WEBVTT - Vitalik Buterin’s Plan for Legitimating Crypto

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<v Speaker 1>Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show

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<v Speaker 1>where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Noah Feldman. Today we have a remarkable guest and

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<v Speaker 1>a remarkable conversation to share with you here on Deep Background.

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<v Speaker 1>I was fortunate enough to have a wide ranging conversation

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<v Speaker 1>with Vitalik Bhuteran. Vitalic is the co founder of Ethereum,

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<v Speaker 1>which you may have heard of as the other extraordinarily

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<v Speaker 1>popular cryptocurrency and a broader blockchain that is a complex

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<v Speaker 1>distributed computer network on which it is possible to build

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<v Speaker 1>all sorts of different applications. Vitalik has contributed centrally to

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<v Speaker 1>creating an enormous infrastructure and a tremendous amount of wealth,

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<v Speaker 1>and unsurprisingly that's made him into a kind of folk

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<v Speaker 1>hero of the crypto world. Oh and I may have

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<v Speaker 1>forgotten to mention this Vitalk is all of twenty seven

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<v Speaker 1>years old. Vitalik is a kind of public intellectual of

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<v Speaker 1>the cryptocurrency and blockchain space. He has a blog where

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<v Speaker 1>his posts are more like fully crafted, well thought out essays.

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<v Speaker 1>This blog, which you can find at vitalic dot Ca,

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<v Speaker 1>turns out to be one of the most extraordinary resources

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<v Speaker 1>you can imagine for anyone who, like me, is trying

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<v Speaker 1>to make sense of this new and complex set of

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<v Speaker 1>developments in the world around blockchain. What inspired me to

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<v Speaker 1>ask Metallic to come on the show was a particular

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<v Speaker 1>post or essay on his blog about the nature of legitimacy.

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<v Speaker 1>Legitimacy is a central concept in government, a central concept

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<v Speaker 1>in constitutions, a central concept in property law. And I

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<v Speaker 1>was stunned and amazed to see how central Vitalic himself

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<v Speaker 1>made it to the whole structure of the blockchain and

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<v Speaker 1>of cryptocurrency. I really wanted to delve deeper into his

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<v Speaker 1>idea and to how it relates to the entire system

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<v Speaker 1>of crypto and Vitalik graciously agreed to come and talk

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<v Speaker 1>about exactly that topic. Vitalic, thank you so much for

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<v Speaker 1>being here. I really appreciate your work because I see

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<v Speaker 1>who as somebody who is simultaneously a creator, an inventor

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<v Speaker 1>of things, and also a public intellectual of those same things.

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<v Speaker 1>And I was extremely struck by one of the many

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<v Speaker 1>fascinating posts that you put on your blog, and they're

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<v Speaker 1>really I mean, most people would publish them as essays

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<v Speaker 1>and magazines you put them up on your blog, so

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<v Speaker 1>that makes them easily accessible about legitimacy, and in particular

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<v Speaker 1>about the idea that legitimacy is a scarce resource and

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<v Speaker 1>something that we need to think very seriously about. In

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<v Speaker 1>the text of the blockchain. It grabbed my attention because

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<v Speaker 1>my day job as being a constitutional law professor, and

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<v Speaker 1>so what I do is I think about legitimacy twenty

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<v Speaker 1>four seven three to six five, And I was fascinated

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<v Speaker 1>to see the ways that you were engaging with the topic.

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<v Speaker 1>So I wonder if we could start, maybe with your

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<v Speaker 1>working definition of legitimacy, and then from there I want

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<v Speaker 1>you to talk to us about your leading and really

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<v Speaker 1>fascinating example that you given the essay, which is the

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<v Speaker 1>great powable of Steam and Hive. So maybe the start

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<v Speaker 1>by what you mean by legitimacy. Sure, So the thing

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<v Speaker 1>that I use the word legitimacy to refer to is

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<v Speaker 1>this idea that there are these collective patterns of behavior

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<v Speaker 1>where people all act in a particular way, so they

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<v Speaker 1>play a part in enacting and participating in some particular outcome.

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<v Speaker 1>Basically because there exists this kind of collective idea in

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<v Speaker 1>everyone's heads, that this outcome is like it or not.

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<v Speaker 1>It is a thing that's happening, and everyone is okay

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<v Speaker 1>with going along with it. Right. So basically it's this

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<v Speaker 1>sort of self referential concept that you know, there's a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of different situations in the world where the thing

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<v Speaker 1>that is in everyone's interests is to just sort of

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<v Speaker 1>play along with the same game that everyone else is playing. Right, So, like,

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<v Speaker 1>if everyone else is driving on the left side of

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<v Speaker 1>the road, it makes a lot of sense for you

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<v Speaker 1>to drive on the right side of the road. If

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<v Speaker 1>everyone else is driving on the left side of the road,

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<v Speaker 1>it makes sense for you to drive on the left

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<v Speaker 1>side of the road. Even if there aren't any police

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<v Speaker 1>around enforcing the rules, it would still mostly work. And

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<v Speaker 1>you know, even if like you personally have some slight

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<v Speaker 1>preference for one direction or the other, it's still in

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<v Speaker 1>your interest to just sort of go along with the

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<v Speaker 1>strategy that everyone else is going along with. And I

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<v Speaker 1>think that this is something that goes beyond very simple

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<v Speaker 1>examples like that. I think it's an extremely important concept

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<v Speaker 1>in just social relations in general. Right, And I gave

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<v Speaker 1>a few examples of this kind of both on the

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<v Speaker 1>blockchain and off So just starting with a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>off the blockchain examples. Like language is one good example, right, Like,

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<v Speaker 1>you know we argue whether or not a dolphin is

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<v Speaker 1>a fish, right, you know, a version of English where

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<v Speaker 1>a dolphin is a fish would work totally fine. A

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<v Speaker 1>version of English where a dolphin isn't a fish would

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<v Speaker 1>also work totally fine. But you know, even more important

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<v Speaker 1>than getting the right answer is just effects that we

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<v Speaker 1>agree on an answer. National borders are also another example

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<v Speaker 1>of legitimacy, right, Like if aliens came in tomorrow and they, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>kind of edited all our brains and they to make

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<v Speaker 1>us all think that, say the border between the US

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<v Speaker 1>and Canada is five kilometers north of where it is today, Well,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, the world will just keep on going. But

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<v Speaker 1>the border between the US and Canada actually would be

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<v Speaker 1>five kilometers north of where it is today. So governments

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<v Speaker 1>have legitimacy. Systems of property rights have legitimacy, and systems

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<v Speaker 1>of rules inside of watchains can have legitimacy as well.

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<v Speaker 1>One pushback question before we get to the big parable.

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<v Speaker 1>In my world, when we talk about legitimacy, we usually

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<v Speaker 1>build into it a specific component that's in some of

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<v Speaker 1>your examples, but maybe not in all of them, and

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<v Speaker 1>you did allude to it, and that is not only

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<v Speaker 1>that this is the game that's happening right now and

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<v Speaker 1>it's in my interest to play in this game, but

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<v Speaker 1>also the component that I think to use your words were,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm okay with that, right. So in other words,

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<v Speaker 1>that's the part of legitimacy that is sometimes called not

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<v Speaker 1>just descriptive but normative, you know, the m I okay

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<v Speaker 1>with that part of it. And as you mentioned, it's

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<v Speaker 1>a bit of a self referential concept because we can

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<v Speaker 1>ask whether a system has legitimacy by asking do the

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<v Speaker 1>people in that system feel okay with the way things

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<v Speaker 1>that are working. The reason I bring this up, even

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<v Speaker 1>though it's a teeny bit abstract, is that in your

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<v Speaker 1>examples of pure coordination games like everyone drive on the

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<v Speaker 1>right side of the road or everyone drive on the

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<v Speaker 1>left side of the road, it literally doesn't matter which

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<v Speaker 1>side we choose. Right in the UK and in Japan

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<v Speaker 1>they drive on the left. In other countries they drive

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<v Speaker 1>on the right. And you do it because everyone else

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<v Speaker 1>is doing it, but you also do it because if

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<v Speaker 1>you don't, you're going to smash into another car. So

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<v Speaker 1>you're okay with it, but you're only okay with it

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<v Speaker 1>in the sense that you had to pick one, and

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<v Speaker 1>it's arbitrary as to which one you pick. In contrast,

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<v Speaker 1>if you think about examples like borders, governments, property rights,

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<v Speaker 1>saying you're okay with it means something a little more

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<v Speaker 1>than that. It doesn't just mean, you know, like in

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<v Speaker 1>a government of absolute arbitrary power, well, I'm going to

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<v Speaker 1>go along with what the government says because I'm going

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<v Speaker 1>to be killed. Otherwise, such a government might be legitimate

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<v Speaker 1>if everyone starts saying and I'm okay with that, But

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<v Speaker 1>the government might be illegitimate even if people are following

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<v Speaker 1>the rules if people say to themselves, I'm not okay

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<v Speaker 1>with this, but what am I going to do? I

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<v Speaker 1>have no choice, And then if I knew that no

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<v Speaker 1>one were watching, I would break the rules. So I

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<v Speaker 1>just I guess before we dive into the concrete example,

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<v Speaker 1>I wonder how important is it to you to give

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<v Speaker 1>a definition of legitimacy that could be satisfied without our

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<v Speaker 1>focusing on how okay with it people are. No, It's

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<v Speaker 1>definitely a very good question and a very important points right,

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<v Speaker 1>because people, I think do use the word sort of

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<v Speaker 1>equivocating between the positive way of looking at things and

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<v Speaker 1>the normative way of looking at things. So like the

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<v Speaker 1>way that I defined legitimacy in the post, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the government of North Korea is the legitimate government of

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<v Speaker 1>North Korea, right, because exactly like you know, even if

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<v Speaker 1>lots of people are really unhappy with it, North Koreans

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<v Speaker 1>all act like it's the government of North Korea. I know,

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<v Speaker 1>America act so like it's the government of North Korea.

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<v Speaker 1>South Korea act so like it's the government of North Korea. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>But then at the same time, I also later on

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<v Speaker 1>in my post, I bring up these different theories of legitimacy,

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<v Speaker 1>basically ways in which or reasons by which some outcome

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<v Speaker 1>could be perceived as sell legitimate, and number one in

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<v Speaker 1>the way I put brute force, right, But aside from

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<v Speaker 1>number one, I had all of these others and the

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<v Speaker 1>other theories of legitimacy having to do with things like

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<v Speaker 1>fairness and participation and continuity and like, these are things

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<v Speaker 1>that we would be much more morally okay with. And

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<v Speaker 1>I think if I had any point on that question,

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<v Speaker 1>I would say that like descriptive legitimacy and a kind

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<v Speaker 1>of moral acceptability. Like they're both real contexts, and I

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<v Speaker 1>do think that they have some kid action even in

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<v Speaker 1>the real world, right, Like something being morally acceptable to

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<v Speaker 1>the people in that context as definitely is something that

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<v Speaker 1>really contributes to that thing being legitimate in a descriptive sense,

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<v Speaker 1>but it's also not the only thing. Let's turn now

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<v Speaker 1>to this what I'm calling a parable And like a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of great essays, your essay is built around a

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<v Speaker 1>central example, and I wonder if you would describe to

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<v Speaker 1>us the parable of Steam and Hive. Sure. So, there

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<v Speaker 1>was a sub blockchain called Steam, right, it was a

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<v Speaker 1>trying to be a decentralized social media thing, like you

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<v Speaker 1>could have some system for built in tipping. There's incentives,

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<v Speaker 1>there's like decentralized content curation of sometime. You know, it

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<v Speaker 1>was a very interesting experiment, right, But there is also

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<v Speaker 1>this kind of political intrium inside of the Steam ecosystem

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<v Speaker 1>that happens where basically at the beginning there is Steam

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<v Speaker 1>the blockchain, and then there is Steam the company, and

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<v Speaker 1>Steam the company that it happens everywhere exactly like you know,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a the Ethereum Foundation, there's the z cash Foundation,

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<v Speaker 1>there's all these foundations, but the big difference between a

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<v Speaker 1>blockchain and a traditional centralized service is that in the

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<v Speaker 1>centralized context, the like Twitter the company based has the

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<v Speaker 1>technical ability to do whatever they want to Twitter the service, right.

