Speaker 1: Let me begin by once again thanking Chancellor Merkel and
Speaker 1: the people of Bavaria and Germany for their extraordinary hospitality
Speaker 1: here at the G Summit.
Speaker 2: This evening, President Trump will be leaving Washington for southwest France.
Speaker 3: We saw us at the G seven summits in the
Speaker 3: English county of Cornwall.
Speaker 1: Mini hosts this year's summit of the Group of seven
Speaker 1: Wealthy st Economies.
Speaker 4: Every year, the leaders of the Group of Seven nations
Speaker 4: get together to hash out some of the world's biggest problems.
Speaker 4: This year's summit is in Japan and it starts on Friday.
Speaker 4: But after all the talking and picture taking is over
Speaker 4: and everybody flies back home, will anything actually come of it?
Speaker 4: I'm West Kosova today on the Big Take Bloomberg's Rosalind
Speaker 4: Mathieson and Flavia kraus Jackson tell us what to watch
Speaker 4: for at the G seven. Roz Flave certainly covered your
Speaker 4: share of G seven summits and actually, rous can you
Speaker 4: start just by reminding us which countries are in this
Speaker 4: Group of seven?
Speaker 3: Well, the G seven actually used to be the G
Speaker 3: eight until some years ago, of course, when Russia was
Speaker 3: a member. But Russia was kicked out for its actions
Speaker 3: in crimea.
Speaker 1: Russia is mobilizing tens of thousands of troops, and the
Speaker 1: US circling the wagons with other world powers. Once known
Speaker 1: as the Group of Eight, but now known as the
Speaker 1: Group of Seven G seven because Russia has been exiled.
Speaker 3: So now it's the Group of Seven, which is really
Speaker 3: a bunch of more advanced industrialized economies. So you've got
Speaker 3: obviously the US in there, Japan is the only Asia member,
Speaker 3: and then you've got a bunch of European countries Italy, France,
Speaker 3: Germany and the UK and really sort of is kind
Speaker 3: of a G eight again because the European Union is
Speaker 3: part of the meetings. They come along, their leadership comes
Speaker 3: and has those conversations, So in a way it's sort
Speaker 3: of a pseudo G eight really if you include the
Speaker 3: up Union in there.
Speaker 4: And this year the meeting is in Japan in Hiroshima.
Speaker 3: It's really evocative for Japan to host this summit in Hiroshima.
Speaker 3: Of course, for Japan the dying days of World War II,
Speaker 3: two nuclear weapons dropped on it to end the war,
Speaker 3: and of course since then for Japan the nuclear question
Speaker 3: has been really fundamental. You've got a country that has
Speaker 3: a pacifist constitution that it's army. Really it's called self
Speaker 3: defense force for a reason, and very much a deep
Speaker 3: sense in Japan if we can't do this again. And
Speaker 3: so for Japan, hosting it in Hiroshima is meaningful because
Speaker 3: they're looking around saying, hang on, the nuclear architecture that
Speaker 3: we knew is fading. There's no monitoring systems in place anymore.
Speaker 3: The Russian president has threatened to use nuclear weapons on Ukraine.
Speaker 3: Our knee neighbor, North Korea is building their nuclear arsenal
Speaker 3: by the day. South Korea is talking about whether they
Speaker 3: should get nuclear weapons at some point to defend against
Speaker 3: North Korea. We've got Japan sitting there saying we remember
Speaker 3: what happened to us at the end of World War
Speaker 3: II and we know what it's like. And hosting it
Speaker 3: Hiroshima the backtop of some of those buildings that were
Speaker 3: destroyed and are still there and having leaders meet there
Speaker 3: is a really really symbolic message for Japan.
Speaker 4: Flavia When was the G seven started and how did
Speaker 4: they decide who is going to be in it?
Speaker 2: It came together in nineteen seventy three, when there's the
Speaker 2: oil shop.
Speaker 5: The oil producing countries of the Arab world decided to
Speaker 5: use their oil as a political weapon. They will reduce
Speaker 5: oil production by five percent a month until the Israelis
Speaker 5: withdrawal from occupied territories.
Speaker 2: And it was actually the French who kind of said, listen,
Speaker 2: we need to kind of get together and work out
Speaker 2: collectively what to do. And at the time, these countries
Speaker 2: represented the riches, the most powerful, and part of the
Speaker 2: reason also, but obviously about bringing places like Germany and
Speaker 2: Italy and Japan into the tent is because they had
Speaker 2: suffered so much of the ravages of World War Two.
