WEBVTT - What is a denial of service attack?

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello there, everybody,

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<v Speaker 1>and welcome to tech stuff. My name is Chris Poulette

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm an editor here at how stuff works dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>Sitting next to me, as usual, is senior writer Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, Crispy. Alrighty, then, so what we got on

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<v Speaker 1>tap for today? Well, what we have on tap to

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<v Speaker 1>start us off is a little a listener mail. And

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<v Speaker 1>this listener mail comes from Dorian, and Dorian says, Hey, guys,

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<v Speaker 1>I really enjoy listening to your podcast. I've been hearing

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff about an attack on Twitter and Facebook,

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<v Speaker 1>and I was wondering what that is all about. I

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<v Speaker 1>heard Twitter was down for several hours, while Facebook took

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<v Speaker 1>it like a man and was knocked down to about

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<v Speaker 1>But still, what's going on? Keep up with a great podcast, Dorian.

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<v Speaker 1>Thanks Dorion. Actually I already responded to Dorian to let

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<v Speaker 1>him know what was going on, but I thought we

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<v Speaker 1>could talk about what happened in general and then get

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<v Speaker 1>down to some specifics. So in general, we're talking about

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<v Speaker 1>a denial of service attack. Yeah. Actually, um, this is

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<v Speaker 1>nothing new. Denial of service attacks have been going on

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<v Speaker 1>for quite some time, and part of the reason for

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<v Speaker 1>that is they're really simple to cause it's a very

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<v Speaker 1>very simple attack on it on a network. Yeah, there's

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<v Speaker 1>actually a couple of different ways you can you can

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<v Speaker 1>perform a denial of service attack. That two most common

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<v Speaker 1>ways really are you can flood a server with requests

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<v Speaker 1>so that it becomes overwhelmed and then shuts down. Or

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<v Speaker 1>you can send a special kind of request to a

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<v Speaker 1>server where you you happen to know that the server

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<v Speaker 1>has certain vulnerabilities, and by sending us a specific kind

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<v Speaker 1>of command, it will cause the server to, uh to

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<v Speaker 1>essentially have a little bit of a freak out. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't know how to handle the command, so it

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<v Speaker 1>ends up shutting down. Um. That way, so in one

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<v Speaker 1>case you're talking about just sending a stream of attacks,

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<v Speaker 1>and then another you just it's like a well placed

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<v Speaker 1>sniper bullet. All right, Then that's that's interesting analogy I

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<v Speaker 1>hadn't heard before, you know, I'm all about the interesting analogies. Okay, then,

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<v Speaker 1>so one shot, one kill. Now the the the denial

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<v Speaker 1>of service attacks like like Chris was saying, aren't really new. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>And really, a a simple denial of service attack isn't

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<v Speaker 1>the most difficult thing to defend yourself against if you

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<v Speaker 1>are targeted by one, because a very simple denial of

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<v Speaker 1>service attack is coming from a single source. Yeah. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>denial of service can be as simple as sending thousands

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<v Speaker 1>and thousands of email messages uh to a single server. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>Basically instead of you know, handling everything one at a time.

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<v Speaker 1>There you know, there's a log jam of information going

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<v Speaker 1>at the server UM, and uh you know pretty soon

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<v Speaker 1>the computer the other end can't handle it all. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>this is not something that you could do, uh if

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<v Speaker 1>you wanted to crank up you know, Mozilla Thunderbird, You're

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<v Speaker 1>not gonna be able to to, uh, you know, overwhelm

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<v Speaker 1>a server by sending it messages one by one. You

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<v Speaker 1>would have to dump thousands and thousands of messages per

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<v Speaker 1>second um onto that server in order to overwhelm it. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>And so really, you know that the to really understand

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<v Speaker 1>denial of service attack, you just really get to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of think about the way uh communication across the web works. Essentially,

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<v Speaker 1>whenever you are doing anything on the web where you

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<v Speaker 1>are trying to retrieve information. You are sending out a

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<v Speaker 1>request from your computer to whichever computer out there on

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<v Speaker 1>the network happens to hold this information. That computer then

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<v Speaker 1>sees where this request is coming from and sends the

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<v Speaker 1>information to you. So, uh, denial of service takes advantage

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<v Speaker 1>of this. Um, if you are really clever, when you

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<v Speaker 1>create your denial of service attack, you will send messages

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<v Speaker 1>to a computer and your uh, you're essentially your return

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<v Speaker 1>address will be masked or or um smurfd or spoofed

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<v Speaker 1>if you prefer. And uh, so the the server will

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<v Speaker 1>try and respond by sending messages to either a nonexistent

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<v Speaker 1>IP address or or one that belongs to someone else

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<v Speaker 1>that doesn't belong to you. Uh makes it a little

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<v Speaker 1>more difficult to track where the attacks are coming from.

