WEBVTT - Biden Arrives in Brussels & the Okta Breach Details 0:00:02.800 --> 0:00:06.160 From the heart of where innovation, money and power collive 0:00:06.920 --> 0:00:11.440 in Silicon Valley and beyond. This is Bloomberg Technology with 0:00:11.480 --> 0:00:27.840 Emily Jay. I'm Emily Changing San Francisco and this is 0:00:27.880 --> 0:00:30.800 Bloomberg Technology. Coming up. In the next hour, President Biden 0:00:30.880 --> 0:00:33.720 arrives in Brussels ahead of a meeting with allies on 0:00:33.760 --> 0:00:37.120 the war in Ukraine, including a NATO summit. We will 0:00:37.159 --> 0:00:40.320 break down what to expect from this trip to Europe, 0:00:41.200 --> 0:00:44.520 plus new details on the hacking group behind the Octa breach, 0:00:44.640 --> 0:00:48.080 why they've been called laughably bad even as they've managed 0:00:48.120 --> 0:00:53.760 to infiltrate so many large scale tech companies, and Madernat 0:00:53.800 --> 0:00:57.120 says it's COVID vaccine produced a strong immune response in 0:00:57.240 --> 0:01:01.960 kids under age six, but it's only honestly effective against omocron. 0:01:02.360 --> 0:01:06.080 WHA on that. Later this hour, President Biden now in Brussels, 0:01:06.120 --> 0:01:09.000 set to meet with European leaders and attend an emergency 0:01:09.080 --> 0:01:11.520 NATO summit, the goal to show that the world is 0:01:11.680 --> 0:01:16.080 united against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg's political news director 0:01:16.160 --> 0:01:19.240 Jody Schneider with US Now, Jody, what are we expecting 0:01:19.280 --> 0:01:22.800 from this trip? What does President Biden want to convey Yeah, Emily. 0:01:22.840 --> 0:01:25.840 He wants. There's several main messages to look for from 0:01:25.880 --> 0:01:29.560 President Biden now that he's in Brussels. One will be 0:01:29.920 --> 0:01:34.600 unity that NATO and UH and the European allies and 0:01:34.680 --> 0:01:38.880 the US and the UK are united in their denunciation 0:01:39.200 --> 0:01:42.800 of Vladimir Putin and his invasion of Ukraine, and that 0:01:42.880 --> 0:01:45.520 they are doing what they can to try to stop 0:01:45.560 --> 0:01:48.720 it from going any further and to stop him UH 0:01:48.840 --> 0:01:52.480 from from uh you know, anything any gains he can 0:01:52.520 --> 0:01:55.920 make there, and to punish him for this. UH. Biden 0:01:56.040 --> 0:01:59.880 also wants to show solidarity with the European countries that 0:02:00.000 --> 0:02:03.520 are taking in so far millions of refugees from Ukraine. 0:02:03.520 --> 0:02:07.480 More than three point three million UH Ukrainians have left 0:02:07.520 --> 0:02:10.880 their country for neighboring countries. More than ten million have 0:02:11.160 --> 0:02:14.880 left their homes. Obviously some sting in Ukraine, but they 0:02:14.880 --> 0:02:17.679 have they have had to leave their homes and their communities. 0:02:18.000 --> 0:02:20.959 And so President Biden wants to make that clear UH 0:02:21.000 --> 0:02:25.280 that the US supports and and empathizes with this what 0:02:25.400 --> 0:02:29.400 will be a growing refugee crisis. Certainly, he wants to 0:02:29.440 --> 0:02:32.839 make the case for more sanctions. The US has had 0:02:32.880 --> 0:02:37.320 the toughest sanctions on oil because the US frankly imports 0:02:37.360 --> 0:02:42.000 the least amount of crude oil and petroleum products from Russia. 0:02:42.200 --> 0:02:45.240 European countries in a much more different situation, but the 0:02:45.280 --> 0:02:48.160 US wants to push them to do more on sanctions. 0:02:48.200 --> 0:02:50.480 So those will be the three messages you can look 0:02:50.520 --> 0:02:53.680 for from the US president. Well, and how could we 0:02:53.800 --> 0:02:56.720 see the US step up sanctions and put pressure on 0:02:56.800 --> 0:03:00.720 Europe to step up sanctions. Yeah, so the US has already, 0:03:00.840 --> 0:03:06.280 you know, gone a long way towards sanctioning both uh, 0:03:06.440 --> 0:03:11.440 the oligarchs in Russia, and UH done things like you know, 0:03:11.520 --> 0:03:16.480 banned the import of Russian oil, Russian crude oil to 0:03:16.520 --> 0:03:20.520 the US. However, they're taking more steps and