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<v Speaker 1>But Steam the company versus Steam the blockchain, there's actually

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<v Speaker 1>a bit more of a difference. And most of the

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<v Speaker 1>time in crypto land, I don't really think about this, right,

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<v Speaker 1>But what happened here was that the owner of a

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<v Speaker 1>Steam the company decided to sell Steam the company. Now

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<v Speaker 1>it's not actually possible to sell Steam the blockchain, right

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<v Speaker 1>because Steam the blockchain is a thing that only exists

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<v Speaker 1>because you have these thousands of independent, coordinating participants and they,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, ultimately have the right to run whatever code

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<v Speaker 1>they want. But you know, ultimately, like what code gets

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<v Speaker 1>run is constrained by the facts that people have to

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<v Speaker 1>agree to all run the same code. And if you

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<v Speaker 1>run different code from everyone else, then you know, even

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<v Speaker 1>if your code is better, you're just kind of off

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<v Speaker 1>in your own little universe and you're not talking to

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<v Speaker 1>anyone else. Right. The blockchain's kind of forked, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're on the minority for it, that's a lonely

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<v Speaker 1>place to be. So Steam the company got sold and

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<v Speaker 1>the new buyer, the new owner or Steam the company

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<v Speaker 1>as this a character named Justin's son. And Justin's son

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<v Speaker 1>is this crypto entrepreneur who's you know, a very controversial

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<v Speaker 1>and is widely known for doing a lot of things

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<v Speaker 1>that I personally against it are unethical, like you know,

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<v Speaker 1>like his white paper, plagiarized ipfs, and there's other examples.

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<v Speaker 1>So there's reasons for the community to be a kind

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<v Speaker 1>of very suspicious of him. So overnight, basically this a

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<v Speaker 1>sale was announced and I don't think the community was

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<v Speaker 1>really consulted about it and the company to clarified by

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<v Speaker 1>the way, because I think it's useful for people who

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<v Speaker 1>are like me, who are come from other worlds. The

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<v Speaker 1>things that he's done that you consider unethical are unethical

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<v Speaker 1>within the ethical framework shared by other people who operate

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<v Speaker 1>in and live in the blockchain. They're not illegal in

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<v Speaker 1>some sense of the term. Or do you think maybe

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<v Speaker 1>they were illegal in some cases it's possible that he

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<v Speaker 1>did illegal stuff. It's possible he didn't. I don't. I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know, but like plagiarism, that's one example, right, Like

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<v Speaker 1>I don't that's not illegal, but that is considered unethical

0:13:00.676 --> 0:13:03.276
<v Speaker 1>in a context much broader than the blockchain space. And

0:13:03.956 --> 0:13:06.076
<v Speaker 1>like his white paper, did you know a copy a

0:13:06.116 --> 0:13:08.396
<v Speaker 1>bunch of pages of I think it was the IPFS

0:13:08.396 --> 0:13:12.076
<v Speaker 1>white paper pretty directly. Okay, thanks so close, Parenthices, go

0:13:12.116 --> 0:13:16.036
<v Speaker 1>back to your story. Okay, So basically overnight, right, the

0:13:16.116 --> 0:13:20.396
<v Speaker 1>Steam community woke up and they realized that Steam the Company,

0:13:20.676 --> 0:13:22.916
<v Speaker 1>this thing that was supposed to be a steward of

0:13:22.916 --> 0:13:25.356
<v Speaker 1>Steam the blockchain, and up until then they kind of

0:13:25.356 --> 0:13:28.356
<v Speaker 1>trusted without really thinking about it, is suddenly controlled by

0:13:28.356 --> 0:13:32.276
<v Speaker 1>a potentially hostile actor. And you know, they were obviously

0:13:32.396 --> 0:13:35.996
<v Speaker 1>very scared by this, right, and so they and they

0:13:36.036 --> 0:13:39.276
<v Speaker 1>before there was this sort of informal gentlemen's agreement that

0:13:39.676 --> 0:13:43.036
<v Speaker 1>the funds that are that are controlled by Steam the Company.

0:13:43.196 --> 0:13:45.156
<v Speaker 1>So Steam the Company had twenty percent of all the

0:13:45.156 --> 0:13:48.836
<v Speaker 1>Steam tokens would be like are sort of held in trust, right,

0:13:48.836 --> 0:13:53.676
<v Speaker 1>and they're intended for the ongoing development of the Steam ecosystem,

0:13:53.676 --> 0:13:55.796
<v Speaker 1>and they're not just like, you know, the personal play

0:13:55.796 --> 0:13:58.956
<v Speaker 1>money of the founder. But then when Justin Sun comes in,

0:13:59.116 --> 0:14:01.476
<v Speaker 1>they did not have the trust that this agreement would

0:14:01.476 --> 0:14:04.116
<v Speaker 1>be honored, and so they had decided to make a

0:14:04.156 --> 0:14:07.356
<v Speaker 1>move on the Steam blockchain, so using the voting mechanism

0:14:07.396 --> 0:14:10.276
<v Speaker 1>of the allegated proof of stakes mechanism that's built into

0:14:10.316 --> 0:14:13.236
<v Speaker 1>Steam in order to just add a rule that says

0:14:13.276 --> 0:14:16.356
<v Speaker 1>that that accounts cannot be used to vote, because like,

0:14:16.436 --> 0:14:18.196
<v Speaker 1>if that accounts could be used to vote, right, that's

0:14:18.196 --> 0:14:20.316
<v Speaker 1>one accountable twenty percent of all the Steam tokens, and

0:14:20.356 --> 0:14:23.436
<v Speaker 1>that would just give Justin Son essentially like you and

0:14:23.476 --> 0:14:26.596
<v Speaker 1>a later all rule setting power. So just pause for

0:14:26.636 --> 0:14:30.676
<v Speaker 1>clarification purposes, the people who the other holders of the

0:14:30.716 --> 0:14:36.796
<v Speaker 1>tokens exercise their voting power to disenfranchise whoever would be

0:14:36.836 --> 0:14:38.036
<v Speaker 1>the owner of it. In this case, it was a

0:14:38.076 --> 0:14:42.476
<v Speaker 1>particular person, the owner of twenty percent of the tokens

0:14:42.476 --> 0:14:44.756
<v Speaker 1>that were out there. So as it were eighty percent,

0:14:44.836 --> 0:14:46.196
<v Speaker 1>I mean it made it probably wasn't all of them,

0:14:46.356 --> 0:14:49.556
<v Speaker 1>but a majority of the of all the voters voted

0:14:49.596 --> 0:14:54.356
<v Speaker 1>to disenfranchise the person who held twenty percent, right, Okay,

0:14:54.396 --> 0:14:56.356
<v Speaker 1>go on. That's fascinating in its own right because of

0:14:56.396 --> 0:14:58.596
<v Speaker 1>the way that's parable as headache. It is. Yeah, So

0:14:58.716 --> 0:15:01.716
<v Speaker 1>Justin Son struck back, right, and what he did was

0:15:01.756 --> 0:15:05.436
<v Speaker 1>that he made another proposal. The eventual result of them

0:15:05.556 --> 0:15:09.556
<v Speaker 1>was to basically like kick out the delegates, the kind

0:15:09.556 --> 0:15:14.316
<v Speaker 1>of elected participants that participated in the original move against him,

0:15:14.556 --> 0:15:17.916
<v Speaker 1>and basically kind of secure majority control over the blockchain

0:15:17.996 --> 0:15:20.996
<v Speaker 1>to the point where he could not be diswatched anymore.

0:15:21.436 --> 0:15:25.236
<v Speaker 1>And he did this using not just funds that he

0:15:25.276 --> 0:15:28.436
<v Speaker 1>had directly, but he also talked to exchanges, right, because

0:15:28.596 --> 0:15:30.876
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of users that just have like their

0:15:30.916 --> 0:15:34.476
<v Speaker 1>Steam tokens held by exchanges and exchanges like they have

0:15:34.556 --> 0:15:37.156
<v Speaker 1>the private key, so they theoretically have the ability to vote.

0:15:37.356 --> 0:15:39.116
<v Speaker 1>And so he wants to a bunch of these big

0:15:39.116 --> 0:15:41.876
<v Speaker 1>exchanges and convinced them to make this kind of big

0:15:41.956 --> 0:15:46.196
<v Speaker 1>move to basically make a counter vote reverse those results

0:15:46.236 --> 0:15:51.076
<v Speaker 1>and just secure power for himself. Now again clarification question,

0:15:51.316 --> 0:15:54.476
<v Speaker 1>when you say secure power for himself, if you asked him,

0:15:54.516 --> 0:15:57.036
<v Speaker 1>if we had him on the show, wouldn't he say,

0:15:57.476 --> 0:15:59.636
<v Speaker 1>what do you mean? Secure power for myself? They just

0:15:59.716 --> 0:16:03.076
<v Speaker 1>disenfranchised me, and so all I was trying to do

0:16:03.236 --> 0:16:05.836
<v Speaker 1>was get back my voting power. I mean, leaving aside

0:16:05.836 --> 0:16:07.276
<v Speaker 1>whether that would be sure or not. Is that what

0:16:07.316 --> 0:16:09.836
<v Speaker 1>he would say? I think so? And what do you

0:16:09.876 --> 0:16:13.236
<v Speaker 1>make of it? I mean, well, there's multiple levels to this, right,

0:16:13.276 --> 0:16:16.316
<v Speaker 1>because this is one of those situations where there's like,

0:16:17.156 --> 0:16:21.476
<v Speaker 1>like there was this sort of informal agreement that the

0:16:21.596 --> 0:16:24.236
<v Speaker 1>coins owned by the companies should like should not be

0:16:24.316 --> 0:16:26.596
<v Speaker 1>used to vote in before the handover, were not being

0:16:26.716 --> 0:16:29.756
<v Speaker 1>used to vote. But then of course that agreements have

0:16:29.956 --> 0:16:33.076
<v Speaker 1>ended up never being put into stone. So you can

0:16:33.076 --> 0:16:35.796
<v Speaker 1>blame the community for not being careful as well. You know,

0:16:35.876 --> 0:16:37.876
<v Speaker 1>you can blame the ritual owners of Steam for not

0:16:37.916 --> 0:16:41.076
<v Speaker 1>being transparent and not consulting with the community about the handover.

