WEBVTT - Hack That Auto 2.0

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from Hey

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<v Speaker 1>there and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strickland and

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<v Speaker 1>joined me in the studio today is Joe McCormick. Hey, Joe,

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<v Speaker 1>Hey Jonathan. I'm doing great. How are you? I am

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<v Speaker 1>quite well and Joe very graciously agreed to join me

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<v Speaker 1>on this episode where we're going to update a topic

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<v Speaker 1>that I covered with Ben Boland's back on November ten,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand and fourteen. The episode came out called Hack

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<v Speaker 1>That Auto. So this is Hacked that Auto two point oh.

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<v Speaker 1>So wait a minute. This was about the technology of

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<v Speaker 1>like hatchets that you used to mutilate and destroy automobiles. No,

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<v Speaker 1>just people named auto. Oh no, like Vondas Mark. That

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<v Speaker 1>sounds horribly violent. It was pretty violent. Ben is a

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<v Speaker 1>Ben is just a ticking time bomb. Wait a minute,

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<v Speaker 1>Hold on a second. I'm remembering that in the world

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<v Speaker 1>of tech mala gea hack means something different than what

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<v Speaker 1>I do to would it? Does it? Does? It generally

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<v Speaker 1>means that you are, you know, hacking together something to

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<v Speaker 1>accomplish a particular goal, and hacking can mean anything, right

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<v Speaker 1>like it doesn't necessarily the connotation we typically assigned to

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<v Speaker 1>it is someone is trying to gain unauthorized access to something,

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<v Speaker 1>which really is a subset of hacking exactly. Hacking really

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<v Speaker 1>could mean that you are building stuff, like you could

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<v Speaker 1>be a maker. You're trying to create a device that

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<v Speaker 1>does a very specific thing, and it maybe to do

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<v Speaker 1>it in a way that no one has done before.

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<v Speaker 1>It maybe to increase efficiency, efficiency, maybe the furthest thing

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<v Speaker 1>from your mind. It might just be to do something creatively.

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<v Speaker 1>And in that previous episode of Hack that Auto, Ben

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<v Speaker 1>and I covered lots of ways where you could use

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<v Speaker 1>technology to alter a vehicle in order to make it

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<v Speaker 1>do something that it was either not intended to do

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<v Speaker 1>or that had been limitation that have been placed upon

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<v Speaker 1>it at the manufacturing stage. WHOA, WHOA. So you mean

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<v Speaker 1>like you could overclock your car the same way you

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<v Speaker 1>can overclock your CPU. Well, maybe not the same way,

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<v Speaker 1>but getting a very similar response, because there are governors

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<v Speaker 1>and speed limitters on vehicles right where it is set

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<v Speaker 1>so that the engine might be capable of producing enough

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<v Speaker 1>power to get you to a speed above the quote

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<v Speaker 1>unquote top speed of your vehicle, but there are are

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<v Speaker 1>elements inside the vehicle that limit those speeds. Like you

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<v Speaker 1>can't go beyond them because they essentially cut the power,

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<v Speaker 1>so you're not going to be able to get more

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<v Speaker 1>out of it. But if you hack your vehicle, you could,

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<v Speaker 1>in theory, remove said limitations at your own peril and

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<v Speaker 1>be able to go faster than what the vehicle's manufacturer

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<v Speaker 1>had intended, you know, at the risk of sounding like

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<v Speaker 1>a gullible sheep, I bet those limitations are there for

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<v Speaker 1>a decent reason. They tend to be. Yeah, like, I

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<v Speaker 1>could probably damage your vehicle or do something unsafe if

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<v Speaker 1>you exceed them. I don't know if you have you

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<v Speaker 1>ever been in a car where it reached a certain

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<v Speaker 1>speed and the car was beginning to feel like it

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<v Speaker 1>was not enjoying that experience. Yeah, the first car I had,

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<v Speaker 1>if you got up to about fifty five or so,

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<v Speaker 1>it felt like it was about to come apart. Yeah. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>And there are some cars where, even right off the lot,

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<v Speaker 1>if you are pushing it at towards the top speed,

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<v Speaker 1>you start to feel like, yeah, this vehicle is not

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<v Speaker 1>really meant to maintain this for any length of time.

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<v Speaker 1>But there are people who want to have that full

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<v Speaker 1>control of their vehicle and they want to be able

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<v Speaker 1>to do things with their vehicle that perhaps the manufacturer

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<v Speaker 1>had put limitations on, and they will hack their their cars.

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<v Speaker 1>And this is made possible by well a couple of things.

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<v Speaker 1>If you have a car that's more than twenty years old,

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<v Speaker 1>then you might be able to mechanically alter that vehicle, right.

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<v Speaker 1>But as vehicles have become more and more complex, more

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<v Speaker 1>and more of those uh, those those systems have become computerized,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's falling into what some people call the black

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<v Speaker 1>box problem, which is where you have a system that

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<v Speaker 1>is essentially contained within a black box and it is

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<v Speaker 1>very difficult, if not impossible, to get access inside that

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<v Speaker 1>black box. You can alter what happens once this is

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<v Speaker 1>what what whatever the output is of that system, you

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<v Speaker 1>can alter that, and you can alter the arrangement of

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<v Speaker 1>various black box systems. But if you don't have that

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<v Speaker 1>special diagnostic computer right or any other means of tapping

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<v Speaker 1>into it, then you're kind of stuck. And and the

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<v Speaker 1>argument is that the technology is reaching a level of

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<v Speaker 1>complexity where the tinker is becoming more and more rarefied,

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<v Speaker 1>Like it's it's harder to be a tinker in that

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<v Speaker 1>world because things are getting so specialized and so advanced

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<v Speaker 1>that it requires a good deal of specialization just to

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<v Speaker 1>alter one thing, let alone all the other related systems.

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<v Speaker 1>I feel like we talked about this in an early

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<v Speaker 1>episode of the Forward Thinking podcast. This is very familiar.

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<v Speaker 1>But okay, so that's how you hack your own vehicle

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<v Speaker 1>to improve or maybe not improve but change it. Sure,

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<v Speaker 1>but what about the more, you know, the more popular

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<v Speaker 1>sense of hacking these days, where you're talking about violating

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<v Speaker 1>a supposedly secure system making it work for you. So

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<v Speaker 1>Ben and I talked about this as well, and overwhelmingly

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<v Speaker 1>the most prevalent version of that kind of hacking required

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<v Speaker 1>physical access to the vehicle and that you would have

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<v Speaker 1>a laptop that you would plug in with a an

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<v Speaker 1>adapter to your your cars computer system, and with that

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<v Speaker 1>laptop you could alter things with the vehicle. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>you could even set it up so that you could

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<v Speaker 1>have remote control of the vehicle through the laptop that's

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<v Speaker 1>still physically attached to the car. Oh wow, I wouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't really expect that with I mean, I could

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<v Speaker 1>see how that could be coming with autonomous cars. But

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<v Speaker 1>I'm so you could control like gas and brake and steering.

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<v Speaker 1>You could certainly control things like brakes and steering. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>not necessarily acceleration, although you could do that too, I assume,

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<v Speaker 1>but you could certainly alter things like you could you

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<v Speaker 1>could make the brakes stop working, and in fact, there

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<v Speaker 1>have been demonstrations where people have done that, where it

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<v Speaker 1>was done in a safe way, but to show that,

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<v Speaker 1>like the anti lock brake system would be disconnected so

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<v Speaker 1>that hitting the brake would do nothing and the car

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<v Speaker 1>would continue on as if you hadn't hit the brake

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<v Speaker 1>at all. Just kind of terrifying to think about. But

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<v Speaker 1>there was a laptop computer sitting right there, plugged into

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<v Speaker 1>the dashboard. It was just that the commands. Like, think

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<v Speaker 1>of it this way, it's the same thing as if

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<v Speaker 1>someone were sitting in the passenger seat sending the commands

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<v Speaker 1>from the laptop directly to your car's computer. Only you

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<v Speaker 1>have removed the need for a person to be sitting

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<v Speaker 1>there because you have a remote system sitting the commands

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<v Speaker 1>to the laptop, which then send the commands to the

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<v Speaker 1>car computer. Well, if you're gonna do that, you might

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<v Speaker 1>as well just say, well, somebody sitting in the passenger

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<v Speaker 1>he could reach over and grab the steering wheel, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and that was the point, right, That was the point

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<v Speaker 1>that allot of the car manufacturers were making, that a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of security experts were making. They said, these examples

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<v Speaker 1>require somebody to have physical access to your vehicle in

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<v Speaker 1>order for them to make these alterations, and therefore it's

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<v Speaker 1>not necessarily something to go out and panic over. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so that doesn't really bother me. What would really bother me?

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<v Speaker 1>And and a quick digression, I think you and I

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<v Speaker 1>are both on the record as being pretty pro autonomous vehicle.

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<v Speaker 1>I am it would be harder for me to be

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<v Speaker 1>more pro autonomous vehicle. I am also very pro autonomous

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<v Speaker 1>vehicle despite all these concerns. And one of these concerns

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<v Speaker 1>is what if somebody could wirelessly hack an autonomous vehicle?

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<v Speaker 1>And that seems like, I mean, hopefully the industry will

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<v Speaker 1>take all the proper steps to prevent that from happening.

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<v Speaker 1>But autonomous vehicles do need to be able to communicate

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<v Speaker 1>with each other, so it seems like they may possibly

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<v Speaker 1>have some wireless based vulnerabilities. And there are cars out

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<v Speaker 1>there right now that have wireless vulnerabilities, and we'll talk

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<v Speaker 1>more about specifics in a little bit. So you are

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<v Speaker 1>absolutely right that autonomous cars will have these because we

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<v Speaker 1>have cars right now that have these these wireless vulnerabilities

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<v Speaker 1>from from various systems. Uh, there have been examples of

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<v Speaker 1>people using the entertainment systems within certain cars to hack

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<v Speaker 1>into the rest of the vehicle. Now, you would think

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<v Speaker 1>that these should be networks within a car that are

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<v Speaker 1>completely separate, that don't have anything to do with one another,

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<v Speaker 1>But there are times where, either because the design is

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<v Speaker 1>simpler or because of well intentioned reasons, the they are

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<v Speaker 1>coupled more closely. Like imagine that you have an entertainment

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<v Speaker 1>system that is wired in such a way where the

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<v Speaker 1>volume of the system will automatically adjust based upon your

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<v Speaker 1>ex leuration. So if you accelerate more, the volume goes

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<v Speaker 1>up because it figures, hey, now it's going to be

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<v Speaker 1>a noisier environment, so I need to balance out by

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<v Speaker 1>becoming louder so that the person can continue to have

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<v Speaker 1>the same experience listening to whatever they're listening to, whether

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<v Speaker 1>they're going slowly or quickly. Well, that means that there

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<v Speaker 1>needs to be some data coming from the drive system

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<v Speaker 1>of the vehicle, and it may just be data and

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<v Speaker 1>it may just flow one way, which would be the

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<v Speaker 1>best way to implement that, but it may mean that

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<v Speaker 1>these systems are more connected than you had first imagined,

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<v Speaker 1>So as we get into more WiFi based entertainment systems,

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<v Speaker 1>that is a potential point of vulnerability for vehicles. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and a thing that just occurs to me is that

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<v Speaker 1>hopefully anybody who made these would sort of have entertainment

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<v Speaker 1>systems running on what's essentially a different computer than the

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<v Speaker 1>computer that controls the engine. Otherwise it seems like it

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<v Speaker 1>could be vulnerable to the kind of buffer overflow attack

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<v Speaker 1>or something where you h you have some kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like you max out the memory on something and then

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<v Speaker 1>you start and then once you've maxed out that area,

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<v Speaker 1>it overflows into a place where you can just execute

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<v Speaker 1>some code. Right. Yeah, that's a good example. I mean

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<v Speaker 1>that that's certainly something that that needs to be thought

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<v Speaker 1>about when designing these systems. And to make this more complicated,

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<v Speaker 1>we have things like, you know, the wireless entry systems,

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<v Speaker 1>which can be spoofed, although it's not easy to do so.

