1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:02,560 Speaker 1: Hi, This is newt Twenty twenty is going to be 2 00:00:02,600 --> 00:00:05,080 Speaker 1: one of the most extraordinary election years of our lifetime. 3 00:00:05,720 --> 00:00:08,080 Speaker 1: I want to invite you to join my Inner Circle 4 00:00:08,520 --> 00:00:11,520 Speaker 1: as we discuss each twist and turn in the presidential race. 5 00:00:11,880 --> 00:00:16,120 Speaker 1: In my members only Inner Circle Club, you'll receive special 6 00:00:16,160 --> 00:00:21,040 Speaker 1: flash briefings, online events, and members only audio reports from 7 00:00:21,079 --> 00:00:23,680 Speaker 1: me and my team. Here is a special offer for 8 00:00:23,760 --> 00:00:28,080 Speaker 1: my podcast listeners. Join my Inner Circle today at Newtcentercircle 9 00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:31,200 Speaker 1: dot com, slash podcast, and if you sign up for 10 00:00:31,240 --> 00:00:34,040 Speaker 1: a one or two year membership, you'll get ten percent 11 00:00:34,080 --> 00:00:37,800 Speaker 1: off your membership price and a VIP fast pass to 12 00:00:37,920 --> 00:00:42,280 Speaker 1: my live events. Join My Inner Circle today at Newtcenter 13 00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:47,120 Speaker 1: Circle dot com slash podcast use the Code podcast at checkout. 14 00:00:47,720 --> 00:00:51,840 Speaker 1: Sign up today at Newtcenter Circle dot com slash podcast 15 00:00:51,880 --> 00:01:04,920 Speaker 1: and use the Code podcast Hurry this Offtway Spires, February fourteenth. 16 00:01:04,920 --> 00:01:08,120 Speaker 1: On this episode of News World Today, we're not just 17 00:01:08,280 --> 00:01:12,000 Speaker 1: facing one enemy. We're facing the greatest range of global 18 00:01:12,040 --> 00:01:15,600 Speaker 1: threats from any time in our history. But how can 19 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:18,760 Speaker 1: we learn from surprise attacks from the past to perceive 20 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:22,279 Speaker 1: the threats of the future. There are very few issues 21 00:01:22,360 --> 00:01:26,440 Speaker 1: more important in designing our national security than getting a 22 00:01:26,520 --> 00:01:30,400 Speaker 1: real understanding of the world as it exists and finding 23 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:33,000 Speaker 1: out how we can get ahead of the curve so 24 00:01:33,080 --> 00:01:36,120 Speaker 1: that we, in fact are prepared when a threat occurs. 25 00:01:36,920 --> 00:01:41,560 Speaker 1: To discuss this, I have two really interesting guests, Steve Toomey, 26 00:01:41,600 --> 00:01:45,080 Speaker 1: the author of Countdown to Pearl Harbor The Twelve Days 27 00:01:45,120 --> 00:01:50,160 Speaker 1: to the Attack, and Eric Dall, author of Intelligence and Surprise, Attack, 28 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:54,200 Speaker 1: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to nine to eleven 29 00:01:54,200 --> 00:02:07,400 Speaker 1: and Beyond. The whole idea of writing a book called 30 00:02:07,440 --> 00:02:10,880 Speaker 1: Countdown to Pearl Harbor the Twelve Days to the Attack 31 00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:15,760 Speaker 1: is really helpful because you go really into a lot 32 00:02:15,800 --> 00:02:18,640 Speaker 1: of detail. What led you to decide to write this? 33 00:02:18,919 --> 00:02:22,160 Speaker 1: Think it's a very important contribution. Now. I simply took 34 00:02:22,200 --> 00:02:25,920 Speaker 1: a vacation to honoluluin with the family, went out to 35 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:29,560 Speaker 1: the Arizona Memorial. And I don't think anyone who goes 36 00:02:29,560 --> 00:02:33,920 Speaker 1: to that memorial can stand there and not be befuddled 37 00:02:33,960 --> 00:02:37,639 Speaker 1: as to how this happened. And I began reading up 38 00:02:37,639 --> 00:02:40,400 Speaker 1: on it, and of course there's no lack of books 39 00:02:40,440 --> 00:02:43,799 Speaker 1: about Pearl Harbor, so it's somewhat of an audacious choice 40 00:02:43,840 --> 00:02:47,520 Speaker 1: to decide to write one. But I thought that the 41 00:02:47,600 --> 00:02:51,160 Speaker 1: drama of the days prior to the attack had not 42 00:02:51,240 --> 00:02:55,720 Speaker 1: really been adequately conveyed. I didn't want to write necessarily 43 00:02:55,720 --> 00:02:58,000 Speaker 1: a military book. I wanted to write a book about 44 00:02:58,000 --> 00:03:01,600 Speaker 1: the people making, or in some cases not making, the 45 00:03:01,720 --> 00:03:06,520 Speaker 1: decisions regarding what information they were receiving and what it meant. 46 00:03:07,320 --> 00:03:11,119 Speaker 1: And the twelve days is actually kind of obvious. It's 47 00:03:11,160 --> 00:03:15,040 Speaker 1: the twelve day period from the morning that the Japanese 48 00:03:15,040 --> 00:03:20,119 Speaker 1: fleet set sail from its secret location until twelve days 49 00:03:20,200 --> 00:03:23,720 Speaker 1: later they arrived off the Hawaiian Islands and launched their planes. 50 00:03:24,520 --> 00:03:27,720 Speaker 1: It seemed to me a perfect window to concentrate not 51 00:03:27,760 --> 00:03:29,840 Speaker 1: so much on the attack, which I think has been 52 00:03:30,200 --> 00:03:33,880 Speaker 1: the subject of many books and movies, but on how 53 00:03:34,040 --> 00:03:37,160 Speaker 1: we got to the attack. It seems so that there's 54 00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:40,320 Speaker 1: a Japanese story, but there's also an American story here, 55 00:03:40,800 --> 00:03:43,320 Speaker 1: and that they're kind of parallel. They're not dancing together. 56 00:03:43,880 --> 00:03:46,080 Speaker 1: I think it would surprise most people to know that 57 00:03:46,400 --> 00:03:49,560 Speaker 1: in the days prior to the attack, the whole country 58 00:03:49,640 --> 00:03:52,120 Speaker 1: had a good sense that the United States was very 59 00:03:52,200 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: likely to be at war in the Pacific. We'd been 60 00:03:55,280 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 1: negotiating with the Japanese over their behavior in the Far East, 61 00:04:00,400 --> 00:04:03,560 Speaker 1: and we were getting all kinds of signals, both public 62 00:04:03,600 --> 00:04:06,160 Speaker 1: and private, in the sense that only the government knew. 63 00:04:06,800 --> 00:04:09,320 Speaker 1: Walter Lippman wrote a column on the fifth of December 64 00:04:09,360 --> 00:04:11,480 Speaker 1: saying we were on the verge of all out war 65 00:04:11,800 --> 00:04:15,280 Speaker 1: in the Pacific, so there was a sense that time 66 00:04:15,320 --> 00:04:19,400 Speaker 1: was running out. We did not know, of course, exactly 67 00:04:19,400 --> 00:04:22,480 Speaker 1: what the Japanese intended to do, but it was clear 68 00:04:22,560 --> 00:04:25,800 Speaker 1: they were getting more desperate. We were reading their diplomatic 69 00:04:25,839 --> 00:04:29,560 Speaker 1: cables because we had broken their code, and we knew 70 00:04:29,600 --> 00:04:31,800 Speaker 1: that many of their ships were on the move. We 71 00:04:31,880 --> 00:04:35,680 Speaker 1: knew that interpreting radio signals. We knew it from coast 72 00:04:35,720 --> 00:04:39,840 Speaker 1: watchers in China where many of the Japanese ships set 73 00:04:39,920 --> 00:04:43,000 Speaker 1: sail from, and Formosa, and we knew those ships were 74 00:04:43,000 --> 00:04:47,960 Speaker 1: headed south toward the Philippines, toward Malaya, toward the Dutch 75 00:04:47,960 --> 00:04:50,880 Speaker 1: East Indies. So the sense that something was going to 76 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:54,599 Speaker 1: happen was extremely great. I'd like to tell people that 77 00:04:54,680 --> 00:04:57,800 Speaker 1: the surprise of December seventh was not that war came 78 00:04:57,839 --> 00:05:01,359 Speaker 1: to us, but where it came to us. It's Pearl 79 00:05:01,440 --> 00:05:04,440 Speaker 1: Harbor as a target. That was the surprise, not the war. 80 00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:08,400 Speaker 1: It actually had a Sunday morning surprise attack at Pearl 81 00:05:08,400 --> 00:05:11,839 Speaker 1: Harbor as part of a fleet practice, so they knew 82 00:05:11,839 --> 00:05:15,120 Speaker 1: it was possible. Why do you think they were as 83 00:05:15,120 --> 00:05:18,920 Speaker 1: surprised at Pearl Harbor Several reasons. Of course, that you're 84 00:05:18,960 --> 00:05:22,080 Speaker 1: absolutely right that an attack on Pearl Harbor is the 85 00:05:22,160 --> 00:05:25,240 Speaker 1: opening act of a war had been theorized in the 86 00:05:25,360 --> 00:05:29,520 Speaker 1: United States for years, As you mentioned, they had conducted 87 00:05:29,800 --> 00:05:35,159 Speaker 1: naval exercises based on that premise, and perhaps most remarkable 88 00:05:35,160 --> 00:05:38,279 Speaker 1: of all, just a few months prior to the actual 89 00:05:38,320 --> 00:05:44,320 Speaker 1: attack in March, two military officers wrote a report that 90 00:05:44,480 --> 00:05:47,640 Speaker 1: actually looked like they had gone into the future and 91 00:05:47,720 --> 00:05:50,760 Speaker 1: seeing what was coming because it was so accurate. It 92 00:05:50,920 --> 00:05:55,440 Speaker 1: theorized about one or more carriers arriving off Hawaii undetected 93 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:59,520 Speaker 1: and launching their planes about three hundred miles out and 94 00:05:59,640 --> 00:06:03,320 Speaker 1: catch the fleet unaware at its stocks in Pearl Harbor. 