1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,720 Speaker 1: I'm gonna do a little history here because it is 2 00:00:02,160 --> 00:00:15,640 Speaker 1: important question or this is the boast. I'm Thomas Subscribe Politics, 3 00:00:15,720 --> 00:00:24,919 Speaker 1: Financial Investment, Attack, Subscribe Voice, Spotify, Great Kansas and always 4 00:00:25,360 --> 00:00:28,160 Speaker 1: I'm Tom. Wonderful to have you with the terminal. And 5 00:00:28,440 --> 00:00:30,600 Speaker 1: I want to go back to the sweat right now 6 00:00:30,840 --> 00:00:34,600 Speaker 1: in the advent of You're fed, which was when United 7 00:00:34,680 --> 00:00:38,280 Speaker 1: Copper blew up in nineteen oh seven and JP Morgan 8 00:00:38,400 --> 00:00:41,800 Speaker 1: sat in a study of a house built by phelp 9 00:00:41,920 --> 00:00:45,360 Speaker 1: Dodge money and tried to ball out the financial system. 10 00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:49,800 Speaker 1: That is the age old distrust of a grarian America 11 00:00:50,400 --> 00:00:53,840 Speaker 1: with the fancy people in New York. Is the history 12 00:00:53,960 --> 00:00:57,920 Speaker 1: repeating itself now with the fancy people in Silicon Valley 13 00:00:58,240 --> 00:01:04,200 Speaker 1: and for that matter, the fancy people and Zurich Swit's on. Well, 14 00:01:04,760 --> 00:01:07,000 Speaker 1: that's a bit of a stretch. I would say that 15 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:15,080 Speaker 1: what's really happening is that classic night that follows day. 16 00:01:15,360 --> 00:01:20,360 Speaker 1: Because we had a a lot of very smart and 17 00:01:20,440 --> 00:01:25,360 Speaker 1: knowledgeable people who pursued a policy over the last decade 18 00:01:25,440 --> 00:01:29,160 Speaker 1: or more of a very accommodative, highly accommodative monetary policy 19 00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:32,520 Speaker 1: with very low interest rates for an extended period of time, 20 00:01:33,040 --> 00:01:35,200 Speaker 1: and when you do that. If you think back over 21 00:01:35,680 --> 00:01:37,920 Speaker 1: every crisis, When you do that for a long period 22 00:01:37,959 --> 00:01:44,040 Speaker 1: of time and inflation of assets and prices rise, you 23 00:01:44,280 --> 00:01:48,160 Speaker 1: end up having to tighten policy. And that means all 24 00:01:48,240 --> 00:01:51,560 Speaker 1: these asset values take downward pressure. And that's what we're 25 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:53,760 Speaker 1: seeing today. That's what we saw back then, that's what 26 00:01:53,880 --> 00:01:55,840 Speaker 1: we saw in the eighties, and that's what we saw 27 00:01:56,520 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 1: in the two thousand and eight period. Is this because 28 00:01:58,920 --> 00:02:02,840 Speaker 1: of the financialization of America and that some of these 29 00:02:02,920 --> 00:02:06,800 Speaker 1: troubled banks are sort of kind of like banks where 30 00:02:06,840 --> 00:02:10,120 Speaker 1: they're catering to the elite, to the haves, to the 31 00:02:10,200 --> 00:02:15,120 Speaker 1: have nots, creating immense distrust politically in Washington, creating an 32 00:02:15,120 --> 00:02:20,359 Speaker 1: immense distrust away from where the elite live. Well, what 33 00:02:20,480 --> 00:02:25,119 Speaker 1: they're doing, I think is when you have this kind 34 00:02:25,160 --> 00:02:28,640 Speaker 1: of speculative, I mean, this is this kind of policy 35 00:02:28,680 --> 00:02:31,960 Speaker 1: in vice speculation. So no, it's not just the elites 36 00:02:32,000 --> 00:02:34,359 Speaker 1: that those who are saying, hey, I'm going to take 37 00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:37,600 Speaker 1: advantage of this. Whether you're in the Midwest or in 38 00:02:38,000 --> 00:02:40,000 Speaker 1: the varying part of the nation, or you're on the 39 00:02:40,080 --> 00:02:42,840 Speaker 1: East coast, you take advantage of this. And then when 40 00:02:42,880 --> 00:02:44,799 Speaker 1: the problem comes and here's where the I think the 41 00:02:44,919 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 1: resentment comes you bail out, you bail out banks, you 42 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:52,359 Speaker 1: bail out some banks, and that's what we have with 43 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:54,600 Speaker 1: too Big to Fail from the last time through, and 44 00:02:54,680 --> 00:02:57,880 Speaker 1: it still continues today. And those who are in the 45 00:02:58,919 --> 00:03:04,600 Speaker 1: smaller communities who are not bailed outcome or lose your 46 00:03:04,720 --> 00:03:06,960 Speaker 1: job as a result of having the titan poll too much. 47 00:03:07,040 --> 00:03:10,720 Speaker 1: They become very resentful and blame it to some extent 48 00:03:10,840 --> 00:03:15,639 Speaker 1: rightfully on the elites who supposedly know all this. I'm 49 00:03:15,680 --> 00:03:18,359 Speaker 1: often asked, you know, Tom, you know these are really 50 00:03:18,440 --> 00:03:20,639 Speaker 1: smart people. You should just let them, you know, figure 51 00:03:20,720 --> 00:03:23,240 Speaker 1: this stuff where you and I say, well, that's smart 52 00:03:23,320 --> 00:03:26,440 Speaker 1: where we're in this mess. So it's it's it's I 53 00:03:26,520 --> 00:03:28,200 Speaker 1: think there needs to be a lot of humility in 54 00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:32,760 Speaker 1: the policy making business because it can often go south 55 00:03:32,840 --> 00:03:37,000 Speaker 1: when you get too cocky, too confident. Tom, let's talk 56 00:03:37,000 --> 00:03:38,640 Speaker 1: about the moment that we have at had, because you 57 00:03:38,680 --> 00:03:41,360 Speaker 1: have incredible expertise, both as a former head of the 58 00:03:41,440 --> 00:03:44,200 Speaker 1: Kansas City Federal Reserve as well as the head of 59 00:03:44,360 --> 00:03:48,119 Speaker 1: the fdi C, and I'm curious about whether your suspicion 60 00:03:48,400 --> 00:03:52,040 Speaker 1: is there is a more significant risk that authorities are 61 00:03:52,120 --> 00:03:54,640 Speaker 1: trying to stave off by some of the actions overnight. 