1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:01,120 Speaker 1: There's two things happening. 2 00:00:01,160 --> 00:00:04,360 Speaker 2: One thing is there's real things that happen, real tragic 3 00:00:04,680 --> 00:00:08,160 Speaker 2: school shootings, and everybody is aware of when they happen, 4 00:00:08,600 --> 00:00:11,000 Speaker 2: and so that's in the back of everyone's mind, from 5 00:00:11,119 --> 00:00:13,840 Speaker 2: student all the way through everyone else in the district. 6 00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:17,119 Speaker 2: But then there's these fake incidents that equally take a 7 00:00:17,239 --> 00:00:19,960 Speaker 2: toll because we have to communicate them, we have to 8 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:24,360 Speaker 2: respond to them. 9 00:00:24,400 --> 00:00:30,680 Speaker 3: From Bloomberg News and iHeartRadio, it's the big take, I'm 10 00:00:30,680 --> 00:00:36,400 Speaker 3: West Kasova today, a new kind of intruder in America's schools. 11 00:00:45,640 --> 00:00:49,040 Speaker 3: Drills to prepare for an active shooter are now sadly 12 00:00:49,120 --> 00:00:53,040 Speaker 3: a routine part of life for students and teachers across 13 00:00:53,080 --> 00:00:56,840 Speaker 3: the US, And if that weren't stressful enough, schools are 14 00:00:56,880 --> 00:00:59,760 Speaker 3: now seeing a sharp increase in the number of false 15 00:00:59,800 --> 00:01:02,920 Speaker 3: threat It's like bomb scares or reports of violence that 16 00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:08,040 Speaker 3: are intended to create chaos. The police rush in, the school, 17 00:01:08,120 --> 00:01:13,000 Speaker 3: goes into lockdown, and kids and their parents are unnerved. Today, 18 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:17,679 Speaker 3: Bloomberg cybersecurity reporter Jeff Stone tells us about the proliferation 19 00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:19,360 Speaker 3: of these swatting events. 20 00:01:19,360 --> 00:01:22,119 Speaker 4: That's what they're called for less than one hundred dollars 21 00:01:22,200 --> 00:01:24,720 Speaker 4: in some cases, these services will say that we will 22 00:01:24,840 --> 00:01:28,280 Speaker 4: dial this school or this business and we will make 23 00:01:28,959 --> 00:01:29,839 Speaker 4: X kind of threat. 24 00:01:30,000 --> 00:01:31,720 Speaker 3: And later in the show, you. 25 00:01:31,680 --> 00:01:33,920 Speaker 2: Know, there's the securing of the building itself, but then 26 00:01:33,959 --> 00:01:37,480 Speaker 2: there's the where did this message come from part of it, 27 00:01:37,560 --> 00:01:41,520 Speaker 2: and so that's something that we would do with the police. 28 00:01:41,840 --> 00:01:45,280 Speaker 3: That's Matt Landahl. He's a school superintendent in New York 29 00:01:45,319 --> 00:01:48,600 Speaker 3: who's had to send his schools into lockdown twice in 30 00:01:48,680 --> 00:01:54,640 Speaker 3: the last two months after swatters threatened violence. Jeff, let's 31 00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:57,520 Speaker 3: just start with the BaseX. What is a swatting incident? 32 00:01:58,280 --> 00:02:01,280 Speaker 4: A swatting incident roughly is and there's a false report. 33 00:02:01,440 --> 00:02:06,200 Speaker 4: Often it's a hoax of someone phoning in a emergency 34 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:09,839 Speaker 4: to a local police department. Often that police department will 35 00:02:09,840 --> 00:02:12,519 Speaker 4: then respond in force, whether it be a swat team 36 00:02:12,760 --> 00:02:16,720 Speaker 4: or officers with guns drawn to a school, to a home. 37 00:02:17,040 --> 00:02:21,560 Speaker 4: Residents or business People on the internet often are phoning 38 00:02:21,560 --> 00:02:25,160 Speaker 4: in these fake events and reporting an active shooter situation 39 00:02:25,280 --> 00:02:28,600 Speaker 4: that doesn't seem to exist, or a bomb threat or 40 00:02:29,120 --> 00:02:31,920 Speaker 4: another emergency that would really induce the kind of panic 41 00:02:31,960 --> 00:02:33,959 Speaker 4: that no one would want to experience in their life. 42 00:02:34,480 --> 00:02:37,040 Speaker 3: And they call this swatting because it's kind of calling 43 00:02:37,120 --> 00:02:38,800 Speaker 3: in the SWAT team. 44 00:02:39,200 --> 00:02:39,600 Speaker 1: That's right. 45 00:02:39,680 --> 00:02:41,880 Speaker 4: So the result is that you might be a principal 46 00:02:41,960 --> 00:02:44,119 Speaker 4: or a teacher or a student at a school. Everything's 47 00:02:44,160 --> 00:02:47,920 Speaker 4: going completely normally, and then the trucks pull in. There 48 00:02:47,919 --> 00:02:53,200 Speaker 4: are helicopters hovering overhead. There is a fleet of emergency vehicles, 49 00:02:53,360 --> 00:02:56,760 Speaker 4: multiple fire departments responding to an emergency that doesn't exist. 50 00:02:57,680 --> 00:03:01,040 Speaker 3: Jeff, We're seeing this happening all over the country, and 51 00:03:01,080 --> 00:03:04,040 Speaker 3: it's happening a lot. What exactly is going on? 52 00:03:04,600 --> 00:03:08,440 Speaker 4: There have been four hundred and one documented false reports 53 00:03:08,520 --> 00:03:11,160 Speaker 4: of this kind since the beginning of the school year 54 00:03:11,200 --> 00:03:14,200 Speaker 4: back in September. To give you an idea of the 55 00:03:14,240 --> 00:03:17,840 Speaker 4: magnitude of that growth, In twenty eighteen twenty nineteen, there 56 00:03:17,880 --> 00:03:21,040 Speaker 4: were sixty nine false reports of this kind. You know, 57 00:03:21,120 --> 00:03:23,440 Speaker 4: in the fall of twenty nineteen, just prior to the 58 00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:27,120 Speaker 4: coronavirus shutting so many schools down, there were twenty two reports. 59 00:03:27,240 --> 00:03:30,239 Speaker 4: Compared to this past fall, there were two hundred and 60 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:33,320 Speaker 4: fifty six. When I was a kid, you know, a 61 00:03:33,360 --> 00:03:37,120 Speaker 4: generation ago, it wasn't as urgent, that threat didn't seem 62 00:03:37,160 --> 00:03:39,440 Speaker 4: as real as it actually could be today, whereas now 63 00:03:39,920 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 4: there's generations of kids that are growing up with the 64 00:03:42,640 --> 00:03:46,720 Speaker 4: specter of violence, real or imagined, hanging over their normal 65 00:03:46,840 --> 00:03:50,200 Speaker 4: school day. It's the kind of thing that researchers are 66 00:03:50,240 --> 00:03:55,160 Speaker 4: trying to understand possible effects of trauma on academic work 67 00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:58,680 Speaker 4: and psychology, emotional health, that kind of thing. It's very 68 00:03:58,720 --> 00:04:00,160 Speaker 4: difficult in track. 