95 00:06:03,600 --> 00:06:09,040 Speaker 1: So this possibility had been talked about extensively and everyone 96 00:06:09,120 --> 00:06:11,440 Speaker 1: knew it, and then they sort of put it to 97 00:06:11,480 --> 00:06:14,240 Speaker 1: the side, like it could happen, but we don't think 98 00:06:14,240 --> 00:06:19,040 Speaker 1: it's going to happen. It seems such an extraordinarily difficult 99 00:06:19,520 --> 00:06:22,520 Speaker 1: thing to do, and I think that's something we have 100 00:06:22,640 --> 00:06:26,960 Speaker 1: to acknowledge with the Japanese that militarily this was an 101 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:32,280 Speaker 1: astonishing feat. Part of that problem is that we thought 102 00:06:32,320 --> 00:06:36,240 Speaker 1: the Japanese tended to view a strategic or tactical situation 103 00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:39,560 Speaker 1: in the same way we did. We thought their logic 104 00:06:39,720 --> 00:06:42,800 Speaker 1: was like our logic. They would conclude that to attack 105 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:46,320 Speaker 1: Pearl Harbor and to attack the United States was folly. 106 00:06:46,360 --> 00:06:49,320 Speaker 1: They would lose the war, which of course they did, 107 00:06:49,960 --> 00:06:53,360 Speaker 1: But we thought that would be so obvious that they 108 00:06:53,360 --> 00:06:57,719 Speaker 1: would not seek war with the United States. Our ambassador 109 00:06:57,760 --> 00:07:00,920 Speaker 1: in Tokyo, manned by the name of Joseph r who 110 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:04,000 Speaker 1: had been there ten years, knew the Japanese a lot 111 00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:08,080 Speaker 1: better than most people, and he specifically warned Washington in 112 00:07:08,160 --> 00:07:12,280 Speaker 1: November of nineteen forty one, you have to be prepared 113 00:07:12,480 --> 00:07:15,400 Speaker 1: for them to do something that makes no sense to us. 114 00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:19,840 Speaker 1: He said, it might be suicidal for them to attack us, 115 00:07:20,520 --> 00:07:23,560 Speaker 1: but you can't rule out them taking that kind of 116 00:07:23,600 --> 00:07:27,920 Speaker 1: action because their values are not our values. He strikes 117 00:07:27,960 --> 00:07:31,080 Speaker 1: me as virtually the only person who really understood what 118 00:07:31,280 --> 00:07:35,240 Speaker 1: the Japanese were capable of. I think it's George Marshall 119 00:07:35,280 --> 00:07:38,200 Speaker 1: who gives a speech saying that the Japanese can't fight 120 00:07:38,280 --> 00:07:41,480 Speaker 1: us because their cities are paper and we would burn them. 121 00:07:41,480 --> 00:07:44,160 Speaker 1: And that's part of why we kept moving B seventeens 122 00:07:44,440 --> 00:07:47,800 Speaker 1: to the Philippines as a direct threat, which was a 123 00:07:47,800 --> 00:07:50,400 Speaker 1: great surprise when I ran across the speech, because I 124 00:07:50,440 --> 00:07:53,720 Speaker 1: had always thought our attitude was so tough because of 125 00:07:53,720 --> 00:07:55,920 Speaker 1: Pearl Harbor, But in fact this is a pre Pearl 126 00:07:55,960 --> 00:08:00,800 Speaker 1: Harbor speech threatening the mass destruction with fair Bond, because 127 00:08:00,800 --> 00:08:03,840 Speaker 1: it was the logical consequence of how we thought about 128 00:08:03,840 --> 00:08:06,600 Speaker 1: war after World War One. There's a tension that seems 129 00:08:06,600 --> 00:08:10,240 Speaker 1: to me between scattering the aircraft so they can't be 130 00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 1: destroyed from the air and bunching them up so they 131 00:08:13,280 --> 00:08:17,840 Speaker 1: can be protected against sabotage, and that at Pearl they 132 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:24,680 Speaker 1: had gone almost totally in favor of avoiding sabotage at 133 00:08:24,680 --> 00:08:27,400 Speaker 1: the risk, of course, of creating very good target zones 134 00:08:27,960 --> 00:08:30,680 Speaker 1: for the aircraft. What is your read of that the 135 00:08:30,760 --> 00:08:33,880 Speaker 1: tension that was involved in trying to make that decision. 136 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:37,120 Speaker 1: Yours a very good point, And at the core of 137 00:08:37,160 --> 00:08:41,040 Speaker 1: that issue is the fact that there was no unified 138 00:08:41,080 --> 00:08:44,640 Speaker 1: command in Hawaii. There was the Navy in the Army, 139 00:08:44,760 --> 00:08:49,559 Speaker 1: and neither had supervisory jurisdiction over the other. So they 140 00:08:49,559 --> 00:08:53,560 Speaker 1: were making independent decisions. They were communicating, and they would 141 00:08:53,600 --> 00:08:58,320 Speaker 1: need often, but the two commanding officers had no authority 142 00:08:58,480 --> 00:09:02,719 Speaker 1: over each other. And when information began to arrive in 143 00:09:02,840 --> 00:09:06,520 Speaker 1: Pearl that things were building, the army commander and by 144 00:09:06,559 --> 00:09:09,200 Speaker 1: the name of Walter Short, made the decision that the 145 00:09:09,200 --> 00:09:12,960 Speaker 1: only real threat he faced as commander of Hawaii's army 146 00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:17,520 Speaker 1: forces was from sabotage, and so he grouped all his 147 00:09:17,600 --> 00:09:20,720 Speaker 1: planes on his airfield's the manner that made it easiest 148 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:23,720 Speaker 1: to protect them against somebody trying to sneak over the fence. 149 00:09:24,720 --> 00:09:29,960 Speaker 1: The threat of sabotage through Japanese Americans of first or 150 00:09:29,960 --> 00:09:36,200 Speaker 1: second generation in Hawaii was always greatly exaggerated by the 151 00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:40,720 Speaker 1: Army and the FBI. There was no sabotage at any point. 152 00:09:41,240 --> 00:09:44,400 Speaker 1: On the other hand, the Navy saw its role as 153 00:09:44,640 --> 00:09:49,439 Speaker 1: fighting out at sea, not protecting itself in Hawaii, and 154 00:09:49,640 --> 00:09:54,560 Speaker 1: its planes were not grouped against sabotage. Actually, many of 155 00:09:54,600 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 1: them were at sea on December seventh, aboard two aircraft carriers, 156 00:09:59,600 --> 00:10:03,760 Speaker 1: and the mentality on both sides was that there really 157 00:10:03,920 --> 00:10:09,000 Speaker 1: wasn't much chance of an air raid of significance on Hawaii. 158 00:10:09,640 --> 00:10:13,440 Speaker 1: The threat was in the armies case one of sabotage, 159 00:10:13,480 --> 00:10:15,720 Speaker 1: and I never got the sense the Navy worried too 160 00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 1: much that its basis could be sabotaged. Why do you 161 00:10:18,960 --> 00:10:23,000 Speaker 1: think there was this dramatic underestimation of the Japanese Navy. 162 00:10:23,080 --> 00:10:25,160 Speaker 1: I have to say I think some of the problem 163 00:10:25,520 --> 00:10:29,600 Speaker 1: was a sense of racial superiority. It's a little disconcerting 164 00:10:29,679 --> 00:10:32,559 Speaker 1: today to read some of the things that were written 165 00:10:32,800 --> 00:10:36,160 Speaker 1: about the Japanese in a military sense in the thirties 166 00:10:36,160 --> 00:10:40,040 Speaker 1: and early forties. They were regarded as sort of mechanically 167 00:10:40,080 --> 00:10:44,920 Speaker 1: and technically not very capable. It was thought that their 168 00:10:45,240 --> 00:10:49,920 Speaker 1: pilots literally could not fly very well because of various 169 00:10:50,240 --> 00:10:54,800 Speaker 1: alleged physiological defects, like they had a bad sense of balance, 170 00:10:55,760 --> 00:10:58,800 Speaker 1: and that they weren't good mechanics, they couldn't fix things, 171 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:03,440 