0:16:41.476 --> 0:16:46.316
<v Speaker 1>I think ultimately, like the thing that caused the community

0:16:46.356 --> 0:16:48.436
<v Speaker 1>to do this is just that like they you know,

0:16:48.516 --> 0:16:52.116
<v Speaker 1>did not want to participate in a blockchain where one

0:16:52.116 --> 0:16:55.516
<v Speaker 1>participant had this amount of power Like that just sort

0:16:55.556 --> 0:16:57.756
<v Speaker 1>of goes against what even the purpose of a blockchain

0:16:57.876 --> 0:17:00.236
<v Speaker 1>is trying to be. So then what happened when he

0:17:00.316 --> 0:17:02.636
<v Speaker 1>got back the power that he had been taken haven't

0:17:02.636 --> 0:17:05.196
<v Speaker 1>been teamed from him. So when he got that power back,

0:17:05.356 --> 0:17:08.996
<v Speaker 1>at that point, he had power secured in the sense

0:17:09.276 --> 0:17:11.436
<v Speaker 1>that he had all of these delegates, he had a

0:17:11.436 --> 0:17:14.636
<v Speaker 1>lot of coins, and so the only move that the

0:17:14.636 --> 0:17:17.596
<v Speaker 1>community had available was to do this sort of extra

0:17:17.636 --> 0:17:20.596
<v Speaker 1>protocol appeal, right, they announced that they would make a

0:17:20.636 --> 0:17:24.196
<v Speaker 1>hard work. They would just release a new version of

0:17:24.236 --> 0:17:27.796
<v Speaker 1>the software, and that new version of the software would

0:17:28.716 --> 0:17:32.236
<v Speaker 1>basically remove the right to vote from and I think

0:17:32.356 --> 0:17:37.076
<v Speaker 1>even burned the coins of anyone who participated on justin

0:17:37.156 --> 0:17:39.316
<v Speaker 1>sun side during the votes, right, so they made this

0:17:39.356 --> 0:17:42.716
<v Speaker 1>protocol keeping while keeping the value of their own coins,

0:17:42.756 --> 0:17:45.796
<v Speaker 1>I guess, transposing it precisely. So they decided this is

0:17:45.916 --> 0:17:48.996
<v Speaker 1>totally fascinating, and it's it's where your story starts to

0:17:49.036 --> 0:17:51.156
<v Speaker 1>look really different from what could have happened in a country.

0:17:51.236 --> 0:17:53.716
<v Speaker 1>Let's say they said, we're going to go and make

0:17:53.756 --> 0:17:58.676
<v Speaker 1>our own new ecosystem copied from the old ecosystem, excluding

0:17:58.796 --> 0:18:00.956
<v Speaker 1>the wealth and the power of the people whom we

0:18:01.556 --> 0:18:04.996
<v Speaker 1>now see as the bad guys, replicating our own wealth

0:18:04.996 --> 0:18:07.876
<v Speaker 1>and power, but in theory in precise proportion to how

0:18:07.876 --> 0:18:11.476
<v Speaker 1>it's allocated among us right now, minus the parts that

0:18:11.516 --> 0:18:16.796
<v Speaker 1>we burned, exactly. And they did this right, and for

0:18:17.316 --> 0:18:20.316
<v Speaker 1>trademark reasons, they had to rename it, so instead of

0:18:20.316 --> 0:18:22.676
<v Speaker 1>being Steam, it was called Hive, and a huge part

0:18:22.716 --> 0:18:25.356
<v Speaker 1>of the ecosystem actually did migrate, right. So I think

0:18:25.596 --> 0:18:28.436
<v Speaker 1>since then the market caps over the two have actually

0:18:28.516 --> 0:18:30.556
<v Speaker 1>been sort of pretty neck and neck against each other.

0:18:31.876 --> 0:18:35.436
<v Speaker 1>So what is your takeaway from this whole parable? Right?

0:18:35.476 --> 0:18:39.276
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you know, many influential people in history, religious

0:18:39.316 --> 0:18:41.516
<v Speaker 1>leaders amongst them, like to speak in parables. It's a

0:18:41.516 --> 0:18:43.316
<v Speaker 1>good way to reach people, but it's sometimes helpful to

0:18:43.356 --> 0:18:45.396
<v Speaker 1>explain what the parable means. So what does this parable

0:18:45.436 --> 0:18:48.356
<v Speaker 1>mean to you? Right? So the conclusion that I made

0:18:48.396 --> 0:18:51.796
<v Speaker 1>in the post, right, is that this was proof that

0:18:52.356 --> 0:18:55.396
<v Speaker 1>like Justin Sun never actually owns the coins. Like when

0:18:55.396 --> 0:18:59.116
<v Speaker 1>we talk about ownership, there's you know, this concept of

0:18:59.156 --> 0:19:02.276
<v Speaker 1>like usas fructus and abusis I think is the Latin

0:19:02.316 --> 0:19:04.436
<v Speaker 1>phrase like you can use the property, you can enjoy it,

0:19:04.516 --> 0:19:06.676
<v Speaker 1>or you can abuse it. Like those are the rights

0:19:06.676 --> 0:19:08.996
<v Speaker 1>of ownership. Right, If you own something, you can you know,

0:19:09.196 --> 0:19:11.916
<v Speaker 1>basically do whatever you want with it, with the exception

0:19:11.996 --> 0:19:14.836
<v Speaker 1>of regulations that apply regardless of what property you're using

0:19:14.876 --> 0:19:17.436
<v Speaker 1>to do things. But clearly, in this sense, like Justin

0:19:18.316 --> 0:19:21.476
<v Speaker 1>used the coins that were in his possession, but he

0:19:21.596 --> 0:19:23.956
<v Speaker 1>ended up not being able to use them successfully, right,

0:19:23.996 --> 0:19:27.316
<v Speaker 1>because you know, the ecosystem forked off and he was

0:19:27.436 --> 0:19:30.836
<v Speaker 1>not able to sort of fully implement the thing that

0:19:30.876 --> 0:19:33.436
<v Speaker 1>he was entitled to emplements. According to the formal rules

0:19:33.436 --> 0:19:36.116
<v Speaker 1>of the system. And what that shows to me is

0:19:36.156 --> 0:19:38.756
<v Speaker 1>that this is proof that justin sun Never and even

0:19:38.796 --> 0:19:41.636
<v Speaker 1>the Steam company never actually owns those coins. Right, the

0:19:41.716 --> 0:19:45.876
<v Speaker 1>coins in some sense actually were sort of owned not

0:19:46.036 --> 0:19:48.796
<v Speaker 1>just by the holder of a cryptographic key, but they

0:19:48.796 --> 0:19:54.076
<v Speaker 1>were also owned directly by a community conception of legitimacy. Right,

0:19:54.116 --> 0:19:58.156
<v Speaker 1>they were directly owned sort of by this metaphysical object

0:19:58.316 --> 0:20:02.436
<v Speaker 1>that consists of this set of principles that existed and

0:20:02.516 --> 0:20:05.796
<v Speaker 1>we're maybe unstated and we're maybe informal and vague up

0:20:05.836 --> 0:20:09.876
<v Speaker 1>until that point in the Steam community's heads, and like,

0:20:09.996 --> 0:20:14.596
<v Speaker 1>that's a really powerful thing. It's tremendously powerful. So now

0:20:14.636 --> 0:20:16.516
<v Speaker 1>if I may, let me just say a quick word

0:20:16.716 --> 0:20:20.516
<v Speaker 1>and ask your dreer reaction about how these same issues

0:20:20.516 --> 0:20:22.476
<v Speaker 1>are thought about in the context of property law and

0:20:23.036 --> 0:20:25.996
<v Speaker 1>constitutional law, which you think of themselves. You know, constitution

0:20:26.076 --> 0:20:28.396
<v Speaker 1>law thinks it's the law of the blockchain, and property

0:20:28.476 --> 0:20:30.396
<v Speaker 1>law thinks it's the law of the tokens, at least

0:20:30.556 --> 0:20:33.436
<v Speaker 1>in this particularity. So in that world, we would say

0:20:33.516 --> 0:20:36.796
<v Speaker 1>everything that you described could happen in a real existing

0:20:36.996 --> 0:20:41.436
<v Speaker 1>community or government. It's usually called a revolution. Right, you

0:20:41.556 --> 0:20:44.876
<v Speaker 1>have some backgrounds set of principles that people think of

0:20:44.916 --> 0:20:48.316
<v Speaker 1>as the allocation of power. Who's in charge, who are

0:20:48.316 --> 0:20:50.116
<v Speaker 1>the courts, who do you have to listen to? Who

0:20:50.116 --> 0:20:52.916
<v Speaker 1>are the police? And then that system uses some set

0:20:52.916 --> 0:20:56.236
<v Speaker 1>of rules to decide who owns what property law governs

0:20:56.276 --> 0:20:58.436
<v Speaker 1>the stuff you own, voting rights law, which used to

0:20:58.476 --> 0:21:00.156
<v Speaker 1>be thought of many many years ago as a species

0:21:00.156 --> 0:21:03.996
<v Speaker 1>of property law, because they're closely connected. Governs how you

0:21:04.036 --> 0:21:08.156
<v Speaker 1>get to participate in decision making. But if someone exercises,

0:21:08.236 --> 0:21:09.796
<v Speaker 1>or some group of people or size a lot of

0:21:09.836 --> 0:21:12.476
<v Speaker 1>power in a way that makes other people in this system,

0:21:13.076 --> 0:21:14.756
<v Speaker 1>usually a majority of them, but it doesn't have to

0:21:14.756 --> 0:21:18.396
<v Speaker 1>be a majority angry enough to break the system. You

0:21:18.436 --> 0:21:21.596
<v Speaker 1>can get a revolution, and in that revolution, people break

0:21:21.596 --> 0:21:25.156
<v Speaker 1>the existing structures of power. They take away people's property rights.

0:21:25.756 --> 0:21:28.796
<v Speaker 1>They can take away physical objects that people have, or

0:21:28.836 --> 0:21:31.676
<v Speaker 1>they can take away their abstract rights, like you know,

0:21:31.716 --> 0:21:34.276
<v Speaker 1>the abstract idea that they own a piece of land,

0:21:34.956 --> 0:21:37.636
<v Speaker 1>or you know the shares that they In theory wouldn't

0:21:37.676 --> 0:21:40.676
<v Speaker 1>that kind of value can be destroyed, And because we

0:21:40.756 --> 0:21:43.476
<v Speaker 1>know that that can happen, we tend to think their

0:21:43.476 --> 0:21:48.076
<v Speaker 1>property law and a whole constitutional order are contingent and

0:21:48.116 --> 0:21:51.356
<v Speaker 1>their contingent on their not being a revolution. And when

0:21:51.396 --> 0:21:53.396
<v Speaker 1>we're looking for a word to describe the world where

0:21:53.396 --> 0:21:55.676
<v Speaker 1>there's no revolution, sometimes we use the exact same word

0:21:55.716 --> 0:21:58.036
<v Speaker 1>that you used. We say this system has a property

0:21:58.036 --> 0:22:01.676
<v Speaker 1>of legitimacy, meaning that right now, no one is starting

0:22:01.716 --> 0:22:04.636
<v Speaker 1>a revolution who has enough support to make it into

0:22:04.716 --> 0:22:07.956
<v Speaker 1>a very successful revolution. And we think that all the

0:22:07.996 --> 0:22:13.196
<v Speaker 1>time we're operating against that backdrop. So in my world,

0:22:13.556 --> 0:22:17.916
<v Speaker 1>your story makes perfect sense, and we also always assume

0:22:18.476 --> 0:22:20.836
<v Speaker 1>that it's true, even though we might not always talk

0:22:20.836 --> 0:22:23.156
<v Speaker 1>about it, except when there's revolution in the air. As

0:22:23.156 --> 0:22:24.996
<v Speaker 1>you were saying early in peacetime, you don't have to

0:22:24.996 --> 0:22:27.316
<v Speaker 1>think about these things. So I guess the first question

0:22:27.316 --> 0:22:28.836
<v Speaker 1>I want to ask is, when you hear me say

0:22:28.876 --> 0:22:30.796
<v Speaker 1>what I just said, do you think duh, you know

0:22:30.876 --> 0:22:35.156
<v Speaker 1>that's obvious? And if so, why does it why did

0:22:35.196 --> 0:22:37.556
<v Speaker 1>it seem or why does it seem surprising in the

0:22:37.596 --> 0:22:42.876
<v Speaker 1>context of the blockchain for similar dynamics to be in play. Again,

0:22:43.716 --> 0:22:48.716
<v Speaker 1>I'm definitely not surprised that constitutional law has similar vocabulary

0:22:48.756 --> 0:22:53.156
<v Speaker 1>for these kinds of things. The thing that just surprised

0:22:53.236 --> 0:22:57.556
<v Speaker 1>me and fascinated me about this happening in block channel land.