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<v Speaker 1>That way, Um, But because that's the way the web works,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you send a request and then the server responds.

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<v Speaker 1>That's how you take advantage of it. I mean, it's

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<v Speaker 1>it's kind of an obligatory response, right. You can't just

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<v Speaker 1>ignore it unless you build that into a firewall. Yeah. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>And and that's the whole thing is Uh, the web

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<v Speaker 1>is doing what it's naturally designed to do in this case.

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<v Speaker 1>So I mean, if it didn't work that way, you

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be able to get information when you needed it.

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<v Speaker 1>You'd load up your web browser, you would go to say,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know www. Dot how stuff works dot com?

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<v Speaker 1>And if it didn't automatically serve up that website, you

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't you wouldn't get anything in your browser. The the

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<v Speaker 1>web just would not work without this kind of process.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's what the attackers take advantage of. Yep. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>um uh. Spoofing is one way to mask an attack.

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<v Speaker 1>Another way would be to build a massive army of bots, right,

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<v Speaker 1>or a zombie army as we call it. And then

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<v Speaker 1>you wouldn't even have to launch it an attack from

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<v Speaker 1>the primary primary computer at all. You can just have

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<v Speaker 1>all your you know, zombies attack it for you. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>this this is a multi step process. Let's say that

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<v Speaker 1>you are a nefarious hacker who is intent on bringing

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<v Speaker 1>down some poor company's website. Right, So you are an

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<v Speaker 1>unscrupulous person and you want to cause lots of damage.

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<v Speaker 1>First of all, shame on you, But how would you

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<v Speaker 1>do this? Well, the first step if you're wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>do one of these attacks, which By the way, these

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<v Speaker 1>are called distributed denial of service attacks because the attack

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<v Speaker 1>is distributed across an army of computers as opposed to

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<v Speaker 1>coming from just one source. Yeah, makes it which also

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<v Speaker 1>makes it just that much worse because now it's not

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<v Speaker 1>coming from one computer, it's coming from lots and lots

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<v Speaker 1>of computer. Right you, your options become more limited when

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<v Speaker 1>you are dealing with a distributed denial of service attack.

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<v Speaker 1>You can't just shut off access from one IP address

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<v Speaker 1>and hope to be all right, because, of course the

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<v Speaker 1>attack is coming from every direction imaginable. So the first

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<v Speaker 1>step in creating one of these attacks is to build

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<v Speaker 1>your zombie army. And the way you do this is

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<v Speaker 1>you create malware, so malicious software and often in the

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<v Speaker 1>form of a trojan, where you trick innocent people into

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<v Speaker 1>installing software that will create a backdoor to their operating system,

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<v Speaker 1>often completely disguised so that it's really really difficult to

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<v Speaker 1>detect the fact that someone has intruded upon your your computer.

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<v Speaker 1>And you do this enough times where you compromise enough

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<v Speaker 1>computers where you can direct all of these computers at

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<v Speaker 1>the same time. You can then send usually a pretty

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<v Speaker 1>simple command to start peppering a target, in this case,

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<v Speaker 1>the company's server, the one the company company that you

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<v Speaker 1>wanted to attack in the first place. And you tell

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<v Speaker 1>all of these computers to start sending thousands upon thousands

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<v Speaker 1>of messages or requests electronic requests to this one company

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<v Speaker 1>server all at the same time, and it just becomes

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<v Speaker 1>a massive attack, and it will eventually, uh either overwhelmed

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<v Speaker 1>the server or I mean, if the if the people

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<v Speaker 1>working at the company are really clever, they may be

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<v Speaker 1>able to uh to get around without it bogging everything

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<v Speaker 1>down for too long. But usually it'll it will at

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<v Speaker 1>least cause some massive headaches for a few hours, which

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<v Speaker 1>is pretty much what happened with the Twitter case. But

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<v Speaker 1>we'll get into that a little bit more later, okay. UM. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>And and you know, with these situations, the cys admin,

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<v Speaker 1>the system administrator UM on the receiving end of this,

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<v Speaker 1>by this point, probably woken up at two a m.