Speaker 1: they couldn't innovate. The cartoons and caricatures that would appear 172 00:11:03,640 --> 00:11:08,480 Speaker 1: in the press usually showed cute little Japanese soldiers with 173 00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:13,840 Speaker 1: gigantic glasses and buck teeth. There really was a stereotypical 174 00:11:13,960 --> 00:11:18,120 Speaker 1: image of the Japanese. So there was this belief, and 175 00:11:18,280 --> 00:11:21,160 Speaker 1: as you alluded to earlier, one of the places where 176 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:24,240 Speaker 1: it came back to bite the Pacific fleet was on 177 00:11:24,280 --> 00:11:28,480 Speaker 1: the issue of torpedoes. Torpedo dropped from an airplane plunges 178 00:11:28,760 --> 00:11:32,800 Speaker 1: fairly deeply before it levels off and begins its run 179 00:11:32,840 --> 00:11:36,600 Speaker 1: to the target, and Pearl Harbor at its deepest was 180 00:11:36,640 --> 00:11:40,640 Speaker 1: only forty five feet, and the theory was that anybody 181 00:11:40,640 --> 00:11:44,959 Speaker 1: attempting an air raid using torpedoes would discover that their 182 00:11:45,000 --> 00:11:48,000 Speaker 1: torpedoes simply plunged into the bottom of Pearl Harbor and 183 00:11:48,240 --> 00:11:52,840 Speaker 1: did no one any harm. The Plivic Fleet received information 184 00:11:53,160 --> 00:11:59,360 Speaker 1: that tests were showing improvements in air torpedoes, they were 185 00:11:59,400 --> 00:12:03,640 Speaker 1: not dropping as deeply into the ocean, but Admiral Kimmel, 186 00:12:03,760 --> 00:12:08,599 Speaker 1: the Pacific commander in Hawaii, still believed he had immunity 187 00:12:08,880 --> 00:12:13,680 Speaker 1: from torpedo attack because the harbor was too shallow, and 188 00:12:13,880 --> 00:12:18,080 Speaker 1: the Japanese, unbeknownst to them, in Pearl Harbor, had actually 189 00:12:18,120 --> 00:12:21,520 Speaker 1: altered their torpedoes in a very subtle way. After many tests. 190 00:12:21,760 --> 00:12:24,480 Speaker 1: They put an extra fin on the torpedoes so that 191 00:12:24,559 --> 00:12:27,600 Speaker 1: it did not rotate as much as it was falling 192 00:12:27,640 --> 00:12:31,120 Speaker 1: through the air, which reduced the depth to which the 193 00:12:31,160 --> 00:12:36,240 Speaker 1: torpedo plunged, and of course, on December seventh, by far 194 00:12:36,320 --> 00:12:39,079 Speaker 1: the greatest damage to the Pacific fleet came from air 195 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:42,680 Speaker 1: drop torpedoes. The one great exception is the Arizona, which 196 00:12:42,720 --> 00:12:45,920 Speaker 1: was destroyed by a gravity bomb, but almost all the 197 00:12:45,960 --> 00:12:49,680 Speaker 1: other big ships were damaged not by bombs primarily, but 198 00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:55,680 Speaker 1: by torpedoes, in some cases hit multiple times. So that 199 00:12:55,840 --> 00:12:59,920 Speaker 1: assumption that the Japanese could not innovate could not correct 200 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:02,880 Speaker 1: this problem which they knew how deep Pearl Harbor was. 201 00:13:03,440 --> 00:13:08,240 Speaker 1: That assumption proved literally fatal because the time difference is 202 00:13:08,360 --> 00:13:12,679 Speaker 1: they actually knew about Pearl Harbor, and yet they are 203 00:13:12,760 --> 00:13:15,880 Speaker 1: still caught on the ground and lose most of their 204 00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:19,160 Speaker 1: air force in the opening hour or two. There's something 205 00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:22,560 Speaker 1: about trying to move from a peacetime military to a 206 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:27,160 Speaker 1: wartime military that seems to make it almost impossible to 207 00:13:27,200 --> 00:13:28,880 Speaker 1: move with speed. I don't know if you looked at 208 00:13:28,920 --> 00:13:32,000 Speaker 1: all at the degree at which MacArthur and the people 209 00:13:32,040 --> 00:13:34,760 Speaker 1: in the Philippines were surprised, but in some ways it 210 00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:38,440 Speaker 1: seems to me it's even more surprising how surprised they 211 00:13:38,480 --> 00:13:42,120 Speaker 1: were because they had hours of notice. Plus the original 212 00:13:42,120 --> 00:13:45,080 Speaker 1: assumptions had been that the Japanese would move south along 213 00:13:45,080 --> 00:13:48,880 Speaker 1: the China coast and next to the Philippines, so that 214 00:13:49,160 --> 00:13:51,600 Speaker 1: most planning assumed that the Philippines were much more at 215 00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:54,160 Speaker 1: risk than Pearl Harbor. I mean, do you have any 216 00:13:54,200 --> 00:13:57,120 Speaker 1: thoughts on how they managed to avoid learning about any 217 00:13:57,160 --> 00:14:01,240 Speaker 1: of that. I have long been baffled, as you are, 218 00:14:01,559 --> 00:14:06,000 Speaker 1: by MacArthur's actions that day. Frankly, I think his actions 219 00:14:06,080 --> 00:14:10,960 Speaker 1: were more damnable than what happened to the commanders in Hawaii. 220 00:14:11,120 --> 00:14:14,760 Speaker 1: For the reason you cited. He had knowledge that war 221 00:14:14,840 --> 00:14:18,600 Speaker 1: had begun, He had knowledge that Japanese forces were moving 222 00:14:18,640 --> 00:14:21,880 Speaker 1: in his area. Yet all those B seventeens that had 223 00:14:21,920 --> 00:14:26,040 Speaker 1: been flown to the Philippines to replenish his air force 224 00:14:26,080 --> 00:14:28,560 Speaker 1: and act as a deterrent, many, if not all, of them, 225 00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:31,800 Speaker 1: were disabled on the runway. I've never quite understood why 226 00:14:31,880 --> 00:14:35,960 Speaker 1: MacArthur wasn't disciplined more for that. I guess the answer 227 00:14:36,280 --> 00:14:40,040 Speaker 1: is that we needed someone to be a figure to 228 00:14:40,160 --> 00:14:43,040 Speaker 1: lead in the Pacific, and perhaps they settled on that 229 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:45,840 Speaker 1: as a reason not to do anything about it. The 230 00:14:45,880 --> 00:14:48,160 Speaker 1: Philippines were the place where we thought that would probably 231 00:14:48,200 --> 00:14:51,600 Speaker 1: be hit. In fact, on December seventh, when the realization 232 00:14:51,680 --> 00:14:55,920 Speaker 1: reached Washington of the fact that there was a deadline, 233 00:14:56,480 --> 00:15:01,040 Speaker 1: discovered in a Japanese diplomatic cable from Tokyo to Washington 234 00:15:01,080 --> 00:15:05,080 Speaker 1: a deadline referring to one pm Eastern time as something 235 00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:08,560 Speaker 1: going to happen. The first reaction in Washington was to 236 00:15:08,600 --> 00:15:12,320 Speaker 1: send alerts to the Pacific again, and the priority was 237 00:15:12,320 --> 00:15:15,640 Speaker 1: the Philippines. Everyone thought the Philippines were the place likely 238 00:15:15,640 --> 00:15:19,440 Speaker 1: to be hit first. I assume MacArthur must have had 239 00:15:19,840 --> 00:15:22,480 Speaker 1: the same sense, and I would note that his counterpart, 240 00:15:22,560 --> 00:15:25,520 Speaker 1: the naval commander in the Philippines, manned by the name 241 00:15:25,560 --> 00:15:30,440 Speaker 1: of Thomas Hart, he reacted much differently. He dispersed his ships, 242 00:15:30,480 --> 00:15:32,680 Speaker 1: he didn't have many, but he took them to see 243 00:15:33,000 --> 00:15:36,480 Speaker 1: and so MacArthur's behavior has always been a mystery to 244 00:15:36,560 --> 00:15:40,080 Speaker 1: me in terms of being unprepared for war. If I 245 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:43,760 Speaker 1: remember correctly, the messages were sent by Western Union on 246 00:15:43,840 --> 00:15:47,520 Speaker 1: December seven, when this realization that something was about to happen. 247 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:51,320 Speaker 1: They first tried to send the messages to the Philippines 248 00:15:51,360 --> 00:15:57,080 Speaker 1: and Hawaii via army radio, and there was atmospheric interference. 