1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,840 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:12,160 Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,280 --> 00:00:13,920 Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio. 5 00:00:24,320 --> 00:00:26,920 Speaker 2: Hello, and welcome back to the show. My name is 6 00:00:27,080 --> 00:00:31,920 Speaker 2: nol Our, buddy Matt is on adventure as Ben. You're Ben, and. 7 00:00:32,000 --> 00:00:35,200 Speaker 1: Matt will be returning soon. They do call me Ben. 8 00:00:35,360 --> 00:00:39,400 Speaker 1: We're joined as always with our super producer Paul, Mission 9 00:00:39,479 --> 00:00:43,360 Speaker 1: Control decand most importantly, you are you. You are here, 10 00:00:43,400 --> 00:00:46,680 Speaker 1: and that makes this the stuff they don't want you 11 00:00:46,760 --> 00:00:51,400 Speaker 1: to know. Noel hacking, hacking? 12 00:00:52,680 --> 00:00:54,880 Speaker 2: Can you hack it? Can you hack it? 13 00:00:56,120 --> 00:00:59,360 Speaker 1: What's the uh what's the first thing you think of 14 00:00:59,760 --> 00:01:01,080 Speaker 1: when you think of hacking. 15 00:01:01,480 --> 00:01:04,520 Speaker 2: I guess the term has become dare I say, a 16 00:01:04,520 --> 00:01:08,360 Speaker 2: bit hackneyed over time, just because it's like, yeah, it 17 00:01:08,440 --> 00:01:12,720 Speaker 2: conjures images of like bad nineties movie depictions of the Internet, 18 00:01:12,920 --> 00:01:16,840 Speaker 2: of someone with like a weird, like overly bespoke cased 19 00:01:16,920 --> 00:01:21,920 Speaker 2: laptop having a screen flashing access granted, you know, people 20 00:01:21,959 --> 00:01:27,280 Speaker 2: flying through vectors of like weird transparent buildings like pre matrix. 21 00:01:27,760 --> 00:01:30,640 Speaker 2: Maybe I'm mainly thinking of the movie Hackers, but it 22 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:32,640 Speaker 2: was a trope for a while, right, Ben, does that? 23 00:01:32,680 --> 00:01:34,240 Speaker 2: Does that? Come? Does that? Though? Some of those things 24 00:01:34,319 --> 00:01:36,320 Speaker 2: come to mind for you too, You're right. 25 00:01:36,200 --> 00:01:39,920 Speaker 1: No, I always love it in the nineteen nineties films 26 00:01:40,120 --> 00:01:46,280 Speaker 1: when someone reroutes the encryptions right right, the big that's 27 00:01:46,360 --> 00:01:50,960 Speaker 1: the big move. And and it's true that hacking is 28 00:01:51,000 --> 00:01:55,720 Speaker 1: a misrepresented concept in the world of film, Like, weird 29 00:01:55,840 --> 00:01:59,760 Speaker 1: not hackers, to be completely honest with everyone, right, Like, 30 00:02:00,360 --> 00:02:03,920 Speaker 1: we know a little bit of coding, we have phones, 31 00:02:04,200 --> 00:02:08,639 Speaker 1: we get it. But we're also aware that some hacks 32 00:02:08,720 --> 00:02:13,000 Speaker 1: like stucksnet can alter the course of history, and others 33 00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:18,240 Speaker 1: like WannaCry can sweep across the globe at a moment's notice. 34 00:02:18,960 --> 00:02:23,520 Speaker 1: The world of hackings pretty pretty invisible to most people. 35 00:02:23,680 --> 00:02:26,680 Speaker 1: But it's a dangerous world, and it's a very real 36 00:02:26,720 --> 00:02:32,000 Speaker 1: one with genuine potential for harm. And so tonight we 37 00:02:32,120 --> 00:02:37,359 Speaker 1: decided to explore the story of one hacker, in particular, 38 00:02:37,880 --> 00:02:45,079 Speaker 1: a guy named Marcus Hutchins, who accidentally, per his own account, 39 00:02:45,400 --> 00:02:50,639 Speaker 1: stopped a global conspiracy and saved the world. Here are 40 00:02:50,680 --> 00:02:52,560 Speaker 1: the facts. Who is this guy? 41 00:02:53,080 --> 00:02:55,280 Speaker 2: Dang? Yeah? I mean, well, first of all, when we 42 00:02:55,320 --> 00:02:57,760 Speaker 2: think of hackers, we usually think of like some like 43 00:02:58,000 --> 00:03:01,240 Speaker 2: aim screen name type handle right, It's like, well, they 44 00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:03,800 Speaker 2: don't often even get elevated to the point where we 45 00:03:03,880 --> 00:03:06,560 Speaker 2: even like know their names. That's by design, because a 46 00:03:06,600 --> 00:03:08,680 Speaker 2: lot of these folks want to stay anonymous. But we 47 00:03:08,760 --> 00:03:11,400 Speaker 2: do know a thing or two about Marcus. He was 48 00:03:11,440 --> 00:03:15,560 Speaker 2: born in the nineties. Damn you child, nineteen ninety four 49 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:18,960 Speaker 2: in the UKs. Sorry, whenever I see someone born in 50 00:03:18,960 --> 00:03:21,960 Speaker 2: the nineteen nineties, God forbid even the two thousands, I'm like, 51 00:03:22,360 --> 00:03:26,120 Speaker 2: I'm such an old But yes, I know they exist 52 00:03:26,200 --> 00:03:28,600 Speaker 2: there everywhere. Man, They're crawling out the woodwork, and they're 53 00:03:28,639 --> 00:03:32,440 Speaker 2: doing big stuff, no doubt. In the United Kingdom in 54 00:03:32,520 --> 00:03:37,160 Speaker 2: nineteen ninety four, Marcus already was when he came of age, 55 00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:38,520 Speaker 2: or at least to the point where he could, you know, 56 00:03:38,880 --> 00:03:41,600 Speaker 2: click clock on a computer, was already showing great promise 57 00:03:41,840 --> 00:03:46,040 Speaker 2: with computers and early kinds of programming. There's a story 58 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:49,480 Speaker 2: apocryphal or no, that talks about how he was able 59 00:03:49,520 --> 00:03:53,440 Speaker 2: to bypass the computers at his school reroute the encryptions. 60 00:03:53,680 --> 00:03:57,920 Speaker 2: Dare we say bypass the school's computer. I guess let's 61 00:03:57,920 --> 00:04:02,080 Speaker 2: say locks, you know, protection systems, maybe something that would 62 00:04:02,120 --> 00:04:04,960 Speaker 2: not allow people to install outside software so that he 63 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:08,560 Speaker 2: could install game software. You know some kids, what do 64 00:04:08,600 --> 00:04:12,000 Speaker 2: you think it was plaining? I guess in the nineties 65 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:14,839 Speaker 2: it would have been what what? What was a PC game? 66 00:04:14,880 --> 00:04:18,799 Speaker 2: This is waypost Doom and like the ID software stuff. 67 00:04:18,800 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 2: What would maybe Minecraft? 68 00:04:21,320 --> 00:04:24,320 Speaker 1: Maybe you're right, we came up on Oregon Trail. Let's 69 00:04:24,360 --> 00:04:25,680 Speaker 1: be honest, that's true. 70 00:04:25,760 --> 00:04:28,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, And then I just remember, you know, with all 71 00:04:28,240 --> 00:04:30,320 Speaker 2: the ID software games, those were the ones where they 72 00:04:30,320 --> 00:04:32,599 Speaker 2: would send you the freeware discs in the mail, and 73 00:04:32,640 --> 00:04:34,680 Speaker 2: so that was something that everyone would have installed. But 74 00:04:34,880 --> 00:04:37,200 Speaker 2: in the I guess he would have been coming of age, 75 00:04:37,240 --> 00:04:40,120 Speaker 2: like in the early two thousands, so that might have 76 00:04:40,200 --> 00:04:41,960 Speaker 2: been Minecraft. That's my theory. 77 00:04:42,320 --> 00:04:46,479 Speaker 1: Hmm, that's a solid one. I agree with you. We 78 00:04:46,480 --> 00:04:50,000 Speaker 1: we're getting a lot of his initial career and origin 79 00:04:50,160 --> 00:04:55,000 Speaker 1: story somewhat apocryphal, as you as you said from this 80 00:04:55,240 --> 00:05:02,280 Speaker 1: article by Andy Greenberg over Wired, and Marcus teaches himself 81 00:05:02,360 --> 00:05:07,200 Speaker 1: the ins and outs of coding. He starts hanging out 82 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:15,800 Speaker 1: online right in these forums, in these Prereddit areas, or 83 00:05:16,080 --> 00:05:19,880 Speaker 1: Reddit was already around, or things like Reddit, things like 84 00:05:19,960 --> 00:05:22,360 Speaker 1: the chans, So it. 85 00:05:22,279 --> 00:05:25,240 Speaker 2: Would have been more for these smaller communities. Definitely wouldn't 86 00:05:25,240 --> 00:05:27,120 Speaker 2: have been quite in the mainstream as much as it 87 00:05:27,200 --> 00:05:27,680 Speaker 2: is today. 88 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:34,560 Speaker 1: Yeah, he was specifically hanging out with the bad kids 89 00:05:34,600 --> 00:05:41,120 Speaker 1: of the Internet who wanted to flex on malware. Malware 90 00:05:41,279 --> 00:05:43,560 Speaker 1: is like software. 91 00:05:44,000 --> 00:05:44,480 Speaker 2: It is. 92 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:51,240 Speaker 1: A genre definition of things, programs that are meant to 93 00:05:51,680 --> 00:05:58,440 Speaker 1: compromise other machines in some way. He's dare I say, 94 00:05:58,520 --> 00:06:02,920 Speaker 1: hacking at an early age, and he's very young at 95 00:06:02,920 --> 00:06:05,039 Speaker 1: this point still, yeah. 96 00:06:04,839 --> 00:06:07,719 Speaker 2: I think he at around fourteen years old he comes 97 00:06:07,800 --> 00:06:11,000 Speaker 2: up with his first kind of little hack. I guess, uh, 98 00:06:11,240 --> 00:06:12,920 Speaker 2: it is funny that how hack has sort of become 99 00:06:12,920 --> 00:06:15,120 Speaker 2: more appropriated by the normies, like the idea of like 100 00:06:15,160 --> 00:06:17,880 Speaker 2: life hacks and stuff, But back in this day, it 101 00:06:17,920 --> 00:06:20,479 Speaker 2: was it was kind of literally figuring out a weakness, 102 00:06:20,600 --> 00:06:22,479 Speaker 2: you know, some sort of vulnerability and a piece of 103 00:06:22,520 --> 00:06:25,280 Speaker 2: software and then exploiting that. This would probably be one 104 00:06:25,320 --> 00:06:27,560 Speaker 2: of the more basic types of hacks. And he did 105 00:06:27,560 --> 00:06:31,159 Speaker 2: that with Internet Explorer, figuring out of that whole what 106 00:06:31,320 --> 00:06:34,280 Speaker 2: is it like autofill stuff where it like saves your info? 107 00:06:34,480 --> 00:06:37,240 Speaker 2: And I think back in those days it wasn't as 108 00:06:37,360 --> 00:06:40,240 Speaker 2: like authentication heavy as it is now, like even to 109 00:06:40,320 --> 00:06:42,839 Speaker 2: get access to certain autofill type things you have to 110 00:06:42,960 --> 00:06:45,360 Speaker 2: enter a password and use your name and maybe even 111 00:06:45,400 --> 00:06:47,279 Speaker 2: a fingerprints, you know, if you're using one of those 112 00:06:47,760 --> 00:06:48,920 Speaker 2: newer Mac laptops. 113 00:06:48,960 --> 00:06:50,960 Speaker 1: But here's the text on your phone. 