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<v Speaker 1>So wireless obviously that's when you've got you know, your

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<v Speaker 1>little key fob and you push a button and it

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<v Speaker 1>unlocks the door so you can get into your car. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>Those work on little radio signals, and it is possible

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<v Speaker 1>to broadcast radio signals at a car and activate it's

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<v Speaker 1>unlocking mechanism. It's not easy, and the reason it's not

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<v Speaker 1>easy is that you need to know generally what frequency

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<v Speaker 1>this thing is broadcasting over, so it may require you

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<v Speaker 1>to be in the presence of the key fob being

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<v Speaker 1>used in order to pick up on this frequency. You

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<v Speaker 1>really need to know probably the beginning of the code,

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<v Speaker 1>which again you can sometimes glean by listening in essentially

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<v Speaker 1>on that key fob um and then you have to

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<v Speaker 1>brute force attack because the way key fobs work is

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<v Speaker 1>it works with a rolling algorithm, so every time you

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<v Speaker 1>press that button, it changes the code, so the cook

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<v Speaker 1>but it's changed based upon an algorithm, so it's based

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<v Speaker 1>upon specific rules. It's not random because if it were random,

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<v Speaker 1>no car would ever know when it's key is being used,

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<v Speaker 1>right but it But that means that if you are

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<v Speaker 1>using a remote attack to try and get access to

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<v Speaker 1>a vehicle, then you have to do a brute force

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<v Speaker 1>so this can take minutes up to hours, depending upon

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<v Speaker 1>uh the system and depending upon your luck based upon

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<v Speaker 1>where you're starting from the code. And also it means

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<v Speaker 1>that if you have a keyless entry and you go

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<v Speaker 1>to your car and you try and use it and

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<v Speaker 1>someone has remotely accessed your vehicle. One of the only

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<v Speaker 1>ways you might be able to tell, assuming that your

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<v Speaker 1>vehicle is still there, is that is that it takes

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of presses before anything works, because it will

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<v Speaker 1>take a while for the the code on your key

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<v Speaker 1>fob to match up with the code that's in the car. So,

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<v Speaker 1>in other words, if you press it and you're like, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>nothing's happening, and you press a couple more times, then

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<v Speaker 1>it it'll synchronize up again and then you can have access. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>This is something that has been done already. Security experts

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<v Speaker 1>have shown. There's one in particular who used his own

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<v Speaker 1>vehicle to demonstrate that you could gain access. But it

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<v Speaker 1>could take hours and it takes a huge amount of effort,

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not something that is is probably easier to

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<v Speaker 1>just get a brick and bash the window. Yeah, it's

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<v Speaker 1>definitely not likely to happen, right, I get like the

0:12:41.960 --> 0:12:45.240
<v Speaker 1>likelihood of it happening is incredibly low because there are

0:12:45.320 --> 0:12:48.000
<v Speaker 1>other ways of getting access to a vehicle that require

0:12:48.120 --> 0:12:51.800
<v Speaker 1>far less work and far less access to set vehicle.

0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:56.400
<v Speaker 1>For a given length of time. Um, there are other

0:12:56.440 --> 0:13:00.480
<v Speaker 1>examples of someone having a remote control of a vehicle,

0:13:00.960 --> 0:13:04.160
<v Speaker 1>but it was it was by exploiting a system that

0:13:04.240 --> 0:13:08.880
<v Speaker 1>was intended to have this remote shutdown feature. So you

0:13:09.240 --> 0:13:12.559
<v Speaker 1>you know that a lot of vehicles have this ability

0:13:12.679 --> 0:13:17.200
<v Speaker 1>for for a an entity to either remotely shut down

0:13:17.200 --> 0:13:20.000
<v Speaker 1>the engine or do things like hawk the horn, right, yeah,

0:13:20.040 --> 0:13:22.560
<v Speaker 1>I think, Uh, well, I know one scenario in which

0:13:22.600 --> 0:13:26.880
<v Speaker 1>this occurs would be like, so let's say you take

0:13:26.920 --> 0:13:30.320
<v Speaker 1>out a loan on a car and the person who

0:13:30.400 --> 0:13:32.959
<v Speaker 1>sells you the car is not very confident that you

0:13:32.960 --> 0:13:36.440
<v Speaker 1>will pay back that loan. They can put equipment on

0:13:36.480 --> 0:13:39.400
<v Speaker 1>the car that prevents it from starting up, right, so

0:13:39.440 --> 0:13:42.240
<v Speaker 1>they can say, this person isn't paying on their financing,

0:13:42.480 --> 0:13:45.040
<v Speaker 1>we need to shut down the car's ability to run. Yeah,

0:13:45.080 --> 0:13:47.800
<v Speaker 1>it's essentially a remote kill switch and your car will

0:13:47.840 --> 0:13:51.320
<v Speaker 1>not start at that point. And uh, yeah, it could

0:13:51.320 --> 0:13:53.400
<v Speaker 1>be hopefully they wouldn't be able to turn off the

0:13:53.440 --> 0:13:57.640
<v Speaker 1>engine while you're driving. No, I don't think that's that's

0:13:57.840 --> 0:14:00.559
<v Speaker 1>a possibility, but they could certainly do it, you know,

0:14:00.760 --> 0:14:02.680
<v Speaker 1>so that the next time you try to start up

0:14:02.679 --> 0:14:05.560
<v Speaker 1>your car it doesn't work. And uh, it can be

0:14:05.640 --> 0:14:08.120
<v Speaker 1>used in that case where someone's not keeping up with

0:14:08.160 --> 0:14:09.760
<v Speaker 1>their payments. It can also be used in the case

0:14:09.760 --> 0:14:12.200
<v Speaker 1>of a stolen car. So if your car stolen, you

0:14:12.200 --> 0:14:14.880
<v Speaker 1>report it to the police, you work with the dealership,

0:14:14.920 --> 0:14:18.040
<v Speaker 1>you explain, hey, my vehicle was stolen. They can actually

0:14:18.120 --> 0:14:21.080
<v Speaker 1>activate this remote kill switch so that the criminals who

0:14:21.120 --> 0:14:22.960
<v Speaker 1>have possession of your car are no longer able to

0:14:23.040 --> 0:14:26.280
<v Speaker 1>drive it, and then the police can hopefully locate your

0:14:26.360 --> 0:14:29.400
<v Speaker 1>vehicle and you get it back. Uh Right. So there

0:14:29.440 --> 0:14:32.280
<v Speaker 1>are legitimate reasons why you would want that technology install

0:14:32.400 --> 0:14:35.360
<v Speaker 1>on your vehicle. However, there was at least one case

0:14:35.480 --> 0:14:40.880
<v Speaker 1>where a person who had access to said system, uh,

0:14:41.040 --> 0:14:47.360
<v Speaker 1>accessed it for personal reasons and out of vindictiveness, was

0:14:47.560 --> 0:14:51.720
<v Speaker 1>essentially harassing somebody using the system to mess with their vehicle.

0:14:52.160 --> 0:14:56.160
<v Speaker 1>So if you look at a discussions about car hacking,

0:14:56.360 --> 0:14:59.600
<v Speaker 1>and they always say, like, what are the examples of

0:14:59.680 --> 0:15:02.120
<v Speaker 1>Mali Shiss car hacking, they said, well, outside of research

0:15:02.120 --> 0:15:05.640
<v Speaker 1>and development, where where security researchers are trying their best

0:15:05.800 --> 0:15:09.560
<v Speaker 1>to do this to to see if it's viable, there's

0:15:09.600 --> 0:15:12.360
<v Speaker 1>only one example of it ever actually happening, and in

0:15:12.400 --> 0:15:15.520
<v Speaker 1>that case, it wasn't hacking in the sense of someone

0:15:15.560 --> 0:15:17.320
<v Speaker 1>setting down at their computer and trying to get access

0:15:17.320 --> 0:15:20.880
<v Speaker 1>to a vehicle, someone exploiting an existing system that was

0:15:20.920 --> 0:15:26.200
<v Speaker 1>already attached to that vehicle. But that being said, with

0:15:26.280 --> 0:15:32.080
<v Speaker 1>all those caveats laid out, the issue of wireless hacking

0:15:32.240 --> 0:15:35.920
<v Speaker 1>a vehicle, of remotely accessing a vehicle is by no

0:15:36.040 --> 0:15:41.440
<v Speaker 1>means a dead issue. It is something that is continuously

0:15:41.560 --> 0:15:44.800
<v Speaker 1>brought up, and as of the time that we're recording

0:15:44.800 --> 0:15:50.640
<v Speaker 1>this podcast, which is in May of twenty, there's increasing

0:15:50.760 --> 0:15:54.280
<v Speaker 1>interest in this because of a pair of researchers and

0:15:54.440 --> 0:15:56.960
<v Speaker 1>what they claim they are able to do and what

0:15:57.040 --> 0:16:01.840
<v Speaker 1>they will show off at the black At Conference in August.

0:16:02.600 --> 0:16:05.640
<v Speaker 1>What is that? Well, first I should explain what the

0:16:05.640 --> 0:16:09.280
<v Speaker 1>black Hat Conference is, So it's a um it's essentially

0:16:09.440 --> 0:16:13.760
<v Speaker 1>it's a hacker convention. It's all about discussing security vulnerabilities

0:16:14.240 --> 0:16:19.440
<v Speaker 1>and uh, the ways to exploit them. Now, in hacker circles,

0:16:19.600 --> 0:16:22.040
<v Speaker 1>you have white hats and black hats, and sometimes you

0:16:22.040 --> 0:16:25.480
<v Speaker 1>can argue gray hats. White hat hackers are people who

0:16:25.720 --> 0:16:29.080
<v Speaker 1>are looking for security vulnerabilities with the intent to have

0:16:29.120 --> 0:16:33.680
<v Speaker 1>those security vulnerabilities patched so that they are no longer vulnerable.

0:16:34.360 --> 0:16:38.560
<v Speaker 1>Black hat hackers UH tend to be the folks who

0:16:38.600 --> 0:16:42.120
<v Speaker 1>find security vulnerabilities in order to exploit them, whether that

0:16:42.240 --> 0:16:44.560
<v Speaker 1>is to exploit them directly or to exploit them by

0:16:44.600 --> 0:16:48.880
<v Speaker 1>selling that information to other interested parties. And whether they're

0:16:48.880 --> 0:16:51.560
<v Speaker 1>doing it for cash or for leverage over somebody, or

0:16:51.640 --> 0:16:54.280
<v Speaker 1>just for fun, Yeah, just to build their own reputation,

0:16:54.480 --> 0:16:56.960
<v Speaker 1>as opposed to, you know, a genuine desire to help

0:16:57.000 --> 0:16:59.600
<v Speaker 1>other folks. So even though it's called the black Hat Conference,

0:16:59.600 --> 0:17:01.560
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't necessarily mean that these are all people who

0:17:01.560 --> 0:17:03.800
<v Speaker 1>are gathering around trying to figure out how to control

0:17:03.840 --> 0:17:06.840
<v Speaker 1>the world through their laptops. Often its actual discussions about

0:17:07.560 --> 0:17:10.399
<v Speaker 1>these are serious concerns that we need to address in

0:17:10.520 --> 0:17:14.560
<v Speaker 1>order to make sure that they don't become huge problems

0:17:14.680 --> 0:17:18.960
<v Speaker 1>go beyond concern to an enormous problem. So the the

0:17:19.000 --> 0:17:22.239
<v Speaker 1>researchers were talking about, actually, I think Ben and I

0:17:22.320 --> 0:17:26.920
<v Speaker 1>mentioned them to Charlie Miller and Chris valisek Uh, their

0:17:27.000 --> 0:17:32.119
<v Speaker 1>two security experts who had talked about hacking cars previously.