0:22:57.796 --> 0:22:59.716
<v Speaker 1>Is that the way that a lot of us think

0:22:59.756 --> 0:23:03.596
<v Speaker 1>about the world, or at least philosophers think kind of

0:23:03.676 --> 0:23:06.156
<v Speaker 1>legal philosopher's take about the world, right, is that you

0:23:06.236 --> 0:23:08.476
<v Speaker 1>have the laws of physics and the laws of physics

0:23:08.556 --> 0:23:10.996
<v Speaker 1>or layers right, and the laws of physics. You know,

0:23:11.036 --> 0:23:15.356
<v Speaker 1>you have guns and bombs and soldiers, and like that's

0:23:15.396 --> 0:23:17.636
<v Speaker 1>what ends up kind of ultimately in the extreme of

0:23:17.676 --> 0:23:21.036
<v Speaker 1>extremes deciding things. Then you have layer one, and layer

0:23:21.116 --> 0:23:24.356
<v Speaker 1>one is like basically legal norms that are run by countries.

0:23:24.596 --> 0:23:27.476
<v Speaker 1>And then sometimes that layer one collapses, but most of

0:23:27.476 --> 0:23:29.956
<v Speaker 1>the time that layer one doesn't collapse, But then everything

0:23:29.996 --> 0:23:32.996
<v Speaker 1>above that layer one is some layer two. And the

0:23:33.076 --> 0:23:35.316
<v Speaker 1>way that layer two works though, is that most of

0:23:35.356 --> 0:23:37.716
<v Speaker 1>the time it runs fine, but the portion of the

0:23:37.756 --> 0:23:39.836
<v Speaker 1>time when it does not run fine, what you have

0:23:39.996 --> 0:23:41.876
<v Speaker 1>is you actually have some kind of appeal like a

0:23:42.156 --> 0:23:44.916
<v Speaker 1>descents to layer one, right, Like if a business transaction

0:23:44.956 --> 0:23:48.076
<v Speaker 1>goes badly one if this party sues the other party,

0:23:48.436 --> 0:23:51.356
<v Speaker 1>you know, layer one, the government legal system ultimately ends

0:23:51.396 --> 0:23:54.716
<v Speaker 1>up kind of deciding who's right. If say you have

0:23:54.756 --> 0:23:58.196
<v Speaker 1>a dispute where the employees of Twitter decide that they're

0:23:58.196 --> 0:24:01.636
<v Speaker 1>going to take over Twitter servers because they have different

0:24:01.636 --> 0:24:04.116
<v Speaker 1>opinions about which accounts should be banned. They might be

0:24:04.116 --> 0:24:07.036
<v Speaker 1>able to kind of achieve some victories for a few hours,

0:24:07.036 --> 0:24:10.116
<v Speaker 1>but you know, eventually they the police get called in

0:24:10.116 --> 0:24:12.796
<v Speaker 1>and then the courts get called in, and like this

0:24:12.996 --> 0:24:18.636
<v Speaker 1>layer one that presents this abstraction of just always giving

0:24:18.636 --> 0:24:22.116
<v Speaker 1>you some kind of concrete final resolution that has you know,

0:24:22.236 --> 0:24:26.556
<v Speaker 1>universal agreements, is what ends up being the final designer, right.

0:24:26.876 --> 0:24:29.196
<v Speaker 1>But in the blockchain space, what we have is like

0:24:29.236 --> 0:24:32.436
<v Speaker 1>we in this particular context, we don't have that, right,

0:24:32.676 --> 0:24:36.316
<v Speaker 1>Like there's no sort of recourse to at least the

0:24:36.396 --> 0:24:39.196
<v Speaker 1>nation state layer one legal system. Instead, we have something

0:24:39.596 --> 0:24:43.436
<v Speaker 1>that feels more similar to this kind of layer one's

0:24:43.716 --> 0:24:47.236
<v Speaker 1>that is the blockchain community. And then that ends up

0:24:47.476 --> 0:24:51.316
<v Speaker 1>descending to something that feels like a different layer zero,

0:24:51.396 --> 0:24:54.596
<v Speaker 1>which is basically not quite laws of physics, but at

0:24:54.636 --> 0:24:57.356
<v Speaker 1>least kind of the laws of computing, and like the

0:24:57.396 --> 0:25:00.716
<v Speaker 1>practical rules of well, you know, who actually is running

0:25:00.756 --> 0:25:03.956
<v Speaker 1>the software, who actually is running the blockchain, how quickly

0:25:03.996 --> 0:25:06.916
<v Speaker 1>is it possible to convince people to update software. So

0:25:07.436 --> 0:25:09.636
<v Speaker 1>things that feel like there are sort of aspects of

0:25:09.756 --> 0:25:12.516
<v Speaker 1>nature as opposed to things that are aspects of a

0:25:12.716 --> 0:25:16.116
<v Speaker 1>kind of a human main construction. We'll be right back.

0:25:25.876 --> 0:25:29.676
<v Speaker 1>Let's bring now your big claim about legitimacy to bear

0:25:29.916 --> 0:25:33.556
<v Speaker 1>on the big picture of the blockchain. Sure, to those

0:25:33.636 --> 0:25:37.076
<v Speaker 1>on the outside who were eagerly like me, eagerly learning

0:25:37.116 --> 0:25:39.996
<v Speaker 1>about the ideology of the blockchain and its functionalities and

0:25:40.036 --> 0:25:42.116
<v Speaker 1>its goals and its trans and are really interested in

0:25:42.116 --> 0:25:46.036
<v Speaker 1>the question of its transformative capacities, A crucial question is,

0:25:47.116 --> 0:25:49.276
<v Speaker 1>you know, why will lots and lots and lots of

0:25:49.356 --> 0:25:53.796
<v Speaker 1>people in the future engage on the blockchain, right? Why

0:25:53.876 --> 0:25:58.316
<v Speaker 1>will they prefer it to other more centralized options. How

0:25:58.396 --> 0:26:01.716
<v Speaker 1>much of the answer for you is connected to this

0:26:01.876 --> 0:26:04.636
<v Speaker 1>legitimacy question. How much does it connect to the idea that, well,

0:26:05.196 --> 0:26:09.036
<v Speaker 1>the blockchain can offer forms of legitimacy for the kinds

0:26:09.036 --> 0:26:12.276
<v Speaker 1>of things that it does well or that enables people

0:26:12.276 --> 0:26:14.876
<v Speaker 1>to do well that are different from and maybe more

0:26:14.916 --> 0:26:19.036
<v Speaker 1>attractive than the kinds of legitimacy that we're accustomed to

0:26:19.076 --> 0:26:26.716
<v Speaker 1>seeing in more centralized deployment. I think that's a good question,

0:26:26.836 --> 0:26:30.476
<v Speaker 1>and it depends quite a lot on no legitimacy, and

0:26:31.116 --> 0:26:35.596
<v Speaker 1>I think that's true on multiple levels. So there's sort

0:26:35.596 --> 0:26:38.116
<v Speaker 1>of two different levels that I can talk about. So

0:26:38.196 --> 0:26:42.556
<v Speaker 1>the first level is that I think the decentralized architecture

0:26:42.676 --> 0:26:46.876
<v Speaker 1>of blockchains is something that directly can give users a

0:26:46.876 --> 0:26:49.876
<v Speaker 1>feeling of a safety and a feeling of safety that

0:26:50.476 --> 0:26:53.436
<v Speaker 1>the functionality that the blockchain provides is not going to

0:26:53.476 --> 0:26:57.596
<v Speaker 1>just change on them in unexpected and unacceptable ways. And like,

0:26:57.716 --> 0:27:00.156
<v Speaker 1>one very practical example of this, right is, like if

0:27:00.156 --> 0:27:02.916
<v Speaker 1>you look at things like Twitter and Facebook, they at

0:27:02.956 --> 0:27:06.116
<v Speaker 1>the very beginning had very open APIs, and there are

0:27:06.156 --> 0:27:09.956
<v Speaker 1>lots of startups that built themselves relying on the assumption

0:27:10.036 --> 0:27:12.916
<v Speaker 1>that the APIs would continue to exist as they have existed.

0:27:13.356 --> 0:27:15.836
<v Speaker 1>But then what happens in a lot of cases is

0:27:15.876 --> 0:27:18.316
<v Speaker 1>that Twitter and Facebook basically pulled the rug on them right,

0:27:18.316 --> 0:27:21.156
<v Speaker 1>like they just made the APIs no longer work. Regardless

0:27:21.196 --> 0:27:23.916
<v Speaker 1>of what the reasons were. The result was that people

0:27:24.076 --> 0:27:26.836
<v Speaker 1>like Yahd entrepreneurs have just spent years building these projects.

0:27:26.836 --> 0:27:29.036
<v Speaker 1>But the result is that like Twitter just makes a

0:27:29.116 --> 0:27:32.796
<v Speaker 1>decision with a few clicks and boom, their entire business

0:27:32.796 --> 0:27:35.596
<v Speaker 1>model is gone. With a blockchain like that, you can't

0:27:35.596 --> 0:27:38.836
<v Speaker 1>really do that, right because even if you don't want

0:27:38.916 --> 0:27:41.916
<v Speaker 1>to talk to a blockchain directly and you're making a service,

0:27:41.956 --> 0:27:44.716
<v Speaker 1>and it's like working through some APIs like from ether

0:27:44.796 --> 0:27:47.356
<v Speaker 1>scan or some one of these kind of service providers.

0:27:47.636 --> 0:27:50.036
<v Speaker 1>Like if either scan decides to change its serves of service,

0:27:50.036 --> 0:27:52.276
<v Speaker 1>the blockchain is open, right, and there's other alternatives. You

0:27:52.316 --> 0:27:54.916
<v Speaker 1>can just like go over to ether chain and they'll

0:27:54.916 --> 0:27:57.996
<v Speaker 1>start doing the same thing. And then if someone suggests

0:27:57.996 --> 0:28:01.076
<v Speaker 1>that the rules of the blockchain themselves change, then that

0:28:01.116 --> 0:28:04.676
<v Speaker 1>can only happen through this long, open process, and even

0:28:04.796 --> 0:28:07.356
<v Speaker 1>you can just potentially go in and raise your objections

0:28:07.356 --> 0:28:10.556
<v Speaker 1>to it, and like it's much much harder and much

0:28:10.636 --> 0:28:13.356
<v Speaker 1>less likely for the thing that you were doing to

0:28:13.476 --> 0:28:17.916
<v Speaker 1>just suddenly, you know, become impossible on you. Right, for example,

0:28:17.996 --> 0:28:20.356
<v Speaker 1>is even just a twenty one million women in bitcoin? Right?