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<v Speaker 1>Caffeine free, unshaven and in his jammies somewhere in a

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<v Speaker 1>big room full of machines that aren't working where they're

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to. UM is going to have to try and

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<v Speaker 1>figure out where this is going. Because UM, for a

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<v Speaker 1>distributed denial of service attack to work, it has to

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<v Speaker 1>be targeted at one specific point. That's how it overwhelms

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<v Speaker 1>the server. So UM he or she is going to

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<v Speaker 1>try and figure out what port um that attack is

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<v Speaker 1>coming from is directed toward and shut it down to

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<v Speaker 1>keep the service from being overwhelmed. The thing is that's

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<v Speaker 1>where all the other traffic is going through, the legitimate traffic,

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<v Speaker 1>so UM, you know there there's a problem here. It's

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<v Speaker 1>also got to be rerouted. So you basically have to

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<v Speaker 1>tell the legitimate traffic, Hey, go through this hole in

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<v Speaker 1>our firewall, use this hole to go send messages to

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<v Speaker 1>our server, and we'll send him back through this port.

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<v Speaker 1>And we're not going to tell the guys who are

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<v Speaker 1>sending these uh attacks against us. And sometimes that restore

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<v Speaker 1>service pretty quickly, right, and sometimes it takes hours and

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<v Speaker 1>hours or even days before service returns. Um. Another another

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<v Speaker 1>thing I wanted to point out is to make this

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<v Speaker 1>even more difficult to trace, because I'm sure you can

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<v Speaker 1>imagine if you are being attacked, if your service being

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<v Speaker 1>attacked by a zombie army, you know, you start looking

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<v Speaker 1>at the the the origin of these attacks, you're going

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<v Speaker 1>to find the victimized computers, you're not necessarily going to

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<v Speaker 1>be able to trace it back to the original computer

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers computer. Um to make that even more difficult

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<v Speaker 1>to trace, they can a hacker can use something called reflectors. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>this is really nasty. This it's different. It's different. That's

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<v Speaker 1>good that you have those, because I've seen plenty of

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<v Speaker 1>bikers who have not had those. I'm amazed they're still upright. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>but no, these reflectors are totally different. So let's get

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<v Speaker 1>off that tangent right now. The way this works is

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<v Speaker 1>that the hacker sends a command to the zombie army.

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<v Speaker 1>The zombie armies sending requests to other computers, innocent computers

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<v Speaker 1>that have not been compromised by any sort of malware whatsoever.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, so these are just average servers and computers

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<v Speaker 1>across the net. But what the the zombie computers are

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<v Speaker 1>doing is they're sending it as if the messages were

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<v Speaker 1>coming from the targeted server. So let's use a let's

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<v Speaker 1>use a name. Let's say that it's CNN's server. So

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<v Speaker 1>the the hackerson's the command to his zombie army. The

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<v Speaker 1>zombie army all start sending messages to various computers. Across

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<v Speaker 1>the net as if those messages were coming from CNN.

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<v Speaker 1>All of those computers and servers respond to this request

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<v Speaker 1>by sending data to CNN's server, which of course has

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<v Speaker 1>not set anything out at this point, so it's getting

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<v Speaker 1>responses to messages it has not sent. It gets overwhelmed

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<v Speaker 1>by the traffic and by the fact that it's getting

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<v Speaker 1>responses to something that it didn't even do, and then

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<v Speaker 1>you have your denial of distributed denial of service attack,

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<v Speaker 1>basically using it against itself. Yes, it's it's both really

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<v Speaker 1>clever and really nasty. Yeah, yeah, I would agree with that. Ye. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a couple of different ways you can talk about,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, what you should do in case of a

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<v Speaker 1>denial of service attack, but really the best defense is

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<v Speaker 1>to just practice smart, safe web behaviors, you know, because

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<v Speaker 1>the only way denial of service distributed denial service attacks

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<v Speaker 1>work is for people to download the software that turns

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<v Speaker 1>their computer into a zombie in the first place. Right

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<v Speaker 1>that's true. You you know, you could already have participated

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<v Speaker 1>in one of these, if you've ever had one of these,

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<v Speaker 1>you could be participating in one right now. That's true,

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<v Speaker 1>and you may not even know it. You know, you

