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Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 1: It was another transformational term at the Supreme Court, where

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Speaker 1: the Republican appointed supermajority left no doubt that its conservative

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Speaker 1: revolution is pushing ahead to attain its goals without much

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Speaker 1: regard for precedent. The Conservatives slashed the power of regulators,

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Speaker 1: rule that Donald Trump is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution

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Speaker 1: for official presidential acts, made it harder to challenge voting

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Speaker 1: maps as racially gerrymandered, and found that homeless people sleeping

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Speaker 1: on the streets can be jailed. In those decisions, as

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Speaker 1: well as seven others. The Court was divided down ideological

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Speaker 1: lines six to three, with the liberal justices in the minority.

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Speaker 1: Joining me is Anthony Michael Christ, a professor at the

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Speaker 1: Georgia State University College of Law. People are bemoaning how

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Speaker 1: the Supreme Court had has become so political, But you

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Speaker 1: write that the Supreme Court always has been political and

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Speaker 1: that the Court has never been an apolitical arbiter of

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Speaker 1: the constitution. Tell us why so?

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Speaker 2: You know, the Supreme Court has two important features in

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Speaker 2: terms of how justice think. I think the first one

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Speaker 2: is that you know they're members of society, and so

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Speaker 2: you know, society has kind of dominant main streame views

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Speaker 2: and those that are very much on the outside, and justices,

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Speaker 2: much like your average citizen, is going to internalize those views,

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Speaker 2: internalize those changing dynamics in society and current events and

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Speaker 2: all the like, and their jurisprudence is going to sometimes

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Speaker 2: be affected by that. But then the other thing that's

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Speaker 2: even more important in terms of the Supreme Court's jurisprudential

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Speaker 2: outcomes is the fact that it is the byproduct of

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Speaker 2: big political coalition that elected presidents and that elect majorities

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Speaker 2: in the Senate. That then creates this dynamic where you

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Speaker 2: get a president who appoints justice the Supreme Court who

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Speaker 2: also reflects their ideological commitments. And so generally speaking, because

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Speaker 2: of these two different features of how justices get picked

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Speaker 2: and how they just operate as regular members of society, right,

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Speaker 2: they're not for medically sealed off from the rest of us.

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Speaker 2: You know, the courts tend to reflect majoritarian views. Certainly,

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Speaker 2: I think there's a case to be made that this court,

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Speaker 2: the Roberts Court, and as the Roberts Court is currently constituted.

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Speaker 2: A lot of people may say this, well, outside of

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Speaker 2: the kind of mainstream views of the average American today,

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Speaker 2: And I think there was an argument made for that,

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Speaker 2: for sure. But generally speaking, the Supreme Court just contrary

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Speaker 2: to what most of us have been taught in law

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Speaker 2: school and in college for years and years and years,

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Speaker 2: it's not a counter majoritory and institution. It has typically

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Speaker 2: reflected the majority view on major questions of law and politics.

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Speaker 1: Do you think that this is becoming more pronounced because

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Speaker 1: the Court has moved so fast to overrule precedent and

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Speaker 1: to change the law.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, So I think maybe a good app comparison maybe

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Speaker 2: the Warren Court from the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties

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Speaker 2: and the current Robbers Court as it existed we'll say

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Speaker 2: since the Trump administration, so around twenty sixteen, and certainly

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Speaker 2: there's similar dynamics in that both courts overturned a lot

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Speaker 2: of precedent. People generally don't see the Warren Court as

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Speaker 2: being at a step with the average Americans view during

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Speaker 2: that period because the New Deal coalition was dominant and

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Speaker 2: they won outright majorities both in Congress and substantial majorities

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Speaker 2: time and again in terms of sending a president to

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Speaker 2: the White app and even Republicans who were more conservative

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Speaker 2: than the average Democrat at the time tends to be

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Speaker 2: more liberal, and so the views of the average politicians

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Speaker 2: who was electable in that time period was very much

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Speaker 2: in sync with the appsview of the typical Supreme Court

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Speaker 2: justice at the time. Why I think people seem more

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Speaker 2: skeptical of this court is because unlike the War in Court,

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Speaker 2: for example, you know, Donald Trump when he was first elected,

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Speaker 2: never cured a popular vote majority, and I think, you know,

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Speaker 2: in terms of public opinion pulling really never cracked a

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Speaker 2: majority of Americans supporting his presidency. And at the same time,

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Speaker 2: there was a dynamic that occurred in the Senate where

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Speaker 2: Donald Trump's Supreme Court nominees, unlike every nominee in the

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Speaker 2: years past, was unable to secure a majority of Senators

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Speaker 2: to confirm the nomination that he put forward for the

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Speaker 2: Supreme Court, who also represented a majority of Americans, because

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Speaker 2: the Senate has become so malaportioned based on population. And

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Speaker 2: so I think part of the anxiety that you see,

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Speaker 2: particularly from the center, center, left and left of the

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Speaker 2: political spectrum here in the United States, that is a

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Speaker 2: byproduct of the feeling that the Supreme Court is representing

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Speaker 2: minoritarian on minoritarian on minoritarian interests and not in step

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Speaker 2: with kind of the general flow and trajectory of the

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Speaker 2: American body politics, as was the case perhaps in the

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Speaker 2: nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties. So there are similarities in

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Speaker 2: terms of the court reflecting winning coalitions to a certain extent,

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Speaker 2: both between the Warren Court and the Roberts Court. But

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Speaker 2: I think there are also very significant qualitated differences in

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Speaker 2: terms of where we are in the kind of a

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Speaker 2: longer term trajectory in American politics.

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Speaker 1: So let's talk about some of the cases. One of

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Speaker 1: the cases where it seemed to me that politics was

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Speaker 1: blatantly at play was the Idaho abortion case. There were

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Speaker 1: enough justices to place a stay on the district court

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Speaker 1: order so that Idaho could enforce its ban before the decision,

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Speaker 1: but then some of them must have had a change

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Speaker 1: of heart backed off, and in the dissent, Justice Alito

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Speaker 1: seemed to question why, and is the obvious answer the

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Speaker 1: upcoming alone.

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Speaker 2: I think the answer is it was absolutely the election,

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Speaker 2: and it was a feeling by a number of justices

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Speaker 2: on the Court that coming down with a ruling that

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Speaker 2: restricted abortion access further would be electorally damaging to conservatives

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Speaker 2: and Republicans across the country in a very important election cycle.