Speaker 2: But they're also on the recipient of a lot of money.
Speaker 2: To a great extent, Germany, Italy and Japan boomed after
Speaker 2: World War Two. They didn't have develop their own armies.
Speaker 2: That was sort of part of the condition as well,
Speaker 2: you know, certainly for Germany and for Japan. And actually
Speaker 2: the sort of the technically the winners, places like the
Speaker 2: UK and France suffered the ravagers of the economy in
Speaker 2: the nineteen seventies. The UK suffered the humiliation of having
Speaker 2: to go to the International Monetary Fund and ask for
Speaker 2: some money. When it all came together, you can really
Speaker 2: sort of see all the big players from World War Two,
Speaker 2: both the winners and the losers, and how they came
Speaker 2: together in this post World War II reality. And then
Speaker 2: what's particularly fascinating, of course, you've got the oil crisis
Speaker 2: that brought it all to ahead. And then to Rossi's
Speaker 2: point is when Russia came in, and that was in
Speaker 2: the late nineteen nineties, nineteen ninety eight with Yelson, it's
Speaker 2: almost impossible to imagine that time, but at the time
Speaker 2: he had even been considering of joining the European Union.
Speaker 2: And look at where we are now. So the G
Speaker 2: seven really reflects some pretty seismic changes that the world
Speaker 2: has undergone, both in terms of its geopolitics, it's shifting
Speaker 2: power structure, and its economic prowess.
Speaker 4: There are a lot of issues on the table for
Speaker 4: this summit, even more than we've seen in the past.
Speaker 3: Well, that's right, and there are fundamentally two big issues
Speaker 3: that are on the table and neither of them are
Speaker 3: at the summit, and that's Russia and China. And so
Speaker 3: you've still got the fallout of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Speaker 3: You've got questions of how the Group of Seven and
Speaker 3: its affiliates will be there also how they can deal
Speaker 3: with that in terms of trying to constrain Russia's economy
Speaker 3: to the point that it might change Vladimir Putin's actions.
Speaker 3: On the ground, You've got the reality of the actions
Speaker 3: taken so far to penalize this economy not really having
Speaker 3: the kind of effect they probably wanted, and so a
Speaker 3: lot of conversations on the ground about sort of closing
Speaker 3: those loopholes on sanctions, possibly a near total ban on
Speaker 3: exports to Russia. So what's worked so far to try
Speaker 3: and contain Russia, what hasn't, what else can be done?
Speaker 3: And then there's sort of the fundamental question of Russia
Speaker 3: in the rest of the world. We've seen Vladimir Putin
Speaker 3: working to build relationships with countries outside the G seven,
Speaker 3: So how does the G seven counteract that. That's going
Speaker 3: to be a big topic at the summit. And then
Speaker 3: the other question again is China, which is also not there,
Speaker 3: but really these two big powers who are outside the
Speaker 3: orbit of the G seven, and how did the G
Speaker 3: seven member states deal with both of them, including the
Speaker 3: increasing economic and strategic influence of China around the world.
Speaker 3: So there's sort of two big topics on the table
Speaker 3: and a lot of questions about how on earth the
Speaker 3: G seven can manage within a world where you've got
Speaker 3: those powers operating.
Speaker 2: It's like almost what matters the most is what they
Speaker 2: don't talk about, what they talk behind closed doors. You're
Speaker 2: not going to expect Taiwan to be mentioned that that
Speaker 2: is such a divisive, toxic issue, and so increasingly what
Speaker 2: these summits are are about the optics, what kind of
Speaker 2: conversations are happening behind closed doors. Like a really good
Speaker 2: example that Roz and I lived through was in Cornwall
Speaker 2: back in twenty twenty one. The G seven leaders hadn't
Speaker 2: seen each other in a while, COVID had happened, and
Speaker 2: this is a chance for all of them to get
Speaker 2: back together in a very evocative location, which was in
Speaker 2: a beach in Cornwall. Now, at the time there was
Speaker 2: a lot of headlines spent on this rather silly row
Speaker 2: over sausages and Brexit that consumed France and the UK,
Speaker 2: and Manuel Macron and Boris Johnson were not particularly friends
Speaker 2: and this sort of rather silly row kind of spilled
Speaker 2: out in public. But something rather more important was happening
Speaker 2: behind closed doors. Boris Johnson had invited the Australian leader
Speaker 2: and what had happened had been that Biden and Johnson
Speaker 2: and Morrison had come together to make a secret deal
Speaker 2: about developing nuclear submarines, and this happened without Macron having
Speaker 2: any idea. Of course, this was humiliating for Macron because
Speaker 2: he thought he had his own deal with Scott Morrison,
Speaker 2: the Prime Minister of Australia.
