35:48,280 --> 00:35:50,200 Speaker 1: a while, it's like, Okay, do we really want to 627 00:35:50,239 --> 00:35:53,680 Speaker 1: solve all of Afghanistan's problems? Are we going to really 628 00:35:53,719 --> 00:35:56,279 Speaker 1: transform this country? But this again gets back to the 629 00:35:56,280 --> 00:35:58,920 Speaker 1: original purpose of the war. If we'd kept it focused 630 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:03,040 Speaker 1: on al Qaeda, I think we were pretty successful up front, 631 00:36:03,080 --> 00:36:05,840 Speaker 1: and over time we've done a fairly good job of 632 00:36:05,920 --> 00:36:09,879 Speaker 1: going after the original al Qaida central organization. But then 633 00:36:09,920 --> 00:36:13,479 Speaker 1: we became embroiled in a war in Afghanistan. It wasn't 634 00:36:13,480 --> 00:36:16,560 Speaker 1: a war against al Qaeda. We somehow got stuck in 635 00:36:16,640 --> 00:36:19,879 Speaker 1: a war in Afghanistan that was essentially a civil war 636 00:36:19,960 --> 00:36:23,839 Speaker 1: at some regards, and we didn't make the distinction, why 637 00:36:23,920 --> 00:36:27,319 Speaker 1: are we fighting a war in Afghanistan? If we just 638 00:36:27,440 --> 00:36:30,440 Speaker 1: kept it too we're fighting al Qaeda. I think that 639 00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:32,839 Speaker 1: would have gone a long way to keeping us from 640 00:36:32,880 --> 00:36:36,480 Speaker 1: getting bogged down in Afghanistan like we did in Vietnam. Yeah, 641 00:36:36,480 --> 00:36:39,560 Speaker 1: and one of the problems is and Somalia is a 642 00:36:39,560 --> 00:36:43,600 Speaker 1: good example after Blackhawk Down and the loss of nineteen Americans, 643 00:36:44,040 --> 00:36:47,160 Speaker 1: we pulled out well. In retrospect, that might have been 644 00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:48,520 Speaker 1: the right thing to do at the time, I was 645 00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:52,040 Speaker 1: very critical of Clinton for doing it, but we weren't 646 00:36:52,080 --> 00:36:54,920 Speaker 1: going to gain much ground in Somalia. I mean, we 647 00:36:54,960 --> 00:36:58,280 Speaker 1: didn't understand the tribal fights, we didn't understand the gangs. 648 00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:03,080 Speaker 1: And his story prior to say World War One, the 649 00:37:03,239 --> 00:37:07,600 Speaker 1: level of ruthlessness that industrial countries would use change the 650 00:37:07,640 --> 00:37:10,239 Speaker 1: game because you just killed lots of people, Well, we're 651 00:37:10,239 --> 00:37:12,160 Speaker 1: not prepared to do that. And if you're not prepared 652 00:37:12,200 --> 00:37:15,439 Speaker 1: to do that, you'd better design a strategy about who 653 00:37:15,440 --> 00:37:17,440 Speaker 1: you really are. You know so and so in the 654 00:37:17,520 --> 00:37:19,800 Speaker 1: art of war says you have to know the enemy 655 00:37:20,000 --> 00:37:23,600 Speaker 1: and know yourself well. Somali is a great example of this, 656 00:37:23,920 --> 00:37:27,480 Speaker 1: as you mentioned Blackhawk down under the Clinton administration almost 657 00:37:27,520 --> 00:37:30,280 Speaker 1: thirty years ago. Now for the Pope, this is largely 658 00:37:30,360 --> 00:37:34,239 Speaker 1: under the radar, But we've been involved militarily in Somalia 659 00:37:34,400 --> 00:37:37,359 Speaker 1: for many years now under Obama, under Trump, and now 660 00:37:37,440 --> 00:37:41,000 Speaker 1: under Biden. We send special operations for US is there. 661 00:37:41,040 --> 00:37:43,440 Speaker 1: We have small units that stay there for a period 662 00:37:43,440 --> 00:37:45,600 Speaker 1: of time. We've been flying lots of drone operations because 663 00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:48,759 Speaker 1: we're trying to fight this al Shabab group, which is 664 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:53,520 Speaker 1: a Somali group, and there's no question they're pretty brutal Jahadas, 665 00:37:53,880 --> 00:37:56,920 Speaker 1: but we're fighting them because we think they're affiliated with 666 00:37:56,960 --> 00:38:00,279 Speaker 1: al Qaeda, and there's certainly some sympathies there. But why 667 00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:04,040 Speaker 1: are we engaged in this war in Somalia? Who's the enemy? 