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Speaker 2: And I think one of the key dynamics here that

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Speaker 2: it's important to note is that this was of course

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Speaker 2: a dig right, so it was dismissed and providently granted,

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Speaker 2: which basically means that at least one of the members

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Speaker 2: who voted to hear the case in the first place

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Speaker 2: so voted to hear, sir, decided that no, they had

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Speaker 2: coal feet and they just didn't want to touch this,

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Speaker 2: And that to me suggests, you know, it was probably

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Speaker 2: not one of the liberals right who would get cold feet,

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Speaker 2: because they would not vote for curt unless they thought

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Speaker 2: they would certainly win, which with this court being as

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Speaker 2: conservative as it is, an anti abortion as it is,

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Speaker 2: you know, that wouldn't be a really safe bet. So

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Speaker 2: it's very like, if not absolutely certainty, that either Justice Barrett,

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Speaker 2: Chief Justice Roberts, or Justice Kavanaugh or in that group

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Speaker 2: who initially decided to hear this case and realize that

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Speaker 2: it was going to go in a way they didn't

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Speaker 2: particularly like, likely for political reasons, and they backed off.

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Speaker 2: And so I think the core disposition here at least

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Speaker 2: among the three more I would say more moderate conservatives.

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Speaker 2: I wouldn't call them moderates, but they're certainly less conservative

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Speaker 2: than say Justice Alito or Justice Thomas. But those three Kavanaugh, Roberts, Barrett,

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Speaker 2: I think hope that either they could pump this off

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Speaker 2: for another time and decide against the federal government during

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Speaker 2: a year that is not an election year, or they

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Speaker 2: could just sit back and hope Donald Trump wins the

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Speaker 2: presidency in November, wait for the Trump administration to reverse

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Speaker 2: course on this policy that bid an administration promulgated, and

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Speaker 2: then they won't have to touch it at all. So

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Speaker 2: this was really politics all the way down.

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Speaker 1: Now, the Eighth Amendment, we don't talk about it all

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Speaker 1: that much in the news, and the ban on cruel

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Speaker 1: and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court seems to often ignore

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Speaker 1: its protections and a lot of times the case is

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Speaker 1: involve criminal laws. But this term there was a case

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Speaker 1: involving homelessness. Tell us about that and what the court

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Speaker 1: did there.

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Speaker 2: So, in a case called City of Grant's Past, the

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Speaker 2: Supreme Court said that it does not violate the Eighth

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Speaker 2: Amendments ban on Cruel and Unusual punishment to essentially criminalize

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Speaker 2: people from camping in public spaces. And the hard part

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Speaker 2: here is that, you know, there's a couple of dynamics

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Speaker 2: that really make this situation agonizing, I think for people

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Speaker 2: who particularly are concerned about unhoused persons. And how you know,

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Speaker 2: we treat homelessness in the United States, which is, you know,

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Speaker 2: a lot of cities create policies and adopt public policies

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Speaker 2: that are not particularly friendly to affordable housing or density

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Speaker 2: which can make housing more available and cheaper and whatnot,

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Speaker 2: which could help ease some of these pressures. And you know,

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Speaker 2: cities also seem to be really resistant in many respects

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Speaker 2: to provide adequate services. And so you know, cities make

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Speaker 2: these deliberate policies which make it harder for people to

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Speaker 2: secure housing or to seek temporary shelter. But then at

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Speaker 2: the same time, say you can't just sleep outside, you

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Speaker 2: can't put up a tent, or we're going to basically

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Speaker 2: criminalize your essential existence as an unhoused person. And so

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Speaker 2: in this respect, the policy choices of cities is really

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Speaker 2: a way to kind of crown people and push them

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Speaker 2: out of their jurisdiction and say you're someone else's problem now,

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Speaker 2: and that puts people in a really tough bind and

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Speaker 2: it's really hard to get out, and so you know,

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Speaker 2: the majority basically said, well, you know, this is not

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Speaker 2: a problem, like you essentially have choices here as a person,

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Speaker 2: and that's that there's no constitutional refuge or shield here

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Speaker 2: under the Eighth Amendment. Whereas I think that the centers

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Speaker 2: understood the bind that people face in these very tough situations.

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Speaker 2: I think what's telling in some respects, at least for

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Speaker 2: me as a scholar of political history and particularly somebody

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Speaker 2: who is focused on reconstruction. You know, so much of

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Speaker 2: this court is hell bent on originalist principles. And it's

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Speaker 2: kind of ironic because, you know, if you look back

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Speaker 2: to the eighteen sixties when zoadical Republicans were running the

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Speaker 2: show and reconstruction was on their mind, and the Fourteenth

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Speaker 2: Amendment came into play, as did the forerunner to the

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Speaker 2: Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of eighteen sixty six.

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Speaker 2: These lost many respects for us to push back on

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Speaker 2: seven states which use vacancy walls, which were very similar

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Speaker 2: right to what is that play here in the City

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Speaker 2: of Grant Pass case, and basically track people either you know,

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Speaker 2: working on certain plantations or working in certain conditions kind

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Speaker 2: of fleeing the jurisdiction. And the huge part one of

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Speaker 2: the pushback against that was that people should have freedom

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Speaker 2: of movement. And you know, there were certainly people who

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Speaker 2: also thought that there was a requirement and an obligation

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Speaker 2: on government to provide some kind of basic social safety net.

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Speaker 2: And this is a particularly important point that reconstruction legislators

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Speaker 2: in South Carolina made in the late eighteen sixties and

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Speaker 2: or only eighteen seventies. But there's no originalism here, right,

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Speaker 2: There's kind of no originalism for folks who are poor.

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Speaker 2: And I think that's really kind of telling in some

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Speaker 2: respects about what this court is doing. It's not some

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Speaker 2: kind of neutral jurisprudential decision making. They make decisions on

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Speaker 2: an ad hoc basis, implementing whatever kind of constitutional tools

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Speaker 2: of interpretation they want as they see fit. There's really

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Speaker 2: no rhyme or reason to it other than they see

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Speaker 2: an issue and they craft a rule based on what

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Speaker 2: they viscerally and politically feel is the right outcome.