62 00:03:54,720 --> 00:03:56,760 Speaker 1: In other words, what do you make of the criticism 63 00:03:57,040 --> 00:04:05,280 Speaker 1: that they took a bazuka to basically an well, I 64 00:04:05,320 --> 00:04:06,880 Speaker 1: would like to be able to say that too, that 65 00:04:07,040 --> 00:04:10,320 Speaker 1: it wasn't a systemic but there was with this event 66 00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:16,280 Speaker 1: a great uncertainty raised about banks, especially regional banks. And 67 00:04:16,360 --> 00:04:18,960 Speaker 1: so if I were sitting at that table, as much 68 00:04:19,000 --> 00:04:21,160 Speaker 1: as I would not want it to, but in a crisis, 69 00:04:21,320 --> 00:04:24,080 Speaker 1: you do what you have to do, and I would 70 00:04:24,120 --> 00:04:27,200 Speaker 1: have gone along with that, I think. I think yes, 71 00:04:27,320 --> 00:04:30,760 Speaker 1: but there and they are trying to avoid further problems 72 00:04:30,800 --> 00:04:33,400 Speaker 1: down a little because when you raise interest rates by 73 00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:37,320 Speaker 1: a factor at least twenty five in less than a year, 74 00:04:37,880 --> 00:04:43,279 Speaker 1: the assets it's not just those government bonds with duration 75 00:04:43,360 --> 00:04:46,360 Speaker 1: rests that are taking hits. There are other assets, and 76 00:04:46,480 --> 00:04:49,320 Speaker 1: everyone knows that that's why you see this uncertain you continue, 77 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:53,160 Speaker 1: there's a whole asset on the portfolio these banks, and 78 00:04:53,520 --> 00:04:55,360 Speaker 1: those are going to be under pressure with this higher 79 00:04:55,400 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 1: interest rate and with the likelies slowing of the economy. 80 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:01,040 Speaker 1: And so that's really what they're trying to do. Yes, 81 00:05:01,120 --> 00:05:04,320 Speaker 1: we're going to the depositors say don't run, let's not 82 00:05:04,440 --> 00:05:07,240 Speaker 1: make this thing worse, and that's what you do in 83 00:05:07,320 --> 00:05:10,880 Speaker 1: a crisis. Go ahead. Well, but I guess that the 84 00:05:10,920 --> 00:05:13,280 Speaker 1: concern that some people have is, Okay, this is a 85 00:05:13,400 --> 00:05:15,840 Speaker 1: crisis response. But on the flip side, you're creating long 86 00:05:15,920 --> 00:05:18,880 Speaker 1: lasting policy without actually creating it. And this goes to 87 00:05:19,160 --> 00:05:22,480 Speaker 1: ensuring all deposits above two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, 88 00:05:22,800 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 1: the thinking, okay, let's protect all those small businesses so 89 00:05:25,720 --> 00:05:28,760 Speaker 1: that they can meet payroll. Is there a consequence to 90 00:05:28,960 --> 00:05:32,880 Speaker 1: having a de facto policy implied by the actions without 91 00:05:32,920 --> 00:05:35,480 Speaker 1: it being codified or even paid for by some of 92 00:05:35,560 --> 00:05:39,120 Speaker 1: these banks. Well, yes, I mean you have set the 93 00:05:39,279 --> 00:05:43,479 Speaker 1: expectation today. I mean everyone's going to be protected. Every 94 00:05:43,600 --> 00:05:46,800 Speaker 1: depositor is going to be protective. That's if you walk 95 00:05:46,880 --> 00:05:48,640 Speaker 1: away from that, now you are going to create a 96 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:52,200 Speaker 1: heck of a crisis. So yes, that is pretty clear. 97 00:05:52,640 --> 00:05:54,760 Speaker 1: And what they're trying to do is what these special 98 00:05:54,839 --> 00:05:57,680 Speaker 1: facilities learning facilities to say, hey, we'll take your assets 99 00:05:57,720 --> 00:06:01,160 Speaker 1: at far, especially the so called government bonds, so that 100 00:06:01,279 --> 00:06:04,320 Speaker 1: there's there's a liquidity coming into the system and if 101 00:06:04,360 --> 00:06:07,800 Speaker 1: there are other problems in other assets. You were talking 102 00:06:07,839 --> 00:06:11,000 Speaker 1: about commercial real estate earlier, Well, at that point, they're 103 00:06:11,040 --> 00:06:15,080 Speaker 1: going to have to step up and protect these these depositors, 104 00:06:15,160 --> 00:06:17,200 Speaker 1: because that's the expectation. If you don't do it, you're 105 00:06:17,200 --> 00:06:18,680 Speaker 1: going to have a made your problem on your hand. 106 00:06:18,960 --> 00:06:22,040 Speaker 1: The issue is we never learned from the mistake. I 107 00:06:22,080 --> 00:06:25,800 Speaker 1: mean everyone I've heard this on this program and others, 108 00:06:25,880 --> 00:06:31,080 Speaker 1: that capital is just we're well capitalized. Well, if you 109 00:06:31,160 --> 00:06:33,720 Speaker 1: were well capitalized, you wouldn't have this kind of uncertainty 110 00:06:33,760 --> 00:06:36,880 Speaker 1: in the in the system. So you're well capitalized for 111 00:06:36,960 --> 00:06:40,360 Speaker 1: good times, but can you really take the shocks? Liquidity? 112 00:06:40,640 --> 00:06:44,200 Speaker 1: Liquidity is follow us capital because when people become uncertain 113 00:06:44,240 --> 00:06:48,719 Speaker 1: about your solvency, they run, and then your liquidity problem 114 00:06:49,120 --> 00:06:52,040 Speaker 1: forces the issue. So we have to you know, we're 115 00:06:52,040 --> 00:06:54,480 Speaker 1: going to have to get through this, and the government's 116 00:06:54,520 --> 00:06:57,600 Speaker 1: going to intervene. But if we don't learn on the 117 00:06:57,680 --> 00:07:02,320 Speaker 1: other side of this to watch monetary policy are supervision. 