0:17:32.240 --> 0:17:35.720
<v Speaker 1>They had UH shown in two thousand thirteen and two

0:17:35.720 --> 0:17:39.959
<v Speaker 1>thousand and fourteen various ways to hack vehicles. UH, and

0:17:40.040 --> 0:17:43.400
<v Speaker 1>now they are talking that. In the two thousand fifteen

0:17:43.400 --> 0:17:47.879
<v Speaker 1>conference in August, they will reveal a way of remotely

0:17:48.040 --> 0:17:51.040
<v Speaker 1>gaining access to a vehicle. It does not require you

0:17:51.200 --> 0:17:54.600
<v Speaker 1>to plug a laptop into a computer. They say that

0:17:54.920 --> 0:17:57.920
<v Speaker 1>you could do this with an unmodified vehicle as soon

0:17:57.960 --> 0:18:04.080
<v Speaker 1>as it rolls off the dealership. Scary, very scary. Um,

0:18:04.160 --> 0:18:07.199
<v Speaker 1>that's an excellent question. I think that I'm sure that

0:18:07.240 --> 0:18:12.360
<v Speaker 1>they have something. The extent of that. Yeah, no, no, no,

0:18:12.640 --> 0:18:16.480
<v Speaker 1>the extent of what they have I do not know now. Previously,

0:18:16.520 --> 0:18:19.560
<v Speaker 1>they have published lists of vehicles that they have looked

0:18:19.560 --> 0:18:25.480
<v Speaker 1>at that they say represent, you know, the most hackable

0:18:25.840 --> 0:18:27.960
<v Speaker 1>kind of vehicles, and the very top of the list,

0:18:27.960 --> 0:18:32.719
<v Speaker 1>where the Jeep Cherokee was number one. That's the most table,

0:18:32.920 --> 0:18:38.640
<v Speaker 1>most tackable, most tackical. But they had identified three different

0:18:38.640 --> 0:18:44.720
<v Speaker 1>criteria for hackability, including things like are the systems interconnected

0:18:44.760 --> 0:18:47.480
<v Speaker 1>with one with one another? How many wireless points of

0:18:47.720 --> 0:18:52.440
<v Speaker 1>entry are are potentially there? That sort of stuff, and

0:18:52.720 --> 0:18:55.520
<v Speaker 1>out of the various criteria, the Jeep Cherokee had the

0:18:55.560 --> 0:18:59.040
<v Speaker 1>most of them, the most examples. Uh. The Infinity Q

0:18:59.280 --> 0:19:03.400
<v Speaker 1>fifty was also up there in the catalacic esconade as

0:19:03.480 --> 0:19:08.439
<v Speaker 1>a as the the SNL Southern character would say was

0:19:08.760 --> 0:19:12.960
<v Speaker 1>also up there, and uh, when we're talking about wireless

0:19:13.000 --> 0:19:17.560
<v Speaker 1>points of vulnerability, really you're talking about any system that

0:19:17.720 --> 0:19:23.639
<v Speaker 1>has that wireless communication capability. So one example, which is

0:19:23.760 --> 0:19:27.840
<v Speaker 1>perfectly innocent in of itself is the tire monitoring system,

0:19:27.920 --> 0:19:30.320
<v Speaker 1>the tire pressure monitoring system. So if you have a

0:19:30.400 --> 0:19:33.320
<v Speaker 1>vehicle that has this, then like you get in your car,

0:19:33.440 --> 0:19:35.520
<v Speaker 1>you turn your you know, you put the key in

0:19:35.520 --> 0:19:38.560
<v Speaker 1>the ignition you or if it's key less ignition, you

0:19:38.600 --> 0:19:41.199
<v Speaker 1>turn on your car, however that may be. And there

0:19:41.240 --> 0:19:44.200
<v Speaker 1>might be an indicator on your dashboard that tells you,

0:19:44.200 --> 0:19:47.159
<v Speaker 1>you know, if your tires are overinflated, underinflated, what the

0:19:47.359 --> 0:19:50.159
<v Speaker 1>you know, how the pressure is? Uh, which is kind

0:19:50.160 --> 0:19:52.320
<v Speaker 1>of cool. You're like, oh, awesome, I don't need to

0:19:52.359 --> 0:19:54.679
<v Speaker 1>get out of my vehicle, you know, pull over to

0:19:54.680 --> 0:19:57.800
<v Speaker 1>a gas station or whatever and get the air pressure

0:19:57.840 --> 0:20:01.520
<v Speaker 1>gauge out and see how it's doing. It's telling right here, um,

0:20:01.560 --> 0:20:04.840
<v Speaker 1>which is useful. But it's doing so with wireless sensors

0:20:04.880 --> 0:20:09.280
<v Speaker 1>that communicate back to the the computer system that is

0:20:09.400 --> 0:20:12.000
<v Speaker 1>governing all the other systems in the car. Yeah. I

0:20:12.040 --> 0:20:16.520
<v Speaker 1>can see why you wouldn't want wires going to the tires. Yeah, yeah, no,

0:20:16.600 --> 0:20:20.960
<v Speaker 1>it would it would be problematic. Right, So the the

0:20:21.119 --> 0:20:24.119
<v Speaker 1>wireless system is likely communicating with the what's called the

0:20:24.119 --> 0:20:29.360
<v Speaker 1>controller area network bus or can bus, which is kind

0:20:29.400 --> 0:20:32.480
<v Speaker 1>of like the traffic controller of all the different systems

0:20:32.480 --> 0:20:36.240
<v Speaker 1>that feed information into the cars computer, the master control program.

0:20:37.280 --> 0:20:39.680
<v Speaker 1>If not the master control program, it's got to be

0:20:39.800 --> 0:20:47.400
<v Speaker 1>like the master control programs Uh executive assistant, Right, yeah, yeah,

0:20:47.680 --> 0:20:50.480
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's good old David Uh not Yeah Stark

0:20:50.760 --> 0:20:53.560
<v Speaker 1>controlling this. So yeah, exactly, it's it's this this traffic

0:20:53.560 --> 0:20:57.159
<v Speaker 1>controller that sends the information to the computer. Well, you know,

0:20:57.440 --> 0:21:00.560
<v Speaker 1>that's a potential point of vulnerability. And there have been

0:21:00.600 --> 0:21:05.200
<v Speaker 1>examples of being able to track a vehicle based upon

0:21:05.359 --> 0:21:12.640
<v Speaker 1>tracking the unique monitoring frequency for that that tire pressure system.

0:21:12.680 --> 0:21:15.960
<v Speaker 1>So you could potentially track where a vehicle has gone

0:21:16.160 --> 0:21:23.280
<v Speaker 1>by keeping note of this particular this particular wireless communication system,

0:21:23.320 --> 0:21:26.760
<v Speaker 1>if you could, can you get access to more critical

0:21:27.280 --> 0:21:31.520
<v Speaker 1>systems like breaking or steering through that? That remains to

0:21:31.560 --> 0:21:36.800
<v Speaker 1>be seen. So Miller and Uh and Valask have said

0:21:37.560 --> 0:21:43.760
<v Speaker 1>that they have found some interesting stuff through their experiments. Um,

0:21:43.800 --> 0:21:47.000
<v Speaker 1>they haven't had this discussion, so we can't say exactly

0:21:47.040 --> 0:21:49.600
<v Speaker 1>what they revealed. But they have said that uh, or

0:21:49.640 --> 0:21:53.400
<v Speaker 1>at least the black Hat website says that the presentation

0:21:53.480 --> 0:21:57.080
<v Speaker 1>will include starting with remote exploitation, we will show how

0:21:57.119 --> 0:22:00.800
<v Speaker 1>to pivot through different pieces of the v vehicles hardware

0:22:00.840 --> 0:22:03.040
<v Speaker 1>in order to be able to send messages on the

0:22:03.160 --> 0:22:08.200
<v Speaker 1>can bus to critical electronic control units e c us.

0:22:08.720 --> 0:22:12.120
<v Speaker 1>We will conclude by showing several can messages that affect

0:22:12.119 --> 0:22:16.360
<v Speaker 1>physical systems of the vehicle. So that that's pretty vague, right.

0:22:16.520 --> 0:22:20.680
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't specifically say that it could do something like

0:22:21.800 --> 0:22:24.920
<v Speaker 1>break the car as it b R A K E

0:22:25.119 --> 0:22:28.680
<v Speaker 1>the car like apply the brakes. Doesn't say that, uh,

0:22:28.800 --> 0:22:33.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, explicitly, so maybe their methodology will be limited.

0:22:33.880 --> 0:22:36.440
<v Speaker 1>And in fact, they say that they plan on showing

0:22:37.080 --> 0:22:41.359
<v Speaker 1>both the reality and the limitations of remote hacking on vehicles.

0:22:41.960 --> 0:22:46.440
<v Speaker 1>So a lot of security experts have said, listen, this

0:22:46.520 --> 0:22:49.520
<v Speaker 1>is something to be concerned about, yes, but not something

0:22:49.520 --> 0:22:53.439
<v Speaker 1>to panic over because one, they have not indicated how

0:22:53.480 --> 0:22:57.840
<v Speaker 1>extensive these these messages can go, like what what the

0:22:57.880 --> 0:23:01.320
<v Speaker 1>effects can be. Two, they haven't discussed their methodology of

0:23:01.400 --> 0:23:04.480
<v Speaker 1>coming up with the ability, the way of doing it,

0:23:04.680 --> 0:23:07.600
<v Speaker 1>or if whether or not they plan on sharing in

0:23:07.720 --> 0:23:12.400
<v Speaker 1>detail how it's done. And three, it may require so

0:23:12.520 --> 0:23:17.240
<v Speaker 1>much effort to do this that, just like the keyless entry,

0:23:17.359 --> 0:23:19.760
<v Speaker 1>no one would ever bother to do it, because they

0:23:19.800 --> 0:23:22.680
<v Speaker 1>are easier ways to sabotage a vehicle than going through

0:23:22.680 --> 0:23:27.879
<v Speaker 1>these processes. But showing that it's possible means that further,

0:23:28.160 --> 0:23:32.959
<v Speaker 1>like the future generations of vehicles could be built and

0:23:33.040 --> 0:23:37.439
<v Speaker 1>designed to counteract this sort of stuff from the from

0:23:37.520 --> 0:23:42.480
<v Speaker 1>the get go so that it doesn't become attempting enough

0:23:42.560 --> 0:23:47.199
<v Speaker 1>target to make further investigation into that that line of attack.

0:23:47.359 --> 0:23:50.520
<v Speaker 1>Right like, if you if you find a vulnerability and

0:23:50.560 --> 0:23:53.440
<v Speaker 1>you find a really hard way that you can exploit

0:23:53.440 --> 0:23:56.560
<v Speaker 1>that vulnerability, that might lead to other people saying maybe

0:23:56.600 --> 0:23:59.280
<v Speaker 1>I can find an easier way to exploit that same vulnerability.

0:23:59.320 --> 0:24:01.720
<v Speaker 1>As long as that sunability exists, and it's a it's

0:24:01.720 --> 0:24:04.240
<v Speaker 1>a target, and if we ever get to a point

0:24:04.359 --> 0:24:09.360
<v Speaker 1>where it's easier to attack the target than other methods

0:24:09.560 --> 0:24:13.840
<v Speaker 1>of messing with a vehicle, then you're in trouble. So

0:24:13.880 --> 0:24:18.440
<v Speaker 1>the hope is that these systems one could be addressed

0:24:18.480 --> 0:24:22.800
<v Speaker 1>by updating firmware on existing vehicles, and two could be

0:24:22.840 --> 0:24:28.120
<v Speaker 1>prevented in future vehicle design. Uh that being said, of course,

0:24:28.160 --> 0:24:31.800
<v Speaker 1>we still don't know what they're gonna say yet. It

0:24:31.880 --> 0:24:36.240
<v Speaker 1>may it may be that this is all uh, you know, largely,

0:24:37.000 --> 0:24:39.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, the speculation that we're having is largely harmless.

0:24:39.920 --> 0:24:43.920
<v Speaker 1>That could be that's best case scenario. Worst case would be, Yeah,

0:24:44.000 --> 0:24:46.119
<v Speaker 1>we figured out that we could with a laptop and

0:24:46.160 --> 0:24:48.399
<v Speaker 1>a wireless transmitter, we can make your card do whatever

0:24:48.440 --> 0:24:50.440
<v Speaker 1>we wanted to do. That would be bad. Well, I

0:24:50.480 --> 0:24:53.680
<v Speaker 1>would say, actually, the best case scenario would be that, um,

0:24:54.080 --> 0:24:57.840
<v Speaker 1>that they actually do turn up whatever are the most

0:24:57.840 --> 0:25:02.000
<v Speaker 1>critical vulnerabilities that exist in that leads manufacturers to take

0:25:02.040 --> 0:25:05.360
<v Speaker 1>better steps to protect their cars. Yeah, assuming that there

0:25:05.400 --> 0:25:08.480
<v Speaker 1>are in fact critical vulnerabilities, that is the best case scenario.

0:25:08.960 --> 0:25:11.480
<v Speaker 1>The true best case scenario is to discover there are

0:25:11.520 --> 0:25:15.560
<v Speaker 1>no critical vulnerabilities. But the likelihood of that, I mean,

0:25:15.760 --> 0:25:19.520
<v Speaker 1>if someone's really determined to get access to a system,

0:25:19.560 --> 0:25:23.000
<v Speaker 1>there hasn't been a system made that is crack proof.

0:25:24.000 --> 0:25:30.600
<v Speaker 1>You know, eventually, given enough time, resources and willpower, any

0:25:30.680 --> 0:25:35.040
<v Speaker 1>system that has been made can will eventually be be breached.