UH, the 0:03:20.639 --> 0:03:24.560 National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said today the President Biden 0:03:24.600 --> 0:03:28.080 tomorrow at that summit and on Friday, will be announcing 0:03:28.120 --> 0:03:32.920 even more sanctions against oligarchs, against individuals as well as 0:03:33.040 --> 0:03:36.640 companies and other entities. So the US is trying to 0:03:36.760 --> 0:03:40.240 double down even more on those sanctions, even as Vladimir 0:03:40.280 --> 0:03:44.320 Putin continues to criticize them. And we will be seeing more. 0:03:44.840 --> 0:03:47.520 I think we will be seeing at least more verbal 0:03:48.120 --> 0:03:53.440 um accusations made against Russia. President Biden before he got 0:03:53.480 --> 0:03:55.640 on the plane, when he was talking to reporters before 0:03:55.640 --> 0:03:58.800 he got on Air Force one or earlier today, said 0:03:58.840 --> 0:04:01.520 that he would not be prize. The Ladimir Protin was 0:04:01.640 --> 0:04:04.840 to use chemical weapons in Ukraine. So there will be 0:04:04.920 --> 0:04:08.680 a lot of warnings as well as talk about sections. 0:04:09.280 --> 0:04:12.520 All right, Bloomberg's Jody Schneider, thank you for that. Update 0:04:12.520 --> 0:04:16.640 will continue to follow the president's trip in Europe. Meantime, 0:04:16.680 --> 0:04:19.440 insta Cart is launching a platform of services to sell 0:04:19.520 --> 0:04:23.919 to supermarkets, including fifteen minute delivery for grocery retailers and 0:04:23.960 --> 0:04:27.880 building warehouses to store products and manage picking, packing and 0:04:27.920 --> 0:04:32.359 delivery for supermarkets, a move that cements the company's turn 0:04:32.680 --> 0:04:37.000 into enterprise services. Under new CEO FJ Cmo, Insta Cart 0:04:37.000 --> 0:04:40.039 has been making multiple moves to strengthen the company's relationship 0:04:40.080 --> 0:04:45.000 with grocers as opposed to just consumers. Coming up, they 0:04:45.040 --> 0:04:48.839 claimed to have hacked some of the biggest names in tech. 0:04:49.000 --> 0:04:51.559 We've got the latest on Lapses and how they've managed 0:04:51.560 --> 0:04:55.039 to preach so many large scale tech companies despite being 0:04:55.080 --> 0:05:17.800 described as laughable. That is next. This is Bloomberg the 0:05:17.880 --> 0:05:20.800 latest now on the evolving Opta breach the identity management 0:05:20.839 --> 0:05:23.960 company that many businesses use as a top line of 0:05:24.040 --> 0:05:27.960 cyber defense. The group behind the breach calls itself Lapsis, 0:05:28.160 --> 0:05:31.440 and Bloomberg reports it has a murky background. For more, 0:05:31.480 --> 0:05:35.360 I'm joined by Bloomberg's Jack Gillum, who reports on cybersecurity 0:05:35.440 --> 0:05:37.560 for US. So Jack talked to us about what we've 0:05:37.680 --> 0:05:40.440 learned about LOPSIS in the last twenty four hours. We've 0:05:40.480 --> 0:05:44.920 heard laughable, We've heard the word murky. Who are they? So? 0:05:45.000 --> 0:05:47.960 This is a group Emily that has sort of breached, 0:05:48.120 --> 0:05:50.679 has risen up in the last year or two, according 0:05:50.720 --> 0:05:53.080 to certain experts that we've spoken with. Um, they've made 0:05:53.080 --> 0:05:55.400 bigger splashes in the last few months. They operate on 0:05:55.480 --> 0:05:59.240 Telegram channels, which we might use to communicate with folks, 0:05:59.240 --> 0:06:01.800 but they used it to actually, uh, you know, brag 0:06:01.800 --> 0:06:04.160 about what they've been able to hack. Um. They're kind 0:06:04.160 --> 0:06:06.440 of an interesting group. Normally, when we think of these groups, 0:06:06.480 --> 0:06:09.760 we think of folks ransomware actors who take our data 0:06:09.800 --> 0:06:12.360 and encrypted and will offer to unlock it for us 0:06:12.400 --> 0:06:14.120 if we give them, you know, some sort of money 0:06:14.160 --> 0:06:18.640 in exchange. UM. These folks instead will just release the data. UM. 0:06:18.720 --> 0:06:20.800 Now you know, we've talked about them being sort of 0:06:20.880 --> 0:06:23.360 laughably bad. That was one expert we we spoke to 0:06:23.400 --> 0:06:25.920 who studies this kind of stuff. Um, but you know, 0:06:26.279 --> 0:06:28.360 just like a broken clock is right twice a day. 0:06:28.440 --> 0:06:32.120 I mean, even idiots, he said, can do really bad things. Uh. 0:06:32.160 --> 0:06:35.000 In this case, they apparently had released the source code, 0:06:35.320 --> 0:06:39.200 some source code of being, which is Microsoft's signature search engine, 0:06:39.360 --> 0:06:43.599 their mapping platform, their voice recognition software. Um. So you know, 0:06:43.680 --> 0:06:46.880 even if there are they might be you know, kids, 0:06:46.920 --> 0:06:49.560 they might be amateurs, they might not be nation state hackers. 