69 00:04:00,280 --> 00:04:03,160 Speaker 3: Really, especially when we have a situation now where there 70 00:04:03,160 --> 00:04:06,240 Speaker 3: are so many school shootings that teachers are being trained, 71 00:04:06,360 --> 00:04:10,000 Speaker 3: that schools are buying all sorts of equipment to protect 72 00:04:10,080 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 3: kids if this happens. You see things like backpacks that 73 00:04:13,120 --> 00:04:15,880 Speaker 3: have bulletproof linings in them, and so if somebody calls 74 00:04:15,920 --> 00:04:18,279 Speaker 3: in a threat, they're going to take it seriously, even 75 00:04:18,279 --> 00:04:19,560 Speaker 3: if it doesn't sound credible. 76 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:24,080 Speaker 4: You can't be the principal or the teacher who says 77 00:04:24,200 --> 00:04:27,560 Speaker 4: this isn't happening, because the stakes of being wrong are 78 00:04:28,200 --> 00:04:31,960 Speaker 4: so high, you know, literally can cost you know, many 79 00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:34,760 Speaker 4: lives in the event that you're wrong. So the cost 80 00:04:34,800 --> 00:04:38,599 Speaker 4: of your day being disrupted by an emergency situation is 81 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:40,800 Speaker 4: still better than the alternative, you know, in the event 82 00:04:40,839 --> 00:04:43,359 Speaker 4: that you're wrong about that. There seems to be a 83 00:04:43,400 --> 00:04:46,520 Speaker 4: few factors at play here. One of them is that 84 00:04:46,880 --> 00:04:52,520 Speaker 4: one incident like this begets more incidents the copycat problem exactly. 85 00:04:52,640 --> 00:04:55,279 Speaker 4: Just like when there's a actual school shooting, there are 86 00:04:56,000 --> 00:04:59,960 Speaker 4: further threats of other school shootings, you know, real or 87 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:03,160 Speaker 4: imagine again around the country that seems to be happening here. 88 00:05:03,360 --> 00:05:06,520 Speaker 4: What's also happening here is there appears to be more coordination. 89 00:05:06,680 --> 00:05:08,760 Speaker 4: We know of the FBI is investigating, we know there's 90 00:05:08,800 --> 00:05:11,640 Speaker 4: all kinds of police forces investigating. Because if there's one 91 00:05:11,640 --> 00:05:15,960 Speaker 4: incident in say rural New York State, that same county 92 00:05:16,120 --> 00:05:19,600 Speaker 4: will be affected in multiple schools over span of days. 93 00:05:19,720 --> 00:05:21,960 Speaker 4: Then it goes away for a while, it might hit 94 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:26,479 Speaker 4: somewhere else, say Texas, Michigan, somewhere in California, and the 95 00:05:26,480 --> 00:05:30,240 Speaker 4: problem continues to spread in clusters around the nation rather 96 00:05:30,279 --> 00:05:31,200 Speaker 4: than single schools. 97 00:05:32,600 --> 00:05:36,159 Speaker 3: And did they think that this is organized or that 98 00:05:36,440 --> 00:05:39,800 Speaker 3: this is happening a lot but by a lot of 99 00:05:39,800 --> 00:05:42,400 Speaker 3: different people, a little bit of both. 100 00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:46,279 Speaker 4: There appears to be some evidence that there are individuals 101 00:05:46,360 --> 00:05:48,760 Speaker 4: doing this within the United States. There have been a 102 00:05:48,839 --> 00:05:52,720 Speaker 4: number of young people ages you know, sixteen, even a 103 00:05:52,760 --> 00:05:56,119 Speaker 4: little bit younger up to early twenties calling in fake 104 00:05:56,360 --> 00:05:58,800 Speaker 4: threats like this. There's not a lot known about this, 105 00:05:58,880 --> 00:06:02,920 Speaker 4: but there's also some evidence that people are using voice 106 00:06:03,120 --> 00:06:07,040 Speaker 4: disguising technology from outside the country trying to influence local 107 00:06:07,040 --> 00:06:10,560 Speaker 4: police departments within the United States to play on very 108 00:06:10,560 --> 00:06:13,080 Speaker 4: real and existing fears of violence and schools. 109 00:06:14,160 --> 00:06:18,479 Speaker 3: Jeff, you've reported on one school called Granite City High School. 110 00:06:18,680 --> 00:06:20,040 Speaker 3: Can you tell us what happened there? 111 00:06:21,279 --> 00:06:23,880 Speaker 4: On the morning of April twelve, students and teachers in 112 00:06:23,920 --> 00:06:26,960 Speaker 4: Granite City High in Granite City, Illinois were sitting down 113 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:31,120 Speaker 4: for tests and getting ready for SATs, the dreaded college 114 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:35,440 Speaker 4: admissions eligibility tests, and all psyched up ready to go. 115 00:06:35,480 --> 00:06:38,240 Speaker 4: There were about fifteen hundred students on hand that day, 116 00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:42,520 Speaker 4: plus staff, teachers, and administrators. Everything seemed to be going normally. 117 00:06:42,600 --> 00:06:46,600 Speaker 4: It was a nice day. When two police helicopters started 118 00:06:46,640 --> 00:06:50,920 Speaker 4: floating overhead. Ultimately sixteen law enforcement agencies were on hand. 119 00:06:51,640 --> 00:06:54,320 Speaker 4: They kind of appeared out of the blue, according to 120 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:58,600 Speaker 4: the superintendent. It turns out someone had called in a 121 00:06:58,680 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 4: fake active show to the local police department. Rather than 122 00:07:02,480 --> 00:07:04,960 Speaker 4: calling nine to one one, they used a non emergency 123 00:07:05,040 --> 00:07:08,960 Speaker 4: phone line, triggering this response. The police department apparently did 124 00:07:09,040 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 4: not communicate with the school. They appeared at the school 125 00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:15,960 Speaker 4: fully ready to go, armed, swept through the hallways. School 126 00:07:16,040 --> 00:07:19,440 Speaker 4: students were on lockdown, a lot of kids were held 127 00:07:19,520 --> 00:07:23,840 Speaker 4: in their testing rooms and really going through all of 128 00:07:23,880 --> 00:07:25,880 Speaker 4: the procedures that you would expect in the event that 129 00:07:25,920 --> 00:07:28,480 Speaker 4: there was a real event. Ultimately, the police were in 130 00:07:28,520 --> 00:07:32,080 Speaker 4: and out within a few hours, but still testing was rescheduled. 