0:25:35.320 --> 0:25:41.639
<v Speaker 1>Speak for yourself. I'm behind seven proxies. I tracked him

0:25:41.680 --> 0:25:44.520
<v Speaker 1>all the all the way to a pub in Ireland.

0:25:44.560 --> 0:25:56.400
<v Speaker 1>It turned out he was at least three more hops away. Uh, well,

0:25:56.480 --> 0:25:59.520
<v Speaker 1>as scary as the idea of somebody hacking the car

0:25:59.760 --> 0:26:02.680
<v Speaker 1>you or driving is, Yeah, about the only thing I

0:26:02.720 --> 0:26:06.880
<v Speaker 1>could imagine scarier than that is somebody hacking the airplane

0:26:07.000 --> 0:26:10.000
<v Speaker 1>you're writing in. Yeah, that would that is a a

0:26:10.320 --> 0:26:14.440
<v Speaker 1>sobering thought right now. Of course, we would hope that

0:26:14.800 --> 0:26:18.560
<v Speaker 1>nothing like that is possible. That airplanes are designed to

0:26:18.640 --> 0:26:21.040
<v Speaker 1>be as secure as possible, and that they don't really

0:26:21.080 --> 0:26:24.880
<v Speaker 1>have any vulnerabilities that you could exploit, like like these,

0:26:24.920 --> 0:26:28.159
<v Speaker 1>you know, tire pressure gauges or anything like that. We

0:26:28.240 --> 0:26:32.439
<v Speaker 1>would hope, but that might not necessarily be the case,

0:26:33.280 --> 0:26:37.680
<v Speaker 1>because this month, in May, if you haven't seen yet,

0:26:37.680 --> 0:26:41.440
<v Speaker 1>some media outlets have been reporting that a security researcher

0:26:41.920 --> 0:26:46.240
<v Speaker 1>named Chris Roberts may have hacked an airplane and send

0:26:46.240 --> 0:26:50.199
<v Speaker 1>it off course. Yeah. Now, the reason why you're building

0:26:50.240 --> 0:26:53.359
<v Speaker 1>so many qualifiers into this statement is because, as it

0:26:53.400 --> 0:26:57.080
<v Speaker 1>turns out, there's there are a lot of differing accounts

0:26:57.280 --> 0:27:00.359
<v Speaker 1>about what exactly was done and or happened. Yeah, well,

0:27:00.400 --> 0:27:03.440
<v Speaker 1>our information is a kind of like he said, he said,

0:27:03.600 --> 0:27:07.560
<v Speaker 1>he said issue, So I'll explain that as we go forward.

0:27:07.560 --> 0:27:10.840
<v Speaker 1>But who is Chris Roberts so for years he has

0:27:10.920 --> 0:27:14.119
<v Speaker 1>been known as a white hat hacker. We talked about

0:27:14.240 --> 0:27:16.439
<v Speaker 1>black hats and white hats earlier. If you're a listener

0:27:16.480 --> 0:27:19.000
<v Speaker 1>to the show, you're probably familiar anyway. But the white

0:27:19.000 --> 0:27:23.480
<v Speaker 1>hat is somebody who at least ostensibly uh goes out

0:27:23.560 --> 0:27:27.919
<v Speaker 1>and looks for vulnerabilities and systems in order to improve security,

0:27:27.960 --> 0:27:30.639
<v Speaker 1>to show you, hey, here's where you're weak. You should

0:27:30.640 --> 0:27:34.800
<v Speaker 1>shore up your defenses in this area. And so Roberts

0:27:34.800 --> 0:27:37.879
<v Speaker 1>for years has been known as a white hat hacker,

0:27:38.080 --> 0:27:42.960
<v Speaker 1>especially in a vionic sort of publicly denouncing alleged security

0:27:43.000 --> 0:27:48.600
<v Speaker 1>problems and vulnerabilities in networks airline manufacturers put into their aircraft.

0:27:49.840 --> 0:27:52.280
<v Speaker 1>So keeping in mind that, you know, as the aircraft

0:27:52.320 --> 0:27:56.480
<v Speaker 1>experience has evolved over time, Roberts would argue it has

0:27:56.520 --> 0:28:01.680
<v Speaker 1>introduced vulnerabilities from an electronics standpoint computer standpoints, So things

0:28:01.720 --> 0:28:04.600
<v Speaker 1>like the in flight entertainment systems, the i f E

0:28:04.760 --> 0:28:06.960
<v Speaker 1>s or the fact that a lot of a lot

0:28:07.000 --> 0:28:11.240
<v Speaker 1>of airlines offer WiFi on their flights. Yeah, that these

0:28:11.280 --> 0:28:16.119
<v Speaker 1>could potentially be vulnerabilities. Yeah, and so you know you

0:28:16.119 --> 0:28:19.080
<v Speaker 1>would just hope that well, I mean, if a plane's

0:28:19.600 --> 0:28:23.439
<v Speaker 1>showing me movies on some central computer system. Surely that

0:28:23.520 --> 0:28:27.200
<v Speaker 1>computer is not linked to the computers that control things

0:28:27.280 --> 0:28:32.160
<v Speaker 1>like I don't know, life support systems inside the airplane. Yeah,

0:28:32.200 --> 0:28:36.600
<v Speaker 1>the the engine, the navigating computer. You would hope that

0:28:36.640 --> 0:28:40.680
<v Speaker 1>there's no involvement there. But I'm gonna tell a little story. Okay,

0:28:41.200 --> 0:28:44.920
<v Speaker 1>So in April, I think it was on April fifteen,

0:28:46.000 --> 0:28:50.640
<v Speaker 1>sometimes in the middle of April. Yeah, Roberts, the same guy,

0:28:50.720 --> 0:28:54.320
<v Speaker 1>Chris Roberts. He was removed from a flight by FBI

0:28:54.480 --> 0:28:58.800
<v Speaker 1>agents after the flight landed in Syracuse, New York. And

0:28:59.000 --> 0:29:02.240
<v Speaker 1>the supposed reason that everybody figured this happened was because

0:29:02.400 --> 0:29:07.200
<v Speaker 1>Roberts had tweeted a joke about hacking an airplane in

0:29:07.240 --> 0:29:11.680
<v Speaker 1>which he was riding earlier that day, and has at

0:29:11.720 --> 0:29:15.520
<v Speaker 1>least on one subsequent occasion said he was essentially poking

0:29:15.560 --> 0:29:20.560
<v Speaker 1>the bear. Yeah. So the tweet read as follows, find

0:29:20.560 --> 0:29:24.920
<v Speaker 1>myself on a seven hundred. Let's see box I F

0:29:24.960 --> 0:29:28.360
<v Speaker 1>E ice st com Shall we start playing with E

0:29:28.520 --> 0:29:32.920
<v Speaker 1>I C A S messages pass oxygen on anyone? Smiley face.

0:29:33.880 --> 0:29:37.960
<v Speaker 1>So he's using some some acronyms there. One of them

0:29:38.040 --> 0:29:41.280
<v Speaker 1>is I F E that's in flight entertainment. Another one

0:29:41.360 --> 0:29:44.280
<v Speaker 1>is E I C a S that's engine indicating and

0:29:44.360 --> 0:29:48.920
<v Speaker 1>crew alerting system at the past oxygen on what it

0:29:48.960 --> 0:29:51.960
<v Speaker 1>seems to be saying there is he's suggesting it would

0:29:51.960 --> 0:29:55.280
<v Speaker 1>be funny to, uh to trigger a command that makes

0:29:55.320 --> 0:29:58.880
<v Speaker 1>the oxygen masks descend on all the passengers, whereupon you

0:29:58.920 --> 0:30:02.280
<v Speaker 1>would uh adjust your own mask before helping others. Yes,

0:30:02.360 --> 0:30:05.520
<v Speaker 1>that's important to remember. Now. Of course, it's important to

0:30:05.560 --> 0:30:08.960
<v Speaker 1>point out that Roberts did not do anything. He was

0:30:09.040 --> 0:30:14.000
<v Speaker 1>just tweeting a joke. Still, one could and probably has

0:30:14.080 --> 0:30:16.840
<v Speaker 1>argued that such a joke was at best in poor

0:30:16.880 --> 0:30:21.000
<v Speaker 1>taste and at worst really dumb. Yeah. Well, especially because

0:30:21.160 --> 0:30:25.280
<v Speaker 1>the FBI acted on it. The FBI agents detained him,

0:30:25.400 --> 0:30:29.680
<v Speaker 1>interrogated him, and confiscated his electronics. He even tweeted out

0:30:29.680 --> 0:30:34.280
<v Speaker 1>a picture of the electronics that were confiscated and said, well,

0:30:34.320 --> 0:30:38.880
<v Speaker 1>they're all encrypted, but they're all gone now. Yeah. So

0:30:38.920 --> 0:30:41.880
<v Speaker 1>that was last month in April. But in May, a

0:30:41.960 --> 0:30:45.360
<v Speaker 1>Canadian news organization published I guess what must have been

0:30:45.400 --> 0:30:49.920
<v Speaker 1>a leaked copy um of a warrant application for the

0:30:49.920 --> 0:30:53.640
<v Speaker 1>search and seizure of Robert's devices. This was written up

0:30:53.640 --> 0:30:58.560
<v Speaker 1>by FBI special agent Mark Hurley. According to this document,

0:30:59.120 --> 0:31:02.880
<v Speaker 1>Roberts had all ready voluntarily spoken with the FBI in

0:31:03.000 --> 0:31:06.440
<v Speaker 1>February and March of so a few months ago to

0:31:06.840 --> 0:31:11.200
<v Speaker 1>inform them about basically what he claimed were security vulnerabilities

0:31:11.320 --> 0:31:14.080
<v Speaker 1>in these in flight entertainment systems that we were talking

0:31:14.120 --> 0:31:17.720
<v Speaker 1>about before. And he identified several aircraft, in particular the

0:31:17.760 --> 0:31:22.080
<v Speaker 1>Boeing seven hundred, the seven thirty seven, nine hundred, the

0:31:22.120 --> 0:31:26.120
<v Speaker 1>seven fifty seven two hundred, and the Airbus A three twenty. Now,

0:31:26.160 --> 0:31:29.600
<v Speaker 1>if you'll notice, he identified in his tweet that he

0:31:29.680 --> 0:31:32.480
<v Speaker 1>was on A seven hundred, one of the ones that

0:31:32.560 --> 0:31:37.800
<v Speaker 1>had these in flight entertainment system vulnerabilities according to him,

0:31:37.840 --> 0:31:40.080
<v Speaker 1>and so that's sort of the joke he was making.

0:31:40.120 --> 0:31:42.800
<v Speaker 1>He was like, Okay, remember these things I've been talking about.

0:31:42.920 --> 0:31:46.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm on one of these planes now. So the document,

0:31:47.000 --> 0:31:52.840
<v Speaker 1>the warrant application, claims that Roberts told FBI agents on

0:31:52.920 --> 0:31:58.920
<v Speaker 1>these earlier conversations that he had exploited these security flaws

0:31:58.960 --> 0:32:04.240
<v Speaker 1>and penetrated in flight entertainment networks in midflight. So he

0:32:04.320 --> 0:32:10.920
<v Speaker 1>claims between he penetrated i FE systems fifteen to twenty times,

0:32:11.560 --> 0:32:14.120
<v Speaker 1>and he said he gained access to these i FE

0:32:14.320 --> 0:32:18.040
<v Speaker 1>systems by physically plugging in. I thought this was interesting.