249 00:15:57,360 --> 00:16:01,160 Speaker 1: They couldn't reach Hawaii directly, so they ended upsetting telegrams 250 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:05,560 Speaker 1: which were not opened and decoded until the attack was 251 00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:09,280 Speaker 1: well underway that afternoon. Right there, of course, there being 252 00:16:09,320 --> 00:16:14,080 Speaker 1: a lesson in making sure your communications are intact, coming 253 00:16:14,160 --> 00:16:17,040 Speaker 1: up what we can learn from the Pearl Harbor attack 254 00:16:17,080 --> 00:16:28,840 Speaker 1: in nineteen forty one. I was delighted when the first 255 00:16:28,880 --> 00:16:33,120 Speaker 1: sponsor of Newts World was Oxford Gold Group. I love 256 00:16:33,400 --> 00:16:36,760 Speaker 1: entrepreneurial startups of people who are eager, willing to go 257 00:16:36,760 --> 00:16:39,840 Speaker 1: out and do new and different things. And as a historian, 258 00:16:40,440 --> 00:16:44,480 Speaker 1: I know that having a balanced portfolio is a very 259 00:16:44,520 --> 00:16:49,239 Speaker 1: important thing, and they offer financial information and background information 260 00:16:49,680 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 1: that I think is very helpful. 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We must understood how, given the nature 291 00:18:44,040 --> 00:18:47,920 Speaker 1: of bushido and the spirit of the samurai, desperation would 292 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:51,800 Speaker 1: lead to an attack and they must understood how launching 293 00:18:51,800 --> 00:18:55,399 Speaker 1: a surprise attack, especially on a Sunday morning, guaranteed that 294 00:18:55,440 --> 00:19:00,440 Speaker 1: we would be relentlessly ferocious and actually eliminated the possibility 295 00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:03,800 Speaker 1: of the kind of negotiated agreement which was the core 296 00:19:03,880 --> 00:19:07,080 Speaker 1: of their strategy. So the temporary advantage they gained at 297 00:19:07,080 --> 00:19:11,080 Speaker 1: Pearl they threw away strategically because it just guaranteed that 298 00:19:11,080 --> 00:19:16,240 Speaker 1: we would mobilize totally. Absolutely, they misread us as much 299 00:19:16,240 --> 00:19:21,160 Speaker 1: as we misread them. They did not appreciate the outrage 300 00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:25,679 Speaker 1: that would be created by simultaneously going through the fiction 301 00:19:25,720 --> 00:19:29,800 Speaker 1: of negotiations in Washington while your ships were sailing three 302 00:19:29,840 --> 00:19:33,720 Speaker 1: thousand miles to the Hawaiian Islands to pull off a 303 00:19:33,760 --> 00:19:39,840 Speaker 1: sneak attack. Technically, the final message breaking off negotiations was 304 00:19:39,880 --> 00:19:44,520 Speaker 1: to be delivered by their ambassador before the planes arrived 305 00:19:44,600 --> 00:19:49,000 Speaker 1: over Pearl. Due to various translation and decoding problems, the 306 00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:52,280 Speaker 1: message was not delivered until after the attack had begun. 307 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,160 Speaker 1: But I don't think it would have made much difference 308 00:19:55,800 --> 00:20:00,520 Speaker 1: if the message breaking off negotiations and indicating great Japanese 309 00:20:00,520 --> 00:20:04,240 Speaker 1: dissatisfactions that had been delivered an hour or ninety minutes 310 00:20:04,440 --> 00:20:07,560 Speaker 1: before the bombs fell. I don't think Americans would have 311 00:20:07,560 --> 00:20:10,720 Speaker 1: been any less outraged by the fact that it was 312 00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:15,120 Speaker 1: a sucker punch, while technically coming after the declaration of war. 313 00:20:15,720 --> 00:20:17,639 Speaker 1: I think it's important to remember, and I think it's 314 00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:20,960 Speaker 1: hard for generations after Pearl to recognize and one hundred 315 00:20:20,960 --> 00:20:23,920 Speaker 1: and sixty five year history of the nation to that point, 316 00:20:23,960 --> 00:20:28,600 Speaker 1: this was the single most shattering and unexpected event in 317 00:20:28,640 --> 00:20:31,879 Speaker 1: the history of the country. The public had been told 318 00:20:31,880 --> 00:20:36,679 Speaker 1: over and over how competent the Navy was, how vigilant, 319 00:20:36,960 --> 00:20:40,280 Speaker 1: and how strong. There had been stories all through the 320 00:20:40,280 --> 00:20:45,040 Speaker 1: summer of nineteen forty one about how our reconnaissance planes 321 00:20:45,119 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: were twenty four to seven vigilant around Pearl Harbor, flying 322 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:51,560 Speaker 1: hundreds of miles out to see making sure that no 323 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:54,240 Speaker 1: one was out there. Well, none of that was true. 324 00:20:54,520 --> 00:20:57,560 Speaker 1: The Navy didn't even do that in the final hours 325 00:20:57,600 --> 00:21:01,359 Speaker 1: before the attack, despite all the income evidence, which was 326 00:21:01,440 --> 00:21:06,399 Speaker 1: probably husband Kimmel's greatest failure not to begin an air search. 327 00:21:07,160 --> 00:21:12,520 Speaker 1: The shock was just astounding, and the resolve to win 328 00:21:13,040 --> 00:21:15,959 Speaker 1: was made concrete that day. And I think that the 329 00:21:16,040 --> 00:21:20,840 Speaker 1: Japanese just never anticipated how angry people would be at 330 00:21:20,880 --> 00:21:22,439 Speaker 1: what they had done well, and I think it was 331 00:21:22,480 --> 00:21:26,320 Speaker 1: compounded again as a cultural problem because it didn't occur 332 00:21:26,359 --> 00:21:29,240 Speaker 1: to them. The attacking on a Sunday morning would sort 333 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:33,000 Speaker 1: of magnify everything. People are at home on Sunday, they're relaxed, 334 00:21:33,280 --> 00:21:36,600 Speaker 1: they're having Sunday lunch, and suddenly the radio says Pearl 335 00:21:36,640 --> 00:21:39,359 Speaker 1: Harbor has been attacked. The country by the end of 336 00:21:39,400 --> 00:21:43,800 Speaker 1: that day was just seething with anger. Lines appeared outside 337 00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:46,760 Speaker 1: the army offices all over the country, people willing to 338 00:21:46,920 --> 00:21:49,840 Speaker 1: sign up immediately. One of the things that makes that 339 00:21:49,920 --> 00:21:53,399 Speaker 1: day so shocking is that the whole country knew the 340 00:21:53,400 --> 00:21:55,439 Speaker 1: world had been at war for two years, and that 341 00:21:55,520 --> 00:21:58,320 Speaker 1: we had been to one degree or an others staying 342 00:21:58,320 --> 00:22:02,960 Speaker 1: out of it. And attack immediately told the entire country 343 00:22:03,080 --> 00:22:06,440 Speaker 1: that their sons, their brothers, their husbands, their uncles, we're 344 00:22:06,480 --> 00:22:09,560 Speaker 1: all going to go off someplace, if not to war, 345 00:22:09,680 --> 00:22:13,760 Speaker 1: then into defense plants, and that this was going to 346 00:22:13,840 --> 00:22:18,720 Speaker 1: be a long haul and universal experience for the country. 347 00:22:19,119 --> 00:22:24,240 Speaker 1: Thank you very much, Thank you, mister speaker. Next, how 348 00:22:24,359 --> 00:22:27,040 Speaker 1: nine to eleven changed the way we view intelligence together. 349 00:22:35,560 --> 00:22:38,720 Speaker 1: It's the holiday season, and what better time to give 350 00:22:38,760 --> 00:22:41,159 Speaker 1: than Now you know you can't take your money with 351 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:44,920 Speaker 1: you go to Delta Rescue dot org, slash Newt and 352 00:22:45,000 --> 00:22:48,160 Speaker 1: learn more about how you can support Delta Rescue through 353 00:22:48,160 --> 00:22:52,320 Speaker 1: a state planning this holiday, Delta Rescue is celebrating forty 354 00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:56,000 Speaker 1: years and is the only no kill, care for life 355 00:22:56,040 --> 00:22:59,960 Speaker 1: home for more than fifteen hundred dogs, cats, and horses 356 00:23:00,440 --> 00:23:02,840 Speaker 1: that have all been abandoned in the wilderness. 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And since it's the 366 00:23:36,080 --> 00:23:39,919 Speaker 1: holiday season, enjoy the movie Magic right there on the 367 00:23:39,920 --> 00:23:43,320 Speaker 1: website free. It's a heartwarming story of a dog that 368 00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:47,000 Speaker 1: is an angel played by Christopher Lloyd. Go to Delta 369 00:23:47,080 --> 00:23:50,879 Speaker 1: Rescue dot org slash neut watch this holiday family movie 370 00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:56,480 Speaker 1: and request Newts free estate planning package. Again. My package 371 00:23:56,520 --> 00:24:00,000 Speaker 1: is only available on Delta Rescue dot org slash neut. 372 00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:13,720 Speaker 1: What got you to focus on the whole issue of 373 00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:18,520 Speaker 1: intelligence and surprise attacks. Well, I got interested originally after 374 00:24:18,600 --> 00:24:22,680 Speaker 1: nine to eleven with the renewed problem of surprise terrorist attacks. 