0:06:49.880 --> 0:06:51.960 You know, given the right tools and opportunities, that could 0:06:52.000 --> 0:06:55.400 be pretty dangerous. Right. So they've hit Microsoft, as you say, 0:06:55.440 --> 0:06:58.560 they've been targeting Crypto, and of course this Octa breach. 0:06:58.960 --> 0:07:01.680 Let's dig in to what exactly happened with Octa because 0:07:01.720 --> 0:07:04.800 Octa says the company itself was not breach, but due 0:07:04.800 --> 0:07:08.480 to a breach of a third party, three sixty six 0:07:08.560 --> 0:07:12.840 Octa customers were compromised. How serious is this and what 0:07:12.880 --> 0:07:16.160 does that actually mean? So to start from the beginning, 0:07:16.160 --> 0:07:19.280 Octa is what's called an identity management platform. That's just 0:07:19.320 --> 0:07:21.840 a fancy way of having a central place where you 0:07:21.840 --> 0:07:24.120 can log in, you know, putting your user name and password. 0:07:24.160 --> 0:07:26.560 We all do it for our jobs. Um, you know, 0:07:26.600 --> 0:07:28.480 where you just have to put in your credentials. Your 0:07:28.480 --> 0:07:31.200 two factor authentication wants to get access to all sorts 0:07:31.200 --> 0:07:34.960 of things. So that essentially is like a mainline uh, 0:07:35.000 --> 0:07:38.280 you know, authentication to get into say a company web portal, 0:07:38.760 --> 0:07:41.840 um to get into a software developers back in you 0:07:41.920 --> 0:07:44.520 name it. Now, you know, it's only as the company says, 0:07:44.560 --> 0:07:47.160 two point five percent, but that's still hundreds of companies, 0:07:47.200 --> 0:07:49.200 you know, as you mentioned three hundred and sixty six. 0:07:49.600 --> 0:07:51.720 And while we need to be careful here and appreciate 0:07:51.760 --> 0:07:54.800 that this investigation is ongoing, you know, the details are 0:07:54.800 --> 0:07:57.800 slowly coming out and we're understanding them. You know, at 0:07:57.840 --> 0:08:01.640 worst case scenario here, these attackers could get access to 0:08:01.800 --> 0:08:05.040 these victims networks. So even though OCTA may in and 0:08:05.040 --> 0:08:08.080 of itself not have been breached, if these attackers were 0:08:08.080 --> 0:08:11.560 able to get sort of get into that authentication stream, 0:08:11.600 --> 0:08:14.040 you know, be able to get into uh one of 0:08:14.080 --> 0:08:16.880 their client's networks, they could pull out all sorts of data. 0:08:16.920 --> 0:08:18.760 And we don't know the extent of that yet, but 0:08:18.880 --> 0:08:20.400 I think that's going to be the big question as 0:08:20.440 --> 0:08:24.000 we go forward here so it does sound pretty serious. Indeed, 0:08:24.280 --> 0:08:28.120 and just to underscore this, you said LAPSES is not 0:08:28.160 --> 0:08:31.800 a nation state tied hacking group. Does that mean this 0:08:31.880 --> 0:08:36.160 has no relation to potential Russian cyber attacks or the 0:08:36.280 --> 0:08:39.679 chaos going on in cyberspace right now as a result 0:08:39.720 --> 0:08:43.640 of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It might not be emily. 0:08:43.679 --> 0:08:45.720 But we also need to realize, and this is to 0:08:45.880 --> 0:08:49.000 follow up on the you know, very not specific, but 0:08:49.120 --> 0:08:51.920 very repeated warnings by the US government and others that 0:08:52.000 --> 0:08:55.440 you know, Russia is looking for opportunities, they say, to 0:08:55.600 --> 0:08:58.600 access major companies and their networks in order to bring 0:08:58.640 --> 0:09:02.840 them down, especially critical utilities. We saw and new Burger Um, 0:09:02.880 --> 0:09:05.440 the senior US official in charge of cyber Um, who 0:09:05.520 --> 0:09:08.560 made a very public plea about companies updating their security. 