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Speaker 1: Coming up next on the Bloomberg Lawn Show, what happened

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Speaker 1: to the Chief Justice being an institutionalist who believed in

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Speaker 1: judges only calling balls and strikes. I'm June Grosso and

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Speaker 1: you're listening to Bloomberg. The Supreme Court's fractured decision in

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Speaker 1: an important gun rights case. This term shows the justices

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Speaker 1: can't quite agree on how to use history and tradition

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Speaker 1: to analyze the constitutionality of firearm restrictions. The eight to

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Speaker 1: one ruling in the Rahemi case, which upheld a federal

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Speaker 1: law that bans people's subject to domestic violence restraining orders

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Speaker 1: from possessing a gun, elicited separate writings from seven of

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Speaker 1: the nine justices. Concurrences on both sides of the ideological

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Speaker 1: line show there's a rigorous debate going on over the

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Speaker 1: legal theory of originalism, which the Court's conservative majority has embraced.

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Speaker 1: I've been talking to Anthony Michael Christ, a professor at

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Speaker 1: the Georgia State University College of Law. Do you think,

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Speaker 1: not only in this case, but in other cases, it's

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Speaker 1: sort of exposed the problems with originalism and riffs among

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Speaker 1: the conservatives about originalism especially. I think it showed in

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Speaker 1: the Raheemi case. I think, where you know, what is it?

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Speaker 1: Everyone has a different you know, not everyone, but there

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Speaker 1: are so many different opinions what is originalism?

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Speaker 2: I think the Rahemi case is really telling in some respects.

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Speaker 2: It's ironic to me that Justice Tummas, who wrote the

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Speaker 2: decision a couple of years ago in Bruin which was

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Speaker 2: this right revolutionary Second Amendment case, basically was a loan

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Speaker 2: to center in Rahimi and said, well, you don't really

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Speaker 2: understand what I wrote. And so you know that that

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Speaker 2: kind of undercuts the whole point of originalism, right when

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Speaker 2: you have the author of an opinion that received majority

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Speaker 2: vote by members of the United States Supreme Court saying

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Speaker 2: to other people in the Supreme Court you don't understand

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Speaker 2: just a couple of years later what I actually meant

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Speaker 2: kind of ironically undercuts originalism and its alleged integrity as

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Speaker 2: a tool of interpretation. But I think the other thing

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Speaker 2: is that it has shown some crack in that people

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Speaker 2: have understood that originalism has applied in a very strict

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Speaker 2: and narrow sense, had unworkable and untenable outcome. And I think, frankly,

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Speaker 2: the fact that the justices all raandly rejected this idea

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Speaker 2: that the Second Amendment should somehow protect domestic abusers and

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Speaker 2: allow them to have weapons. You know, most people in

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Speaker 2: the United States, I think, would say they agree that

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Speaker 2: that should not be the case. But if you applied

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Speaker 2: just to Thomas's tests that he articulated a couple of

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Speaker 2: years ago in a truly faithful way, the outcome would

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Speaker 2: have been different. And so I think the Rashini case

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Speaker 2: in some respects illustrates how there's this kind of roving

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Speaker 2: attempt by a number of the members of the Court

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Speaker 2: to apply originalism where it works for them, and to

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Speaker 2: kind of push back a bit where it doesn't. And that, again,

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Speaker 2: I think truly is astonishing for a group of people

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Speaker 2: who suggest that originalism is the one, only and true

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Speaker 2: way to interpret the Constitution.

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Speaker 1: And you point out that there were cases where the

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Speaker 1: Court sort of applied lenient statutory interpretations to benefit, for example,

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Speaker 1: the January sixth defendants and white collar criminals.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, so to me, one of the interesting cases that

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Speaker 2: the Supreme Court decided was a case dealing with January

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Speaker 2: sixth defendants called Fisher. And in Fisher, there was again

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Speaker 2: it can just catch all phrase that if you apply

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Speaker 2: it a very strict form of textualism that somebody like

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Speaker 2: Neil Gorsuch would often propose as being his preferred way

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Speaker 2: of statutory interpretation, he makes sure have come out with

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Speaker 2: a different outcome that didn't favor the January sixth defendants.

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Speaker 2: And so I think there are a lot of people,

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Speaker 2: myself included, who may say that that decision of Fisher,

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Speaker 2: as a matter of statutory interpretation, it might make sense,

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Speaker 2: it might not. There might be some reasonable disagreement about

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Speaker 2: what that decision should have looked like. But the decision itself,

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Speaker 2: here's kind of the veil of legislative intent and legislative

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Speaker 2: history in order to reach an outcome, and there are

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Speaker 2: a number of justices who sign onto the opinion who

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Speaker 2: generally reject that as an approach to interpreting a statute.

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Speaker 2: And so I think one of the things that is

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Speaker 2: something we should debate perhaps is whether or not these

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Speaker 2: justices are being principled or whether they are again just

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Speaker 2: kind of approaching these cases like lack a mole and

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Speaker 2: hitting the kind of originalist opportunities where they come up

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Speaker 2: and avoid them where that kind of approach doesn't really

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Speaker 2: work for the outcomes that they truly desire. And so

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Speaker 2: I think the real questions that arose out of this

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Speaker 2: term cases which really is ripe for debate about whether

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Speaker 2: or not the justices are being true in terms of

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Speaker 2: adhering to this kind of principle or this kind of

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Speaker 2: theory or kind of pool of interpretation uniformally, no matter

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Speaker 2: what the out I think they're often disingenuous in that respect.

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Speaker 1: So along that line, when Trump was contesting the election

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Speaker 1: in twenty twenty, it seemed like the court didn't do

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Speaker 1: him any favors, but this term they gave him everything

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Speaker 1: he wanted. In more, you mentioned the January sixth case.

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Speaker 1: There was that incredibly broad ruling on presidential immunity. They

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Speaker 1: refused to allow Colorado officials to remove him from the ballot.

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Speaker 1: What happened? Why did they go so far to try

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Speaker 1: to insulate Trump?

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Speaker 2: I think the big difference is that many people fell

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Speaker 2: in twenty twenty that President Trump at the time had

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Speaker 2: very weak political standing. There was a sense that there

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Speaker 2: was going to be a total, perhaps landslide in favor

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Speaker 2: of Joe Biden, and that of course didn't really happen.