668 00:38:04,040 --> 00:38:06,800 Speaker 1: What are we really trying to accomplish? And we've tried everything. 669 00:38:06,840 --> 00:38:09,959 Speaker 1: We've sent troops there to stay, we've pulled him out, 670 00:38:10,000 --> 00:38:13,839 Speaker 1: We've tried air wars, we've tried nation building. Frankly, none 671 00:38:13,840 --> 00:38:16,040 Speaker 1: of it's really working. It may be one of those 672 00:38:16,120 --> 00:38:19,480 Speaker 1: unsolvable problems. I don't know, but this is the kind 673 00:38:19,520 --> 00:38:22,760 Speaker 1: of insurgency still we aren't quite sure what to do about. 674 00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:25,640 Speaker 1: If I had lunch one time with Mark Bowden, who 675 00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:30,440 Speaker 1: wrote Black Hawk Down, and he said he got money 676 00:38:30,480 --> 00:38:31,960 Speaker 1: from the paper to go do this book, and he 677 00:38:32,040 --> 00:38:36,360 Speaker 1: wanted to interview Somalians. He wanted both sides of the story. 678 00:38:37,040 --> 00:38:42,240 Speaker 1: So he goes into Somalia by himself, and he hires 679 00:38:42,280 --> 00:38:46,480 Speaker 1: a local guide and he is staying at the only 680 00:38:46,520 --> 00:38:50,000 Speaker 1: hotel that's open, and he is the only hard currency 681 00:38:50,040 --> 00:38:53,399 Speaker 1: guest at the hotel. And after about a week, the 682 00:38:53,440 --> 00:38:56,719 Speaker 1: gang which has been guarding him comes to him and says, 683 00:38:57,200 --> 00:39:01,440 Speaker 1: we're very uncomfortable guarding an American and we think you 684 00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:06,439 Speaker 1: should leave the country. And so he pretty worried about that, 685 00:39:07,080 --> 00:39:09,440 Speaker 1: and he goes and says to the hotel owner, you 686 00:39:09,480 --> 00:39:12,680 Speaker 1: know I've going to have to leave. The hotel owner, 687 00:39:12,840 --> 00:39:16,360 Speaker 1: seeing his only hard currency guests, says, why do you 688 00:39:16,360 --> 00:39:18,439 Speaker 1: have to leave? And he said, well, you know, this 689 00:39:18,480 --> 00:39:21,000 Speaker 1: gang that's been protecting me said they're not going to 690 00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:24,440 Speaker 1: protect me anymore. And he said they're not the government. 691 00:39:25,920 --> 00:39:29,959 Speaker 1: He said, hire a bigger gang. So the hotel owner 692 00:39:29,960 --> 00:39:33,480 Speaker 1: helps him find an even bigger gang who for even 693 00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:37,000 Speaker 1: more money, which shortens us to stay agree they will 694 00:39:37,000 --> 00:39:39,960 Speaker 1: protect him, at which point the smaller gang let's see 695 00:39:40,000 --> 00:39:41,920 Speaker 1: him alone because they don't want to take on the 696 00:39:41,920 --> 00:39:46,120 Speaker 1: bigger gang. But I thought to myself, you couldn't sit 697 00:39:46,160 --> 00:39:50,319 Speaker 1: in the Pentagon and design this. It's a level of 698 00:39:50,440 --> 00:39:54,439 Speaker 1: chaos and a level of being beyond control that we're 699 00:39:54,680 --> 00:40:00,120 Speaker 1: very uncomfortable with. And I think that we underestimate how 700 00:40:00,160 --> 00:40:03,160 Speaker 1: many places there are in the world though we're not 701 00:40:03,280 --> 00:40:07,359 Speaker 1: able to impose civilization in our terms because they have 702 00:40:07,440 --> 00:40:12,279 Speaker 1: layers of resistance that are you know, centuries deep, and 703 00:40:12,400 --> 00:40:15,120 Speaker 1: our life and death. Well that's