0:32:18.080 --> 0:32:22.160
<v Speaker 1>So he said he physically plugged in via a modified

0:32:22.280 --> 0:32:27.680
<v Speaker 1>Cat six Ethernet cable into the seat electronics box or SEB,

0:32:27.880 --> 0:32:30.880
<v Speaker 1>and these are found under the seats in some airplanes,

0:32:31.280 --> 0:32:33.840
<v Speaker 1>so you can imagine his process. Basically, what he said

0:32:33.840 --> 0:32:36.160
<v Speaker 1>he did is he reach under the seat in front

0:32:36.160 --> 0:32:39.480
<v Speaker 1>of him and sort of wiggle this box and squeeze

0:32:39.520 --> 0:32:44.640
<v Speaker 1>it until the cover comes off, which is quite the

0:32:44.680 --> 0:32:50.640
<v Speaker 1>feat because many of these are fixed by screws. Yeah, well,

0:32:50.680 --> 0:32:54.560
<v Speaker 1>we'll go into we'll go into potential objections to the story. Yeah,

0:32:54.760 --> 0:32:57.120
<v Speaker 1>oh yeah, yeah. So I've never tried to get into

0:32:57.160 --> 0:33:02.600
<v Speaker 1>a seat electronic box myself. Neither have, uh, nor will I,

0:33:02.720 --> 0:33:05.040
<v Speaker 1>and nor should you, because it's not a good thing

0:33:05.080 --> 0:33:06.720
<v Speaker 1>to try to mess with. But what he said is

0:33:06.760 --> 0:33:09.960
<v Speaker 1>he got the cover off and he'd plug in. It's

0:33:10.000 --> 0:33:12.880
<v Speaker 1>kind of strange that nobody ever seemed to like notice

0:33:12.960 --> 0:33:15.920
<v Speaker 1>him doing this. One of thee to the story. Yeah,

0:33:16.040 --> 0:33:19.800
<v Speaker 1>but uh so, and again, just to reiterate, this is

0:33:19.920 --> 0:33:25.040
<v Speaker 1>what the warrant application claims he told the FBI earlier

0:33:25.160 --> 0:33:29.160
<v Speaker 1>this year. So it's several levels of hearsay. Um, But yeah,

0:33:29.480 --> 0:33:31.520
<v Speaker 1>they said he so he said he would plug in

0:33:31.560 --> 0:33:34.720
<v Speaker 1>with this Cat six ethernet cable and that would give

0:33:34.800 --> 0:33:38.160
<v Speaker 1>him access to the plane's i FE system, the inflight

0:33:38.320 --> 0:33:40.920
<v Speaker 1>entertainment one and then and I'm going to read just

0:33:41.000 --> 0:33:44.440
<v Speaker 1>a direct quote from the warrant application in this next part.

0:33:44.600 --> 0:33:48.600
<v Speaker 1>It claims that Roberts told them he quote connected to

0:33:48.640 --> 0:33:52.760
<v Speaker 1>other systems on the airplane network after he exploited SLASH,

0:33:52.840 --> 0:33:57.360
<v Speaker 1>gained access to or quote hacked the i FE system.

0:33:57.440 --> 0:34:00.880
<v Speaker 1>He stated that he then overwrote code on the airplane's

0:34:01.120 --> 0:34:05.360
<v Speaker 1>thrust management computer. While a board of flight, He stated

0:34:05.400 --> 0:34:09.120
<v Speaker 1>that he successfully commanded the system he had accessed to

0:34:09.280 --> 0:34:13.680
<v Speaker 1>issue the CLB or climb command. He stated that he

0:34:13.800 --> 0:34:18.200
<v Speaker 1>thereby caused one of the airplane engines to climb, resulting

0:34:18.200 --> 0:34:21.640
<v Speaker 1>in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane during

0:34:21.680 --> 0:34:24.600
<v Speaker 1>one of these flights. He also stated that he used

0:34:24.719 --> 0:34:30.040
<v Speaker 1>Vortex software after compromising SLASH, exploiting or quote hacking the

0:34:30.160 --> 0:34:34.120
<v Speaker 1>airplane's networks. He used the software to monitor traffic from

0:34:34.160 --> 0:34:40.520
<v Speaker 1>the cockpit system and if true, this is fascinating. The

0:34:40.560 --> 0:34:44.960
<v Speaker 1>warrant application claims Robert said he used default I d

0:34:45.200 --> 0:34:50.520
<v Speaker 1>s and passwords to compromise the network. That was a

0:34:50.520 --> 0:34:56.320
<v Speaker 1>face palm. There if that's true, people change your passwords.

0:34:56.719 --> 0:35:01.480
<v Speaker 1>I mean, okay, here, here, here's one thing I would argue,

0:35:02.400 --> 0:35:04.560
<v Speaker 1>as far as the changing of the passwords is yes,

0:35:04.600 --> 0:35:08.360
<v Speaker 1>as it should not be default. At the same time,

0:35:09.040 --> 0:35:14.719
<v Speaker 1>this is a difficult, UH scenario because you have multiple

0:35:14.760 --> 0:35:19.040
<v Speaker 1>flight crews all using the same equipment. So how do

0:35:19.080 --> 0:35:22.520
<v Speaker 1>you do I D password management in that case? Like

0:35:22.960 --> 0:35:27.120
<v Speaker 1>assuming that assuming that the idea and password is is

0:35:27.200 --> 0:35:31.640
<v Speaker 1>unique to the vehicle, to the aircraft, and not unique

0:35:31.640 --> 0:35:35.120
<v Speaker 1>to the crew. So if if it's unique to the crew,

0:35:35.160 --> 0:35:37.040
<v Speaker 1>that's one thing. You know, if it's if it's the

0:35:37.080 --> 0:35:39.279
<v Speaker 1>pilot and copilot who have to put in this I

0:35:39.360 --> 0:35:41.760
<v Speaker 1>D and password, and it's the same for whichever aircraft

0:35:41.800 --> 0:35:44.920
<v Speaker 1>are in, that's one thing. But I suspect that's not

0:35:44.960 --> 0:35:48.520
<v Speaker 1>the case. I suspect it's more unique to the aircraft.

0:35:49.120 --> 0:35:51.560
<v Speaker 1>That's more. That's tricky. How do you where do you

0:35:51.600 --> 0:35:55.000
<v Speaker 1>record the information for the aircraft so that the crew

0:35:55.160 --> 0:35:58.080
<v Speaker 1>has access to it? Um? I mean, I don't know.

0:35:58.239 --> 0:36:00.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, but you can do better than default.

0:36:00.600 --> 0:36:04.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure, I'm sure, And I don't know the answer

0:36:04.400 --> 0:36:07.120
<v Speaker 1>to this question. And I mean I would hesitate to

0:36:07.120 --> 0:36:09.640
<v Speaker 1>ask because I don't think I don't need to know.

0:36:09.760 --> 0:36:13.080
<v Speaker 1>As long as I know that they are practicing good

0:36:13.080 --> 0:36:16.040
<v Speaker 1>security measures, as long as they're not doing the default

0:36:16.080 --> 0:36:20.440
<v Speaker 1>ide and password, Uh, then whatever you know, I'm maybe uh.

0:36:20.480 --> 0:36:23.040
<v Speaker 1>And then of course he claimed he after this that

0:36:23.080 --> 0:36:26.000
<v Speaker 1>he used a virtual environment to build a virtual version

0:36:26.080 --> 0:36:28.920
<v Speaker 1>of the airplane's network that he could then study safely,

0:36:29.680 --> 0:36:34.480
<v Speaker 1>and so to to reiterate this, he according to the

0:36:34.520 --> 0:36:39.720
<v Speaker 1>FBI document, Roberts claimed he steered an airplane, He plugged

0:36:39.719 --> 0:36:42.640
<v Speaker 1>into an airplane from a passenger seat, and caused the

0:36:42.640 --> 0:36:49.480
<v Speaker 1>airplane to briefly divert off course. That's amazing and amazingly

0:36:49.560 --> 0:36:52.600
<v Speaker 1>scary if true. Yeah, that that is that is incredibly

0:36:52.640 --> 0:36:55.640
<v Speaker 1>sobering if in fact it is true. Now, there are

0:36:55.680 --> 0:36:57.960
<v Speaker 1>some things to consider, and we'll get fully into some

0:36:58.080 --> 0:37:01.280
<v Speaker 1>questions about this story later on. One of the things

0:37:01.400 --> 0:37:04.480
<v Speaker 1>is that I think there might be some confusion online

0:37:04.480 --> 0:37:06.680
<v Speaker 1>in reaction to this story, where one of the things

0:37:06.719 --> 0:37:09.880
<v Speaker 1>is that Roberts was not claiming that he did this

0:37:10.040 --> 0:37:14.040
<v Speaker 1>on the day he was arrested. The warrant application is

0:37:14.120 --> 0:37:16.560
<v Speaker 1>saying that he told them he had done this in

0:37:16.640 --> 0:37:20.759
<v Speaker 1>previous years. Yeah, and they just got around to arresting him. Later. Yeah, Well,

0:37:20.800 --> 0:37:23.239
<v Speaker 1>I think they got around to arresting him because of

0:37:23.280 --> 0:37:26.759
<v Speaker 1>this tweet and then because they suspected that he had

0:37:26.840 --> 0:37:30.120
<v Speaker 1>been messing with the flight he was on that day

0:37:30.160 --> 0:37:32.560
<v Speaker 1>and in April, even though he claims I think he

0:37:32.600 --> 0:37:35.840
<v Speaker 1>claims that he didn't mess with it that day. Yeah. Uh,

0:37:35.920 --> 0:37:38.479
<v Speaker 1>And so there's there was. I believe there was. Part

0:37:38.520 --> 0:37:43.720
<v Speaker 1>of the the accusation was that the this this electronics box,

0:37:43.719 --> 0:37:48.520
<v Speaker 1>the seat the CEB had been altered, but Robert says, well,

0:37:48.640 --> 0:37:51.520
<v Speaker 1>I didn't, that wasn't me. Yeah. Yeah, So the FBI

0:37:51.600 --> 0:37:54.920
<v Speaker 1>claimed it showed signs of tampering. The seat, the one

0:37:55.040 --> 0:37:56.959
<v Speaker 1>under the seat in front of him on the flight

0:37:57.000 --> 0:37:59.960
<v Speaker 1>he'd been on that day looked like it had had

0:38:00.040 --> 0:38:02.200
<v Speaker 1>been tampered with, but he claimed he didn't do it.

0:38:02.920 --> 0:38:05.239
<v Speaker 1>And so I don't know what to say about that,

0:38:05.280 --> 0:38:09.480
<v Speaker 1>except that another interesting question that comes out of this

0:38:09.600 --> 0:38:13.400
<v Speaker 1>is about the nature of white hat hacking. Right, So, like,

0:38:13.560 --> 0:38:16.719
<v Speaker 1>if you take this story at face value and just say,

0:38:16.800 --> 0:38:20.799
<v Speaker 1>let's assume it's true, and you are a white hat

0:38:20.840 --> 0:38:25.560
<v Speaker 1>hacker who is aware of a very dangerous, very scary

0:38:25.719 --> 0:38:29.120
<v Speaker 1>security vulnerability, whether it's in a vehicle or a piece

0:38:29.120 --> 0:38:32.359
<v Speaker 1>of software on the internet infrastructure, whatever. It may be

0:38:32.600 --> 0:38:35.000
<v Speaker 1>something that that could really endanger a lot of people,

0:38:35.600 --> 0:38:37.799
<v Speaker 1>and you're aware of how to exploit it, and you

0:38:37.840 --> 0:38:40.520
<v Speaker 1>know that other people could exploit it, and you've been

0:38:40.520 --> 0:38:44.080
<v Speaker 1>trying to warn people about it but getting nowhere. But

0:38:44.080 --> 0:38:47.319
<v Speaker 1>but it's not getting fixed. What do you do? And

0:38:47.440 --> 0:38:49.080
<v Speaker 1>so I know a lot of people would look at

0:38:49.080 --> 0:38:51.719
<v Speaker 1>what he did here if he in fact did do it,

0:38:52.120 --> 0:38:55.399
<v Speaker 1>and they would say, that's that's so reckless. How could

0:38:55.400 --> 0:38:57.520
<v Speaker 1>you gamble with the lives of all the people on

0:38:57.600 --> 0:39:00.480
<v Speaker 1>that plane just to sort of like proves something for

0:39:00.520 --> 0:39:04.759
<v Speaker 1>a little research project. On the other hand, I think,

0:39:05.239 --> 0:39:07.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, you could argue that, well, you know, he

0:39:07.400 --> 0:39:09.840
<v Speaker 1>didn't tell it to like crash into the ground. He

0:39:10.239 --> 0:39:14.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe executed something that it would have seemed

0:39:14.360 --> 0:39:18.640
<v Speaker 1>to him to be an innocuous test. I don't know. Again,

0:39:18.840 --> 0:39:21.120
<v Speaker 1>we have to say, again, this is all sort of

0:39:21.200 --> 0:39:23.520
<v Speaker 1>hypothetical because we don't know what really happen. We don't

0:39:23.520 --> 0:39:25.640
<v Speaker 1>know the real story. Yeah, so a lot of this

0:39:25.719 --> 0:39:29.040
<v Speaker 1>depends upon what really happened, Right, So I think anything

0:39:29.040 --> 0:39:33.000
<v Speaker 1>that would that results in the diverting at all from

0:39:33.000 --> 0:39:37.680
<v Speaker 1>a flight plan is incredibly reckless, Even if even if

0:39:37.719 --> 0:39:40.480
<v Speaker 1>it's too demonstrate, Hey, you really need to pay attention

0:39:40.520 --> 0:39:46.400
<v Speaker 1>to me, these vulnerabilities exist. I think that's taking taking

0:39:46.440 --> 0:39:50.080
<v Speaker 1>that approach where you are potentially putting the lives of

0:39:50.120 --> 0:39:52.719
<v Speaker 1>everyone on board that flight, not just yourself. I mean,

0:39:52.760 --> 0:39:55.520
<v Speaker 1>if it were just yourself and you were just proving it,

0:39:56.280 --> 0:39:59.960
<v Speaker 1>then that's one thing. But you are taking You're taking.