0:28:20.676 --> 0:28:23.276
<v Speaker 1>Like I think bitcoin is sometimes like they overstate this

0:28:23.316 --> 0:28:24.796
<v Speaker 1>a bit and they say that, you know, the twenty

0:28:24.796 --> 0:28:27.236
<v Speaker 1>one million limit is backed by mass, like obviously it's

0:28:27.236 --> 0:28:30.796
<v Speaker 1>not right, Like, obviously, if everyone agrees that tomorrow we're

0:28:30.836 --> 0:28:32.956
<v Speaker 1>gonna run a new version of the Clients, and that

0:28:33.076 --> 0:28:35.716
<v Speaker 1>Clients now says that there's thirty one million bitcoins, then

0:28:35.996 --> 0:28:38.316
<v Speaker 1>like for all practical intents and purposes, there's thirty one

0:28:38.316 --> 0:28:41.676
<v Speaker 1>million bitoins now, but in practice, like, there are these

0:28:41.836 --> 0:28:45.556
<v Speaker 1>very strong forces of a legitimacy that go against that. Right,

0:28:45.596 --> 0:28:48.756
<v Speaker 1>there's this entire community that basically says, you know, twenty

0:28:48.756 --> 0:28:53.556
<v Speaker 1>one million is the zone data of bitcoin or like,

0:28:53.836 --> 0:28:57.236
<v Speaker 1>without that property, this sting is not bitcoin. And there's

0:28:57.436 --> 0:29:00.116
<v Speaker 1>enough people who just really fervently believe in this that

0:29:00.276 --> 0:29:03.236
<v Speaker 1>you know, in practice, breaking the twenty one million limit

0:29:03.356 --> 0:29:06.556
<v Speaker 1>is just going to be like extremely harder impossible. So

0:29:07.316 --> 0:29:10.716
<v Speaker 1>that's money answer, right, Okay, good, let's talk about that answer,

0:29:10.716 --> 0:29:12.676
<v Speaker 1>and then I'm sure you have more to say about it.

0:29:12.916 --> 0:29:15.236
<v Speaker 1>But this answer is really fascinating an incredibly generative. So

0:29:15.356 --> 0:29:16.836
<v Speaker 1>I want to say a couple of different things about

0:29:16.836 --> 0:29:20.796
<v Speaker 1>it in question. So the first is, let's start with

0:29:20.836 --> 0:29:26.036
<v Speaker 1>this question of is the argument basically, look, distributed power

0:29:26.636 --> 0:29:32.116
<v Speaker 1>democracy would be the analogy in ordinary constitutional design has

0:29:32.196 --> 0:29:37.276
<v Speaker 1>some real advantages over concentrated power like autocracy or certain

0:29:37.276 --> 0:29:41.676
<v Speaker 1>forms of monarchy, and so in the long run, many

0:29:41.756 --> 0:29:47.676
<v Speaker 1>people will prefer the blockchain model to the more centralized model. First,

0:29:47.756 --> 0:29:51.716
<v Speaker 1>sort of like the reasons that people prefer democracies to autocracies,

0:29:52.436 --> 0:29:56.196
<v Speaker 1>which includes the possibility or includes the probability that for

0:29:56.196 --> 0:29:59.356
<v Speaker 1>a democracy to make changes, you need a lot of

0:29:59.356 --> 0:30:00.996
<v Speaker 1>people to agree, and so you need this a certain

0:30:00.996 --> 0:30:05.236
<v Speaker 1>amount of decentralization there, whereas in a pure autocracy, you know,

0:30:05.316 --> 0:30:08.716
<v Speaker 1>the emperor decides tomorrow or Hijinping decides tomorrow, the things

0:30:08.756 --> 0:30:10.956
<v Speaker 1>are going to be different and then they are going

0:30:10.996 --> 0:30:14.756
<v Speaker 1>to be different. So my first question is is there

0:30:14.796 --> 0:30:17.116
<v Speaker 1>a kind of loose analogy there such that when people

0:30:17.116 --> 0:30:19.516
<v Speaker 1>are making the argument for the appeal of the blockchain

0:30:19.516 --> 0:30:22.556
<v Speaker 1>and its advantages, it has a kind of family resemblance

0:30:23.156 --> 0:30:26.396
<v Speaker 1>to the argument about the advantages over decentralized governance, namely

0:30:26.436 --> 0:30:32.316
<v Speaker 1>democracy over centralized government, namely autocracy. I think that's definitely

0:30:32.316 --> 0:30:35.396
<v Speaker 1>a good analogy. So if it is, and that's for me,

0:30:35.436 --> 0:30:38.556
<v Speaker 1>that's very clarifying. And I apologize for translating your world

0:30:38.596 --> 0:30:41.396
<v Speaker 1>into my world, but for lease some listeners, your world

0:30:41.436 --> 0:30:47.316
<v Speaker 1>is certainly newer than mine. If that's true, then what

0:30:47.476 --> 0:30:50.836
<v Speaker 1>about the counter concern, which is that you know, there

0:30:50.836 --> 0:30:53.516
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of people who prefer big centralized systems

0:30:53.516 --> 0:30:56.916
<v Speaker 1>of governance, and what partly the reason for that is

0:30:56.956 --> 0:31:01.436
<v Speaker 1>that big decentralized groups of people are susceptible to their

0:31:01.516 --> 0:31:07.396
<v Speaker 1>own weird changes over time. Right, they can collectively decide

0:31:07.756 --> 0:31:10.196
<v Speaker 1>that they're going to go out and do something completely different,

0:31:10.316 --> 0:31:12.796
<v Speaker 1>and we call that a revolution, a revolution that establishes

0:31:12.956 --> 0:31:16.436
<v Speaker 1>and achieves legitimacy, And it doesn't necessarily do a better

0:31:16.516 --> 0:31:21.116
<v Speaker 1>job of protecting settled expectations than do the older systems

0:31:21.676 --> 0:31:27.356
<v Speaker 1>like monarchies and autocracies. Yeah, so I think two answers there.

0:31:27.756 --> 0:31:31.236
<v Speaker 1>One is that I do think that blockchains have more

0:31:31.316 --> 0:31:34.596
<v Speaker 1>of aya do nothing biased than like sort of built

0:31:34.636 --> 0:31:36.636
<v Speaker 1>in inherently to this lay or zero that we talked

0:31:36.676 --> 0:31:41.316
<v Speaker 1>about them, than systems of governance do. Right, Like, if

0:31:41.676 --> 0:31:44.396
<v Speaker 1>the social layer goes to hell in a country, then

0:31:44.436 --> 0:31:46.356
<v Speaker 1>you know, often a strong man does get in power

0:31:46.356 --> 0:31:48.916
<v Speaker 1>and do whatever they want, Whereas if the social layer

0:31:48.956 --> 0:31:51.436
<v Speaker 1>goes to hell in something like biquin and ethereum, then

0:31:51.756 --> 0:31:56.036
<v Speaker 1>like often just nothing happens. Right So that now, of

0:31:56.036 --> 0:31:58.076
<v Speaker 1>course you can you know, disagree, and there might still

0:31:58.116 --> 0:32:01.076
<v Speaker 1>be the possibility that the social layer goes to hell

0:32:01.236 --> 0:32:04.276
<v Speaker 1>in such a way that makes it easy for crazy

0:32:04.316 --> 0:32:07.116
<v Speaker 1>things to happen in a blockchain. But like it feels

0:32:07.196 --> 0:32:10.116
<v Speaker 1>like there are these a sort of layer zero. Pressure

0:32:10.196 --> 0:32:13.276
<v Speaker 1>is just because of this coordination problem of getting people

0:32:13.276 --> 0:32:15.356
<v Speaker 1>to update their notes at the same time that make

0:32:15.396 --> 0:32:19.156
<v Speaker 1>it less likely. So I think the distinction here is that, like,

0:32:20.156 --> 0:32:23.036
<v Speaker 1>blockchains are only the bottom layer of an application, right,

0:32:23.076 --> 0:32:26.636
<v Speaker 1>and blockchains don't even necessarily have to innovate much for

0:32:26.676 --> 0:32:29.396
<v Speaker 1>applications to be able to innovate much on top. And

0:32:29.436 --> 0:32:31.916
<v Speaker 1>so going back to your point of what if people

0:32:31.996 --> 0:32:35.076
<v Speaker 1>like centralization, one of the big reasons why people like

0:32:35.196 --> 0:32:39.516
<v Speaker 1>centralization is just performance and the ability to kind of

0:32:39.596 --> 0:32:45.116
<v Speaker 1>rapidly pivot and make changes. But applications on a decentralized

0:32:45.156 --> 0:32:48.436
<v Speaker 1>system can do this, right, Like, there's plenty of applications

0:32:48.596 --> 0:32:52.996
<v Speaker 1>on ethereum where those applications have internal governance, and that

0:32:53.036 --> 0:32:57.636
<v Speaker 1>internal governance has the ability to, like say, completely switch

0:32:57.676 --> 0:32:59.956
<v Speaker 1>over the rules with a sixty to eight time delay

0:33:00.316 --> 0:33:02.556
<v Speaker 1>or sometimes completely switch over the rules with a zero

0:33:02.676 --> 0:33:05.676
<v Speaker 1>day time delay, right, Like, you can build rules and

0:33:05.756 --> 0:33:07.716
<v Speaker 1>you can make things a kind of all long the

0:33:07.716 --> 0:33:11.356
<v Speaker 1>spectrum from the centrals a full centralization on top of

0:33:11.396 --> 0:33:14.956
<v Speaker 1>a decentralized system. Now, what you can't do is you

0:33:15.036 --> 0:33:18.316
<v Speaker 1>can't build a decentralized application on top of Twitter, right,

0:33:18.516 --> 0:33:21.636
<v Speaker 1>So that's kind of the intuitive case for wanting or

0:33:21.716 --> 0:33:23.556
<v Speaker 1>you can only in so far as Twitter will let

0:33:23.596 --> 0:33:26.396
<v Speaker 1>you exactly right. So that's kind of the intuitive case

0:33:26.476 --> 0:33:29.836
<v Speaker 1>for wanting things that are closer to being base layers

0:33:29.836 --> 0:33:32.956
<v Speaker 1>to be more decentralized, but wanting things that are closer

0:33:32.996 --> 0:33:36.476
<v Speaker 1>to the application layer to be more centralized. Although you know,

0:33:36.516 --> 0:33:38.556
<v Speaker 1>in the case of the modern state, you know, the

0:33:38.596 --> 0:33:42.116
<v Speaker 1>post sixteen forty eight state, the state actually has exactly

0:33:42.116 --> 0:33:45.916
<v Speaker 1>that hybrid character that you just describe. The state is Twitter, right,

0:33:45.996 --> 0:33:50.476
<v Speaker 1>it maintains control, albeit it has a governance mechanism behind it,

0:33:50.876 --> 0:33:52.796
<v Speaker 1>although so does Twitter. Technically it has the laws of

0:33:52.836 --> 0:33:57.076
<v Speaker 1>corporations behind it. But then by enabling a free market,

0:33:57.436 --> 0:34:00.916
<v Speaker 1>the state is in a sense allowing people to build

0:34:00.956 --> 0:34:05.516
<v Speaker 1>all kinds of applications on the centralized platform. And so

0:34:05.556 --> 0:34:08.076
<v Speaker 1>the state has really hugely benefited in the modern era

0:34:08.196 --> 0:34:12.356
<v Speaker 1>from this domination. So it is possible and similarly, presumably