131 00:07:32,240 --> 00:07:34,040 Speaker 4: Kids had to go home to their parents. Parents were 132 00:07:34,080 --> 00:07:39,080 Speaker 4: crying in the parking lot. Community wide disruption, and. 133 00:07:39,040 --> 00:07:41,240 Speaker 3: You talked to the superintendent of the school and she 134 00:07:41,320 --> 00:07:42,280 Speaker 3: was pretty rattled. 135 00:07:42,960 --> 00:07:45,640 Speaker 4: She still rattled a few weeks later. She also said, Hey, 136 00:07:45,640 --> 00:07:49,160 Speaker 4: by the way, this happened before. So while this is 137 00:07:49,200 --> 00:07:51,560 Speaker 4: the first time in Granite City, this has happened in 138 00:07:51,640 --> 00:07:54,200 Speaker 4: previous schools in the community. So a lot of the 139 00:07:54,240 --> 00:07:58,800 Speaker 4: teachers who had prior roles at those educational institutions, this superintendent, 140 00:07:58,880 --> 00:08:02,040 Speaker 4: they're still being brought back to a negative place in 141 00:08:02,080 --> 00:08:05,080 Speaker 4: their mind about prior threats like this. They're happening all 142 00:08:05,080 --> 00:08:07,720 Speaker 4: over the country. Buffalo, New York, just went through a 143 00:08:07,880 --> 00:08:11,520 Speaker 4: big cluster of these. The school superintendent there sent out 144 00:08:11,520 --> 00:08:14,160 Speaker 4: a proactive alert saying, we're aware of this issue popping 145 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:16,960 Speaker 4: up all over the US. We know the FBI is investigating, 146 00:08:17,800 --> 00:08:21,440 Speaker 4: we know that there was a cluster in Nevada, affecting 147 00:08:21,480 --> 00:08:25,640 Speaker 4: some colleges and universities. We know that in Harvard there 148 00:08:25,640 --> 00:08:28,400 Speaker 4: were four young men who were held at gunpoint in 149 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:31,360 Speaker 4: their dorm by police that thought they were responding to 150 00:08:31,520 --> 00:08:32,640 Speaker 4: a incident like this. 151 00:08:33,360 --> 00:08:37,040 Speaker 3: Jeff, obviously, with this is affecting hundreds of schools, that's 152 00:08:37,120 --> 00:08:39,720 Speaker 3: a lot of teachers, a lot of administrators. What are 153 00:08:39,760 --> 00:08:43,040 Speaker 3: you hearing from them about their day to day lives 154 00:08:43,040 --> 00:08:45,959 Speaker 3: living under this constant threat that they could have their 155 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:47,079 Speaker 3: day overturned. 156 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:52,280 Speaker 4: We know that it is exhausting. I spoke with one 157 00:08:52,320 --> 00:08:56,080 Speaker 4: superintendent who after an incident earlier this month, said that 158 00:08:56,160 --> 00:08:58,440 Speaker 4: she was crying in her office on what started as 159 00:08:58,440 --> 00:09:01,200 Speaker 4: a normal day and she saw students running out and 160 00:09:01,240 --> 00:09:04,280 Speaker 4: embracing their parents. Everyone was crying. You have to remember 161 00:09:04,280 --> 00:09:06,600 Speaker 4: that a lot of these educators, in particular, are coming 162 00:09:06,640 --> 00:09:09,000 Speaker 4: off of a really tough couple of years as it is, 163 00:09:09,040 --> 00:09:11,559 Speaker 4: thanks to the coronavirus. We know that teachers are dealing 164 00:09:11,559 --> 00:09:14,760 Speaker 4: with a lot of burnout and oftentimes don't have a 165 00:09:14,800 --> 00:09:17,400 Speaker 4: ton of resources to begin with, So this really is 166 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:20,800 Speaker 4: another layer of pain and difficulty. On top of all 167 00:09:20,840 --> 00:09:24,080 Speaker 4: of that, local police departments also are trying to get 168 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:28,040 Speaker 4: up to speed on a kind of cybercrime that typically 169 00:09:28,080 --> 00:09:31,120 Speaker 4: has fallen under the jurisdiction of the FBI or federal 170 00:09:31,200 --> 00:09:35,320 Speaker 4: law enforcement. This is a difficult thing to investigate when 171 00:09:35,360 --> 00:09:38,400 Speaker 4: some of these fake threats come in. It's using a 172 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:42,400 Speaker 4: kind of technology that is not easy to detect by 173 00:09:42,440 --> 00:09:45,360 Speaker 4: reverse dialing a number, for instance, or trying to locate 174 00:09:45,480 --> 00:09:47,920 Speaker 4: where someone is. So it's a huge challenge. It's a 175 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:51,200 Speaker 4: lot of frustration. It's leading to a more urgency in 176 00:09:51,280 --> 00:09:55,480 Speaker 4: terms of community collaboration between schools and police departments and 177 00:09:55,640 --> 00:09:57,360 Speaker 4: practicing for scenarios like this. 178 00:10:00,120 --> 00:10:03,280 Speaker 3: Do they have much success in catching people given how 179 00:10:03,280 --> 00:10:05,679 Speaker 3: hard it is, like in Granite City? Did they ever 180 00:10:05,679 --> 00:10:06,560 Speaker 3: find out who did it? 181 00:10:07,520 --> 00:10:07,600 Speaker 1: No? 182 00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:10,960 Speaker 4: We know that police departments in the FBI are investigating 183 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:14,320 Speaker 4: this with a lot of urgency. For the hundreds of 184 00:10:14,600 --> 00:10:17,280 Speaker 4: swatting incidents that have occurred that we know of this year, 185 00:10:17,600 --> 00:10:21,520 Speaker 4: only a handful of people have been arrested, and often 186 00:10:21,559 --> 00:10:25,200 Speaker 4: their charge with a kind of mischief or making terroristic threats. 187 00:10:25,280 --> 00:10:28,640 Speaker 4: There doesn't appear to be a lot of coordination between 188 00:10:28,679 --> 00:10:31,720 Speaker 4: the suspects who have been arrested over the past few months. 