1 00:00:00,840 --> 00:00:05,080 Speaker 1: A happy Saturday, everybody, chuck here. I hope you're enjoying 2 00:00:05,120 --> 00:00:08,200 Speaker 1: your weekend. I hope you're enjoying your year, your month. 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:11,200 Speaker 1: I hope you're enjoying the very hour in which you 4 00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:14,159 Speaker 1: are coming across this. It is the select episode for 5 00:00:14,320 --> 00:00:17,079 Speaker 1: the week, and I'm picking this one because honestly don't 6 00:00:17,079 --> 00:00:18,720 Speaker 1: remember much about it, and I got to listen to it, 7 00:00:20,120 --> 00:00:22,239 Speaker 1: so maybe I'll learn it all over again. It's about 8 00:00:22,320 --> 00:00:25,280 Speaker 1: number stations and it's called what is a number Station? 9 00:00:29,680 --> 00:00:35,440 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff You Should Know, a production of iHeartRadio. 10 00:00:39,200 --> 00:00:41,640 Speaker 2: Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh Clark with 11 00:00:41,760 --> 00:00:46,199 Speaker 2: Charles W Chuck Bryant, and this is oh Jerry and this. 12 00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:49,600 Speaker 3: Is Stuffish seven four two five eight. 13 00:00:50,159 --> 00:00:54,840 Speaker 2: Can you say it in German? You speak German? Don't 14 00:00:54,840 --> 00:00:55,880 Speaker 2: even jog me. 15 00:00:56,240 --> 00:01:01,040 Speaker 3: It's why dry boom ah Steven, Now, can. 16 00:01:00,880 --> 00:01:02,840 Speaker 2: You do that in a little girl voice? 17 00:01:04,080 --> 00:01:06,479 Speaker 3: You're just toying, Come on, do it. No, you always 18 00:01:06,480 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 3: make me play Saint Paly Girl. I'm tired of it. 19 00:01:10,640 --> 00:01:14,680 Speaker 2: Same poly girl. Now. This is apparently even younger than 20 00:01:14,840 --> 00:01:17,920 Speaker 2: the Saint Poly Girl. It's like a little girl and 21 00:01:17,959 --> 00:01:21,560 Speaker 2: it was a live little girl who in the Swedish 22 00:01:21,640 --> 00:01:26,679 Speaker 2: rhapsody number station. It was a young little girl reading 23 00:01:26,680 --> 00:01:28,840 Speaker 2: out numbers and letters in German. 24 00:01:28,760 --> 00:01:30,000 Speaker 3: Which makes it even creepier. 25 00:01:30,120 --> 00:01:31,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's very creepy. 26 00:01:31,760 --> 00:01:34,319 Speaker 4: This is a very neat subject, so kudos to you 27 00:01:34,360 --> 00:01:35,640 Speaker 4: for tossing this one out there. 28 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:38,520 Speaker 2: Well, I've been waiting for it to publish. Yeah, I'd 29 00:01:38,600 --> 00:01:40,800 Speaker 2: seen it in the calendar coming up and coming up. 30 00:01:40,800 --> 00:01:43,039 Speaker 2: I'm like, come on and publish, and I think it 31 00:01:43,040 --> 00:01:49,040 Speaker 2: published on Friday is Tuesday, yes, and we're talking about 32 00:01:49,040 --> 00:01:53,720 Speaker 2: it just as they are completing their decline, so we 33 00:01:53,760 --> 00:01:54,720 Speaker 2: are on top of this. 34 00:01:55,000 --> 00:01:56,560 Speaker 3: Well I think that well, we'll get into it. 35 00:01:56,600 --> 00:01:58,400 Speaker 4: I think that's what makes it even more interesting is 36 00:01:58,440 --> 00:02:00,600 Speaker 4: that it's still happening, all right. 37 00:02:00,760 --> 00:02:03,680 Speaker 3: Numbers stations, number stations. 38 00:02:04,440 --> 00:02:07,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, like you said number, both words are pluralized. It's 39 00:02:07,240 --> 00:02:13,040 Speaker 2: a little clumsy, and number stations are we should just 40 00:02:13,040 --> 00:02:19,079 Speaker 2: come out and say their short wave radio transmissions or 41 00:02:19,160 --> 00:02:25,120 Speaker 2: transmitters making really weird baffling is the best word for it. 42 00:02:25,639 --> 00:02:30,520 Speaker 2: Transmissions and have been doing so apparently since at least 43 00:02:30,520 --> 00:02:31,359 Speaker 2: World War One. 44 00:02:32,200 --> 00:02:32,720 Speaker 3: Oh really. 45 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:40,080 Speaker 2: Yeah. Supposedly, the first mention of a numbers station came 46 00:02:40,160 --> 00:02:43,280 Speaker 2: from a German magazine in World War One and World 47 00:02:43,280 --> 00:02:45,880 Speaker 2: War Two, they were in full swing, sure, but apparently 48 00:02:45,919 --> 00:02:49,280 Speaker 2: they somehow popped up first around World War One, which 49 00:02:49,360 --> 00:02:54,000 Speaker 2: makes them some of the earliest shortwave transmissions in the world, 50 00:02:54,160 --> 00:02:58,079 Speaker 2: because shortwave radio didn't come around at least into commercial 51 00:02:58,320 --> 00:03:01,840 Speaker 2: use until about nineteen twenty. World War One was a 52 00:03:01,840 --> 00:03:03,840 Speaker 2: few years before that, if you'll remember correct. 53 00:03:03,919 --> 00:03:06,639 Speaker 4: Yeah, that's why I didn't even think that that was possible. 54 00:03:06,680 --> 00:03:09,560 Speaker 4: But like you said, World War II is when they 55 00:03:09,600 --> 00:03:11,480 Speaker 4: were in full swing. Yeah, they really peaked in the 56 00:03:11,520 --> 00:03:16,200 Speaker 4: Cold War and they have been dying out slowly ever since. 57 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:18,080 Speaker 4: But I think one of the neatest things is they 58 00:03:18,080 --> 00:03:20,920 Speaker 4: are still If you have a short wave radio, you 59 00:03:20,960 --> 00:03:27,640 Speaker 4: can tune into a frequency and here beep one, two, seven, 60 00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:32,160 Speaker 4: five eight. You know, it's usually like some sort of tone. 61 00:03:32,040 --> 00:03:35,320 Speaker 2: We should mention to Jerry of the future. Yeah, you're 62 00:03:35,320 --> 00:03:37,640 Speaker 2: supposed to leave that beep in because it's part of 63 00:03:37,640 --> 00:03:38,440 Speaker 2: the numbers station. 64 00:03:38,560 --> 00:03:40,840 Speaker 4: Yeah, we beep Jerry to signal when we want something edited. 65 00:03:40,880 --> 00:03:42,800 Speaker 4: But yeah, number station. That's not always a beep, it'll 66 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:44,600 Speaker 4: just have some sort of Sometimes it's a bit of 67 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:45,240 Speaker 4: a song. 68 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:50,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, like this Swedish Rhapsody or the Lincolnshire poacher a 69 00:03:50,400 --> 00:03:53,520 Speaker 2: British English uksh folk song. 70 00:03:53,800 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 4: Yeah, and I'm so scared of thetuff like that. And 71 00:03:58,640 --> 00:04:02,360 Speaker 4: the reason that the transmission starts off with a tone 72 00:04:02,440 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 4: or a beep or a song so you can it 73 00:04:05,400 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 4: alerts like here comes a transmission in your station. Hone 74 00:04:08,840 --> 00:04:11,840 Speaker 4: in make sure you get some good reception because the 75 00:04:11,920 --> 00:04:13,880 Speaker 4: secret code is about to be revealed. 76 00:04:14,080 --> 00:04:18,360 Speaker 2: And that's exactly what everyone is pretty much in consensus 77 00:04:18,400 --> 00:04:22,080 Speaker 2: on that what comes after this and what is broadcast 78 00:04:22,120 --> 00:04:26,000 Speaker 2: over these numbers stations are secret codes. 79 00:04:26,240 --> 00:04:26,440 Speaker 3: Yeah. 80 00:04:27,440 --> 00:04:31,200 Speaker 2: Again, like for the Swedish rhap City station, it is 81 00:04:31,279 --> 00:04:37,400 Speaker 2: a little girl in speaking in German, reading numbers and letters, 82 00:04:37,839 --> 00:04:42,000 Speaker 2: random seemingly random numbers and letters, and then the transmission 83 00:04:42,040 --> 00:04:45,719 Speaker 2: is over and that happens like or it used to happen. 84 00:04:45,760 --> 00:04:49,359 Speaker 2: That's a defunct numbers station now, but it happened on 85 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:53,560 Speaker 2: a fairly regular schedule. There's other ones. The Intension station 86 00:04:54,240 --> 00:04:58,520 Speaker 2: is a woman saying a tension and then reading Spanish 87 00:04:58,600 --> 00:05:01,960 Speaker 2: numbers and repeating them over and over again and then 88 00:05:02,279 --> 00:05:05,560 Speaker 2: going on to the next set and everybody. No one 89 00:05:05,600 --> 00:05:09,440 Speaker 2: can say for certain, but virtually everyone in the world 90 00:05:09,520 --> 00:05:13,080 Speaker 2: from Cecil Adams at Straight Dope to the head of 91 00:05:13,120 --> 00:05:20,240 Speaker 2: the UK's Trade and Industry Agency say these are secret 92 00:05:20,360 --> 00:05:25,520 Speaker 2: transmissions for spies. The whole basis of them was for espionage. 