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Speaker 2: The election was much close, or I think most people anticipated,

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Speaker 2: and that was both of the presidential election but also

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Speaker 2: in terms of the Senate and the House of representative

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Speaker 2: of results as well, but there was a sense that

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Speaker 2: that was probably going to come to pass. And even

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Speaker 2: when it didn't come to pass, at that point, Donald

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Speaker 2: Trump had lost and so the wins in his sales

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Speaker 2: were completely disflated, and so there really was no benefit

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Speaker 2: to the Supreme Court to go out of their way

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Speaker 2: to help Donald Trump. And if they did, that would

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Speaker 2: also severely risk their own institutional capital. And that's not true. Now.

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Speaker 2: Now you have a resurgent Trump. You have an income

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Speaker 2: president who very well may beat Donald Trump, but who

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Speaker 2: seems to be a little weaker than what most incumbents

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Speaker 2: would want to be at this point in the presidential race.

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Speaker 2: And they also don't want to risk the ire of

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Speaker 2: Donald Trump should Donald Trump win the election in November,

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Speaker 2: And so you know, that's all kind of in that mix.

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Speaker 2: And then of course they're the Conservatives are looking up

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Speaker 2: for their own interest I suspect, which is they would

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Speaker 2: much rather have a seven to two, eight one nine

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Speaker 2: zero conservative Supreme Court if they could have it, and

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Speaker 2: not having a Republican win in November makes it less

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Speaker 2: likely that there will be more Conservatives on the Court

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Speaker 2: a few years from now than there are today. So

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Speaker 2: there are a number of different issues that are at play,

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Speaker 2: but I certainly think that some of the change in

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Speaker 2: tone is political. And I also think though that some

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Speaker 2: of the key issues, for example, the Presidential Community case,

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Speaker 2: the number of members of this Court have truly believed

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Speaker 2: in a doctrine that has empowered the executive. They believe

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Speaker 2: in a unitary executive. They believe that the president should

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Speaker 2: have the power to really wrestle control of administrative agencies

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Speaker 2: and change policy as they see fit in things of

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Speaker 2: that nature. And so to the extent too, that they

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Speaker 2: could write an opinion that is reflective of their very

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Speaker 2: long standing ideological commitments in consolidating executive power and do

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Speaker 2: so in a way that could at least temporarily, if

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Speaker 2: not long term, benefit Trump as perhaps the preferred presidential

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Speaker 2: candidate they're going to do. So.

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Speaker 1: You mentioned the administrative state basically, and the administrative state

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Speaker 1: took hit after hit from the Court this term, and

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Speaker 1: now with its decisions, it places power in the federal

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Speaker 1: judiciary rather than in experts and agencies. So are we

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Speaker 1: bound to see decisions based on the political views of

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Speaker 1: federal judges more and more now that they don't have

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Speaker 1: to worry about Chevron deference.

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Speaker 2: I think it's possible that you could see that there

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Speaker 2: is I think, to some extent, a somewhat limiting factor here,

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Speaker 2: which is there will be times, perhaps where judges will

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Speaker 2: be a little squeamish of wading into a particular policy

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Speaker 2: and pushing back against it because they just don't have

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Speaker 2: the kind of capacity in terms of technical expertise to

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Speaker 2: do so. There will be other areas, I think this

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Speaker 2: is particularly true in environmental policy perhaps, but there will

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Speaker 2: be other areas where judges will feel a lot more

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Speaker 2: comfortable stepping in and pushing back against administrative state. But

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Speaker 2: when that does happen, and when judges do feel comfortable

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Speaker 2: and more at ease to inquire into the rationality of

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Speaker 2: a particular agency's policy, you know, certainly when you're asking

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Speaker 2: something rational or you know something kind of passle sness test,

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Speaker 2: you know, whatever, the test that eventually gets developed, because

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Speaker 2: of course we have a rule from the local right case,

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Speaker 2: but we don't really know how it's going to be

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Speaker 2: fleshed out over time. I think there is a lot

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Speaker 2: more room perhaps for mischief now where a judge's personal

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Speaker 2: policy preferences will be easily substituted for whatever the inmistry

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Speaker 2: of agency wants to do. So certainly that is a risk,

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Speaker 2: but I do think that we'll have to wait and

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Speaker 2: see for the next few years how this all shaked out.

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Speaker 1: Over time, the Chief Justice John Roberts, he used to care,

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Speaker 1: or he seemed to care, about the public's view of

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Speaker 1: the Court, about the Court as an institution, claiming, you know,

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Speaker 1: justices are not politicians, that they're just calling balls and strikes.

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Speaker 1: What do you think happened this term that he seemed

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Speaker 1: to throw away that concern.

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Speaker 2: That's a good question. I think for a long time,

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Speaker 2: Justice Roberts was dealing with a court that was really

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Speaker 2: straddling an ideological lead avoid a bit where any case

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Speaker 2: could come out five to four. Really truly, before Donald

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Speaker 2: Trump took office, you know, the Supreme Court was still

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Speaker 2: incredibly conservative. Even though it had a lot more ideological

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Speaker 2: diversity on it, the court was certainly right of center.

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Speaker 2: And you know, when Justice Kennedy left the bench a

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Speaker 2: couple of years into Donald Trump's term, you know, the

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Speaker 2: court went vastly right ward. But I think despite the

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Speaker 2: Court's conservative dynamics before the Trump innistriction, John Roberts still

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Speaker 2: had to cobble together coalitions, and I think that there

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Speaker 2: was a sense that the American public was becoming increasingly liberal,

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Speaker 2: especially on social issues and some of these kind of

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Speaker 2: hot button issues that were very salient during the Aboma administration.

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Speaker 2: I think there was a sense that he really had

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Speaker 2: to keep together a coalition of five and so there

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Speaker 2: might be some internal judicial politics at play there. It's

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Speaker 2: really hard to say, but I think what we can

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Speaker 2: for certain day is that he has seen, for whatever reason,

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Speaker 2: the Court, you know, in his view, needs and can

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Speaker 2: take a sharp turn. Right now, it's hard to understand exactly,

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Speaker 2: I think without the perspective of more time to kind

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Speaker 2: of grasp exactly what's happened there, but there is I

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Speaker 2: think a noticeable shift in the Chief Justices perspective on

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Speaker 2: the Court as an institution, in the institutional capital that

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Speaker 2: it had. There are some risks to that. I think

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Speaker 2: that opens up the Court to a lot more political

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Speaker 2: tax you know, and so we'll have to see if

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Speaker 2: that works out to his benefit in the longer term.