189 00:10:31,920 --> 00:10:34,600 Speaker 4: This is a generational problem for the Internet. It used 190 00:10:34,600 --> 00:10:37,600 Speaker 4: to be that individuals would be targeted with swatting incidents. 191 00:10:38,000 --> 00:10:42,439 Speaker 4: We know of one guy allegedly who had hacked Amazon's 192 00:10:42,679 --> 00:10:46,880 Speaker 4: ring doorbells and would phone in fake swatting incidents, and 193 00:10:46,960 --> 00:10:49,400 Speaker 4: when the police would arrive, they'd be standing outside someone's 194 00:10:49,440 --> 00:10:52,680 Speaker 4: home and this perpetrator would taunt the police through the 195 00:10:52,760 --> 00:10:56,680 Speaker 4: ring doorbell, just completely infuriating the officers who thought they 196 00:10:56,720 --> 00:10:58,560 Speaker 4: were responding to a hostage scenario. 197 00:11:00,000 --> 00:11:12,200 Speaker 3: When we come back, swatting has now become a business, Jeff. 198 00:11:12,240 --> 00:11:16,000 Speaker 3: It's not just individuals who are calling in these false threads. Unbelievably, 199 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:20,720 Speaker 3: there are automated swatting services that a person can pay 200 00:11:20,840 --> 00:11:24,400 Speaker 3: to create a swatting event for them. What is that 201 00:11:24,480 --> 00:11:25,520 Speaker 3: and how does it work. 202 00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:29,520 Speaker 4: There's a kind of technology called voice over IP tech 203 00:11:30,080 --> 00:11:32,880 Speaker 4: that has been available for years. Essentially, what that allows 204 00:11:32,920 --> 00:11:35,800 Speaker 4: you to do is disguise your real phone number and 205 00:11:35,920 --> 00:11:39,080 Speaker 4: use a specific area code so that it looks like 206 00:11:39,120 --> 00:11:42,280 Speaker 4: you're calling from an area where they're actually receiving the call. 207 00:11:42,320 --> 00:11:44,880 Speaker 4: A lot of your listeners might be familiar with the 208 00:11:44,960 --> 00:11:47,160 Speaker 4: kind of spam or marketing calls that already use this 209 00:11:47,240 --> 00:11:49,120 Speaker 4: kind of thing. That make it more likely that you'll 210 00:11:49,160 --> 00:11:52,079 Speaker 4: pick up your phone if it's from a local caller. Concerningly, 211 00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:56,640 Speaker 4: there are automated services that are available on different kinds 212 00:11:56,640 --> 00:12:01,040 Speaker 4: of chat apps, in different illicit channels that to essentially 213 00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:05,080 Speaker 4: launch a swatting incident for you for less than one 214 00:12:05,160 --> 00:12:07,760 Speaker 4: hundred dollars. In some cases, these services will say that 215 00:12:07,920 --> 00:12:11,400 Speaker 4: we will dial this school or this business and we 216 00:12:11,480 --> 00:12:14,480 Speaker 4: will make X kind of threat, and we expect this 217 00:12:15,120 --> 00:12:18,199 Speaker 4: result to happen, whether it be somebody being arrested, or 218 00:12:18,400 --> 00:12:21,360 Speaker 4: oftentimes they imply that someone might be hurt. So it's 219 00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:24,960 Speaker 4: not quite the level of hiring a hitman, but it 220 00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:27,280 Speaker 4: is the kind of thing that has had fatal consequences 221 00:12:27,320 --> 00:12:27,760 Speaker 4: in the past. 222 00:12:29,040 --> 00:12:32,920 Speaker 3: You also talked about how some of these calls seem 223 00:12:33,000 --> 00:12:36,160 Speaker 3: to have originated from overseas, which is a whole different 224 00:12:36,240 --> 00:12:40,000 Speaker 3: kind of thing. Our investigators looking into the possibility that 225 00:12:40,040 --> 00:12:43,880 Speaker 3: this is organized threats by foreign governments just looking to 226 00:12:43,920 --> 00:12:45,920 Speaker 3: cause kind of mayhem in disruption. 227 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:49,840 Speaker 4: There's no indication that we're aware of that there's a 228 00:12:49,960 --> 00:12:52,640 Speaker 4: foreign government behind this. It does seem like some of 229 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:55,760 Speaker 4: this activities is coordinated by people who certainly know what 230 00:12:55,800 --> 00:12:59,120 Speaker 4: they're doing. What makes swatting a little bit different from 231 00:12:59,280 --> 00:13:02,479 Speaker 4: a more typical threat is that there's no clear monetary 232 00:13:02,520 --> 00:13:06,160 Speaker 4: gain if you are launching a swatting incident from overseas, 233 00:13:06,160 --> 00:13:09,160 Speaker 4: wherever that might be. What you're essentially doing is creating 234 00:13:09,640 --> 00:13:12,960 Speaker 4: chaos and confusion and fear in a community, But there's 235 00:13:13,080 --> 00:13:16,200 Speaker 4: not a lot of extortion that always goes into it, 236 00:13:16,320 --> 00:13:19,439 Speaker 4: or the kind of sal of stolen information that you 237 00:13:19,480 --> 00:13:21,439 Speaker 4: might typically expect from a hacking incident. This is a 238 00:13:21,480 --> 00:13:23,439 Speaker 4: little more nuanced. 239 00:13:23,040 --> 00:13:25,760 Speaker 3: I suppose, though. If you're using one of these services 240 00:13:25,880 --> 00:13:30,520 Speaker 3: to hire someone to create a swatting incident for you, 241 00:13:30,559 --> 00:13:32,679 Speaker 3: there's no telling where that person is. A lot of 242 00:13:32,760 --> 00:13:35,480 Speaker 3: the call centers where scams come in, where they try 243 00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:37,640 Speaker 3: to swindle people out of money, those are based overseas. 244 00:13:38,280 --> 00:13:39,599 Speaker 4: That's correct, And we know that a lot of the 245 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:42,079 Speaker 4: people who are doing this kind of activity are using 246 00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:45,760 Speaker 4: virtual private networks, which are a really good way at 247 00:13:45,760 --> 00:13:49,360 Speaker 4: cloaking your location and ensuring that it's really difficult to 248 00:13:49,400 --> 00:13:51,920 Speaker 4: identify what kind of computer you're contacting them from or 249 00:13:51,920 --> 00:13:54,360 Speaker 4: what your true number is. So that's another complicating step 250 00:13:54,360 --> 00:13:55,160 Speaker 4: for investigators. 