375 00:24:23,119 --> 00:24:26,040 Speaker 1: But I thought that it would be useful to study 376 00:24:26,119 --> 00:24:31,560 Speaker 1: both terrorist attacks and more conventional military surprise attacks of 377 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:34,000 Speaker 1: the sort that we used to worry about actor in 378 00:24:34,040 --> 00:24:36,800 Speaker 1: the Cold War during the first half of my military career, 379 00:24:37,119 --> 00:24:38,840 Speaker 1: but which had gone out of favor, and we didn't 380 00:24:38,840 --> 00:24:41,280 Speaker 1: worry much about that until a few years ago. Was 381 00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:44,440 Speaker 1: it the whole notion of how do we avoid things 382 00:24:44,440 --> 00:24:46,280 Speaker 1: like nine to eleven or what did you hope the 383 00:24:46,320 --> 00:24:50,040 Speaker 1: outcome would be? Yes, absolutely, trying to find out how 384 00:24:50,040 --> 00:24:54,639 Speaker 1: we can better use intelligence, whether collect intelligence or analyze intelligence, 385 00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:58,000 Speaker 1: to stop bad things from happening, to really break what 386 00:24:58,320 --> 00:25:02,960 Speaker 1: often intelligence experts have called the first law of intelligence failure, 387 00:25:03,359 --> 00:25:06,560 Speaker 1: which is that after something bad happens, we always can 388 00:25:06,640 --> 00:25:09,119 Speaker 1: look back and we see there were warnings, there were clues, 389 00:25:09,160 --> 00:25:12,119 Speaker 1: there was intelligence, but somehow we didn't use it or 390 00:25:12,160 --> 00:25:15,600 Speaker 1: we didn't understand it in time to prevent something from happening. 391 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,800 Speaker 1: And I wanted to break that first law of intelligence failure. 392 00:25:19,480 --> 00:25:25,400 Speaker 1: There are really big differences, say between Pearl Harbor or 393 00:25:25,600 --> 00:25:28,960 Speaker 1: the Israeli failure of Yam Kapur and seventy three and 394 00:25:29,119 --> 00:25:31,840 Speaker 1: nine to eleven. There's a question of indicators, as a 395 00:25:31,920 --> 00:25:35,760 Speaker 1: question of sometimes a failure of imagination. To what degree 396 00:25:35,760 --> 00:25:39,199 Speaker 1: do you think that it's possible to have a relatively 397 00:25:39,280 --> 00:25:44,880 Speaker 1: surprised proof system. Well, you can't eliminate surprise altogether. That's 398 00:25:45,080 --> 00:25:48,720 Speaker 1: certainly a function of human nature, and certainly we've learned 399 00:25:48,720 --> 00:25:51,280 Speaker 1: that in history. But I think actually there are a 400 00:25:51,320 --> 00:25:55,520 Speaker 1: lot more similarities in the nature of the intelligence failures 401 00:25:55,840 --> 00:26:01,479 Speaker 1: when we're dealing with terrorist attacks and conventional military style 402 00:26:01,800 --> 00:26:05,800 Speaker 1: surprise attacks, more similarities than I think most people had recognized. 403 00:26:05,840 --> 00:26:07,640 Speaker 1: And my book was one of the first to try 404 00:26:07,640 --> 00:26:10,360 Speaker 1: to look at those both together, and in fact, one 405 00:26:10,359 --> 00:26:12,040 Speaker 1: of the ways I tried to look at them, and 406 00:26:12,160 --> 00:26:14,439 Speaker 1: I think a very useful method is to try to 407 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:17,879 Speaker 1: look not only at intelligence failures, which most of us study. 408 00:26:17,920 --> 00:26:21,360 Speaker 1: That's why we have commissions and Blue Ribbon studies after failures, 409 00:26:21,560 --> 00:26:24,240 Speaker 1: but I also tried to look at intelligence successes to 410 00:26:24,320 --> 00:26:27,720 Speaker 1: try to figure out what happens successfully, what goes right? 411 00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:30,399 Speaker 1: And how we can replicate that. I remember seeing George 412 00:26:30,440 --> 00:26:35,280 Speaker 1: Tennant being worried about al Qaeda and worried about Ben Ladden, 413 00:26:35,760 --> 00:26:39,479 Speaker 1: but he just felt that there was pressure building. And 414 00:26:39,520 --> 00:26:42,960 Speaker 1: I remember I was part of the Heart Rudman Commission 415 00:26:43,040 --> 00:26:46,240 Speaker 1: and we went to see the Secretary of Defense at 416 00:26:46,240 --> 00:26:49,240 Speaker 1: the time and he said to us as a group, 417 00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:52,840 Speaker 1: this was late in two thousand, he said, we're going 418 00:26:52,880 --> 00:26:55,520 Speaker 1: to get hit. He said, I don't know where, but 419 00:26:55,600 --> 00:26:58,480 Speaker 1: he said, I'm just telling you there are too many indicators, 420 00:26:59,160 --> 00:27:01,080 Speaker 1: and there are too many smart people on the other 421 00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:04,399 Speaker 1: side trying to figure this out, and somewhere they're going 422 00:27:04,440 --> 00:27:07,000 Speaker 1: to find a way to hit us. And it was 423 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:09,960 Speaker 1: a very sobering conversation of just before the Clinton team 424 00:27:10,040 --> 00:27:12,800 Speaker 1: left office. And I think that there was a real 425 00:27:12,920 --> 00:27:15,840 Speaker 1: problem because I think the Bush administration didn't want to 426 00:27:15,840 --> 00:27:18,280 Speaker 1: think of it. They were very focused on Russia and 427 00:27:18,480 --> 00:27:23,200 Speaker 1: very focused on traditional threats and whatever the indicators were. 428 00:27:23,720 --> 00:27:27,200 Speaker 1: Neither the system, the FBI, the CIA, etc. Which were 429 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:32,720 Speaker 1: not swapping information, nor the decision makers really wanted to 430 00:27:32,720 --> 00:27:36,959 Speaker 1: focus their time, energy and resources on going after the 431 00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:40,840 Speaker 1: possibility of nine eleven. What did you discover when you 432 00:27:40,840 --> 00:27:43,399 Speaker 1: looked at nine to eleven. Well, I think there are 433 00:27:43,440 --> 00:27:45,919 Speaker 1: two main points that you've just brought out there that 434 00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:48,080 Speaker 1: certainly applied to nine to eleven and also to our 435 00:27:48,200 --> 00:27:50,960 Speaker 1: even greater problems today. And the first is that the 436 00:27:51,040 --> 00:27:53,080 Speaker 1: type of warning that you were describing that we did 437 00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:56,120 Speaker 1: receive from several Blue Ribbon commissions leading up to nine 438 00:27:56,119 --> 00:28:00,480 Speaker 1: to eleven, those were strategic, big picture warnings. And there's 439 00:28:00,480 --> 00:28:03,360 Speaker 1: a big debate within the intelligence community and among analysts, 440 00:28:03,359 --> 00:28:05,040 Speaker 1: and sometimes it kind of seems like a little inside 441 00:28:05,040 --> 00:28:08,639 Speaker 1: the beltway about whether we need more strategic sort of 442 00:28:08,680 --> 00:28:11,040 Speaker 1: big picture warning like that, or do we need more 443 00:28:11,080 --> 00:28:15,120 Speaker 1: tactical sort of detailed warning. And often the experts tend 444 00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:17,480 Speaker 1: to sort of discount tactical warning that's kind of in 445 00:28:17,480 --> 00:28:22,000 Speaker 1: the weeds. But my study by comparing intelligence successes and 446 00:28:22,040 --> 00:28:26,000 Speaker 1: failures shows that a crucial difference is that we need 447 00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:30,240 Speaker 1: to gather that tactical sort of operational, detailed intelligence. The 448 00:28:30,520 --> 00:28:33,880 Speaker 1: warning that we're going to get hit sometime, as you heard, 449 00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:37,159 Speaker 1: and as Blue Ribbon Commissions argued, doesn't really do us 450 00:28:37,240 --> 00:28:39,920 Speaker 1: much good. What we need to do is have intensive 451 00:28:40,040 --> 00:28:44,080 Speaker 1: enough intelligence collection to provide actual warning of specific plots, 452 00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:47,040 Speaker 1: specific dangers, and that's a lot more difficult than the 453 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:49,120 Speaker 1: other problem that we're facing today, I think, which is 454 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:52,800 Speaker 1: that even though our intelligence community, our national security community 455 00:28:53,040 --> 00:28:55,520 Speaker 1: is huge, we spend so much of our national treasure 456 00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:59,560 Speaker 1: on trying to keep us safe. Still it's very difficult 457 00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:03,320 Speaker 1: for our American national security community to focus on more 458 00:29:03,360 --> 00:29:06,120 Speaker 1: than a couple of things at a time, which sounds 459 00:29:06,400 --> 00:29:09,360 Speaker 1: like it must be crazy, but that's the problem you're describing. 