1 00:00:01,920 --> 00:00:04,320 Speaker 1: Welcome to brain Stuff, a production of I Heart Radio, 2 00:00:06,280 --> 00:00:10,760 Speaker 1: Hey brain Stuff, Lauren Voge bomb here. On October nine, 3 00:00:11,440 --> 00:00:15,920 Speaker 1: one especially equipped Soviet t U nine bomber flew toward 4 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:18,400 Speaker 1: a remote chain of islands in the Arctic Ocean that 5 00:00:18,480 --> 00:00:21,800 Speaker 1: the USS are frequently used as a site for nuclear tests, 6 00:00:22,079 --> 00:00:25,080 Speaker 1: accompanied by a smaller plane equipped with a movie camera 7 00:00:25,160 --> 00:00:29,240 Speaker 1: and instruments for monitoring air samples. But this wasn't just 8 00:00:29,320 --> 00:00:32,640 Speaker 1: a routine nuclear test. Attached to the underside of the 9 00:00:32,640 --> 00:00:35,640 Speaker 1: plane was a thermonuclear bomb that was so big it 10 00:00:35,640 --> 00:00:40,040 Speaker 1: wouldn't fit inside the normal interior bomb bay. The cylindrical 11 00:00:40,120 --> 00:00:43,199 Speaker 1: device was twenty six ft that's eight meters long and 12 00:00:43,240 --> 00:00:47,000 Speaker 1: weighed nearly sixty thousand pounds or twenty seven metric tons. 13 00:00:47,880 --> 00:00:51,000 Speaker 1: The device had the prosaic official name of Item six 14 00:00:51,040 --> 00:00:53,600 Speaker 1: O two, but it's gone down in history with the 15 00:00:53,680 --> 00:00:56,800 Speaker 1: nickname of the Czar Bomba, the Russian way of calling 16 00:00:56,800 --> 00:01:01,200 Speaker 1: it the Emperor of bombs, and that name was no exaggeration. 17 00:01:01,720 --> 00:01:04,880 Speaker 1: Czar bomba's yield is estimated to have been roughly fifty 18 00:01:04,920 --> 00:01:08,640 Speaker 1: seven megatons, about thirty eight hundred times the power of 19 00:01:08,680 --> 00:01:11,800 Speaker 1: the fifteen kiloton atomic bomb that the US used to 20 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:17,000 Speaker 1: destroy Hiroshima in on that day in nineteen sixty one, 21 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:19,959 Speaker 1: Czar Bombo was released on a parachute in order to 22 00:01:19,959 --> 00:01:22,400 Speaker 1: slow its descent and give the bomber and its crew 23 00:01:22,520 --> 00:01:27,000 Speaker 1: a chance to escape. When the giant bomb finally detonated 24 00:01:27,040 --> 00:01:30,240 Speaker 1: about thirteen thousand feet or four kilometers over its target, 25 00:01:30,640 --> 00:01:33,680 Speaker 1: the blast was so powerful that it destroyed everything within 26 00:01:33,720 --> 00:01:37,080 Speaker 1: a nearly twenty two mile or thirty five kilometer radius 27 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,440 Speaker 1: and generated a mushroom cloud that towered nearly two hundred 28 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:44,840 Speaker 1: thousand feet or sixty kilometers high. In Soviet towns a 29 00:01:44,920 --> 00:01:47,960 Speaker 1: hundred miles or a hundred and sixty kilometers from ground zero, 30 00:01:48,320 --> 00:01:51,520 Speaker 1: wooden houses were destroyed, and even brick and stone structures 31 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:56,640 Speaker 1: suffered damage. After being largely forgotten for many years, Zar 32 00:01:56,760 --> 00:01:59,800 Speaker 1: Bombo was back in the news in August when the 33 00:02:00,000 --> 00:02:03,440 Speaker 1: shan State Nuclear Power Company posted on YouTube a vintage 34 00:02:03,440 --> 00:02:06,240 Speaker 1: film that showed an aerial view of the explosion and 35 00:02:06,240 --> 00:02:10,320 Speaker 1: the towering cloud it created. One of the cameramen who 36 00:02:10,360 --> 00:02:13,440 Speaker 1: recorded the event described the bomb as creating quote, a 37 00:02:13,480 --> 00:02:16,959 Speaker 1: powerful white flash over the horizon, and after a long 38 00:02:17,000 --> 00:02:20,040 Speaker 1: period of time, he heard a remote, indistinct and heavy 39 00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:24,320 Speaker 1: blow as if the Earth had been killed. The blast 40 00:02:24,360 --> 00:02:27,000 Speaker 1: was so powerful that its shock wave caused the tin 41 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:31,160 Speaker 1: to immediately drop three thousand feet or a kilometer in altitude, 42 00:02:31,560 --> 00:02:34,560 Speaker 1: though the pilot regained control and got the plane back 43 00:02:34,560 --> 00:02:39,600 Speaker 1: to its base safely. So why did the Soviets want 44 00:02:39,760 --> 00:02:44,000 Speaker 1: such a humongous bomb? Czar Bomba's test was symbolic of 45 00:02:44,160 --> 00:02:47,640 Speaker 1: escalating tensions between the Soviets and the United States. After 46 00:02:47,720 --> 00:02:51,600 Speaker 1: a June nine summit in Vienna between Soviet leader Nikita 47 00:02:51,639 --> 00:02:55,880 Speaker 1: Khrushchev and US President John F. Kennedy went badly. Kruschev 48 00:02:55,960 --> 00:02:59,079 Speaker 1: apparently decided to take out his frustrations by showing off 49 00:02:59,080 --> 00:03:03,880 Speaker 1: Soviet military progress, including ending the informal moratorium on nuclear 50 00:03:03,919 --> 00:03:07,600 Speaker 1: testing that both countries had maintained since the late nineteen fifties. 