Speaker 4: Ras you mentioned Russia and China are two big issues.
Speaker 4: What are the sorts of conversations that will be happening
Speaker 4: behind the scenes, out of the line of state.
Speaker 3: Well, the interesting conversations that the G seven in Japan
Speaker 3: may be the ones between G seven member states and
Speaker 3: the non G seven member states who are there because,
Speaker 3: of course, as is the way with these summits, the
Speaker 3: leaders get to invite a bunch of other countries, and
Speaker 3: Japan has invited a clutch of countries that you think
Speaker 3: of from the global South, or they like to call
Speaker 3: them now sort of middle country. So you've got Vietnam, India, Brazil,
Speaker 3: the African Union representing the entirety of Africa and so on,
Speaker 3: and so you're going to have lots of conversations with
Speaker 3: those leaders behind the scenes, which is about trying to
Speaker 3: get them more in line with the G seven on
Speaker 3: issues surrounding both Russia and China. What these countries get
Speaker 3: pulled in by is the ability to trade, do investment,
Speaker 3: and get money from China and Russia. And so you
Speaker 3: have the G seven countries trying to get in there
Speaker 3: but struggling, and so what they want to show is tangibly,
Speaker 3: we've got things that we can do with you economically
Speaker 3: to support you in your development. And what they need
Speaker 3: to stop doing, and these middle countries have said this
Speaker 3: clearly is stop lecturing them on values, stop coming at
Speaker 3: them about human rights, coming about them about the state
Speaker 3: of their democracy or not, and simply put money on
Speaker 3: the table. And that's the thing that will help draw
Speaker 3: these countries back away from the orbit of Russia and China.
Speaker 3: So you can imagine lots of promises behind the scenes.
Speaker 3: That's something that tangibly they're looking at doing. And then
Speaker 3: the other interesting thing that will happen away from that
Speaker 3: main conversation is, of course the leaders of South Korea
Speaker 3: and Australia are there and that's sort of part of
Speaker 3: that broadening kind of security alliance involving the US, the UK,
Speaker 3: also India, but Japan and Australia, and a lot of
Speaker 3: conversations again around sort of the safety of nuclear arsenals,
Speaker 3: what to do collectively to try and deal with the
Speaker 3: activity of regimes like North Korea as well as Russia,
Speaker 3: but also other nuclear states that aren't really part of
Speaker 3: the global architecture. I mean, you're talking India, Pakistan, China
Speaker 3: and so on. And so there'll be a lot of
Speaker 3: sideline conversations about military cooperation potentially between those countries, and
Speaker 3: all of that will happen somewhat behind the scenes.
Speaker 2: Yeah, And there's also this sort of uncomfortable feeling that
Speaker 2: the US are going to have to come to terms
Speaker 2: with is that they really have no ability to stop
Speaker 2: countries they consider bad guys from developing nuclear arsenals.
Speaker 4: After the break, Europe's leaders wonder if they can still
Speaker 4: count down the US. All of these things that you're
Speaker 4: talking about here point to something else, which is a
Speaker 4: real change in the US's status in the world. Whereas
Speaker 4: before the US was very clearly the leader of the
Speaker 4: G seven and could kind of lost other countries around
Speaker 4: and this is the way it's going to be now.
Speaker 4: It seems that a lot of the conversation is the
Speaker 4: US asking other countries to please see things their way.
Speaker 3: Well, certainly that's the kind of the fundamental takeaway really
Speaker 3: of the war in Ukraine, whatever happens in that terrible
Speaker 3: conflict on the ground. Beyond that, we are in a
Speaker 3: period of significant change in terms of global power dynamics.
Speaker 3: I mean, where we'll be in five, ten, fifteen, twenty years.