93 00:05:25,760 --> 00:05:26,039 Speaker 3: Yeah. 94 00:05:26,080 --> 00:05:30,000 Speaker 4: And the reason why everyone is speculating that that is 95 00:05:30,160 --> 00:05:33,479 Speaker 4: absolutely the case, which it almost certainly is, like we said, 96 00:05:33,760 --> 00:05:38,599 Speaker 4: is because no government to this day has come forward 97 00:05:39,160 --> 00:05:42,480 Speaker 4: and admitted this or owned this. It is all still 98 00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:48,160 Speaker 4: technically speculation because you cannot point to a factual statement. 99 00:05:48,200 --> 00:05:50,520 Speaker 4: The closest we've ever come is. 100 00:05:50,440 --> 00:05:55,560 Speaker 3: They finally got someone from the United Kingdom, a spokesperson. 101 00:05:55,720 --> 00:05:57,640 Speaker 2: That was the dude from the Trade Agency. 102 00:05:57,720 --> 00:06:02,039 Speaker 4: Oh really, Yeah, the exact quotas people should not be 103 00:06:02,120 --> 00:06:06,599 Speaker 4: mystified by them. They're not, shall we say, for public consumption. Yeah, 104 00:06:06,640 --> 00:06:08,720 Speaker 4: And that's the only thing on record that any government 105 00:06:08,760 --> 00:06:11,840 Speaker 4: has ever spoke about what these transmissions are. 106 00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:17,360 Speaker 2: Right, So the idea that they are government transitions are 107 00:06:17,360 --> 00:06:19,480 Speaker 2: the reason we have to speculate is because the government's 108 00:06:19,520 --> 00:06:23,440 Speaker 2: never claimed them. On the flip side, the reason everyone 109 00:06:23,480 --> 00:06:30,599 Speaker 2: thinks that they are government backed clandestine transmissions is because 110 00:06:30,640 --> 00:06:35,680 Speaker 2: these are pirate radio frequencies, pirate radio transmitters. Yeah. 111 00:06:35,720 --> 00:06:37,400 Speaker 4: My first thing was like, just find one of these 112 00:06:37,440 --> 00:06:39,400 Speaker 4: and look it up and find out what the deal is. 113 00:06:39,480 --> 00:06:40,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, you would think. 114 00:06:40,240 --> 00:06:40,320 Speaker 1: So. 115 00:06:40,600 --> 00:06:44,800 Speaker 2: They're totally unlicensed. Nobody knows exactly where they are. 116 00:06:44,880 --> 00:06:46,479 Speaker 3: They're illegal technically. 117 00:06:46,120 --> 00:06:49,719 Speaker 2: Yes, they're very illegal because they transmit over air traffic 118 00:06:49,800 --> 00:06:55,000 Speaker 2: control frequencies. Well that's a big one. And no one 119 00:06:55,080 --> 00:06:59,359 Speaker 2: investigates them. There's no investigation into these number stations whatsoever. 120 00:06:59,440 --> 00:07:02,960 Speaker 2: So the fact that the government won't say anything about them, 121 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:07,120 Speaker 2: and the fact that the government isn't investigating these very 122 00:07:07,400 --> 00:07:14,520 Speaker 2: blatantly out in the open, weird baffling transmissions suggests that, Yeah, 123 00:07:14,600 --> 00:07:19,000 Speaker 2: everybody's right that these are government backed transmissions used to 124 00:07:19,480 --> 00:07:25,200 Speaker 2: communicate anonymously and in one direction two spies embedded in 125 00:07:25,280 --> 00:07:26,000 Speaker 2: foreign countries. 126 00:07:26,120 --> 00:07:26,320 Speaker 3: Yeah. 127 00:07:26,360 --> 00:07:28,280 Speaker 4: I was about to call it a conversation, but it's 128 00:07:28,360 --> 00:07:31,680 Speaker 4: really not. It's I think on the BBC documentary Saw 129 00:07:31,680 --> 00:07:32,760 Speaker 4: they called it a monologue. 130 00:07:33,120 --> 00:07:35,160 Speaker 3: You're just sending a one way message exactly. 131 00:07:36,080 --> 00:07:37,960 Speaker 4: All right, Right after this break, we're going to talk 132 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:43,119 Speaker 4: a little bit about shortwave radio technology. The secret key 133 00:07:43,600 --> 00:08:08,280 Speaker 4: to sending these messages, all right, The key to this 134 00:08:08,320 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 4: whole thing is sending a short way Like you might 135 00:08:11,000 --> 00:08:15,520 Speaker 4: think in this day and age, why not just send 136 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:16,560 Speaker 4: a telefax? 137 00:08:17,880 --> 00:08:18,440 Speaker 2: Right now? 138 00:08:18,480 --> 00:08:21,320 Speaker 4: Why not send an email or you know, there's surely, 139 00:08:21,560 --> 00:08:27,000 Speaker 4: surely there are safer ways to send espionage, this information, 140 00:08:27,160 --> 00:08:32,240 Speaker 4: highly classified instructions to go kill the leader of a country, perhaps. 141 00:08:32,080 --> 00:08:34,719 Speaker 2: Right, like if you want to activate Reggie Jackson to 142 00:08:34,840 --> 00:08:39,560 Speaker 2: kill Queen Elizabeth kill Norberg. Yeah, yeah, that's that's how 143 00:08:39,600 --> 00:08:41,280 Speaker 2: would you do it in this day and age, you'd 144 00:08:41,280 --> 00:08:43,800 Speaker 2: think an email would do it? No, And you want 145 00:08:43,840 --> 00:08:47,160 Speaker 2: to know who proves definitively that that is not safe 146 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:47,720 Speaker 2: for secure? 147 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:53,480 Speaker 3: Who Jimmy Fallon, Edward Edward Snowden. 148 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:57,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, there there are. If you use a computer, you 149 00:08:58,040 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 2: leave a trace. Yeah, it's virtually impossible to erase anything 150 00:09:02,720 --> 00:09:03,400 Speaker 2: on a computer. 151 00:09:03,520 --> 00:09:05,319 Speaker 3: Yeah, if you think you have, then you haven't. 152 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:10,080 Speaker 2: Plus, if you are, say emailing somebody, you're transmitting what's 153 00:09:10,120 --> 00:09:15,600 Speaker 2: supposed to be highly sensitive even encrypted information over a network. 154 00:09:15,760 --> 00:09:18,320 Speaker 2: That stuff can be captured, like go listen to our 155 00:09:18,559 --> 00:09:21,920 Speaker 2: employer as your employer spying on you episode. Yeah, you 156 00:09:22,040 --> 00:09:24,520 Speaker 2: can't do it, Like you can communicate like that, but 157 00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:28,240 Speaker 2: you're leaving digital traces everywhere. The beauty of the short 158 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:32,920 Speaker 2: wave radio transmission is that again it's anonymous and it's 159 00:09:33,000 --> 00:09:36,240 Speaker 2: one directional. But if you get caught with a short 160 00:09:36,280 --> 00:09:39,079 Speaker 2: wave radio. At least, say back in the sixties or 161 00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:42,880 Speaker 2: the seventies or something, it wasn't weird. It didn't prove 162 00:09:42,960 --> 00:09:43,760 Speaker 2: that you were a spy. 163 00:09:44,160 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 3: Yeah, you done, just tuning into my my stories. 164 00:09:47,120 --> 00:09:49,560 Speaker 2: Exactly, just listening to the BBC World. 165 00:09:49,440 --> 00:09:54,559 Speaker 4: Service shortwave energy radio energy. It's all determined by the 166 00:09:54,600 --> 00:09:57,720 Speaker 4: power of your transmitter. So if you've got a humongous transmitter, 167 00:09:58,160 --> 00:10:00,640 Speaker 4: you can send and any be that big, but you 168 00:10:00,679 --> 00:10:02,400 Speaker 4: can send a message one way message to the other 169 00:10:02,480 --> 00:10:05,360 Speaker 4: side of the world, right, And the reason it can 170 00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:08,880 Speaker 4: travel across the planet is because it's bouncing off of 171 00:10:09,920 --> 00:10:12,720 Speaker 4: it literally is bouncing off the ionosphere of the Earth 172 00:10:13,000 --> 00:10:16,319 Speaker 4: or well, yeah, of the Earth, fifty to three hundred 173 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:19,480 Speaker 4: and seventy five miles up above our surface. It's in 174 00:10:19,520 --> 00:10:24,880 Speaker 4: the upper atmosphere, and solar ionization creates an electrical charge 175 00:10:25,000 --> 00:10:28,840 Speaker 4: and that charge reflects that signal right back down to Earth. 