0:34:12.436 --> 0:34:15.676
<v Speaker 1>if you were, you know, a major platform, you might

0:34:15.796 --> 0:34:19.236
<v Speaker 1>want it might be the smartest move to allow the

0:34:19.276 --> 0:34:23.556
<v Speaker 1>building of all kinds of you know, decentralized things on

0:34:23.596 --> 0:34:27.716
<v Speaker 1>top of your platform, because it actually encourages everybody to

0:34:27.716 --> 0:34:29.516
<v Speaker 1>be to be invested in that platform. That might be

0:34:29.556 --> 0:34:33.996
<v Speaker 1>the winning strategy from a certain standpoint. That's very possible,

0:34:34.156 --> 0:34:37.316
<v Speaker 1>but there are also limits to the extent to which

0:34:37.436 --> 0:34:41.196
<v Speaker 1>a centralized state can commit to a trustfulness. Like one

0:34:41.356 --> 0:34:43.756
<v Speaker 1>very practical example, right as if we look at say

0:34:43.756 --> 0:34:47.476
<v Speaker 1>centralized US tech companies, like back about ten or fifteen

0:34:47.556 --> 0:34:52.036
<v Speaker 1>years ago, they were fairly fairly trusted internationally, right, and

0:34:52.116 --> 0:34:54.796
<v Speaker 1>there was this kind of legal order where people could

0:34:54.836 --> 0:34:56.956
<v Speaker 1>sort of put their heads in the sand. It kind

0:34:56.956 --> 0:34:59.996
<v Speaker 1>of pretends that these Silicon Valley companies were basically living

0:35:00.036 --> 0:35:02.916
<v Speaker 1>inside of an anarchy, and they would just like be

0:35:02.996 --> 0:35:05.756
<v Speaker 1>able to you know, keep on and do keep on

0:35:05.796 --> 0:35:09.116
<v Speaker 1>doing whatever was in their business interests. But then what happened,

0:35:09.116 --> 0:35:11.396
<v Speaker 1>and what's happened over the last ten years, is that

0:35:11.956 --> 0:35:15.836
<v Speaker 1>a lot of countries, like both governments and people in

0:35:15.916 --> 0:35:18.436
<v Speaker 1>countries and especially countries that are not very friendly to

0:35:18.476 --> 0:35:22.836
<v Speaker 1>the US, started being much more suspicious of US tech companies. Now,

0:35:22.876 --> 0:35:24.796
<v Speaker 1>some of that I think is, of course, is because

0:35:24.836 --> 0:35:28.276
<v Speaker 1>they just they want to promote local alternatives so they

0:35:28.276 --> 0:35:30.836
<v Speaker 1>can have control themselves. But some of that is also

0:35:30.916 --> 0:35:33.596
<v Speaker 1>because like they are actually afraid that if the US

0:35:33.636 --> 0:35:35.756
<v Speaker 1>and this other country comes into conflicts, then the US

0:35:35.796 --> 0:35:39.236
<v Speaker 1>government is actually going to ruck hold them. Whereas you know,

0:35:39.316 --> 0:35:42.796
<v Speaker 1>the Ethereum blockchain, for example, is less capable of doing

0:35:43.236 --> 0:35:48.276
<v Speaker 1>that if say, an application was built by someone from

0:35:48.316 --> 0:35:51.196
<v Speaker 1>the Bitcoin community and at ran on the ethereum blockchain.

0:35:52.876 --> 0:35:55.796
<v Speaker 1>So now you're turning to the last topic I want

0:35:55.796 --> 0:35:58.396
<v Speaker 1>to talk about, and it's very rich and fascinating to me.

0:35:58.476 --> 0:36:00.516
<v Speaker 1>And that is what you might call the issue of

0:36:00.516 --> 0:36:04.036
<v Speaker 1>pre commitment. Right, how well suited are different kinds of

0:36:04.076 --> 0:36:09.436
<v Speaker 1>institutions to promising in advance that they won't mess things

0:36:09.516 --> 0:36:12.116
<v Speaker 1>up relative to your settled expectations. And you already mentioned

0:36:12.116 --> 0:36:14.676
<v Speaker 1>that in the context of the people who say, well,

0:36:14.996 --> 0:36:18.436
<v Speaker 1>you know, bitcoin's foundational definition is it's limited to twenty

0:36:18.436 --> 0:36:21.036
<v Speaker 1>one million, and a lot follows from that. Right, Therefore

0:36:21.116 --> 0:36:24.436
<v Speaker 1>they say it's a fixed supply. Therefore they say it's

0:36:24.436 --> 0:36:27.236
<v Speaker 1>analogous to gold, which is also a fixed supply. Although

0:36:27.636 --> 0:36:29.436
<v Speaker 1>we may not have found all of that fixed supply,

0:36:29.636 --> 0:36:33.276
<v Speaker 1>the fixed supply in principle exists. So what I'm interested

0:36:33.316 --> 0:36:35.516
<v Speaker 1>in there're two aspects of this. I'm interested in one.

0:36:35.716 --> 0:36:38.956
<v Speaker 1>Why would we believe that one kind of institution is

0:36:38.996 --> 0:36:43.076
<v Speaker 1>more impervious to pre commitment than another if all precommitments

0:36:43.116 --> 0:36:45.196
<v Speaker 1>are just based on self interest? Right, So if the

0:36:45.236 --> 0:36:49.116
<v Speaker 1>people who were holding the bitcoin voting power chose to

0:36:49.156 --> 0:36:51.396
<v Speaker 1>expand the number, and it was in their interest to

0:36:51.436 --> 0:36:54.436
<v Speaker 1>do so, they would do so much in the same

0:36:54.516 --> 0:36:57.076
<v Speaker 1>way that when a government decides that it's in its

0:36:57.116 --> 0:37:00.236
<v Speaker 1>interests to expand its monetary supply, it has a governance

0:37:00.276 --> 0:37:03.756
<v Speaker 1>mechanism or multiple complex governance mechanisms, and then it does so.

0:37:04.076 --> 0:37:06.516
<v Speaker 1>And yet when he hears from people in the bitcoin

0:37:06.596 --> 0:37:09.996
<v Speaker 1>world things like, well, that can ever happened here? We

0:37:10.036 --> 0:37:12.676
<v Speaker 1>can't trust states to be pre committed, but of course

0:37:12.716 --> 0:37:16.716
<v Speaker 1>we can trust our institutions to be pre committed. So

0:37:17.116 --> 0:37:18.996
<v Speaker 1>is there anything to that? I mean, I have trouble

0:37:19.036 --> 0:37:20.876
<v Speaker 1>seeing why we would be more trusting of one than

0:37:20.916 --> 0:37:25.356
<v Speaker 1>the other. Sure, so I think like the important thing

0:37:25.436 --> 0:37:28.156
<v Speaker 1>is that bitcoin doesn't have a concept of voting power, right,

0:37:28.556 --> 0:37:31.316
<v Speaker 1>like it has miners. But at the same time, like

0:37:31.356 --> 0:37:33.956
<v Speaker 1>if a minor creates a block that violates the current roles,

0:37:34.156 --> 0:37:36.036
<v Speaker 1>like even if ninety percent of all the miners are

0:37:36.076 --> 0:37:38.276
<v Speaker 1>going along with them, the nodes that are run by

0:37:38.356 --> 0:37:41.596
<v Speaker 1>users are still going to reject them. Right Although although

0:37:41.636 --> 0:37:44.196
<v Speaker 1>your whole, your whole parable shows that they could just

0:37:44.276 --> 0:37:48.236
<v Speaker 1>hive fork off and replicate, they could exactly so that's

0:37:48.236 --> 0:37:51.276
<v Speaker 1>why such genius. Right, Yeah, that's very true. But at

0:37:51.276 --> 0:37:53.876
<v Speaker 1>the same time, like that action does have a cost, right,

0:37:54.156 --> 0:37:57.996
<v Speaker 1>Like if it was a an actual voting system, then

0:37:58.396 --> 0:38:00.716
<v Speaker 1>like you know, once the vote happened and fifty one

0:38:00.756 --> 0:38:03.476
<v Speaker 1>percent approved the motion and change the source code, well

0:38:03.756 --> 0:38:06.036
<v Speaker 1>you're kind of screwed, right, yeah, well, or or at

0:38:06.036 --> 0:38:08.476
<v Speaker 1>the very least, like the shoe is on the other foot.

0:38:08.476 --> 0:38:11.716
<v Speaker 1>And like the burden of overcoming the coordination problem, which

0:38:11.796 --> 0:38:14.476
<v Speaker 1>is a really really high burden like basically falls on

0:38:14.516 --> 0:38:17.756
<v Speaker 1>the side of the dissenters. But in the case of bitcoin,

0:38:18.116 --> 0:38:21.636
<v Speaker 1>the burden of overcoming the coordination burden for anything controversial

0:38:21.996 --> 0:38:24.436
<v Speaker 1>falls on the side of the people that are trying

0:38:24.436 --> 0:38:26.836
<v Speaker 1>to make the change. Right. That's true in a revolution

0:38:26.876 --> 0:38:28.676
<v Speaker 1>as well, Right, the burden is on the people who

0:38:28.716 --> 0:38:32.516
<v Speaker 1>want to make the revolution typically right, but there are

0:38:32.596 --> 0:38:36.196
<v Speaker 1>also ways to rapidly change policy in a state that

0:38:36.196 --> 0:38:39.036
<v Speaker 1>don't require revolution. May I just say about that often

0:38:39.396 --> 0:38:42.556
<v Speaker 1>people who study states. I had Francis fo Kiama on

0:38:42.556 --> 0:38:44.076
<v Speaker 1>the show the other day, and this is something that

0:38:44.276 --> 0:38:47.396
<v Speaker 1>he writes about extensively, think that the capacity to make

0:38:47.476 --> 0:38:50.196
<v Speaker 1>changes legally is actually a crucial part of the anti

0:38:50.276 --> 0:38:53.356
<v Speaker 1>fragility of states. In other words, it's thought to be

0:38:53.636 --> 0:38:55.636
<v Speaker 1>one of the best ways to avoid the decay of

0:38:55.636 --> 0:39:00.276
<v Speaker 1>a political order, to ensure the possibility of negotiating change

0:39:00.276 --> 0:39:01.796
<v Speaker 1>within the framework of law. And when you can't do

0:39:01.796 --> 0:39:04.716
<v Speaker 1>it anymore, you get rigid, and when you get rigid,

0:39:04.716 --> 0:39:07.956
<v Speaker 1>you tend towards decay. So that seems like a good

0:39:07.996 --> 0:39:11.836
<v Speaker 1>feature rather of the very possible. It's also like states

0:39:11.836 --> 0:39:15.356
<v Speaker 1>and blockchains also do very different things, right, Like blockchains

0:39:15.396 --> 0:39:20.396
<v Speaker 1>are like software constructions that relatively are interacting with a

0:39:20.436 --> 0:39:23.076
<v Speaker 1>simpler world. You know, States have to deal with just

0:39:23.156 --> 0:39:26.516
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of problems and they have to act strategically

0:39:26.516 --> 0:39:29.876
<v Speaker 1>in the face of external threats. So it's possible that

0:39:30.236 --> 0:39:34.116
<v Speaker 1>the kind of like the correct balance between agility and

0:39:34.756 --> 0:39:37.716
<v Speaker 1>ability to just kind of credibly stick in one place

0:39:37.836 --> 0:39:39.996
<v Speaker 1>is just different between the two contexts. And that's fine.

