WEBVTT - TechStuff Looks at Password Security

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello again, everyone,

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech stuff. My name is Chris Poulett, and

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an editor at house stuff works dot com. Sitting

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<v Speaker 1>across to me, as is a typically the case, senior

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<v Speaker 1>writer Jonathan Strickland. Hey there, you know, so I was

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<v Speaker 1>thinking maybe after this we could I don't know, play

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<v Speaker 1>game risk. What do you think I think we already are?

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<v Speaker 1>That's funny. Uh. Yeah. Security has been in the news

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<v Speaker 1>a lot lately as of the time we're recording this

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<v Speaker 1>in late August two thousand and twelve, UM. And part

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<v Speaker 1>of that is because, as we have touched on in

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<v Speaker 1>a handful of times since, some of the big, more

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<v Speaker 1>widely publicized cases have been making the news. That you know,

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<v Speaker 1>hackers have been breaking into different accounts at major corporate

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<v Speaker 1>rations online, stealing people's information. It's unclear whether people's credit

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<v Speaker 1>card numbers were stolen, or if we have your home

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<v Speaker 1>address or we know the name of your dog. There

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<v Speaker 1>was the whole story of Matt Honan getting his entire

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<v Speaker 1>digital life hacked because of a vulnerability between the systems

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<v Speaker 1>of Amazon and Apple YEP, which clearly taken a loan,

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<v Speaker 1>clearly were not obvious as problems, but when put together,

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<v Speaker 1>post problems because they were the people who were doing

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<v Speaker 1>the hacking game to the system and put them against

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<v Speaker 1>one another to create a bigger picture that allowed them

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<v Speaker 1>to get the information. Well, uh, you know, people have

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<v Speaker 1>been saying that you need secure password please, and there

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<v Speaker 1>are news reports about this too. People are still using

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<v Speaker 1>password as their password or obvious terms one, two, three, four.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the kind of thing an idiot puts on his luggage. Hey, so,

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<v Speaker 1>uh yeah, I mean those kinds of things are still

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<v Speaker 1>in practice, and of course you need to use more

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<v Speaker 1>secure passwords, but it's it's it goes deeper than that.

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<v Speaker 1>There's more information out there now about how even using

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<v Speaker 1>stronger passwords alone isn't necessarily going to keep hackers from

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<v Speaker 1>being able to get into your account. You know, think

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<v Speaker 1>about what you're doing. There's there's several several things that

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<v Speaker 1>you have to consider. One of those is the idea

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<v Speaker 1>of linking accounts together, because that means that should one

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<v Speaker 1>account become vulnerable, then those other linked accounts could also

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<v Speaker 1>be vulnerable. That was the case with Matt Honan, right.

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<v Speaker 1>So one of the many problems of his yes UM

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<v Speaker 1>because more identifiable problems because once they got access to

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<v Speaker 1>his Google account, then they were able to reset stuff

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<v Speaker 1>all over the place, and then it turned out that

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<v Speaker 1>all they really wanted was to access his Twitter account,

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<v Speaker 1>which is I guess in a way he's fortunate, but

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<v Speaker 1>it's still pretty crazy every that they managed to do

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<v Speaker 1>in order to do that, and they caused quite a

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<v Speaker 1>bit of damage along the way to matahone in anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>not to mention to the the the public perception of

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<v Speaker 1>security UM on the back end. So that's one thing

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<v Speaker 1>is linking lots of accounts together holds a very specific danger.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, for one, thing like Facebook Connect or really

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<v Speaker 1>any open i D approach, right, if that system is

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<v Speaker 1>not secure, you have a single point that you can

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<v Speaker 1>target that will give you access to lots of stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>Now that's so sad because for us the consumer, that's

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<v Speaker 1>so helpful having one account that you can log into

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<v Speaker 1>and from there you can authenticate with multiple other services.

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<v Speaker 1>You don't have to build out form after form after form. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's nice. It is a very valu service now.

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<v Speaker 1>And I'm not saying that that Facebook Connect or Open

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<v Speaker 1>Idea or any of that is that they are not secure.

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<v Speaker 1>They're putting they're putting lots of protections in place to

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<v Speaker 1>try and keep user information as safe as possible. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not it's not so much that it's inherently wrongs that

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<v Speaker 1>if something does happen, it can cause serious problem. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's one issue. Another issue is the way that

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<v Speaker 1>we create passwords as users. For those of us who

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<v Speaker 1>are using either very common words or even names. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>even if we think we're being clever by adding a

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<v Speaker 1>few numbers to it, that's not really that secure. And

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<v Speaker 1>if it becomes even more insecure if we're using those

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<v Speaker 1>passwords at multiple accounts. So I think, uh, we we were.

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<v Speaker 1>We both read an article from Ours Technica by Dan

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<v Speaker 1>Gooden called why passwords have never been weaker and crackers

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<v Speaker 1>have never been stronger. It's actually it's a fascinating read,

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<v Speaker 1>and I do recommend you check it out if you

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<v Speaker 1>find this episode interesting, or even if you don't, it's

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<v Speaker 1>a good thing to know. And uh, it's it's typically

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<v Speaker 1>our technically typically get into a more technical detail than

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<v Speaker 1>than articles on how stuff works dot com. But if

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<v Speaker 1>you're if you're really serious about it, there there's a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of important information in there, and we can give

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<v Speaker 1>you kind of the the layman approach to what is

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<v Speaker 1>going on here. But part of that is that I

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<v Speaker 1>remember reading, and it may not have been in this article,

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<v Speaker 1>I do remember reading a statistic that the average user

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<v Speaker 1>has something like six and a half passwords in the Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>so they used six and a half pass And you know,

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<v Speaker 1>of course this is an average. We're not saying someone

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<v Speaker 1>out there's just putting, oh, you know what, I was

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<v Speaker 1>gonna type in my whole password, which is typically password,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm just gonna type in pass for this one. No,

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<v Speaker 1>that's not what it means sword, it's the average. So

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<v Speaker 1>but that means that, you know, you think the average

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<v Speaker 1>person has around twenty five accounts across the web, but

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<v Speaker 1>they're using on average, six and a half passwords, So

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<v Speaker 1>each password is being used around three times on average.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's again an average. You might have just

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<v Speaker 1>one password that used twenty times and the other three

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<v Speaker 1>used the other five. But I don't to use the

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<v Speaker 1>same password on Google and yeah, who's so I'll use

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<v Speaker 1>one for one and the other one for the other,

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<v Speaker 1>and then I'll use the Google one again for interest, yeah, whatever,

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<v Speaker 1>for Facebook, because they are those are disconnected enough where

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<v Speaker 1>it's not gonna know. That's still a problem unless you

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<v Speaker 1>think that I am a super genius, because I can

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<v Speaker 1>say this, No, I I reused passwords from time to

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<v Speaker 1>time too. I'm guilty of it, just as much as

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<v Speaker 1>the planet. I was awful for a long time. Passwords

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<v Speaker 1>among that that was pretty much mine too. I had

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<v Speaker 1>about three passwords that I used for almost everything. That

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<v Speaker 1>is no longer the case. People, I don't do that anymore. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I told you I didn't mean you erase all those

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<v Speaker 1>accounts anyway. So that's that's another user behavior, and we'll

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<v Speaker 1>get more into that in a minute. But then the