176 00:10:29,360 --> 00:10:33,880 Speaker 4: It's called skywave or skip and skywave. Yeah, And that's 177 00:10:33,920 --> 00:10:37,200 Speaker 4: why you can with a seemingly pretty simple piece of equipment, 178 00:10:37,679 --> 00:10:41,080 Speaker 4: I can send a message to the South Pacific. Yeah, 179 00:10:41,520 --> 00:10:43,439 Speaker 4: from my bedroom. Well, I don't know if i'd have 180 00:10:43,520 --> 00:10:47,920 Speaker 4: one big enough for my Bedroom's pretty big. I wanted 181 00:10:47,920 --> 00:10:51,480 Speaker 4: to see how big these things were actually, you know, 182 00:10:51,640 --> 00:10:53,520 Speaker 4: like if they say really big ones, to send them 183 00:10:53,559 --> 00:10:55,040 Speaker 4: further and further, Like how big do they get? 184 00:10:55,160 --> 00:10:58,319 Speaker 2: They get very huge. They can cover scores of acres. 185 00:10:58,480 --> 00:11:02,880 Speaker 2: Oh okay, a big shortwave antenna, which is why it 186 00:11:02,920 --> 00:11:04,079 Speaker 2: can get very expensive. 187 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:05,680 Speaker 3: So that's bigger than my bedroom. 188 00:11:05,720 --> 00:11:07,719 Speaker 2: You can also use ones that are the size of 189 00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:12,000 Speaker 2: your bedroom. It depends not only like you said, on 190 00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:15,360 Speaker 2: the size of the transmitter, it depends on the atmospheric 191 00:11:15,400 --> 00:11:19,800 Speaker 2: conditions too, so uppusually shortwave transmissions are received best at 192 00:11:19,880 --> 00:11:22,880 Speaker 2: sunrise and sunset. And no one's one hundred percent sure, 193 00:11:23,120 --> 00:11:25,000 Speaker 2: but it has to do with the ion a sphere. 194 00:11:25,440 --> 00:11:28,800 Speaker 2: And because that's where the northern lights are happening. Yeah, 195 00:11:29,800 --> 00:11:34,240 Speaker 2: that's where solar rays hit the hit the Earth's atmosphere 196 00:11:34,720 --> 00:11:38,199 Speaker 2: and they the atoms loose their electrons, I believe, so 197 00:11:38,240 --> 00:11:41,800 Speaker 2: they become ions forming the iono sphere. And because this 198 00:11:41,960 --> 00:11:48,560 Speaker 2: is constantly changing, you can't predict exactly how shortwave radio 199 00:11:49,080 --> 00:11:52,280 Speaker 2: wave will act, but you can kind of guess, well, 200 00:11:52,520 --> 00:11:57,320 Speaker 2: this time the Sun's least active or most active, whatever, 201 00:11:57,400 --> 00:12:01,079 Speaker 2: it has some impact on that sky. What's it called 202 00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:05,160 Speaker 2: the sky? What skywave, the skywave effect, So you can 203 00:12:05,200 --> 00:12:09,319 Speaker 2: communicate with somebody in a foreign country, right, yea. And 204 00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:13,520 Speaker 2: not only can it not be tracked, it's very difficult 205 00:12:13,640 --> 00:12:16,560 Speaker 2: to trace who sent that, where that transmission's coming from. 206 00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:19,319 Speaker 2: It's impossible to trace who's receiving it. 207 00:12:19,840 --> 00:12:20,240 Speaker 3: That's right. 208 00:12:20,600 --> 00:12:23,400 Speaker 2: So you have no idea who in your country is 209 00:12:23,520 --> 00:12:27,880 Speaker 2: getting this, which means that you're broadcasting to anybody and 210 00:12:27,960 --> 00:12:32,959 Speaker 2: everybody who feels like listening to this a secret code. 211 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:35,520 Speaker 2: But the fact is, if you use the right kind 212 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 2: of secret code, no one can crack all right. 213 00:12:38,800 --> 00:12:41,920 Speaker 4: That brings up an important point because you would think also, 214 00:12:43,240 --> 00:12:47,120 Speaker 4: you can hack into the most secure computer system on 215 00:12:47,200 --> 00:12:50,360 Speaker 4: the planet if you're good enough as a hacker. So 216 00:12:50,520 --> 00:12:53,760 Speaker 4: how in the world could sending a coded key like 217 00:12:53,840 --> 00:12:56,840 Speaker 4: it's nineteen fifty five and you're trying to get your 218 00:12:56,920 --> 00:12:59,280 Speaker 4: decoder ring, you know from. 219 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:01,280 Speaker 3: The Red Was it the Red Rider? 220 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:03,720 Speaker 2: No story? No, that's way off. 221 00:13:04,520 --> 00:13:05,880 Speaker 3: No, what was it? It was? 222 00:13:08,040 --> 00:13:08,079 Speaker 2: No? 223 00:13:08,160 --> 00:13:09,720 Speaker 3: No, no, I'm talking about it in the Christmas story. 224 00:13:10,320 --> 00:13:12,240 Speaker 2: It was a little orphan any that was the show. 225 00:13:13,120 --> 00:13:13,760 Speaker 3: I didn't think it was. 226 00:13:14,040 --> 00:13:16,439 Speaker 2: He didn't he didn't care about pirates and all that jazz, 227 00:13:16,520 --> 00:13:19,000 Speaker 2: pirates and smugglers and all that jazz. He listened to 228 00:13:19,040 --> 00:13:20,280 Speaker 2: a little Orphan Anne. 229 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:22,480 Speaker 3: And I'll take it word for it. I remember, now 230 00:13:22,840 --> 00:13:23,559 Speaker 3: do you know? 231 00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:25,320 Speaker 2: But I'll take your word for it, dude, I'm telling 232 00:13:25,320 --> 00:13:27,320 Speaker 2: you it's a little orphan any I will. That's say, 233 00:13:27,360 --> 00:13:31,319 Speaker 2: I'm taking my hat. I don't have a hat on 234 00:13:31,559 --> 00:13:33,600 Speaker 2: right now, but I would eat it if I if 235 00:13:33,679 --> 00:13:34,160 Speaker 2: I were wrong. 236 00:13:34,559 --> 00:13:37,000 Speaker 4: At any rate, you're not little Ralphie decoding the message 237 00:13:37,000 --> 00:13:41,280 Speaker 4: from little Orphanani. But it is actually the most secure 238 00:13:41,720 --> 00:13:45,160 Speaker 4: way that you can send a secret message is by 239 00:13:46,120 --> 00:13:50,200 Speaker 4: creating a unique code that you know and have written 240 00:13:50,240 --> 00:13:52,600 Speaker 4: down on a piece of paper, and your buddy knows 241 00:13:52,920 --> 00:13:54,520 Speaker 4: who has it written down on a piece of paper. 242 00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:56,800 Speaker 4: You only use it once, that's the kind of the 243 00:13:56,920 --> 00:14:00,400 Speaker 4: key here, and then you destroy it afterward. That still 244 00:14:00,480 --> 00:14:02,120 Speaker 4: the most it's unbreakable. 245 00:14:02,480 --> 00:14:04,839 Speaker 2: So what it's called is a one time pad, the 246 00:14:05,000 --> 00:14:07,040 Speaker 2: old one time because you only use it once, and 247 00:14:07,160 --> 00:14:09,000 Speaker 2: it is old. It's from the nineteenth century. 248 00:14:09,080 --> 00:14:11,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, and it's still uncrackable. It is. 249 00:14:11,120 --> 00:14:13,960 Speaker 2: And the reason why it's uncrackable is because you each 250 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:15,679 Speaker 2: have like you said, you each have a copy of 251 00:14:15,800 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 2: this this code. But it's randomly generated. Right, So let's 252 00:14:19,880 --> 00:14:22,680 Speaker 2: say you have the sheet of paper and the other 253 00:14:22,720 --> 00:14:24,520 Speaker 2: person as the sheet of paper, and the sheet of 254 00:14:24,560 --> 00:14:28,280 Speaker 2: paper says, it's just like strings of random numbers, like 255 00:14:28,360 --> 00:14:32,000 Speaker 2: four or five numbers long, and it's just totally random, 256 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:35,800 Speaker 2: and it just covers, you know, several sheets of paper. Well, 257 00:14:35,840 --> 00:14:39,320 Speaker 2: you guys start at the same place, and when the 258 00:14:39,520 --> 00:14:44,280 Speaker 2: person transmitting the message wants to encrypt it, they run 259 00:14:44,360 --> 00:14:47,280 Speaker 2: their message. So say you guys have agreed like zero 260 00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:52,320 Speaker 2: is a, B is one, C is two, et cetera. 