118 00:07:02,440 --> 00:07:06,240 Speaker 1: We need stronger capital these put anycovery racials. We have 119 00:07:06,320 --> 00:07:09,159 Speaker 1: to make sure they're actually liquid because we say bonds 120 00:07:09,160 --> 00:07:11,960 Speaker 1: are risk free, Well they're not duracial risk free. So 121 00:07:12,480 --> 00:07:15,080 Speaker 1: we better could do a different better job on the 122 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:18,640 Speaker 1: other side of this media panic. If we're going to 123 00:07:18,680 --> 00:07:20,560 Speaker 1: avoid him in the future. I gotta get through the 124 00:07:20,600 --> 00:07:23,560 Speaker 1: stone first. Thomas, this was fantastic. Try to catch up 125 00:07:23,560 --> 00:07:26,000 Speaker 1: with these, sir. Thank you Thomas Hunik, the former FDIC. 126 00:07:26,800 --> 00:07:39,480 Speaker 1: Nice check. Our team has just done a great job. 127 00:07:39,560 --> 00:07:41,160 Speaker 1: Guess to have to guess. As we just spoke with 128 00:07:41,240 --> 00:07:44,280 Speaker 1: the former president of the Kansas City Fed, John and 129 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:46,120 Speaker 1: I are going to force a day to check here. John, 130 00:07:46,160 --> 00:07:48,360 Speaker 1: I'm going to go to the two year yield of 131 00:07:48,760 --> 00:07:51,760 Speaker 1: four point one five percent. It's in a little bit, 132 00:07:51,880 --> 00:07:54,800 Speaker 1: but it's not giving me the theater that we see 133 00:07:54,840 --> 00:07:56,640 Speaker 1: in some of the printings for the banks. Do you 134 00:07:56,680 --> 00:07:58,160 Speaker 1: want the fatter of the two year right for the 135 00:07:58,240 --> 00:07:59,800 Speaker 1: last week, because I can bring it to you if 136 00:07:59,840 --> 00:08:02,560 Speaker 1: you like. We're unchanged on the two year this morning, 137 00:08:03,000 --> 00:08:06,520 Speaker 1: Yesterday up twenty seven basis points, Wednesday dance thirty six, 138 00:08:06,640 --> 00:08:10,200 Speaker 1: Tuesday up twenty seven, Monday dance sixty one. When was 139 00:08:10,240 --> 00:08:12,200 Speaker 1: the last time you saw a week like that? Lisa? 140 00:08:12,480 --> 00:08:15,360 Speaker 1: In the vonmarket, Well, in terms of IMPI volatilty two 141 00:08:15,400 --> 00:08:18,080 Speaker 1: thousand and eight, it's like arrhythmia. You look at the chart, 142 00:08:18,120 --> 00:08:21,360 Speaker 1: it looks like an arrhythmic kind of problem with your heart. 143 00:08:21,960 --> 00:08:24,239 Speaker 1: Right now, we're gonna jump to it with our guest 144 00:08:24,320 --> 00:08:28,200 Speaker 1: Anastasia Murosso she's chief investment strategist at I Capital, but 145 00:08:28,320 --> 00:08:31,240 Speaker 1: with a brilliant no doubt in the last twenty four 146 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 1: hours of where we are, Anastasia, you take a much 147 00:08:34,559 --> 00:08:37,960 Speaker 1: broader view. You've always done that with JP Morgan and others, 148 00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:41,960 Speaker 1: and you're out in searching for shadows globally this morning. 149 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:45,800 Speaker 1: Of these traumas, what's the shadow you're most focused one? Well, 150 00:08:45,840 --> 00:08:48,280 Speaker 1: it's in the US banking sector. And we were talking 151 00:08:48,320 --> 00:08:51,440 Speaker 1: about whether SVB and Signature Bank or idiots and creadic issues. 152 00:08:51,600 --> 00:08:54,080 Speaker 1: I don't think they're idiots and creadic issues. I think 153 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:57,520 Speaker 1: there is a broader problem. There's some very specific things 154 00:08:57,559 --> 00:08:59,760 Speaker 1: that went wrong at those two banks. But if you 155 00:08:59,840 --> 00:09:02,679 Speaker 1: take a step back, let's take stock of what's happening. 156 00:09:02,760 --> 00:09:05,439 Speaker 1: Is the FED is raising rates. First of all, depositors 157 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:08,080 Speaker 1: have other options, and if you look at the online 158 00:09:08,120 --> 00:09:10,719 Speaker 1: savings rate, for example, it is much higher than what 159 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:13,440 Speaker 1: you're getting on your checking accounts or your savings accounts. 160 00:09:13,640 --> 00:09:17,640 Speaker 1: So depositors are looking for other options, and as a results, 161 00:09:17,760 --> 00:09:20,920 Speaker 1: as those deposits go out, the banks are having to sell. 162 00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:24,200 Speaker 1: They're either available for sales, securities or now the fears 163 00:09:24,240 --> 00:09:25,760 Speaker 1: that they're going to have to sell some of their 164 00:09:25,920 --> 00:09:28,920 Speaker 1: health to maturity securities, and that means a new wave 165 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:33,239 Speaker 1: of markdowns. So this is I mean, this is systemic, 166 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:35,400 Speaker 1: or at least it's broad based. And this is why 167 00:09:35,760 --> 00:09:38,120 Speaker 1: I think the market is having a hard time saying, yes, 168 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:40,760 Speaker 1: this is it, this is over, because what we've seen 169 00:09:41,040 --> 00:09:44,480 Speaker 1: is sort of a patchwork, a piecemeal approach of regulation. 170 00:09:44,600 --> 00:09:48,240 Speaker 1: And we said the depositors of these two institutions don't 171 00:09:48,280 --> 00:09:50,319 Speaker 1: have to worry about their deposits, and we sort of 172 00:09:50,360 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 1: have an implicit guarantee, but implicit may not be enough. 173 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:57,440 Speaker 1: Next steps Federal serfmates next week. If they met today 174 00:09:57,440 --> 00:09:59,000 Speaker 1: and had to make that decision, what on earth would 175 00:09:59,000 --> 00:10:01,360 Speaker 1: they do? It is such a coin toss. But the 176 00:10:01,440 --> 00:10:03,079 Speaker 1: more I thought about it this week, the more I 177 00:10:03,160 --> 00:10:06,400 Speaker 1: think they have two pause. It is a very different store. 178 00:10:06,400 --> 00:10:08,600 Speaker 1: I think in the US versus the ECB, the ECB 179 00:10:08,800 --> 00:10:11,240 Speaker 1: is pre committed to fifty basis points, and the ECB 180 00:10:11,400 --> 00:10:14,040 Speaker 1: can look at all the capital ratios and liquidity ratios 181 00:10:14,080 --> 00:10:17,199 Speaker 1: of their banks and say, our banking system is fine, 182 00:10:17,240 --> 00:10:19,600 Speaker 1: and our rates are not at four point seven five percent, 183 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:23,439 Speaker 1: and Credit Suite is truly unique and different. But you 184 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:26,280 Speaker 1: look at the US and you say, the banking system 185 00:10:26,440 --> 00:10:30,280 Speaker 1: broadly is experiencing strain under these level of rates, and 186 00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:34,440 Speaker 1: you know the confidence signal of twenty five basis points. 