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Speaker 1: Now here's a highlight from coast to coast AM on

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Speaker 1: iHeartRadio U LEO.

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Speaker 2: Do countries including ours, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, the

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Speaker 2: United States, do we have cybersecurity divisions within government that

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Speaker 2: do nothing but try to hack other countries?

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Speaker 3: Oh yeah, I mean, if you really, if you look

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Speaker 3: at it, and I happen to be of the thought

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Speaker 3: process that we are already in World War three and

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Speaker 3: it's a cyber war and it's been going on for

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Speaker 3: a long time. The first shots fired really in this

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Speaker 3: cyber war in the modern era, really was the stucksonet

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Speaker 3: attack from the United States against Iran, against their nuclear facilities.

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Speaker 3: And this happened I believe it was about twenty ten

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Speaker 3: or twenty eleven. But to me, we initiated it in

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Speaker 3: a sense, you know, we're going after the Iranian nuclear

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Speaker 3: program back then, and countries, yes, are going back and

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Speaker 3: forth initiating attacks against each other. It's a constant thing.

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Speaker 3: We have what's referred to as advanced persistent threat groups

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Speaker 3: from different countries. The four main belligerents that we find,

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Speaker 3: you know, attacking Western countries Western democracies are Russia, China,

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Speaker 3: North Korea, and Iran. Those are the names that generally

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Speaker 3: pop up whenever we talk about this sort of international hacking.

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Speaker 3: But within the United States, we do have agencies like

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Speaker 3: you know, sees and different agencies within the sub agencies

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Speaker 3: within the intelligence community that yeah, this is sort of

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Speaker 3: their job, you know, and and a lot of it is,

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Speaker 3: you know, not necessarily to be offensive, but you know,

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Speaker 3: kind of to be defensive. They're they're being proactive in

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Speaker 3: terms of trying to figure out what are the best

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Speaker 3: defenses against emerging.

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Speaker 2: Threat Give us an initial refresher on technology, Julio, if

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Speaker 2: you can specifically the Internet. It works, but how does

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Speaker 2: it work? I mean, where is the central brain? If

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Speaker 2: there is one where everything goes to around the planet,

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Speaker 2: I mean, how does it work?

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Speaker 3: Well, I mean that's kind of like a broad question.

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Speaker 3: I mean, I think that the World Wide Web was created.

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Speaker 3: I think at this point the basic idea and then

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Speaker 3: the way that it works is like that sort of

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Speaker 3: technology was developed, you know, initially back in the sixties,

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Speaker 3: and it's sort of improved and then I guess that's

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Speaker 3: the way that it's known now. It sort of existed

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Speaker 3: since the nineteen eighties. But I mean it basically we're

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Speaker 3: all interconnected through that internationally, and data is transferred you know,

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Speaker 3: through whatquote unquote Worldwide Web that as it exists today.

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Speaker 3: You know, I'm sorry, I just that's kind of a

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Speaker 3: really kind of a broad question. I don't want to

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Speaker 3: come off sounding like Kamala Harris or something explanation of it,

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Speaker 3: you know what I'm saying.

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Speaker 2: But you know, well, if somebody pulls the plug on

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Speaker 2: the Internet, can you do that? Can that be done?

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Speaker 3: Yeah? Theoretically a lot of things can happen. Yeah, I

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Speaker 3: mean I think it would be more or less like

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Speaker 3: let's say, if we had like an EMP attack. Let's say,

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Speaker 3: like a North Korean you know, satellite up in space

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Speaker 3: has aimed at the American power grid and hits the

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Speaker 3: American power grid. A lot of things are going to

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Speaker 3: go out, partially obviously within the United States. You know,

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Speaker 3: we're gonna have issues with digital communications like the Internet.

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Speaker 3: That's part of it, you know, part of what could

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Speaker 3: be affected potentially.

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Speaker 1: As as well as other things.

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Speaker 3: You know, and you know that that's there's a lot

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Speaker 3: of I would say right now, there's a lot of danger, uh,

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Speaker 3: in terms of the way that we can be hit

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Speaker 3: or compromised by smaller countries. The way I look at

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Speaker 3: it is that you know, I think digitally with whether

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Speaker 3: you want to call it hacking or through the Internet

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Speaker 3: or anything like that, it's the great equalizer of military powers.