0:09:08.600 --> 0:09:11.840 Adding this what's called two factor authentication. So you might 0:09:11.880 --> 0:09:14.160 have a group of you know, a loose group of 0:09:14.200 --> 0:09:17.880 folks who are trying to infiltrate companies and steal their data. 0:09:18.160 --> 0:09:20.600 But these two things aren't mutually exclusive. You still have 0:09:20.960 --> 0:09:23.920 what the government is calling this persistent threat of Russian 0:09:24.000 --> 0:09:26.920 nation states um and that companies need to do more 0:09:26.960 --> 0:09:29.319 in order to improve their security and keep themselves and 0:09:29.360 --> 0:09:32.360 their customers safe, all right, Bloomberg, Jack Gill and thanks 0:09:32.400 --> 0:09:34.560 for the additional details there. I do want to continue 0:09:34.559 --> 0:09:38.120 this conversation on cybersecurity and bringing Karen Martin. He is 0:09:38.120 --> 0:09:41.720 the former CEO of the UK's National Cybersecurity Center. He 0:09:41.760 --> 0:09:46.360 is also the managing director at Paladin Capital Scarin. Thank 0:09:46.400 --> 0:09:49.640 you so much for joining us. You know, so far 0:09:49.760 --> 0:09:53.760 it seems we have seen a dearth of cyber attacks 0:09:54.080 --> 0:09:58.840 from Russian would be attacker since the war has started, 0:09:59.240 --> 0:10:03.280 would you agree and why is that? Well, thank you 0:10:03.320 --> 0:10:07.640 Emily for having me on. I think saying as a 0:10:07.720 --> 0:10:09.920 dearth of attacks might be taking it a little bit farther. 0:10:10.040 --> 0:10:13.480 Have been some quite important hacks. There was the hack 0:10:13.520 --> 0:10:16.600 of the VIAS satellite network, which according to the Ukrainian 0:10:16.600 --> 0:10:21.440 Cybersecurity Agency, caused some quite serious disruption to communications. But 0:10:21.480 --> 0:10:24.000 that's the sort of thing we've seen from Russia before 0:10:24.120 --> 0:10:28.000 against Ukraine since hostility started, not on February twenty four, 0:10:28.040 --> 0:10:31.360 but with the annexation of Crimea, and I think a 0:10:31.400 --> 0:10:34.600 lot of people would have expected a serious intensification of 0:10:34.640 --> 0:10:38.760 that and that hasn't happened yet. Why might that be, Well, 0:10:38.760 --> 0:10:41.240 it may be that the Russian cyber hackers weren't ready, 0:10:41.360 --> 0:10:43.480 like a lot of the Russian forces, maybe they weren't 0:10:43.520 --> 0:10:47.840 told And unlike some military operations, say flying a bombing 0:10:47.880 --> 0:10:52.120 squad over a city, and a sophisticated hack of a 0:10:52.160 --> 0:10:55.160 power grid of internet infrastructure actually takes a very long 0:10:55.200 --> 0:10:58.040 time to plan. That takes a lot of time, skill, resources, 0:10:58.200 --> 0:11:00.360 and a bit of luck. You have to remain under acted, 0:11:00.559 --> 0:11:04.240 So maybe they weren't ready. Um Also, frankly, when you're 0:11:04.240 --> 0:11:07.040 in a state of full scale war, blowing something up 0:11:07.160 --> 0:11:11.960 is easier for the invader than doing a sophisticated cyber attack. 0:11:12.360 --> 0:11:14.439 So there are all sorts of reasons. But I think 0:11:14.480 --> 0:11:17.600 the sort of cyber war that we feared hasn't happened yet. 0:11:17.880 --> 0:11:20.080 But we're still in this crisis, and I think the 0:11:20.120 --> 0:11:22.840 President was right to sign the alarm the other night 0:11:22.880 --> 0:11:25.360 about what might happen because we need to be prepared. 0:11:26.480 --> 0:11:29.480 So how serious that would you say? The threat is 0:11:29.920 --> 0:11:33.120 of Russian cyber attacks given so many of their resources 0:11:33.120 --> 0:11:36.760 have been focused on this physical invasion thus far, And 0:11:36.880 --> 0:11:41.160 if these cyber attacks do happen, how damaging could they be? 0:11:42.080 --> 0:11:44.560 So it depends on your starting point. If you subscribe 0:11:44.559 --> 0:11:47.000 to a kind of Hollywood version of cyber war where 0:11:47.280 --> 0:11:50.280 everything goes off at once, a normal life is completely 0:11:50.320 --> 0:11:53.240 blown apart. I don't think that's realistic. That's very hard 0:11:53.280 --> 0:11:55.600 to do, and it's extremely hard to do at scale. 