251 00:13:56,240 --> 00:13:59,760 Speaker 3: So politicians are obviously starting to take notice of this 252 00:14:00,040 --> 00:14:01,559 Speaker 3: victually locally. 253 00:14:01,480 --> 00:14:03,800 Speaker 5: And I want to reassure parents that the State of 254 00:14:03,800 --> 00:14:07,880 Speaker 5: New York takes us very seriously. It is incredibly, incredibly 255 00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:10,320 Speaker 5: stressed on our families at this time, and there's nothing 256 00:14:10,360 --> 00:14:12,920 Speaker 5: we want more than to restore some sense of common 257 00:14:12,960 --> 00:14:15,240 Speaker 5: normalcy for our kids who've been through so much over 258 00:14:15,240 --> 00:14:16,080 Speaker 5: the last few years. 259 00:14:16,760 --> 00:14:19,760 Speaker 3: What is the response from elected official has. 260 00:14:19,760 --> 00:14:24,040 Speaker 4: Been so far panic and a scramble to show that 261 00:14:24,080 --> 00:14:28,360 Speaker 4: they are paying attention. The solutions, frankly, are difficult to 262 00:14:28,400 --> 00:14:30,600 Speaker 4: discern how they will make a major difference, But I 263 00:14:30,640 --> 00:14:32,240 Speaker 4: think that a lot of the goal here is to 264 00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:35,280 Speaker 4: kind of start a conversation about this larger problem and 265 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:39,560 Speaker 4: ensure that schools and administrators and teachers are trained for 266 00:14:39,720 --> 00:14:42,240 Speaker 4: situations where if they need to be in contact with 267 00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:45,280 Speaker 4: the police, they're able to do that efficiently. In some cases, 268 00:14:45,840 --> 00:14:50,080 Speaker 4: researchers and school safety experts are recommending that schools will 269 00:14:50,120 --> 00:14:54,560 Speaker 4: go through simple tasks like making sure that everyone knows 270 00:14:54,560 --> 00:14:57,560 Speaker 4: where the emergency exit is, which isn't always clear, or 271 00:14:57,680 --> 00:15:00,680 Speaker 4: ensuring that everyone can hear the PA system, or ensuring 272 00:15:00,720 --> 00:15:04,080 Speaker 4: that a superintendent is able to quickly reach parents to 273 00:15:04,160 --> 00:15:08,360 Speaker 4: assuage any concerns about an active shooter. Situation and remind 274 00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:09,200 Speaker 4: them that it isn't real. 275 00:15:11,040 --> 00:15:13,160 Speaker 3: As you're reporting on this story, and I imagine you're 276 00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:15,080 Speaker 3: gonna be writing about it quite a lot, what's the 277 00:15:15,080 --> 00:15:17,360 Speaker 3: next thing that we should be watching for. 278 00:15:18,040 --> 00:15:20,640 Speaker 4: We are trying to understand more about the perpetrators and 279 00:15:20,720 --> 00:15:23,800 Speaker 4: really the motive behind some of these crimes. We know 280 00:15:24,040 --> 00:15:27,520 Speaker 4: that when there are teenagers or young people who are 281 00:15:27,520 --> 00:15:30,440 Speaker 4: behind this kind of thing, a lot of the explanation 282 00:15:30,800 --> 00:15:33,200 Speaker 4: is that their brains aren't fully developed. You know, it 283 00:15:33,320 --> 00:15:36,520 Speaker 4: might be more interesting to be standing outside while the 284 00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:38,920 Speaker 4: police sweep your school than to be sitting in third 285 00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:41,120 Speaker 4: period and taking an exam that you didn't study for. 286 00:15:41,680 --> 00:15:44,359 Speaker 4: There does those seem to be a level of coordination, 287 00:15:44,400 --> 00:15:47,320 Speaker 4: as you alluded to, that is indicative of a larger 288 00:15:47,560 --> 00:15:51,600 Speaker 4: problem that we and perhaps you know, more organized police 289 00:15:51,680 --> 00:15:55,400 Speaker 4: forces with subpoena power don't fully grasp the meaning of yet. 290 00:15:56,040 --> 00:15:57,680 Speaker 3: Jeff, thanks so much for coming on the show. 291 00:15:58,040 --> 00:16:00,000 Speaker 4: Thank you. 292 00:16:00,320 --> 00:16:02,800 Speaker 3: When we come back, we hear from a school superintendent 293 00:16:02,920 --> 00:16:15,400 Speaker 3: who's had to deal with these swatting events. Our supervising producer, 294 00:16:15,520 --> 00:16:19,440 Speaker 3: Vicki Vigolina, has two kids in middle school and she's 295 00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:23,920 Speaker 3: experienced these school swatting incidents twice in the last two months. 296 00:16:23,960 --> 00:16:26,800 Speaker 3: Along with her husband and kids and all the other parents, 297 00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:33,120 Speaker 3: teachers and administrators. She spoke to her district superintendent of schools. 298 00:16:33,760 --> 00:16:37,240 Speaker 2: My name is Matts Landall and I'm the superintendent of 299 00:16:37,280 --> 00:16:38,640 Speaker 2: the beacon Cy School District. 300 00:16:39,040 --> 00:16:42,560 Speaker 3: Here's their conversation about what actually happens when a threat 301 00:16:42,600 --> 00:16:43,320 Speaker 3: is called in. 302 00:16:44,800 --> 00:16:48,360 Speaker 6: Doctor Landall, you have been leading this district since twenty seventeen. 303 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:50,960 Speaker 6: You let it through the outbreak of COVID, you let 304 00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:54,040 Speaker 6: it through online schooling and the slow but short return 305 00:16:54,120 --> 00:16:57,600 Speaker 6: to classes. But recently you are, along with many other 306 00:16:57,640 --> 00:17:00,880 Speaker 6: school leaders around the country, navigating a new sort of chaos, 307 00:17:00,960 --> 00:17:03,760 Speaker 6: which is these calls to the district involving threats to 308 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:07,320 Speaker 6: the schools. What happens when you receive this call, when 309 00:17:07,320 --> 00:17:09,880 Speaker 6: you receive a threat like this, what has to happen logistically? 310 00:17:11,200 --> 00:17:14,400 Speaker 2: Well, the one we got in February, the call actually 311 00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:18,040 Speaker 2: went into the police department instead of us, and so 312 00:17:18,480 --> 00:17:21,320 Speaker 2: they were both notifying us that they received the call 313 00:17:21,400 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 2: and rushing over. 314 00:17:23,119 --> 00:17:27,399 Speaker 1: To the school to see what was going on or 315 00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:28,240 Speaker 1: to intervene. 