0:39:40.396 --> 0:39:42.636
<v Speaker 1>I mean, the question that I want to close with then,

0:39:43.036 --> 0:39:45.156
<v Speaker 1>is one that I really fascinates me, and I see

0:39:45.156 --> 0:39:46.716
<v Speaker 1>it again and again and again as I talk to

0:39:46.876 --> 0:39:50.636
<v Speaker 1>sophisticated people in your blockchain universe or in crypto land,

0:39:51.276 --> 0:39:55.076
<v Speaker 1>and that is there seems to be this impulse towards

0:39:55.356 --> 0:39:58.556
<v Speaker 1>what I would call almost like a conservative preservationism, a

0:39:58.756 --> 0:40:02.436
<v Speaker 1>worry that the reason we can't trust, say, governments, is

0:40:02.476 --> 0:40:06.436
<v Speaker 1>that they do stuff too frequently, you know, too riskly

0:40:06.916 --> 0:40:10.916
<v Speaker 1>that facilitates the interests of vote majorities, and that we

0:40:10.956 --> 0:40:13.636
<v Speaker 1>need to draw a line against that. We need to

0:40:14.076 --> 0:40:16.116
<v Speaker 1>have principles and rules. And in that sense, it sounds

0:40:16.116 --> 0:40:18.516
<v Speaker 1>in libertarianism, the idea that you know, we have some

0:40:18.596 --> 0:40:20.676
<v Speaker 1>basic fundamental rights and we ought to stick to those

0:40:20.716 --> 0:40:22.396
<v Speaker 1>and we don't want to live in a world where

0:40:22.636 --> 0:40:26.956
<v Speaker 1>the government can just wish away our rights. And that

0:40:26.996 --> 0:40:30.116
<v Speaker 1>makes sense to me. And here's the punchline. But if

0:40:30.156 --> 0:40:33.556
<v Speaker 1>your account of legitimacy is true, and I believe you

0:40:33.596 --> 0:40:37.276
<v Speaker 1>convince me that it is, then I don't see how

0:40:37.436 --> 0:40:42.676
<v Speaker 1>decentralization in the blockchain fulfills those libertarian aspirations, because it

0:40:42.756 --> 0:40:46.876
<v Speaker 1>just pushes them up one level to the level of

0:40:46.956 --> 0:40:49.716
<v Speaker 1>the voting members, the people who structure the governance, and

0:40:49.756 --> 0:40:51.356
<v Speaker 1>they don't literally have to vote, they just have to

0:40:51.396 --> 0:40:53.076
<v Speaker 1>have the capacity to do what you said in the

0:40:53.516 --> 0:40:57.516
<v Speaker 1>steam Hive story of just forking off and replicating. And

0:40:57.556 --> 0:41:00.396
<v Speaker 1>so if that's the case, then this world it's no

0:41:00.516 --> 0:41:04.556
<v Speaker 1>worse than but it not obviously better than a world

0:41:04.556 --> 0:41:08.836
<v Speaker 1>of centralized platforms when it comes to including governments, when

0:41:08.836 --> 0:41:11.636
<v Speaker 1>it comes to these kinds of pre commitment to certain

0:41:11.676 --> 0:41:17.196
<v Speaker 1>core principles, I think the main part of my answer

0:41:17.236 --> 0:41:20.156
<v Speaker 1>to that is that I'm a marginalist and not an absolutist.

0:41:20.436 --> 0:41:23.436
<v Speaker 1>Like I think, even if you can't get a one

0:41:23.516 --> 0:41:27.556
<v Speaker 1>hundred percent of the way towards satisfying some principle or

0:41:27.996 --> 0:41:29.996
<v Speaker 1>or idea or systems of values, you could still make

0:41:29.996 --> 0:41:32.396
<v Speaker 1>a huge gain by getting thirty percent or fifty percent

0:41:32.436 --> 0:41:35.476
<v Speaker 1>of the way there. And like I do think that

0:41:35.756 --> 0:41:39.036
<v Speaker 1>what I call the laws of physics that exist in

0:41:39.076 --> 0:41:42.676
<v Speaker 1>the in watchannel onto and the way that a kind

0:41:42.676 --> 0:41:46.396
<v Speaker 1>of the coordination problems tilt against someone making wanting to

0:41:46.436 --> 0:41:49.476
<v Speaker 1>make radical changes, even though radical changes are still possible

0:41:49.556 --> 0:41:52.876
<v Speaker 1>if they can overcome those coordination problems. Just the facts

0:41:52.876 --> 0:41:54.996
<v Speaker 1>that users run notes just means that you have to

0:41:55.276 --> 0:41:57.556
<v Speaker 1>consult users at all. Like I do think that those

0:41:57.556 --> 0:42:02.476
<v Speaker 1>things are improvements. I definitely don't claim that watchings are

0:42:02.836 --> 0:42:06.036
<v Speaker 1>or can be one hundred percent immutable systems, no matter

0:42:06.036 --> 0:42:09.316
<v Speaker 1>how hard someone tries to be. I think, just going

0:42:09.356 --> 0:42:12.036
<v Speaker 1>back a bit to your earlier analogy, it's with like

0:42:12.116 --> 0:42:14.516
<v Speaker 1>tech companies and how a tech company is, like they

0:42:14.516 --> 0:42:17.476
<v Speaker 1>do end up changing a lot. I think my answer

0:42:17.596 --> 0:42:21.116
<v Speaker 1>there is just that like there are if we look

0:42:21.156 --> 0:42:24.276
<v Speaker 1>at the tech universe, like there are already things that

0:42:24.356 --> 0:42:26.796
<v Speaker 1>are more immutable than tech companies, right, and that is

0:42:26.796 --> 0:42:29.916
<v Speaker 1>programming languages, right like Python. You know, it took decades

0:42:29.956 --> 0:42:32.796
<v Speaker 1>to move from Python to to Python three C plus plus.

0:42:32.836 --> 0:42:35.116
<v Speaker 1>I think it's still backwards compatible with what was there

0:42:35.156 --> 0:42:39.676
<v Speaker 1>like tens of years ago. So there are also things

0:42:39.716 --> 0:42:42.676
<v Speaker 1>that are decentralized in that sense, right, and like programming

0:42:42.716 --> 0:42:46.836
<v Speaker 1>languages are a good example. So the way that I

0:42:47.116 --> 0:42:49.556
<v Speaker 1>kind of I guess view the way things should be

0:42:49.836 --> 0:42:53.036
<v Speaker 1>is that intuitively, things that are more general purpose and

0:42:53.116 --> 0:42:56.356
<v Speaker 1>that are more abstract, it's less likely that they are

0:42:56.396 --> 0:42:59.076
<v Speaker 1>going to need to change rapidly because the goal of

0:42:59.116 --> 0:43:01.356
<v Speaker 1>them is to be general purpose, right, Like with a

0:43:01.356 --> 0:43:03.756
<v Speaker 1>programming language like Python, like you can build anything in

0:43:03.796 --> 0:43:05.876
<v Speaker 1>response to it, Like Python did not even have to

0:43:05.956 --> 0:43:08.556
<v Speaker 1>change in a response to say, the emergence of the

0:43:08.556 --> 0:43:11.756
<v Speaker 1>blockchain world. But things that are closer to the application layer,

0:43:11.996 --> 0:43:14.716
<v Speaker 1>they do need to adapt. There's more need for centralization.

0:43:15.036 --> 0:43:18.476
<v Speaker 1>There is potentially need for kind of bounded centralization where

0:43:18.676 --> 0:43:21.836
<v Speaker 1>you include some decentralized components, but they're more to keep

0:43:21.876 --> 0:43:24.596
<v Speaker 1>the centralized party honestly than to kind of shackle than one.

0:43:26.556 --> 0:43:28.356
<v Speaker 1>So things that are closer to the user can be

0:43:28.396 --> 0:43:31.676
<v Speaker 1>more centralized, and that's fine Ethereum. I guess I view

0:43:31.756 --> 0:43:35.116
<v Speaker 1>it as being a little bit more like a programming

0:43:35.156 --> 0:43:37.556
<v Speaker 1>language than or taking the role of something like a

0:43:37.596 --> 0:43:41.036
<v Speaker 1>programming language, than taking a role of something like Twitter.

0:43:41.116 --> 0:43:44.396
<v Speaker 1>But at the same time, like blockchains are their own category, right,

0:43:44.476 --> 0:43:46.836
<v Speaker 1>Like I think, you know, blockchains, like they take some

0:43:46.916 --> 0:43:49.636
<v Speaker 1>of the properties of a languages, some of the properties

0:43:49.636 --> 0:43:52.756
<v Speaker 1>of companies, you could say, some of the properties of states,

0:43:52.796 --> 0:43:55.716
<v Speaker 1>but they also like they are not each any of

0:43:55.756 --> 0:43:59.076
<v Speaker 1>those things individually, right, Like they are I think this

0:43:59.716 --> 0:44:03.236
<v Speaker 1>new construction that's only really possible now that we have

0:44:03.276 --> 0:44:06.796
<v Speaker 1>this second all of these advancements in technology and cryptography,

0:44:07.236 --> 0:44:10.236
<v Speaker 1>and like there's a lot of opportunity to build interesting

0:44:10.276 --> 0:44:13.196
<v Speaker 1>things on top of them, and like the legitimacy that

0:44:13.556 --> 0:44:16.396
<v Speaker 1>blockchains provide by being what I call this kind of

0:44:16.396 --> 0:44:19.476
<v Speaker 1>credibly neutral environment. Like I think there's a lot of

0:44:19.476 --> 0:44:23.196
<v Speaker 1>potential for people to build even centralized services that talk

0:44:23.236 --> 0:44:27.036
<v Speaker 1>to each other, that sit on the same blockchain. There's

0:44:27.156 --> 0:44:30.596
<v Speaker 1>value that I think can come out of those things.

0:44:30.876 --> 0:44:34.156
<v Speaker 1>But at the same time, like, I'm definitely not a

0:44:34.436 --> 0:44:37.996
<v Speaker 1>proponent of the idea that sort of blockchain like designs

0:44:38.036 --> 0:44:41.196
<v Speaker 1>are something that's intended to take over every sector of

0:44:41.196 --> 0:44:43.236
<v Speaker 1>how the world operates either, Like I think they're just

0:44:43.516 --> 0:44:46.036
<v Speaker 1>a new thing that we've invented in like, we'll see

0:44:46.076 --> 0:44:48.716
<v Speaker 1>how they interact with everything else. So we've created in

0:44:48.716 --> 0:44:52.236
<v Speaker 1>the world the telch You don't need me to thank

0:44:52.276 --> 0:44:55.476
<v Speaker 1>you for the tremendous value that your creativity has created

0:44:55.596 --> 0:44:57.436
<v Speaker 1>lots of spaces, But what I do want to thank

0:44:57.476 --> 0:45:02.116
<v Speaker 1>you for is writing and talking about the things that

0:45:02.196 --> 0:45:04.476
<v Speaker 1>you do in the worlds that you're creating in such

0:45:04.476 --> 0:45:08.076
<v Speaker 1>an accessible way. I've learned an enormous amount from reading

0:45:08.116 --> 0:45:10.836
<v Speaker 1>your blog, post, your work, and also just for engaging

0:45:11.396 --> 0:45:14.956
<v Speaker 1>in this sort of open minded, engaged, analogical way. I

0:45:14.996 --> 0:45:18.036
<v Speaker 1>think it's tremendously valuable for those of us who are

0:45:18.076 --> 0:45:21.556
<v Speaker 1>not crypto natives. And sometime sometime in the future we

0:45:21.596 --> 0:45:24.076
<v Speaker 1>can talk about language. I mean, I think linguistics as

0:45:24.076 --> 0:45:26.796
<v Speaker 1>a backdrop here is fascinating because sort of what you

0:45:26.796 --> 0:45:28.796
<v Speaker 1>were just saying at the end there the relationship between

0:45:29.476 --> 0:45:32.716
<v Speaker 1>language and governance you know, we do all of our

0:45:32.756 --> 0:45:37.796
<v Speaker 1>governance through language, right, but language itself is gradically decentralized.