114 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:53,520 Speaker 2: That's right exactly, because a lot of times this stuff 115 00:06:53,560 --> 00:06:56,120 Speaker 2: will include credit card information. It couldn't even include you know, 116 00:06:56,120 --> 00:06:57,760 Speaker 2: that would not be the brightest thing in the world 117 00:06:57,800 --> 00:07:01,839 Speaker 2: to always have that stuff, you know, available for autofill 118 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:04,400 Speaker 2: but it certainly is out there now and a little 119 00:07:04,440 --> 00:07:07,000 Speaker 2: more protective. But back then it would be for stuff 120 00:07:07,040 --> 00:07:09,280 Speaker 2: like addresses, you know, for shipping or whatever it might be. 121 00:07:09,440 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 2: And he used it to I guess, send a direct 122 00:07:11,680 --> 00:07:15,680 Speaker 2: line back to him, you know, from the computer with 123 00:07:15,960 --> 00:07:21,280 Speaker 2: the malware installed, to give people's passwords, and. 124 00:07:21,800 --> 00:07:26,240 Speaker 1: He never used it to commit a crime. The forums 125 00:07:26,280 --> 00:07:29,880 Speaker 1: he was hanging out on were all about flexing. It's 126 00:07:29,960 --> 00:07:33,840 Speaker 1: like his version of a skate park, you know, where 127 00:07:33,880 --> 00:07:38,280 Speaker 1: people are doing their halfpipe tricks, right, And he gets 128 00:07:38,320 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 1: acceptance and approval online, and he hangs out more and 129 00:07:42,680 --> 00:07:46,920 Speaker 1: more often on these forums, and his teachers and his 130 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:52,080 Speaker 1: parents notice that he's not doing so great at his 131 00:07:53,440 --> 00:07:55,880 Speaker 1: homework in school, yeah. 132 00:07:56,080 --> 00:07:58,360 Speaker 2: The regular stuff now, because he's spending all his time 133 00:07:58,400 --> 00:08:02,840 Speaker 2: on those computer labs, and much like what happens when 134 00:08:03,680 --> 00:08:06,800 Speaker 2: hackers are convicted, you know, and sent away that a 135 00:08:06,840 --> 00:08:09,480 Speaker 2: lot of times one of the conditions of their release 136 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:12,559 Speaker 2: are you can never go near a computer ever again, 137 00:08:12,600 --> 00:08:16,080 Speaker 2: which always seems so heartbreaking. But yeah, he was banned 138 00:08:16,120 --> 00:08:19,880 Speaker 2: from using any of the school's computers because the faculty 139 00:08:19,960 --> 00:08:23,320 Speaker 2: thought that he had hacked the entire school network, which 140 00:08:23,320 --> 00:08:27,000 Speaker 2: he did deny again and got some apocryphal tales in here, 141 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:30,360 Speaker 2: which is always kind of the way it goes with 142 00:08:30,400 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 2: figures like this, But in the end, it was just 143 00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:36,800 Speaker 2: just the push over the cliff he needed to even 144 00:08:36,880 --> 00:08:40,040 Speaker 2: more reject kind of the stuff they were trying to 145 00:08:40,480 --> 00:08:43,559 Speaker 2: hopefully get him to do, to go deeper into in 146 00:08:43,640 --> 00:08:46,319 Speaker 2: terms of like normal homework and a career and all 147 00:08:46,320 --> 00:08:49,760 Speaker 2: of that stuff. So he stopped, basically stopped going to school. 148 00:08:50,559 --> 00:08:52,000 Speaker 1: He can't blame him, you know. 149 00:08:52,080 --> 00:08:56,199 Speaker 2: Oh yeah, tore a terrible move to really absolutely misguided 150 00:08:56,240 --> 00:08:58,880 Speaker 2: attempt to get someone to not do the thing that 151 00:08:58,920 --> 00:08:59,360 Speaker 2: they love. 152 00:09:00,679 --> 00:09:05,520 Speaker 1: And so he gets pushed away from what we call it, 153 00:09:05,840 --> 00:09:09,800 Speaker 1: we're going to sound very old, his irl society in 154 00:09:09,880 --> 00:09:15,040 Speaker 1: real life society. He gets pushed away, and soon he 155 00:09:15,559 --> 00:09:19,640 Speaker 1: is hanging out full time on these Internet forums. And 156 00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:24,800 Speaker 1: you know these are forbes associated with what we call 157 00:09:25,080 --> 00:09:28,720 Speaker 1: pen testing, if we're being correct, penetration testing. 158 00:09:28,800 --> 00:09:31,920 Speaker 2: Ah yeah, isn't familiar with that one. And it's like 159 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:33,640 Speaker 2: you said, I mean a lot of it was sort 160 00:09:33,640 --> 00:09:36,000 Speaker 2: of flexes, like here's see what I can do, but 161 00:09:36,040 --> 00:09:38,880 Speaker 2: it wasn't necessarily these folks were colluding, you know, to 162 00:09:39,360 --> 00:09:43,880 Speaker 2: plan large scale Internet heists. But as we know, in 163 00:09:44,000 --> 00:09:47,280 Speaker 2: order to know what the bad guys are doing and 164 00:09:47,280 --> 00:09:49,640 Speaker 2: how to protect against what they're doing, you got to 165 00:09:49,720 --> 00:09:52,200 Speaker 2: kind of have the same bag of tricks. So this 166 00:09:52,280 --> 00:09:55,160 Speaker 2: really is kind of an interesting early, you know, kind 167 00:09:55,200 --> 00:09:58,320 Speaker 2: of entry point into what ultimately led to him being 168 00:09:58,360 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 2: as known as he became. 169 00:10:00,960 --> 00:10:05,440 Speaker 1: Just so, and you know, at this point, if you're 170 00:10:05,559 --> 00:10:09,240 Speaker 1: hanging out with those bad kids on that Internet halfpipe, 171 00:10:09,920 --> 00:10:13,360 Speaker 1: the feds are gonna come shut you down. The squares 172 00:10:13,400 --> 00:10:17,240 Speaker 1: are gonna come in, and authorities will clamp down on 173 00:10:17,240 --> 00:10:20,560 Speaker 1: one site. But they're essentially playing whack them hole, which 174 00:10:20,600 --> 00:10:25,360 Speaker 1: means that the users of these forums will transfer to 175 00:10:25,720 --> 00:10:30,959 Speaker 1: another site. So the forum that our young friend Hutchens 176 00:10:31,000 --> 00:10:34,680 Speaker 1: hangs out at gets closed down, gets shut down, so 177 00:10:34,760 --> 00:10:38,120 Speaker 1: he moves to another spot it's cold in a burst 178 00:10:38,120 --> 00:10:43,600 Speaker 1: of creativity hack forums, no one well no, no one 179 00:10:43,640 --> 00:10:45,280 Speaker 1: will ever figure that one out. 180 00:10:45,840 --> 00:10:48,560 Speaker 2: Well, how man, isn't the smarter move instead of like 181 00:10:48,679 --> 00:10:51,120 Speaker 2: cracking down and like tipping your hand just to kind 182 00:10:51,120 --> 00:10:53,920 Speaker 2: of lurk and see what you can see. I guess 183 00:10:54,200 --> 00:10:56,120 Speaker 2: they probably do that for a while and then get 184 00:10:56,120 --> 00:10:58,400 Speaker 2: to a point where they're like, Okay, we've exhausted this one. 185 00:10:58,440 --> 00:11:00,400 Speaker 2: We need to I just wonder it will be the 186 00:11:00,440 --> 00:11:02,640 Speaker 2: impetus for the cops coming in and breaking them up, 187 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:05,840 Speaker 2: or learning these folks to their presence, or if it's 188 00:11:05,880 --> 00:11:08,960 Speaker 2: more like they overplayed their hand and the kids are like, 189 00:11:09,000 --> 00:11:12,559 Speaker 2: oh no, we've been made. We need to move on right. 190 00:11:13,040 --> 00:11:17,600 Speaker 1: Right right. We've got a great quote from Wired from 191 00:11:17,760 --> 00:11:22,120 Speaker 1: our buddy Andy writing here, and he talks about you 192 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:24,679 Speaker 1: know what this makes me think of. It makes me 193 00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:31,720 Speaker 1: think of walking into a hotel pool or something like that, 194 00:11:31,760 --> 00:11:35,440 Speaker 1: where you have the steps at first where you dip 195 00:11:35,520 --> 00:11:39,480 Speaker 1: your toes in, and our buddy Hutchins is walking in 196 00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:46,280 Speaker 1: deeper and deeper water. Wired describes hack forums in a 197 00:11:46,360 --> 00:11:47,560 Speaker 1: pretty interesting way. 198 00:11:48,080 --> 00:11:51,800 Speaker 2: Yeah. He describes the members as being a shade more 199 00:11:51,840 --> 00:11:54,840 Speaker 2: advanced in their skills and a shade Murkier in their ethics. 200 00:11:55,280 --> 00:11:58,760 Speaker 2: A lord of the flies collection of young hackers seeking 201 00:11:58,760 --> 00:12:03,360 Speaker 2: to impress one another with nihilistic feats of exploitation. They're 202 00:12:03,400 --> 00:12:06,920 Speaker 2: in lies of the flex. We were talking about the minimum 203 00:12:07,080 --> 00:12:10,880 Speaker 2: table stakes to gain respect from the hack forums crowd 204 00:12:10,920 --> 00:12:14,080 Speaker 2: was possession of a botnet, a collection of hundreds of 205 00:12:14,080 --> 00:12:18,480 Speaker 2: thousands of malware infected computers that obey a hacker's commands, 206 00:12:18,800 --> 00:12:21,880 Speaker 2: capable of directing junk traffic at rivals to flood their 207 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:24,480 Speaker 2: web servers and knock them offline. What's known as a 208 00:12:24,520 --> 00:12:28,400 Speaker 2: distributed denial of service or d DOS attack. Pretty common 209 00:12:29,280 --> 00:12:31,840 Speaker 2: technique we've heard that, you know, make the news plenty, 210 00:12:31,920 --> 00:12:34,240 Speaker 2: Like if I'm not mistaken, we were all just in 211 00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:37,880 Speaker 2: Las Vegas recently, and I think they were a victim 212 00:12:37,880 --> 00:12:40,960 Speaker 2: of a hack that I think involved at least in 213 00:12:41,120 --> 00:12:44,520 Speaker 2: part d DOS attacks. Because all of their servers were overloaded, 214 00:12:44,760 --> 00:12:47,320 Speaker 2: they couldn't talk to each other, the MGM hotels and 215 00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:49,760 Speaker 2: the lights wouldn't work in the room. And when you 216 00:12:49,800 --> 00:12:53,000 Speaker 2: have a system that's so interconnected like that, these things 217 00:12:53,080 --> 00:12:54,160 Speaker 2: can be crippling, right. 218 00:12:54,720 --> 00:13:00,680 Speaker 1: You nailed it, Yeah, absolutely, And it's said that Matt 219 00:13:00,760 --> 00:13:04,800 Speaker 1: is on adventures, because that's one of the things, as 220 00:13:04,840 --> 00:13:08,400 Speaker 1: you will call that he brought up to us before 221 00:13:08,440 --> 00:13:13,360 Speaker 1: you and Paul and I traveled to Las Vegas. Matt 222 00:13:13,440 --> 00:13:17,040 Speaker 1: was I'm not gonna do an impression of Matt because 223 00:13:17,080 --> 00:13:17,559 Speaker 1: we all know. 224 00:13:18,160 --> 00:13:20,160 Speaker 2: It's not possible. He's too singular, that. 225 00:13:21,200 --> 00:13:25,400 Speaker 1: He's such a voice. Yeah, and uh, Matt, just who 226 00:13:25,440 --> 00:13:29,320 Speaker 1: everyone knows. Matt was telling us before we went to 227 00:13:29,400 --> 00:13:34,080 Speaker 1: Vegas about the hack. I think he was the first 228 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:37,480 Speaker 1: one who clocked it, and he was saying, guys, we 229 00:13:37,600 --> 00:13:42,240 Speaker 1: gotta be careful. He asked us if we would bring 230 00:13:42,360 --> 00:13:47,840 Speaker 1: burner phones, and uh, and be honest with you, I 231 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:50,600 Speaker 1: did not bring a burner phone. I used my real 232 00:13:50,679 --> 00:13:53,080 Speaker 1: phone in Las Vegas. 