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<v Speaker 1>might have a computer that's running a little slowly, but

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<v Speaker 1>otherwise you might not realize it. Yeah, So if you

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<v Speaker 1>if you just practice those safe behaviors, you know, you

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<v Speaker 1>don't don't go to UH just don't click on on

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<v Speaker 1>weird links that you don't recognize. UM. Make sure you

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<v Speaker 1>have good anti virus and anti spywear UH software and

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<v Speaker 1>make sure you're running it regularly and that you keep

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<v Speaker 1>it updated. Make sure that you install patches when you

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<v Speaker 1>get them. A lot of the malware, the way it

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<v Speaker 1>works is that it will target a specific vulnerability that

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<v Speaker 1>a hacker will find out about a specific kind of

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<v Speaker 1>operating system. So let's say you're running Windows Vista and

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<v Speaker 1>there is a known vulnerability. Well, Microsoft is going to

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<v Speaker 1>release patches that patch the security holes on on a

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<v Speaker 1>fairly regular basis, but you have to install them for

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<v Speaker 1>them to work. If you don't update your system, it

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<v Speaker 1>will remain vulnerable. So, I mean, we talk about in

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<v Speaker 1>the office a lot about how annoying it is to

0:12:38.880 --> 0:12:42.720
<v Speaker 1>get system updates that require you to reboot your system,

0:12:42.840 --> 0:12:45.679
<v Speaker 1>and it it takes forever to download them, I mean,

0:12:45.760 --> 0:12:48.800
<v Speaker 1>like yesterday. Yeah. But on the other hand, if it

0:12:48.960 --> 0:12:51.079
<v Speaker 1>means that it prevents your computer from becoming part of

0:12:51.120 --> 0:12:54.600
<v Speaker 1>a zombie army. That's a good thing. So, I mean

0:12:54.640 --> 0:12:58.079
<v Speaker 1>I'm irritated by them too. But so now we we

0:12:58.200 --> 0:13:00.480
<v Speaker 1>talked about the flooding ones, let me just talk a

0:13:00.640 --> 0:13:03.679
<v Speaker 1>little bit about the other kind, which is that's the

0:13:03.760 --> 0:13:07.760
<v Speaker 1>kind that send um an attack that that just sort

0:13:07.800 --> 0:13:11.360
<v Speaker 1>of confuses the computer. Um. That's a it's a really

0:13:11.400 --> 0:13:14.200
<v Speaker 1>a logic or a software attack. And there's several different

0:13:14.280 --> 0:13:18.560
<v Speaker 1>kinds of that as well. And this is just where

0:13:18.640 --> 0:13:22.120
<v Speaker 1>you you come up with a command, uh that gives

0:13:22.160 --> 0:13:24.960
<v Speaker 1>a computer trouble. It just it's not able to try.

0:13:25.080 --> 0:13:27.920
<v Speaker 1>It's not really able to execute the command as um.

0:13:28.160 --> 0:13:31.199
<v Speaker 1>It should be able to. It tries to, but it can't.

0:13:31.640 --> 0:13:33.480
<v Speaker 1>Like when you provide one by zero and it gets

0:13:33.480 --> 0:13:36.559
<v Speaker 1>stuck in an infinite loop something like that, or or

0:13:36.679 --> 0:13:41.319
<v Speaker 1>you ask a robot of paradox and then it explodes. Yes,

0:13:42.120 --> 0:13:45.880
<v Speaker 1>when the owner of the robot finds out right, Yeah,

0:13:45.880 --> 0:13:48.400
<v Speaker 1>I was thinking of the Futurama episode with the Evil

0:13:48.480 --> 0:13:52.320
<v Speaker 1>Santa Claus robot. They say, well, if you if you are,

0:13:52.640 --> 0:13:56.000
<v Speaker 1>if your programmed to kill everyone who's naughty, isn't that naughty?