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Speaker 1: So, as you point out, the conservatives have played a

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Speaker 1: long game with the Supreme Court. So at this point,

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Speaker 1: what is it that liberals or those in the center

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Speaker 1: can do because the court is what the court is,

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Speaker 1: and it's in power, and can anything be done.

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Speaker 2: I think the lessons of liberals is that there needs

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Speaker 2: to be a long game played in a way that

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Speaker 2: is somewhat similar to what conservatives did in the late

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Speaker 2: nineteen seventies and kind of hyper charge in the early

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Speaker 2: nineteen eighties. Liberals don't have. I mean, there's certainly the

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Speaker 2: American Constitution Society, which folks may be familiar with, which

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Speaker 2: is in many respects kind of a liberal version of

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Speaker 2: the Federalist Society, which many people are familiar with. But

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Speaker 2: the Federal Society is a really powerful organization that began

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Speaker 2: as a small conference at Yale in nineteen eighty two.

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Speaker 2: A lot of work had to be put in by

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Speaker 2: conservatives and libertarians into that organization to get it in

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Speaker 2: a place where it's kind of at the center of power. Right.

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Speaker 2: It took forty years to be at the true center

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Speaker 2: of power, but it really was a very important institution

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Speaker 2: in terms of developing lawyers into judges and putting people

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Speaker 2: into places political power, and being a truly important center

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Speaker 2: for networking and the spread of ideas that would later

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Speaker 2: become by constitutional law. The liberals, I think, need to

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Speaker 2: understand that that kind of organizational power, that kind of

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Speaker 2: structural political force, is required in order to make the

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Speaker 2: law turn left. So they're going to have to create

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Speaker 2: those organizations or invest in the ones that already exist,

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Speaker 2: and understand that that is a long term investment. At

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Speaker 2: the same time, I think a lot of liberals have

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Speaker 2: been kind of deluded for years by the war in

436
00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:02,080
Speaker 2: court in particular, even that Court will save us right,

437
00:26:02,119 --> 00:26:05,040
Speaker 2: that there's some kind of liberal value in the American

438
00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:09,280
Speaker 2: constitutional order as embodies by the courts in the nineteen

439
00:26:09,320 --> 00:26:12,040
Speaker 2: fifties and nineteen sixties, that is going to kind of

440
00:26:12,080 --> 00:26:15,480
Speaker 2: live on in perpetuity. And that's just not the case.

441
00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:20,119
Speaker 2: Constitutional law begins at the ballot box, and in particular,

442
00:26:20,280 --> 00:26:24,439
Speaker 2: begins at the ballot box in presidential election years. And

443
00:26:24,480 --> 00:26:27,560
Speaker 2: so I think for folks who look at the Court's

444
00:26:27,560 --> 00:26:31,280
Speaker 2: conservatism and are kind of struck by it as being

445
00:26:31,640 --> 00:26:35,200
Speaker 2: bad for the United States or reflecting values that they

446
00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:38,240
Speaker 2: disagree with, then the response has to be to create

447
00:26:38,400 --> 00:26:42,760
Speaker 2: organizations and the kind of structural political forces to push

448
00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:47,239
Speaker 2: back against that and to invest in electoral politics. And

449
00:26:47,280 --> 00:26:50,959
Speaker 2: that's really important. Courts don't operate in their kind of independent,

450
00:26:51,000 --> 00:26:55,640
Speaker 2: isolated sphere. They are truly part of a broader political atmosphere.

451
00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:57,439
Speaker 1: Thanks so much for being on the show and sharing

452
00:26:57,480 --> 00:27:01,960
Speaker 1: your insights about this term, Professor Anthony Michael Christ of

453
00:27:02,000 --> 00:27:05,760
Speaker 1: the Georgia State University College of Law. Coming up next,

454
00:27:06,040 --> 00:27:09,000
Speaker 1: the corruption trial of Senator Bob Menendez is coming to

455
00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:13,199
Speaker 1: a close. This is Bloomberg. In eight weeks of trial,

456
00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:17,240
Speaker 1: the government has presented a sprawling case against Democratic Senator

457
00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:21,720
Speaker 1: Bob Menendez, with testimony from a cooperating witness and more

458
00:27:21,760 --> 00:27:26,040
Speaker 1: than a thousand pieces of evidence, including thirteen goal bars,

459
00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:30,960
Speaker 1: five hundred thousand dollars in cash, and a secret FBI videotape.

460
00:27:31,320 --> 00:27:35,399
Speaker 1: Federal prosecutors say Menendez put his power up for sale,

461
00:27:35,760 --> 00:27:39,439
Speaker 1: pursuing bribes for years while promising to use his power

462
00:27:39,720 --> 00:27:42,359
Speaker 1: to help those who paid him, in a clear pattern

463
00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:46,240
Speaker 1: of corruption. The defense says prosecutors have not come close

464
00:27:46,280 --> 00:27:49,080
Speaker 1: to meeting their burden of showing the gold or cash

465
00:27:49,320 --> 00:27:52,160
Speaker 1: was given as a bribe. The seventy year old senator

466
00:27:52,200 --> 00:27:57,119
Speaker 1: is accused of bribery, extortion, fraud, conspiracy, obstruction of justice,

467
00:27:57,400 --> 00:28:00,159
Speaker 1: and acting as a foreign agent of Egypt and he

468
00:28:00,200 --> 00:28:04,040
Speaker 1: faces decades in prison if convicted. Join me from the

469
00:28:04,040 --> 00:28:08,000
Speaker 1: courthouse is Bloomberg Legal reporter David Voriancis, who's been covering

470
00:28:08,040 --> 00:28:11,480
Speaker 1: the trial. David tell us about the prosecution's theory of

471
00:28:11,520 --> 00:28:11,960
Speaker 1: the case.