261 00:14:52,800 --> 00:14:57,040 Speaker 2: So you take that and you'd get you I know, dude, 262 00:14:57,040 --> 00:14:59,800 Speaker 2: it is mind boggling, Like this is about as simple 263 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:02,920 Speaker 2: a cryptology gets. In it it makes me bleed from 264 00:15:02,960 --> 00:15:03,520 Speaker 2: my ears. 265 00:15:03,440 --> 00:15:05,080 Speaker 3: Because all you have to do is agree on what's what. 266 00:15:06,440 --> 00:15:07,920 Speaker 3: You know, it could be anything, right, So. 267 00:15:08,120 --> 00:15:11,240 Speaker 2: You're agreeing on what's what, but you also have this 268 00:15:11,480 --> 00:15:16,040 Speaker 2: randomly generated code. Sure key, right, So let's say I 269 00:15:16,120 --> 00:15:20,280 Speaker 2: want to say, what up, chuck? That's w h A 270 00:15:20,560 --> 00:15:24,840 Speaker 2: t U P C h U c K. So that's 271 00:15:24,880 --> 00:15:28,960 Speaker 2: eleven letters, right. So if you have your your key 272 00:15:29,680 --> 00:15:33,120 Speaker 2: and you're encoding it, you would use these first, the 273 00:15:33,240 --> 00:15:38,680 Speaker 2: first eleven numbers to encode what's already encoded. So the 274 00:15:39,080 --> 00:15:47,480 Speaker 2: w is say, Y says it's the number twenty two, okay, right, 275 00:15:47,600 --> 00:15:50,040 Speaker 2: and then so on. So like there's a number assigned 276 00:15:50,080 --> 00:15:53,000 Speaker 2: to each letter, so you have that, and then you 277 00:15:53,120 --> 00:15:56,960 Speaker 2: run it through this code, this randomly generated code. So 278 00:15:57,080 --> 00:16:01,400 Speaker 2: you add that and then so you have twenty what 279 00:16:01,560 --> 00:16:04,920 Speaker 2: I say, twenty two, yeah, and then say the first 280 00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:07,600 Speaker 2: letter or the first number of this code is seven, 281 00:16:08,040 --> 00:16:09,000 Speaker 2: so you have twenty nine. 282 00:16:09,160 --> 00:16:09,360 Speaker 3: Yeah. 283 00:16:09,720 --> 00:16:12,800 Speaker 2: So that's what the little German girl reads on the air, 284 00:16:13,360 --> 00:16:17,960 Speaker 2: twenty nine, yeah, fifty two, thirty seven eighteen. 285 00:16:18,160 --> 00:16:18,360 Speaker 3: Yeah. 286 00:16:18,760 --> 00:16:22,160 Speaker 2: It means nothing to anyone else in the entire world 287 00:16:22,200 --> 00:16:25,800 Speaker 2: except for you and the person who has the other 288 00:16:25,960 --> 00:16:29,720 Speaker 2: copy of this code, since there's only two copies and 289 00:16:29,840 --> 00:16:31,120 Speaker 2: you're only using it once and. 290 00:16:31,120 --> 00:16:32,160 Speaker 3: You're gonna eat it afterward. 291 00:16:32,400 --> 00:16:37,240 Speaker 2: Yeah. And the key is that it's randomly generated numbers. Yeah, 292 00:16:38,320 --> 00:16:41,680 Speaker 2: then it'll it's theoretically it will never be broken. 293 00:16:41,840 --> 00:16:44,000 Speaker 3: Yeah. But I mean that's just one example. You could 294 00:16:45,600 --> 00:16:49,440 Speaker 3: You could have five pre code rules. 295 00:16:50,640 --> 00:16:54,920 Speaker 4: To confuse someone trying to crack this code, right, yeah, 296 00:16:55,080 --> 00:16:57,680 Speaker 4: and they don't eat It's not like the simplest code 297 00:16:57,800 --> 00:17:01,080 Speaker 4: is this letter represents this number, this represents this letter. 298 00:17:01,600 --> 00:17:03,760 Speaker 4: It gets more complex than that. You could both have 299 00:17:04,280 --> 00:17:07,680 Speaker 4: agreed upon a book. You have to kill a mockingbird. 300 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:13,160 Speaker 4: I've got to kill a mockingbird. Four eight twelve ninety thirteen. 301 00:17:13,840 --> 00:17:17,600 Speaker 4: Four means go to page four. Thirteen means now you're 302 00:17:17,640 --> 00:17:20,640 Speaker 4: really going to page thirteen. Ignore the four then look 303 00:17:20,680 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 4: at the twelfth line. Then look at the eighth word 304 00:17:23,600 --> 00:17:24,240 Speaker 4: on that page. 305 00:17:24,440 --> 00:17:27,280 Speaker 2: Right. What a one time pad would do is take 306 00:17:27,400 --> 00:17:31,040 Speaker 2: that already agreed upon code and encrypt it even further. 307 00:17:31,920 --> 00:17:34,199 Speaker 4: Yeah, But the point is it doesn't have to represent letters. 308 00:17:34,280 --> 00:17:37,880 Speaker 4: It can represent full words in a text that you've 309 00:17:37,920 --> 00:17:41,040 Speaker 4: agreed upon. True, And it's basically like thumbing through this 310 00:17:41,119 --> 00:17:43,600 Speaker 4: book picking out all these various words to make a sentence. 311 00:17:43,800 --> 00:17:47,119 Speaker 2: Right. The problem is that's its vulnerability as well. Like 312 00:17:47,320 --> 00:17:52,160 Speaker 2: to get a copy of the randomly generated key that's 313 00:17:52,280 --> 00:17:56,600 Speaker 2: used to encrypt this message, right, you have to have 314 00:17:56,720 --> 00:17:59,320 Speaker 2: some sort of contact with somebody. Yeah, So that's one 315 00:17:59,400 --> 00:18:02,680 Speaker 2: vulnerability of it. The thing is is like, depending on 316 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:07,440 Speaker 2: how long this is, as many numbers as there are is, 317 00:18:07,480 --> 00:18:11,840 Speaker 2: as long as as many transmissions as you can transmit. 318 00:18:12,400 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 2: Does that make any sense? No? 319 00:18:14,440 --> 00:18:15,040 Speaker 3: Say it clearer? 320 00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:18,720 Speaker 2: So I said, what up, Chuck, Yeah, that's eleven. That 321 00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:21,879 Speaker 2: uses the first eleven numbers on this key. But say 322 00:18:21,920 --> 00:18:24,560 Speaker 2: there's fifty thousand numbers on the key, Well, we have 323 00:18:24,640 --> 00:18:27,520 Speaker 2: a lot more messages I can send to you that 324 00:18:28,160 --> 00:18:31,600 Speaker 2: we're going through the pad. Eventually, though, we're going to 325 00:18:31,720 --> 00:18:33,720 Speaker 2: use up this pad and we need to meet again 326 00:18:33,840 --> 00:18:36,280 Speaker 2: so I can give you another randomly generated. 327 00:18:35,880 --> 00:18:36,760 Speaker 3: Key at Kinko's. 328 00:18:37,040 --> 00:18:38,600 Speaker 2: That's the vulnerability of it. 329 00:18:39,359 --> 00:18:42,640 Speaker 4: Well, the other fit well and not a fail safe. 330 00:18:42,680 --> 00:18:44,359 Speaker 4: But the thing that makes it even safer is a 331 00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:47,400 Speaker 4: lot of times they would send and presumably are still 332 00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:50,679 Speaker 4: sending dummy messages, so you don't even know if it's 333 00:18:50,760 --> 00:18:53,040 Speaker 4: real to begin with, And there are only so many 334 00:18:53,920 --> 00:18:57,800 Speaker 4: person hours you can dedicate as a government to code crackers, 335 00:18:58,880 --> 00:19:01,679 Speaker 4: and they might be working on a it's not even real, right, 336 00:19:01,760 --> 00:19:04,399 Speaker 4: you don't know what transmissions are legit. 337 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:08,240 Speaker 2: And that is a proposal by a group called Enigma. 338 00:19:08,440 --> 00:19:10,880 Speaker 2: And we'll talk about Enigma right after this message because 339 00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:37,159 Speaker 2: they're pretty awesome. So, Chuck, we were talking about Enigma. 340 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:41,440 Speaker 2: I mentioned Enigma, and Enigma is this group that of 341 00:19:41,720 --> 00:19:45,000 Speaker 2: basically amateur radio people, short. 342 00:19:44,800 --> 00:19:49,480 Speaker 4: Wave radio enthusiast. They really get into this. Yes it's 343 00:19:49,520 --> 00:19:50,080 Speaker 4: a thing, and. 344 00:19:50,160 --> 00:19:53,680 Speaker 2: They started this is pre pre internet days. I think 345 00:19:53,720 --> 00:19:56,439 Speaker 2: it was in the eighties, the late eighties early nineties 346 00:19:56,480 --> 00:20:00,480 Speaker 2: that ENIGMA first came around and kind of coalesced. And 347 00:20:00,680 --> 00:20:04,960 Speaker 2: ENIGMA stands for European Numbers Information Gathering and Monitoring Association. 348 00:20:05,560 --> 00:20:07,520 Speaker 2: And basically it was just a group of these people 349 00:20:07,600 --> 00:20:10,879 Speaker 2: who had all yeah, right, who had all and I 350 00:20:10,960 --> 00:20:13,760 Speaker 2: think they reverse engineered that well we always do, but 351 00:20:13,880 --> 00:20:17,280 Speaker 2: they had all kind of started to talk or find 352 00:20:17,359 --> 00:20:21,360 Speaker 2: each other and say have you heard this weird transmission 353 00:20:21,440 --> 00:20:24,000 Speaker 2: and they're like, yes, I've heard that one, and you should. 