0:13:56.120 --> 0:13:58.920
<v Speaker 1>And doesn't that mean you should kill yourself, which, by

0:13:58.960 --> 0:14:01.000
<v Speaker 1>the way, is not actually a paradox, but that that's

0:14:01.040 --> 0:14:03.960
<v Speaker 1>what they called it in the episode. Um, but yeah,

0:14:04.160 --> 0:14:06.360
<v Speaker 1>it's the equivalent of that, you're sending a computer a

0:14:06.559 --> 0:14:09.439
<v Speaker 1>a question that it is not able to answer, and

0:14:09.800 --> 0:14:12.079
<v Speaker 1>uh that again, it's one of those things where once

0:14:12.120 --> 0:14:14.080
<v Speaker 1>you realize that this is a problem, you can adjust

0:14:14.160 --> 0:14:18.400
<v Speaker 1>the computer's programming so that it no longer uh has

0:14:18.480 --> 0:14:20.440
<v Speaker 1>that trouble. But you know, you have to you have

0:14:20.480 --> 0:14:23.520
<v Speaker 1>to identify the problem first before you can fix it, obviously, right,

0:14:23.800 --> 0:14:29.440
<v Speaker 1>all right, my therapist tells me that nice. I have

0:14:29.640 --> 0:14:32.200
<v Speaker 1>no response to that. All right, So let's talk about

0:14:32.200 --> 0:14:34.360
<v Speaker 1>the first you heard it here. Let's talk about the

0:14:34.560 --> 0:14:38.720
<v Speaker 1>Twitter attacks, shall we. Okay, so what happened with Twitter?

0:14:39.000 --> 0:14:41.920
<v Speaker 1>And at the time that we're recording this, actually we're

0:14:42.120 --> 0:14:45.200
<v Speaker 1>we've gotten really close between recording and publishing right now,

0:14:45.640 --> 0:14:48.040
<v Speaker 1>so uh, this will go live pretty quickly. But the

0:14:48.760 --> 0:14:52.320
<v Speaker 1>the attack that happened on Twitter, um a while ago,

0:14:52.400 --> 0:14:55.200
<v Speaker 1>in a short while ago, was a kind of denial

0:14:55.280 --> 0:14:58.360
<v Speaker 1>of service attack, and it was interesting because it wasn't

0:14:58.680 --> 0:15:02.520
<v Speaker 1>meant to necess necessarily take down Twitter or Facebook or

0:15:02.680 --> 0:15:05.760
<v Speaker 1>live journal. Live journal was another site that was affected

0:15:05.800 --> 0:15:09.640
<v Speaker 1>by this attack. Um. In fact, this attack was specifically

0:15:09.800 --> 0:15:16.440
<v Speaker 1>targeted at a particular individual yep, a professor in fact,

0:15:16.960 --> 0:15:23.479
<v Speaker 1>um who was sort of providing a place for refugees

0:15:23.560 --> 0:15:28.080
<v Speaker 1>from from the from Georgia, the country, not the state. Um.

0:15:28.640 --> 0:15:33.360
<v Speaker 1>And it was some possibly Russian hackers that that targeted

0:15:33.960 --> 0:15:39.080
<v Speaker 1>this person's accounts and UH as a result, the site

0:15:39.080 --> 0:15:44.680
<v Speaker 1>suffered collateral damage. Twitter the worst of all of them, yep, yep. Well,

0:15:44.720 --> 0:15:46.360
<v Speaker 1>it's just one of those things where they were they

0:15:46.400 --> 0:15:50.080
<v Speaker 1>were trying apparently you know, of course they haven't exactly

0:15:50.280 --> 0:15:53.320
<v Speaker 1>stepped forward and said, yes, we're just trying to get

0:15:53.360 --> 0:15:56.000
<v Speaker 1>this one guy sorry the rest of you, right, um,

0:15:56.440 --> 0:15:59.480
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, they were apparently trying to silence him or

0:15:59.480 --> 0:16:02.440
<v Speaker 1>at least you know, on the web. And UH, in

0:16:02.560 --> 0:16:05.760
<v Speaker 1>the meantime, managed to take down Twitter for several hours,

0:16:06.600 --> 0:16:08.800
<v Speaker 1>not even a fail whale. Yeah, some of us, some

0:16:08.960 --> 0:16:13.440
<v Speaker 1>of us were having difficulty coping that day. A few

0:16:13.520 --> 0:16:16.160
<v Speaker 1>of you, yes, yeah, some of you out there were

0:16:16.200 --> 0:16:19.120
<v Speaker 1>probably having trouble. Um. I was in a corner weeping

0:16:19.360 --> 0:16:22.360
<v Speaker 1>for most of that day for those of us who

0:16:22.360 --> 0:16:24.960
<v Speaker 1>were trying to work. Yeah, I'm sorry about that. Uh,

0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:28.200
<v Speaker 1>the corner being the corner of Chris's desk because you know,

0:16:28.280 --> 0:16:33.160
<v Speaker 1>it's comfy over there. But yeah, it was bad, and

0:16:33.320 --> 0:16:35.680
<v Speaker 1>of course, you know you, you know, you're the first reaction.