0:11:56.480 --> 0:11:59.880 And obviously, if you're in Ukraine, you're in fear of 0:12:00.000 --> 0:12:02.800 your life, your way of life, the survival of the country, 0:12:03.360 --> 0:12:05.360 and so they've got worse things to worry about the 0:12:05.800 --> 0:12:09.439 computer hackers, although they do have to try to defend 0:12:09.520 --> 0:12:11.840 their critical networks. But if you're looking at the risk 0:12:11.920 --> 0:12:15.079 to the West. We spoke earlier a little bit about 0:12:15.120 --> 0:12:17.920 the sort of ransomware attacks and the criminal attacks. A 0:12:17.960 --> 0:12:20.360 lot of those happened out of Russia, and Russia has 0:12:20.360 --> 0:12:24.040 got both criminals and state workers who are very very 0:12:24.040 --> 0:12:26.559 good at hacking, and maybe they don't need to do 0:12:26.640 --> 0:12:29.760 the elitive level attack on a paragride or something to 0:12:29.840 --> 0:12:34.360 cause us real difficulties. Last year, Russian criminals attacked Colonial 0:12:34.360 --> 0:12:37.720 pipelines email systems and that caused the company to shut 0:12:37.760 --> 0:12:40.480 down the pipeline, causing fuel shortages. And all the bunch 0:12:40.520 --> 0:12:43.320 of Russian criminals who've pledged support for a president Putin 0:12:43.400 --> 0:12:46.720 and his invasion last year attacked the Irish healthcare system 0:12:46.720 --> 0:12:50.360 and cause huge delayed cancer operations, anti natal services and 0:12:50.360 --> 0:12:53.559 so forth. So where those attacks to happen, I think 0:12:53.559 --> 0:12:55.680 there's a soft underbelly of a way of life that 0:12:55.760 --> 0:12:59.040 could be disrupted, not directly sort of fatal like a 0:12:59.080 --> 0:13:02.760 military operation, and but it could be seriously disruptive. And 0:13:02.800 --> 0:13:04.880 that's why I think the authorities are right to sign 0:13:04.920 --> 0:13:09.559 the alarm. What kind of counterattacks are being waged by 0:13:09.640 --> 0:13:14.559 the United States and others around the world at this moment, Well, 0:13:14.600 --> 0:13:18.080 they don't say, so it's hard to know, and occasionally 0:13:18.120 --> 0:13:21.040 some operations get declassified. But I don't think we should 0:13:21.040 --> 0:13:23.480 think that we have some magic invisible weapon that can 0:13:23.520 --> 0:13:25.840 force Putain to change his mind. Otherwise we would have 0:13:25.920 --> 0:13:27.720 used it by now. And I think if you look 0:13:27.760 --> 0:13:31.200 at it, So, let's take that operation against Irish healthcare, 0:13:31.200 --> 0:13:34.640 which was done by criminals for money. Will the United 0:13:34.640 --> 0:13:37.840 States towards allies who have been demanding that Russia ceases 0:13:39.040 --> 0:13:42.599 hostile cyber action against critical infrastructure. Would we disrupt the 0:13:42.640 --> 0:13:47.320 civilian healthcare system in Russia? Now it's technically possible, but 0:13:47.400 --> 0:13:50.679 are we going to do things to noncompetent Russian civilians 0:13:50.720 --> 0:13:53.520 that we're not prepared to do in the in the 0:13:53.080 --> 0:13:56.080 in the physical world. Some of the activists that are 0:13:56.120 --> 0:13:58.320 working on behalf of the Ukrainians have been doing things 0:13:58.360 --> 0:14:00.680 like disrupting a bit of media and that has some 0:14:00.760 --> 0:14:03.720 tactical effect, but it's hard to see what strategic effect 0:14:04.120 --> 0:14:06.280 we have. I think there's an asymmetry here. We've got 0:14:06.280 --> 0:14:10.600 these highly digitized, vulnerable societies that are more digitally advanced 0:14:10.600 --> 0:14:14.120 than most of Russian civilian life. So some it's not 0:14:14.200 --> 0:14:17.240 really a case of fighting cyber with cyber. The sanctions, 0:14:17.280 --> 0:14:20.200 the diplomatic pressure of the Army Ukrainians, those are always 0:14:20.200 --> 0:14:24.960 of pushing back, probably more than using cyber capabilities. Meantime, 0:14:25.240 --> 0:14:28.840 we are getting some headlines on