354 00:20:24,200 --> 00:20:27,359 Speaker 2: You should check out this frequency on Tuesday nights at 355 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 2: eight pm because it transmits this. And they suddenly realized 356 00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:34,520 Speaker 2: there's this whole community of people out there, so they 357 00:20:34,560 --> 00:20:38,320 Speaker 2: set up a newsletter, they started a naming convention, and 358 00:20:38,400 --> 00:20:42,600 Speaker 2: they started assigning, collecting and assigning names to these different things. 359 00:20:43,040 --> 00:20:44,399 Speaker 3: So like E. 360 00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:50,800 Speaker 2: Designated an English speaking trans numbers station, S was Slavic 361 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:55,200 Speaker 2: v is various, which encapsulates everything from like French to Spanish. 362 00:20:55,880 --> 00:20:59,880 Speaker 2: And ENIGMA really took this thing and put it into 363 00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:05,879 Speaker 2: you understandable terms. And they are basically eavesdropping or they 364 00:21:05,960 --> 00:21:09,440 Speaker 2: were eaves dropping on the spy community. 365 00:21:09,600 --> 00:21:10,560 Speaker 3: Are they not doing that anymore. 366 00:21:10,760 --> 00:21:13,399 Speaker 2: So Enigma disbanded I think in two thousand and then 367 00:21:13,560 --> 00:21:16,359 Speaker 2: almost immediately another group came and said, well, we're Enigma 368 00:21:16,359 --> 00:21:18,280 Speaker 2: in two thousand. We're going to carry this on. And 369 00:21:18,400 --> 00:21:21,879 Speaker 2: that's pretty fortunate because they were around to put all 370 00:21:21,920 --> 00:21:24,399 Speaker 2: this on the internet. Before it was like you had 371 00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:27,879 Speaker 2: to like subscribe to newsletters and have a shortwave radio. 372 00:21:28,200 --> 00:21:29,800 Speaker 2: Now it's like you can just go on the internet 373 00:21:30,160 --> 00:21:34,520 Speaker 2: and listen to all sorts of archives of these defunct 374 00:21:35,119 --> 00:21:36,280 Speaker 2: number stations as well. 375 00:21:36,400 --> 00:21:38,840 Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean they're creepy sounding. I don't like. It's 376 00:21:38,920 --> 00:21:39,360 Speaker 3: kind of cool. 377 00:21:39,600 --> 00:21:41,760 Speaker 2: I've got one for you. We've talked about it before. 378 00:21:41,840 --> 00:21:44,000 Speaker 2: Do you remember the Yosemite Sam transmission. 379 00:21:44,480 --> 00:21:47,080 Speaker 3: Yeah, I'm convinced that that's just a person having fun. 380 00:21:48,119 --> 00:21:58,280 Speaker 2: Well, let's play it. I like that one. I think 381 00:21:58,359 --> 00:22:02,800 Speaker 2: it's full of info. It's cool. 382 00:22:02,840 --> 00:22:07,159 Speaker 4: It's coming from somewhere out in Albuquerque in the desert 383 00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:10,920 Speaker 4: in New Mexico, and it's been going since what like 384 00:22:11,040 --> 00:22:14,560 Speaker 4: two thousand and four. Yeah, And what makes this one 385 00:22:14,760 --> 00:22:18,359 Speaker 4: interesting is that it's not a code, it's just Yosemite 386 00:22:18,440 --> 00:22:20,080 Speaker 4: Sam saying that thing. 387 00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:23,320 Speaker 2: Well, then it's followed by that data burst, yeah, which 388 00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:25,400 Speaker 2: they think is some sort of compressed information. 389 00:22:26,240 --> 00:22:27,879 Speaker 4: Yeah, seah, I don't believe it. I think this is 390 00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:29,800 Speaker 4: a short wave enthusiasts having a good time. 391 00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:33,920 Speaker 2: Well, he's been doing it like, it's pretty sophisticated. It 392 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:35,600 Speaker 2: does it like over and over again, I think, for 393 00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:37,960 Speaker 2: forty seconds and switches to the next frequency and it 394 00:22:38,080 --> 00:22:41,840 Speaker 2: just goes through the band. Yeah, on a then he's 395 00:22:41,840 --> 00:22:43,000 Speaker 2: got a computer doing. 396 00:22:42,840 --> 00:22:43,280 Speaker 3: It for him. 397 00:22:44,040 --> 00:22:46,640 Speaker 2: Maybe if it is just some dude, But either way, 398 00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:49,160 Speaker 2: I like the use of useemite Sam. No, it's cool, 399 00:22:49,280 --> 00:22:54,600 Speaker 2: but it's pretty It's exemplar of a number station, of 400 00:22:54,680 --> 00:22:58,200 Speaker 2: a numbers transmission. There's something that indicates that this is 401 00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:02,280 Speaker 2: about to happen, and then there's the happening, the transmission 402 00:23:02,359 --> 00:23:05,720 Speaker 2: of the secret code, whether it's digital in nature or 403 00:23:05,760 --> 00:23:10,680 Speaker 2: whether it's spoken. And then there it is ended by 404 00:23:11,320 --> 00:23:14,080 Speaker 2: you know, assumity Sam again or something like that. Yeah, 405 00:23:14,200 --> 00:23:17,840 Speaker 2: it's saying here's the beginning, here's the information, here's the end. 406 00:23:18,119 --> 00:23:19,679 Speaker 3: Now go kill Nordburg. Right. 407 00:23:20,600 --> 00:23:22,520 Speaker 4: One of the other cool things about this is, and 408 00:23:24,000 --> 00:23:26,240 Speaker 4: you know, when we were talking about surely there's better ways, 409 00:23:26,320 --> 00:23:31,159 Speaker 4: and the government could theoretically shut down the Internet. They 410 00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:34,840 Speaker 4: could zap a satellite transmissions, they could shut everything down. 411 00:23:35,240 --> 00:23:40,320 Speaker 4: This is almost unstoppable. You can't shut down shortwave radio. 412 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:42,120 Speaker 4: I mean, I guess you've cut power maybe. 413 00:23:42,359 --> 00:23:45,760 Speaker 2: Yeah, well no, supposedly no, I mean yeah, and then 414 00:23:46,359 --> 00:23:49,680 Speaker 2: I guess if people have batteries though in their shortwave radio. 415 00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:50,200 Speaker 3: Good point. 416 00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:54,919 Speaker 2: The one way to combat it is called jamming. Frequency jamming, 417 00:23:54,960 --> 00:23:59,040 Speaker 2: And basically it's just broadcasting on the same frequency that 418 00:23:59,240 --> 00:24:03,720 Speaker 2: these other transmitters, the numbers stations are transmitting on. And 419 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:07,520 Speaker 2: so if you're broadcasting within your country, you're probably gonna 420 00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:10,600 Speaker 2: reach those shortwave radios better than somebody on the other 421 00:24:10,680 --> 00:24:14,960 Speaker 2: side of the planet's transmission. Well, and so apparently Russia 422 00:24:15,040 --> 00:24:18,440 Speaker 2: spent billions or the Soviets spent billions of dollars during 423 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:23,320 Speaker 2: the Cold War jamming frequencies from all sorts of different transmissions, 424 00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:27,080 Speaker 2: and they play things like the sound of seagulls or 425 00:24:27,240 --> 00:24:31,199 Speaker 2: random beeps or whatever. And it was just to prevent 426 00:24:31,920 --> 00:24:35,240 Speaker 2: people from transmitting into Russia. But even with all of 427 00:24:35,320 --> 00:24:39,359 Speaker 2: that money and technology mustard or marshalled against it, they 428 00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:43,320 Speaker 2: still weren't entirely successful. Like shortwave radio transmissions get through. 429 00:24:43,640 --> 00:24:45,840 Speaker 2: It's just too big to fight. 430 00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:50,240 Speaker 4: Yeah, you can't jam the entire frequency of all shortwaves, 431 00:24:50,760 --> 00:24:51,880 Speaker 4: like every single frequency. 432 00:24:53,760 --> 00:24:57,080 Speaker 3: If you have ever heard the uh the Wilco. 433 00:24:57,680 --> 00:25:02,399 Speaker 4: Remember Yankee Hotel Foxtrot that album, Yeah, that was on 434 00:25:02,520 --> 00:25:04,240 Speaker 4: the album at some point. I can't remember what song 435 00:25:04,320 --> 00:25:08,280 Speaker 4: it Yankee Hotel fox Trot in a woman's voice and 436 00:25:08,359 --> 00:25:09,480 Speaker 4: that is a famous. 