1 00:00:01,360 --> 00:00:04,440 Speaker 1: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. I was a 2 00:00:04,480 --> 00:00:07,840 Speaker 1: CIA officer stationed around the world in high threat posts 3 00:00:07,840 --> 00:00:09,520 Speaker 1: in Europe, Russia, and in Asia. 4 00:00:09,560 --> 00:00:12,640 Speaker 2: And I served in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East 5 00:00:12,760 --> 00:00:16,840 Speaker 2: and in war zones. We sometimes created conspiracies to deceive 6 00:00:16,880 --> 00:00:17,799 Speaker 2: our adversaries. 7 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:21,720 Speaker 1: Now we're going to use our expertise to deconstruct conspiracy 8 00:00:21,760 --> 00:00:23,520 Speaker 1: theories large and small. 9 00:00:23,800 --> 00:00:24,680 Speaker 2: Could they be true? 10 00:00:25,000 --> 00:00:26,280 Speaker 3: Or are we being manipulated? 11 00:00:26,800 --> 00:00:28,840 Speaker 1: This is mission implausible. 12 00:00:31,640 --> 00:00:34,320 Speaker 3: This is part two of John and Jerry's conversation with 13 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:39,000 Speaker 3: David McCloskey, their old CIA co worker, former analyst, and 14 00:00:39,200 --> 00:00:42,239 Speaker 3: current spy novelist and the host of the podcast The 15 00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:43,599 Speaker 3: Rest Is Classified. 16 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 2: So as a writer, as an author, everybody wants a 17 00:00:50,640 --> 00:00:54,400 Speaker 2: conspiracy on their plot right as they're replete with conspiracy theories. 18 00:00:54,600 --> 00:00:57,400 Speaker 2: Do you find, as do we to a certain extent, 19 00:00:57,600 --> 00:01:00,440 Speaker 2: that outside of maybe the Beltway some you know, people 20 00:01:00,440 --> 00:01:03,400 Speaker 2: who are like foreign policy walks, then it's hard to 21 00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:08,040 Speaker 2: keep fictional conspiracy theories and what the CIA and what 22 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:12,000 Speaker 2: the intelligence community and what the US government actually is 23 00:01:12,080 --> 00:01:14,920 Speaker 2: and can do like the deep state. Do you find that, 24 00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:17,880 Speaker 2: you know, you feel questions from people where they're they're 25 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:22,160 Speaker 2: not quite sure of where the line is between like 26 00:01:22,240 --> 00:01:25,200 Speaker 2: a fun fictional conspiracy and books or a movie or 27 00:01:25,840 --> 00:01:27,959 Speaker 2: you know, the way shit really works, and how do 28 00:01:27,959 --> 00:01:28,679 Speaker 2: you resolve of that. 29 00:01:29,080 --> 00:01:32,679 Speaker 4: So I continue to be surprised, although I shouldn't be, 30 00:01:33,240 --> 00:01:36,760 Speaker 4: at just how little most people know about the way 31 00:01:37,440 --> 00:01:41,319 Speaker 4: the intelligence community or the CIA more more particularly works. 32 00:01:41,360 --> 00:01:44,759 Speaker 4: I mean, most people, even you know, very smart, well 33 00:01:44,760 --> 00:01:47,640 Speaker 4: read people, just don't have an understanding of the way 34 00:01:47,640 --> 00:01:52,560 Speaker 4: it functions. And I think almost all of the primary 35 00:01:53,000 --> 00:01:57,280 Speaker 4: source material for people's perceptions come from Hollywood. They come 36 00:01:57,320 --> 00:02:01,920 Speaker 4: from spy films and TV shows and and spy novels. Right, 37 00:02:02,000 --> 00:02:02,680 Speaker 4: that's the way. 38 00:02:02,520 --> 00:02:05,320 Speaker 1: People president of the United States understands how it functions. 