233 00:13:52,840 --> 00:13:58,040 Speaker 2: But not your real name. You were assigned one by 234 00:13:58,080 --> 00:14:02,640 Speaker 2: hotel management. Yeah, but it's crazy how effective some of 235 00:14:02,640 --> 00:14:05,240 Speaker 2: these simpler kind of techniques can be. And I guess 236 00:14:05,240 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 2: I didn't really understand the idea of this botnet, Like 237 00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:11,439 Speaker 2: it's basically like these are these are these computers who 238 00:14:11,520 --> 00:14:14,440 Speaker 2: don't know they've been had, who don't know they've been infected, 239 00:14:14,440 --> 00:14:17,400 Speaker 2: and are now like under your sway like that you know, 240 00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:20,440 Speaker 2: sorcerer's apprentice in the brooms kind of scenario. Right. 241 00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:27,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, and this kid, Marcus Hutchins is a child at 242 00:14:27,320 --> 00:14:31,040 Speaker 1: this point, he's fifteen years old, he's all in. He 243 00:14:31,160 --> 00:14:37,080 Speaker 1: creates a botnet, and what he does is he suckers 244 00:14:37,120 --> 00:14:42,760 Speaker 1: people via fake files or misleading files uploaded to bit 245 00:14:42,840 --> 00:14:49,240 Speaker 1: torrent sites. For those of us in a certain demographic, 246 00:14:49,560 --> 00:14:53,000 Speaker 1: you might think of LimeWire or things like that. 247 00:14:53,920 --> 00:14:56,560 Speaker 2: Oh dude, but I mean bit torrent. You know, you 248 00:14:56,560 --> 00:14:58,600 Speaker 2: would get it through like the Pirate Bay or whatever, 249 00:14:58,760 --> 00:15:00,840 Speaker 2: or like there were other different ones. And the way 250 00:15:00,880 --> 00:15:04,240 Speaker 2: BitTorrent files work is they're like broken up into all 251 00:15:04,240 --> 00:15:07,280 Speaker 2: these little micro pieces that are then kind of reassembled. 252 00:15:07,800 --> 00:15:10,480 Speaker 2: So I imagine this is a very smart way of 253 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:14,000 Speaker 2: using a technology that is a little bit you know, 254 00:15:14,240 --> 00:15:17,440 Speaker 2: more underground internety. But it's also like, you know, we 255 00:15:17,520 --> 00:15:20,240 Speaker 2: knew tons of people that weren't mega hacker, people that 256 00:15:20,280 --> 00:15:23,760 Speaker 2: were like using bittorn all the time. It was super mainstream. 257 00:15:23,800 --> 00:15:26,320 Speaker 2: So it would make sense that he amassed a pretty 258 00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:31,400 Speaker 2: significant bought army by exploiting these BitTorrent sites for sure. 259 00:15:31,720 --> 00:15:36,240 Speaker 1: And we all remember, let's be honest, whether you are 260 00:15:36,600 --> 00:15:41,840 Speaker 1: a street laced NRO person or whether you have a 261 00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:45,880 Speaker 1: little bit of r Maybe in your college days, you 262 00:15:45,960 --> 00:15:51,080 Speaker 1: remember the old say they said, look, you're never gonna 263 00:15:51,120 --> 00:15:54,720 Speaker 1: get caught if you're downloading the files. You're only in 264 00:15:54,800 --> 00:15:58,720 Speaker 1: trouble if you're the one uploading them or sharing them, 265 00:15:58,840 --> 00:16:01,680 Speaker 1: right and yeah, and so it's true. 266 00:16:01,520 --> 00:16:03,440 Speaker 2: For some of them. But like the bit torrent ones, 267 00:16:03,560 --> 00:16:06,720 Speaker 2: just by participating you were sort of part of It 268 00:16:06,720 --> 00:16:08,760 Speaker 2: was harder to track down individuals, I think because it 269 00:16:08,840 --> 00:16:11,920 Speaker 2: was like by downloading the file, you were also participating 270 00:16:11,920 --> 00:16:14,400 Speaker 2: in the upload. But I got a few of those 271 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:20,000 Speaker 2: Web Sheriff no no infringement notices back in the day. 272 00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:20,960 Speaker 2: I sure did you know what? 273 00:16:20,960 --> 00:16:21,120 Speaker 1: It was? 274 00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:24,480 Speaker 2: Usually about HBO related content. It was usually about like 275 00:16:24,480 --> 00:16:27,560 Speaker 2: Sopranos episodes or episodes of sixty And you'd get this 276 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 2: like form letter directed at your ISP, and then they 277 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:35,280 Speaker 2: would come to you and it was like, hey, fly right, buddy, 278 00:16:35,880 --> 00:16:37,720 Speaker 2: or things are going to go poorly for you. You can 279 00:16:37,760 --> 00:16:40,040 Speaker 2: get banned from your ISP. At the very least, that's 280 00:16:40,040 --> 00:16:40,800 Speaker 2: probably what happened. 281 00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:46,040 Speaker 1: Oh geez, well, this doesn't hit our boy, Hutchins, our 282 00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:49,520 Speaker 1: young fifteen year old Hutchins. He has a bought army. 283 00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:53,680 Speaker 1: It's like eight thousand computers and he starts setting up 284 00:16:53,720 --> 00:17:00,400 Speaker 1: his own business. He has one called ghost Hosting. The 285 00:17:00,520 --> 00:17:05,879 Speaker 1: first O is zero, get it because it's leaked to. 286 00:17:05,920 --> 00:17:11,000 Speaker 2: Speak, Yeah, very aim Internetti as well. This is a 287 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:14,280 Speaker 2: server kind of like web services deal, you know, kind 288 00:17:14,280 --> 00:17:17,080 Speaker 2: of like we know now is like AWS Amazon web 289 00:17:17,119 --> 00:17:21,800 Speaker 2: services for hosting sites, much smaller and much more niche 290 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:25,280 Speaker 2: This was specifically for hosting sites for hack forum members 291 00:17:25,440 --> 00:17:30,639 Speaker 2: that allowed them to shield their IP addresses from anyone 292 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:33,560 Speaker 2: who would try to, you know, find where the root 293 00:17:33,880 --> 00:17:39,280 Speaker 2: of such sites might be. But he had some caveats. 294 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:41,680 Speaker 2: He would allow people to post anything other than child 295 00:17:41,720 --> 00:17:44,800 Speaker 2: sexual abuse material. It's good on him for that, of course, 296 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:47,360 Speaker 2: because we know a lot of times these masked you know, 297 00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:50,640 Speaker 2: web sites or servers. That's a big part of it. 298 00:17:50,760 --> 00:17:52,840 Speaker 2: But what he was doing essentially was like sort of 299 00:17:52,880 --> 00:17:56,760 Speaker 2: a smaller scale silk Road dark web thing, but I 300 00:17:56,760 --> 00:18:00,000 Speaker 2: don't think you needed like a tour browser to access. 301 00:18:00,040 --> 00:18:02,840 Speaker 2: Think it wasn't like exactly dark Road silk Web, but 302 00:18:03,080 --> 00:18:05,080 Speaker 2: it was in that vein the idea that you couldn't 303 00:18:05,119 --> 00:18:08,359 Speaker 2: necessarily figure out where it was coming from, and maybe 304 00:18:08,400 --> 00:18:10,480 Speaker 2: there was even a way for users to be encrypted 305 00:18:10,480 --> 00:18:11,720 Speaker 2: so they couldn't be tracked either. 306 00:18:12,280 --> 00:18:15,639 Speaker 1: Yeah, it was all about anonymity, and he had these 307 00:18:15,840 --> 00:18:21,040 Speaker 1: ethical lines. He kept evolving his skills. He learned how 308 00:18:21,080 --> 00:18:27,560 Speaker 1: to analyze and improve other hackers software, especially their rootkits. 309 00:18:27,880 --> 00:18:31,480 Speaker 1: Rootkits are a thing that will change the operating system 310 00:18:31,680 --> 00:18:35,359 Speaker 1: of a computer such that it can hide itself. And 311 00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:40,400 Speaker 1: people were massively impressed on these forums. And by the way, 312 00:18:40,520 --> 00:18:44,640 Speaker 1: at this point, none of these folks on these forums 313 00:18:45,280 --> 00:18:49,440 Speaker 1: know anything about each other. They're very careful with it. 314 00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:53,920 Speaker 1: And this guy, our guy Mark, he starts taking these 315 00:18:54,000 --> 00:19:00,640 Speaker 1: gigs writing what the authorities will call malware, and he's 316 00:19:00,720 --> 00:19:07,480 Speaker 1: picking up little side joints, you know, He's like, hey, 317 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,120 Speaker 1: I know how to turn a piece of code here, 318 00:19:10,440 --> 00:19:15,360 Speaker 1: and that's where he meets someone calling themselves. Theny things 319 00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:21,800 Speaker 1: turn dark. It eventually leads him to something terrible called 320 00:19:22,160 --> 00:19:22,919 Speaker 1: Wanna Cry. 321 00:19:23,520 --> 00:19:26,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's interesting to kind of get the trajectory of 322 00:19:26,800 --> 00:19:30,840 Speaker 2: this kid and his sort of like upbringing or like 323 00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:33,080 Speaker 2: his rise in this kind of culture, because at this 324 00:19:33,200 --> 00:19:36,159 Speaker 2: point he's like a teenager, you know, he's basically kind 325 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:39,520 Speaker 2: of like a snotty teenager who just kind of maybe 326 00:19:39,560 --> 00:19:42,280 Speaker 2: wants to creak a little bit of chaos, you know, 327 00:19:42,320 --> 00:19:44,960 Speaker 2: but he does seem to have a moral code, which 328 00:19:44,960 --> 00:19:46,960 Speaker 2: I think is important. And I think what we're gonna 329 00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:50,600 Speaker 2: see is a turn where he's like, Ooh, with great 330 00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:53,639 Speaker 2: power comes great responsibility kind of vibes, you know. And 331 00:19:53,680 --> 00:19:56,439 Speaker 2: it just took him meeting the super villain kind of 332 00:19:56,560 --> 00:19:59,840 Speaker 2: our story to make that realization. But maybe I'm over 333 00:20:00,080 --> 00:20:03,720 Speaker 2: over stating the case. But it's a really interesting story. 