437 00:25:09,440 --> 00:25:10,680 Speaker 3: Is it code? 438 00:25:11,200 --> 00:25:12,680 Speaker 2: Was that from the Content project? 439 00:25:13,880 --> 00:25:15,560 Speaker 3: No, I don't think so, but we should talk about that. 440 00:25:15,680 --> 00:25:15,960 Speaker 3: For sure. 441 00:25:16,560 --> 00:25:20,040 Speaker 4: That was a project and it was also I guess 442 00:25:20,119 --> 00:25:23,359 Speaker 4: in the wild West days where you're talking about pre internet, 443 00:25:23,440 --> 00:25:25,879 Speaker 4: if people wanted to hear the stuff, some people got 444 00:25:25,920 --> 00:25:31,359 Speaker 4: together and put together the greatest hits sort of on 445 00:25:31,560 --> 00:25:34,720 Speaker 4: CD with a lot of accompanying material about what you're 446 00:25:34,760 --> 00:25:38,000 Speaker 4: listening to, and none of them. Obviously, you can't break 447 00:25:38,040 --> 00:25:40,440 Speaker 4: these codes. That's the thing I find interesting is people 448 00:25:40,440 --> 00:25:44,000 Speaker 4: sit around listen to this stuff but with no aim 449 00:25:44,080 --> 00:25:45,240 Speaker 4: of cracking the code. 450 00:25:45,440 --> 00:25:48,359 Speaker 2: I think some people do attempt to crack the code 451 00:25:48,359 --> 00:25:51,040 Speaker 2: and it's impossible. Well, it's not impossible, and we should 452 00:25:51,080 --> 00:25:53,720 Speaker 2: say with the reason why it's not impossible is because 453 00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:57,639 Speaker 2: if you're using a computer generated random number A computers 454 00:25:57,720 --> 00:26:01,160 Speaker 2: not capable of truly of generating a truly random number 455 00:26:01,400 --> 00:26:04,920 Speaker 2: because computers run on algorithms. Yeah, algorithms are designed to 456 00:26:04,960 --> 00:26:08,560 Speaker 2: follow patterns, so they're just incapable of it. So you could, 457 00:26:08,920 --> 00:26:13,919 Speaker 2: especially today, a hacker could conceivably crack one of these, 458 00:26:14,119 --> 00:26:15,680 Speaker 2: especially old transmissions. 459 00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:18,320 Speaker 4: But yeah, but you still don't know what those numbers 460 00:26:18,359 --> 00:26:22,159 Speaker 4: stand for. Even if you find a pattern of numbers. 461 00:26:22,119 --> 00:26:24,160 Speaker 2: Right, they're still an agreed upon thing that you would 462 00:26:24,160 --> 00:26:26,800 Speaker 2: have to figure out, but it would it makes it 463 00:26:27,080 --> 00:26:30,760 Speaker 2: possible if you could crack that one time pad key, 464 00:26:31,320 --> 00:26:35,600 Speaker 2: then you have a real chance at de deciphering the 465 00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:36,560 Speaker 2: message itself. 466 00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:39,240 Speaker 4: Well, yeah, if you know what they stand for. But 467 00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:43,320 Speaker 4: I still maintain if only you and I know what 468 00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:45,160 Speaker 4: those numbers represent. 469 00:26:45,000 --> 00:26:47,280 Speaker 2: Right to kill a Mockingbird pages. 470 00:26:47,400 --> 00:26:48,200 Speaker 3: Yeah, exactly. 471 00:26:49,000 --> 00:26:52,320 Speaker 2: Uh, well, you were saying the Content Project thing. Yeah, 472 00:26:52,480 --> 00:26:55,680 Speaker 2: so it's a four CD compilation and apparently I read 473 00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:58,640 Speaker 2: an article from the time when it came out, which 474 00:26:58,720 --> 00:27:01,560 Speaker 2: is the nineties. It was like perfect timing because there 475 00:27:01,640 --> 00:27:05,000 Speaker 2: was y two K going on, there was millennium angst, 476 00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:08,040 Speaker 2: there was the X files, and this thing came out 477 00:27:08,040 --> 00:27:11,359 Speaker 2: in nineteen ninety seven and Selon wrote an article on it, 478 00:27:11,480 --> 00:27:14,439 Speaker 2: and this guy who wrote it was like a music 479 00:27:14,640 --> 00:27:18,960 Speaker 2: Concrete Aficionado. So people appreciated it, not just for the 480 00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:23,879 Speaker 2: fact that it's like recordings of real live spy transmissions, 481 00:27:24,520 --> 00:27:28,000 Speaker 2: but some people like the kind of avant garde noise 482 00:27:28,600 --> 00:27:29,959 Speaker 2: that it had going on too. 483 00:27:30,119 --> 00:27:34,239 Speaker 4: And I'm sure the Flaming Lips are currently planning an 484 00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:39,040 Speaker 4: album composed of nothing but messages from number stations. 485 00:27:39,800 --> 00:27:40,440 Speaker 2: Number eight. 486 00:27:42,640 --> 00:27:45,760 Speaker 3: There's a movie that exists that I had never heard of, 487 00:27:46,240 --> 00:27:47,240 Speaker 3: called The Number Station. 488 00:27:47,960 --> 00:27:48,920 Speaker 2: I hadn't heard of it either. 489 00:27:49,359 --> 00:27:52,840 Speaker 4: Yeah, I don't think it was released really. It said 490 00:27:52,880 --> 00:27:56,160 Speaker 4: it from twenty thirteen, and like I know most movies 491 00:27:56,200 --> 00:27:58,640 Speaker 4: that are released, it probably went straight to video or something. 492 00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:04,080 Speaker 4: I watched trailer day. It's John Cusack and Malin Ackerman, 493 00:28:04,800 --> 00:28:07,760 Speaker 4: and you know, they work at a number station and 494 00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:11,080 Speaker 4: he's to protect the number station, but something bad happens 495 00:28:11,160 --> 00:28:13,199 Speaker 4: and they're compromised. 496 00:28:12,680 --> 00:28:14,879 Speaker 3: Right and is who he says he is? And is 497 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:16,359 Speaker 3: she who she says she is? 498 00:28:16,560 --> 00:28:16,679 Speaker 2: Right? 499 00:28:17,359 --> 00:28:20,479 Speaker 3: Who knows? You'll have to rint that turkey to find out. 500 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:21,800 Speaker 2: Did it look bad? 501 00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:25,600 Speaker 3: Yeah? Sure, it's looked pretty bad. 502 00:28:25,800 --> 00:28:32,680 Speaker 2: Sorry John Cusack, Yeah, sorry John Cusack. So I think 503 00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:37,800 Speaker 2: one of the most interesting things about numbers stations is that, 504 00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:41,360 Speaker 2: like you said they peaked during the Cold War right 505 00:28:41,480 --> 00:28:44,080 Speaker 2: when the Berlin Wall fell, and then in the few 506 00:28:44,160 --> 00:28:47,719 Speaker 2: years after that the number of transmissions supposedly just dropped 507 00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:50,040 Speaker 2: off dramatically, although I did see in at least one 508 00:28:50,080 --> 00:28:52,640 Speaker 2: place that supposedly they increased, but I didn't see that 509 00:28:52,720 --> 00:28:56,760 Speaker 2: supported anywhere else. But the idea that they're still around 510 00:28:56,840 --> 00:29:00,720 Speaker 2: it all in twenty fourteen, that there's still no stations 511 00:29:00,760 --> 00:29:04,960 Speaker 2: transmitting gibberish really says a lot. So it says a 512 00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:07,920 Speaker 2: couple of things, and you've already mentioned one. It's possible 513 00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:12,000 Speaker 2: they are just transmitting gibberish to throw off anybody listening. Yeah, 514 00:29:12,080 --> 00:29:16,640 Speaker 2: this one to basically just kind of sap their resources. 515 00:29:16,320 --> 00:29:19,720 Speaker 3: Right, like keep them riskies busy listening to our bach. 516 00:29:20,280 --> 00:29:23,760 Speaker 2: Sure. Another one is that they're keeping them going in 517 00:29:23,960 --> 00:29:26,400 Speaker 2: case they need to use them again. 518 00:29:26,680 --> 00:29:28,320 Speaker 3: I think that's totally the reason. 519 00:29:28,280 --> 00:29:32,240 Speaker 2: In which case that's pretty smart, because that's just you're 520 00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:34,360 Speaker 2: not showing your hand, like where all of a sudden 521 00:29:35,400 --> 00:29:40,640 Speaker 2: an inactive radio station suddenly starts up again indicase activity 522 00:29:40,920 --> 00:29:44,080 Speaker 2: or it's been doing the same thing for ten years, 523 00:29:44,720 --> 00:29:48,719 Speaker 2: and on year seven it actually transmitted a real secret message. 