187 00:10:34,480 --> 00:10:36,880 Speaker 1: I don't really think that goes that far. The biggest 188 00:10:37,320 --> 00:10:40,200 Speaker 1: signal of confidence would be to say we are tuned 189 00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:42,839 Speaker 1: to the issue. We want to take the time to 190 00:10:42,920 --> 00:10:45,120 Speaker 1: make sure we have the right approach in place before 191 00:10:45,160 --> 00:10:47,520 Speaker 1: we resume the rate hiking cycle. To me, that would 192 00:10:47,559 --> 00:10:49,800 Speaker 1: be the best approach. The economic argument that they could 193 00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:52,599 Speaker 1: make that a lot of economists are making is that 194 00:10:52,920 --> 00:10:56,079 Speaker 1: you are seeing a rapid tightening in financial conditions and 195 00:10:56,120 --> 00:10:57,880 Speaker 1: the heels of this that you're not seeing the same 196 00:10:57,960 --> 00:11:01,520 Speaker 1: kind of credit that is even over to smaller businesses. 197 00:11:01,679 --> 00:11:04,280 Speaker 1: Given all of your experience in the private markets world, 198 00:11:04,679 --> 00:11:07,000 Speaker 1: do you see this distress starting to spread in a 199 00:11:07,040 --> 00:11:09,319 Speaker 1: way that Larry Fink is describing saying that that's the 200 00:11:09,400 --> 00:11:13,280 Speaker 1: next shoe to drop. Not yet and certainly not broadly, 201 00:11:13,400 --> 00:11:16,480 Speaker 1: but I think it will impact pockets of private markets. 202 00:11:16,559 --> 00:11:20,000 Speaker 1: So for example SVB. The reason why you know this 203 00:11:20,200 --> 00:11:22,199 Speaker 1: is such a big deal for the startup community, it's 204 00:11:22,240 --> 00:11:24,679 Speaker 1: forget the deposits deposits are safe, but what about the 205 00:11:24,760 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 1: lines of credit. What about the loans that some of 206 00:11:27,160 --> 00:11:29,480 Speaker 1: these VC back companies were able to get that they 207 00:11:29,520 --> 00:11:31,800 Speaker 1: wouldn't have gotten from some of the bigger banks. So 208 00:11:31,880 --> 00:11:34,120 Speaker 1: who's going to step in and fill the void? Now? 209 00:11:34,240 --> 00:11:36,480 Speaker 1: I do happen to think that people will step in. 210 00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:38,760 Speaker 1: I think there's a lot of venture capital that has 211 00:11:38,800 --> 00:11:41,040 Speaker 1: been raised that has to be deployed, but guess what, 212 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:43,400 Speaker 1: least it's not going to be deployed at the same valuations. 213 00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:46,680 Speaker 1: And if you look at the early stage VC valuations, 214 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:49,280 Speaker 1: this sort of did never one up to the levels 215 00:11:49,400 --> 00:11:51,719 Speaker 1: that the late stage venture did. You know, we'd had 216 00:11:51,760 --> 00:11:54,240 Speaker 1: a huge surge in twenty twenty one. So I think 217 00:11:54,320 --> 00:11:57,559 Speaker 1: the deals may still be getting done vcs, maybe the 218 00:11:57,640 --> 00:12:00,920 Speaker 1: providers of liquidity, but they're going to demand a pretty 219 00:12:00,960 --> 00:12:03,679 Speaker 1: steep haircut and a discount on those valuations. So base 220 00:12:03,760 --> 00:12:05,760 Speaker 1: case now for many people and a stage usk that 221 00:12:05,840 --> 00:12:08,679 Speaker 1: growth gets hit. With that in mind, what do you 222 00:12:08,720 --> 00:12:11,720 Speaker 1: play for at the moment in the sanquity market. Yeah, 223 00:12:11,960 --> 00:12:14,640 Speaker 1: so maybe I'm a big contrarian on the standpoint. I mean, 224 00:12:14,679 --> 00:12:17,640 Speaker 1: I do agree with Lisa that this is a deflationary 225 00:12:17,760 --> 00:12:20,480 Speaker 1: development and that the banks will tighten landing standards and 226 00:12:20,559 --> 00:12:23,240 Speaker 1: they'll pull back on lending over time. But John, if 227 00:12:23,240 --> 00:12:25,400 Speaker 1: you look at the economy today, we came into the 228 00:12:25,440 --> 00:12:28,400 Speaker 1: air the consensus did expecting zero percent GDP growth the 229 00:12:28,520 --> 00:12:31,880 Speaker 1: last I checked, which was yesterday Atlanta GDP FED. The 230 00:12:32,000 --> 00:12:34,880 Speaker 1: projection now for Q one is three point two percent 231 00:12:34,920 --> 00:12:38,120 Speaker 1: GDP growth. This is an economy this week aside, that's 232 00:12:38,120 --> 00:12:41,800 Speaker 1: these consumer confidence that has been rising, the new manufacturing 233 00:12:41,920 --> 00:12:44,640 Speaker 1: orders that are picking up, and the economy is actually fine. 234 00:12:45,080 --> 00:12:48,960 Speaker 1: So I think that explains the resilience why we've seen 235 00:12:49,000 --> 00:12:51,400 Speaker 1: in the market. That's why we hang around this four thousand, 236 00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:54,280 Speaker 1: thirty nine hundred dollar level, because the economy is fine, 237 00:12:54,559 --> 00:12:57,280 Speaker 1: and I think the market is betting that this banking 238 00:12:57,440 --> 00:12:59,600 Speaker 1: issue is going to make the FED at least pause. 239 00:13:00,200 --> 00:13:02,680 Speaker 1: So for now, you know, I can't say we're going 240 00:13:02,760 --> 00:13:05,880 Speaker 1: to see immediate new lows in the market. But at 241 00:13:05,920 --> 00:13:09,240 Speaker 1: the same time, I think how this ultimately plays out 242 00:13:09,320 --> 00:13:11,959 Speaker 1: as hopefully the banking issue is fixed and then the 243 00:13:12,040 --> 00:13:14,199 Speaker 1: FED gets back to its inflation fighting man date and 244 00:13:14,280 --> 00:13:16,720 Speaker 1: then we have this major repricing that needs to happen, 245 00:13:17,080 --> 00:13:19,480 Speaker 1: you know, back from whatever the terminal rate is. It 246 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:22,400 Speaker 1: now four point six percent back to five point eight, 247 00:13:22,480 --> 00:13:24,719 Speaker 1: maybe to six and a half percent. So that's a 248 00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:28,360 Speaker 1: big repricing that's probably coming for the market. Let's say 249 00:13:28,480 --> 00:13:30,800 Speaker 1: later this year. That's how white the ranch of outcomes. 