334 00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:07,680 Speaker 1: You're one hundred percent correct, Noal, I propose we pause 335 00:20:07,920 --> 00:20:11,159 Speaker 1: for a word from our sponsor, which will hopefully be 336 00:20:11,280 --> 00:20:12,600 Speaker 1: a VPN company. 337 00:20:12,840 --> 00:20:14,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, no doubt. 338 00:20:20,440 --> 00:20:27,880 Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy. So this guy Vinnie contacts Marcus. 339 00:20:27,920 --> 00:20:33,359 Speaker 1: Marcus is about sixteen at this point, and Vinnie is 340 00:20:33,400 --> 00:20:36,840 Speaker 1: a stranger on the Internet. Marcus does not know him 341 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:41,560 Speaker 1: from a Canna paint. And Vinnie goes to Marcus and says, 342 00:20:41,600 --> 00:20:46,000 Speaker 1: I'll give you a job make a new rootkit for me, kiddo, 343 00:20:47,000 --> 00:20:52,560 Speaker 1: and I'll sell it all over the cool people Internet 344 00:20:52,640 --> 00:20:56,199 Speaker 1: and you will get fifty percent of the profits. 345 00:20:56,600 --> 00:21:00,440 Speaker 2: Dude, sounds like a deal. I'm sixteen on I'm doing 346 00:21:00,440 --> 00:21:02,760 Speaker 2: this for fun largely anyway, and I'm starting to make 347 00:21:02,800 --> 00:21:06,639 Speaker 2: a little extra money, you know, proving the principle and 348 00:21:06,760 --> 00:21:09,320 Speaker 2: mom and dad wrong, you know, why wouldn't I hop 349 00:21:09,359 --> 00:21:12,880 Speaker 2: on this train? So a little more than halfway through 350 00:21:12,920 --> 00:21:16,040 Speaker 2: twenty twelve, they get this whole deal up and running 351 00:21:16,119 --> 00:21:18,760 Speaker 2: something called a upas kit, which I believe is named 352 00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:23,080 Speaker 2: after a poison tree. So maybe it's pronounced upus upus. 353 00:21:23,600 --> 00:21:28,680 Speaker 1: Yeah. Look, I am also not one hundred percent on 354 00:21:28,720 --> 00:21:32,399 Speaker 1: the pronunciation, but you're right now. It is named after 355 00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:36,280 Speaker 1: a poisonous tree Antiaris toxicaria. 356 00:21:36,520 --> 00:21:39,959 Speaker 2: Yeah that sounds scary mainly just cut has toxic in it, 357 00:21:40,000 --> 00:21:42,480 Speaker 2: but it's part of the mulberry family, which is a 358 00:21:42,560 --> 00:21:46,160 Speaker 2: very pleasant sounding tree. But so, yeah, this is their enterprise. 359 00:21:46,240 --> 00:21:49,320 Speaker 2: They've been working on for a bit now. And at 360 00:21:49,320 --> 00:21:53,959 Speaker 2: this point, Vinnie sends Hutchins like a bunch of drugs 361 00:21:54,320 --> 00:21:57,000 Speaker 2: for his birthday. 362 00:21:56,200 --> 00:22:04,119 Speaker 1: Because he was so Mark was complaining to his internet 363 00:22:04,160 --> 00:22:09,360 Speaker 1: friend Vinnie about how difficult it was to find good 364 00:22:09,480 --> 00:22:12,440 Speaker 1: drugs in the United Kingdom. 365 00:22:13,119 --> 00:22:17,679 Speaker 2: Okay, so this was not completely unsolicited then, like Marcus 366 00:22:17,840 --> 00:22:20,520 Speaker 2: is into these drugs, he wasn't just like because that 367 00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:22,679 Speaker 2: also seems like a flex too, where it's like I 368 00:22:22,720 --> 00:22:25,000 Speaker 2: know where you live and I'm sending you illegal stuff. 369 00:22:25,000 --> 00:22:28,280 Speaker 2: This would have been appreciated by young Marcus. I'm open, 370 00:22:28,640 --> 00:22:31,399 Speaker 2: we're not talking about crank or heroin here. Maybe just 371 00:22:31,520 --> 00:22:32,040 Speaker 2: some weed. 372 00:22:32,760 --> 00:22:35,520 Speaker 1: Yeah, I think it was just saying I can't find 373 00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:42,040 Speaker 1: good weed in the United Kingdom, and Vinny comes through 374 00:22:42,240 --> 00:22:45,000 Speaker 1: with more than just cannabis. 375 00:22:45,160 --> 00:22:48,560 Speaker 2: I see. So there is a little bit of a 376 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:50,720 Speaker 2: little bit of a flex in there too, I think, 377 00:22:50,760 --> 00:22:53,879 Speaker 2: where it's almost like, you know, yeah, you're in deep 378 00:22:53,960 --> 00:22:58,119 Speaker 2: Because to your point, Ben, he'd always sort of just 379 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:01,280 Speaker 2: ridden that line between doing stuff that was just a 380 00:23:01,280 --> 00:23:03,879 Speaker 2: little more anarchist and a little more just kind of 381 00:23:03,880 --> 00:23:07,120 Speaker 2: middle finger to the man and like square society, but 382 00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:11,880 Speaker 2: never things that would be considered fully morally reprehensible or 383 00:23:11,960 --> 00:23:14,880 Speaker 2: like felony level illegal, right. 384 00:23:15,560 --> 00:23:22,119 Speaker 1: Right, Just so, the upus Upas sales had allowed Marcus 385 00:23:22,160 --> 00:23:26,240 Speaker 1: the ability to not go to school and to work 386 00:23:26,480 --> 00:23:30,639 Speaker 1: full time. He was supporting himself. He was one of 387 00:23:30,640 --> 00:23:35,840 Speaker 1: those kids who probably looked like, what do you call it, 388 00:23:36,240 --> 00:23:39,960 Speaker 1: hikiko mori, the kids who stay home guys? 389 00:23:40,040 --> 00:23:42,920 Speaker 2: Yeah, in Japan for sure, or like in Spider Man, 390 00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:44,840 Speaker 2: he's like the guy in the chair, you know. 391 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:51,719 Speaker 1: Right, yeah, And he was increasingly living this double life. 392 00:23:51,760 --> 00:23:56,280 Speaker 1: He was a mild mannered young British man by day. 393 00:23:56,440 --> 00:23:59,840 Speaker 1: He was a master hacker by night. And here we 394 00:23:59,880 --> 00:24:05,080 Speaker 1: go back to Marcus's own admissions. He made a serious error, 395 00:24:05,400 --> 00:24:08,520 Speaker 1: just like you said, Noel, he had always stayed a 396 00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:14,720 Speaker 1: step away from actions he considered illegal or unethical or 397 00:24:14,800 --> 00:24:19,959 Speaker 1: morally reprehensible. And he said he knew of criminals, and 398 00:24:20,119 --> 00:24:23,640 Speaker 1: he knew of crimes they had committed, but he did 399 00:24:23,680 --> 00:24:28,760 Speaker 1: not consider himself a criminal. He always thought he was 400 00:24:29,240 --> 00:24:34,440 Speaker 1: just on the side of the law, exactly. 401 00:24:34,680 --> 00:24:38,800 Speaker 2: And now he's starting to get an inkling that he's 402 00:24:38,840 --> 00:24:42,520 Speaker 2: starting to wade into some of those deeper waters, going 403 00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:45,879 Speaker 2: past the kiddie pool and into the you know, the 404 00:24:45,920 --> 00:24:48,480 Speaker 2: scary part of the pool where the monsters are they 405 00:24:48,520 --> 00:24:50,960 Speaker 2: really are you guys, be careful part where you can't 406 00:24:50,960 --> 00:24:53,400 Speaker 2: see the bottom. There's scary stuff down there. You ever 407 00:24:53,440 --> 00:24:56,200 Speaker 2: have that. I pretend there was Jaws was in the pool. 408 00:24:56,240 --> 00:24:57,960 Speaker 2: Maybe I'd just like to freak myself out when I 409 00:24:58,000 --> 00:24:59,840 Speaker 2: was a kid. But I think the metaphor holds true. 410 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:04,320 Speaker 1: The metaphor does hold true, and you are terrified of 411 00:25:04,359 --> 00:25:05,000 Speaker 1: open water. 412 00:25:05,760 --> 00:25:08,439 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's just a thing that it's a recurring theme 413 00:25:08,600 --> 00:25:11,040 Speaker 2: for me in dreams where I can't see the bottom. 414 00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:13,520 Speaker 2: And it's not usually even things that I think are 415 00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:16,919 Speaker 2: going to murder me. It's just big things that you 416 00:25:17,000 --> 00:25:21,680 Speaker 2: can't see. And sometimes the big things that you can't see, 417 00:25:22,000 --> 00:25:24,440 Speaker 2: you don't really know whether they're good or bad. And 418 00:25:24,840 --> 00:25:26,480 Speaker 2: at this point you made a really good point in 419 00:25:26,480 --> 00:25:30,480 Speaker 2: the outline, Ben, we're not sure whether Marcus is living 420 00:25:30,520 --> 00:25:34,399 Speaker 2: a double life as a superhero or potentially a super 421 00:25:34,480 --> 00:25:35,560 Speaker 2: villain in the making. 422 00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:43,080 Speaker 1: Ah, he's living two lives and he's not sure at 423 00:25:43,080 --> 00:25:47,200 Speaker 1: this point, right which is good or which is bad. 424 00:25:48,040 --> 00:25:52,440 Speaker 1: His buddy Vinnie ask him to write a new version 425 00:25:53,280 --> 00:25:59,920 Speaker 1: of this malware, of this program, and he asked Marcus 426 00:26:00,119 --> 00:26:06,160 Speaker 1: to write in some programming that would be a little 427 00:26:06,200 --> 00:26:10,359 Speaker 1: bit of an escalation, things like key logging, a couple 428 00:26:10,400 --> 00:26:14,000 Speaker 1: other specific bells and whistles. Nol, we know what key 429 00:26:14,040 --> 00:26:14,679 Speaker 1: logging is. 430 00:26:15,480 --> 00:26:17,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think it's similar to the little hack you 431 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:18,920 Speaker 2: as talking we were talking about earlier they did with 432 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:23,680 Speaker 2: Internet Explorer, where it's using that auto fill stuff to 433 00:26:24,400 --> 00:26:28,119 Speaker 2: funnel information out of out of the person's individual computer. 434 00:26:28,240 --> 00:26:32,080 Speaker 2: So when you're typing something, somebody who has root access 435 00:26:32,119 --> 00:26:35,560 Speaker 2: to your machine can then get a copy of that 436 00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:38,040 Speaker 2: and they can access like things that you have input 437 00:26:38,480 --> 00:26:41,560 Speaker 2: manually into your computer, which oftentimes you know all the time, 438 00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:45,439 Speaker 2: really includes personal data and passwords and things that you 439 00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:46,840 Speaker 2: do not want people to have access to. 440 00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:51,160 Speaker 1: And if you are hearing this on a work computer, 441 00:26:51,920 --> 00:26:56,440 Speaker 1: if you use a work laptop, it is completely legal 442 00:26:56,560 --> 00:27:01,200 Speaker 1: for your employer to do key law game programs. 