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<v Speaker 1>third piece is how safe are those passwords within the

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<v Speaker 1>databases of the companies that hold those passwords. So if

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<v Speaker 1>you are a cracker, you know a hacker who is

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<v Speaker 1>specifically trying to crack into security systems, and you have

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<v Speaker 1>identified a potential target to try and get at their

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<v Speaker 1>password database, then uh, if it's if it's one where

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<v Speaker 1>the user base of that service or company also typically

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<v Speaker 1>has accounts at other places you've managed to not just

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<v Speaker 1>get the passwords for that one account, but knowing that

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<v Speaker 1>people tend to reuse their passwords, you might actually have

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<v Speaker 1>access to multiple services. Now, there are ways that companies

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<v Speaker 1>can protect against this, not just by building a good

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<v Speaker 1>security system that's hard to crack, but also by uh

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<v Speaker 1>encrypting those passwords in the database, so that if you

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<v Speaker 1>get that database, yes you've got a whole bunch of data,

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<v Speaker 1>but it does not translate directly to the passwords because

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<v Speaker 1>it's been put through a hashing algorithm. Yeah, and there's

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<v Speaker 1>there are several sort of standard hashing algorithms, so basically

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<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a little like uh email encryption too.

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<v Speaker 1>So you have, let's just pick pass the four letter

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<v Speaker 1>word pass um, you put it through the hashing algorithm,

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<v Speaker 1>and on the other side of it, the letters and

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<v Speaker 1>numbers that make up the encrypted information look nothing like that.

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<v Speaker 1>And it might be that your four letter password has

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<v Speaker 1>just become a thirty two letter encrypted string of characters. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>So somebody seeing that written down, say on a piece

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<v Speaker 1>of paper, is not going to have any idea what

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<v Speaker 1>that is, and they're not really going to have any

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<v Speaker 1>way to decipher it. And theoretically it's pretty well, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>pretty well protected right theoretically. But here's the problem is

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<v Speaker 1>that not first of all, not every company has historically

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<v Speaker 1>encrypted all those passwords. And there have been cases where

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<v Speaker 1>crackers have gotten access to a password database that was

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<v Speaker 1>stored in plain text. That means that the password that

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<v Speaker 1>you type in appears in that database as you typed it,

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<v Speaker 1>so there's no hidden you know, code or anything. You've

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<v Speaker 1>got those passwords, Well, that's very valuable to a cracker

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<v Speaker 1>for more than just the fact that they now have

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<v Speaker 1>access to your account. What's also valuable is that they

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<v Speaker 1>now have a list of words that people use as passwords. So, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a there's a type of attack we should talk about,

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<v Speaker 1>the brute force attack. A brute force attack is when

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<v Speaker 1>a cracker tries to get access to a system by

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<v Speaker 1>filling out the essentially filling out the password field multiple

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<v Speaker 1>times until they get a positive result. And um, one

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<v Speaker 1>way of doing a brute force attack, A very common

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<v Speaker 1>way is to do what's called a dictionary attack, where

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<v Speaker 1>you take you create a virtual dictionary of words that

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<v Speaker 1>you use as the basis for passwords, knowing that a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people will pick a common dictionary word as

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<v Speaker 1>the basis of their password hard wark antelope ant eater.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, it just goes all the way through animals

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<v Speaker 1>for some reason. But something else that they'll do as

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<v Speaker 1>part of this dictionary attack what they'll start adding changing symbols.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's say your your password is ard vark, but

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<v Speaker 1>you're being clever and changing the a's symbols to add symbols.

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<v Speaker 1>And uh, you know, let's say you pick a word

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<v Speaker 1>with with ease in it and you change them to threes.

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<v Speaker 1>They try those two, yeah, because those are very common approaches.

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<v Speaker 1>And yes, you know, keeping in mind that most of

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<v Speaker 1>us are using passwords that are easy for us to remember,

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<v Speaker 1>and the more random ish or seemingly random these passwords get,

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<v Speaker 1>the harder it is for us to recall them. So,

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<v Speaker 1>knowing that's a weakness, the cracker can say, all right, well,

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<v Speaker 1>let's go with all these words, and let's go with

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<v Speaker 1>the various variations we would expect people to use with

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<v Speaker 1>these words. And even if you've done stuff like just

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<v Speaker 1>added a couple of numbers at the end, that's not

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<v Speaker 1>always a tough thing either. They can start going through

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<v Speaker 1>all of these different variations, adding various numbers at the end,

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<v Speaker 1>if they know how many characters your password is, that

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<v Speaker 1>already has given them a huge advantage. And the reason

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<v Speaker 1>why this is possible is because we've got processors out

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<v Speaker 1>there that can do these these calculations in parallel. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>if you were to do them all one after the other,

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<v Speaker 1>it may take you centuries to get through all the

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<v Speaker 1>possibilities of a particular password, depending on how many characters

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<v Speaker 1>there are within that password. In Hollywood, Hollywood computers can

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<v Speaker 1>do a executive brute force attacking about twelve seconds. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>well sometimes that can happen here too, but that's generally

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<v Speaker 1>not the way it works. Well, that's that's one of

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<v Speaker 1>the interesting things about this article is you learn from

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<v Speaker 1>reading that UH an attack like this doesn't take very

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<v Speaker 1>long at all at most, assuming that you're not following

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<v Speaker 1>really really strong password particles. Um. Yeah, it turns out

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<v Speaker 1>that it's like, because of this parallel processing, you've got

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<v Speaker 1>a processor that's working on multiple UH approaches to this

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<v Speaker 1>logan attempt. So we can go through all these different variations.

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<v Speaker 1>Even when there are billions and billions, as Karl Sagan

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<v Speaker 1>would say, of variations of passwords, the processor can go

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<v Speaker 1>through so many so quickly. You know, each each thread

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<v Speaker 1>in that parallel processing is moving at an incredible rate,

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<v Speaker 1>and you've got multiple threads all going Uh. There are

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<v Speaker 1>crackers who use graphics processing units g p used to

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<v Speaker 1>do this. They because they GPUs are designed to be

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<v Speaker 1>parallel processors. Yeah. Even even though they're designed primarily to

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<v Speaker 1>handle graphics instructions and display them on your your monitor,

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<v Speaker 1>GPUs can be uh pressed into service, let's say, by

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<v Speaker 1>a program by a software that that can specifically UM

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<v Speaker 1>send instructions to it. So what people do, UM, there

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<v Speaker 1>are open source program ms that you can use to

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<v Speaker 1>uh assign password cracking to your GPU. UM sad to say,

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<v Speaker 1>and and one of the uh the interesting stories that

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<v Speaker 1>are one of the the interesting bits that I read from

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<v Speaker 1>this article too was UH that people have grown increasingly

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<v Speaker 1>intelligent about the way they save cracked passwords. So they're

0:13:23.200 --> 0:13:29.160
<v Speaker 1>saving up dictionary attack type information. And so if you

0:13:29.280 --> 0:13:34.439
<v Speaker 1>use you know, password one is your password on one site, UM,

0:13:34.520 --> 0:13:36.880
<v Speaker 1>and they want to hack in to your account at

0:13:36.920 --> 0:13:41.720
<v Speaker 1>the House of Online Grapefruit, they might try they and

0:13:41.720 --> 0:13:44.120
<v Speaker 1>they've got your information. They could try it there too,

0:13:44.120 --> 0:13:45.920
<v Speaker 1>to see if you've used your password on more than

0:13:45.960 --> 0:13:49.440
<v Speaker 1>one site. So that makes it increasingly dangerous for you

0:13:49.520 --> 0:13:53.480
<v Speaker 1>to use the same password in multiple locations because there

0:13:53.559 --> 0:13:57.400
<v Speaker 1>is a growing database of password information that that people

0:13:57.440 --> 0:14:00.480
<v Speaker 1>are saving, not just throwing away once an attack is

0:14:00.480 --> 0:14:03.160
<v Speaker 1>completely That database also means that they can look at

0:14:03.200 --> 0:14:06.439
<v Speaker 1>things like frequencies, like how frequently are people using this

0:14:06.600 --> 0:14:09.640
<v Speaker 1>specific word or variations of this word as a password.