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Speaker 3: So if you're let's say, a smaller country, you don't

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Speaker 3: have to be one of the big four, like I

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Speaker 3: pointed out before, between Russia and China, North Korea and Iran.

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Speaker 3: Let's say you're a smaller country, but you want to

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Speaker 3: you know, attack another country that's bigger and more powerful

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Speaker 3: and has like a military that that can destroy you

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Speaker 3: and wipe your country out. You can you can get

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Speaker 3: pretty much, you know, a strong offensive front via cybersecurity

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Speaker 3: and hacking. You know, it's I think cybersecurity and hacking

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Speaker 3: is the great equalizer between military powers in terms of

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Speaker 3: you know, smaller countries being able to go on the

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Speaker 3: offensive against larger countries. That's one way I think I

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Speaker 3: would kind of praise it in terms of, you know,

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Speaker 3: the dangers that exist on that quote unquote internet.

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Speaker 2: Ironically, we're talking about the power grid tomorrow night on

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Speaker 2: Coast to Coast with our friend Bill Forstin. Now, let's

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Speaker 2: talk a little bit about election hacking. What's all this

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Speaker 2: what's all this talk about Russia meddling with twenty twenty four.

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Speaker 2: What do you think they're doing.

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Speaker 3: Well, it's like twenty twenty six. I mean, they did

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Speaker 3: kind of interfere in a sense attacking. I don't know

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Speaker 3: if you remember, in the Wiki Leaks dumped a lot

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Speaker 3: of information that had been acquired via Russian hacking.

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Speaker 2: They hit Paul.

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Speaker 3: Podesta's or ale. Yeah, John Podesta, Sorry, John Pedesta's email.

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Speaker 2: You mentioned me, You meant you mentioned the year twenty

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Speaker 2: twenty six.

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Speaker 3: We're not there yet, I'm sorry twenty sixteen. I meant

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Speaker 3: sorry twenty six Yeah, I'm not coming from the future. Actually,

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Speaker 3: you know, not yet exactly. Yeah, no, But in twenty sixteen,

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Speaker 3: they hit the DNC emails. They hit John Podesta's emails.

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Speaker 3: If you remember, WEEKI Leaks dumped out a lot of

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Speaker 3: embarrassing information regarding DMC communications. They were some of the

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Speaker 3: stuff that they was in there was pretty funny, not funny,

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Speaker 3: actually unfortunate and kind of sad. But they were talking about,

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Speaker 3: like you know, from the perspective of myself as a

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Speaker 3: Hispanic voter, they were talking about how they could better

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Speaker 3: reach Hispanics, and they were referring to it as Tackle

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Speaker 3: Bowl engagement, which is, you know, kind of pretty racist

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Speaker 3: and offensive in a sense. But they they they were

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Speaker 3: looking for something that they can put out there that

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Speaker 3: I believe damaging to one of one of the other campaigns,

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Speaker 3: whoever it is, or just to sow discord and you know,

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Speaker 3: in anyway, just to cause confusion, spread disinformation. There's a

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Speaker 3: lot of things going on right now. One of the

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Speaker 3: things actually it was there's now what AI. There was

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Speaker 3: recently an AI robo call campaign that was going on,

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Speaker 3: which is another version of like let's say election interference.

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Speaker 3: You know, they the social media apps have gotten or

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Speaker 3: tried to get a little bit better in terms of

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Speaker 3: who they're allowing to purchase ads during the election cycle,

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Speaker 3: Like you have to go through a little bit more

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Speaker 3: stringent supposedly betting before they'll allow you to post a

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Speaker 3: political ad, whereas it was a little bit more of

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Speaker 3: the wild West and twenty up to like through twenty

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Speaker 3: sixteen and twenty twenty and in the last few cycles.

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Speaker 3: But I think like in this most recent case, right

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Speaker 3: you had like Iran and this was confirmed by the

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Speaker 3: FBI that they they did actually hack both campaigns, the

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Speaker 3: Trump campaign and the Harris campaign specifically, like somebody like

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Speaker 3: that that we all know the name of Roger Stone.