the lapses the group 0:14:28.960 --> 0:14:33.600 that we believe hacked OCTA earlier this year, that a 0:14:33.640 --> 0:14:37.320 teenager is suspected by cyber research searchers of being the 0:14:37.360 --> 0:14:41.240 mastermind behind this operation, a teenager who still lives with 0:14:41.320 --> 0:14:45.760 his mom in England. What's your take on what happened 0:14:45.760 --> 0:14:49.120 with OCTA quickly and if it has any ties to 0:14:49.240 --> 0:14:51.880 the chaos going on in cyberspace as a result of 0:14:51.920 --> 0:14:54.680 the war. But we're moving from the fog of war 0:14:54.760 --> 0:14:58.560 to the chaos of the Lapsis attack and who knows. 0:14:58.600 --> 0:15:02.480 There's no evidence I've seen of any connection to the war, 0:15:02.560 --> 0:15:05.760 so let's not jump to conclusions. Actually, it's a reminder 0:15:06.520 --> 0:15:09.520 that people can cause chaos and mayhem on the internet, 0:15:09.800 --> 0:15:14.720 even if they're not connected to politically motivated objectives, even 0:15:14.760 --> 0:15:17.480 if some of their methods are laughable. So let's a 0:15:17.600 --> 0:15:20.640 critical reminder of vulnerabilities and need to clean up oor 0:15:20.680 --> 0:15:26.280 digital environment. Karen Martin, Paladin Capital Group Managing Director, really 0:15:26.320 --> 0:15:37.800 appreciate your expertise on this, Karen, thank you. At the 0:15:37.800 --> 0:15:40.960 Bloomberger Quality Summit, Visa chair and CEO L Kelly weighed 0:15:41.000 --> 0:15:44.560 in on the difficult decision to suspend operations in Russia. 0:15:44.600 --> 0:15:47.920 He also talked about how Visa is helping its employees 0:15:48.040 --> 0:15:53.480 in both Russia and Ukraine take a listen. We have 0:15:53.520 --> 0:15:56.160 employees in both Ukraine and Russia, so this impacted us 0:15:56.160 --> 0:15:59.840 and in both countries, and from the beginning, our number 0:15:59.840 --> 0:16:03.080 one goal was to get as many people to safety 0:16:03.080 --> 0:16:05.720 who wanted to be The reality is today we have 0:16:05.800 --> 0:16:11.040 about sixty families, so we took care of children, in 0:16:11.120 --> 0:16:15.880 some cases mothers and fathers. Where we did send vans 0:16:16.080 --> 0:16:19.440 through a couple of different security companies. Almost all our 0:16:19.440 --> 0:16:23.200 global security people are either in in Hungary or Poland 0:16:23.320 --> 0:16:28.080 right now, and we extracted people when we could, it's 0:16:28.120 --> 0:16:30.920 getting harder and harder to do. We have about a 0:16:30.960 --> 0:16:33.600 dozen people left in Kiev. It's gonna be hard to 0:16:33.600 --> 0:16:36.280 get them out at this point. Uh, most of our 0:16:36.320 --> 0:16:40.440 employees are on the scattered along the western coast, hoping 0:16:40.480 --> 0:16:43.200 to stay, hoping not to have to break up their 0:16:43.320 --> 0:16:46.880 their families. UM. You know when I was in Poland, 0:16:46.880 --> 0:16:52.400 the one of that's when the the base twelve kilometers 0:16:52.440 --> 0:16:55.040 from the Polish border was bombed and one of our 0:16:55.080 --> 0:16:57.520 employees husband is in the army and she had been 0:16:57.520 --> 0:17:00.560 facetiming and with with him every day, and she went 0:17:00.960 --> 0:17:03.040 like half a day or three quarters of a day 0:17:03.080 --> 0:17:07.400 without hearing from them. And right before I left Poland 0:17:07.840 --> 0:17:11.199 had to Dubai to see our Russian employees, she grabbed 0:17:11.240 --> 0:17:12.760 me and told me that she had gotten a text 0:17:12.840 --> 0:17:16.600 from him that he was alive, which at least is 0:17:16.640 --> 0:17:20.840 good news, but it shows the impact this is having, 0:17:21.440 --> 0:17:24.640 and we're equally committed to our Russian employees. We ended 0:17:24.680 --> 0:17:28.679 up UH two weeks ago shutting down or suspending our 0:17:28.760 --> 0:17:33.240 business in Russia. Not an easy decision, but a decision 0:17:33.240 --> 0:17:35.399 that was driven by three things. One is, with the 0:17:35.440 --> 0:17:39.760 sanctions UH, it was getting increasingly difficult to operate. Number Two, 0:17:40.400 --> 0:17:44.359 the reality was that we we were, you know, concerned 