right, I mean. And 704 00:40:15,239 --> 00:40:17,560 Speaker 1: the other country that's near Somalia that comes to mind 705 00:40:17,560 --> 00:40:20,040 Speaker 1: like that is Yemen. You know, we've done this very 706 00:40:20,040 --> 00:40:22,919 Speaker 1: similar thing. We've invested a lot of money, a lot 707 00:40:22,920 --> 00:40:25,040 Speaker 1: of time, a lot of troops to Yemen. Most of 708 00:40:25,040 --> 00:40:27,680 Speaker 1: it again is out of the headlines, are not on TV. 709 00:40:28,000 --> 00:40:31,680 Speaker 1: But you know, Yemen and Somalia are two countries where, yes, 710 00:40:31,800 --> 00:40:36,040 Speaker 1: there's a strong Jahadat presence. Yes there's people who are 711 00:40:36,080 --> 00:40:39,200 Speaker 1: affiliated with al Qaeda. And I'm not trying to minimize 712 00:40:39,239 --> 00:40:42,160 Speaker 1: that threat, but we've never really figured out a long 713 00:40:42,280 --> 00:40:47,480 Speaker 1: term effective strategy for containing insurgencies or containing the terrorist 714 00:40:47,520 --> 00:40:50,399 Speaker 1: threat from those countries in that regard, and that's something 715 00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:54,120 Speaker 1: I'm still worry about. It's not just Afghanistan, although certainly 716 00:40:54,320 --> 00:40:56,720 Speaker 1: you know with the Talban and charge there's legitimate reason 717 00:40:56,760 --> 00:40:59,960 Speaker 1: to worry there too, But there's all sorts of countries 718 00:41:00,080 --> 00:41:02,200 Speaker 1: like this. We can turn to China all we want 719 00:41:02,239 --> 00:41:04,560 Speaker 1: at the Pentagon, you know that's important. I'm not trying 720 00:41:04,600 --> 00:41:07,279 Speaker 1: to dismiss that. But the rest of the world's going 721 00:41:07,320 --> 00:41:09,680 Speaker 1: to keep percolating, and we still haven't figured out a 722 00:41:09,719 --> 00:41:12,960 Speaker 1: way to confront or deal with these threats in an 723 00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:16,600 Speaker 1: effective and manageable manner. Well. In the most populous country 724 00:41:17,360 --> 00:41:21,200 Speaker 1: and subsit Haran, Africa's Nigeria and Boca Haram is a 725 00:41:21,360 --> 00:41:24,000 Speaker 1: very real threat, and we don't have any kind of 726 00:41:24,080 --> 00:41:28,760 Speaker 1: strategy for seriously helping the Nigerian government win that struggle. 727 00:41:29,239 --> 00:41:31,520 Speaker 1: As an example what you're saying, I have two last 728 00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:35,920 Speaker 1: questions for you. One is, because you'd already been covering 729 00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:38,520 Speaker 1: all this before you got into the stockuments, so you've 730 00:41:38,560 --> 00:41:41,920 Speaker 1: had years of experience. What was the biggest surprise to 731 00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:45,680 Speaker 1: you The biggest surprise in these interviews, the notes and 732 00:41:45,719 --> 00:41:50,120 Speaker 1: transcripts were just the frank admission of failure, of people 733 00:41:50,160 --> 00:41:52,279 Speaker 1: saying they didn't know what they were doing. There were 734 00:41:52,280 --> 00:41:55,640 Speaker 1: two in particular. There was Lieutenant General Doug Lout, who's 735 00:41:55,680 --> 00:41:58,360 Speaker 1: the wars are at the White House under Bush and Obama, 736 00:41:58,400 --> 00:42:01,959 Speaker 1: and he said we were divorced of a fundamental understanding 737 00:42:02,040 --> 00:42:06,680 Speaker 1: of Afghanistan. He said, twenty four hundred lives lass who 738 00:42:06,719 --> 00:42:10,240 Speaker 1: will say this was in Vain? And for an army 739 00:42:10,360 --> 00:42:13,399 Speaker 1: general to suggest that when he refers to twenty four 740 00:42:13,480 --> 00:42:15,480 Speaker 1: hundred lives laws, of course he's talking about the number 741 00:42:15,480 --> 00:42:18,440 Speaker 1: of US troops have been killed, but to even suggest 742 00:42:19,239 --> 00:42:22,919 Speaker 1: the possibility that those lies may have been lost in Vain, 743 00:42:23,120 --> 00:42:26,560 Speaker 1: that's just astonishing because they never do that in the military. 