Speaker 3: We could debate that forever and flavy and I will
Speaker 3: no doubt debate that all the time, because we like
Speaker 3: to discuss these things. But what we're seeing is the
Speaker 3: emergence of a multipolar system where the US is still
Speaker 3: a significant power, but perhaps a waning power, and you
Speaker 3: have China rising and bringing other countries into its orbit.
Speaker 3: You have Russia's arguably still a fading power despite the
Speaker 3: war in Ukrainean economically it's very small, but able to
Speaker 3: create mischief in many countries around the world. And certainly
Speaker 3: there's an alliance of sorts between Russia and China at
Speaker 3: the moment, and you've got the US thinking, well, how
Speaker 3: can we retain influence in these places? But even within
Speaker 3: the G seven, the US has had some torturous moments
Speaker 3: with Europe in recent years, and not just under the
Speaker 3: administration of Donald Trump, but also under Joe Biden, who
Speaker 3: is arguably even more of a protectionist than Trump, but
Speaker 3: just sort of in nicer clothing and saying it in
Speaker 3: nicer ways than Donald Trump did. And so you've got
Speaker 3: those fractures potentially also emerging, and you can see that
Speaker 3: in some of the ways that they debate stuff at
Speaker 3: the summit between Europe and the US.
Speaker 2: In terms of examples of that freed relationship transatlantic relationship
Speaker 2: between the US and its partners in Europe, very good
Speaker 2: recent example is a Manuel Macron who went to Beijing
Speaker 2: to see Shujingping of China and essentially sort of volunteered
Speaker 2: that China should take a central role in negotiating a
Speaker 2: piece in Ukraine. And that's really not a call that
Speaker 2: one would expect Macron to make or have your dacity
Speaker 2: to do so. Now, on the one hand, you have
Speaker 2: a leader with a tremendous ego, but it's also pretty
Speaker 2: indicative of how several leaders really don't feel like they
Speaker 2: need to kiss the hand or the ring anymore.
Speaker 5: So.
Speaker 2: In Italy you have a new leader, Jarja Milauney, who
Speaker 2: is also trying to carve her own path in terms
Speaker 2: of how to manage that relationship. Do you have to
Speaker 2: pick sides? So you have to pick between us and China,
Speaker 2: And in so doing, what are the economic costs? And
Speaker 2: in Germany, of course, you have Olive Schultz, who is
Speaker 2: very much in the shadow of his predecessor, Angela Merkel,
Speaker 2: who had such an overarching, huge reputation, but whose reputation
Speaker 2: has recently been tarnished over her own relationship with Kutin.
Speaker 2: And it's unclear how history will treat Merkle, whether she
Speaker 2: will be seen as someone who kind of kept Vladimir
Speaker 2: Putin at bay, or whether she was someone who essentially
Speaker 2: appeased him. So these are the questions that keep coming
Speaker 2: back over and over just in terms of this global South.
Speaker 2: A very good example is the new president in Brazil, Lula,
Speaker 2: who of course was president before and has come back
Speaker 2: and his second incarnation as president has made absolutely crystal
Speaker 2: clear that he has no intention of picking sides. And
Speaker 2: Latin America is a very good example of a region
Speaker 2: that was originally seen as America's backyard, but increasingly now
Speaker 2: is perhaps being seen as China's backyard. And you see
Speaker 2: that very much reflected in the trade figures China will
Speaker 2: soon eclipse the US in terms of the biggest trade
Speaker 2: partner in the region.
Speaker 3: The one thing on that also is that it didn't
Speaker 3: start with Joe Biden. He's obviously dealing with these fundamental
Speaker 3: shifts that we're seeing. But Flavia made this point also,
Speaker 3: is that if you look back through decades, you're talking
Speaker 3: about decades where the US just didn't see Africa as important,
Speaker 3: and didn't see parts of North Africa, perhaps in the
Speaker 3: Middle East as important, didn't see parts of Eastern Europe
Speaker 3: as important, certainly regarded Latin America as its backyard, but
Speaker 3: equally didn't invest a lot in there. And so now
Speaker 3: is turning around saying, hey, we're here, we're present, we
Speaker 3: want to be involved, we want to hear you, we
Speaker 3: want to talk to you, and these countries saying, well,
Speaker 3: where have you been all this time? And so you
Speaker 3: really do see those countries. It's not so much that
Speaker 3: they're resisting the US, but they're saying the US, you
Speaker 3: were never here, and now you're trying to get our
Speaker 3: attention because you can see the way the world is
Speaker 3: shifting and you want us on board with you. But
Speaker 3: it's a bit too late, and so you see a
Speaker 3: parade of US officials going through Africa recently, for example,
Speaker 3: None of that really seemed to get a lot of traction. Again,
Speaker 3: the one thing that probably will get their attention is
Speaker 3: simply the idea of greater investment and trade.