443 00:27:02,440 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 2: Just be aware. So anyway, anybody is it to measure 444 00:27:05,600 --> 00:27:08,920 Speaker 2: productivity sometimes like that's a thing, you know, they can 445 00:27:08,960 --> 00:27:12,439 Speaker 2: literally check your work, you know, not to make people 446 00:27:12,520 --> 00:27:16,240 Speaker 2: freak out or be paranoid, but that is important. Don't 447 00:27:16,280 --> 00:27:19,000 Speaker 2: fool yourself if you're using a work machine for things 448 00:27:19,000 --> 00:27:21,480 Speaker 2: that aren't work related. It's not like they're watching you 449 00:27:21,560 --> 00:27:23,840 Speaker 2: twenty four to seven, but that stuff is fair game 450 00:27:24,320 --> 00:27:27,080 Speaker 2: to just be warned, right, Yeah. 451 00:27:27,040 --> 00:27:32,440 Speaker 1: Be aware. So Marcus is a very smart dude. He's 452 00:27:32,480 --> 00:27:36,760 Speaker 1: a kid at this point still, and he knows these 453 00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:42,200 Speaker 1: functionalities for exactly what they are. He says, look at this. 454 00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:48,320 Speaker 1: This will be a program specifically built to target financial institutions. 455 00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:52,640 Speaker 1: And in his mind, he says, if I do this, 456 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:57,840 Speaker 1: I am committing crime. There's no way to rationalize it. 457 00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:01,400 Speaker 1: There's no way to call it a gray area. There 458 00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:05,960 Speaker 1: is no liminal space. I will not write this thing, 459 00:28:06,280 --> 00:28:12,560 Speaker 1: he tells his quote unquote pal Vinnie. And then Vinny 460 00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:17,720 Speaker 1: reveals there was a poison pill to that gift. 461 00:28:19,040 --> 00:28:21,320 Speaker 2: Oh boy, could have Could I think that's what I 462 00:28:21,359 --> 00:28:25,119 Speaker 2: was maybe picking up on a little bit, whor it's like, yeah, 463 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:28,880 Speaker 2: I've got something on you, a poison pill. Indeed, sending 464 00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:34,480 Speaker 2: that package of drugs meant that he had basically blackmail 465 00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:40,479 Speaker 2: level information on Marcus and could go about exposing, you know, 466 00:28:40,640 --> 00:28:46,360 Speaker 2: his kind of secret activities. So they came to a 467 00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:49,840 Speaker 2: bit of a compromise where Marcus made only a few 468 00:28:49,840 --> 00:28:51,840 Speaker 2: of the chair a handful of the changes and updates 469 00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:53,800 Speaker 2: that were being asked I in the key logging, and 470 00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:56,200 Speaker 2: then he then decided he would farm out the rest 471 00:28:56,320 --> 00:29:00,560 Speaker 2: of the things that Marcus would not willingly do you 472 00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:01,240 Speaker 2: know elsewhere. 473 00:29:02,200 --> 00:29:08,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, Marcus agreed to make the key logging functionality and 474 00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:10,920 Speaker 1: dragged his feet a bit. By his own admission, you 475 00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:15,959 Speaker 1: can read his blog. Vinnie goes like you said, no, 476 00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:22,840 Speaker 1: he outsources and gets the other functions for this thing. 477 00:29:23,400 --> 00:29:28,920 Speaker 1: And this thing evolves, and by twenty fourteen, Venny quote 478 00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:33,800 Speaker 1: unquote Vinnie is selling a new program. It's called Kronos. 479 00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:40,600 Speaker 1: Marcus continues his regular life. He goes to community college, 480 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:44,560 Speaker 1: he graduates. People have no idea that he is basically 481 00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:50,880 Speaker 1: neo in the matrix. Yeah, and things start to go 482 00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:58,080 Speaker 1: south in his online world, so we can, I think, 483 00:29:58,200 --> 00:30:05,440 Speaker 1: gloss over some of the the terrible things that happened there. Eventually, 484 00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:11,400 Speaker 1: Marcus takes on the name malware Tech, and nobody knows 485 00:30:11,480 --> 00:30:15,920 Speaker 1: that malware Tech is a guy in the United Kingdom 486 00:30:16,320 --> 00:30:21,040 Speaker 1: named Marcus Hutchins until twenty seventeen. 487 00:30:21,280 --> 00:30:28,840 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's when the WannaCry ransomware attacks happen, and I 488 00:30:28,880 --> 00:30:30,560 Speaker 2: got my wires a little cross when we were talking 489 00:30:30,600 --> 00:30:32,640 Speaker 2: about the MGM stuff. While there may have been a 490 00:30:32,680 --> 00:30:36,160 Speaker 2: DDAs attack is part of that, Mainly what that whole 491 00:30:36,200 --> 00:30:42,800 Speaker 2: thing was about was ransomware. WannaCry was is a ransomware 492 00:30:42,880 --> 00:30:44,040 Speaker 2: crypto worm, which to. 493 00:30:44,000 --> 00:30:46,440 Speaker 1: Your made up what is that on? 494 00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:48,960 Speaker 2: All these words are great. I love it, Thank you 495 00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:52,520 Speaker 2: William Gibson. And by the way, that cyberpunk cartoon that 496 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:55,640 Speaker 2: goes along with the game that's on Netflix, it's very good. 497 00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,560 Speaker 2: It's really really cool. It's called Cyberpunk some colon something, 498 00:30:59,600 --> 00:31:01,400 Speaker 2: but it's a pretty pretty cool and it does a 499 00:31:01,480 --> 00:31:04,920 Speaker 2: great job of carrying on the legacy of like William 500 00:31:04,920 --> 00:31:06,960 Speaker 2: Gibson and Philip K. Dick and a lot of the 501 00:31:07,040 --> 00:31:10,560 Speaker 2: kind of you know, fourbears of really interesting kind of 502 00:31:10,840 --> 00:31:14,600 Speaker 2: Internet culture and science fiction. But ransomware basically holds this 503 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:20,640 Speaker 2: information or the information on your computer hostage by encrypting 504 00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:24,040 Speaker 2: the files like not to your benefit, right, like locking 505 00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:25,400 Speaker 2: you out essentially. 506 00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:31,600 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, yeah, crypto ransomware, or by locking you out 507 00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:36,680 Speaker 1: of your computer entirely, which will be locker ransomware, which 508 00:31:36,720 --> 00:31:40,520 Speaker 1: we know. I have to pause for a moment and 509 00:31:40,640 --> 00:31:45,080 Speaker 1: on MAT's behalf also say thank you so much for 510 00:31:45,160 --> 00:31:50,200 Speaker 1: shouting out William Gibson, neuromancer, the author who saw it 511 00:31:50,240 --> 00:31:56,200 Speaker 1: all coming in ransomware. Ransomware is pretty nasty because it 512 00:31:56,240 --> 00:32:02,480 Speaker 1: will direct the victim to pay some sort of financial 513 00:32:03,360 --> 00:32:09,600 Speaker 1: thing right through a very specific set of instructions, usually 514 00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:16,560 Speaker 1: bitcoin nowadays or some sort of derivative of WannaCry is 515 00:32:17,040 --> 00:32:26,160 Speaker 1: even nastier because WannaCry will automatically propagate itself. It is 516 00:32:26,360 --> 00:32:31,000 Speaker 1: considered a network worm. When it hit the Internet, it 517 00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:36,520 Speaker 1: was May twelfth, twenty seventeen. It continued to May seventeenth. 518 00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:42,880 Speaker 1: During just that small amount of time, just those few days. 519 00:32:44,320 --> 00:32:50,360 Speaker 1: It hit over one hundred and fifty countries. It was nasty, 520 00:32:50,520 --> 00:32:55,520 Speaker 1: went so far because it was based on It was 521 00:32:55,560 --> 00:33:00,640 Speaker 1: based on some demonic stuff that Uncle Sam figured out out. 522 00:33:00,800 --> 00:33:04,160 Speaker 2: And experts and you know, folks kind of watch watching 523 00:33:04,200 --> 00:33:08,800 Speaker 2: the events unfold began to advise to not pay the 524 00:33:08,880 --> 00:33:12,640 Speaker 2: ransom because there had not been any reliable information pointing 525 00:33:12,640 --> 00:33:14,440 Speaker 2: to people actually getting their stuff back. 526 00:33:14,840 --> 00:33:21,640 Speaker 1: Yeah, and WannaCry was based on an exploit called Eternal Blue, 527 00:33:22,160 --> 00:33:27,640 Speaker 1: which was discovered Slash created Slash developed by the Essay. 528 00:33:28,240 --> 00:33:34,040 Speaker 1: About a month before WannaCry hit the world, there was 529 00:33:34,080 --> 00:33:36,320 Speaker 1: a group You're gonna love this, man, because I know 530 00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:40,120 Speaker 1: you love cyberpunk. There was a group of hackers named 531 00:33:40,160 --> 00:33:44,560 Speaker 1: the Shadow Brokers. Yeah, that's a real thing. How is 532 00:33:44,600 --> 00:33:45,440 Speaker 1: that a real thing? 533 00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, it sounds like cyberpunk, but it also sounds like 534 00:33:48,640 --> 00:33:52,960 Speaker 2: Skyrim or something like much more Lord of the ringsy. 535 00:33:53,160 --> 00:33:56,880 Speaker 1: Right, the I'm sure they love all of these things. 536 00:33:57,200 --> 00:34:01,840 Speaker 1: They might be playing Skyrim now. The Shatto Brokers stole 537 00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:06,600 Speaker 1: the Eternal Blue exploit from the Essay somehow, and they 538 00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:09,640 Speaker 1: leaked it to the world. And the Want to Cry 539 00:34:09,719 --> 00:34:17,799 Speaker 1: attack mainly worked on organizations that had not updated their software, 540 00:34:18,160 --> 00:34:22,400 Speaker 1: they had not applied patches from Microsoft, they were working 541 00:34:22,480 --> 00:34:27,880 Speaker 1: with older, outdated versions of operating systems. And at this 542 00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:32,240 Speaker 1: point we have to be honest, it is very very 543 00:34:32,360 --> 00:34:36,640 Speaker 1: easy to ignore all those things, all those little pop 544 00:34:36,719 --> 00:34:41,680 Speaker 1: ups you get that say update your software now, right, Like, 545 00:34:42,120 --> 00:34:45,600 Speaker 1: how many times have you ignored those today? Folks? 