460 00:29:09,400 --> 00:29:12,440 Speaker 1: There After nine to eleven, we had to focus on 461 00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:16,000 Speaker 1: the terrorist threat, but even then it took us ten 462 00:29:16,120 --> 00:29:19,880 Speaker 1: years to find Usama bin Laden. Well, now we're facing 463 00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:22,960 Speaker 1: so many more threats all around the world, including this 464 00:29:23,040 --> 00:29:26,040 Speaker 1: renewed threat of great power competition. We have to once 465 00:29:26,040 --> 00:29:30,280 Speaker 1: again focus our attention outside the US two major powers 466 00:29:30,320 --> 00:29:32,480 Speaker 1: around the world, But we can't keep our eye off 467 00:29:32,480 --> 00:29:35,840 Speaker 1: the baald here domestically with the terrorist threat, and it's 468 00:29:35,920 --> 00:29:39,360 Speaker 1: very difficult for our large national security and intelligence community 469 00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:41,160 Speaker 1: to do all of that at the same time. When 470 00:29:41,160 --> 00:29:44,120 Speaker 1: you look at the Japanese and forty one, or you 471 00:29:44,160 --> 00:29:47,080 Speaker 1: look at Ben Ladden, or if you look at the Chinese, 472 00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:51,040 Speaker 1: they may have a totally different sense of what matters 473 00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:56,200 Speaker 1: than we do, so that at times we find ourselves 474 00:29:56,280 --> 00:30:00,800 Speaker 1: trying to project ourselves onto a particular situation, but in 475 00:30:00,840 --> 00:30:03,280 Speaker 1: fact they're going to view it and analyze it from 476 00:30:03,320 --> 00:30:06,880 Speaker 1: a totally different manner than we are. That's part of 477 00:30:06,880 --> 00:30:10,200 Speaker 1: the problem today that we don't have enough analysts within 478 00:30:10,240 --> 00:30:13,080 Speaker 1: our intelligence and national security communities that have a really 479 00:30:13,280 --> 00:30:16,840 Speaker 1: good keen understanding of all the many different cultures and 480 00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:21,400 Speaker 1: different communities in different countries that threaten us. Next, we 481 00:30:21,520 --> 00:30:24,680 Speaker 1: face a greater range of threats than any other time 482 00:30:24,720 --> 00:30:36,400 Speaker 1: in our history. Hi, this is Nick Gingwich. After I 483 00:30:36,440 --> 00:30:39,440 Speaker 1: served as Speaker of the House, I opened my own business, 484 00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:43,040 Speaker 1: Gingwish three sixty. As a business owner, if you don't 485 00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:45,840 Speaker 1: know your numbers, you don't know your business. That is 486 00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:48,440 Speaker 1: what nut Suite by Oracle has set out to solve, 487 00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:51,680 Speaker 1: because most companies don't have a clear picture of their finances, 488 00:30:51,960 --> 00:30:54,720 Speaker 1: and that is why many businesses fail. Question for any 489 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:57,760 Speaker 1: business owner out there is, are you confident that you've 490 00:30:57,760 --> 00:31:01,520 Speaker 1: got the right numbers of your fingertips? Serious entrepreneurs and 491 00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:05,080 Speaker 1: finance teams run a nutsweet by Oracle, the world's number 492 00:31:05,120 --> 00:31:09,040 Speaker 1: one cloud business system. NetSuite offers a full picture of 493 00:31:09,040 --> 00:31:12,840 Speaker 1: all your finances, all in one place, in real time, 494 00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:16,400 Speaker 1: right from your phone or your desktop. No more guessing, 495 00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:18,840 Speaker 1: no more worry. The way you don't know could kill 496 00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:23,240 Speaker 1: your company. That's why netsweet customers grow three times faster 497 00:31:23,640 --> 00:31:26,600 Speaker 1: than the S and P five hundred and you can too. 498 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:30,680 Speaker 1: Schedule your free demo right now and receive their free 499 00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:34,920 Speaker 1: guide seven key strategies to grow your profits at NetSuite 500 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:38,360 Speaker 1: dot com slash newt. Set up your free demo and 501 00:31:38,440 --> 00:31:41,720 Speaker 1: get your free guide to day at netsweet dot com 502 00:31:41,800 --> 00:31:58,600 Speaker 1: slash newt. That's NetSuite dot com slash neot. We probably 503 00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:04,479 Speaker 1: face a greater rain of cultural requirements than any country 504 00:32:04,480 --> 00:32:07,000 Speaker 1: in history. I was once at the Blue House, which 505 00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:10,840 Speaker 1: is the president of South Korea. I was Speaker of House. 506 00:32:10,840 --> 00:32:14,080 Speaker 1: They're complaining that we didn't pay enough attention, and I said, yeah, 507 00:32:14,680 --> 00:32:17,440 Speaker 1: my dad had served there in fifty three. We'd have 508 00:32:17,640 --> 00:32:20,480 Speaker 1: troops there. Ever since, we still had a four star 509 00:32:20,560 --> 00:32:23,720 Speaker 1: general there and thousands of troops. I said, but the 510 00:32:23,760 --> 00:32:26,560 Speaker 1: problem is, if you're an American president, when you get 511 00:32:26,640 --> 00:32:30,840 Speaker 1: up in the morning, there are two hundred countries that 512 00:32:30,960 --> 00:32:33,960 Speaker 1: could potentially be at the top of your national security brief. 513 00:32:34,800 --> 00:32:37,080 Speaker 1: And I said, you're right, as that's really hard for 514 00:32:37,200 --> 00:32:41,760 Speaker 1: us to be able to focus enough on anywhere, And 515 00:32:41,840 --> 00:32:45,080 Speaker 1: don't you think that that has compounded our risk of 516 00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:48,960 Speaker 1: surprise that we now have so many different potential opponents 517 00:32:49,040 --> 00:32:52,360 Speaker 1: who each have their own organizational structure, in their own 518 00:32:52,400 --> 00:32:56,320 Speaker 1: pattern which can be wildly different. So when you start 519 00:32:56,360 --> 00:32:59,720 Speaker 1: to train analysts, getting them to be able to actually 520 00:33:00,200 --> 00:33:03,920 Speaker 1: thoroughly be immersed in one only begins the whole process. 521 00:33:03,920 --> 00:33:06,120 Speaker 1: And then you've got to find a way to have 522 00:33:06,480 --> 00:33:09,720 Speaker 1: strategic meetings where you might have people who represent seven 523 00:33:09,840 --> 00:33:14,960 Speaker 1: or nine wildly different cultural backgrounds sitting in a meeting 524 00:33:14,960 --> 00:33:19,400 Speaker 1: trying to discuss what's going on. Absolutely, the former Director 525 00:33:19,440 --> 00:33:23,360 Speaker 1: of National Intelligence, James Clapper, used to say that during 526 00:33:23,440 --> 00:33:27,000 Speaker 1: his fifty year career in American intelligence, he had never 527 00:33:27,040 --> 00:33:30,040 Speaker 1: seen an era as we're in today, where there are 528 00:33:30,080 --> 00:33:33,640 Speaker 1: more difficult challenges and more varied challenges for American intelligence. 529 00:33:34,040 --> 00:33:36,600 Speaker 1: I kind of think that anybody who's been doing something 530 00:33:36,640 --> 00:33:38,840 Speaker 1: at a senior and respected level for fifty years, we 531 00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:40,880 Speaker 1: should listen to him. And I think that's the case. 532 00:33:41,240 --> 00:33:43,640 Speaker 1: We just don't have the type of expertise such as 533 00:33:43,720 --> 00:33:46,120 Speaker 1: during the Cold War when I was a young Navy 534 00:33:46,120 --> 00:33:49,000 Speaker 1: intelligence officer, we could focus on one kind of enemy. 