472
00:28:12,480 --> 00:28:17,760
Speaker 3: The prosecution theory is that Senator Robert Menendez engaged in

473
00:28:17,800 --> 00:28:22,199
Speaker 3: a five year bribery scheme with his wife, who was

474
00:28:22,840 --> 00:28:25,920
Speaker 3: his girlfriend for much of the period, and with two

475
00:28:26,600 --> 00:28:31,639
Speaker 3: New Jersey businessmen who paid him bribes in exchange or

476
00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:37,000
Speaker 3: official actions. They also say that Menendez acted as an

477
00:28:37,119 --> 00:28:42,120
Speaker 3: agent of the nation of Egypt, taking several actions or

478
00:28:42,160 --> 00:28:46,400
Speaker 3: promising to take several official actions that would benefit that country.

479
00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:51,760
Speaker 3: They say that Menendez also obstructed justice when his lawyers

480
00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:55,120
Speaker 3: tried to head off an indictment before it happened by

481
00:28:55,240 --> 00:28:58,680
Speaker 3: lying to prosecutors about some of the underlying facts of

482
00:28:58,720 --> 00:29:04,680
Speaker 3: the case. And they say that Menendez was quite sophisticated

483
00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:08,760
Speaker 3: and cunning in the way that he acted over several years,

484
00:29:09,280 --> 00:29:14,040
Speaker 3: never being too obvious or overt in his demands, but

485
00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:19,320
Speaker 3: always taking money, particularly when his wife Nadine needed it.

486
00:29:19,720 --> 00:29:24,520
Speaker 1: What was the strongest evidence the prosecution had against Menendez?

487
00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:26,040
Speaker 2: In your view, I thought.

488
00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:29,920
Speaker 3: They did an excellent job of building a circumstantial case

489
00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:36,719
Speaker 3: that married the timing of various texts, emails, actions, meetings,

490
00:29:36,960 --> 00:29:43,120
Speaker 3: photographs with what they say were bribes received by Menendez

491
00:29:43,280 --> 00:29:47,240
Speaker 3: and official actions or the promise of official actions that

492
00:29:47,360 --> 00:29:52,240
Speaker 3: he took. So they built three different long summary charts

493
00:29:52,600 --> 00:29:57,400
Speaker 3: that FBI officials introduced to the jury, and that was

494
00:29:57,480 --> 00:30:01,640
Speaker 3: their way of bringing in literally hundreds of texts and

495
00:30:01,760 --> 00:30:05,880
Speaker 3: emails that showed over a five year period. This is

496
00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:09,760
Speaker 3: what Menendez was thinking, This is what Nadine Arslanian later

497
00:30:09,920 --> 00:30:14,280
Speaker 3: his wife Nadine Menendez was thinking. This is what Fred

498
00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:18,040
Speaker 3: Bavies and Will Hannah, who our defendants were doing, and

499
00:30:18,160 --> 00:30:21,680
Speaker 3: a whole long list of characters that are also involved

500
00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:23,040
Speaker 3: in this case in some way.

501
00:30:23,680 --> 00:30:27,400
Speaker 1: How much depends on the testimony of the witness who

502
00:30:27,480 --> 00:30:29,080
Speaker 1: flipped Jose Rebey.

503
00:30:29,480 --> 00:30:32,920
Speaker 3: It depends on who you ask. If prosecutors say that

504
00:30:33,040 --> 00:30:37,800
Speaker 3: they built a strong, essentially bullet proof case that does

505
00:30:37,880 --> 00:30:43,480
Speaker 3: not rely heavily on Uribe, who's a former insurance broker

506
00:30:43,560 --> 00:30:47,080
Speaker 3: from New Jersey who treated guilty to Thriving Menendez and

507
00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:51,360
Speaker 3: testified against them for several days. Prossecuers believed that they

508
00:30:51,520 --> 00:30:55,400
Speaker 3: corroborated his account at every step of the way. On

509
00:30:55,440 --> 00:30:59,080
Speaker 3: the other hand, Menendez his lawyers say that prosecutors are

510
00:30:59,160 --> 00:31:03,960
Speaker 3: quite reliant on Uribe, who is a serial liar, who

511
00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:10,200
Speaker 3: fabricated conversations to make Menendez look bad, and who can't

512
00:31:10,240 --> 00:31:13,800
Speaker 3: be trusted, and because he can't be trusted, the government's

513
00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:15,320
Speaker 3: case can't be trusted either.

514
00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:20,560
Speaker 1: There were some heavy hitters that testified against Menendez, including

515
00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:23,360
Speaker 1: the New Jersey Attorney General at the time and the

516
00:31:23,400 --> 00:31:25,320
Speaker 1: top federal prosecutor in New Jersey.

517
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:31,000
Speaker 3: Right the former New Jersey Attorney General, Gerber Greywall, who

518
00:31:31,040 --> 00:31:34,400
Speaker 3: is now the Enforcement director at the Securities in Exchange Commission,

519
00:31:35,080 --> 00:31:38,960
Speaker 3: testified about a phone call and a meeting that he

520
00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:44,600
Speaker 3: had with Menendez in twenty nineteen that prosecutors say, you

521
00:31:44,640 --> 00:31:47,920
Speaker 3: know was part of the Bride Grey scheme. Jurors also

522
00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:51,920
Speaker 3: heard from Philip Spellinger, who's the current US Attorney in

523
00:31:52,000 --> 00:31:55,640
Speaker 3: New Jersey, which makes him the top law enforcement official

524
00:31:55,680 --> 00:31:59,000
Speaker 3: in the state. And they also heard from an undersecretary

525
00:31:59,120 --> 00:32:04,000
Speaker 3: former undersecret carry at the US Department of Agriculture about

526
00:32:04,000 --> 00:32:07,800
Speaker 3: a similar phone call that he took from Menendez in

527
00:32:07,880 --> 00:32:13,040
Speaker 3: which he said the senator asked him to drop an

528
00:32:13,080 --> 00:32:18,440
Speaker 3: effort to get Egypt, to abandon a monopoly that one

529
00:32:18,480 --> 00:32:22,760
Speaker 3: of the defendants had in Egypt, or meet in sections

530
00:32:22,840 --> 00:32:24,440
Speaker 3: under the Holal standards.

531
00:32:24,720 --> 00:32:29,840
Speaker 1: We've talked before about the physical evidence of those gold

532
00:32:29,840 --> 00:32:33,480
Speaker 1: bars and the five hundred thousand dollars in cash, How

533
00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:35,640
Speaker 1: does the defense explain.