0:14:09.880 --> 0:14:12.320
<v Speaker 1>And the more people who use it, the more you're like,

0:14:12.360 --> 0:14:14.280
<v Speaker 1>all right, well let's bump this up the list. It's

0:14:14.320 --> 0:14:17.240
<v Speaker 1>more of a likely candidate for a password. So, you know,

0:14:17.480 --> 0:14:19.760
<v Speaker 1>we like to think that the passwords we choose are unique,

0:14:20.440 --> 0:14:23.720
<v Speaker 1>but that's if we're basing it off a name or

0:14:23.760 --> 0:14:26.880
<v Speaker 1>a word. That's not the case. There are lots of

0:14:26.880 --> 0:14:29.600
<v Speaker 1>people out there using lots of passwords, and there's a

0:14:29.600 --> 0:14:31.560
<v Speaker 1>good chance that someone out there is using the same

0:14:31.640 --> 0:14:35.480
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote unique password. You are. Just remember your unique

0:14:35.600 --> 0:14:39.440
<v Speaker 1>just like everybody else. You know, when everybody is special,

0:14:39.920 --> 0:14:46.320
<v Speaker 1>no one is. It's incredible. Um. The so yeah, the

0:14:46.320 --> 0:14:50.200
<v Speaker 1>the the database can tell the cracker all right, Well,

0:14:50.760 --> 0:14:52.680
<v Speaker 1>not only am I using a dictionary attack, but I'm

0:14:52.760 --> 0:14:57.240
<v Speaker 1>using a curated dictionary attack in a way, because these

0:14:57.240 --> 0:14:59.920
<v Speaker 1>are the known passwords that are floating out there and

0:15:00.000 --> 0:15:01.600
<v Speaker 1>the world, and these are the ones that are really

0:15:01.640 --> 0:15:04.760
<v Speaker 1>popular that lots of people use. So we'll go through

0:15:04.800 --> 0:15:07.280
<v Speaker 1>all the variations of these first, and you just you

0:15:07.320 --> 0:15:10.520
<v Speaker 1>tweak your cracking program to do that so that you

0:15:10.680 --> 0:15:14.000
<v Speaker 1>can get the the largest number of results in the

0:15:14.080 --> 0:15:16.200
<v Speaker 1>least amount of time. And another thing you can do

0:15:16.320 --> 0:15:19.520
<v Speaker 1>is once you've figured out these passwords that are very popular,

0:15:20.400 --> 0:15:23.040
<v Speaker 1>that helps you determine other things, Like there are only

0:15:23.160 --> 0:15:27.200
<v Speaker 1>so many hashing algorithms that are really popular out there

0:15:27.200 --> 0:15:30.600
<v Speaker 1>in the world of computer security, right, so if you

0:15:30.680 --> 0:15:35.280
<v Speaker 1>know which hashing algorithm there the particular company is using,

0:15:36.000 --> 0:15:38.240
<v Speaker 1>and you are able to get let's say you get

0:15:38.320 --> 0:15:41.680
<v Speaker 1>access to their encrypted password database. So now you've got

0:15:41.720 --> 0:15:44.720
<v Speaker 1>a list of passwords that are encrypted, so you cannot

0:15:44.800 --> 0:15:47.080
<v Speaker 1>just look at them and know what the passwords are.

0:15:47.560 --> 0:15:50.160
<v Speaker 1>If you are able to determine which security protocol they're

0:15:50.240 --> 0:15:55.520
<v Speaker 1>using and you have this massive database of um of

0:15:55.200 --> 0:15:58.200
<v Speaker 1>of of passwords that are really popular, you can run

0:15:58.240 --> 0:16:02.160
<v Speaker 1>those passwords through the same encryption algorithm to look at

0:16:02.160 --> 0:16:04.760
<v Speaker 1>the hashes that come out and then start matching them

0:16:04.840 --> 0:16:07.200
<v Speaker 1>up with the stuff that was in the database. So

0:16:07.240 --> 0:16:09.600
<v Speaker 1>you're still cracking the passwords. You're just going about in

0:16:09.600 --> 0:16:12.360
<v Speaker 1>a different way as far as this brute force attack

0:16:12.440 --> 0:16:15.360
<v Speaker 1>is concerned. It's still a brute force attack. It's just

0:16:15.520 --> 0:16:19.360
<v Speaker 1>doing it in a kind of an odd roundabout way.

0:16:19.400 --> 0:16:21.760
<v Speaker 1>Because you've got the you've got the hash of the password,

0:16:22.520 --> 0:16:25.480
<v Speaker 1>you've got the security protocol that's being used. Now you're

0:16:25.480 --> 0:16:29.800
<v Speaker 1>trying to guess the original word that created that hashed password.

0:16:30.360 --> 0:16:32.760
<v Speaker 1>Once you're able to do that, that account is no

0:16:32.800 --> 0:16:35.680
<v Speaker 1>longer secure. And if that again, if you're using that

0:16:35.720 --> 0:16:39.800
<v Speaker 1>same password elsewhere, those accounts aren't secure. UM. So you

0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:42.880
<v Speaker 1>might be asking yourself, hey, if there are crackers out

0:16:42.880 --> 0:16:46.840
<v Speaker 1>there who have these really advanced tools that can either

0:16:47.520 --> 0:16:51.200
<v Speaker 1>figure out a password or uh, you know, kind of

0:16:51.440 --> 0:16:54.640
<v Speaker 1>work down a list so that the the passwords I

0:16:54.760 --> 0:16:58.640
<v Speaker 1>use are vulnerable, how do I how do I protect myself?