0:45:37.956 --> 0:45:40.196
<v Speaker 1>There are efforts to centralize that they never go very well.

0:45:40.596 --> 0:45:43.956
<v Speaker 1>You know, there's definitional, there's something very rich there. Yeah, no,

0:45:44.076 --> 0:45:47.236
<v Speaker 1>some do. Yeah, you know, language is definitely fascinating. Like

0:45:47.276 --> 0:45:49.636
<v Speaker 1>I think in some ways that might even be one

0:45:49.676 --> 0:45:52.076
<v Speaker 1>of the kind of closest things to a blotcha in

0:45:52.236 --> 0:45:56.156
<v Speaker 1>a historical context, right like absolutely, yeah, yeah, open source,

0:45:56.356 --> 0:45:59.076
<v Speaker 1>but with fixed units, with some connection, depending on if

0:45:59.076 --> 0:46:01.036
<v Speaker 1>you're a Chomsky and or not, some connection to some

0:46:01.116 --> 0:46:04.996
<v Speaker 1>underlying biological principles and rules. Deep divide within the field

0:46:05.036 --> 0:46:07.596
<v Speaker 1>about whether these are primary, like there's a language unit

0:46:07.596 --> 0:46:10.436
<v Speaker 1>in the brain, whether they are alternatively socially constructed. I mean,

0:46:10.876 --> 0:46:13.676
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's totally rich for everything that we were

0:46:13.716 --> 0:46:15.356
<v Speaker 1>talking about, and you should write about it, and we

0:46:15.356 --> 0:46:16.916
<v Speaker 1>should talk about it some other time. I mean I

0:46:16.916 --> 0:46:19.796
<v Speaker 1>would love to talk absolutely, I would too. I learned

0:46:19.796 --> 0:46:22.076
<v Speaker 1>a huge amount from this conversation, so I really want

0:46:22.076 --> 0:46:23.836
<v Speaker 1>to thank you for that. No, thank you very much.

0:46:23.836 --> 0:46:33.916
<v Speaker 1>I'll learn a lot too. We're in our third season

0:46:33.916 --> 0:46:37.516
<v Speaker 1>of Deep Background, and according to my producer Molaboard, we've

0:46:37.516 --> 0:46:40.756
<v Speaker 1>interviewed more than a hundred people on the show. I

0:46:40.876 --> 0:46:42.876
<v Speaker 1>have to say that although it would be a terrible

0:46:42.956 --> 0:46:45.796
<v Speaker 1>idea to play favorites among them, I was about as

0:46:45.836 --> 0:46:49.476
<v Speaker 1>excited by my conversation with Vitalic as I have been

0:46:49.716 --> 0:46:52.556
<v Speaker 1>at any time in all of the interviews that I've done.

0:46:53.156 --> 0:46:56.716
<v Speaker 1>What excited me was to see the talk's mind at work,

0:46:56.996 --> 0:46:59.796
<v Speaker 1>to see its speed and its creativity, and to have

0:46:59.836 --> 0:47:02.476
<v Speaker 1>the opportunity to play a little bit with him in

0:47:02.596 --> 0:47:05.836
<v Speaker 1>banging around ideas that have been the focus of much

0:47:05.876 --> 0:47:09.236
<v Speaker 1>of my own work and that I developed in a

0:47:09.276 --> 0:47:13.916
<v Speaker 1>context completely unrelated to crypto and the blockchain, and to

0:47:14.036 --> 0:47:17.676
<v Speaker 1>see that in some potential way, these ideas of legitimacy

0:47:17.836 --> 0:47:20.876
<v Speaker 1>may in fact be central to the way that this

0:47:20.916 --> 0:47:26.196
<v Speaker 1>new world is developing. I was deeply struck by Vitalis

0:47:26.436 --> 0:47:31.076
<v Speaker 1>parable of Steam and Hive and his core takeaway, namely

0:47:31.116 --> 0:47:34.836
<v Speaker 1>that on the blockchain and in the crypto space, everything

0:47:34.876 --> 0:47:40.476
<v Speaker 1>depends on the acquiescence of the participants in the collective undertaking,

0:47:40.676 --> 0:47:42.956
<v Speaker 1>and if they get up and decide to change it,

0:47:43.236 --> 0:47:47.316
<v Speaker 1>eliminate it, or imitate it and recreate it, they can

0:47:47.516 --> 0:47:51.836
<v Speaker 1>do that. This parable opens up some deep and fundamental

0:47:51.916 --> 0:47:56.156
<v Speaker 1>questions about what crypto and blockchain are good for and

0:47:56.196 --> 0:47:58.556
<v Speaker 1>what they might or might not be able to contribute

0:47:58.596 --> 0:48:01.916
<v Speaker 1>to the broader world. I myself am only beginning to

0:48:01.956 --> 0:48:05.196
<v Speaker 1>develop my thoughts on this topic, but listening to Vitalic

0:48:05.556 --> 0:48:09.116
<v Speaker 1>made me suspect that the benefits that people are described

0:48:09.556 --> 0:48:12.436
<v Speaker 1>as the benefits of the blockchain have a lot to

0:48:12.476 --> 0:48:16.236
<v Speaker 1>do with the benefits of decentralized governance that we associate

0:48:16.276 --> 0:48:21.116
<v Speaker 1>with democracy, as opposed to the historically significant benefits of

0:48:21.156 --> 0:48:24.996
<v Speaker 1>autocracy or monarchy, which are more closely associated in the

0:48:24.996 --> 0:48:30.516
<v Speaker 1>blockchain world with the dominance of central powerful platforms controlled

0:48:30.636 --> 0:48:34.116
<v Speaker 1>by a single corporation and often headed by a single

0:48:34.196 --> 0:48:38.556
<v Speaker 1>powerful founder CEO. If this analogy turns out to be

0:48:38.636 --> 0:48:41.716
<v Speaker 1>valuable and useful, and Vitallic seem to think that perhaps

0:48:41.796 --> 0:48:44.556
<v Speaker 1>it could be, it will help us to see that

0:48:44.836 --> 0:48:48.556
<v Speaker 1>some of the advantages of the distributed blockchain might be

0:48:48.796 --> 0:48:52.476
<v Speaker 1>real and significant, because there are some kinds of decision

0:48:52.476 --> 0:48:55.916
<v Speaker 1>making and some kinds of development of businesses and opportunities

0:48:56.076 --> 0:49:00.796
<v Speaker 1>that might work better in decentralized ways. Yet simultaneously, there

0:49:00.836 --> 0:49:05.396
<v Speaker 1>may also be circumstances where centralized governance is preferable even

0:49:05.436 --> 0:49:09.836
<v Speaker 1>to the users than decentralized governance. And what's more, there

0:49:09.836 --> 0:49:13.396
<v Speaker 1>could be hybrid models, much like modern governments, where there

0:49:13.476 --> 0:49:16.796
<v Speaker 1>is a central national government, but that government then enables

0:49:16.836 --> 0:49:20.996
<v Speaker 1>people to create all kinds of different sorts of applications,

0:49:20.996 --> 0:49:24.836
<v Speaker 1>like private companies, against the backdrop of the state's ordinary

0:49:24.916 --> 0:49:30.876
<v Speaker 1>centralized operations. Most fundamentally, however, if it's the case, as

0:49:30.956 --> 0:49:34.516
<v Speaker 1>Vitali says, that legitimacy is the key concept on the blockchain,

0:49:34.796 --> 0:49:37.316
<v Speaker 1>then we always have to keep our eye on what

0:49:37.396 --> 0:49:43.276
<v Speaker 1>happens when legitimacy erodes, is recreated and is reshaped. Events

0:49:43.316 --> 0:49:47.116
<v Speaker 1>that occur in governments, both through gradual changes sometimes and

0:49:47.236 --> 0:49:52.276
<v Speaker 1>also through revolutionary changes. Those revolutions may be rare, but

0:49:52.316 --> 0:49:55.636
<v Speaker 1>when they happen, they move around a lot of wealth,

0:49:55.956 --> 0:49:59.036
<v Speaker 1>they unsettle a lot of settled expectations, and they can

0:49:59.116 --> 0:50:04.996
<v Speaker 1>lead to tremendous improvement as well as tremendous disorder. It's

0:50:05.036 --> 0:50:09.196
<v Speaker 1>far too soon to draw conclusions about any of these subjects,

0:50:09.196 --> 0:50:11.596
<v Speaker 1>partly because in the world of governments, where people have

0:50:11.676 --> 0:50:14.876
<v Speaker 1>been talking about concepts like legitimacy for at least twenty

0:50:14.876 --> 0:50:19.076
<v Speaker 1>five hundred years, we still don't have definitive answers but

0:50:19.156 --> 0:50:21.796
<v Speaker 1>the idea that there may be some points of contact

0:50:21.996 --> 0:50:24.956
<v Speaker 1>between the worlds that we have known and understand and

0:50:25.036 --> 0:50:27.316
<v Speaker 1>the new worlds that are being created by people like

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<v Speaker 1>the talk is to me hopeful, interesting, and potentially of

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<v Speaker 1>tremendous value to trying to figure out the world around us.

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<v Speaker 1>I hope you had as much fun in this conversation

0:50:40.436 --> 0:50:43.436
<v Speaker 1>as I did. Until the next time I speak to you,

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<v Speaker 1>be well, think deep thoughts like Fatalic does, and have

0:50:48.636 --> 0:50:52.036
<v Speaker 1>a little fun. Deep background is brought to you by

0:50:52.076 --> 0:50:56.156
<v Speaker 1>Pushkin Industries. Our producer is Mola Board, our engineer is

0:50:56.196 --> 0:51:00.436
<v Speaker 1>Ben Talliday, and our showrunner is Sophie Crane mckibbon. Editorial

0:51:00.476 --> 0:51:05.036
<v Speaker 1>support from noahm Osband. Theme music by Luis Gara at Pushkin.

0:51:05.196 --> 0:51:08.956
<v Speaker 1>Thanks to Mia Lobell, Julia Barton, Lydia Jean Cott, Heather Fain,

0:51:09.316 --> 0:51:14.116
<v Speaker 1>Carli Migliori, Maggie Taylor, Eric Sandler, and Jacob Weissberg. You

0:51:14.116 --> 0:51:16.676
<v Speaker 1>can find me on Twitter at Noah R. Feldman. I

0:51:16.756 --> 0:51:19.156
<v Speaker 1>also write a column from Bloomberg Opinion, which you can

0:51:19.196 --> 0:51:23.236
<v Speaker 1>find at Bloomberg dot com slash Feldman. To discover Bloomberg's

0:51:23.276 --> 0:51:27.276
<v Speaker 1>original slate of podcasts, go to bloomberg dot com, slash podcasts,

0:51:27.596 --> 0:51:30.076
<v Speaker 1>and if you liked what you heard today, please write

0:51:30.116 --> 0:51:33.836
<v Speaker 1>a review or tell a friend. This is deep background