51 00:03:08,840 --> 00:03:12,000 Speaker 1: The resumption of testing gave Soviet weapons researchers a chance 52 00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:13,800 Speaker 1: to try out an idea that they had had for 53 00:03:13,880 --> 00:03:16,840 Speaker 1: building a giant H bomb, one that was far bigger 54 00:03:16,880 --> 00:03:19,120 Speaker 1: than the most powerful weapon in the U s Arsenal 55 00:03:20,240 --> 00:03:23,360 Speaker 1: and the frightening logic of all out nuclear war. Having 56 00:03:23,400 --> 00:03:26,519 Speaker 1: a high yield H bomb did make some sense theoretically 57 00:03:27,160 --> 00:03:30,799 Speaker 1: at the time, missiles capable of striking distant countries were 58 00:03:30,840 --> 00:03:33,840 Speaker 1: still in their infancy, and the Soviet Union didn't have 59 00:03:33,919 --> 00:03:38,000 Speaker 1: many strategic bombers. The US, in contrast, had a variety 60 00:03:38,040 --> 00:03:41,120 Speaker 1: of aircraft that could strike from bases conveniently close to 61 00:03:41,160 --> 00:03:45,520 Speaker 1: Soviet territory. We spoke by email with Nikolai Sakov, a 62 00:03:45,600 --> 00:03:48,680 Speaker 1: Vienna based senior fellow affiliated with the James Martin Center 63 00:03:48,720 --> 00:03:52,320 Speaker 1: for Non Proliferation Studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies 64 00:03:52,360 --> 00:03:56,760 Speaker 1: at Monterey in California. He said, hence, if you can 65 00:03:56,800 --> 00:04:00,080 Speaker 1: deliver only one, two or three bombs, they better be 66 00:04:00,240 --> 00:04:05,200 Speaker 1: very powerful. But the Soviet researchers pushed that idea to 67 00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:09,160 Speaker 1: an extreme. Originally they envisioned a one hundred megaton weapon 68 00:04:09,320 --> 00:04:12,000 Speaker 1: with a high level of radiation, but settled for one 69 00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:15,400 Speaker 1: of slightly more than half that much explosive power after 70 00:04:15,440 --> 00:04:19,400 Speaker 1: the USSRS political leadership expressed worries about contamination from such 71 00:04:19,400 --> 00:04:24,520 Speaker 1: a blast, Sokov said, as a result, fallout was very limited, 72 00:04:24,839 --> 00:04:27,839 Speaker 1: much more limited than one could expect. The shock wave 73 00:04:28,000 --> 00:04:33,840 Speaker 1: was really strong, however, its circumnavigated Earth three times. Even so, 74 00:04:34,120 --> 00:04:37,280 Speaker 1: Japanese authorities found the highest level of radiation and rain 75 00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:40,359 Speaker 1: water that they had ever detected and a quote invisible 76 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:43,920 Speaker 1: cloud of radioactive ash that drifted eastward across the Pacific 77 00:04:44,200 --> 00:04:46,560 Speaker 1: and then crossed Canada and the Great Lakes region of 78 00:04:46,560 --> 00:04:50,560 Speaker 1: the US, but US scientists reassured the public that most 79 00:04:50,560 --> 00:04:52,680 Speaker 1: of the debris from the Czar BOMBA would stay high 80 00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:56,080 Speaker 1: in the stratosphere and gradually lose its radioactivity by the 81 00:04:56,080 --> 00:04:59,800 Speaker 1: time it fell to earth. The Soviets informed the US 82 00:05:00,040 --> 00:05:03,640 Speaker 1: forehand of their intention to test a fifty megaton nuclear bomb. 83 00:05:04,279 --> 00:05:06,440 Speaker 1: In a speech just a week before the blast, The 84 00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:09,240 Speaker 1: U s Deputy Secretary of Defense suggested that the bomb 85 00:05:09,400 --> 00:05:12,440 Speaker 1: wasn't intended to intimidate the US, but to send a 86 00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:18,080 Speaker 1: message to the Soviet Union's restless ally China. Whatever the case, 87 00:05:18,279 --> 00:05:21,679 Speaker 1: although the Czar BOMBA made headlines in the US, government, 88 00:05:21,720 --> 00:05:25,960 Speaker 1: officials weren't that impressed by the nightmarish display of nuclear destruction. 