Speaker 4: What does the US have to offer at this Group
Speaker 4: of Seven summit and beyond to other countries to say
Speaker 4: you should follow our leadership?
Speaker 2: I would answer the question in terms of what Joe
Speaker 2: Biden specifically can do, And one of the things that
Speaker 2: he promised to do when he defeated Donald Trump back
Speaker 2: in twenty twenty was to say America is back, and
Speaker 2: America's ally have essentially been testing that theory. What does
Speaker 2: it actually mean? Does it mean that you're not going
Speaker 2: to go around saying reckless things like hey, Germany, you
Speaker 2: need to take care of your own military and we're
Speaker 2: going to pull out, or similarly doing the same in Japan,
Speaker 2: Things that send shockwaves through the system of like hold
Speaker 2: on a second, is the US reliable? Can we hold
Speaker 2: it beholden? Two decades long promises? That sense of trust
Speaker 2: I think has been broken. And as much as Joe
Speaker 2: Biden is seen as someone who is honest and decent
Speaker 2: and represents a type of America that I think allies
Speaker 2: are nostalgic for. The reality is that now allies look
Speaker 2: at the US democratic system and see it as pretty broken.
Speaker 2: They are baffled by these elections that go on forever.
Speaker 2: We're eighteen months away from an election, and you have
Speaker 2: all sorts of things that allies say, oh, this is crazy.
Speaker 2: You have Ronda Santis, the Florida governor, who for a
Speaker 2: second we thought might be the Republican nominee, but whose
Speaker 2: star seems to have faded, but coming out and saying, well, well,
Speaker 2: you know, Ukraine is a territorial dispute. People in Ukraine
Speaker 2: and around Ukraine listen to that and think, Okay, what
Speaker 2: this means is that the US is literally not going
Speaker 2: to care about Ukraine in a couple of years, is
Speaker 2: going to be consumed by its own election. And all
Speaker 2: that Vladimir Putin has to do is essentially play the
Speaker 2: long game and wait. And so I think it's important
Speaker 2: to sort of know that everything that not just the
Speaker 2: President says, but what people in Congress say. And the
Speaker 2: perception is that Congress in Washington has become increasingly radicalized,
Speaker 2: and you see that very much in the debt ceiling debate,
Speaker 2: where there's an assumption by markets and by allies that
Speaker 2: somehow this will resolve itself, as it always has. But
Speaker 2: I think what they're increasingly beginning to see is that
Speaker 2: something has been broken and it's not a question of
Speaker 2: just putting it back together. So in answer to your
Speaker 2: question about what the US can do, I don't think
Speaker 2: it can do very much. I think it can try
Speaker 2: definitely to stop lecturing countries about democracy, and I think
Speaker 2: that's to a certain degree stopped that It's become very
Speaker 2: very clear also that the US is increasingly sort of
Speaker 2: looking inside itself and is just focused singularly on China
Speaker 2: and things like TikTok and Ai and all those relationships
Speaker 2: have become transactional and subsumed to the degree of are
Speaker 2: you with us or.
Speaker 1: Not with us?
Speaker 4: What the G seven can and can't do about China's
Speaker 4: growing influence When we come back right, as you mentioned earlier,
Speaker 4: China is moving very strongly forward. Xi Jinping is offering
Speaker 4: China and the way it does business as a viable
Speaker 4: alternative to Western style democracy and appealing to other countries
Speaker 4: to go that way. What is the US argument to
Speaker 4: these countries not to move into China's or a bit.