0:16:35.760 --> 0:16:38.360
<v Speaker 1>Anyone has a Twitter's down. I should tweet about that.

0:16:38.840 --> 0:16:43.200
<v Speaker 1>Oh wait, I can't lematic. Yeah, there's sort of a

0:16:43.280 --> 0:16:47.440
<v Speaker 1>circular problem there. So the other interesting thing about this

0:16:47.600 --> 0:16:50.520
<v Speaker 1>is that by doing this attack, and by causing all

0:16:50.560 --> 0:16:54.160
<v Speaker 1>this collateral damage, the hacks are pretty much guaranteed that

0:16:55.040 --> 0:16:58.120
<v Speaker 1>way more attention is being directed towards this this person

0:16:58.200 --> 0:17:01.560
<v Speaker 1>they were trying to silence than they had anticipated. And

0:17:02.440 --> 0:17:08.720
<v Speaker 1>uh that may have actually hurt them more than helped them. True. Yeah,

0:17:08.840 --> 0:17:13.080
<v Speaker 1>it sort of makes a digital martyr anyway. Well, and

0:17:13.359 --> 0:17:15.399
<v Speaker 1>and now more people are aware of this person and

0:17:15.560 --> 0:17:18.399
<v Speaker 1>the message that he is trying to to convey. And

0:17:18.560 --> 0:17:23.520
<v Speaker 1>so really it's this was probably well, I mean, it

0:17:23.640 --> 0:17:25.920
<v Speaker 1>was already a bad thing to do, period, but it

0:17:26.040 --> 0:17:29.320
<v Speaker 1>was definitely a mistake on their part. I think so.

0:17:29.840 --> 0:17:33.359
<v Speaker 1>But that's exactly what happened, you know, you have someone

0:17:33.520 --> 0:17:37.240
<v Speaker 1>was using a sledgehammer to take care of a very

0:17:37.520 --> 0:17:42.760
<v Speaker 1>precise problem that they perceived. So fifty bit of alliteration there,

0:17:43.200 --> 0:17:47.320
<v Speaker 1>thank you. I I was not intending to do that,

0:17:47.440 --> 0:17:50.960
<v Speaker 1>but it just kind of happened. So we'll really that's

0:17:51.000 --> 0:17:53.880
<v Speaker 1>pretty much what I have about on denial of service attacks. Yeah,

0:17:54.280 --> 0:17:57.919
<v Speaker 1>it's um it's one of those things that is amazingly simple.

0:17:58.440 --> 0:18:00.720
<v Speaker 1>Yet when you factor in some of the things, like

0:18:01.359 --> 0:18:03.760
<v Speaker 1>you know how to stop them, and uh, you know,

0:18:03.920 --> 0:18:06.560
<v Speaker 1>the different kinds of attacks and some of the nasty

0:18:06.600 --> 0:18:10.240
<v Speaker 1>new twists they're throwing in, you know. I mean, we

0:18:10.320 --> 0:18:13.320
<v Speaker 1>can always hope that as consumers get more savvy about

0:18:13.400 --> 0:18:17.359
<v Speaker 1>computer security that these sort of attacks will decrease in number,

0:18:17.440 --> 0:18:20.920
<v Speaker 1>because again, it does really depend upon uh, the individual

0:18:21.040 --> 0:18:26.040
<v Speaker 1>victims trying to install this code on their computers to

0:18:26.320 --> 0:18:28.960
<v Speaker 1>to make themselves part of the zombie army for it

0:18:29.080 --> 0:18:31.960
<v Speaker 1>to work. The distributed ones anyway, the straight up denial

0:18:32.000 --> 0:18:34.320
<v Speaker 1>of service of course, could be done by anyone. UM,

0:18:34.720 --> 0:18:37.399
<v Speaker 1>and be a computer skeptic, you know, don't just install

0:18:37.760 --> 0:18:40.480
<v Speaker 1>random things that get sent to you from people, even

0:18:40.560 --> 0:18:44.720
<v Speaker 1>from people you trust, because sometimes these programs use their

0:18:45.040 --> 0:18:47.679
<v Speaker 1>email boxes and you know, they go through the contact

0:18:47.760 --> 0:18:52.040
<v Speaker 1>lists and everything to everybody that they know and oh, well, hey,

0:18:52.200 --> 0:18:54.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, if John installed this, then I should too.