524 00:29:49,160 --> 00:29:51,840 Speaker 2: But it seemed just like the everything else in those 525 00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:54,920 Speaker 2: ten years, you're doing some pretty good spycraft there. 526 00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:56,960 Speaker 4: Yeah, or just to keep that, like you may not 527 00:29:57,080 --> 00:30:00,880 Speaker 4: be actively using it, but just to keep that a 528 00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:05,640 Speaker 4: method relevant, right, Like you know, if you quit doing something, 529 00:30:05,680 --> 00:30:07,040 Speaker 4: it's going to die off. No one's going to know 530 00:30:07,080 --> 00:30:09,280 Speaker 4: how to do it anymore. Sure, Yeah, so you know, 531 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:13,360 Speaker 4: just keep those people working. And you know, they may 532 00:30:13,680 --> 00:30:16,200 Speaker 4: not even know if they're transmitting real messages or not. 533 00:30:16,600 --> 00:30:19,440 Speaker 2: I would guess if you're just saying, oh yeah, yeah, 534 00:30:19,440 --> 00:30:20,840 Speaker 2: if you just hand them a sheet of paper and 535 00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:21,920 Speaker 2: it's just yeah. 536 00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:24,520 Speaker 4: In fact, that may be a pretty safe way to 537 00:30:24,600 --> 00:30:28,240 Speaker 4: do things. Sure, it's like the person with the nuclear key. 538 00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:30,320 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's just a test. 539 00:30:31,240 --> 00:30:34,640 Speaker 2: Who knows, war games. We'll find out in thirty minutes. 540 00:30:35,280 --> 00:30:37,640 Speaker 4: There are also other theories that they are and I 541 00:30:37,680 --> 00:30:41,360 Speaker 4: think some of this does go on, maybe drug runners 542 00:30:41,840 --> 00:30:44,080 Speaker 4: right using stuff like this, because some of them are 543 00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:49,520 Speaker 4: less than professional. Apparently the ones from Cuba or Cuba, sorry, Jerry, 544 00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:50,760 Speaker 4: are a little. 545 00:30:52,880 --> 00:30:55,840 Speaker 2: Comical. Well, they were renowned for just having really bad 546 00:30:55,960 --> 00:30:57,840 Speaker 2: slip ups, especially during the whole war. 547 00:30:57,880 --> 00:31:00,360 Speaker 4: Like you'd hear people talking and laughing in the back ground, 548 00:31:00,520 --> 00:31:03,720 Speaker 4: or an accidental transmission of a radio station. 549 00:31:03,960 --> 00:31:05,720 Speaker 2: Right, Radio Havana. 550 00:31:05,840 --> 00:31:08,360 Speaker 4: Right, Yeah, so they were kind of known for not 551 00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:10,280 Speaker 4: being too skilled at it. But I imagine the drug 552 00:31:10,360 --> 00:31:11,160 Speaker 4: runners are the same. 553 00:31:11,560 --> 00:31:14,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's virtually the same thing. And I mean there's 554 00:31:14,040 --> 00:31:18,800 Speaker 2: absolutely no reason why drug runners couldn't have also couldn't 555 00:31:18,840 --> 00:31:24,360 Speaker 2: also use this. Yeah, alongside the espionage community too. 556 00:31:24,640 --> 00:31:27,440 Speaker 4: Yeah, there's might be as one b as two, right, 557 00:31:27,720 --> 00:31:30,640 Speaker 4: and they get the message, says huh Chipman of Kilo's 558 00:31:30,680 --> 00:31:31,840 Speaker 4: coming in Miami Beach tomorrow night. 559 00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:35,560 Speaker 2: Right, let's go get them kill one. I'm one. 560 00:31:38,800 --> 00:31:40,600 Speaker 4: But I do think there may be a little bit 561 00:31:40,640 --> 00:31:43,040 Speaker 4: of that. I think it's a mixed bag of why 562 00:31:43,120 --> 00:31:46,000 Speaker 4: they're still being broadcast. I think there are enthusiasts that 563 00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:47,960 Speaker 4: are probably just doing their own. 564 00:31:47,800 --> 00:31:48,440 Speaker 3: Thing for fun. 565 00:31:49,240 --> 00:31:53,440 Speaker 4: Yeah, that'd be fun, man, if I was in Guam 566 00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:55,600 Speaker 4: and I could send you a private message to be 567 00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:56,120 Speaker 4: a short. 568 00:31:55,960 --> 00:31:58,000 Speaker 2: Wave Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. I thought you meant people 569 00:31:58,040 --> 00:31:59,680 Speaker 2: who are just doing it just to mess with, like 570 00:31:59,800 --> 00:32:01,440 Speaker 2: the Enigma community or something. 571 00:32:01,480 --> 00:32:03,080 Speaker 3: I think that probably happens too. I bet you it's 572 00:32:03,080 --> 00:32:03,720 Speaker 3: all kinds of things. 573 00:32:03,800 --> 00:32:05,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, I'm sure you're right. 574 00:32:05,720 --> 00:32:07,000 Speaker 3: There's one guy out there, trust me. 575 00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:11,080 Speaker 2: There have been some some actual spies who have been 576 00:32:11,160 --> 00:32:16,320 Speaker 2: busted in this century, long after the Cold War, who 577 00:32:16,520 --> 00:32:22,240 Speaker 2: had shortwave radios and one time pads in their apartments 578 00:32:22,360 --> 00:32:27,160 Speaker 2: or houses. Apparently, in twenty eleven in Germany, a couple 579 00:32:27,440 --> 00:32:30,080 Speaker 2: who'd lived there since nineteen eighty eight and were spying 580 00:32:30,160 --> 00:32:34,560 Speaker 2: for the Russians were caught in the act of receiving 581 00:32:35,160 --> 00:32:39,400 Speaker 2: a Numbers transmission in their home when they were apprehended 582 00:32:39,480 --> 00:32:40,760 Speaker 2: and busted for spying. 583 00:32:40,880 --> 00:32:41,680 Speaker 3: I can see that scene. 584 00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:44,320 Speaker 4: He's got like one headphone up and he's holding it 585 00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:46,600 Speaker 4: with his hand and he's writing something down in pencil 586 00:32:46,920 --> 00:32:51,920 Speaker 4: and his wife's trying to eat it really quick, spit 587 00:32:52,040 --> 00:32:52,520 Speaker 4: it out. 588 00:32:53,000 --> 00:32:54,240 Speaker 3: And in two thousand and one, Anna A. 589 00:32:54,320 --> 00:32:58,320 Speaker 4: Montes worked for the US Civil Defension Intelligence Agency and 590 00:32:58,440 --> 00:33:01,640 Speaker 4: she was convicted of spying for Cuba. And when they 591 00:33:01,680 --> 00:33:03,880 Speaker 4: searched her home they found a short wave radio in 592 00:33:03,960 --> 00:33:07,640 Speaker 4: a code sheet. And so, yeah, I mean that's it's 593 00:33:07,680 --> 00:33:10,720 Speaker 4: still going on, man. I think it's pretty neat. Yeah, 594 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:15,800 Speaker 4: I do too, Like it's old school but almost fool proof. 595 00:33:17,600 --> 00:33:22,880 Speaker 2: Yeah. The big vulnerability is getting the random randomly generated 596 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:23,880 Speaker 2: key to the spy. 597 00:33:24,280 --> 00:33:24,480 Speaker 3: Yeah. 598 00:33:24,520 --> 00:33:26,320 Speaker 4: And they also point out on the article who wrote 599 00:33:26,360 --> 00:33:31,200 Speaker 4: this one by the way, Nathan Chandler. Nathan points out 600 00:33:31,280 --> 00:33:35,000 Speaker 4: that these days, you're likely your one timer might be 601 00:33:35,120 --> 00:33:39,160 Speaker 4: sent to you, maybe digitally somehow, but it's not It 602 00:33:39,200 --> 00:33:40,920 Speaker 4: doesn't like tip anyone off necessarily. 603 00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:44,120 Speaker 2: Yeah, but not quite sure how. 604 00:33:45,040 --> 00:33:48,400 Speaker 4: Yeah, I would think if you're being watched, then an 605 00:33:48,400 --> 00:33:50,240 Speaker 4: email with a lot of random numbers might dip somewhere. 606 00:33:50,320 --> 00:33:52,320 Speaker 2: Right. Well, it used to be they'd print them on 607 00:33:52,640 --> 00:33:55,240 Speaker 2: the kind of paper that like dissolved quickly or burned 608 00:33:55,280 --> 00:33:57,920 Speaker 2: and left no ash or whatever. They were on such 609 00:33:58,000 --> 00:33:59,720 Speaker 2: tiny piece of paper you had to use a really 610 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:04,000 Speaker 2: good magnifying oh like lens to read it. Yeah, and 611 00:34:04,160 --> 00:34:06,000 Speaker 2: you could hide them in like a walnut shell or 612 00:34:06,040 --> 00:34:09,239 Speaker 2: something like that. Oh wow, who knows what they're doing now, Yeah, 613 00:34:09,680 --> 00:34:10,800 Speaker 2: but they are doing something. 