Speaker 3: The argument primarily is that be careful what you get
Speaker 3: into by beware in that getting into, especially financial relationships,
Speaker 3: economic relationships with China always come with a price tag,
Speaker 3: and it may not come for several years later, but
Speaker 3: it probably will come either you'll find yourself owing a
Speaker 3: lot of money to China that China may call in
Speaker 3: at some point when suits or China will want you
Speaker 3: to behave in a certain way. And you see that
Speaker 3: in a variety of other groupings. You see that in Asia,
Speaker 3: which is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, where countries
Speaker 3: like Cambodia, for example, have often been the block for
Speaker 3: policies that would be critical of China because of the
Speaker 3: economic relationship between Cambodia and China. So China essentially says
Speaker 3: to Campodia, we expect you to block these policies or
Speaker 3: these criticisms of us in that forum, and so the
Speaker 3: chips do tend to come China's way in the end.
Speaker 3: And that's the argument from the US and others is
Speaker 3: that be careful what you get into. The other argument
Speaker 3: is China policy can change on a dime, and we've
Speaker 3: seen that domestically in recent years, there'll be a sudden
Speaker 3: clamp down on a sector out of the blue. There'll
Speaker 3: be sudden restrictions, there'll be a purge of certain companies
Speaker 3: an investment. If you really bound yourself into China in
Speaker 3: that regard, you never know when you might be the
Speaker 3: company they decide to crack down on, or in the
Speaker 3: sector they decide that they're going for, and so it's
Speaker 3: very volatile and uncertain in terms of the reliability of
Speaker 3: your investment in the long term. So those are two
Speaker 3: of the primary arguments that the US, but also European
Speaker 3: nations and other members of what you think of as
Speaker 3: the West, come at when they try to say these
Speaker 3: countries don't get too close into bed with China.
Speaker 4: So a lot of issues on the table, a lot
Speaker 4: to discuss. We've talked about only some of them here.
Speaker 4: Coming out of this summit. What do we expect, What
Speaker 4: results do you think will come of it.
Speaker 3: One of the things where we are expecting, possibly is
Speaker 3: an announcement on a near total bound on exports to Russia.
Speaker 3: So it means that anything that goes into Russia has
Speaker 3: to be given an exemption, and that's a flip of
Speaker 3: what it is now in terms of being able to
Speaker 3: send your goods in from a variety of countries. So
Speaker 3: there's that aspect of it that would involve the G
Speaker 3: seven and the EU. That's one thing we're expecting, possibly
Speaker 3: a crackdown on the diamond trade out of Russia, which
Speaker 3: is quite lucrative for Russia also, And we're looking for
Speaker 3: some kind of language coordination around China. Even if they
Speaker 3: don't mention China by name in their statements, what do
Speaker 3: they do when they talk about economic coercion? That's a
Speaker 3: phrase they're using a lot for China at the moment.
Speaker 3: So is there some kind of joint statement that touches
Speaker 3: on that issue, which is really a signal to China
Speaker 3: that they're going to sort of work together to try
Speaker 3: and manage China in terms of its economic policies. That's
Speaker 3: another thing you could see that may come out of it.
Speaker 3: But they're really on the China side, probably more statements
Speaker 3: of intent versus something tangible.
Speaker 2: And I will say, I'm looking for optics and I
Speaker 2: think it's incredibly important to sort of see how all
Speaker 2: these leaders are relating to each other. Last year in
Speaker 2: the Alps in Germany, Biden wasn't seen very often. There
Speaker 2: were whisperings of like, well what is he doing? Is
Speaker 2: he too tired?
Speaker 3: Is he old?
Speaker 2: You know, the age thing is something that actually keeps
Speaker 2: coming back. It's showing in polls. It's something that allies notice.
Speaker 2: Is Joe Biden going to go and have a bunch
Speaker 2: of bilaterals which is what is expected. Everyone wants to
Speaker 2: meet the US president or not. You know, you're going
Speaker 2: to have Trudeau, who's the leader of Canada, who now
Speaker 2: is the elder statesman, which is you know, an extraordinary
Speaker 2: turn of events, but he's going to be the person
Speaker 2: who have seen the most out of these summits. You
Speaker 2: want to see how Rishi Sunak Whu's are going to
Speaker 2: be making his debut as UK Prime Minister. There's been
Speaker 2: a lot of revolving doors in the UK. How does
Speaker 2: the new UK leader who's trying to steady the ship
Speaker 2: of the UK after the turmoil of the Brexit years,
Speaker 2: how is he going to make his debut on the
Speaker 2: world stage.
Speaker 4: Roz Flavia, thanks so much for coming on the show.
Speaker 4: Thank you, thanks for listening to us. Here at the
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