0:17:44.359 --> 0:17:48.280 about this unprovoked war that had been UH put upon, 0:17:48.440 --> 0:17:52.080 thrust upon the people and in Ukraine. And number three, 0:17:52.880 --> 0:17:56.520 we thought that for the sake of everybody, that had 0:17:56.880 --> 0:17:59.560 orderly wind down of the business, where we weren't forced 0:17:59.600 --> 0:18:02.480 into it by another round of sanctions that might say, 0:18:02.640 --> 0:18:04.760 you know, immediately we have to shut down, was in 0:18:04.800 --> 0:18:10.000 the best interests of everybody. And we subsequently UH made 0:18:10.040 --> 0:18:12.760 available to our Russian employees the ability to relocate, and 0:18:12.800 --> 0:18:15.399 if they relocated, we would give them a job. And 0:18:15.440 --> 0:18:17.640 in what is quite a statement, we had a town 0:18:17.640 --> 0:18:20.679 hold with them on a Sunday morning, and by that Wednesday, 0:18:20.840 --> 0:18:24.600 seventy of them and their families had already moved to 0:18:24.680 --> 0:18:28.359 dubai Um. And today I believe that now I didn't 0:18:28.359 --> 0:18:30.719 get a briefing this morning, but last I knew we 0:18:30.720 --> 0:18:32.720 were somewhere in the neighborhood of about a hundred and 0:18:32.720 --> 0:18:37.720 twenty employees in their families said migrated UH to Russia. 0:18:38.520 --> 0:18:40.119 So we'll see what happens. You know, a lot of 0:18:40.119 --> 0:18:43.240 these folks are hopeful that they'll get back in weeks. 0:18:43.960 --> 0:18:46.359 I'm not sure that's going to be the case. I 0:18:46.400 --> 0:18:49.080 think this is going to be a prolonged battle. I 0:18:49.119 --> 0:18:54.080 think Putin underestimated the will and the skill of the 0:18:54.160 --> 0:19:00.679 Ukrainian people. Visa Zeo L Kelly there well. Instagram will 0:19:00.720 --> 0:19:02.800 let users switch their feed so they can view the 0:19:02.840 --> 0:19:06.440 most recent posts first. This after years of complaints about 0:19:06.440 --> 0:19:09.160 the photo apps current ranking system that orders post based 0:19:09.200 --> 0:19:12.000 on user behavior. In a blog post, Instagram saying it 0:19:12.040 --> 0:19:14.480 wants people to feel good about the time they spend 0:19:14.480 --> 0:19:26.119 their giving them tools to shape their own experience. Welcome 0:19:26.119 --> 0:19:28.400 back to Bloomberg Technology and Emily Chang. In San Francisco, 0:19:28.880 --> 0:19:32.160 Maderna says it's COVID nineteen vaccine produced a strong immune 0:19:32.200 --> 0:19:35.400 response in children under age six and initial results from 0:19:35.400 --> 0:19:39.640 a large final stage trial, but it showed only modest 0:19:39.680 --> 0:19:43.880 effectiveness in reducing omicron infections. Maderna will submit this data 0:19:43.960 --> 0:19:47.400 to regulators in the US and overseas as soon as possible. 0:19:47.600 --> 0:19:50.600 I want to get more on this with Bloomberg's Drew Armstrong. Drew, 0:19:50.640 --> 0:19:54.160 what are we supposed to make of this efficacy data, 0:19:54.359 --> 0:19:56.560 and why has it been so hard to get this 0:19:56.760 --> 0:20:00.280 vaccine buttoned up for kids five and under? It's a 0:20:00.280 --> 0:20:01.919 really good question, you know. I mean, so what we 0:20:02.000 --> 0:20:05.320 know from this is that you do see this modest efficacy. 0:20:05.400 --> 0:20:07.840 I think it's a forty three percent for kids UM 0:20:07.880 --> 0:20:10.200 six months to two years and thirty seven and a 0:20:10.240 --> 0:20:13.240 half percent for UM kids two to five, which is 0:20:13.280 --> 0:20:15.320 you know, so so it's below the f d a's 0:20:15.640 --> 0:20:18.840 kind of prior stated threshold about what they're looking for. 0:20:19.440 --> 0:20:21.040 I think, you know, there's a couple of pieces of 0:20:21.040 --> 0:20:23.560 good news when you dig deep into this one. You know, 0:20:23.600 --> 0:20:27.600 the antibody response that's kind of the immune system's initial defense, 0:20:27.840 --> 0:20:30.840 UM line of defense. Essentially, it looks similar to what 0:20:30.880 --> 0:20:34.160 you see in adults. So that's good. UM. In terms 0:20:34.200 --> 0:20:39.119 of severe outcomes hospitalizations, deaths, it's inconclusive, and