0:16:59.200 --> 0:17:00.680
<v Speaker 1>And there are a few things you can do. One

0:17:00.880 --> 0:17:05.119
<v Speaker 1>is use a unique password for every service that you

0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:09.199
<v Speaker 1>log into, which is incredibly difficult if you're doing it

0:17:09.240 --> 0:17:11.800
<v Speaker 1>on your own, which is why I would suggest getting

0:17:11.800 --> 0:17:15.159
<v Speaker 1>a password manager program. And there are a lot of

0:17:15.200 --> 0:17:18.280
<v Speaker 1>them out there. There are some that are free, there's

0:17:18.280 --> 0:17:21.080
<v Speaker 1>some that you pay for. Um, there's some that are

0:17:21.119 --> 0:17:24.320
<v Speaker 1>in the cloud. There are some that are based on

0:17:24.359 --> 0:17:28.840
<v Speaker 1>your system. Yeah. Uh, you use a password manager, right,

0:17:29.119 --> 0:17:32.359
<v Speaker 1>I do as well, um, and I'll go ahead and

0:17:32.400 --> 0:17:34.920
<v Speaker 1>say which one I use. I use dash Lane, which

0:17:35.200 --> 0:17:37.920
<v Speaker 1>uh I tried out for the first time this year

0:17:38.040 --> 0:17:42.640
<v Speaker 1>and I like it well enough. Um. It saves passwords

0:17:42.640 --> 0:17:45.600
<v Speaker 1>and if you want, it will generate a password for you,

0:17:45.720 --> 0:17:48.080
<v Speaker 1>so you don't have to just come up with a

0:17:48.119 --> 0:17:50.320
<v Speaker 1>string of things. It'll it'll do it for you and

0:17:50.400 --> 0:17:53.800
<v Speaker 1>save it to your account. You create a master password

0:17:54.440 --> 0:17:58.240
<v Speaker 1>that is a strong password, meaning that there are upper

0:17:58.240 --> 0:18:01.960
<v Speaker 1>and lower case letters. There's a numbers in there. Uh,

0:18:02.000 --> 0:18:03.680
<v Speaker 1>and all you have to do is remember that one.

0:18:04.240 --> 0:18:07.000
<v Speaker 1>Which that sounds tricky, but I'll give you a hint

0:18:07.080 --> 0:18:09.440
<v Speaker 1>on how to do something like that if you want

0:18:09.480 --> 0:18:13.080
<v Speaker 1>to try it yourself. You create a master password. Uh.

0:18:13.119 --> 0:18:17.000
<v Speaker 1>Then when you log into your dash ling account in

0:18:17.040 --> 0:18:19.720
<v Speaker 1>my case, you then have access to all the other

0:18:19.720 --> 0:18:22.639
<v Speaker 1>passwords that are that that dash Lane generates. So I

0:18:22.640 --> 0:18:26.440
<v Speaker 1>actually went in to all my accounts and used the

0:18:26.520 --> 0:18:30.160
<v Speaker 1>dash Lane password generator program and it creates a ten

0:18:30.359 --> 0:18:35.919
<v Speaker 1>character long strong password that's unique. So none of my

0:18:35.960 --> 0:18:39.800
<v Speaker 1>accounts used the same ones anymore. They're all ten characters long,

0:18:40.359 --> 0:18:45.640
<v Speaker 1>they are a mix of various characters and uh. When

0:18:45.680 --> 0:18:49.560
<v Speaker 1>you get to about nine characters, and if it's a

0:18:49.600 --> 0:18:53.159
<v Speaker 1>truly you know, or at least a seemingly random series

0:18:53.160 --> 0:18:57.240
<v Speaker 1>of characters and numbers, uh, the difficulty of cracking that

0:18:57.320 --> 0:19:01.639
<v Speaker 1>password escalates dramatically. So it might go from a matter

0:19:01.760 --> 0:19:04.639
<v Speaker 1>of days, two weeks or months. And the harder you

0:19:04.680 --> 0:19:08.520
<v Speaker 1>make it to crack, the more likely your information will

0:19:08.840 --> 0:19:12.680
<v Speaker 1>be safe so or that it will just be difficult

0:19:12.720 --> 0:19:16.239
<v Speaker 1>for anyone to guess. Um. So that's the purpose of

0:19:16.280 --> 0:19:19.640
<v Speaker 1>creating these strong passwords and the purpose for the password managers,

0:19:19.720 --> 0:19:24.399
<v Speaker 1>because strong passwords are hard to remember. Um, so all

0:19:24.440 --> 0:19:27.080
<v Speaker 1>I have to do is remember my one master password.

0:19:27.119 --> 0:19:28.760
<v Speaker 1>Here's the hint I was gonna make. So if you

0:19:28.800 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 1>want to make a strong password, like a master strong password, uh,

0:19:35.040 --> 0:19:38.240
<v Speaker 1>it's best that you come up with a phrase that

0:19:38.320 --> 0:19:42.399
<v Speaker 1>you will not forget and it it's great if the

0:19:42.440 --> 0:19:47.359
<v Speaker 1>phrase also has a proper noun somewhere after the first word,

0:19:47.680 --> 0:19:49.639
<v Speaker 1>so that you have some capitals in there as well.

0:19:50.040 --> 0:19:52.600
<v Speaker 1>And you need a number, like a four digit number

0:19:52.640 --> 0:19:57.520
<v Speaker 1>is best. So for example, you might say Dad's first

0:19:57.720 --> 0:20:03.760
<v Speaker 1>car was a eighteen fifty six Volkswagen bug. M all right,

0:20:04.200 --> 0:20:06.840
<v Speaker 1>So then your password. You take the first letter off

0:20:06.880 --> 0:20:09.400
<v Speaker 1>of each of those words and the number and you

0:20:09.520 --> 0:20:13.199
<v Speaker 1>put them together and that becomes your password. So the

0:20:13.240 --> 0:20:16.040
<v Speaker 1>first letter would be upper case D for Dad's and

0:20:16.040 --> 0:20:19.280
<v Speaker 1>then first car, so it's upper case D, lower case F,

0:20:19.920 --> 0:20:24.160
<v Speaker 1>lower case C, lower case W, lower case A. Then

0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:29.440
<v Speaker 1>you have the one and then uppercase V upper case

0:20:29.480 --> 0:20:33.080
<v Speaker 1>B for Volkswagen bug. That could be your master password.

0:20:33.400 --> 0:20:36.399
<v Speaker 1>And when you look at it as just a string

0:20:36.440 --> 0:20:40.120
<v Speaker 1>of letters and numbers, it looks meaningless. You know, there's

0:20:40.160 --> 0:20:44.280
<v Speaker 1>no there's no phrase that's evident right there immediately unless

0:20:44.359 --> 0:20:47.000
<v Speaker 1>you happen to have already known it. So don't tell

0:20:47.080 --> 0:20:51.480
<v Speaker 1>people you're, oh, I gotta change my password. Yeah, but no,

0:20:51.680 --> 0:20:54.679
<v Speaker 1>don't tell people what your phrases. But make it a

0:20:54.680 --> 0:20:59.679
<v Speaker 1>phrase that is easy to remember and uh, and that

0:20:59.720 --> 0:21:03.879
<v Speaker 1>could your master password, and don't use it again. Just

0:21:04.080 --> 0:21:06.720
<v Speaker 1>use it for your master password, and then use the

0:21:06.800 --> 0:21:10.640
<v Speaker 1>password generator or a password generator if you don't want

0:21:10.640 --> 0:21:13.920
<v Speaker 1>to trust one thing with it. But it's it's easier

0:21:13.920 --> 0:21:17.399
<v Speaker 1>to use a password managers onboard password generator because they

0:21:17.400 --> 0:21:20.680
<v Speaker 1>can save it directly to your account. Otherwise you're gonna

0:21:20.680 --> 0:21:24.840
<v Speaker 1>have to transfer that that password to whatever your manager

0:21:24.920 --> 0:21:30.359
<v Speaker 1>is UM and then that way you've got a vault

0:21:30.359 --> 0:21:36.080
<v Speaker 1>of passwords that are encrypted, that are ten characters, hopefully

0:21:36.119 --> 0:21:38.639
<v Speaker 1>at least ten characters nine or ten characters at the

0:21:38.760 --> 0:21:44.840
<v Speaker 1>very least, and are strong. It's funny. It's it's rather

0:21:44.880 --> 0:21:47.960
<v Speaker 1>than coming up with a mnemonic device to remember your password,

0:21:47.960 --> 0:21:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you start with them mnemonic device and from it from it. Yeah,

0:21:51.840 --> 0:21:54.320
<v Speaker 1>I think that that's way easier, because that is I've

0:21:54.400 --> 0:21:59.320
<v Speaker 1>used a password generator before that creates a random string

0:21:59.359 --> 0:22:02.679
<v Speaker 1>of characters and then tells you it's easy to remember this.