250 00:13:31,120 --> 00:13:32,800 Speaker 1: I'm right now potentially. And I started to thank you 251 00:13:32,880 --> 00:13:39,400 Speaker 1: on Stam said that FI Capital, thank you. We got 252 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:42,600 Speaker 1: eight ways to go with our guests here, John, I'm 253 00:13:42,600 --> 00:13:44,440 Speaker 1: gonna cut it. I'm gonna give you an anecdote, John, 254 00:13:44,640 --> 00:13:46,800 Speaker 1: and then you guys can pick up the adult conversation 255 00:13:46,880 --> 00:13:50,400 Speaker 1: with Gerard Cassidy, who's been fabulous with us this week 256 00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:54,000 Speaker 1: and particularly interpreting Senator Warren's comments. Gerard, you and I've 257 00:13:54,080 --> 00:13:59,520 Speaker 1: lived this. You're in Swellsley, Massachusetts, and you need a jumbo. 258 00:14:00,160 --> 00:14:02,719 Speaker 1: The new place up the coast of Maine in bar 259 00:14:02,880 --> 00:14:06,600 Speaker 1: Harbor right now, there's an eleven million dollar property up there, 260 00:14:07,120 --> 00:14:09,959 Speaker 1: and I need a five million jumbo. And you go 261 00:14:10,080 --> 00:14:13,560 Speaker 1: down Washington Street in Wellesley and you're walts into First 262 00:14:13,600 --> 00:14:17,560 Speaker 1: Republic Bank and you get a five million dollar jumbo 263 00:14:18,080 --> 00:14:23,760 Speaker 1: over a cup of coffee? Is that what we're bailing out? Tom? 264 00:14:24,520 --> 00:14:26,520 Speaker 1: Thank you again for having me on the program. And 265 00:14:26,520 --> 00:14:29,120 Speaker 1: I would say, I don't think that's exactly what we're 266 00:14:29,120 --> 00:14:32,760 Speaker 1: bailing out. But yes, they are definitely a jumbo mortgage lender, 267 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:38,080 Speaker 1: but they're also a financial advisor. They were a wealth manager, 268 00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:41,400 Speaker 1: and that is certainly part of it. All. The key, though, is, 269 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:43,960 Speaker 1: I think it's more the contagion risk than people are 270 00:14:44,000 --> 00:14:46,760 Speaker 1: worried about that. If you allow any of these very 271 00:14:46,880 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: large banks to become insolvent and the depositors at risk, 272 00:14:52,040 --> 00:14:54,800 Speaker 1: you certainly worry about the contagion risk, which is of 273 00:14:54,920 --> 00:14:58,320 Speaker 1: course what we have worried about in past crisis. Is 274 00:14:58,400 --> 00:15:00,760 Speaker 1: whether it was the O eight or nine prices, or 275 00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:03,040 Speaker 1: even in the nineteen ninety prices. Jared, I think a 276 00:15:03,080 --> 00:15:05,600 Speaker 1: lot of people in America are finding the communication at 277 00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:08,920 Speaker 1: the moment from authorities to be somewhat confusing. They have 278 00:15:09,040 --> 00:15:12,440 Speaker 1: implied at some level the old depositors will be made hold. 279 00:15:13,000 --> 00:15:15,720 Speaker 1: They have implied at some level the regardless of size, 280 00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: most financial institutions in this country would carry that systemic 281 00:15:19,800 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: risk exception, and yet there is still nervousness. Jarard, What 282 00:15:23,240 --> 00:15:25,960 Speaker 1: on earth can authorities do when it comes to tackling 283 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:30,440 Speaker 1: those issues? I think, John, what we're going to see 284 00:15:30,600 --> 00:15:33,960 Speaker 1: is obviously each day beyond the failures of those two 285 00:15:34,000 --> 00:15:37,320 Speaker 1: banks last weekend will give us some calm in the markets. 286 00:15:37,480 --> 00:15:41,720 Speaker 1: People are still jittery. But in my conversations with bank 287 00:15:41,800 --> 00:15:45,120 Speaker 1: managements this week, what we saw and heard was that 288 00:15:45,680 --> 00:15:49,520 Speaker 1: depositors were very angst on Monday, but as the week 289 00:15:49,600 --> 00:15:51,640 Speaker 1: went on, things start to calm down a little bit. 290 00:15:51,760 --> 00:15:54,720 Speaker 1: So I think what we'll see is time will help 291 00:15:54,880 --> 00:15:57,480 Speaker 1: heal some of these wounds. But you're right about the 292 00:15:57,560 --> 00:16:01,720 Speaker 1: communication part of it. It has been a time confusing, 293 00:16:02,040 --> 00:16:04,720 Speaker 1: and I think they need to get a stronger message 294 00:16:04,760 --> 00:16:07,680 Speaker 1: out there that for the time being, in a period 295 00:16:07,880 --> 00:16:11,560 Speaker 1: of uncertainty, the Federal Reserve, the FDAC in Treasury will 296 00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:14,880 Speaker 1: be there. More explicitly than they said on Sunday, Jared, 297 00:16:14,960 --> 00:16:17,440 Speaker 1: the public might hear numbers like one hundred and fifty 298 00:16:17,520 --> 00:16:20,960 Speaker 1: three billion dollars come from the so called discount window 299 00:16:21,320 --> 00:16:23,440 Speaker 1: at the Federal Reserve, and Jared, there might be people 300 00:16:23,440 --> 00:16:26,520 Speaker 1: tuning in this morning, listening watching this program, finding all 301 00:16:26,560 --> 00:16:29,440 Speaker 1: of that quite scary. There are these two facilities, Gerard. 302 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:31,760 Speaker 1: There is the discount window, It's been around a long 303 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:34,200 Speaker 1: long time. There was a new facility introduced on Sunday 304 00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:39,000 Speaker 1: evening BTFP, the Bank Term Funding program in really simple terms, Gerard, 305 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:45,080 Speaker 1: Can you explain those big numbers we heard yesterday afternoon, Johnny. 306 00:16:45,640 --> 00:16:48,320 Speaker 1: They're incredible numbers, but when you put it on the 307 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:51,920 Speaker 1: banking system, and if you just look at total deposits 308 00:16:52,120 --> 00:16:57,720 Speaker 1: in the banking system, they're around seventeen eighteen trillion dollars. 