0:18:55.680 --> 0:18:58.000
<v Speaker 1>You know, John didn't mean to install that he thought

0:18:58.000 --> 0:19:00.399
<v Speaker 1>it was something else, and so did you. Yeah, it's

0:19:00.440 --> 0:19:04.439
<v Speaker 1>a domino thing, and if one person gets uh, gets compromised,

0:19:04.480 --> 0:19:07.040
<v Speaker 1>then it may may mean that everyone they know then

0:19:07.160 --> 0:19:09.000
<v Speaker 1>follow a suit. And then of course it spreads out

0:19:09.080 --> 0:19:12.000
<v Speaker 1>that you know what that is. That's a web Yeah,

0:19:12.720 --> 0:19:15.600
<v Speaker 1>and it's worldwide or a shampoo commercial. Oh yeah, and

0:19:15.720 --> 0:19:19.320
<v Speaker 1>they called two friends. Um, but yeah, so that's a

0:19:19.520 --> 0:19:22.400
<v Speaker 1>that's denial of service in a nutshell. Uh. I hope

0:19:22.440 --> 0:19:25.440
<v Speaker 1>you guys kind of have a better grip on the concept.

0:19:25.600 --> 0:19:29.040
<v Speaker 1>It's um, it's interesting stuff, and I'm sure it'll be

0:19:30.480 --> 0:19:33.560
<v Speaker 1>a tactic that people use for for years to come

0:19:33.640 --> 0:19:35.720
<v Speaker 1>because there are a lot of people will spare time

0:19:35.720 --> 0:19:38.320
<v Speaker 1>on their hands and chips on their shoulders, and it

0:19:38.480 --> 0:19:40.800
<v Speaker 1>is so innate to the web that it's just it's

0:19:40.840 --> 0:19:42.240
<v Speaker 1>just gonna be one of the first things that people

0:19:42.320 --> 0:19:45.879
<v Speaker 1>try when they want to take down a website. Well, since, uh,

0:19:46.080 --> 0:19:49.440
<v Speaker 1>since we've exhausted that topic, I think it's time for

0:19:49.760 --> 0:19:57.000
<v Speaker 1>just a little more listener man. Then all right, and

0:19:57.640 --> 0:20:00.040
<v Speaker 1>this listener man on me scroll all the way and

0:20:00.119 --> 0:20:01.840
<v Speaker 1>so I can get the name right. Comes from Alan

0:20:02.320 --> 0:20:05.680
<v Speaker 1>from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill so a

0:20:05.760 --> 0:20:09.159
<v Speaker 1>tar heel. I guess uh and Alan actually wrote a

0:20:09.320 --> 0:20:12.520
<v Speaker 1>very nice email, very and it was a pretty long one,

0:20:12.520 --> 0:20:14.359
<v Speaker 1>so I'm gonna have to summarize part of it, but

0:20:14.760 --> 0:20:17.560
<v Speaker 1>I'll read the beginning here. Hey guys, First of all,

0:20:17.640 --> 0:20:20.240
<v Speaker 1>I love the show and then listened listened since the beginning,

0:20:20.359 --> 0:20:23.760
<v Speaker 1>Thanks a lot, Alan. I have a minor correction about

0:20:23.840 --> 0:20:27.119
<v Speaker 1>the August fifth podcast on cell phone interference, but it

0:20:27.240 --> 0:20:30.760
<v Speaker 1>has nothing to do with the subject material. Y'all misspoke,

0:20:31.040 --> 0:20:34.399
<v Speaker 1>But putting a the in front of Mayo Clinic. They

0:20:34.440 --> 0:20:36.960
<v Speaker 1>are sticklers up there about it because they feel that

0:20:37.040 --> 0:20:40.399
<v Speaker 1>putting a the diminishes the respect that the name of

0:20:40.440 --> 0:20:43.720
<v Speaker 1>the hospital gives to the founder, Dr Mayo. Leaving it

0:20:43.840 --> 0:20:47.360
<v Speaker 1>as simply Mayo Clinic without any article pays more homage

0:20:47.400 --> 0:20:52.359
<v Speaker 1>to the patient, first staff, second philosophies that Dr mayor Mayo. Sorry, wow,

0:20:52.600 --> 0:20:56.160
<v Speaker 1>I just made it worse made so successful. Well, thanks

0:20:56.160 --> 0:20:59.560
<v Speaker 1>a lot, Allen. Um. I did not know that. I've

0:20:59.560 --> 0:21:03.239
<v Speaker 1>always it as the Mayo Clinic. Yeah, and it kind

0:21:03.240 --> 0:21:05.199
<v Speaker 1>of makes sense that definite article would be in there.