546 00:34:46,160 --> 00:34:48,719 Speaker 2: Yeah? You know, I'm I run a lot of like 547 00:34:49,719 --> 00:34:52,799 Speaker 2: I use my personal computer for work and you know, 548 00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:55,239 Speaker 2: pro personal stuff when I'm at home, and then I 549 00:34:55,239 --> 00:34:58,120 Speaker 2: have my work laptop, but I oftentimes don't have auto 550 00:34:58,160 --> 00:35:02,080 Speaker 2: install on for those I updates from Mac because a 551 00:35:02,080 --> 00:35:04,479 Speaker 2: lot of the third party like audio things that I use, 552 00:35:04,840 --> 00:35:08,720 Speaker 2: they'll quickly get bricked if you do the wrong updates. 553 00:35:08,760 --> 00:35:10,520 Speaker 2: So sometimes you have to like wait like a year 554 00:35:11,200 --> 00:35:14,279 Speaker 2: for a new update to be fully tested. But then 555 00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:16,319 Speaker 2: there are also sort of like sub updates that are 556 00:35:16,320 --> 00:35:18,719 Speaker 2: more like security things. Those are the ones you do 557 00:35:18,760 --> 00:35:20,480 Speaker 2: want to make sure you do, even if you're not 558 00:35:20,480 --> 00:35:23,160 Speaker 2: doing the full updates. Always make sure that the security 559 00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:26,520 Speaker 2: patches are turned on, because that's the kind of stuff 560 00:35:26,520 --> 00:35:28,160 Speaker 2: that is protecting you from these sorts of things. 561 00:35:28,600 --> 00:35:34,640 Speaker 1: Absolutely, I think it's very easy to ignore that routine maintenance, right, 562 00:35:34,760 --> 00:35:40,000 Speaker 1: that routine security, and especially if you're like us, if 563 00:35:40,040 --> 00:35:45,400 Speaker 1: you work with any cavalcade of idiosyncratic apps or platforms, 564 00:35:45,920 --> 00:35:48,440 Speaker 1: it's kind of like a house of cards, you know, 565 00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:52,720 Speaker 1: if you change one and then it changes everything else. 566 00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:56,799 Speaker 1: And that's what the hackers are counting on, and that 567 00:35:56,920 --> 00:36:01,200 Speaker 1: is why within just a few days a cry infected 568 00:36:02,400 --> 00:36:08,560 Speaker 1: hundreds of thousands of computers. The estimates of damage ranged 569 00:36:08,680 --> 00:36:14,920 Speaker 1: from hundreds of millions of dollars to literally billions of dollars. 570 00:36:15,440 --> 00:36:21,560 Speaker 1: And like you said, the experts told everyone, one, patch 571 00:36:21,600 --> 00:36:25,560 Speaker 1: your computer, and two, don't give in to the ransom. 572 00:36:26,040 --> 00:36:29,600 Speaker 1: Don't give in to the terrorists because they're not going 573 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:33,000 Speaker 1: to give you your money back. No one knew what 574 00:36:33,160 --> 00:36:39,440 Speaker 1: to do until one day, our pal, Marcus Hutchins, walked 575 00:36:39,480 --> 00:36:42,839 Speaker 1: home from lunch and found out what was going on. 576 00:36:43,000 --> 00:36:46,840 Speaker 1: We're gonna pause for a word from our sponsor, and 577 00:36:46,880 --> 00:36:50,120 Speaker 1: then Noel maybe we talked about how this guy saved 578 00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:58,320 Speaker 1: the day absolutely, and. 579 00:36:58,320 --> 00:37:05,640 Speaker 2: We're back talking about mild mannered Marcus Hutchins of the 580 00:37:05,680 --> 00:37:09,080 Speaker 2: Internet and also the United Kingdom, who had been through 581 00:37:09,400 --> 00:37:12,680 Speaker 2: kind of an emotional rollercoaster. At this point, I did 582 00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:15,440 Speaker 2: do a little extra reading and the package of drugs 583 00:37:15,719 --> 00:37:18,239 Speaker 2: that were sent to him. It wasn't just weed. It 584 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:23,080 Speaker 2: was like amphetamines and psychedelics and hallucinogens. And apparently when 585 00:37:23,160 --> 00:37:25,319 Speaker 2: he started doing a lot of these kind of like 586 00:37:26,040 --> 00:37:28,760 Speaker 2: all night coding sessions once he stopped going to school, 587 00:37:29,160 --> 00:37:32,359 Speaker 2: he himself got addicted pretty badly to amphetamines. He used 588 00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:35,360 Speaker 2: to replace them, replace just you know, coffee with it. 589 00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:40,640 Speaker 2: So he was down a pretty dark path in more 590 00:37:40,680 --> 00:37:43,799 Speaker 2: ways than one. You know, he had basically been blackmailed 591 00:37:43,880 --> 00:37:48,040 Speaker 2: himself by this vinny character who threatened to turn the 592 00:37:48,080 --> 00:37:51,319 Speaker 2: information he had on him against him. This package of 593 00:37:51,400 --> 00:37:53,200 Speaker 2: drugs that he sent to him, he perhaps turned him 594 00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:55,760 Speaker 2: into the FBI or whatever, not to mention other stuff 595 00:37:55,800 --> 00:37:58,080 Speaker 2: that he likely had. Can you imagine, Ben, if you 596 00:37:58,160 --> 00:38:00,600 Speaker 2: were doing this and thinking you were like, you know, 597 00:38:00,760 --> 00:38:05,120 Speaker 2: King Shiit of fuc came out and then all of 598 00:38:05,160 --> 00:38:08,399 Speaker 2: a sudden, the person that has guided you into this 599 00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:11,439 Speaker 2: world turns on you, and now you feel like you're 600 00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:15,400 Speaker 2: sort of you're there botnet. You know, they've got control 601 00:38:15,480 --> 00:38:15,680 Speaker 2: of you. 602 00:38:16,239 --> 00:38:19,479 Speaker 1: Oh that's good. Yeah, I mean it's evil, but that's 603 00:38:19,520 --> 00:38:24,400 Speaker 1: a great feeling. Yeah, that's the deep water you're talking about. Yeah, 604 00:38:24,560 --> 00:38:30,280 Speaker 1: And this is Hutchins has to struggle through this stuff. 605 00:38:30,480 --> 00:38:37,120 Speaker 1: He is by the time WannaCry hits, he is navigating 606 00:38:39,080 --> 00:38:43,279 Speaker 1: the brighter side of drug addiction, I think, and he 607 00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:50,120 Speaker 1: is working through what we would call white hat hacking, 608 00:38:50,680 --> 00:38:54,440 Speaker 1: which is, you know, we have def con here in 609 00:38:54,520 --> 00:39:00,759 Speaker 1: Las Vegas. It's where Yeah, it's where you where. Essentially 610 00:39:00,880 --> 00:39:06,080 Speaker 1: you are no longer paid to do malware programming. You 611 00:39:06,120 --> 00:39:10,960 Speaker 1: are paid by companies like a bounty hunter. You find 612 00:39:11,040 --> 00:39:16,520 Speaker 1: the exploits, the vulnerabilities in their software, and they give 613 00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:19,879 Speaker 1: you a ton of money if it works out. This 614 00:39:19,920 --> 00:39:25,520 Speaker 1: guy is working under the name malware Tech, and you 615 00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:31,200 Speaker 1: can find his blog as Marcus Hutchins. You can also 616 00:39:31,360 --> 00:39:35,839 Speaker 1: find malware Tech. He's not really on Twitter anymore, which 617 00:39:35,880 --> 00:39:38,319 Speaker 1: I know is a bummer for you know, because you 618 00:39:38,480 --> 00:39:40,839 Speaker 1: love Twitter so very much. 619 00:39:40,960 --> 00:39:45,160 Speaker 2: I love it so much. Yeah, yes, gosh. 620 00:39:44,160 --> 00:39:45,799 Speaker 1: Oh gosh, pardon me. 621 00:39:46,640 --> 00:39:48,360 Speaker 2: You're You're right on the money, Ben, Even like the 622 00:39:48,360 --> 00:39:51,640 Speaker 2: emails that I get from them still say x formerly Twitter. 623 00:39:51,880 --> 00:39:55,920 Speaker 2: It's like it's not gonna happen elon. But yeah, he 624 00:39:56,120 --> 00:40:00,640 Speaker 2: he gets wind of this, I think, and much the 625 00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:02,960 Speaker 2: same way that the rest of the world does. But 626 00:40:03,000 --> 00:40:05,239 Speaker 2: he has more information that the rest of the world 627 00:40:05,280 --> 00:40:07,520 Speaker 2: doesn't have, so he knows what he's looking at. Hutchins 628 00:40:07,600 --> 00:40:09,880 Speaker 2: learn of want to cry. After he had some lunch 629 00:40:09,880 --> 00:40:13,560 Speaker 2: on May the twelfth, he saw networks across Britain's healthcare 630 00:40:13,680 --> 00:40:18,439 Speaker 2: system had been hit by the ransomware. So that's that's, 631 00:40:18,520 --> 00:40:20,120 Speaker 2: you know, and this is that kind of stuff that 632 00:40:20,120 --> 00:40:23,480 Speaker 2: that is the super dark side. You know, we were 633 00:40:23,480 --> 00:40:26,880 Speaker 2: talking about casinos. That sucks for business. You know, casinos 634 00:40:26,880 --> 00:40:29,560 Speaker 2: make a lot of money losing money, you know, inconvenicing 635 00:40:29,640 --> 00:40:31,799 Speaker 2: guests and all of that, and that sucks. That's no good. 636 00:40:31,800 --> 00:40:36,520 Speaker 2: But healthcare systems, people could die, you know, like like 637 00:40:36,840 --> 00:40:39,520 Speaker 2: not to mention like the if it's if it's interconnected 638 00:40:39,560 --> 00:40:42,319 Speaker 2: in the same way that the power stuff was, you know, 639 00:40:42,480 --> 00:40:45,560 Speaker 2: at at the MGM, A lot of these larger facilities, 640 00:40:45,640 --> 00:40:47,799 Speaker 2: they are going to have that level of interconnectedness. So 641 00:40:47,800 --> 00:40:51,040 Speaker 2: he sees reports of Britain's health system being hit by 642 00:40:51,040 --> 00:40:53,400 Speaker 2: these that's going to be things like records and you know, 643 00:40:53,640 --> 00:40:55,920 Speaker 2: all of that stuff. But he with the information that 644 00:40:55,960 --> 00:40:58,880 Speaker 2: he has, knowing this is likely an extension of the 645 00:40:58,920 --> 00:41:02,480 Speaker 2: thing that he participated in in some way, he starts 646 00:41:02,520 --> 00:41:04,799 Speaker 2: to get a little micro you know, looking into the 647 00:41:04,840 --> 00:41:06,560 Speaker 2: code and seeing what he can see. 648 00:41:07,600 --> 00:41:13,200 Speaker 1: And as he is running in his digital fingers across 649 00:41:13,239 --> 00:41:17,600 Speaker 1: the carapace of this thing, he finds a chink in 650 00:41:17,640 --> 00:41:22,239 Speaker 1: the armor, a gap. He sees that there is a 651 00:41:22,880 --> 00:41:26,680 Speaker 1: part of the code that includes a web address. The 652 00:41:26,719 --> 00:41:32,080 Speaker 1: web address is not registered, so he registers the domain. 