0:22:03.119 --> 0:22:07.920
<v Speaker 1>Just remember echo Bravos seven Delta delta bro. You know,

0:22:07.960 --> 0:22:10.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm like, this is that? Where are you from? Where

0:22:10.840 --> 0:22:14.800
<v Speaker 1>that is easy? How is how is remembering a random

0:22:14.840 --> 0:22:19.080
<v Speaker 1>selection of echoes and Bravos and et cetera numbers easier

0:22:19.119 --> 0:22:22.600
<v Speaker 1>than say, just remembering e e blah blah. You know, like,

0:22:23.160 --> 0:22:25.880
<v Speaker 1>that's not easier to me. But this other method where

0:22:25.880 --> 0:22:29.840
<v Speaker 1>you create a mnemonic device first and then convert that

0:22:29.880 --> 0:22:33.639
<v Speaker 1>into a strong password, makes way more sense to me.

0:22:34.840 --> 0:22:39.880
<v Speaker 1>And uh again, because you know, the output of it

0:22:40.000 --> 0:22:44.399
<v Speaker 1>is a seemingly random string of letters and numbers. Uh,

0:22:44.440 --> 0:22:49.040
<v Speaker 1>it's not something that's easy for a computer to guess. Yeah, well, um,

0:22:49.080 --> 0:22:52.800
<v Speaker 1>I use one password by agile bits um, which is

0:22:52.880 --> 0:22:56.159
<v Speaker 1>a you can get as a desktop application for Windows

0:22:56.240 --> 0:23:00.400
<v Speaker 1>or Mac. UM also works on iOS and Android UM

0:23:00.440 --> 0:23:02.639
<v Speaker 1>and uh you know it has a browser plug in

0:23:02.960 --> 0:23:06.600
<v Speaker 1>too on the desktop so that you uh, say, you

0:23:06.720 --> 0:23:10.600
<v Speaker 1>visit a site where you have a um an account,

0:23:10.960 --> 0:23:13.080
<v Speaker 1>maybe a shopping site, maybe a banking site or something

0:23:13.119 --> 0:23:15.159
<v Speaker 1>like that for example, So you have your log in

0:23:15.200 --> 0:23:17.280
<v Speaker 1>and password, you have to log in and has a

0:23:17.320 --> 0:23:19.239
<v Speaker 1>little button and you press the button in it you know,

0:23:19.440 --> 0:23:21.840
<v Speaker 1>says what is your overall passwords? He is your master

0:23:21.880 --> 0:23:24.920
<v Speaker 1>password in there, and then as soon as you uh

0:23:25.040 --> 0:23:28.240
<v Speaker 1>log in, you'll be given an opportunity to log into

0:23:28.240 --> 0:23:31.200
<v Speaker 1>the site and it submits the information for you. Yeah,

0:23:31.200 --> 0:23:34.639
<v Speaker 1>this is important if you're using a someone else's computer

0:23:34.840 --> 0:23:37.760
<v Speaker 1>and you are using a browser to navigate to something.

0:23:38.280 --> 0:23:41.639
<v Speaker 1>And you know, again, if you've created these these strong passwords,

0:23:42.200 --> 0:23:44.840
<v Speaker 1>remembering each one is going to be really hard. And

0:23:44.880 --> 0:23:46.439
<v Speaker 1>if you and it's not like you're gonna go and

0:23:46.520 --> 0:23:50.560
<v Speaker 1>install your you know, you don't want to install the

0:23:50.680 --> 0:23:53.640
<v Speaker 1>desktop program on someone else's computer. I mean, that's not

0:23:54.000 --> 0:23:57.040
<v Speaker 1>your job. It's their computer. Especially like let's say that

0:23:57.080 --> 0:23:58.879
<v Speaker 1>you're at a library or something and you want to

0:23:58.920 --> 0:24:01.040
<v Speaker 1>log in and check l but you've used one of

0:24:01.080 --> 0:24:05.200
<v Speaker 1>these strong password vaults using something that has a web

0:24:05.200 --> 0:24:08.480
<v Speaker 1>browser interface in it, so that you can log into

0:24:08.480 --> 0:24:12.120
<v Speaker 1>the service and access those passwords and then log out

0:24:12.320 --> 0:24:16.359
<v Speaker 1>and those passwords are no longer there. That's important. Yeah, yeah,

0:24:16.440 --> 0:24:19.160
<v Speaker 1>and uh, it does give you a one password. Also

0:24:19.160 --> 0:24:22.880
<v Speaker 1>gives you the opportunity to when you're creating a password, um,

0:24:23.359 --> 0:24:25.920
<v Speaker 1>to make it as longer as short as you need

0:24:25.960 --> 0:24:29.200
<v Speaker 1>to really so, or include symbols, or not to include symbols.

0:24:29.240 --> 0:24:33.640
<v Speaker 1>So one of the important tips that this article that

0:24:33.640 --> 0:24:36.480
<v Speaker 1>that Jonathan and I read points out is that eight

0:24:36.680 --> 0:24:42.560
<v Speaker 1>digit or eight character passwords are easier to crack than

0:24:42.920 --> 0:24:46.360
<v Speaker 1>longer ones. So if you're you're presented with a a website,

0:24:46.400 --> 0:24:49.399
<v Speaker 1>you're you're filling out the information for the account, it says, oh, well,

0:24:49.440 --> 0:24:52.440
<v Speaker 1>your password needs to be six characters are longer. Don't

0:24:52.440 --> 0:24:55.480
<v Speaker 1>pick a six character password? Is the is the simple

0:24:55.600 --> 0:24:58.080
<v Speaker 1>thing for that, whether it's your own or one that

0:24:58.320 --> 0:25:03.240
<v Speaker 1>uh one of many many very capable password generators. Um. Yeah,

0:25:03.440 --> 0:25:05.760
<v Speaker 1>As Jonathan said, these are the two that we picked,

0:25:05.800 --> 0:25:08.080
<v Speaker 1>but there are lots of them out They're great. There

0:25:08.119 --> 0:25:10.359
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of them, and they all like you

0:25:10.400 --> 0:25:13.560
<v Speaker 1>can read reviews of them and uh. And you know,

0:25:13.600 --> 0:25:18.280
<v Speaker 1>these are companies that their reputation is completely built upon

0:25:18.359 --> 0:25:21.960
<v Speaker 1>how reliable they are and that and how upfront and

0:25:22.000 --> 0:25:24.919
<v Speaker 1>transparent they are in the sense of they're not using

0:25:25.280 --> 0:25:29.080
<v Speaker 1>data themselves to get access to stuff. In fact, most

0:25:29.119 --> 0:25:33.160
<v Speaker 1>of these companies have the information encrypted so that they

0:25:33.160 --> 0:25:37.679
<v Speaker 1>don't have any idea what passwords you are using. Because

0:25:37.680 --> 0:25:40.080
<v Speaker 1>it's just like we were talking about with the the

0:25:40.119 --> 0:25:44.480
<v Speaker 1>password databases, where all they are encrypted passwords, same sort

0:25:44.520 --> 0:25:46.680
<v Speaker 1>of thing. They they have no way of knowing what

0:25:46.760 --> 0:25:50.879
<v Speaker 1>you chose as your various passwords. They just provide the

0:25:51.440 --> 0:25:53.760
<v Speaker 1>hard the world the software that that lets you do it.