744 00:42:26,600 --> 00:42:30,759 Speaker 1: You always venerate the sacrifice, no matter what the situation was. 745 00:42:30,760 --> 00:42:33,040 Speaker 1: And I'm not criticizing lou here. I think he was 746 00:42:33,080 --> 00:42:36,480 Speaker 1: being honest. But he's raising this very basic question, what 747 00:42:36,640 --> 00:42:39,200 Speaker 1: did we accomplish in Afghanistan? Why did we have to 748 00:42:39,239 --> 00:42:42,280 Speaker 1: pay this price? The other thing, there was an interview 749 00:42:42,280 --> 00:42:45,279 Speaker 1: with Richard Boucher, who had been in charge at the 750 00:42:45,280 --> 00:42:49,560 Speaker 1: State Department of our diplomacy in South Asia, including Afghanistan 751 00:42:49,680 --> 00:42:52,440 Speaker 1: under Bush, and he said, very simply, we didn't know 752 00:42:52,480 --> 00:42:54,480 Speaker 1: what we were doing. We didn't know what we were 753 00:42:54,520 --> 00:42:58,839 Speaker 1: doing in Afghanistan. So here the senior officials admit that 754 00:42:58,840 --> 00:43:01,880 Speaker 1: we just plane didn't know what we were doing. You know, 755 00:43:01,920 --> 00:43:04,560 Speaker 1: as a journalist, you'd never expect somebody to say that, right, 756 00:43:04,640 --> 00:43:07,480 Speaker 1: you always assumed that they would be self critical, but 757 00:43:07,600 --> 00:43:09,920 Speaker 1: just so bluntly admitted they didn't know what they were 758 00:43:09,960 --> 00:43:14,279 Speaker 1: doing in America's longest war. That's pretty astonishing and it 759 00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:17,680 Speaker 1: still sits with me today like that, and it's sobering 760 00:43:18,680 --> 00:43:23,040 Speaker 1: that not having had a strategy, people at a very 761 00:43:23,080 --> 00:43:26,239 Speaker 1: senior level didn't stop and say, you know, we had 762 00:43:26,280 --> 00:43:28,920 Speaker 1: better hammer out of strategy before we go much further. 763 00:43:29,960 --> 00:43:33,399 Speaker 1: I mean, these things are hard. That's what World War 764 00:43:33,440 --> 00:43:37,600 Speaker 1: Two on the Allied side was done brilliantly, because to 765 00:43:37,680 --> 00:43:40,160 Speaker 1: get the Americans and the British to work together, they 766 00:43:40,160 --> 00:43:42,000 Speaker 1: had to actually sit in a room and hammer out 767 00:43:42,000 --> 00:43:45,840 Speaker 1: of strategy. They couldn't afford to just do everything, and 768 00:43:45,920 --> 00:43:48,200 Speaker 1: they knew it. I mean, they were very very aware 769 00:43:49,120 --> 00:43:52,480 Speaker 1: that you couldn't just throw resources randomly around the planet. 770 00:43:53,120 --> 00:43:57,879 Speaker 1: But that whole discipline has somehow been lost. You see 771 00:43:57,920 --> 00:44:01,319 Speaker 1: this under Obama. When General Stanley McCrystal took over in 772 00:44:01,360 --> 00:44:03,920 Speaker 1: two thousand and nine, he and Obama tried to come 773 00:44:03,960 --> 00:44:07,480 Speaker 1: up with a new strategy, I mean, this enhanced counterinsurgency strategy. 774 00:44:07,520 --> 00:44:10,120 Speaker 1: But in the documents we obtained for the book, there's 775 00:44:10,160 --> 00:44:13,600 Speaker 1: an interview with a NATO official who's saying that mccrystal's 776 00:44:13,640 --> 00:44:18,120 Speaker 1: original strategy review, this seventy page report that was shared 777 00:44:18,160 --> 00:44:21,720 Speaker 1: with our allies, it barely mentioned al Qaeda, just talked 778 00:44:21,719 --> 00:44:25,600 Speaker 1: about defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan. But this NATO official said, 779 00:44:25,880 --> 00:44:27,680 Speaker 1: of course, the whole reason we were supposed to be 780 00:44:27,719 --> 00:44:29,440 Speaker 1: there was because of al Qaeda, So we had to 781 00:44:29,480 --> 00:44:32,600 