653 00:41:32,239 --> 00:41:35,360 Speaker 1: This is very in the weeds, but he registers the domain, 654 00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:41,400 Speaker 1: and and he's on record say this. He says, he 655 00:41:41,440 --> 00:41:45,239 Speaker 1: always says, like, I paid ten dollars and sixty nine 656 00:41:45,320 --> 00:41:49,320 Speaker 1: cents to get the domain address. And at the same time, 657 00:41:49,480 --> 00:41:54,200 Speaker 1: while he's doing this concurrently across the pond, there's another 658 00:41:54,280 --> 00:41:58,280 Speaker 1: guy who also deserves his flowers, a guy named Darien 659 00:41:58,400 --> 00:42:02,640 Speaker 1: huss He's twenty eight years old. He lives in the 660 00:42:02,760 --> 00:42:05,840 Speaker 1: United States, I think in the Michigan area. He is 661 00:42:05,880 --> 00:42:11,280 Speaker 1: a research engineer for a cybersecurity firm called proof Point. 662 00:42:11,760 --> 00:42:16,560 Speaker 1: And this guy's doing his own analysis. And this guy, Darien, 663 00:42:17,360 --> 00:42:22,600 Speaker 1: notices that whomever wrote this hardware left in a feature 664 00:42:23,000 --> 00:42:28,480 Speaker 1: called a kill switch. And so Darien sends a screenshot 665 00:42:28,560 --> 00:42:33,239 Speaker 1: of this to our buddy Hutchins, who is still at 666 00:42:33,239 --> 00:42:35,480 Speaker 1: this point anonymous online. 667 00:42:35,800 --> 00:42:39,000 Speaker 2: So they go back and forth about this and realize 668 00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:42,879 Speaker 2: something really really important that registering the domain name and 669 00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:49,239 Speaker 2: redirecting the attacks to malware tech server had actually activated 670 00:42:49,280 --> 00:42:54,799 Speaker 2: the kill switch, which halted the basically neutralized the ransomware, 671 00:42:55,760 --> 00:42:59,839 Speaker 2: creating something that's known as in the packing parlance as 672 00:42:59,840 --> 00:43:00,719 Speaker 2: a sinkhole. 673 00:43:01,640 --> 00:43:08,480 Speaker 1: Yeah. That means that the attacks with that current variant 674 00:43:08,800 --> 00:43:15,840 Speaker 1: of WannaCry will no longer execute successfully. And it's weird 675 00:43:15,920 --> 00:43:19,759 Speaker 1: how this stuff is like it's like covid. That's why 676 00:43:19,760 --> 00:43:22,719 Speaker 1: they call it a virus, right, because there could be 677 00:43:22,800 --> 00:43:26,280 Speaker 1: a new variant. One of the first things that malware 678 00:43:26,320 --> 00:43:30,359 Speaker 1: Tech does is say, look, you have to get all 679 00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:35,520 Speaker 1: of your operating systems patched immediately. And he has a 680 00:43:35,560 --> 00:43:42,560 Speaker 1: great crisis of faith here because to reveal this, to 681 00:43:42,600 --> 00:43:47,799 Speaker 1: save the Internet, he has to give up his anonymity. 682 00:43:48,600 --> 00:43:51,520 Speaker 1: And that's what he does. That's why we know malware 683 00:43:51,560 --> 00:44:00,520 Speaker 1: tech is cybersecurity consultant. Marcus Hutchints. You can find him today, folks, 684 00:44:00,560 --> 00:44:05,560 Speaker 1: Marcus Hutchins dot com. The guy literally saved the Internet. 685 00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:09,120 Speaker 1: He says he did it accidentally. He says he stumbled 686 00:44:09,200 --> 00:44:12,920 Speaker 1: upon it. And there's so much more to the story. 687 00:44:14,120 --> 00:44:16,360 Speaker 1: But I think we gotta I think we got to 688 00:44:16,400 --> 00:44:20,759 Speaker 1: give the guy the props where it's due Noel, would 689 00:44:20,840 --> 00:44:26,680 Speaker 1: our podcast exist if if wanna cry continued? 690 00:44:27,120 --> 00:44:28,719 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, you got you 691 00:44:28,719 --> 00:44:31,719 Speaker 2: do have to kind of wonder, like it was so 692 00:44:31,880 --> 00:44:36,680 Speaker 2: insidious that it could have caused irreparable damage to large systems. 693 00:44:36,719 --> 00:44:40,960 Speaker 2: You know. This is also long enough ago that it's 694 00:44:41,000 --> 00:44:43,800 Speaker 2: almost like the way airports were before nine to eleven, 695 00:44:43,960 --> 00:44:47,360 Speaker 2: you know what I mean, Like, once something massive like 696 00:44:47,440 --> 00:44:50,399 Speaker 2: this happens that is so earth shattering, you know, then 697 00:44:51,640 --> 00:44:54,239 Speaker 2: things but things kind of turn a corner in terms 698 00:44:54,239 --> 00:44:56,879 Speaker 2: of like security, and maybe I'm maybe I'm off base there, 699 00:44:56,880 --> 00:44:59,680 Speaker 2: but it does feel like that's the case. Is like 700 00:44:59,719 --> 00:45:01,680 Speaker 2: he said the beginning of the show, this really was 701 00:45:01,760 --> 00:45:06,640 Speaker 2: something that shifted the course of technological events. So yeah, 702 00:45:06,680 --> 00:45:08,960 Speaker 2: I think it could have knocked things out. I always 703 00:45:08,960 --> 00:45:11,360 Speaker 2: think of the movie as bad as it is Escape 704 00:45:11,400 --> 00:45:14,200 Speaker 2: from La the sequel to Escape from New York, the 705 00:45:14,239 --> 00:45:17,520 Speaker 2: John Carpenter movie. The School is pretty bad overall, but 706 00:45:17,560 --> 00:45:21,759 Speaker 2: it has a pretty interesting foil or plot, I guess 707 00:45:21,880 --> 00:45:25,600 Speaker 2: device where it's this idea that like all electricity and 708 00:45:25,800 --> 00:45:30,719 Speaker 2: interconnected you know, machinery will will be killed, including batteries, 709 00:45:30,840 --> 00:45:32,759 Speaker 2: and they don't really explain how that makes sense in 710 00:45:32,800 --> 00:45:33,200 Speaker 2: that I. 711 00:45:33,120 --> 00:45:36,080 Speaker 1: Remember that and I remember the soundtracks banging though. 712 00:45:36,000 --> 00:45:38,520 Speaker 2: It's pretty good, but it does make me think of like, 713 00:45:38,640 --> 00:45:41,120 Speaker 2: is this some kind of like would this be a 714 00:45:41,160 --> 00:45:44,160 Speaker 2: fight club event? Like a project may set us back 715 00:45:44,200 --> 00:45:47,280 Speaker 2: to the Stone age type event. We don't know. Because 716 00:45:47,360 --> 00:45:50,839 Speaker 2: Hutchins did jump in, would it have been solved otherwise? 717 00:45:51,840 --> 00:45:53,680 Speaker 2: I don't know that either. What do you think, Ben? 718 00:45:53,920 --> 00:45:56,080 Speaker 2: A lot of this stuff is just based on boneheaded, 719 00:45:56,440 --> 00:46:01,839 Speaker 2: like exploitable flaws in saw where you know, with the 720 00:46:02,000 --> 00:46:05,360 Speaker 2: would the the Microsofts of the world have figured it 721 00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:07,040 Speaker 2: out first and figured out how to do something about it. 722 00:46:07,080 --> 00:46:09,040 Speaker 2: I kind of think, No, I. 723 00:46:09,239 --> 00:46:11,480 Speaker 1: Kind of think you're right on that one, Noel, because 724 00:46:12,120 --> 00:46:17,600 Speaker 1: consider that Eternal Blue, which is the exploit Uncle Sam 725 00:46:17,640 --> 00:46:25,240 Speaker 1: figured out. Eternal Blue, was discovered by the United States government, 726 00:46:26,000 --> 00:46:32,680 Speaker 1: and they could have told Microsoft. They did not tell Microsoft. 727 00:46:33,280 --> 00:46:39,760 Speaker 1: They instead built a monster, right, and the monster got 728 00:46:39,800 --> 00:46:43,239 Speaker 1: out of its gauge and then became another thing. It 729 00:46:43,360 --> 00:46:49,320 Speaker 1: evolved like some sort of sinister evil Pokemon, and. 730 00:46:49,160 --> 00:46:51,360 Speaker 2: In its final form, right. 731 00:46:51,480 --> 00:46:56,839 Speaker 1: And Marcus Hutchins is the one person who said, hang 732 00:46:56,920 --> 00:47:00,080 Speaker 1: on a sec way to tick, you know, and and 733 00:47:00,680 --> 00:47:05,399 Speaker 1: did the right thing. The story continues. Of course, one 734 00:47:05,480 --> 00:47:11,000 Speaker 1: A Cry is largely suspected to be a creation of 735 00:47:11,360 --> 00:47:17,520 Speaker 1: the Deep Rcave the North Korean government. In full fairness, 736 00:47:18,080 --> 00:47:21,840 Speaker 1: the government of North Korea denies that it was them 737 00:47:22,400 --> 00:47:23,760 Speaker 1: in a stunning plot twist. 738 00:47:24,120 --> 00:47:28,080 Speaker 2: So, I guess when when you're in this kind of world, 739 00:47:28,280 --> 00:47:31,240 Speaker 2: you know, and all these types of code, these pieces 740 00:47:31,239 --> 00:47:33,799 Speaker 2: of code, there's an open source ness to it. You know, 741 00:47:33,840 --> 00:47:36,279 Speaker 2: if you're in the community, you share and share like 742 00:47:36,360 --> 00:47:39,960 Speaker 2: and maybe something some group did you know, a small 743 00:47:39,960 --> 00:47:42,879 Speaker 2: close knit group of you know, hackers or coders might 744 00:47:43,000 --> 00:47:45,840 Speaker 2: end up in another attack, right, because this stuff is 745 00:47:45,920 --> 00:47:49,239 Speaker 2: kind of shared. So Hutchins, it's not like he directly 746 00:47:49,320 --> 00:47:52,120 Speaker 2: participated in making this. It was just something that the 747 00:47:52,200 --> 00:47:56,040 Speaker 2: experience that he had with Vinny led him to have 748 00:47:56,080 --> 00:47:58,919 Speaker 2: the know how to recognize what he was looking at. 749 00:47:59,040 --> 00:47:59,520 Speaker 2: Is that right? 750 00:48:00,080 --> 00:48:05,160 Speaker 1: You're absolutely right, dude, because if you go to Marcus 751 00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:08,279 Speaker 1: Hutchins dot com right now, what you can see is 752 00:48:09,760 --> 00:48:15,560 Speaker 1: threat intelligence a lot of work. Basically. I guess if 753 00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:18,680 Speaker 1: you're if you're like this guy, you feel like you're 754 00:48:18,840 --> 00:48:24,359 Speaker 1: always telling people the same things. You're always saying, Hey, 755 00:48:24,600 --> 00:48:29,200 Speaker 1: update your browser, Hey, don't you know click on pop 756 00:48:29,280 --> 00:48:33,520 Speaker 1: ups or whatever for us knuckleheads in the crowd. And 757 00:48:34,239 --> 00:48:38,880 Speaker 1: we have a lot to thank this guy for because 758 00:48:38,960 --> 00:48:44,600 Speaker 1: he genuinely did stop a conspiracy. And no, you and 759 00:48:44,640 --> 00:48:47,720 Speaker 1: I talked about this off air. A lot of people 760 00:48:47,880 --> 00:48:54,080 Speaker 1: familiar with the situation are probably gonna say, Hey, Noel, Matt, Paul, Ben, 761 00:48:54,920 --> 00:48:58,200 Speaker 1: Doc Holliday, why are you acting like this guy should 762 00:48:58,239 --> 00:49:02,120 Speaker 1: get a statue in the square? Why are you acting 763 00:49:02,160 --> 00:49:07,960 Speaker 1: like he's a super perfect person. He got in trouble later, right. 