39 00:02:05,320 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 4: Just to be clear, by the way, I didn't realize 40 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:09,640 Speaker 4: this is not actually a tangent, although it'll sound like it. 41 00:02:10,040 --> 00:02:13,680 Speaker 4: We write a the CI writes like a chapter in 42 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:17,400 Speaker 4: this book that they put out every presidential transition about 43 00:02:17,520 --> 00:02:20,560 Speaker 4: the transition for the like the briefings and all of 44 00:02:20,600 --> 00:02:23,640 Speaker 4: that to kind of get the new potus in office. 45 00:02:24,040 --> 00:02:28,200 Speaker 4: And the chapter in the book for Trump the first administration, 46 00:02:28,240 --> 00:02:30,200 Speaker 4: because they haven't done the second one yet, was called 47 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:33,880 Speaker 4: Donald J. Trump a unique challenge. That was literally that 48 00:02:33,880 --> 00:02:36,880 Speaker 4: that was literally the title of the chapter, and it 49 00:02:36,919 --> 00:02:39,840 Speaker 4: did confirm that he's not I don't think he's he's 50 00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:42,639 Speaker 4: not really a PDB reader kind of guy, let's put 51 00:02:42,639 --> 00:02:44,960 Speaker 4: it that way. That is, by the way, the reason 52 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:48,359 Speaker 4: why I think there continues to be a tremendous demand 53 00:02:48,560 --> 00:02:53,760 Speaker 4: for spy related, espionage related content because people don't it's 54 00:02:53,800 --> 00:02:57,320 Speaker 4: it's sort of secretive. And if you, as a reader 55 00:02:57,680 --> 00:03:00,000 Speaker 4: or a watcher of spy content, feel as though you're 56 00:03:00,040 --> 00:03:02,560 Speaker 4: being led into a secret world, there's something interesting and 57 00:03:02,600 --> 00:03:09,040 Speaker 4: intriguing about that. And I generally try to write things 58 00:03:09,080 --> 00:03:12,800 Speaker 4: to be as authentic as possible, but you you sort 59 00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:15,920 Speaker 4: of get to a point in every story where something 60 00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:17,680 Speaker 4: has to happen for the demands of the story that 61 00:03:17,760 --> 00:03:22,280 Speaker 4: are not the way it actually happens, and yeah, there's 62 00:03:22,280 --> 00:03:26,200 Speaker 4: there's there's somebody the directors working for the Russians or something. 63 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:28,639 Speaker 4: There's got to be something big and that sets the 64 00:03:29,080 --> 00:03:33,040 Speaker 4: stakes for the whole story, and that that tends to 65 00:03:33,080 --> 00:03:35,880 Speaker 4: break the rules of the way things actually work. And 66 00:03:36,200 --> 00:03:37,800 Speaker 4: so I think as a you know, as a writer, 67 00:03:37,880 --> 00:03:41,240 Speaker 4: I'm generally trying to create enough of a sort of 68 00:03:41,280 --> 00:03:45,120 Speaker 4: foundation in the novel that you, as the reader, are 69 00:03:45,160 --> 00:03:47,920 Speaker 4: willing to take those leaps, or maybe are just so 70 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:50,200 Speaker 4: kind of a lulled into the world of the story 71 00:03:50,240 --> 00:03:52,760 Speaker 4: that you don't even know that at three or four 72 00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:56,000 Speaker 4: points along the way, I'm positing a scenario that you 73 00:03:56,040 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 4: know is extremely unlikely to happen, although I would say 74 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:01,800 Speaker 4: what I'm generally also trying to do, And you talked 75 00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:05,880 Speaker 4: about conspiracy conspiracies, and I think I'm trying to create 76 00:04:06,080 --> 00:04:12,120 Speaker 4: a scenario in the novels that is highly improbable, But 77 00:04:12,760 --> 00:04:16,120 Speaker 4: in the world of the novel and the characters of 78 00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:20,320 Speaker 4: the novel and the rules of the novel, it's not implausible. Right, 79 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:24,039 Speaker 4: So you read it and you'd be like, this never happens. 