309 00:16:58,240 --> 00:17:00,400 Speaker 1: It's hard for any of us to get our arms 310 00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:05,240 Speaker 1: around a number a trillion dollars. So our system is gigantic. 311 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:08,400 Speaker 1: And these numbers that you just referenced on the discount 312 00:17:08,440 --> 00:17:12,639 Speaker 1: window borrowings that we're announced yesterday are very large, but 313 00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:17,119 Speaker 1: the economy in the system is extremely large. So putting 314 00:17:17,160 --> 00:17:20,359 Speaker 1: it in that perspective, the numbers I think are more manageable. 315 00:17:20,600 --> 00:17:23,720 Speaker 1: But you know, just seeing that absolute number one hundred 316 00:17:23,800 --> 00:17:26,919 Speaker 1: and fifty plus billion dollars is a big number, Gerard. 317 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:29,600 Speaker 1: This one French policy expert, quoted in the Financial Times, 318 00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:34,600 Speaker 1: highlighted the sort of insignificance relatively speaking, in terms of 319 00:17:34,680 --> 00:17:37,000 Speaker 1: the scope of some of these banks that are being 320 00:17:37,119 --> 00:17:40,840 Speaker 1: rescued by authorities, saying, this is the US version of 321 00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:45,080 Speaker 1: small Venetian banks. You're always systemic for somebody. Do you 322 00:17:45,119 --> 00:17:49,720 Speaker 1: think that that criticism is valid? I think to some 323 00:17:49,920 --> 00:17:52,800 Speaker 1: extent it is. I mean, we still have, as you know, Lisa, 324 00:17:52,840 --> 00:17:56,679 Speaker 1: are over forty six hundred banks in the United States, 325 00:17:56,760 --> 00:18:01,600 Speaker 1: and unfortunately, if million dollar bank, if there's any banks 326 00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:05,320 Speaker 1: that's small, were to go insolvent, it wouldn't cause the 327 00:18:05,720 --> 00:18:08,960 Speaker 1: repercussions that a two hundred billion dollar bank did so, 328 00:18:09,440 --> 00:18:12,200 Speaker 1: even though the two hundred billion dollar bank is smaller 329 00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:17,359 Speaker 1: relative to JP Morgan or Bank America. As you all know, 330 00:18:17,680 --> 00:18:20,480 Speaker 1: this was the second largest bank failure in US history. 331 00:18:20,560 --> 00:18:23,000 Speaker 1: It's a big bank, even though relative to our big 332 00:18:23,080 --> 00:18:25,480 Speaker 1: guys it's not. So they certainly need to put in 333 00:18:26,880 --> 00:18:30,800 Speaker 1: further controls and procedures. More liquidity might be required, more 334 00:18:30,880 --> 00:18:33,600 Speaker 1: capital might be required, But the industry is definitely going 335 00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:36,000 Speaker 1: to see more regulation as a result of what we 336 00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:38,840 Speaker 1: just came through. Is there a bigger problem, Gerard the 337 00:18:38,880 --> 00:18:41,280 Speaker 1: people are kind of hinting at but not addressing directly, 338 00:18:41,640 --> 00:18:45,480 Speaker 1: which is that the disproportional amount of commercial real estate, 339 00:18:45,560 --> 00:18:49,720 Speaker 1: as Thomas mentioned many times, of individual loans of sort 340 00:18:49,760 --> 00:18:52,399 Speaker 1: of the riskier assets the bigger banks have gotten out 341 00:18:52,480 --> 00:18:57,280 Speaker 1: of that. That concentration has regulators authorities very concerned about 342 00:18:57,320 --> 00:18:59,639 Speaker 1: smaller and regional banks and the potential contagion and the 343 00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:05,360 Speaker 1: const quinces. Lisa, We're always worried about commercial real estate. 344 00:19:05,480 --> 00:19:08,159 Speaker 1: If you go back in time before even Tom and 345 00:19:08,240 --> 00:19:11,600 Speaker 1: I were doing this in the eighteen hundreds, commercial real 346 00:19:11,720 --> 00:19:15,040 Speaker 1: estate's always been a problem for banks during a crisis 347 00:19:15,359 --> 00:19:18,520 Speaker 1: and then has to be managed effectively. And to do 348 00:19:18,640 --> 00:19:20,600 Speaker 1: that you have to, to your point, you need to 349 00:19:20,680 --> 00:19:23,680 Speaker 1: keep the concentration risks in the manage real state. You 350 00:19:23,800 --> 00:19:26,480 Speaker 1: cannot have a bank that has seventy five of their 351 00:19:26,520 --> 00:19:29,360 Speaker 1: assets in commercial real estate loans. So commercial real estate 352 00:19:29,760 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 1: it's going to potentially be challenging in the urban markets 353 00:19:33,640 --> 00:19:37,240 Speaker 1: for downtown class B and C space, But overall, you know, 354 00:19:37,560 --> 00:19:41,639 Speaker 1: most commercial real estate is underwritten very conservatively, and should 355 00:19:41,640 --> 00:19:45,320 Speaker 1: there be some higher delinquencies and charge offs, I think 356 00:19:45,359 --> 00:19:48,840 Speaker 1: the system will handle it effectively with the levels of 357 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:52,359 Speaker 1: capital in the system today. Jod next steps options, what 358 00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:56,080 Speaker 1: do you think they are? John? Really good question, and 359 00:19:56,200 --> 00:19:59,040 Speaker 1: I would tell you we anticipate that more of the 360 00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:02,520 Speaker 1: smaller reach nals will be required to carry more liquidity. 361 00:20:02,800 --> 00:20:05,920 Speaker 1: You might be familiar with something called the LCR liquidity 362 00:20:05,960 --> 00:20:08,440 Speaker 1: coverage ratio, where the banks have to hold up the 363 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:11,840 Speaker 1: thirty days of money that they would handle a run 364 00:20:11,920 --> 00:20:14,320 Speaker 1: on the bank. These are our giant g set banks 365 00:20:14,359 --> 00:20:17,240 Speaker 1: as they're referred to, like a JP Morgan Bank America. 