764 00:49:08,520 --> 00:49:12,759 Speaker 2: Well, you know, he was eventually kind of roped in 765 00:49:12,960 --> 00:49:17,400 Speaker 2: with the scheme or surrounding the scheme that Vinnie was 766 00:49:17,480 --> 00:49:20,000 Speaker 2: at the center of. And in twenty seventeen, he got 767 00:49:20,040 --> 00:49:25,480 Speaker 2: arrested by the FBI. He was brought up on hacking 768 00:49:25,600 --> 00:49:29,360 Speaker 2: charges or sir six hacking related federal charges in the 769 00:49:29,480 --> 00:49:34,040 Speaker 2: US District Court for Eastern District of Wisconsin related to 770 00:49:34,239 --> 00:49:39,840 Speaker 2: spreading that Chronos package. And he was asked to flip, 771 00:49:40,120 --> 00:49:43,000 Speaker 2: you know, on some of his fellow you know, hackers 772 00:49:43,080 --> 00:49:46,200 Speaker 2: or community members, including Vinnie. He did not have enough 773 00:49:46,320 --> 00:49:51,560 Speaker 2: information on Vinnie to actually give them anything actionable, so 774 00:49:51,600 --> 00:49:53,520 Speaker 2: he wasn't able to And then he refused to flip 775 00:49:53,520 --> 00:49:56,480 Speaker 2: on anybody else in the community. He did plead guilty 776 00:49:56,520 --> 00:49:59,560 Speaker 2: in twenty nineteen to two of the ten charges against him, 777 00:50:00,080 --> 00:50:03,960 Speaker 2: including wire fraud, distributing, selling, promoting, and advertising a device 778 00:50:04,080 --> 00:50:11,000 Speaker 2: used to intercept electronic communications. He basically just from sitting 779 00:50:11,080 --> 00:50:14,400 Speaker 2: in jail during a lot of these proceedings ended up 780 00:50:14,400 --> 00:50:18,360 Speaker 2: with time served and some fines, so he was punished, 781 00:50:18,360 --> 00:50:20,520 Speaker 2: you know, for some of this stuff, and then he 782 00:50:21,000 --> 00:50:23,759 Speaker 2: you know, presumably flipped it around into how can I 783 00:50:23,800 --> 00:50:26,959 Speaker 2: be legitimate and like use what I know to help 784 00:50:27,000 --> 00:50:30,280 Speaker 2: stop bad guys, whether or not that's just to benefit 785 00:50:30,400 --> 00:50:33,200 Speaker 2: like companies that can pay him. I don't think we're 786 00:50:33,239 --> 00:50:36,319 Speaker 2: saying necessarily this like White Night, but he did make 787 00:50:36,360 --> 00:50:38,560 Speaker 2: some good decisions along the way and did not turn 788 00:50:38,640 --> 00:50:41,640 Speaker 2: down what could have been a much darker, super villainous path. 789 00:50:43,120 --> 00:50:48,240 Speaker 1: And the judge in his case sentenced him to time 790 00:50:48,360 --> 00:50:53,759 Speaker 1: served and one year of supervised release and said, you 791 00:50:53,800 --> 00:50:57,920 Speaker 1: have turned the corner. You stop using your skills for 792 00:50:58,120 --> 00:51:04,120 Speaker 1: criminal purpose. You made them a benefit to society well 793 00:51:04,200 --> 00:51:08,319 Speaker 1: before you ever went to court. So they said, like, 794 00:51:08,600 --> 00:51:12,440 Speaker 1: you made the right decision before you were forced into 795 00:51:12,480 --> 00:51:12,880 Speaker 1: doing so. 796 00:51:13,080 --> 00:51:13,800 Speaker 2: That's right. 797 00:51:14,200 --> 00:51:15,160 Speaker 1: Yeah, you like. 798 00:51:15,160 --> 00:51:17,600 Speaker 2: To see that. I think that's important because a lot 799 00:51:17,600 --> 00:51:21,520 Speaker 2: of times, I think we think judges they don't look 800 00:51:21,560 --> 00:51:24,040 Speaker 2: at stuff like that or or that. It's it's really 801 00:51:24,080 --> 00:51:28,680 Speaker 2: hard to get to have a sense that there is 802 00:51:28,680 --> 00:51:30,880 Speaker 2: some redemption, you know that. But like, you know, he 803 00:51:30,920 --> 00:51:33,800 Speaker 2: made these choices on his own. We're talking about decisions 804 00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:36,000 Speaker 2: that he made all on the way where he could 805 00:51:36,040 --> 00:51:38,400 Speaker 2: have gone down this fork in the road and instead 806 00:51:38,400 --> 00:51:40,719 Speaker 2: he went down this one, and that all led to 807 00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:45,000 Speaker 2: I think what has ended up being a very thoughtful 808 00:51:45,040 --> 00:51:48,319 Speaker 2: and intelligent person that's using some skills that they have 809 00:51:49,000 --> 00:51:53,640 Speaker 2: for the betterment of of you know whatever, because you 810 00:51:53,680 --> 00:51:59,520 Speaker 2: can't fight fire with you know, jello. Maybe it's kind 811 00:51:59,520 --> 00:51:59,919 Speaker 2: of fun. 812 00:52:00,040 --> 00:52:03,759 Speaker 1: It's like my favorite that's my favorite analogy you've ever done. 813 00:52:04,000 --> 00:52:07,360 Speaker 2: Okay, I'm going to go I'm gonna put that on 814 00:52:07,440 --> 00:52:09,239 Speaker 2: on a shirt. But I just mean, like, you know, 815 00:52:09,280 --> 00:52:12,400 Speaker 2: when you're in these circles, these very elite circles, or 816 00:52:12,440 --> 00:52:14,680 Speaker 2: you have to earn your way in, those are the 817 00:52:14,680 --> 00:52:17,560 Speaker 2: people that really know how to stay on top of 818 00:52:17,560 --> 00:52:20,520 Speaker 2: what's going on because these are very fast moving developments 819 00:52:20,560 --> 00:52:24,000 Speaker 2: and technology and in like cybersecurity and threats. So it's 820 00:52:24,080 --> 00:52:27,320 Speaker 2: kind of whether he's a superhero or not. I'm glad 821 00:52:27,400 --> 00:52:30,680 Speaker 2: there are people like him out there hopefully keeping us 822 00:52:30,719 --> 00:52:34,040 Speaker 2: from getting escaped from la back into the stone age. 823 00:52:34,400 --> 00:52:38,240 Speaker 1: So let's end on this. Maybe there's a great quote 824 00:52:38,280 --> 00:52:42,799 Speaker 1: from the judge. The judge says, it's going to take 825 00:52:42,960 --> 00:52:46,960 Speaker 1: individuals like yourself who have the skill set, even at 826 00:52:47,000 --> 00:52:50,200 Speaker 1: the tender age of twenty four or twenty five, to 827 00:52:50,320 --> 00:52:56,759 Speaker 1: come up with solutions. The judge, even in court implied 828 00:52:57,239 --> 00:53:02,240 Speaker 1: or argued that Marcus Hutchins should get a full pardon 829 00:53:03,520 --> 00:53:07,120 Speaker 1: while admitting that the current court did not have the 830 00:53:07,200 --> 00:53:11,000 Speaker 1: power to grant one, and was like, ah, you're good though. 831 00:53:11,920 --> 00:53:17,279 Speaker 1: You turned it around, and it's neat. It's neat to 832 00:53:17,320 --> 00:53:20,440 Speaker 1: hear this. Here's another line, it's neat to hear stuff 833 00:53:20,480 --> 00:53:24,279 Speaker 1: like this. There are just too many positives on the 834 00:53:24,360 --> 00:53:28,040 Speaker 1: other side of the ledger. The final call in the 835 00:53:28,080 --> 00:53:31,880 Speaker 1: case of Marcus Hutchins today is a sentence of time 836 00:53:32,040 --> 00:53:37,000 Speaker 1: served with a one year period of supervised release, which 837 00:53:37,080 --> 00:53:40,600 Speaker 1: is crazy. He's online now you can go. 838 00:53:40,960 --> 00:53:43,520 Speaker 2: That's right. So like again, we talked about this at 839 00:53:43,560 --> 00:53:44,799 Speaker 2: the top of the show too. A lot of these 840 00:53:44,800 --> 00:53:48,360 Speaker 2: folks that maybe don't demonstrate this turning of the corner 841 00:53:48,719 --> 00:53:51,880 Speaker 2: are barred from ever touching a computer again for the 842 00:53:51,880 --> 00:53:54,279 Speaker 2: rest of their lives. And as we know someone who 843 00:53:54,320 --> 00:53:56,439 Speaker 2: that is like this is a passion for folks. They're 844 00:53:56,440 --> 00:53:58,399 Speaker 2: not always it's doing it. The money's part of it, 845 00:53:58,640 --> 00:54:00,880 Speaker 2: but it's like it is how they're rain's work and 846 00:54:01,000 --> 00:54:03,080 Speaker 2: like to be cut off from that would be the 847 00:54:03,080 --> 00:54:06,480 Speaker 2: greatest punishment of all, I think, And so good on 848 00:54:06,600 --> 00:54:10,400 Speaker 2: Marcus Man. Cool story, honestly, kind of a posy vibe story. 849 00:54:10,440 --> 00:54:12,760 Speaker 2: I'm I'm digging it, Ben, It's. 850 00:54:12,640 --> 00:54:18,200 Speaker 1: Kind of cool, right, No, And we like the positive stories, 851 00:54:18,520 --> 00:54:26,239 Speaker 1: especially especially these kind of these empowered underdogs. Right this 852 00:54:26,440 --> 00:54:30,840 Speaker 1: is a David Goliath kind of story. There was one 853 00:54:30,960 --> 00:54:35,920 Speaker 1: guy who, with a little help from his friends, stopped 854 00:54:35,920 --> 00:54:42,279 Speaker 1: a global conspiracy midway. You know, that's pretty amazing. We 855 00:54:42,360 --> 00:54:45,879 Speaker 1: would love to hear more stories like that. What are 856 00:54:45,960 --> 00:54:53,200 Speaker 1: your favorite tales of people who successfully stopped a global catastrophe? 857 00:54:53,680 --> 00:54:57,440 Speaker 1: Please find us online, right, it's a little bit funny 858 00:54:57,520 --> 00:54:59,200 Speaker 1: to say. 859 00:54:59,120 --> 00:55:01,759 Speaker 2: There are other way is if you don't want to 860 00:55:01,800 --> 00:55:04,839 Speaker 2: catch a worm, but you can hit us up at 861 00:55:04,880 --> 00:55:07,759 Speaker 2: the social media platform of your choosing, or we are 862 00:55:07,800 --> 00:55:15,000 Speaker 2: conspiracy stuff on Twitter, nay xxna, Twitter, whichever, YouTube and Facebook, 863 00:55:15,040 --> 00:55:17,080 Speaker 2: or we have a Facebook group. Here's where it gets crazy, 864 00:55:17,360 --> 00:55:20,520 Speaker 2: new YouTube content popping off every single week. We're a 865 00:55:20,520 --> 00:55:25,680 Speaker 2: conspiracy stuff show, however, on TikTok and Instagram. 866 00:55:26,080 --> 00:55:29,799 Speaker 1: That we are. And as you said, Noel, if you 867 00:55:29,880 --> 00:55:33,160 Speaker 1: don't care to sip the social needs, have no fear. 868 00:55:33,280 --> 00:55:39,840 Speaker 1: You can call us directly one eight three three sdd WYTK. 869 00:55:40,040 --> 00:55:43,920 Speaker 1: You'll hear a brief message and then you'll hear a beep. 870 00:55:44,000 --> 00:55:47,200 Speaker 1: You got three minutes. Those are your minutes. Go nuts 871 00:55:47,200 --> 00:55:50,960 Speaker 1: with them. Yeah, give yourself a cool nickname. Tell us 872 00:55:51,040 --> 00:55:54,440 Speaker 1: what's on your mind. Most importantly, tell us if we 873 00:55:54,480 --> 00:55:57,920 Speaker 1: can use your name and or message on the air. 874 00:55:58,239 --> 00:56:01,520 Speaker 1: If you are saying I don't like social media, I 875 00:56:01,520 --> 00:56:06,480 Speaker 1: don't like votes. What I like is emails, then we 876 00:56:06,520 --> 00:56:09,560 Speaker 1: got your back there too. You can always drop us 877 00:56:09,560 --> 00:56:12,600 Speaker 1: a line anytime of day, any country you live in, 878 00:56:12,960 --> 00:56:16,560 Speaker 1: as long as you have an Internet connection. Send us 879 00:56:16,600 --> 00:56:18,520 Speaker 1: a good old fashioned letter at. 880 00:56:18,440 --> 00:56:20,640 Speaker 2: The place where we read every single email that we 881 00:56:20,840 --> 00:56:42,600 Speaker 2: get conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com. 882 00:56:42,760 --> 00:56:44,800 Speaker 1: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production 883 00:56:44,920 --> 00:56:49,480 Speaker 1: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, 884 00:56:49,560 --> 00:56:52,800 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,