part of 0:20:39.119 --> 0:20:40.600 that is just because the trial is signed. I mean, 0:20:40.640 --> 0:20:43.800 those types of bad outcomes are so rare in kids 0:20:44.280 --> 0:20:47.000 UM luckily, that you actually would have to have a 0:20:47.040 --> 0:20:50.840 truly huge trial to be able to measure them. And 0:20:50.920 --> 0:20:54.120 you know, they did sixty undred children. I believe in 0:20:54.119 --> 0:20:56.520 this and saw you know, none of those severe events 0:20:56.600 --> 0:20:59.800 in either groups. So it's just really really hard to 0:20:59.840 --> 0:21:01.800 get the data when you're looking for events that are 0:21:01.880 --> 0:21:06.760 that rare. Visor's vaccine for kids also has had some 0:21:06.880 --> 0:21:10.520 effectiveness problems. I mean, is there something about very young 0:21:10.600 --> 0:21:13.720 children that has made this more difficult or has it 0:21:13.840 --> 0:21:16.520 not been as higher priority? Yeah, you know, you look 0:21:16.560 --> 0:21:20.600 at the hospitalization rates for younger children. They're around one 0:21:20.840 --> 0:21:24.639 in a hundred thousand of the population at any given time. 0:21:24.840 --> 0:21:27.480 That's substantially less than adults. I mean, it's I think 0:21:27.480 --> 0:21:30.920 it's about a twenty rate of adults, and so it's 0:21:30.960 --> 0:21:33.800 it's honestly, this comes down to it. It seems to 0:21:33.840 --> 0:21:38.959 be less about the actual vaccine itself. And really this 0:21:39.040 --> 0:21:42.399 is more of a statistics problem where you know, to 0:21:42.560 --> 0:21:45.800 get a result out of this, whether your visor or Maderna, 0:21:46.240 --> 0:21:49.800 you need some you know, meaningful number of kids to 0:21:49.880 --> 0:21:54.120 get sick enough to be hospitalized um in your placebo arm, 0:21:54.200 --> 0:21:57.159 and then you know none in the vaccine arm. And 0:21:57.280 --> 0:22:00.479 because those events are so rare, and because you know 0:22:00.600 --> 0:22:04.000 you're you're doing this with only a few thousand kids, 0:22:04.320 --> 0:22:07.080 it becomes really hard to detect those in a way 0:22:07.080 --> 0:22:09.800 that is statistically meaningful, and so you run these trials, 0:22:10.160 --> 0:22:13.080 you see the antibody response that tells you that, hey, 0:22:13.119 --> 0:22:14.840 this looks like it works the same way it does 0:22:14.880 --> 0:22:16.960 in adults, and that's good news, and this should be 0:22:17.080 --> 0:22:19.800 generally true for kids. But when you're looking for that 0:22:19.880 --> 0:22:23.200 type of real world efficacy where you need these real, 0:22:23.640 --> 0:22:27.320 really really rare events to happen in a defined population 0:22:27.720 --> 0:22:30.720 in a limited period of time, it's just really hard 0:22:30.760 --> 0:22:33.160 to get that and then not have it be statistical 0:22:33.200 --> 0:22:35.920 noise um And so I think that has really been 0:22:35.920 --> 0:22:38.920 the challenge. This is a trial design and stats problem. 0:22:39.040 --> 0:22:42.760 It doesn't seem to be as much um of a 0:22:42.800 --> 0:22:45.680 problem with the drugs themselves sort with the vaccines themselves, 0:22:45.760 --> 0:22:48.800 but again, it's just really hard to measure. All right. Well, 0:22:48.840 --> 0:22:51.359 thanks for working through the complexities of all this as 0:22:51.359 --> 0:22:54.160 a mom with kids in that age group. Very anxious 0:22:54.200 --> 0:22:58.639 to see more progress here, Drew Armstrong, thank you. I 0:22:58.680 --> 0:23:00.920 want to continue the conversation out and talk about how 0:23:00.920 --> 0:23:03.840 the pandemic has impacted the healthcare landscape. I want to 0:23:03.840 --> 0:23:07.159 bring in Tera this one often RUPA Health founder and CEO, 0:23:07.200 --> 0:23:11.120 along with tallya Goldberg partner at Bessemer Venture Partners, partners 0:23:11.200 --> 0:23:13.520 Roup of Health just raised twenty million dollars in their 0:23:13.560 --> 0:23:17.120 series A led by Bessemer. Thank you both so much 0:23:17.160 --> 0:23:19.040 for joining us, Tara, I want to talk a little 0:23:19.040 --> 0:23:22.159 bit for us about what RUPA does that you focus 0:23:22.200 --> 0:23:25.320