534
00:32:35,200 --> 00:32:38,560
Speaker 3: That The defense sent a great deal of time and

535
00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:42,720
Speaker 3: inflammation trying to explain the gold bars and the cash.

536
00:32:43,400 --> 00:32:47,120
Speaker 3: On the cash, they said that the prosecutors failed to

537
00:32:47,160 --> 00:32:51,239
Speaker 3: show that there's a connection between that currency that was

538
00:32:51,280 --> 00:32:54,560
Speaker 3: found in the Menendez house in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

539
00:32:54,680 --> 00:32:58,360
Speaker 3: by the FBI, and any actions that he took as

540
00:32:58,400 --> 00:33:02,320
Speaker 3: a senator. They also say that Menendez had a long

541
00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:07,320
Speaker 3: standing habit inskilled in him by his Cuban refugee family,

542
00:33:08,000 --> 00:33:13,320
Speaker 3: of taking out cash regularly from his bank account and

543
00:33:13,480 --> 00:33:17,680
Speaker 3: essentially affording it, and that's how they can explain away

544
00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:20,920
Speaker 3: a great deal of the cash. They also say that

545
00:33:20,960 --> 00:33:25,520
Speaker 3: the gold bars were given to Nadine, his wife, without

546
00:33:25,600 --> 00:33:28,560
Speaker 3: his knowledge, and that he had nothing to do with

547
00:33:28,640 --> 00:33:33,120
Speaker 3: the gold bars, so they have a number of explanations.

548
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:37,520
Speaker 3: They also acknowledge that this is a difficult part of

549
00:33:37,560 --> 00:33:40,320
Speaker 3: the case for the defense. They say that it is

550
00:33:40,400 --> 00:33:43,200
Speaker 3: really the heart of the government's case and that if

551
00:33:43,320 --> 00:33:47,880
Speaker 3: jurors will be patient and listen to their explanation, that

552
00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:50,600
Speaker 3: the prosecution case just falls apart.

553
00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:54,400
Speaker 1: David, I mean, is their main defense saying that the

554
00:33:54,440 --> 00:33:58,560
Speaker 1: prosecution has improven things beyond a reasonable doubt or do

555
00:33:58,640 --> 00:34:00,880
Speaker 1: they have an affirmative defense?

556
00:34:01,400 --> 00:34:04,560
Speaker 3: They say there's an absence of evidence that they have

557
00:34:04,720 --> 00:34:08,120
Speaker 3: not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. They also

558
00:34:08,280 --> 00:34:13,680
Speaker 3: say prosecutors failed to show that Menendez either promised to

559
00:34:13,719 --> 00:34:18,320
Speaker 3: take official action or actually took official action. And you know,

560
00:34:18,440 --> 00:34:21,840
Speaker 3: they've attacked the way that the prosecutors put the case

561
00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:27,040
Speaker 3: together using these massive summary charts, the texts and emails

562
00:34:27,080 --> 00:34:31,239
Speaker 3: and phone calls and meetings, saying that they're asking the

563
00:34:31,320 --> 00:34:35,680
Speaker 3: jury to go too far to draw negative inferences without

564
00:34:35,719 --> 00:34:38,920
Speaker 3: having direct proof of any wrongdoings.

565
00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:44,200
Speaker 1: So Menendez's wife is being tried separately, which is like

566
00:34:44,239 --> 00:34:46,720
Speaker 1: a gift to Menandez in the case because it allows

567
00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:49,800
Speaker 1: him to point at someone who's not in the courtroom

568
00:34:49,840 --> 00:34:53,560
Speaker 1: as a possible culprit. Where does the wife fit in

569
00:34:53,560 --> 00:34:54,520
Speaker 1: in the defense view?

570
00:34:54,840 --> 00:34:58,239
Speaker 3: Maybe Menendez is not at the trial because she has

571
00:34:58,360 --> 00:35:02,640
Speaker 3: breast cancer and is getting treatment for that. The prosecutors

572
00:35:02,680 --> 00:35:08,799
Speaker 3: see her as a critical go between who facilitated conversations

573
00:35:08,800 --> 00:35:14,600
Speaker 3: and bribes between Bob Menendez and the businessman who bribed him.

574
00:35:14,880 --> 00:35:20,080
Speaker 3: The defense have used her as a fall person to

575
00:35:20,239 --> 00:35:25,840
Speaker 3: blame for many of the actions that prosecutors say were criminal,

576
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:32,200
Speaker 3: and they essentially say that Nadine held critical information from

577
00:35:32,400 --> 00:35:37,000
Speaker 3: Bob about the poor state of her finances and the

578
00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:39,719
Speaker 3: gifts that she received from those businessmen.

579
00:35:40,360 --> 00:35:43,040
Speaker 1: I thought it was interesting. At one point he summoned

580
00:35:43,040 --> 00:35:46,799
Speaker 1: her with a bell, and the prosecution used that to

581
00:35:46,880 --> 00:35:49,359
Speaker 1: show that he was the one in charge. Tell us

582
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:50,840
Speaker 1: about that bell ringing.

583
00:35:52,239 --> 00:35:52,439
Speaker 2: Right.

584
00:35:53,000 --> 00:35:56,479
Speaker 3: There was a critical meeting on the patio at ten

585
00:35:56,560 --> 00:36:02,680
Speaker 3: pm on September evening behind the house of the Menendez

586
00:36:02,800 --> 00:36:07,960
Speaker 3: is where the businessman who pleated guilty, Jose Uribe, met

587
00:36:07,960 --> 00:36:13,319
Speaker 3: with Menendez, and prosecutors say and Uriba testify that he

588
00:36:13,360 --> 00:36:18,520
Speaker 3: gave critical details to Menendez about what he should say

589
00:36:18,600 --> 00:36:21,040
Speaker 3: to the new Jersey Attorney General at the time of

590
00:36:21,520 --> 00:36:24,920
Speaker 3: gray Wall. The two men were sitting on the patio

591
00:36:25,040 --> 00:36:28,720
Speaker 3: for an hour, according to the testimony, drinking Grand Marnier,

592
00:36:29,480 --> 00:36:35,160
Speaker 3: smoking cigars, and Menendez needed to write down some information

593
00:36:36,080 --> 00:36:39,880
Speaker 3: and this was a colorful part of the trial. According

594
00:36:39,880 --> 00:36:43,560
Speaker 3: to Eurebe, Menendez picked up a bell and rang it

595
00:36:43,680 --> 00:36:46,680
Speaker 3: to summon his wife, who came out with a piece

596
00:36:46,680 --> 00:36:47,879
Speaker 3: of paper, and.