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Speaker 3: He had his hack, and they were trying to hit

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Speaker 3: other high ranking members and operatives between both campaigns. I

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Speaker 3: think it's along the lines of, you know, a country

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Speaker 3: like Iran is gonna sit there and think, all right,

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Speaker 3: from a geopolitics position, you know which campaign favors us,

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Speaker 3: you know which one would be. You know, how are

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Speaker 3: we better off we better off with Trump as president

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Speaker 3: or we better off with Harris's president. So they may

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Speaker 3: be looking for the same level of let's say, embarrassing

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Speaker 3: communications like what you had in like twenty sixteen emerge

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Speaker 3: and see if they're maybe that can have some sort

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Speaker 3: of an effect on who actually wins the campaign. I

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Speaker 3: don't think that, you know, based on just that alone,

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Speaker 3: whether it would have that much sway within a campaign.

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Speaker 3: But it's just another thing to distract it. You know,

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Speaker 3: then there's another distraction. It's another thing.

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Speaker 1: You know.

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Speaker 3: This sort of just makes the process a little bit

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Speaker 3: more difficult for I guess the campaign they would prefer

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Speaker 3: to see lose.

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Speaker 2: Whistle blower Edward Snowden, who went public from the National

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Speaker 2: Security Agency, did he really do that badly.

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Speaker 3: No, I mean I think he actually, I would go

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Speaker 3: so far as to probably use words like heroic in

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Speaker 3: terms of what he was doing, you know, because we

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Speaker 3: have I think that that's a direct violation of the

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Speaker 3: Fourth Amendment, going ahead and taking all this information, seizing

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Speaker 3: all these because in a sense, I mean, it's not

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Speaker 3: physical papers, you know, like the way that it used

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Speaker 3: to be, because we store information in a different way.

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Speaker 3: But just go ahead, and how's our information take it

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Speaker 3: without our explicit permission or knowledge that it's even going on.

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Speaker 3: All that, you know, volumes and volumes of metadata being stored,

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Speaker 3: being stored by the National Security Agency. I think it's

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Speaker 3: a threat. I mean, that's something that an attack against

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Speaker 3: the citizenry. And you know, as a political activist myself,

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Speaker 3: one of the points that I always make is that,

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Speaker 3: you know, we talk about parties, we talk about Republicans

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Speaker 3: versus Democrats, it's not Republicans versus Democrats. That's a sham, George.

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Speaker 3: You know, at the end of the day, both parties,

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Speaker 3: even though I mean I may be registered as one

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Speaker 3: and I may support the candidates generally of one party

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Speaker 3: over the other, but they're both doing sort of the

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Speaker 3: same bidding, and it's anti citizen. I mean, it's not

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Speaker 3: really Republicans versus Democrats, more or less government versus the

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Speaker 3: private citizen. And I think that Edward Snowden went a

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Speaker 3: long ways in sort of exposing that and bringing that

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Speaker 3: reality to the American people, whether or not a lot

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Speaker 3: of people want to accept it, whether or not it

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Speaker 3: was covered by the media in a way where it

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Speaker 3: was explained, you know, because you have to. You know,

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Speaker 3: the American people, it's a sound bite society. You know,

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Speaker 3: they read headlines, but they don't go ahead and do

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Speaker 3: critical thinking for their own private research. You know, I

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Speaker 3: have to explain it to people sometimes like they're a

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Speaker 3: two year old, so they can fully get it. But

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Speaker 3: I think that Edward Snowden really tried to kind of

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Speaker 3: show the American people where the government and where this

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Speaker 3: you know, data collection apparatus is at this point. And

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Speaker 3: you know this happened years ago. Think about how further

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Speaker 3: advanced we are since then. And it's not even the

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Speaker 3: government just collected this information anymore. We willingly give it

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Speaker 3: up when we go ahead and interact with the website.

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Speaker 3: We don't read terms in conditions when we download an app.