89 00:05:26,680 --> 00:05:30,080 Speaker 1: The US had concentric rings of defenses, from early warning 90 00:05:30,160 --> 00:05:33,440 Speaker 1: radar to fighter aircraft, and surface to air missiles that 91 00:05:33,480 --> 00:05:35,760 Speaker 1: all would have made it difficult for a Soviet bomber 92 00:05:35,839 --> 00:05:39,120 Speaker 1: to succeed in a first strike, and a device as 93 00:05:39,160 --> 00:05:42,160 Speaker 1: massive as the Tzar BOMBA was dangerous to the aircraft 94 00:05:42,279 --> 00:05:44,600 Speaker 1: that dropped it, so much so that the t U 95 00:05:45,279 --> 00:05:48,440 Speaker 1: crew had been given only a fifty fifty chance of survival. 96 00:05:50,120 --> 00:05:53,080 Speaker 1: But we also spoke via email with Robert Standish Norris, 97 00:05:53,279 --> 00:05:55,840 Speaker 1: a senior fellow for Nuclear policy at the Federation of 98 00:05:55,880 --> 00:05:59,880 Speaker 1: American Scientists. He said that the US quote looked in 99 00:06:00,080 --> 00:06:05,360 Speaker 1: the big bomb option and decided no. He explained that theoretically, quote, 100 00:06:05,400 --> 00:06:07,919 Speaker 1: there is no limit on how big a hydrogen bomb 101 00:06:07,960 --> 00:06:11,640 Speaker 1: can be. If ever used, zar BOMBA would clearly kill 102 00:06:11,680 --> 00:06:15,320 Speaker 1: a lot more people. Accuracy became an option, and if 103 00:06:15,320 --> 00:06:17,600 Speaker 1: you improve it by half, then you can cut the 104 00:06:17,680 --> 00:06:20,760 Speaker 1: yield by a factor of eight. This is what we did, 105 00:06:20,920 --> 00:06:24,920 Speaker 1: and the Soviets followed. We also checked in with Pavel 106 00:06:24,960 --> 00:06:28,200 Speaker 1: Podvig via email. He's a long time nuclear weapons analyst 107 00:06:28,279 --> 00:06:30,760 Speaker 1: who has worked with the United Nations and National Security 108 00:06:30,760 --> 00:06:34,440 Speaker 1: Studies programs at Princeton and Stanford Universities, and operates the 109 00:06:34,440 --> 00:06:39,279 Speaker 1: website Russian forces dot org. He said, everybody understood that 110 00:06:39,440 --> 00:06:42,159 Speaker 1: it's too big to be a practical weapon. From the 111 00:06:42,200 --> 00:06:45,120 Speaker 1: point of view of destructive power. It's even more efficient 112 00:06:45,160 --> 00:06:49,920 Speaker 1: to use several smaller weapons than one large one. Zara 113 00:06:49,960 --> 00:06:53,680 Speaker 1: BOMBA ended up being a Maccab curiosity of the nuclear age, 114 00:06:54,080 --> 00:06:59,360 Speaker 1: Podvig said no additional devices of this kind were built. Instead, 115 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 1: the US SAR went in a different direction. A few 116 00:07:02,520 --> 00:07:06,040 Speaker 1: years after the Czar bomba test, Soviet missile designers achieved 117 00:07:06,040 --> 00:07:09,000 Speaker 1: a major breakthrough with liquid fuel, opening the way to 118 00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 1: produce strategic missiles that could be kept ready for launch 119 00:07:11,680 --> 00:07:16,600 Speaker 1: for extended periods and hidden in protected silos. Sokov explained, 120 00:07:16,880 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: about nineteen sixty four to nineteen sixty five, the Soviet 121 00:07:20,080 --> 00:07:24,280 Speaker 1: Union decisively turned toward an emphasis on intercontinental ballistic missiles, 122 00:07:24,440 --> 00:07:27,160 Speaker 1: which can carry several warheads, each of which will strike 123 00:07:27,200 --> 00:07:30,840 Speaker 1: a different target, which typically amounted to about sixty six 124 00:07:31,520 --> 00:07:34,600 Speaker 1: of its strategic force until about the mid nineteen nineties, 125 00:07:34,680 --> 00:07:39,280 Speaker 1: when it declined to roughly fift By the nineteen seventies, 126 00:07:39,320 --> 00:07:42,280 Speaker 1: only five percent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was in 127 00:07:42,320 --> 00:07:44,960 Speaker 1: the form of bombs that could be dropped by aircraft. 128 00:07:50,440 --> 00:07:52,920 Speaker 1: Today's episode was written by Patrick J. Kaiger and produced 129 00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:55,000 Speaker 1: by Tyler Clang. For more on this and lots of 130 00:07:55,040 --> 00:07:58,000 Speaker 1: other topics, visit House to works dot com. Brain Stuff 131 00:07:58,040 --> 00:08:00,240 Speaker 1: is production of I Heart Radio. Four more pie cast 132 00:08:00,360 --> 00:08:02,720 Speaker 1: my Heart Radio. Visit the i Heart Radio app. Apple 133 00:08:02,720 --> 00:08:16,280 Speaker 1: Podcasts or wherever you listen to your favorite shows. H