597
00:36:47,800 --> 00:36:50,719
Speaker 1: The prosecution said the bell showed that he was the

598
00:36:50,800 --> 00:36:53,840
Speaker 1: person in charge, not a puppet having his strings pulled

599
00:36:53,840 --> 00:36:56,680
Speaker 1: by someone else. You know, we had talked before about

600
00:36:56,719 --> 00:36:59,920
Speaker 1: whether Menendez would testify or not, and I thought he

601
00:37:00,320 --> 00:37:03,240
Speaker 1: to try to counter some of the evidence and perhaps

602
00:37:03,320 --> 00:37:06,640
Speaker 1: went over a juror or two get a hung jury.

603
00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:10,000
Speaker 1: Did the defense mention at all why he didn't testify it?

604
00:37:10,239 --> 00:37:14,960
Speaker 3: Menenda said outside the courthouse after he announced he was

605
00:37:14,960 --> 00:37:19,360
Speaker 3: in testifying that he felt that the prosecutors had not

606
00:37:19,600 --> 00:37:22,920
Speaker 3: proved their case, so he was essentially saying there was

607
00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:28,239
Speaker 3: no need for his testimony because they failed to prove

608
00:37:28,360 --> 00:37:31,680
Speaker 3: the unreasonable doubt that he engaged in all this criminal conduct.

609
00:37:32,360 --> 00:37:37,200
Speaker 1: He's accused of bribery, extortion, fraud, conspiracy, obstruction of justice,

610
00:37:37,239 --> 00:37:40,040
Speaker 1: and acting as a foreign agent of Egypt. If he

611
00:37:40,360 --> 00:37:43,480
Speaker 1: falls on one, will he fall on all of them?

612
00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:46,880
Speaker 1: Or are their unique circumstances for some of those charges.

613
00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:51,279
Speaker 3: I think what is going to make this case difficult

614
00:37:51,520 --> 00:37:54,400
Speaker 3: for the jury to judge is there are a number

615
00:37:54,520 --> 00:37:59,880
Speaker 3: of separate plots alleged by the government. There's overlapping evidence

616
00:38:00,080 --> 00:38:04,600
Speaker 3: and intersecting points and players. But this is going to

617
00:38:04,600 --> 00:38:08,080
Speaker 3: be a difficult job for the jury to weigh all

618
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:12,319
Speaker 3: these different criminal charges against three defendants. I think it's

619
00:38:12,320 --> 00:38:14,280
Speaker 3: going to take them a while to reach a verdict.

620
00:38:14,640 --> 00:38:16,560
Speaker 1: There's also thirteen hundred.

621
00:38:16,280 --> 00:38:20,360
Speaker 3: Exhibits, at least thirteen hundred. There's a lot of evidence

622
00:38:20,480 --> 00:38:24,600
Speaker 3: to go through. The prosecutors took nearly six hours in

623
00:38:24,680 --> 00:38:30,120
Speaker 3: their initial closing argument. Menendez's lawyer took at least five hours.

624
00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:33,839
Speaker 3: There's a couple more closing arguments than the prosecutors get

625
00:38:33,880 --> 00:38:38,040
Speaker 3: a rebuttal case again, and then there's a fairly complex

626
00:38:38,600 --> 00:38:41,480
Speaker 3: set of legal instructions that the judge has to give

627
00:38:41,560 --> 00:38:43,880
Speaker 3: to the jury. Now this is a jury that was

628
00:38:43,960 --> 00:38:47,399
Speaker 3: told that the case would last six weeks, and now

629
00:38:47,440 --> 00:38:50,520
Speaker 3: we're almost into our ninth week of the trial.

630
00:38:51,120 --> 00:38:53,800
Speaker 1: Well, I know you will be there until the bitter end. David,

631
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:58,880
Speaker 1: thanks so much. That's Bloomberg Legal reporter David Voriacis. In

632
00:38:58,920 --> 00:39:03,240
Speaker 1: other legal news today, Arcago's Capital Management founder Bill Huang

633
00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:07,080
Speaker 1: was found guilty of criminal charges stemming from his firm's

634
00:39:07,160 --> 00:39:11,040
Speaker 1: twenty twenty one collapse. Concluding a two month trial that

635
00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:15,239
Speaker 1: captivated Wall Street, the jury delivered verdicts against Wang and

636
00:39:15,320 --> 00:39:20,520
Speaker 1: his co defendant, former Archagos CFO Patrick Halligan. Both men

637
00:39:20,560 --> 00:39:24,640
Speaker 1: were convicted of defrauding Arcago's counterparties like Credit Suisse and

638
00:39:24,800 --> 00:39:28,600
Speaker 1: UBS by lying to them about the firm's trading activity

639
00:39:28,840 --> 00:39:31,920
Speaker 1: and the level of risk in its portfolio. Wang was

640
00:39:31,960 --> 00:39:38,080
Speaker 1: separately found guilty of manipulating several stocks, including the former ViacomCBS,

641
00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:41,960
Speaker 1: though he was acquitted with regard to one stock. Both

642
00:39:42,040 --> 00:39:47,200
Speaker 1: men were also convicted of participating in racketeering conspiracy. Each

643
00:39:47,280 --> 00:39:51,400
Speaker 1: count theoretically carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.

644
00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:55,400
Speaker 1: The judge set in October twenty eighth sentencing for both men,

645
00:39:55,920 --> 00:39:58,239
Speaker 1: and that's it for this edition of The Bloomberg Law Show.

646
00:39:58,600 --> 00:40:00,920
Speaker 1: Remember you can always get the latest legal news on

647
00:40:01,000 --> 00:40:05,279
Speaker 1: our Bloomberg Law podcasts. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify,

648
00:40:05,480 --> 00:40:10,520
Speaker 1: and at www dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast Slash Law,

649
00:40:10,920 --> 00:40:13,480
Speaker 1: And remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every

650
00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:17,440
Speaker 1: weeknight at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso

651
00:40:17,560 --> 00:40:19,200
Speaker 1: and you're listening to Bloomberg