0:21:05.560 --> 0:21:07.359
<v Speaker 1>It kind of makes it makes it weird. It's you know,

0:21:07.520 --> 0:21:10.960
<v Speaker 1>it's one of those things like yourself from the clinic.

0:21:11.920 --> 0:21:14.800
<v Speaker 1>But Alan also had a couple of other little points.

0:21:14.880 --> 0:21:16.679
<v Speaker 1>He had mentioned that he had been in the hospital

0:21:16.760 --> 0:21:19.440
<v Speaker 1>several times and that I have never had a problem

0:21:20.119 --> 0:21:22.520
<v Speaker 1>with any hospital staff about using his cell phone, so

0:21:22.600 --> 0:21:24.680
<v Speaker 1>he wanted to point that out. And he also wanted

0:21:24.680 --> 0:21:28.160
<v Speaker 1>to point out the episode of MythBusters where the MythBusters

0:21:28.240 --> 0:21:31.520
<v Speaker 1>tested the myth about cell phones being dangerous on planes. Now,

0:21:31.640 --> 0:21:33.680
<v Speaker 1>they weren't allowed to take a plane up into the

0:21:33.840 --> 0:21:37.480
<v Speaker 1>air and test their theories, which I mean for obvious reasons,

0:21:37.560 --> 0:21:40.600
<v Speaker 1>because if they were in fact dangerous, you no longer

0:21:40.760 --> 0:21:45.040
<v Speaker 1>have a show true, you have myth busted into tiny,

0:21:45.119 --> 0:21:47.879
<v Speaker 1>tiny pieces. So what they did was they had to

0:21:47.920 --> 0:21:49.640
<v Speaker 1>do all their tests on the ground, but they tried

0:21:49.680 --> 0:21:54.639
<v Speaker 1>to replicate the the as much of the scenario as

0:21:54.640 --> 0:21:57.879
<v Speaker 1>they possibly could, including changing the pressure and all that

0:21:58.000 --> 0:22:00.320
<v Speaker 1>kind of stuff, and they found that there was no

0:22:00.800 --> 0:22:08.040
<v Speaker 1>appreciable um effect on the airplanes systems through any modern

0:22:08.119 --> 0:22:11.080
<v Speaker 1>cell phone. A cell phone and older cellphone might be

0:22:11.200 --> 0:22:14.760
<v Speaker 1>able to cause a little bit of interference, but anything

0:22:14.840 --> 0:22:17.960
<v Speaker 1>within the last five years or so, UM not so much.

0:22:19.280 --> 0:22:21.399
<v Speaker 1>So thanks a lot Allen for pointing that out and

0:22:21.520 --> 0:22:24.920
<v Speaker 1>for promoting one of discovery shows. That was great. We

0:22:25.000 --> 0:22:26.520
<v Speaker 1>didn't have to do it ourselves because Allen did it

0:22:26.560 --> 0:22:28.760
<v Speaker 1>for us. All right, then, if any of you have

0:22:29.080 --> 0:22:31.800
<v Speaker 1>anything you'd like to say to us, you can email us.

0:22:31.840 --> 0:22:34.359
<v Speaker 1>Our email ad us is tech Stuff at how stuff

0:22:34.359 --> 0:22:36.400
<v Speaker 1>works dot com. If you want to learn more about

0:22:36.400 --> 0:22:39.320
<v Speaker 1>computer security, I highly recommend you visit our site how

0:22:39.400 --> 0:22:42.040
<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Crispy and I will talk to

0:22:42.080 --> 0:22:47.639
<v Speaker 1>you again really soon. For moral thiss and thousands of

0:22:47.680 --> 0:22:50.600
<v Speaker 1>other topics. Esit how stuff works dot com and be

0:22:50.720 --> 0:22:52.840
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0:22:52.960 --> 0:22:59.800
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0:22:59.840 --> 0:23:03.159
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