Speaker 1: get McCrystal to put it back in right. You know, 782 00:44:32,760 --> 00:44:36,000 Speaker 1: it was just even at that level, even when they're 783 00:44:36,120 --> 00:44:39,000 Speaker 1: doing this major strategy review that has all the time 784 00:44:39,000 --> 00:44:42,160 Speaker 1: and attention of the White House and the Pentagon, they 785 00:44:42,200 --> 00:44:45,080 Speaker 1: still lost sight of why we were there. And I 786 00:44:45,239 --> 00:44:47,800 Speaker 1: was shocked by that. So my last question for you, 787 00:44:47,960 --> 00:44:51,320 Speaker 1: because you've done extraordinary work, and this is a major 788 00:44:51,400 --> 00:44:55,440 Speaker 1: contribution I think, which I hope that the professional military 789 00:44:55,520 --> 00:44:59,040 Speaker 1: education people will take seriously and continue to buy your 790 00:44:59,040 --> 00:45:01,160 Speaker 1: book for many, many year years to come. But I'm 791 00:45:01,200 --> 00:45:04,040 Speaker 1: just curious, because you're such a great investigative reporter. What's 792 00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:07,520 Speaker 1: your next big project. Well, so I have another book 793 00:45:07,520 --> 00:45:10,239 Speaker 1: I'm working on about a guy named Fat Leonard and 794 00:45:10,320 --> 00:45:14,080 Speaker 1: he was a defense contractor to the US Navy in Asia. 795 00:45:14,160 --> 00:45:17,920 Speaker 1: He's a Malaysian, and this became the biggest corruption scandal 796 00:45:18,280 --> 00:45:21,120 Speaker 1: in US military history. This is a case where more 797 00:45:21,160 --> 00:45:24,680 Speaker 1: than two dozen US Navy officers have been convicted of 798 00:45:24,719 --> 00:45:28,000 Speaker 1: bribery or related charges. And it's a story of how 799 00:45:28,040 --> 00:45:32,719 Speaker 1: this sort of fantastic character, a Malaysian who supplied US 800 00:45:32,800 --> 00:45:36,920 Speaker 1: ships in Asia, was able to penetrate the Navy at 801 00:45:37,040 --> 00:45:40,040 Speaker 1: very high level. So that's my next project. I hope 802 00:45:40,080 --> 00:45:42,120 Speaker 1: when the book comes out, you'll come back into another 803 00:45:42,160 --> 00:45:46,040 Speaker 1: podcast because that you are fascinating and you do very 804 00:45:46,080 --> 00:45:49,520 Speaker 1: important original work, and I commend you, and I hope 805 00:45:49,520 --> 00:45:51,640 Speaker 1: that this podcast will help sell a few more books. 806 00:45:52,000 --> 00:45:53,800 Speaker 1: Thanks very much for having me on and really enjoyed 807 00:45:53,840 --> 00:46:01,040 Speaker 1: the discussion and appreciate it. Thank you to my guests 808 00:46:01,120 --> 00:46:03,880 Speaker 1: Craig Whitlocke. You can learn more about the twenty year 809 00:46:03,960 --> 00:46:08,040 Speaker 1: War in Afghanistan on our showpage at Newtsworld dot com. 810 00:46:08,239 --> 00:46:11,760 Speaker 1: News World is produced by Gingwish three sixty and iHeartMedia. 811 00:46:12,200 --> 00:46:17,160 Speaker 1: Our executive producer is Debbie Myers, our producer is Goarnsey Sloan, 812 00:46:17,600 --> 00:46:21,360 Speaker 1: and our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the 813 00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:25,799 Speaker 1: show was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the 814 00:46:25,800 --> 00:46:29,120 Speaker 1: team at Gingwidge three sixty. If you've been enjoying Newtsworld, 815 00:46:29,360 --> 00:46:32,440 Speaker 1: I hope you'll go to Apple Podcast and both rate 816 00:46:32,520 --> 00:46:35,400 Speaker 1: us with five stars and give us a review so 817 00:46:35,520 --> 00:46:38,800 Speaker 1: others can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners 818 00:46:38,800 --> 00:46:41,920 Speaker 1: of Newtsworld can sign up from my three free weekly 819 00:46:41,960 --> 00:46:46,719 Speaker 1: columns at Gingwish three sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm 820 00:46:46,800 --> 00:46:49,239 Speaker 1: newt Gingrich. This is Newtsworld