0:25:54.480 --> 0:25:56.159
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, if you can, if you can choose a

0:25:56.200 --> 0:26:00.320
<v Speaker 1>password manager that allow you to create longer passwords and

0:26:00.400 --> 0:26:03.960
<v Speaker 1>to save them automatically in the in your database, that's

0:26:03.960 --> 0:26:06.720
<v Speaker 1>a good thing, especially if your database is encrypted wherever

0:26:06.800 --> 0:26:08.480
<v Speaker 1>it is, whether it's on the cloud or on your

0:26:08.560 --> 0:26:11.800
<v Speaker 1>your hard drive or your phone. UM. You know those

0:26:11.880 --> 0:26:16.400
<v Speaker 1>that's important to know. UM. Also, one of the interesting things,

0:26:16.400 --> 0:26:18.560
<v Speaker 1>and this is one of those things that companies, do

0:26:19.040 --> 0:26:25.120
<v Speaker 1>that make your security less uh more open. Let's say

0:26:25.160 --> 0:26:29.280
<v Speaker 1>to to being cracked is uh people who for their

0:26:29.320 --> 0:26:34.280
<v Speaker 1>accounts have their email address UM as their user name.

0:26:34.320 --> 0:26:37.600
<v Speaker 1>Because these are this is sort of the equivalent of

0:26:37.600 --> 0:26:42.240
<v Speaker 1>of linking accounts. So you know, anybody, Let's say somebody

0:26:42.320 --> 0:26:45.720
<v Speaker 1>hacks into UM an account like they did with that

0:26:46.240 --> 0:26:50.200
<v Speaker 1>large shopping provider, the one that had all the uh

0:26:50.480 --> 0:26:54.480
<v Speaker 1>loyalty programs or cards. Uh. If they if they say, well,

0:26:54.520 --> 0:26:58.800
<v Speaker 1>all they got was people's email addresses, Well that's an

0:26:58.800 --> 0:27:01.760
<v Speaker 1>important part of the equation. So maybe they'll start using

0:27:01.960 --> 0:27:05.040
<v Speaker 1>that email address that they got from those loyalty cards

0:27:05.080 --> 0:27:10.040
<v Speaker 1>in accounts with Amazon and Facebook and Google and all

0:27:10.040 --> 0:27:13.000
<v Speaker 1>these other places. They may start figuring out where your

0:27:13.040 --> 0:27:15.639
<v Speaker 1>accounts are. If they can figure out, you know, using

0:27:15.680 --> 0:27:18.720
<v Speaker 1>that user name and they identify one of the passwords,

0:27:19.160 --> 0:27:24.000
<v Speaker 1>then the dominoes start to fall. So uh, using multiple

0:27:24.359 --> 0:27:28.119
<v Speaker 1>user names and especially not your email address, you can

0:27:28.520 --> 0:27:32.040
<v Speaker 1>arrange that. That's very helpful as well. UM. You wouldn't

0:27:32.040 --> 0:27:34.600
<v Speaker 1>necessarily think it right off the shelf, but when you

0:27:34.640 --> 0:27:38.280
<v Speaker 1>think that these these people are putting together databases of

0:27:38.359 --> 0:27:42.840
<v Speaker 1>this information, it makes it clear that varying as much

0:27:42.840 --> 0:27:46.760
<v Speaker 1>information as possible is a good idea. Also, changing your

0:27:46.800 --> 0:27:51.119
<v Speaker 1>passwords regularly. Let's say you do have a banking site. Um,

0:27:51.280 --> 0:27:55.720
<v Speaker 1>you have a fifteen character password. It's got four different

0:27:55.720 --> 0:27:58.879
<v Speaker 1>symbols in a upper and lower case letters and numbers.

0:27:58.920 --> 0:28:02.119
<v Speaker 1>That's pretty secure. You should probably change it every few months,

0:28:02.560 --> 0:28:04.640
<v Speaker 1>just to be on the safe side. This is your

0:28:04.640 --> 0:28:07.040
<v Speaker 1>financial information we're talking about. It's a good idea to

0:28:07.040 --> 0:28:09.560
<v Speaker 1>swap it out. And you know, another nice thing is

0:28:09.600 --> 0:28:12.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot of those password managers will even have a

0:28:12.359 --> 0:28:15.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, you can set a reminder on many of

0:28:15.440 --> 0:28:18.359
<v Speaker 1>them that you know they'll they'll keep a track of

0:28:18.480 --> 0:28:21.600
<v Speaker 1>when you established a particular password and let you know

0:28:21.680 --> 0:28:24.719
<v Speaker 1>when it's time you should change it up. And again,

0:28:25.040 --> 0:28:26.960
<v Speaker 1>if you're using one of these that has a password

0:28:26.960 --> 0:28:29.240
<v Speaker 1>generator is part of it, then all it takes is

0:28:29.280 --> 0:28:32.760
<v Speaker 1>logging in and uh often it'll go ahead and fill

0:28:32.760 --> 0:28:35.439
<v Speaker 1>out the forms that you need already and then you

0:28:35.480 --> 0:28:38.000
<v Speaker 1>just press a little button to generate a new password.

0:28:38.080 --> 0:28:40.840
<v Speaker 1>It will save the new password to your account. So

0:28:40.960 --> 0:28:42.960
<v Speaker 1>I mean it's something that takes five seconds once you've

0:28:42.960 --> 0:28:45.840
<v Speaker 1>set up the first time, and uh, you know, five

0:28:45.880 --> 0:28:50.080
<v Speaker 1>seconds of effort to keep crackers at bay is not

0:28:50.200 --> 0:28:53.360
<v Speaker 1>a bad idea. Uh. And keep in mind also that

0:28:53.480 --> 0:28:58.680
<v Speaker 1>as GPUs become more sophisticated, um, as software gets more sophisticated,

0:28:58.720 --> 0:29:03.520
<v Speaker 1>as as these algorithms get more sophisticated, it's gonna get

0:29:03.520 --> 0:29:06.600
<v Speaker 1>harder and harder to protect the password. You know, you

0:29:06.600 --> 0:29:10.480
<v Speaker 1>can play the game of adding more characters, which does

0:29:11.320 --> 0:29:16.720
<v Speaker 1>uh increase the difficulties significantly to get the positive hit.

0:29:17.480 --> 0:29:21.760
<v Speaker 1>So uh, you know, we we can stay ahead just

0:29:21.840 --> 0:29:25.000
<v Speaker 1>by adding longer and longer passwords as we go along.