0:40:00.880 --> 0:40:08.520
<v Speaker 1>It's an incredible amount of bravado to say I'm gonna

0:40:08.560 --> 0:40:10.760
<v Speaker 1>put the lives of every single person on this plane

0:40:11.000 --> 0:40:15.279
<v Speaker 1>in danger. I Am potentially going to uh to to

0:40:15.560 --> 0:40:19.319
<v Speaker 1>eliminate the lives of everyone here and forever alter the

0:40:19.400 --> 0:40:22.160
<v Speaker 1>lives of all of their loved ones like that, not

0:40:22.239 --> 0:40:25.680
<v Speaker 1>to mention potentially the lives of people on the ground

0:40:25.800 --> 0:40:29.840
<v Speaker 1>as well. I mean, it's just incredible. Yeah, I totally agree.

0:40:29.880 --> 0:40:32.680
<v Speaker 1>But then on the other hand, you could also make

0:40:32.719 --> 0:40:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the argument, like with this security vulnerability in place and

0:40:36.080 --> 0:40:40.160
<v Speaker 1>them not doing anything to fix it, that that there

0:40:40.200 --> 0:40:43.880
<v Speaker 1>already in danger and you're trying to get something done.

0:40:43.920 --> 0:40:46.360
<v Speaker 1>The best I could say is that there has to

0:40:46.440 --> 0:40:50.719
<v Speaker 1>be some means of getting that message across without physically

0:40:50.800 --> 0:40:54.120
<v Speaker 1>altering the pathway of the aircraft, Like you could send

0:40:54.120 --> 0:40:57.879
<v Speaker 1>a message some other way or you could document what

0:40:57.960 --> 0:41:01.520
<v Speaker 1>you are doing and send that documentation on and say, look,

0:41:02.160 --> 0:41:04.680
<v Speaker 1>this is exactly how it works. If I can do it,

0:41:04.760 --> 0:41:08.160
<v Speaker 1>then potentially other people can do it. And that's why

0:41:08.200 --> 0:41:12.520
<v Speaker 1>you need to address the security vulnerability. I think I

0:41:12.560 --> 0:41:14.200
<v Speaker 1>think there are other ways that would have gotten just

0:41:14.280 --> 0:41:18.880
<v Speaker 1>as much attention from an official standpoint without potentially harming people.

0:41:19.200 --> 0:41:21.880
<v Speaker 1>Assuming that the story that we hear in the affidavit

0:41:21.960 --> 0:41:23.799
<v Speaker 1>is in fact what happened. Yeah, and so now we

0:41:23.880 --> 0:41:27.640
<v Speaker 1>really do need to get to that point what really happened,

0:41:27.760 --> 0:41:32.160
<v Speaker 1>because there are people who have raised serious concerns about

0:41:32.239 --> 0:41:34.279
<v Speaker 1>the version of this story that's come out, and it's

0:41:34.360 --> 0:41:37.840
<v Speaker 1>it's hard to identify if if it's not true, where

0:41:37.840 --> 0:41:40.280
<v Speaker 1>the fault lies. Was there a problem with the FBI?

0:41:40.480 --> 0:41:45.640
<v Speaker 1>Is retelling of u of Robert's supposed story? Did Robert's

0:41:45.680 --> 0:41:49.200
<v Speaker 1>mislead the FBI? Did the FBI not understand what he

0:41:49.280 --> 0:41:51.800
<v Speaker 1>was telling them or did? Or were they misleading in

0:41:51.840 --> 0:41:55.360
<v Speaker 1>their report? But there are places along the line where

0:41:55.560 --> 0:41:58.240
<v Speaker 1>we could have gotten the wrong story from this document.

0:41:58.760 --> 0:42:04.000
<v Speaker 1>So no matter where the fault may lie, there have

0:42:04.040 --> 0:42:07.560
<v Speaker 1>been a lot of people who have pointed out problems

0:42:07.719 --> 0:42:11.120
<v Speaker 1>with the story. So whether it was the original Roberts

0:42:11.120 --> 0:42:14.120
<v Speaker 1>story or was the retelling that's kind of beside the point.

0:42:14.480 --> 0:42:16.359
<v Speaker 1>Here are some of the objections. One of the big

0:42:16.400 --> 0:42:18.960
<v Speaker 1>ones is one that we've raised already, the idea that

0:42:19.600 --> 0:42:23.759
<v Speaker 1>if it requires plugging a modified cable into an electronic

0:42:23.840 --> 0:42:30.760
<v Speaker 1>box that typically is not accessible by a passenger, why

0:42:31.560 --> 0:42:36.440
<v Speaker 1>didn't anyone else notice or comment on it? Or you know,

0:42:37.120 --> 0:42:40.360
<v Speaker 1>because again, it requires some manipulation of the box to

0:42:40.400 --> 0:42:43.839
<v Speaker 1>get access to it, even according to the affidavit story

0:42:43.840 --> 0:42:47.080
<v Speaker 1>of what Roberts was saying, um, and a lot of

0:42:47.080 --> 0:42:49.360
<v Speaker 1>these do have screws that are set in, so you

0:42:49.360 --> 0:42:54.719
<v Speaker 1>would have to unscrew a panel in order to get

0:42:54.719 --> 0:42:58.160
<v Speaker 1>access to the ports that are inside of it. Why

0:42:58.200 --> 0:43:02.360
<v Speaker 1>would no other pastor or flight attendant have noticed this?

0:43:02.400 --> 0:43:06.120
<v Speaker 1>Because it's it's you know, it's fairly disruptive. On one hand,

0:43:06.160 --> 0:43:08.200
<v Speaker 1>I agree with that, but then there's a little part

0:43:08.200 --> 0:43:10.640
<v Speaker 1>of my brain that says, yeah, but what's the easiest

0:43:10.680 --> 0:43:13.520
<v Speaker 1>way to rob a bank? Show up and look like

0:43:13.560 --> 0:43:15.720
<v Speaker 1>you know what you're doing. Just walk into the vault

0:43:15.760 --> 0:43:19.280
<v Speaker 1>like you're somebody who's supposed to be going in. Yeah,

0:43:19.320 --> 0:43:21.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there's a certain thing to be said for

0:43:22.000 --> 0:43:25.120
<v Speaker 1>if you just don't act like you're doing anything shady,

0:43:25.200 --> 0:43:27.479
<v Speaker 1>but you've got this sort of like aura of yeah,

0:43:27.520 --> 0:43:30.040
<v Speaker 1>this is what I normally do. People just don't really

0:43:30.120 --> 0:43:32.359
<v Speaker 1>question it. They're like, Okay, I assume me knows what

0:43:32.360 --> 0:43:35.600
<v Speaker 1>he's doing. Well, And I suppose if if someone saying

0:43:35.600 --> 0:43:38.520
<v Speaker 1>next to that person just assumes that what they're doing

0:43:38.560 --> 0:43:41.120
<v Speaker 1>is plugging in a device to charge because some a

0:43:41.120 --> 0:43:43.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of aircraft now have you know, outlets for that

0:43:44.000 --> 0:43:46.960
<v Speaker 1>sort of thing, Maybe that's the assumption. I still think

0:43:47.000 --> 0:43:51.960
<v Speaker 1>that flight attendants would find it interesting. But maybe but

0:43:52.040 --> 0:43:54.040
<v Speaker 1>let's let's all right, let's go ahead and say that

0:43:54.040 --> 0:43:56.480
<v Speaker 1>that's one of the objections. But the other one is

0:43:56.520 --> 0:43:59.960
<v Speaker 1>that you have to you know this. This also assume

0:44:00.120 --> 0:44:02.680
<v Speaker 1>is that the i f E is in fact an

0:44:02.719 --> 0:44:08.640
<v Speaker 1>interconnected network with the same computers that control the flight controls,

0:44:09.360 --> 0:44:15.600
<v Speaker 1>and not two separate networks that have limited or no connectivity. Right.

0:44:15.640 --> 0:44:19.320
<v Speaker 1>So this is the objection that I really hope is correct.

0:44:19.760 --> 0:44:23.400
<v Speaker 1>And the objection is the airplanes do not actually have

0:44:23.600 --> 0:44:27.040
<v Speaker 1>this vulnerability, right, Like, he couldn't have done what he

0:44:27.120 --> 0:44:31.040
<v Speaker 1>said because it's not possible. Yeah, now there are some

0:44:31.120 --> 0:44:34.479
<v Speaker 1>connections that have to be there for most of these

0:44:34.560 --> 0:44:38.239
<v Speaker 1>i FE systems, because if you've ever been on one

0:44:38.239 --> 0:44:41.920
<v Speaker 1>where you have the track my flight, then obviously the

0:44:42.080 --> 0:44:45.600
<v Speaker 1>track my flight uh app or whatever you want to

0:44:45.640 --> 0:44:49.240
<v Speaker 1>call it in the entertainment system, that feature is gaining

0:44:49.320 --> 0:44:53.960
<v Speaker 1>some information from various systems aboard the aircraft. Uh you know,

0:44:54.040 --> 0:44:57.520
<v Speaker 1>things like altitude and air speed and the temperature outside,

0:44:57.520 --> 0:45:00.640
<v Speaker 1>all this kind of stuff, Um, how how far you

0:45:00.960 --> 0:45:03.040
<v Speaker 1>from your point of origin? How far are you from

0:45:03.040 --> 0:45:06.920
<v Speaker 1>your destination? But all that being said, that could totally

0:45:06.920 --> 0:45:10.560
<v Speaker 1>be connected to computer systems that have no other connection

0:45:10.600 --> 0:45:13.120
<v Speaker 1>to anything else, right, Like, there are a lot of

0:45:13.200 --> 0:45:16.040
<v Speaker 1>redundant systems of board aircraft for very good reason. You

0:45:16.080 --> 0:45:20.400
<v Speaker 1>want there to be redundancy for safety. So and it

0:45:20.440 --> 0:45:23.160
<v Speaker 1>could also be that the information that's come across is

0:45:23.200 --> 0:45:26.279
<v Speaker 1>again traveling in a very specific one way path that

0:45:26.320 --> 0:45:30.960
<v Speaker 1>there's no way to go upstream of that information. Um,

0:45:31.080 --> 0:45:33.960
<v Speaker 1>and that would make the most sense. In fact, Boeing says,

0:45:34.840 --> 0:45:37.200
<v Speaker 1>the connections are limited and offer no access to flight

0:45:37.200 --> 0:45:41.480
<v Speaker 1>controls through the i F e uh and that means

0:45:41.560 --> 0:45:44.120
<v Speaker 1>that you wouldn't be able to get access to this

0:45:44.200 --> 0:45:47.799
<v Speaker 1>thrust management control using the i F It would be impossible.

0:45:47.880 --> 0:45:50.400
<v Speaker 1>So you know, you might be able to hack the

0:45:50.400 --> 0:45:53.320
<v Speaker 1>i f and get access to it and maybe require

0:45:53.360 --> 0:45:56.960
<v Speaker 1>everyone to watch biodome, but you wouldn't necessarily be able

0:45:57.000 --> 0:46:01.640
<v Speaker 1>to tear It would be awful, yeah, but not as

0:46:01.680 --> 0:46:05.800
<v Speaker 1>awful as having someone altered the flight path plan. Um. Now,

0:46:07.120 --> 0:46:09.239
<v Speaker 1>there have been some folks who said it's it might

0:46:09.280 --> 0:46:11.799
<v Speaker 1>be possible that the i f E has a direct

0:46:11.840 --> 0:46:17.120
<v Speaker 1>connection to climate control, which matters, Yeah, because if it's

0:46:17.160 --> 0:46:19.040
<v Speaker 1>on the same system as climate control and you shut

0:46:19.040 --> 0:46:21.560
<v Speaker 1>down climate control, then you're going to force that aircraft

0:46:21.600 --> 0:46:25.600
<v Speaker 1>to land. Uh. I don't know how much access to

0:46:25.600 --> 0:46:28.560
<v Speaker 1>climate control the typical i FE has. It may only

0:46:28.600 --> 0:46:32.759
<v Speaker 1>have access to vent control. Then your vent is on

0:46:32.920 --> 0:46:34.839
<v Speaker 1>or off and that's it. It may not have any

0:46:34.840 --> 0:46:38.399
<v Speaker 1>access to the actual climate control part. I don't know.