316 00:17:28,680 --> 00:17:31,679 Speaker 2: The one we had where recently was like an online 317 00:17:31,840 --> 00:17:36,160 Speaker 2: comment on an online site, and so that was then 318 00:17:36,240 --> 00:17:39,080 Speaker 2: forwarded to us. We have a full time director of 319 00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:42,680 Speaker 2: security in our district and he's pretty much on call 320 00:17:42,760 --> 00:17:45,320 Speaker 2: twenty four to seven along with us, and so we 321 00:17:45,359 --> 00:17:47,920 Speaker 2: called him that evening and then he kind of helps us, lease, 322 00:17:47,960 --> 00:17:50,359 Speaker 2: I'm with the police, and so he immediately started working 323 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:53,000 Speaker 2: with the police. There's a lot of circumstance around how 324 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:55,560 Speaker 2: you respond to each one, but you obviously respond immediately 325 00:17:55,640 --> 00:17:59,000 Speaker 2: and you do kind of trigger all the training and. 326 00:17:59,000 --> 00:18:00,600 Speaker 1: Practice and what's in our plan. 327 00:18:01,119 --> 00:18:03,040 Speaker 2: What I found over the years in dealing with this 328 00:18:03,160 --> 00:18:06,919 Speaker 2: and these ones more recently are obviously pretty troubling, but 329 00:18:07,280 --> 00:18:11,440 Speaker 2: you never know when it's coming and you just respond 330 00:18:11,520 --> 00:18:12,040 Speaker 2: right away. 331 00:18:12,119 --> 00:18:14,120 Speaker 1: And what's great is there's a bunch. 332 00:18:13,960 --> 00:18:15,920 Speaker 2: Of other people who kind of have that twenty four 333 00:18:15,960 --> 00:18:17,960 Speaker 2: to seven part of their job, and so you know, 334 00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:20,119 Speaker 2: the police are always there no matter what time, and 335 00:18:20,520 --> 00:18:23,000 Speaker 2: administrators are on call, and we just start working through it. 336 00:18:23,480 --> 00:18:26,919 Speaker 2: The last part of it is once you've started to 337 00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:30,040 Speaker 2: figure out what to do, you start really working on 338 00:18:30,080 --> 00:18:34,320 Speaker 2: how you communicate it to obviously staff, but also then 339 00:18:34,440 --> 00:18:36,960 Speaker 2: to parents and how quickly can you do that, And 340 00:18:37,040 --> 00:18:39,960 Speaker 2: so it's something unfortunately we have a fair amount of 341 00:18:39,960 --> 00:18:43,119 Speaker 2: practice doing and like I said, everyone is like a 342 00:18:43,160 --> 00:18:44,200 Speaker 2: little different. 343 00:18:44,920 --> 00:18:47,399 Speaker 6: And what has to be established to get sort of 344 00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:50,600 Speaker 6: that all clear. At what point do you feel confident 345 00:18:51,119 --> 00:18:54,560 Speaker 6: to communicate to the community, Hey, we're all okay. 346 00:18:55,240 --> 00:18:57,359 Speaker 2: You know, there's the securing of the building itself, but 347 00:18:57,400 --> 00:19:00,760 Speaker 2: then there's the where did this message come from part 348 00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:03,399 Speaker 2: of it, and so that's something that we would do 349 00:19:04,280 --> 00:19:08,120 Speaker 2: with the police, and then that's something we can communicate out, 350 00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:10,159 Speaker 2: and that is, you know, the police going through a 351 00:19:10,200 --> 00:19:13,560 Speaker 2: building and working with us in terms of making sure 352 00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:15,080 Speaker 2: the building is entirely secure. 353 00:19:15,800 --> 00:19:17,120 Speaker 1: The second part of it. 354 00:19:17,000 --> 00:19:18,840 Speaker 2: Is, you know, what they've been able to get a 355 00:19:18,880 --> 00:19:21,399 Speaker 2: lot better at is they start finding out where the 356 00:19:21,440 --> 00:19:24,720 Speaker 2: message is from. And this is I think police departments 357 00:19:24,760 --> 00:19:27,320 Speaker 2: just not even ours, but just sort of all over 358 00:19:27,359 --> 00:19:30,720 Speaker 2: the place are either doing it themselves or working with 359 00:19:30,920 --> 00:19:34,560 Speaker 2: state entities or federal entities in terms of tracking down 360 00:19:34,640 --> 00:19:39,600 Speaker 2: like IP addresses and working with technology social media companies that. 361 00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:40,600 Speaker 1: All that kind of stuff. 362 00:19:40,960 --> 00:19:42,840 Speaker 2: What I found is they've gotten a lot quicker at 363 00:19:42,880 --> 00:19:46,439 Speaker 2: finding out where the either the comment or even the 364 00:19:46,440 --> 00:19:47,000 Speaker 2: phone calls. 365 00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:48,680 Speaker 1: Sometimes that's obviously. 366 00:19:48,280 --> 00:19:50,719 Speaker 2: Not what I'm involved in it all, but they've been 367 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:53,960 Speaker 2: able to do those things really quickly with us this year, 368 00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:56,280 Speaker 2: and unfortunately, I think it's something they've gotten better at 369 00:19:56,320 --> 00:19:59,879 Speaker 2: dealing with too. But that part has been a good change. 370 00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:02,240 Speaker 2: They're able to get to the bottom pretty quickly. 371 00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:06,920 Speaker 6: I wanted to ask how well equipped personnel wise school 372 00:20:06,960 --> 00:20:10,600 Speaker 6: administrators such as yourself and law enforcement. It sounds like 373 00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:12,840 Speaker 6: you're pretty well equipped to deal with these, but they're 374 00:20:12,880 --> 00:20:15,760 Speaker 6: ever increasing. Has the personnel had to shift? 375 00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:20,440 Speaker 2: Five years ago, it was, you know a few months 376 00:20:20,480 --> 00:20:25,480 Speaker 2: after the Parkland school shooting. We have security monitors or 377 00:20:25,520 --> 00:20:28,159 Speaker 2: cards and all of our schools, but we developed the 378 00:20:28,160 --> 00:20:29,760 Speaker 2: position of directors security. 