0:29:25.760 --> 0:29:28.800
<v Speaker 1>But you know that's a game that ultimately we're gonna

0:29:28.800 --> 0:29:30.280
<v Speaker 1>have to sit there and say we need to find

0:29:30.320 --> 0:29:33.640
<v Speaker 1>a new way to protect stuff. Because that's the problem

0:29:33.680 --> 0:29:37.000
<v Speaker 1>is that you know, you're, you're you're just playing a

0:29:37.000 --> 0:29:39.560
<v Speaker 1>game of cat and mouse at that point. And you know,

0:29:39.600 --> 0:29:43.360
<v Speaker 1>we talked about quantum computers a few times. One of

0:29:43.400 --> 0:29:45.680
<v Speaker 1>the potential things a quantum computer could be very good

0:29:45.720 --> 0:29:52.880
<v Speaker 1>at is cracking codes. Because a quantum computer is is

0:29:53.360 --> 0:29:59.800
<v Speaker 1>also really well equipped for parallel processing um. So that's

0:30:00.320 --> 0:30:02.480
<v Speaker 1>something else to think about, is that now. Granted, right now,

0:30:02.600 --> 0:30:07.240
<v Speaker 1>quantum computers are still largely theoretical. There are a few

0:30:07.320 --> 0:30:11.640
<v Speaker 1>working examples, but they're notoriously difficult to design and even

0:30:11.760 --> 0:30:16.520
<v Speaker 1>more difficult to maintain because you know, the slightest alteration

0:30:16.680 --> 0:30:21.840
<v Speaker 1>and they there the whole coherence problem becomes apparent. Yeah,

0:30:21.880 --> 0:30:26.280
<v Speaker 1>either it is or it isn't toward maybe, Um. Yeah,

0:30:26.360 --> 0:30:29.520
<v Speaker 1>and uh I also read another article on on Ours

0:30:29.560 --> 0:30:33.560
<v Speaker 1>Technica by the same author actually, where they had discovered

0:30:33.560 --> 0:30:37.920
<v Speaker 1>that in versions of Windows seven and eight, Um, it's

0:30:37.920 --> 0:30:43.480
<v Speaker 1>possible to get hold of people's security questions. Uh. Now

0:30:44.760 --> 0:30:47.520
<v Speaker 1>that sounds I think it's easy to come off with

0:30:47.640 --> 0:30:50.600
<v Speaker 1>a negative. That seems like it's a negative against Microsoft,

0:30:50.640 --> 0:30:52.480
<v Speaker 1>and I guess in a way it is. But it

0:30:52.520 --> 0:30:56.760
<v Speaker 1>assumes first that the person has the person's computer. You

0:30:56.800 --> 0:30:58.719
<v Speaker 1>would actually have to have their computer to get it,

0:30:59.240 --> 0:31:03.000
<v Speaker 1>and you'd also have and now how to retrieve that information.

0:31:03.240 --> 0:31:05.560
<v Speaker 1>But that goes back to our discussion of Matt Honan too,

0:31:05.560 --> 0:31:08.920
<v Speaker 1>because if uh, you know a lot of these security

0:31:08.920 --> 0:31:11.880
<v Speaker 1>words that you set up to talk to people on

0:31:11.920 --> 0:31:15.440
<v Speaker 1>the phone about your account, or you set them up online.

0:31:15.760 --> 0:31:18.239
<v Speaker 1>You know, what's the name of your first pet, you know,

0:31:18.360 --> 0:31:21.600
<v Speaker 1>and you put in your first dog's name, and then

0:31:21.680 --> 0:31:24.800
<v Speaker 1>you use that in multiple places, then want that was

0:31:24.880 --> 0:31:27.560
<v Speaker 1>what enabled them to get hold of that information? If

0:31:27.600 --> 0:31:30.000
<v Speaker 1>this person got hold of your computer was able to

0:31:30.040 --> 0:31:34.040
<v Speaker 1>pull that out from the log in help. They could

0:31:34.120 --> 0:31:36.440
<v Speaker 1>use that on your accounts too, So it might be

0:31:36.480 --> 0:31:39.080
<v Speaker 1>a little good to use some reverse social engineering. And

0:31:39.120 --> 0:31:42.000
<v Speaker 1>when someone asks you what who what you're uh the

0:31:42.080 --> 0:31:44.959
<v Speaker 1>name of your first dog was or first pet was,

0:31:45.360 --> 0:31:50.440
<v Speaker 1>you put your favorite uh form of salad dressing in

0:31:50.440 --> 0:31:54.000
<v Speaker 1>there instead something something unusual that they wouldn't be able

0:31:54.040 --> 0:31:57.680
<v Speaker 1>to pick. So that, which, by the way, obvious, is

0:31:57.720 --> 0:32:01.479
<v Speaker 1>a blast when you have to call has you've forgotten

0:32:01.480 --> 0:32:05.160
<v Speaker 1>your passwords stuff, and you call in and then they're like, so,

0:32:06.120 --> 0:32:12.520
<v Speaker 1>what's your favorite pets name? Paul Newman's Thousand Island dressing. Yeah,

0:32:12.920 --> 0:32:18.640
<v Speaker 1>that's right. Well I'll tell you that this is and

0:32:18.720 --> 0:32:21.480
<v Speaker 1>anybody who's frustrated by this conversation and will tell you

0:32:21.520 --> 0:32:27.440
<v Speaker 1>that using these super secure passwords and obviously a fustutory

0:32:27.960 --> 0:32:31.840
<v Speaker 1>material here is a pain in the neck because you know,

0:32:31.840 --> 0:32:33.520
<v Speaker 1>if you don't have to have your password manager with

0:32:33.520 --> 0:32:35.480
<v Speaker 1>you when you're on a friends computer logging in to

0:32:35.560 --> 0:32:37.840
<v Speaker 1>check your mail and it's got some kind of thirty

0:32:37.840 --> 0:32:41.960
<v Speaker 1>two character weird password and you don't remember it, and

0:32:42.040 --> 0:32:44.480
<v Speaker 1>you're going, man, I know, no one's ever going to

0:32:44.520 --> 0:32:48.000
<v Speaker 1>crack into this computer. It's a friends computer. I'm fairly saying, well, yeah,

0:32:48.040 --> 0:32:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you probably are fairly safe, but it's probably worth a

0:32:51.840 --> 0:32:54.920
<v Speaker 1>frustration then, more so than it will be having to

0:32:54.920 --> 0:32:57.560
<v Speaker 1>put out all the fires of all the account information

0:32:57.560 --> 0:32:59.720
<v Speaker 1>that you could be giving up otherwise. And it's not

0:33:00.120 --> 0:33:02.760
<v Speaker 1>so much worrying about your friends computer as it is

0:33:02.840 --> 0:33:05.880
<v Speaker 1>worrying about that database that's on the other end of

0:33:05.880 --> 0:33:12.280
<v Speaker 1>this password system. Because, uh, the more passwords a company accumulates,

0:33:12.280 --> 0:33:14.120
<v Speaker 1>as more and more people use its service, the more

0:33:14.160 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>attractive it is as a target to crackers. And they're

0:33:17.800 --> 0:33:20.280
<v Speaker 1>doing you know, that's that's what they do. They look

0:33:20.320 --> 0:33:23.040
<v Speaker 1>at systems and try and find ways of of penetrating it.