535 00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:52,800 Speaker 1: When I would fly along with our Navy reconnaissance aircraft 536 00:33:52,920 --> 00:33:56,920 Speaker 1: tracking the Soviet fleet. We trusted that we understood the 537 00:33:56,960 --> 00:34:00,720 Speaker 1: Soviet military, that we understood the Soviet pilot who was 538 00:34:00,760 --> 00:34:03,960 Speaker 1: in that big fighter escorted Harberconstance plane, and that we 539 00:34:04,080 --> 00:34:07,160 Speaker 1: knew that that pilot was as professional as we were, 540 00:34:07,440 --> 00:34:09,239 Speaker 1: that he wanted to get home at the end of 541 00:34:09,239 --> 00:34:10,880 Speaker 1: the day and he didn't want to cause trouble, and 542 00:34:10,920 --> 00:34:15,360 Speaker 1: either did we. Well, today we're facing not just one enemy, 543 00:34:15,400 --> 00:34:18,160 Speaker 1: but so many different kinds of enemies, and so many 544 00:34:18,200 --> 00:34:21,120 Speaker 1: that we really still don't understand. So as you think 545 00:34:21,160 --> 00:34:26,239 Speaker 1: about training young intelligence officers over the next day thirty years, 546 00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:30,399 Speaker 1: how much would you change from the current system. One 547 00:34:30,520 --> 00:34:34,840 Speaker 1: big difference I think today is that we need to 548 00:34:34,880 --> 00:34:38,239 Speaker 1: continue to devote even more of our efforts toward what 549 00:34:38,280 --> 00:34:41,880 Speaker 1: we might call domestic intelligence or homeland security intelligence. And 550 00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:46,280 Speaker 1: that's such a whole different problem set from tracking Russian 551 00:34:46,360 --> 00:34:50,080 Speaker 1: or Chinese adventurism around the world. That's such a different 552 00:34:50,120 --> 00:34:53,480 Speaker 1: problem set when we're dealing with domestic terrorism. I think 553 00:34:53,480 --> 00:34:57,080 Speaker 1: it takes a different kind of intelligence analyst, a different 554 00:34:57,120 --> 00:35:00,480 Speaker 1: kind of intelligence collector who is sort of born from 555 00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:03,480 Speaker 1: the ground up thinking about issues such as civil liberties, 556 00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:06,279 Speaker 1: knows how to work with state and local authorities and 557 00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:09,480 Speaker 1: law enforcement, and that's not anything like what I was 558 00:35:09,520 --> 00:35:12,640 Speaker 1: trained to do and what many of our national intelligence 559 00:35:12,760 --> 00:35:15,960 Speaker 1: officials are trained to do. So actually, I think that 560 00:35:16,040 --> 00:35:20,840 Speaker 1: we really should have a separate domestic intelligence organization, similar 561 00:35:20,880 --> 00:35:24,719 Speaker 1: to the British m I five Security Organization, But I 562 00:35:24,760 --> 00:35:27,320 Speaker 1: just don't think there's ever going to be a political 563 00:35:27,360 --> 00:35:31,240 Speaker 1: will behind doing that unless we had another major domestic attack, 564 00:35:31,280 --> 00:35:33,560 Speaker 1: which obviously we don't want and we're working to prevent. 565 00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:36,680 Speaker 1: Walk me through for a minute, how that would differ 566 00:35:36,760 --> 00:35:41,480 Speaker 1: from the FBI. The FBI is our primary domestic intelligence organization. 567 00:35:42,040 --> 00:35:46,719 Speaker 1: It also is our lead federal law enforcement organization, and 568 00:35:47,000 --> 00:35:50,760 Speaker 1: many observers think that's the conflict there, and I agree 569 00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:54,640 Speaker 1: with them that it's difficult for the same organization and 570 00:35:54,760 --> 00:35:59,840 Speaker 1: often the same analysts to use the tools of law enforcement, 571 00:36:00,239 --> 00:36:04,239 Speaker 1: which often have very different legal authorities compared with the 572 00:36:04,280 --> 00:36:08,960 Speaker 1: tools of intelligence. And many experts, even when the nine 573 00:36:08,960 --> 00:36:12,440 Speaker 1: eleven Commission report came out and when DHS was organized, 574 00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:15,640 Speaker 1: many experts thought it was a mistake not to hive 575 00:36:15,760 --> 00:36:19,759 Speaker 1: off part of the FBI's intelligence arm and put that 576 00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:23,279 Speaker 1: within DHS, I think there's still a problem there. We 577 00:36:23,360 --> 00:36:27,200 Speaker 1: can use intelligence tools to gather information on you and me, 578 00:36:27,280 --> 00:36:29,840 Speaker 1: for instance, even if we aren't necessarily doing anything wrong. 579 00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:34,759 Speaker 1: But we don't want the FBI law enforcement side to 580 00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:37,160 Speaker 1: be paying too much attention to us, to be gathering 581 00:36:37,200 --> 00:36:40,359 Speaker 1: our information into law enforcement databases unless there's some sort 582 00:36:40,360 --> 00:36:43,840 Speaker 1: of reasonable suspicion that we're doing something wrong. Those two missions, 583 00:36:43,880 --> 00:36:48,759 Speaker 1: intelligence and law enforcement kind of rest unhappily together. They're 584 00:36:48,760 --> 00:36:53,439 Speaker 1: almost anethetical to each other. You want the aggressiveness to 585 00:36:53,520 --> 00:36:57,640 Speaker 1: preempt a terrorist attrack, but you want the caution to 586 00:36:57,760 --> 00:37:02,960 Speaker 1: protect civil liberties, and you can't possibly have the same 587 00:37:03,000 --> 00:37:05,560 Speaker 1: people have both on their head. That's a great way 588 00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:07,600 Speaker 1: to put it. We don't like being spied on, but 589 00:37:08,080 --> 00:37:12,680 Speaker 1: we need a more aggressive domestic intelligence infrastructure. But the 590 00:37:12,680 --> 00:37:15,719 Speaker 1: problem is that if it's too closely tied to our 591 00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:19,000 Speaker 1: law enforcement infrastructure, that can be a problem. I think 592 00:37:19,000 --> 00:37:21,760 Speaker 1: it would actually be better for civil liberties and better 593 00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:25,520 Speaker 1: for American security if we had a separate, larger intelligence 594 00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:30,680 Speaker 1: organization within DHS that was dedicated to tracking dangers within 595 00:37:30,719 --> 00:37:33,680 Speaker 1: the country and not just the kind of law enforcement 596 00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:37,520 Speaker 1: and criminal and terrorist threats that the FBI tracks. There's 597 00:37:37,520 --> 00:37:40,840 Speaker 1: another reason why the FBI isn't necessarily the best place 598 00:37:40,920 --> 00:37:44,200 Speaker 1: for this mission is that the FBI is a primarily 599 00:37:44,200 --> 00:37:47,239 Speaker 1: domestic organization, and so many of the threats that come 600 00:37:47,280 --> 00:37:51,440 Speaker 1: into our country now are actually coming from overseas. They 601 00:37:51,480 --> 00:37:54,439 Speaker 1: fall into what in the intelligence community would fall into 602 00:37:54,480 --> 00:37:57,480 Speaker 1: our other agencies, the other three letter agencies within the 603 00:37:57,480 --> 00:38:01,239 Speaker 1: intelligence community, the CIA, the NSA, and others. But the 604 00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,760 Speaker 1: problem there is that those agencies don't have the authority 605 00:38:04,760 --> 00:38:07,279 Speaker 1: to operate, and we don't want them to operate domestically, 606 00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:09,640 Speaker 1: so we have sort of a seam there. When a 607 00:38:09,760 --> 00:38:13,040 Speaker 1: threat comes from overseas and comes into this country, it's 608 00:38:13,080 --> 00:38:16,080 Speaker 1: not always clear just whose job it is to track that. 609 00:38:16,680 --> 00:38:20,880 Speaker 1: So from that standpoint, you really have to have I 610 00:38:20,920 --> 00:38:25,960 Speaker 1: think a serious national debate about how we reorganize here 611 00:38:26,000 --> 00:38:29,080 Speaker 1: at home. In addition, though, it seems to me, when 612 00:38:29,120 --> 00:38:33,359 Speaker 1: you look at the rise of cyber capabilities, and I've 613 00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:35,360 Speaker 1: talked a little bit with people in the Pentagon about this, 614 00:38:35,920 --> 00:38:39,480 Speaker 1: we'd organized the world around a series of combat and commands. 