0:46:38.520 --> 0:46:40.640
<v Speaker 1>But if it does have access to climate control, that

0:46:40.640 --> 0:46:42.719
<v Speaker 1>could potentially be a point of vulnerability that could be

0:46:42.760 --> 0:46:47.680
<v Speaker 1>exploited to force an aircraft to land prematurely. Um. Most

0:46:47.719 --> 0:46:51.000
<v Speaker 1>likely flying to the closest airport that has availability and landing.

0:46:51.760 --> 0:46:54.360
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like it's not like, you know, a

0:46:55.600 --> 0:46:59.360
<v Speaker 1>drastic emergency, but it would require premature landing, which obviously

0:46:59.360 --> 0:47:02.680
<v Speaker 1>would be problematic at best. Yeah. I also remember seeing

0:47:02.719 --> 0:47:05.520
<v Speaker 1>one criticism of the story that that essentially said that

0:47:05.760 --> 0:47:09.280
<v Speaker 1>pilots would have to review any kind of like review

0:47:09.320 --> 0:47:12.640
<v Speaker 1>and approved any incoming change to the flight path or

0:47:12.640 --> 0:47:17.480
<v Speaker 1>flight control. Yeah, that's the aircraft systems are designed for safety.

0:47:17.880 --> 0:47:21.680
<v Speaker 1>And again that redundancy is meant for not just the systems,

0:47:21.680 --> 0:47:25.600
<v Speaker 1>but for commands given to the system, so that you know,

0:47:26.120 --> 0:47:28.880
<v Speaker 1>think of any computer program where you've had, you know,

0:47:29.000 --> 0:47:31.600
<v Speaker 1>something where you you choose a command and it pops

0:47:31.640 --> 0:47:34.640
<v Speaker 1>up and says are you sure and you hit okay.

0:47:34.840 --> 0:47:37.359
<v Speaker 1>Multiply that by a hundred, and that's what we're talking

0:47:37.360 --> 0:47:40.319
<v Speaker 1>about with aircraft systems for good reason that that you know,

0:47:40.480 --> 0:47:43.680
<v Speaker 1>you are meant to review and approve these things, so

0:47:43.760 --> 0:47:47.200
<v Speaker 1>that anything that would affect a key element of the

0:47:47.239 --> 0:47:51.640
<v Speaker 1>aircraft's operation would require approval, review, and approval, and not

0:47:51.760 --> 0:47:58.040
<v Speaker 1>just a command issued by a computer. So that's another objection. Uh,

0:47:58.080 --> 0:48:02.440
<v Speaker 1>there's also a Mashable has an article on this. They

0:48:02.480 --> 0:48:05.400
<v Speaker 1>interviewed a pilot. The pilot requested to remain anonymous in

0:48:05.440 --> 0:48:07.799
<v Speaker 1>the interview, So we don't I trust that it's really

0:48:07.800 --> 0:48:11.719
<v Speaker 1>a pilot. I do too. So the pilot said that

0:48:11.920 --> 0:48:15.239
<v Speaker 1>Roberts claims according to what the FBI said. At any rate,

0:48:16.040 --> 0:48:19.240
<v Speaker 1>we're false because the systems he had claimed to access

0:48:19.400 --> 0:48:23.240
<v Speaker 1>didn't exist aboard the type of aircraft he was on. Now, granted,

0:48:23.280 --> 0:48:27.080
<v Speaker 1>this might have just been been uh limited to the

0:48:27.120 --> 0:48:31.160
<v Speaker 1>seven hundred story, and it could be that it was

0:48:31.160 --> 0:48:34.160
<v Speaker 1>a different aircraft that he claimed he had gained access to,

0:48:34.239 --> 0:48:37.359
<v Speaker 1>but he said the pilot says, if Roberts is saying

0:48:37.400 --> 0:48:39.919
<v Speaker 1>he was on a seven hundred when he did this,

0:48:40.400 --> 0:48:43.520
<v Speaker 1>it's impossible because the system he claims to have taken

0:48:43.520 --> 0:48:46.520
<v Speaker 1>advantage of can't do that. He also points out the

0:48:46.640 --> 0:48:49.080
<v Speaker 1>eye cast system you were talking about earlier, says that

0:48:49.080 --> 0:48:52.879
<v Speaker 1>that just displays messages. It doesn't have any control over

0:48:52.960 --> 0:48:56.080
<v Speaker 1>the aircraft at all. All it does is tell you stuff.

0:48:56.400 --> 0:49:01.080
<v Speaker 1>It's a readoubt essentially. Ah. And trying to compromise a

0:49:01.120 --> 0:49:04.840
<v Speaker 1>computer by issuing print commands. Yeah, yeah, you might be

0:49:04.840 --> 0:49:07.960
<v Speaker 1>able to print some naughty words out, but it's not

0:49:08.680 --> 0:49:11.759
<v Speaker 1>it's not affecting any other part of the computer. Uh.

0:49:11.840 --> 0:49:13.759
<v Speaker 1>And then he also pointed out that the I f

0:49:13.800 --> 0:49:17.320
<v Speaker 1>E and cockpit systems had no point of commonality except

0:49:17.400 --> 0:49:19.160
<v Speaker 1>for the fact that they both drew power from the

0:49:19.200 --> 0:49:22.799
<v Speaker 1>same power source. But that's it. They didn't have any crossover,

0:49:22.840 --> 0:49:26.680
<v Speaker 1>there was no connectivity between the two. So it is

0:49:26.880 --> 0:49:31.279
<v Speaker 1>entirely possible that the this is a big fuss over

0:49:31.760 --> 0:49:36.080
<v Speaker 1>over largely nothing. Um But I mean I certainly hope

0:49:36.120 --> 0:49:40.480
<v Speaker 1>so yeah, But I also hope no matter what the

0:49:40.480 --> 0:49:42.520
<v Speaker 1>true facts of this case, where I hope this is

0:49:42.560 --> 0:49:46.800
<v Speaker 1>at least encouraging airline manufacturers and the people who designed

0:49:46.880 --> 0:49:50.400
<v Speaker 1>their their hardware and software to re examine the security

0:49:50.440 --> 0:49:53.239
<v Speaker 1>of their aircraft, right yeah, and really put it through

0:49:53.360 --> 0:49:56.480
<v Speaker 1>vigorous testing. And I don't mean to suggest that they

0:49:56.520 --> 0:50:00.759
<v Speaker 1>don't already do that. I imagine that the companies, I mean,

0:50:01.200 --> 0:50:06.120
<v Speaker 1>obviously they have a vested interest in making sure those

0:50:06.360 --> 0:50:10.920
<v Speaker 1>those systems are tested vigorously with lots of different attempts

0:50:10.920 --> 0:50:14.200
<v Speaker 1>at intrusion. The various scenarios have to be run about

0:50:14.200 --> 0:50:17.960
<v Speaker 1>how likely or possible is this, because I mean, it's

0:50:18.080 --> 0:50:21.440
<v Speaker 1>it's it's life and death, and a company has to

0:50:21.600 --> 0:50:26.160
<v Speaker 1>be able to rely upon having the reputation of being

0:50:26.480 --> 0:50:31.799
<v Speaker 1>responsible for something as important and potentially as dangerous as

0:50:31.840 --> 0:50:37.520
<v Speaker 1>air travel. Um. So I I'm fairly confident that that

0:50:37.600 --> 0:50:41.239
<v Speaker 1>the the security vulnerabilities are very seriously looked at in

0:50:41.280 --> 0:50:46.359
<v Speaker 1>these cases. Whether the Roberts case is as extreme as

0:50:46.400 --> 0:50:49.680
<v Speaker 1>has been indicated in that affidavit, I don't know. I mean,

0:50:50.360 --> 0:50:53.000
<v Speaker 1>if that is a possibility, then that's certainly warrants a

0:50:53.080 --> 0:50:56.200
<v Speaker 1>re examination of how these network systems are laid out

0:50:56.239 --> 0:50:58.879
<v Speaker 1>within an aircraft. Now let me do let me tell

0:50:58.920 --> 0:51:01.520
<v Speaker 1>you something. This is background, Jonathan. Way before I worked

0:51:01.520 --> 0:51:04.680
<v Speaker 1>for How Stuff Works. Years before I had worked for uh,

0:51:04.920 --> 0:51:06.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, I worked for a couple of consulting firms.

0:51:06.760 --> 0:51:08.279
<v Speaker 1>Is before that. This is way back when I was

0:51:08.280 --> 0:51:10.560
<v Speaker 1>looking for my first job. I landed some contract work

0:51:10.600 --> 0:51:15.960
<v Speaker 1>with an airline and my job was to transcribe audio

0:51:16.080 --> 0:51:20.120
<v Speaker 1>files that were detailing the various systems aboard aircraft into

0:51:20.160 --> 0:51:23.240
<v Speaker 1>text files so that there would be a text copy

0:51:23.280 --> 0:51:26.160
<v Speaker 1>of these audios. As far as I know, they didn't

0:51:26.200 --> 0:51:29.360
<v Speaker 1>have the manuals or the hard copy anywhere. So it

0:51:29.400 --> 0:51:35.600
<v Speaker 1>was my job to transcribe hours of technical documentation about

0:51:35.640 --> 0:51:38.799
<v Speaker 1>these aircraft, which included things like how the cables were

0:51:38.840 --> 0:51:40.840
<v Speaker 1>laid out in the systems. And it was fascinating to

0:51:40.960 --> 0:51:44.719
<v Speaker 1>learn at the time. It was nothing, you know, that

0:51:44.960 --> 0:51:47.840
<v Speaker 1>was exploitable or anything like that. It was just interesting.

0:51:48.239 --> 0:51:51.919
<v Speaker 1>But it really displayed to me the care that goes

0:51:51.960 --> 0:51:55.600
<v Speaker 1>into designing these systems to make certain that this redundancy

0:51:55.680 --> 0:51:59.400
<v Speaker 1>is there. And it actually really reassured me quite a bit.

0:52:00.000 --> 0:52:02.680
<v Speaker 1>All I was doing this like, it removes some of

0:52:02.680 --> 0:52:07.880
<v Speaker 1>the the mystery behind aircraft and also displayed exactly how

0:52:07.960 --> 0:52:14.160
<v Speaker 1>incredibly um detail oriented these designers had to be, which

0:52:14.239 --> 0:52:16.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, makes sense if you think about it for

0:52:16.160 --> 0:52:18.640
<v Speaker 1>more than a second you realize, oh, of course they

0:52:18.680 --> 0:52:21.040
<v Speaker 1>have to be. But it really drove that home. So

0:52:21.120 --> 0:52:23.799
<v Speaker 1>I was very thankful to actually have that experience. It's

0:52:23.840 --> 0:52:26.359
<v Speaker 1>one that not a lot of people have necessarily had. Now.