366 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:19,960 Speaker 1: I see more banks being required to do that. You 367 00:20:20,160 --> 00:20:24,560 Speaker 1: heard a lot about this AOCI accumulated other comprehensive income. 368 00:20:24,800 --> 00:20:28,040 Speaker 1: That's where the unrealized gains and losses go for securities. 369 00:20:28,359 --> 00:20:31,200 Speaker 1: For the biggest banks, they deduct that through regulatory capital. 370 00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:33,760 Speaker 1: We expect the smaller banks to be required to do 371 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:37,760 Speaker 1: that as well. Third, we also expect that the industry 372 00:20:37,840 --> 00:20:40,920 Speaker 1: will have to pay higher fees to the FDIC to 373 00:20:41,040 --> 00:20:43,879 Speaker 1: build up the insurance fund, especially if they raised the 374 00:20:43,960 --> 00:20:48,359 Speaker 1: limit on insurance on the deposits to five hundred thousand dollars. 375 00:20:48,600 --> 00:20:50,520 Speaker 1: That will be cost late to the industry as well. 376 00:20:50,640 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 1: What is it about a crisis A new acronyms tone? 377 00:20:53,359 --> 00:20:58,679 Speaker 1: Oh just like a long mist Ryan, Yeah, Chat did 378 00:20:58,680 --> 00:21:12,640 Speaker 1: a great job of explain it. Thank you said, we're 379 00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:16,119 Speaker 1: gonna jump into this right now and continue this discussion 380 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:21,800 Speaker 1: with Alvaro Santos Pereira, well timed chief economist at OECD, 381 00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:24,359 Speaker 1: and we're now supposed to have a dry, boring discussion 382 00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:29,040 Speaker 1: about what OECD looks like forward on economic growth. Amid 383 00:21:29,119 --> 00:21:31,879 Speaker 1: bank crisis. We will not do that, and we can 384 00:21:31,960 --> 00:21:34,280 Speaker 1: do that because he is schooled and has taught at 385 00:21:34,320 --> 00:21:38,240 Speaker 1: the University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser, which truly 386 00:21:38,359 --> 00:21:44,040 Speaker 1: owns a high ground on this arcane world the econometrics Elvarro. 387 00:21:44,200 --> 00:21:47,280 Speaker 1: We have a bank crisis going on, we have different 388 00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:53,240 Speaker 1: shades of bank crisis going on. Well that diminish global GDP. 389 00:21:54,160 --> 00:21:58,520 Speaker 1: Do you just assume with financial fragility things tighten up 390 00:21:58,640 --> 00:22:04,800 Speaker 1: even in China and we see a dampening to economic recovery. Well, Tom, 391 00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:06,840 Speaker 1: thanks very much, so, first of all, I think it's 392 00:22:06,880 --> 00:22:10,359 Speaker 1: important to say that we see a fragile recovery going on. 393 00:22:10,640 --> 00:22:14,720 Speaker 1: Basically we've been we see some positive news in terms 394 00:22:14,760 --> 00:22:17,879 Speaker 1: of activity and in terms of confidence all across the 395 00:22:17,960 --> 00:22:20,760 Speaker 1: world in fact, and we see some good news regarding inflation, 396 00:22:20,840 --> 00:22:22,880 Speaker 1: which it's came down in terms of headline but even 397 00:22:22,920 --> 00:22:26,600 Speaker 1: though care remains a bit fixed and sticky and service 398 00:22:26,680 --> 00:22:29,280 Speaker 1: inflation is a bit sticky. So we've been thinking about 399 00:22:29,359 --> 00:22:33,520 Speaker 1: exactly what is the impact we think at this stage 400 00:22:33,600 --> 00:22:36,240 Speaker 1: the last few days, the impact has been mostly on 401 00:22:36,320 --> 00:22:39,080 Speaker 1: the risk side. That is, risks have certainly increased in 402 00:22:39,200 --> 00:22:43,080 Speaker 1: terms of finance stability and the risk overall, they're more 403 00:22:43,119 --> 00:22:46,760 Speaker 1: tilty to the downside. But at this stage we think 404 00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:49,639 Speaker 1: that it's very important to say that we are undertaking 405 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:55,479 Speaker 1: and undergoing a tentative or fragile recovery that is ongoing. 406 00:22:55,680 --> 00:22:58,359 Speaker 1: I know it's inappropriate for you as an institution and 407 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:01,680 Speaker 1: you as a chief economist of EC. The second guess 408 00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:06,520 Speaker 1: central banks as well. But if we're in the interest 409 00:23:06,680 --> 00:23:10,680 Speaker 1: rate structure we're in now, and particularly ex Japan, can 410 00:23:10,760 --> 00:23:14,639 Speaker 1: you state at OECD that in a general statement we 411 00:23:14,800 --> 00:23:19,840 Speaker 1: are restrictive in our global monetary policy. Well, we can 412 00:23:19,960 --> 00:23:22,360 Speaker 1: say that in spite of the turbulence of the past 413 00:23:22,400 --> 00:23:25,920 Speaker 1: few days, our big problem still is inflation, and so 414 00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:28,680 Speaker 1: we think that we need to be more data driven, 415 00:23:28,760 --> 00:23:31,360 Speaker 1: which means that central banks for sure need to see 416 00:23:31,440 --> 00:23:34,120 Speaker 1: whether what they need to do in regarding press stability 417 00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:37,160 Speaker 1: but also financial stability. And you can see that many 418 00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:39,840 Speaker 1: countries have follow different approaches. I'll give an example there. 419 00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:42,919 Speaker 1: Even before the past few days, Brazil had a big 420 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:45,840 Speaker 1: increase in inflation. Their central bank was very forceful their 421 00:23:45,920 --> 00:23:48,439 Speaker 1: car and the headline efficitions coming down, so they are 422 00:23:48,520 --> 00:23:50,800 Speaker 1: taking a reader now. The Bank of Canada in the 423 00:23:50,880 --> 00:23:52,840 Speaker 1: last two meetings, they decided to let's look at the 424 00:23:52,920 --> 00:23:54,879 Speaker 1: data first. We've done a lot, so let's see if 425 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:57,160 Speaker 1: it is enough. And so I think the Central Bank 426 00:23:57,200 --> 00:23:58,920 Speaker 1: for Central Bank will have to decide what to do 427 00:23:59,640 --> 00:24:02,520 Speaker 1: right now. Now this important to cent terms of financial stability. 