615 00:38:39,480 --> 00:38:41,720 Speaker 1: We have one for the Middle East, one for Latin America, 616 00:38:42,080 --> 00:38:46,440 Speaker 1: one for the Indo Pacific. But the reality may be 617 00:38:46,840 --> 00:38:50,880 Speaker 1: when you start talking about cyber campaigns and space based campaigns, 618 00:38:51,320 --> 00:38:55,719 Speaker 1: you may need almost a global headquarters that can move 619 00:38:55,760 --> 00:38:58,880 Speaker 1: in real time because that's the speed of which the 620 00:38:58,920 --> 00:39:02,400 Speaker 1: campaign will be fall We've divided up the world for 621 00:39:02,560 --> 00:39:05,640 Speaker 1: many decades now into what we call the combatant commands. 622 00:39:06,040 --> 00:39:08,800 Speaker 1: It has so far been a structure that has worked 623 00:39:08,800 --> 00:39:12,400 Speaker 1: pretty well to organize our vast military and intelligence national 624 00:39:12,400 --> 00:39:16,720 Speaker 1: security responsibilities. The threats today can get at you more easily, 625 00:39:16,920 --> 00:39:20,880 Speaker 1: and when we have our forces divided up into mostly 626 00:39:20,920 --> 00:39:24,239 Speaker 1: regionally organized combatant commands, the problem is there can be 627 00:39:24,280 --> 00:39:29,040 Speaker 1: seems between them. We don't have one single command dedicated 628 00:39:29,080 --> 00:39:32,840 Speaker 1: to taking that global look. Maybe the only example I 629 00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:36,120 Speaker 1: could think of would be Special Operations Command, which does 630 00:39:36,600 --> 00:39:40,040 Speaker 1: look globally, but they have very specific focus. We have 631 00:39:40,120 --> 00:39:42,160 Speaker 1: the Joint Staff, and we have the Office of Secretary 632 00:39:42,160 --> 00:39:46,439 Speaker 1: of Defense staff in the Pentagon, but they're not operational organizations. 633 00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:48,520 Speaker 1: They're not in the weeds as much as we need 634 00:39:48,520 --> 00:39:50,960 Speaker 1: somebody to be. You would think that after all of 635 00:39:50,960 --> 00:39:55,040 Speaker 1: the years we've had of doing pretty good intelligence, having 636 00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:57,560 Speaker 1: a long track record of this stuff, you'd think we 637 00:39:57,600 --> 00:40:00,600 Speaker 1: would just be more disciplined and more professional. But In 638 00:40:00,640 --> 00:40:04,640 Speaker 1: the end, cognitive dissonance is very powerful. And if you're 639 00:40:04,680 --> 00:40:06,880 Speaker 1: trying to tell me something I don't want to learn, 640 00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:09,080 Speaker 1: I have all sorts of pretty good devices for not 641 00:40:09,200 --> 00:40:12,600 Speaker 1: learning it. Absolutely, And there have been a lot of 642 00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:16,680 Speaker 1: studies of intelligence community behavior and when do leaders listen 643 00:40:16,719 --> 00:40:18,920 Speaker 1: to intelligence or not? And as you say, we have 644 00:40:19,000 --> 00:40:20,920 Speaker 1: that problem in the intelligence business all the time that 645 00:40:21,200 --> 00:40:24,239 Speaker 1: if a leader is not interested in listening to the assessment, 646 00:40:24,400 --> 00:40:28,480 Speaker 1: that isn't a good situation. What is it you wish 647 00:40:28,600 --> 00:40:35,040 Speaker 1: the American people expected from the intelligence community? And what 648 00:40:35,200 --> 00:40:37,960 Speaker 1: is it you wish the American people we're asking of 649 00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:40,799 Speaker 1: their members of Congress in order to get what they 650 00:40:40,840 --> 00:40:45,000 Speaker 1: should expect. I certainly think that we need to have 651 00:40:45,280 --> 00:40:49,600 Speaker 1: a better and more educated national debate about intelligence, about 652 00:40:49,600 --> 00:40:52,120 Speaker 1: what it is, about how we gather it, and we 653 00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:56,680 Speaker 1: need to somehow get beyond that allergy to domestic intelligence, 654 00:40:56,760 --> 00:40:59,280 Speaker 1: even though, of course, as Americans sort it's in our DNA, 655 00:40:59,400 --> 00:41:02,040 Speaker 1: we don't like people watching us, we don't like people 656 00:41:02,400 --> 00:41:05,359 Speaker 1: collecting information on us. But I think that we need 657 00:41:05,400 --> 00:41:07,719 Speaker 1: to have a better debate about that. We need to 658 00:41:08,040 --> 00:41:12,560 Speaker 1: have Americans understand better what intelligence does. It shouldn't be 659 00:41:12,880 --> 00:41:17,239 Speaker 1: considered a totally separate function of government that's out there 660 00:41:17,280 --> 00:41:19,520 Speaker 1: and it's secret, and we really can't talk about it. 661 00:41:19,760 --> 00:41:21,239 Speaker 1: That's how we used to look at it. During the 662 00:41:21,239 --> 00:41:23,840 Speaker 1: Cold War, whatever was going on was over there, and 663 00:41:23,880 --> 00:41:26,440 Speaker 1: for the most part, our citizens and many of our 664 00:41:26,520 --> 00:41:29,959 Speaker 1: national leaders were happy to let American intelligence and national 665 00:41:30,000 --> 00:41:32,319 Speaker 1: security do what it did as long as it kept 666 00:41:32,360 --> 00:41:35,200 Speaker 1: us safe. But the trouble is that these threats can 667 00:41:35,239 --> 00:41:38,440 Speaker 1: so easily now affect all of us individually and personally. 668 00:41:38,920 --> 00:41:41,640 Speaker 1: So how do we keep ourselves safe while at the 669 00:41:41,680 --> 00:41:44,560 Speaker 1: same time gathering the intelligence that we need not to 670 00:41:44,600 --> 00:41:48,120 Speaker 1: overrun our civil liberties. That's a real challenge, But the 671 00:41:48,120 --> 00:41:50,520 Speaker 1: first step is to have a better national debate and discussion. 672 00:41:51,120 --> 00:41:53,680 Speaker 1: Thank you very very much. Thanks, I really enjoy talking 673 00:41:53,680 --> 00:41:59,719 Speaker 1: to you. Thank you to my guests, Steve Toomey and 674 00:42:00,040 --> 00:42:03,680 Speaker 1: Eric Dahl. You can read more about surprise attacks and 675 00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:07,239 Speaker 1: view excerpts of my guest books on our show page 676 00:42:07,400 --> 00:42:11,520 Speaker 1: at newtsworld dot com. Newtsworld is produced by Westwood One. 677 00:42:12,120 --> 00:42:17,320 Speaker 1: Our executive producers Debbie Myers, and our producer is Garnsey Slam, 678 00:42:17,360 --> 00:42:21,719 Speaker 1: Our editor is Robert Borowski, and our researcher is Rachel Peterson. 679 00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:26,080 Speaker 1: Our guest booker is Tamara Coleman. The artwork for the 680 00:42:26,120 --> 00:42:29,960 Speaker 1: show was created by Steve Penley. The music was composed 681 00:42:29,960 --> 00:42:33,560 Speaker 1: by Joey Salvia. Special thanks to the team at Gingwich 682 00:42:33,560 --> 00:42:37,720 Speaker 1: Street sixty and Westwood One's John Wardock and Robert Mathers. 683 00:42:38,600 --> 00:42:42,239 Speaker 1: Please email me with your comments at newt at newtsworld 684 00:42:42,280 --> 00:42:45,680 Speaker 1: dot com. If you've been enjoying Newtsworld, I hope you'll 685 00:42:45,680 --> 00:42:48,560 Speaker 1: go to Apple Podcast and both rate us with five 686 00:42:48,600 --> 00:42:51,920 Speaker 1: stars and give us a review. Swathers can learn what 687 00:42:51,960 --> 00:42:58,520 Speaker 1: it's all about on the next episode of Newtsworld. Missy 688 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:02,280 Speaker 1: and Michael Owen lost their first born son, Davis Henry Owen, 689 00:43:02,560 --> 00:43:07,040 Speaker 1: to a drug overdose in March twenty fourteen. Their personal 690 00:43:07,120 --> 00:43:11,600 Speaker 1: story is exemplary of the struggle with opioids America's facing today. 691 00:43:12,120 --> 00:43:14,799 Speaker 1: We didn't have anybody that we could reach out to, 692 00:43:15,800 --> 00:43:18,479 Speaker 1: and if we had had somewhere to turn or reach 693 00:43:18,520 --> 00:43:20,920 Speaker 1: out and ask for information, we could have had a 694 00:43:20,960 --> 00:43:24,920 Speaker 1: totally different outcome. But fact then, the stigma was so 695 00:43:25,480 --> 00:43:30,680 Speaker 1: great and nobody wanted to let people know that in 696 00:43:30,719 --> 00:43:33,960 Speaker 1: their family there was somebody who was addicted to drugs. 697 00:43:34,680 --> 00:43:46,640 Speaker 1: I'm new Kangridge. This is news World, the Westwood One 698 00:43:46,680 --> 00:43:47,720 Speaker 1: podcast network,