379 00:20:30,119 --> 00:20:32,000 Speaker 1: So that was a change that was kind of. 380 00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:35,080 Speaker 2: Not a direct response to the Parkland shooting, but everything 381 00:20:35,080 --> 00:20:38,080 Speaker 2: we were dealing with that year we developed that position. 382 00:20:38,400 --> 00:20:42,199 Speaker 2: He's a retired police officer and he's super helpful. Like 383 00:20:42,240 --> 00:20:44,359 Speaker 2: I said, you know, he's on call twenty four to 384 00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:46,320 Speaker 2: seven in a sense to help us deal with stuff. 385 00:20:46,920 --> 00:20:49,720 Speaker 2: So that is a position that probably twenty or thirty 386 00:20:49,800 --> 00:20:52,840 Speaker 2: years ago, like no school district was even thinking of having. 387 00:20:52,960 --> 00:20:55,399 Speaker 1: So that's certainly a new allocation. 388 00:20:55,600 --> 00:20:59,560 Speaker 2: We have, you know, different technology, like pretty sophisticated cameras 389 00:20:59,560 --> 00:21:03,040 Speaker 2: in the schools and security systems and things like that 390 00:21:03,040 --> 00:21:05,320 Speaker 2: that you know, the status helped pay for, but those 391 00:21:05,359 --> 00:21:08,439 Speaker 2: are things that districts weren't thinking about having ten or 392 00:21:08,440 --> 00:21:11,760 Speaker 2: twenty years ago probably either, you know, building principles and 393 00:21:11,760 --> 00:21:13,720 Speaker 2: people like me spend a lot of time on this 394 00:21:13,720 --> 00:21:16,560 Speaker 2: stuff too, And I think it's really just kind of 395 00:21:16,560 --> 00:21:19,280 Speaker 2: become part of the job that day that the more 396 00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:20,320 Speaker 2: recent thing happened. 397 00:21:20,359 --> 00:21:21,480 Speaker 1: It's just like the whole day. 398 00:21:21,520 --> 00:21:24,960 Speaker 2: You just sort of lose that day or more with 399 00:21:25,000 --> 00:21:25,680 Speaker 2: whatever you. 400 00:21:25,560 --> 00:21:28,000 Speaker 1: Had planned for that day. And obviously that's part of 401 00:21:28,040 --> 00:21:29,159 Speaker 1: being a school. 402 00:21:28,920 --> 00:21:32,359 Speaker 2: Administrator or superintendent, so I accept that, but there is 403 00:21:32,480 --> 00:21:34,919 Speaker 2: part of that where it's a newer thing that we 404 00:21:35,000 --> 00:21:37,320 Speaker 2: deal with, and it does seem more frequent now too. 405 00:21:38,520 --> 00:21:40,919 Speaker 6: That's the bit I wanted to also ask you about 406 00:21:40,920 --> 00:21:44,399 Speaker 6: because the personal aspect of all this, You are so 407 00:21:44,880 --> 00:21:47,480 Speaker 6: calm and cool in a situation, and I have experienced 408 00:21:47,480 --> 00:21:50,400 Speaker 6: this personally because I've gotten your robo calls. But when 409 00:21:50,440 --> 00:21:53,200 Speaker 6: you joined Teach for America and decided that education was 410 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:56,480 Speaker 6: your path, did you see this as part of the trajectory. 411 00:21:58,640 --> 00:22:01,280 Speaker 1: No, I didn't see that part of it. I mean, 412 00:22:01,320 --> 00:22:03,359 Speaker 1: my very first year of being an. 413 00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:08,720 Speaker 2: Administrator, I was like an intern administrator. Was Columbine and 414 00:22:08,760 --> 00:22:10,840 Speaker 2: it kind of changed everything. And so every year I've 415 00:22:10,880 --> 00:22:13,640 Speaker 2: been an administrator, we've been dealing with this in one 416 00:22:13,640 --> 00:22:16,919 Speaker 2: way or another. You know, these swatting calls are coming 417 00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:21,560 Speaker 2: from some bad actors, right, and these are kind of 418 00:22:21,560 --> 00:22:24,439 Speaker 2: for other people to say, but it appears the intent 419 00:22:24,560 --> 00:22:26,760 Speaker 2: is to take a toll on people. And I think 420 00:22:26,760 --> 00:22:29,439 Speaker 2: it takes a toll on parents for sure, and it 421 00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:32,520 Speaker 2: certainly takes a toll on you know, teachers and staff 422 00:22:32,600 --> 00:22:35,480 Speaker 2: members and schools, and it takes a toll on administrators. 423 00:22:35,520 --> 00:22:37,560 Speaker 2: And it takes a toll on our students, like they 424 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:40,560 Speaker 2: either get the message themselves or their parents or a 425 00:22:40,640 --> 00:22:43,760 Speaker 2: teacher if it's during the day, has to figure out 426 00:22:43,760 --> 00:22:45,760 Speaker 2: a way to talk to them and keep them calm, 427 00:22:45,960 --> 00:22:46,159 Speaker 2: you know. 428 00:22:46,240 --> 00:22:47,760 Speaker 1: So it's like there's two things happening. 429 00:22:47,840 --> 00:22:51,040 Speaker 2: One thing is there's real things that happen, real tragic 430 00:22:51,359 --> 00:22:54,919 Speaker 2: school shootings, and everybody is aware of when they happen, 431 00:22:55,359 --> 00:22:58,399 Speaker 2: or almost everybody, probably our youngest students are sheltered from it. 432 00:22:58,760 --> 00:23:01,120 Speaker 2: And so that's in the back of everyone's mind, from 433 00:23:01,200 --> 00:23:03,960 Speaker 2: student all the way through everyone else in the district, 434 00:23:04,280 --> 00:23:08,040 Speaker 2: including parents. But then there's these fake incidents that equally 435 00:23:08,080 --> 00:23:10,840 Speaker 2: take a toll because we have to communicate them, we 436 00:23:10,880 --> 00:23:13,639 Speaker 2: have to respond to them. I think in like the 437 00:23:14,119 --> 00:23:18,160 Speaker 2: following our process communicating about it, it takes a toll 438 00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:22,800 Speaker 2: on everyone too, because it's like it causes anxiety and 439 00:23:22,960 --> 00:23:26,080 Speaker 2: it's hard. You know, when I had to make that 440 00:23:26,359 --> 00:23:29,360 Speaker 2: call at five point thirty in the morning a couple 441 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:31,800 Speaker 2: of weeks ago. Obviously I hate to make any of 442 00:23:31,800 --> 00:23:33,880 Speaker 2: those calls, but I really hated to do that when 443 00:23:34,680 --> 00:23:35,879 Speaker 2: we knew it was the right thing to do. We 444 00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:38,399 Speaker 2: knew everyone needed to know about it, but I also knew, 445 00:23:38,440 --> 00:23:40,679 Speaker 2: like everyone getting that call that early in the morning, 446 00:23:41,359 --> 00:23:44,199 Speaker 2: how it was just going to impact several thousand people. 