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Speaker 3: We don't do any of those sorts of things. We

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Speaker 3: just click go ahead, you know, we move along to

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Speaker 3: this because it's more convenient to just you know, click

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Speaker 3: all the boxes and say yep to everything, so you

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Speaker 3: can go ahead and use something. So no, I mean,

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Speaker 3: I would happen to think, you know, I happen to

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Speaker 3: have a I would say, a favorable opinion of Edward Snowden.

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Speaker 2: He's stored away in Russia right now, is any still.

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Speaker 1: Yeah?

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Speaker 3: I mean guys like him and the songe. I mean,

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Speaker 3: the songs is another one where it's a difficult kind

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Speaker 3: of like you know, I wrote a piece for the

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Speaker 3: Epic Times a couple of years ago. It's like, you know,

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Speaker 3: is he a hero or is he a troublemaker? You know,

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Speaker 3: and it's a little bit sort of in a sense

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Speaker 3: of both. But I mean, I think that you've got

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Speaker 3: to have balance, you know, we need the American people

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Speaker 3: need to know the truth of what's going on. You know,

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Speaker 3: that's the biggest issue is the governments lie to their citizens.

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Speaker 3: I mean, you know, I don't think that that's you know,

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Speaker 3: that's not something that should come as a shock to

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Speaker 3: anyone who's been actually paying attention.

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Speaker 1: It's just a.

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Speaker 3: Matter of you know, a lot of times it's people

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Speaker 3: don't want to accept that. You know, we live in

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Speaker 3: a sense too, in a kind of a bread and

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Speaker 3: circuses board of society. You know, people are so numb

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Speaker 3: to you know, because of social media. They sit there

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Speaker 3: on their phones, staring up their phones all day, not

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Speaker 3: knowing that they're giving up all their information to all

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Speaker 3: these private companies, and a lot of them are you know,

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Speaker 3: foreign and collecting information from us, and we have no

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Speaker 3: there's no accountability to what they do with that information.

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Speaker 3: That's why like the issue with TikTok, you know, TikTok,

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Speaker 3: which is a Chinese application, you know, and then you

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Speaker 3: have like security applications like Kasperski, you know, they're a

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Speaker 3: Russian base. That's actually, as at the end of this month,

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Speaker 3: you can't buy Casperski any longer. If you have if

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Speaker 3: you're trying to do it from an American IP address,

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Speaker 3: it's not allowed anymore. But these countries like China and

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Speaker 3: Russia have laws in place that at any time, at

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Speaker 3: any moment, the whim, at the whim of the government,

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Speaker 3: they can go ahead and seize the data that these

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Speaker 3: these companies these applications, these websites or whatnot have collected,

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Speaker 3: you know. And I wrote a piece for Human Events

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Speaker 3: last year about how there were thirty two members of Congress,

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Speaker 3: thirty one of them happened to be Democrats that were

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Speaker 3: still on TikTok. And these are people that had really important,

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Speaker 3: you know, committee assignments where they were handling information regularly

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Speaker 3: that was you know, of national security interest, you know,

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Speaker 3: beyond classified you know sort of information. If they're having

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Speaker 3: any sort of communications on their cell phones. You know,

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Speaker 3: think about the permissions that we allow whenever we download

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Speaker 3: one of these apps. You know, they have access to

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Speaker 3: our files whatever, you know, our contact information, our text communication,

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Speaker 3: you know, all sorts of things that we keep on

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Speaker 3: our cell phones. There's so many people that operate, you know,

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Speaker 3: people that operate their business and just have all their

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Speaker 3: communications strictly limited to their cell phones. You know, China

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Speaker 3: can go ahead and go, hey, you know, let's tap

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Speaker 3: into you know, Corey Booker cell phone or somebody a

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Speaker 3: member of Congress that's on like an important you know,

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Speaker 3: military or national security based committee and wind up having

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Speaker 3: access to all this information. It also opens up the

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Speaker 3: door to potential blackmail. You know, if they're looking at

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Speaker 3: your text messages and they can ascertain that you're in

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Speaker 3: an affair or something, they could potentially compromise a high

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Speaker 3: ranking member of you know, the US government into giving

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Speaker 3: them information or into providing or in trying to influence,

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Speaker 3: you know, favorable diplomacy for them, because they're because they

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Speaker 3: have access to their information, they're able to blackmail them.

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