614 00:34:11,200 --> 00:34:14,719 Speaker 4: Yeah, i'd like to I thought about getting a short 615 00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:17,640 Speaker 4: I was a little bit inspired, but then I thought, man, 616 00:34:17,640 --> 00:34:18,880 Speaker 4: I've got so many other things to do. 617 00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:21,279 Speaker 3: I don't know if I could do fall into their 618 00:34:21,400 --> 00:34:21,879 Speaker 3: rabbit hole. 619 00:34:22,360 --> 00:34:25,759 Speaker 2: So that's numbers stations. If that peaqued your interest, just 620 00:34:25,920 --> 00:34:28,840 Speaker 2: type in numbers stations into your favorite search engine and 621 00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:31,880 Speaker 2: it will lead you down the rabbit hole of short 622 00:34:31,920 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 2: wave radio. Did you say rabbit holes there where I 623 00:34:34,040 --> 00:34:34,600 Speaker 2: got that from? 624 00:34:35,560 --> 00:34:37,520 Speaker 3: I said rabbit hole. But I didn't invent it. 625 00:34:37,960 --> 00:34:40,480 Speaker 2: No, I know, but it just popped up in my head. Yeah, 626 00:34:40,600 --> 00:34:41,600 Speaker 2: it wasn't my own invention. 627 00:34:41,920 --> 00:34:43,480 Speaker 4: And I think if you have a short wave radio 628 00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:45,719 Speaker 4: you probably tune into these anyway because you're just into 629 00:34:45,760 --> 00:34:49,239 Speaker 4: that lifestyle. But I think there's a website called spy numbers, yeah, 630 00:34:49,280 --> 00:34:51,640 Speaker 4: where you can actually find the frequencies and just go 631 00:34:51,800 --> 00:34:53,280 Speaker 4: right there and you don't want to search. 632 00:34:53,160 --> 00:34:56,240 Speaker 2: For them, right, And if you want to read this article, 633 00:34:56,280 --> 00:34:59,720 Speaker 2: you can type the words numbers stations in the search 634 00:34:59,760 --> 00:35:03,000 Speaker 2: part HowStuffWorks dot com. And since I said search part, 635 00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:04,200 Speaker 2: it's time for listener mayo. 636 00:35:06,520 --> 00:35:09,279 Speaker 4: I'm going to call this a bit on sushi from 637 00:35:09,320 --> 00:35:13,120 Speaker 4: someone in Japan. Hey, guys, and Jerry he spelled Jerry 638 00:35:13,239 --> 00:35:13,759 Speaker 4: right as well. 639 00:35:14,040 --> 00:35:15,239 Speaker 2: Man, it's Jerry's day. 640 00:35:15,800 --> 00:35:17,680 Speaker 4: I enjoyed the sushi episode quite a bit and have 641 00:35:17,760 --> 00:35:21,040 Speaker 4: something to add. As a result of modern food production 642 00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:22,880 Speaker 4: following World War Two in Japan and of course the 643 00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:26,680 Speaker 4: US and elsewhere, the quality and traditional methods of making 644 00:35:26,800 --> 00:35:30,080 Speaker 4: show you miso and other Japanese food items sadly plummeted. 645 00:35:30,600 --> 00:35:33,480 Speaker 4: For example, miso can be fermented and aged a matter 646 00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:36,480 Speaker 4: of weeks with the use of temperature control tanks, where 647 00:35:36,600 --> 00:35:40,879 Speaker 4: traditional dark miso would age up to two years. Same 648 00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:44,800 Speaker 4: goes with other ferminted products like show you Meran no 649 00:35:44,960 --> 00:35:47,399 Speaker 4: longer at sweet rice cooking wine is practically sugar water. 650 00:35:47,920 --> 00:35:50,480 Speaker 4: Speaking of sugar, modern Japanese food wouldn't exist without it. 651 00:35:51,440 --> 00:35:56,360 Speaker 4: Bumi boshi, the sour salty pickled plum is lousy with 652 00:35:56,520 --> 00:35:58,359 Speaker 4: artificial color, sugar and refined salt. 653 00:35:58,480 --> 00:35:59,160 Speaker 2: They're still good. 654 00:35:59,320 --> 00:36:01,960 Speaker 4: As much as I loved Japanese food and culture, it's 655 00:36:02,000 --> 00:36:05,720 Speaker 4: quite heartbreaking to see these centuries of traditional food processing 656 00:36:05,760 --> 00:36:08,960 Speaker 4: supplanted by the Japanese version of a twinkie chemically made 657 00:36:09,000 --> 00:36:11,880 Speaker 4: in process as an alternative. There are good quality Japanese 658 00:36:11,920 --> 00:36:16,480 Speaker 4: products to be had, particularly those imported from Eden. Foods 659 00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:19,160 Speaker 4: just high quality, organic and widely distributed. 660 00:36:19,560 --> 00:36:21,160 Speaker 2: Is this the president of eating food? 661 00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,080 Speaker 3: I don't know. Are they based in Alameda, California? 662 00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:25,360 Speaker 2: Sounds like you. 663 00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:30,520 Speaker 4: That is from Lear in Alameda, California. I meant to 664 00:36:30,600 --> 00:36:32,719 Speaker 4: mention to you, I had the worst sushi I've had 665 00:36:32,800 --> 00:36:33,400 Speaker 4: my life. 666 00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:36,000 Speaker 3: The other day. Oh no, where I'm not going to 667 00:36:36,080 --> 00:36:38,200 Speaker 3: say it, but I'm not going back. 668 00:36:38,239 --> 00:36:40,840 Speaker 4: I'll tell you off air. I don't think you wouldn't 669 00:36:40,840 --> 00:36:44,240 Speaker 4: go there anyway, But it was the rice was gummy 670 00:36:45,760 --> 00:36:49,719 Speaker 4: and really gummy to the point where I ate it 671 00:36:50,239 --> 00:36:52,880 Speaker 4: just because I was starving, and I ate it really fast, 672 00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:54,880 Speaker 4: and I was like, oh, this kind of gummy. Then 673 00:36:54,920 --> 00:36:57,440 Speaker 4: afterward I was like, man, that was terrible. 674 00:36:57,719 --> 00:36:59,840 Speaker 2: Yeah, like you say that to yourself and like you 675 00:37:00,120 --> 00:37:03,399 Speaker 2: smiled in their whole mouth was coated and rice. 676 00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:05,760 Speaker 3: It was gross, man, I was. I was ticked off afterward. 677 00:37:05,800 --> 00:37:08,319 Speaker 4: After I paid the bill and complained the who way 678 00:37:08,360 --> 00:37:09,759 Speaker 4: home to Emily, I was like, I really should have 679 00:37:09,800 --> 00:37:12,879 Speaker 4: said something because that was like they should have known 680 00:37:12,880 --> 00:37:14,040 Speaker 4: they shouldn't have served that rice. 681 00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:15,800 Speaker 2: Well, why didn't you say something? 682 00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:18,160 Speaker 4: Because, like I said, I just shoved it in my 683 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:22,640 Speaker 4: face hole and left and complained afterward, which is that's 684 00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:24,000 Speaker 4: how I do things usually. 685 00:37:24,560 --> 00:37:25,960 Speaker 3: I don't like to make a scene. I just like 686 00:37:26,040 --> 00:37:31,720 Speaker 3: to play the martyr afterward. I've talked about that gummy sushep. 687 00:37:31,280 --> 00:37:34,080 Speaker 2: For two days. Yeah. Oh it was that bad. 688 00:37:34,160 --> 00:37:35,719 Speaker 3: Huh. Yeah. The fish and stuff was good, but that 689 00:37:35,880 --> 00:37:38,480 Speaker 3: rice was just very subpar. They should have known better. 690 00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:41,160 Speaker 2: Okay, well tell me where it is afterwards. Oh, will 691 00:37:41,280 --> 00:37:48,120 Speaker 2: okay if you want to, I guess inadvertently or quietly 692 00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:54,400 Speaker 2: clandestineley promote your business like Leir did with his eating 693 00:37:54,480 --> 00:37:58,719 Speaker 2: foods subversively. Yeah, you could send us an email to 694 00:37:58,880 --> 00:38:01,680 Speaker 2: stuff podcast at iHeartRadio dot com. 695 00:38:04,920 --> 00:38:07,200 Speaker 1: Stuff you Should Know is a production of iHeartRadio. 696 00:38:07,719 --> 00:38:12,040 Speaker 3: For more podcasts myheart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 697 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:13,960 Speaker 3: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.