447 00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:46,719 Speaker 2: And you know, it's hard to sort of know that 448 00:23:47,320 --> 00:23:50,240 Speaker 2: everyone's going to either hug their kid a little bit 449 00:23:50,320 --> 00:23:52,600 Speaker 2: tighter before putting them on the bus, or maybe even 450 00:23:52,640 --> 00:23:55,000 Speaker 2: some keeping their kids at home that day, or you know, 451 00:23:55,080 --> 00:23:57,240 Speaker 2: just all those things, or high school students or middle 452 00:23:57,240 --> 00:24:01,119 Speaker 2: school students talking about what this means for them, and. 453 00:24:00,760 --> 00:24:03,120 Speaker 1: Staff members concerned about coming to work. 454 00:24:03,520 --> 00:24:06,879 Speaker 2: So that's the part where it feels like whoever's doing 455 00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:09,040 Speaker 2: all of this, or the people that are doing this, 456 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:12,119 Speaker 2: they're taking you know, these real events that happen, and 457 00:24:12,160 --> 00:24:14,879 Speaker 2: they're just sewing more of this anxiety and fear or 458 00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:17,240 Speaker 2: trying to And so I should probably end by saying, 459 00:24:17,240 --> 00:24:20,680 Speaker 2: we really really work hard to really work through these 460 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:23,800 Speaker 2: incidents and try to be calm and reassuring, and our 461 00:24:23,880 --> 00:24:25,960 Speaker 2: staff I think does an amazing job with that too. 462 00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:29,280 Speaker 6: We should mention you're also a father and your son 463 00:24:29,359 --> 00:24:32,240 Speaker 6: is also in the district, so you know, it's all 464 00:24:32,280 --> 00:24:35,119 Speaker 6: the above for you. Wasn't there an offer of counseling 465 00:24:35,440 --> 00:24:37,880 Speaker 6: when kids came back, especially after the February one where 466 00:24:37,880 --> 00:24:39,560 Speaker 6: it was a little bit more intense. Do you want 467 00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:41,480 Speaker 6: to just speak to that a second, that that's something 468 00:24:41,520 --> 00:24:43,520 Speaker 6: that districts are doing, that's something that you're doing. 469 00:24:44,280 --> 00:24:47,239 Speaker 2: Yeah, in every district budget over the last probably four 470 00:24:47,320 --> 00:24:50,960 Speaker 2: or five years, we've increased mental health professionals in our district. 471 00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:55,560 Speaker 2: We're doing it again for next year's budget. And the 472 00:24:55,640 --> 00:24:58,720 Speaker 2: need is vast out there. I think that's well established. 473 00:24:58,920 --> 00:25:01,600 Speaker 2: But that being said, what happened at the middle school 474 00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:03,760 Speaker 2: that morning there was this swatting call went to the 475 00:25:03,760 --> 00:25:07,879 Speaker 2: police right at arrival, and so police came over, you know, 476 00:25:08,119 --> 00:25:12,000 Speaker 2: armed and ready to deal with someone trying to cause 477 00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:14,879 Speaker 2: harm in the school and so kids saw the police 478 00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:18,440 Speaker 2: coming out with long guns and fests and everything, and 479 00:25:18,560 --> 00:25:21,600 Speaker 2: that was a traumatic day for a lot of kids 480 00:25:21,600 --> 00:25:23,879 Speaker 2: at the middle school. So and we were able to 481 00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:26,720 Speaker 2: once we established that it was false and everything, parents 482 00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:28,920 Speaker 2: were allowed to pick up their kids throughout that day. 483 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:31,679 Speaker 2: We kind of put all the district mental health people 484 00:25:32,119 --> 00:25:34,359 Speaker 2: at the ready for the I think that happened on 485 00:25:34,359 --> 00:25:36,440 Speaker 2: a Friday, so they were ready on Monday for the 486 00:25:36,520 --> 00:25:38,639 Speaker 2: return of students. And there was a fair number of 487 00:25:38,720 --> 00:25:40,879 Speaker 2: kids who took us up on the offer and wanted 488 00:25:40,920 --> 00:25:43,320 Speaker 2: to talk to somebody and just talk it through. To 489 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:45,840 Speaker 2: try to offer a lot of support is like a 490 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:47,840 Speaker 2: way we can all try to get through this together. 491 00:25:48,520 --> 00:25:51,200 Speaker 6: Well, thank you. Yeah, I really appreciate your time. 492 00:25:51,359 --> 00:25:54,840 Speaker 3: Take care, Thanks for listening to us here at The 493 00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:58,399 Speaker 3: Big Take. It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. 494 00:25:58,640 --> 00:26:02,000 Speaker 3: For more shows from my Heart, visit the iHeartRadio app, 495 00:26:02,240 --> 00:26:05,359 Speaker 3: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen, and we'd love to 496 00:26:05,359 --> 00:26:08,480 Speaker 3: hear from you. Email us questions or comments to Big 497 00:26:08,520 --> 00:26:13,199 Speaker 3: Take at Bloomberg dot net. The supervising producer of The 498 00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:17,680 Speaker 3: Big Take is Vicky Bergolina. Our senior producer is Katherine Fink, 499 00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:22,000 Speaker 3: and they both produce this episode. Raphael M. Sely is 500 00:26:22,040 --> 00:26:26,120 Speaker 3: our engineer. Our original music was composed by Leo Sidrin. 501 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:30,240 Speaker 3: I'm Weskasova. We'll be back tomorrow with another big take.