428 00:24:02,560 --> 00:24:05,040 Speaker 1: This is not two thousand and eight important to say 429 00:24:05,119 --> 00:24:07,280 Speaker 1: that banks are in better, much better ship than they 430 00:24:07,359 --> 00:24:10,880 Speaker 1: used to be. Regulations also in many countries and monterry 431 00:24:10,920 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 1: authorities are way more active than they used to be. 432 00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:16,239 Speaker 1: So even though yes, there are risks and there are 433 00:24:16,280 --> 00:24:21,640 Speaker 1: some episodes that a financial volatility that could potentially continue, 434 00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:24,000 Speaker 1: we do think that right now we don't have a 435 00:24:24,400 --> 00:24:27,879 Speaker 1: We don't see systemic risk still on the on the cards. 436 00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:30,399 Speaker 1: What does it rise to that risk? What does something 437 00:24:30,520 --> 00:24:34,919 Speaker 1: break from your vantage point? Well, I think what matters 438 00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:39,480 Speaker 1: that it will be exactly if we have really bad 439 00:24:39,560 --> 00:24:43,440 Speaker 1: news regarding other inflation in front and would that would 440 00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:47,879 Speaker 1: mean that rates would have to go higher than anticipated, 441 00:24:48,359 --> 00:24:52,200 Speaker 1: or if there's an unexpected event right now. As I said, 442 00:24:52,600 --> 00:24:54,879 Speaker 1: what we sey in terms of our risks is that 443 00:24:55,119 --> 00:24:58,720 Speaker 1: even though they are tilted to the downside, the economy 444 00:24:58,760 --> 00:25:01,280 Speaker 1: is starting to have It's not on the United States. 445 00:25:01,400 --> 00:25:04,040 Speaker 1: It's also in Europe and China and a few other 446 00:25:04,119 --> 00:25:09,240 Speaker 1: countries in which we start seeing some positive signs out there. 447 00:25:09,359 --> 00:25:11,080 Speaker 1: So I think it's important to keep the eye on 448 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:14,280 Speaker 1: the ball and understand that in spite of the very 449 00:25:14,320 --> 00:25:19,600 Speaker 1: short run for volatibility, we still think that at these 450 00:25:19,680 --> 00:25:23,600 Speaker 1: stage the economy is slowly getting back on their feet. 451 00:25:23,680 --> 00:25:25,840 Speaker 1: Over the market disagrees, and this is sort of what 452 00:25:25,920 --> 00:25:28,280 Speaker 1: I've found really notable. Over the past couple of days. 453 00:25:28,640 --> 00:25:32,520 Speaker 1: We've seen a huge repricing in FED policy going forward. 454 00:25:32,560 --> 00:25:35,560 Speaker 1: We have seen a huge repricing and expectations for inflation 455 00:25:36,000 --> 00:25:38,159 Speaker 1: and for growth at least at based on the markets 456 00:25:38,240 --> 00:25:41,040 Speaker 1: right now, people are basically expecting FED funds rates are 457 00:25:41,080 --> 00:25:44,240 Speaker 1: showing basically one more hike than done than almost a 458 00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:47,400 Speaker 1: hundred basis points still of rate cuts. What are you saying, 459 00:25:47,520 --> 00:25:49,879 Speaker 1: what are you seeing that is so different to that 460 00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:53,919 Speaker 1: scenario that markets are currently pricing in well, looking at fundamentals, 461 00:25:54,040 --> 00:25:58,880 Speaker 1: and so I understand the markets, and of course sometimes 462 00:25:59,359 --> 00:26:03,840 Speaker 1: markets get over reaction times. Obviously they are on the ball, 463 00:26:03,920 --> 00:26:06,520 Speaker 1: but we think that we need to look at fundamentals, 464 00:26:06,760 --> 00:26:09,320 Speaker 1: and for us, the fundamentals are how is the economy 465 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:11,359 Speaker 1: looking in terms of lab market, how is the economy 466 00:26:11,400 --> 00:26:14,480 Speaker 1: doing to the financial stability front, and also how's the 467 00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:18,560 Speaker 1: economy doing in terms of activity indicators? And what we 468 00:26:18,680 --> 00:26:21,239 Speaker 1: see right now is that, yes, it's true that very 469 00:26:21,320 --> 00:26:23,680 Speaker 1: likely because of the turbulence of the past few days, 470 00:26:23,840 --> 00:26:26,639 Speaker 1: it's very likely that, for example, in financial institutions might 471 00:26:26,680 --> 00:26:30,680 Speaker 1: become a bit more conservative in the lending procedures. It 472 00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:33,520 Speaker 1: is very possible that we might have a few volatively 473 00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:35,919 Speaker 1: in a few in a few financi stitutions. But at 474 00:26:35,960 --> 00:26:39,480 Speaker 1: this stage we don't see systemic risk on the table 475 00:26:39,640 --> 00:26:42,040 Speaker 1: from Paris to the purview of the OECD of our 476 00:26:42,080 --> 00:26:45,680 Speaker 1: Osento's prayer with us their chief economist. Subscribe to the 477 00:26:45,720 --> 00:26:49,920 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Surveillance podcasts on Apple, Spotify and anywhere else you 478 00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:54,280 Speaker 1: get your podcasts. Listen live every weekday starting at seven 479 00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 1: am Easter on Bloomberg dot Com, the iHeartRadio app, tune In, 480 00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:02,840 Speaker 1: and the Blueberg Business Out. You can watch us live. 481 00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:07,359 Speaker 1: I'm Bloomberg Television and always I'm the Bloomberg Terminal. Thanks 482 00:27:07,400 --> 00:27:11,240 Speaker 1: for listening. I'm Tom Keane and this is Bloomberg