0:52:26.360 --> 0:52:28.480
<v Speaker 1>I will also say that it was for a lot

0:52:28.600 --> 0:52:31.279
<v Speaker 1>of old aircraft that aren't around anymore, because this was

0:52:31.360 --> 0:52:34.400
<v Speaker 1>many years ago and those aircraft have since been retired

0:52:34.440 --> 0:52:38.600
<v Speaker 1>from various fleets. But I think there's some old aircraft

0:52:38.640 --> 0:52:41.400
<v Speaker 1>still in circulation. Yeah, but you don't see a whole

0:52:41.440 --> 0:52:46.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of these gigantic old war horses. They've been they've

0:52:46.040 --> 0:52:52.080
<v Speaker 1>been replaced by newer more. Um. Yeah, you know, you know,

0:52:52.120 --> 0:52:55.520
<v Speaker 1>back back when uh an aircraft consisted of a giant

0:52:55.640 --> 0:52:58.840
<v Speaker 1>rubber band and a lot of hope, No, it wasn't

0:52:58.880 --> 0:53:01.160
<v Speaker 1>like that. But other thing I wanted to point out

0:53:01.239 --> 0:53:04.000
<v Speaker 1>kind of going back to the car discussion, just briefly,

0:53:04.800 --> 0:53:09.319
<v Speaker 1>is that whether or not these concerns are critical, like

0:53:09.360 --> 0:53:11.399
<v Speaker 1>whether or not these are things that we really need

0:53:11.440 --> 0:53:15.680
<v Speaker 1>to worry about. Most most security experts say right now,

0:53:16.040 --> 0:53:18.239
<v Speaker 1>the trouble you'd have to go through in order to

0:53:18.440 --> 0:53:21.239
<v Speaker 1>exploit any of these so called vulnerabilities would be so

0:53:21.320 --> 0:53:26.200
<v Speaker 1>great as to render them meaningless. That doesn't really matter

0:53:26.239 --> 0:53:30.000
<v Speaker 1>because there's been so much public interest shown on the

0:53:30.040 --> 0:53:34.680
<v Speaker 1>story for obvious reasons. That is, it has prompted politicians

0:53:34.680 --> 0:53:38.200
<v Speaker 1>to get involved. And Congressman Ed Markey sent out a

0:53:38.239 --> 0:53:41.960
<v Speaker 1>letter to twenty automakers after the two thousand thirteen Black

0:53:41.960 --> 0:53:46.319
<v Speaker 1>Hat conference that that are earlier one where uh they

0:53:46.440 --> 0:53:50.680
<v Speaker 1>were demonstrating the ability to hack vehicles by directly hooking

0:53:50.719 --> 0:53:56.279
<v Speaker 1>up computers to the diagnostic system UM and he sent

0:53:56.560 --> 0:53:59.960
<v Speaker 1>these letter to twenty automakers to ask about their secure

0:54:00.000 --> 0:54:03.440
<v Speaker 1>A measures for wireless attacks. Now, all of the automakers

0:54:03.480 --> 0:54:07.160
<v Speaker 1>that responded, and I think sixteen of twenty cent responses

0:54:07.680 --> 0:54:10.399
<v Speaker 1>something like that, But all of the response the ones

0:54:10.440 --> 0:54:13.560
<v Speaker 1>that responded said their vehicles had wireless points of access,

0:54:13.800 --> 0:54:16.720
<v Speaker 1>so at least one wireless point of access that could

0:54:16.719 --> 0:54:20.960
<v Speaker 1>potentially be used to connect to the car, not necessarily

0:54:21.000 --> 0:54:25.120
<v Speaker 1>exploit of vulnerability, but to connect. Seven of the respondents

0:54:25.120 --> 0:54:27.480
<v Speaker 1>said that they used a third party to test their

0:54:27.520 --> 0:54:31.160
<v Speaker 1>systems for security vulnerabilities, so essentially white hat hackers. They

0:54:31.160 --> 0:54:35.000
<v Speaker 1>went outside their own company to hire contractors and say,

0:54:35.520 --> 0:54:38.440
<v Speaker 1>see if you can gain wireless access, remote access to

0:54:38.520 --> 0:54:41.680
<v Speaker 1>these security systems, and if you can or these these

0:54:41.880 --> 0:54:44.480
<v Speaker 1>what are supposed to be secured systems, and if you can,

0:54:44.560 --> 0:54:45.960
<v Speaker 1>let us know how you did it so we can

0:54:46.000 --> 0:54:49.560
<v Speaker 1>address that before we release the vehicle as a production model.

0:54:50.480 --> 0:54:55.040
<v Speaker 1>Very responsible, But only two said that their vehicles had

0:54:55.080 --> 0:54:59.040
<v Speaker 1>countermeasures for hacking attacks on stuff like breaking and steering systems.

0:54:59.640 --> 0:55:01.879
<v Speaker 1>So the story that gets out from this is that

0:55:02.000 --> 0:55:06.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, only a couple of car manufacturers when they

0:55:06.040 --> 0:55:10.920
<v Speaker 1>weren't named, actually have the security measures in place, and

0:55:10.960 --> 0:55:15.000
<v Speaker 1>only seven are using third parties to test their systems.

0:55:15.600 --> 0:55:18.400
<v Speaker 1>The flip side of that argument could be there's no

0:55:18.520 --> 0:55:24.319
<v Speaker 1>demonstrable security issue yet that that would be enough to

0:55:24.840 --> 0:55:28.720
<v Speaker 1>create a concern. However, it is good to be aware

0:55:28.760 --> 0:55:31.719
<v Speaker 1>of it and to perhaps start building in these kind

0:55:31.760 --> 0:55:36.040
<v Speaker 1>of safety features moving forward, knowing that it's not like

0:55:36.080 --> 0:55:39.240
<v Speaker 1>the world's going to get less connected, right we're gonna

0:55:39.320 --> 0:55:41.799
<v Speaker 1>continue to see that trend go, so we need to

0:55:41.840 --> 0:55:44.440
<v Speaker 1>be certain that we're doing so in a responsible way,

0:55:44.800 --> 0:55:50.680
<v Speaker 1>in a safe way. Totally excellent. I'm glad you agree. So, yeah,

0:55:50.760 --> 0:55:52.960
<v Speaker 1>this was this was a fun kind of thing to

0:55:53.000 --> 0:55:56.600
<v Speaker 1>look at. And I mean, ultimately, I would always argue,

0:55:57.000 --> 0:56:02.719
<v Speaker 1>apply critical thinking to the situation. Don't react with your

0:56:02.800 --> 0:56:06.160
<v Speaker 1>initial emotional reaction. I mean, anyone who sees anything like this,

0:56:06.280 --> 0:56:09.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure the first emotional reaction is a fear, a

0:56:09.719 --> 0:56:13.040
<v Speaker 1>feeling of unease, if not fear right because I mean,

0:56:13.680 --> 0:56:16.920
<v Speaker 1>when you are behind the wheel of your car, you

0:56:16.960 --> 0:56:19.279
<v Speaker 1>know you want to be in control. You don't get

0:56:19.560 --> 0:56:22.160
<v Speaker 1>the thought of someone else potentially gaining control of the

0:56:22.160 --> 0:56:24.520
<v Speaker 1>situation that you felt you were in control of is

0:56:25.200 --> 0:56:29.359
<v Speaker 1>that's scary. So, I mean it's understandable, but apply critical thinking.

0:56:29.440 --> 0:56:32.600
<v Speaker 1>Know that it is not likely to happen. There are

0:56:32.600 --> 0:56:35.480
<v Speaker 1>other things that are far more likely to happen, and

0:56:35.560 --> 0:56:38.560
<v Speaker 1>as long as you take those precautions against those, you're

0:56:38.600 --> 0:56:44.680
<v Speaker 1>probably okay about these other more remote possibilities. Um And again,

0:56:44.719 --> 0:56:47.200
<v Speaker 1>if you are in a position to make decisions about

0:56:47.280 --> 0:56:50.600
<v Speaker 1>these kind of systems, whether it's you know, from a

0:56:50.600 --> 0:56:56.840
<v Speaker 1>car manufacturer or maybe you do aftermarket stuff then keeping

0:56:56.840 --> 0:56:59.200
<v Speaker 1>that in mind and keeping that as as part of

0:56:59.239 --> 0:57:03.680
<v Speaker 1>your best practices of of testing the security of your systems.

0:57:04.160 --> 0:57:07.640
<v Speaker 1>It's definitely something you should look into. Joe, thank you

0:57:07.680 --> 0:57:09.799
<v Speaker 1>for joining me. Thanks for having me, man, I've been

0:57:09.800 --> 0:57:12.520
<v Speaker 1>wanting to talk about this since I saw the article. Yeah,

0:57:12.560 --> 0:57:16.040
<v Speaker 1>and it was fun to kind of follow up on

0:57:16.080 --> 0:57:19.160
<v Speaker 1>an previous episode that actually, you know, it really did

0:57:19.200 --> 0:57:21.800
<v Speaker 1>warrant this new discussion, and we'll probably end up having

0:57:21.800 --> 0:57:27.160
<v Speaker 1>another follow up once the the August Black Hat conferences over.

0:57:27.480 --> 0:57:28.920
<v Speaker 1>In fact, I think it would be good for me

0:57:29.000 --> 0:57:31.720
<v Speaker 1>to do an episode just kind of following up on

0:57:31.760 --> 0:57:34.280
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that comes out of these things like def

0:57:34.280 --> 0:57:37.520
<v Speaker 1>Con and black Hat, so that folks can know, all right,

0:57:38.040 --> 0:57:42.480
<v Speaker 1>what were the vulnerabilities that were discovered? How bad is it?

0:57:42.680 --> 0:57:45.800
<v Speaker 1>Those are two good questions to answer. So I will

0:57:45.840 --> 0:57:48.320
<v Speaker 1>try to do that this year and and follow up

0:57:48.320 --> 0:57:50.600
<v Speaker 1>on that because I think it'd be really interesting. Uh,

0:57:50.600 --> 0:57:52.440
<v Speaker 1>And I've got buddies who are hackers, so they can

0:57:52.440 --> 0:57:54.720
<v Speaker 1>give me the inside story. Maybe I'll get Snubs to

0:57:54.720 --> 0:57:56.640
<v Speaker 1>come on, Shannon Morris to come on, or or Darren

0:57:56.720 --> 0:57:58.840
<v Speaker 1>Kitchen to come on and talk about it because they're

0:57:58.840 --> 0:58:03.800
<v Speaker 1>both super smart about that stuff, way smarter than I am. Guys,

0:58:04.520 --> 0:58:07.080
<v Speaker 1>I'll listen to that. Yeah, if you'll be fantastic, you know,

0:58:07.160 --> 0:58:09.000
<v Speaker 1>maybe we'll even have a three person show. I mean,

0:58:09.040 --> 0:58:11.720
<v Speaker 1>it's always that we have three microphones in here. There's

0:58:11.760 --> 0:58:15.439
<v Speaker 1>no reason why we can't do that. So, guys, thank

0:58:15.480 --> 0:58:18.080
<v Speaker 1>you so much for listening. You can check out Joe's

0:58:18.120 --> 0:58:21.040
<v Speaker 1>work at other locations. He's one of the hosts and

0:58:21.080 --> 0:58:24.720
<v Speaker 1>writers for Forward Thinking. So we do the Forward Thinking

0:58:24.720 --> 0:58:28.280
<v Speaker 1>podcast twice a week Wednesdays and Fridays, and Joe has

0:58:28.320 --> 0:58:31.360
<v Speaker 1>written for the video series as well, and so you

0:58:31.360 --> 0:58:33.320
<v Speaker 1>can check us out there. Joe, you also write for

0:58:33.400 --> 0:58:36.240
<v Speaker 1>some of the video series and appear occasionally in them. Yeah.

0:58:36.240 --> 0:58:39.120
<v Speaker 1>I write for brain stuff and uh and other house

0:58:39.120 --> 0:58:41.680
<v Speaker 1>stuff Works videos and you can check those out on

0:58:41.720 --> 0:58:44.120
<v Speaker 1>the house stup Works main page on YouTube or at

0:58:44.120 --> 0:58:46.840
<v Speaker 1>the brain Stuff page. Yeah, those are awesome. There are

0:58:46.840 --> 0:58:49.840
<v Speaker 1>a lot of fun. They range all over the map,

0:58:49.880 --> 0:58:53.800
<v Speaker 1>from super cool science two, super scary stuff to really

0:58:53.840 --> 0:58:56.960
<v Speaker 1>just quirky fun facts that you might not have thought about.

0:58:57.680 --> 0:58:59.640
<v Speaker 1>They're always fun to work on, so check those out.

0:59:00.040 --> 0:59:02.280
<v Speaker 1>If you have any suggestions for future guests on the

0:59:02.320 --> 0:59:05.480
<v Speaker 1>show topics. You know, you have questions or comments, You

0:59:05.480 --> 0:59:08.840
<v Speaker 1>have your own insight into things like hacking vehicles, Send

0:59:08.880 --> 0:59:11.600
<v Speaker 1>me a message the email addresses tech stuff at how

0:59:11.640 --> 0:59:14.520
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com, or drop me a line on Facebook,

0:59:14.560 --> 0:59:17.320
<v Speaker 1>Twitter or Tumbler to handle it. All three of those

0:59:17.440 --> 0:59:20.400
<v Speaker 1>is tech stuff h s W and I'll talk to

0:59:20.480 --> 0:59:28.400
<v Speaker 1>you again really soon. For more on this and thousands

0:59:28.440 --> 0:59:40.160
<v Speaker 1>of other topics, how stuff works dot com