0:33:23.160 --> 0:33:27.120
<v Speaker 1>So it's you know, they're not they're not worried about

0:33:27.160 --> 0:33:30.520
<v Speaker 1>getting your your buddy bills computer. They're looking at you know,

0:33:31.240 --> 0:33:34.360
<v Speaker 1>like Mega core that has all those passwords in it.

0:33:34.440 --> 0:33:38.280
<v Speaker 1>That's what they want. So you know, using that easy password,

0:33:38.760 --> 0:33:45.520
<v Speaker 1>while it's convenient, is also ultimately a dangerous thing. And

0:33:45.920 --> 0:33:48.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, I gotta I gotta admit, like, for the

0:33:48.760 --> 0:33:54.040
<v Speaker 1>very long time, I had pretty poor password protection, and

0:33:54.320 --> 0:33:56.280
<v Speaker 1>I just I was just I did not I was

0:33:56.320 --> 0:33:59.680
<v Speaker 1>not very good about it at all. Even as we

0:33:59.680 --> 0:34:04.240
<v Speaker 1>were telling people change your passwords, still wasn't doing as

0:34:04.400 --> 0:34:06.160
<v Speaker 1>as good a job as I should have. But you

0:34:06.200 --> 0:34:08.399
<v Speaker 1>don't back up your hard drive regularly? Oh yes I do,

0:34:08.920 --> 0:34:11.640
<v Speaker 1>I do good. I got well the MAC hard drive,

0:34:12.520 --> 0:34:14.520
<v Speaker 1>my my PC hard drive. I do not back up

0:34:14.520 --> 0:34:16.640
<v Speaker 1>as regularly as I should which really I need to

0:34:16.640 --> 0:34:20.400
<v Speaker 1>start doing that. But the in the neck. But but

0:34:20.480 --> 0:34:23.080
<v Speaker 1>cloud services have made that really a lot better too,

0:34:23.640 --> 0:34:26.279
<v Speaker 1>now you know. Cloud of course has its own set

0:34:26.360 --> 0:34:28.600
<v Speaker 1>of problems, which we've talked about in previous podcasts. But

0:34:28.680 --> 0:34:31.400
<v Speaker 1>everything technological has its own set of problems. You just

0:34:31.440 --> 0:34:33.879
<v Speaker 1>have to decide which ones are the most acceptable set

0:34:33.880 --> 0:34:37.520
<v Speaker 1>of problems for you. So, but I have I have switched.

0:34:37.560 --> 0:34:41.279
<v Speaker 1>I mean I am now I am wholeheartedly in this.

0:34:41.920 --> 0:34:44.600
<v Speaker 1>Let's protect our passwords, especially after saying what happened to Honan.

0:34:45.440 --> 0:34:47.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you and I are in the public eye.

0:34:47.960 --> 0:34:51.520
<v Speaker 1>We're not celebrities by any stretch of the imagination. But

0:34:51.800 --> 0:34:55.399
<v Speaker 1>it's not that far, um, it's not. It's not all

0:34:55.480 --> 0:34:58.160
<v Speaker 1>the realm of possibility that someone at some point could say,

0:34:58.160 --> 0:35:00.680
<v Speaker 1>you know what would be funny? Well, and and it

0:35:00.800 --> 0:35:03.319
<v Speaker 1>just really takes somebody getting ahold of your name. Yeah,

0:35:03.360 --> 0:35:06.160
<v Speaker 1>that's why they tell people to shred when you have

0:35:06.239 --> 0:35:07.920
<v Speaker 1>a junk mail or something with your name on it,

0:35:07.960 --> 0:35:10.560
<v Speaker 1>to shred that information. Because I've got one of those two.

0:35:10.640 --> 0:35:13.799
<v Speaker 1>You never know when somebody's gonna go and you know,

0:35:13.880 --> 0:35:15.919
<v Speaker 1>say Jonathan's chickline. I bet there's a bunch of people

0:35:15.960 --> 0:35:19.319
<v Speaker 1>named that. Actually there are. So one of them got

0:35:19.320 --> 0:35:22.479
<v Speaker 1>booked in North Atlanta for something a couple of weeks ago,

0:35:22.560 --> 0:35:25.440
<v Speaker 1>but wasn't me. I won't ask how you know that

0:35:25.480 --> 0:35:28.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm on the lamp because I've got a Google alert

0:35:28.719 --> 0:35:34.399
<v Speaker 1>said to my name, because because how many egomaniac I'm

0:35:34.400 --> 0:35:36.759
<v Speaker 1>an egomaniac, I have a Google alert said to my name.

0:35:36.960 --> 0:35:39.480
<v Speaker 1>I saw a Google alert. I went and I said,

0:35:39.880 --> 0:35:42.560
<v Speaker 1>someone named me was arrested. But it's not me, because

0:35:42.560 --> 0:35:44.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm looking at the picture and that's not me. So

0:35:44.760 --> 0:35:47.240
<v Speaker 1>I am comforted to know I am not currently under arrest.

0:35:47.960 --> 0:35:50.120
<v Speaker 1>That's good to know. It was good to know the

0:35:50.160 --> 0:35:52.239
<v Speaker 1>police wanted a few words with me earlier, and you

0:35:52.239 --> 0:35:55.000
<v Speaker 1>know I can tell him the truth. I gotta go alright, guys,

0:35:55.120 --> 0:35:58.040
<v Speaker 1>if you have any suggestions for future topics on tech stuff,

0:35:58.160 --> 0:36:04.440
<v Speaker 1>um biometrics that earning perhaps like what's it like the

0:36:04.520 --> 0:36:07.759
<v Speaker 1>podcast Out of the Penitentiary. Let us know. You can

0:36:07.760 --> 0:36:10.799
<v Speaker 1>send us email our addresses tech stuff at Discovery dot com,

0:36:11.000 --> 0:36:14.120
<v Speaker 1>or contact us on Facebook or Twitter. Are handled. There

0:36:14.200 --> 0:36:17.439
<v Speaker 1>is tech stuff hsw and Chris will talk to you soon.

0:36:17.680 --> 0:36:20.680
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk to you in ten to twenty for more

0:36:20.719 --> 0:36:23.000
<v Speaker 1>on this and thousands of other topics. Is it how

0:36:23.040 --> 0:36:29.239
<v Speaker 1>staff works dot com? See, guys, I told you we

0:36:29.320 --> 0:36:32.400
<v Speaker 1>talked to you again. Really soon. That really soon is

0:36:32.520 --> 0:36:35.200
<v Speaker 1>right now. I'm just reminding you that we have our

0:36:35.200 --> 0:36:38.799
<v Speaker 1>photo upload widget live on the site at www dot

0:36:38.800 --> 0:36:42.160
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0:36:42.200 --> 0:36:45.080
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0:36:45.320 --> 0:36:49.200
<v Speaker 1>So send us those pictures of your modifications, your tech ideas,

0:36:49.400 --> 0:36:52.160
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0:36:52.200 --> 0:36:55.800
<v Speaker 1>steampunking everything in sight, put on your goggles and show

0:36:55.880 --> 0:36:58.719
<v Speaker 1>that to us. We can't wait to see them. Brought

0:36:58.760 --> 0:37:01.960
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0:37:02.120 --> 0:37:02.760
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