80 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:26,720 Speaker 4: But if you dip into the world of the. 81 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:28,960 Speaker 2: Book's internally consistently. 82 00:04:28,560 --> 00:04:32,200 Speaker 4: It's internally exactly how these places work. There actually is 83 00:04:32,279 --> 00:04:34,599 Speaker 4: material out there available to you. You can listen to 84 00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:37,160 Speaker 4: this podcast, you can listen to my podcast. You can 85 00:04:37,160 --> 00:04:39,400 Speaker 4: go out there and get the memoirs of any number 86 00:04:39,440 --> 00:04:43,279 Speaker 4: of CI officers who have written actual books about the 87 00:04:43,279 --> 00:04:45,880 Speaker 4: way the place really functions and read it. It's not 88 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:50,120 Speaker 4: that there's some dearth of material. It's that very few 89 00:04:50,160 --> 00:04:52,680 Speaker 4: people actually know where to look, or frankly are probably 90 00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:56,120 Speaker 4: not even maybe that interested in the reality of it. 91 00:04:56,160 --> 00:04:59,640 Speaker 4: They just they want the spy spy attainment. 92 00:04:59,600 --> 00:05:03,040 Speaker 1: To go, then to the stories and the content. You've 93 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:06,240 Speaker 1: now had a number of episodes with your new podcast, 94 00:05:06,320 --> 00:05:10,039 Speaker 1: which is very popular and getting quide attention and good praise. 95 00:05:10,520 --> 00:05:13,839 Speaker 1: Do you have some favorite stories? You guys have covered 96 00:05:14,200 --> 00:05:18,040 Speaker 1: Edward Snowden, You've covered the Israeli killing of nuclear scientists. 97 00:05:18,080 --> 00:05:23,320 Speaker 1: You've covered MK Ultra and tests, tests inside the CIA, 98 00:05:23,480 --> 00:05:27,880 Speaker 1: Klaus Fuchs and the atomic program, spies inside of Russia. 99 00:05:28,440 --> 00:05:30,279 Speaker 1: Do you have any sort of favorites or anything you'd 100 00:05:30,320 --> 00:05:31,720 Speaker 1: like to aim people towards. 101 00:05:32,240 --> 00:05:34,559 Speaker 4: Yeah, I mean, well, so I would point people toward 102 00:05:34,720 --> 00:05:38,640 Speaker 4: the Snowden series that were just dropped recently. That one 103 00:05:39,760 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 4: was really interesting for me because I was at the 104 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:46,560 Speaker 4: Agency when that happened, and of course not involved in 105 00:05:46,600 --> 00:05:49,840 Speaker 4: it in any way, but had some awareness of sort 106 00:05:49,839 --> 00:05:52,919 Speaker 4: of how it had gone down, but had never spent 107 00:05:53,800 --> 00:05:57,640 Speaker 4: days researching it and talking about it with Gordon. So like, 108 00:05:57,760 --> 00:06:02,400 Speaker 4: getting into that story was really really interesting and confirmed 109 00:06:02,440 --> 00:06:05,960 Speaker 4: all of my preconceived biases about ed Snowden. Also, I 110 00:06:05,960 --> 00:06:08,200 Speaker 4: would say I was not. My opinion of the man 111 00:06:08,360 --> 00:06:10,640 Speaker 4: was not changed, So that was a really fun one. 112 00:06:10,880 --> 00:06:14,040 Speaker 4: The other one that I've really enjoyed doing was there 113 00:06:14,120 --> 00:06:19,359 Speaker 4: was a spir ring of Bulgarians who were operating in 114 00:06:19,480 --> 00:06:22,520 Speaker 4: The Minions. The Minions. Yeah, I love the Minions one 115 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:26,160 Speaker 4: because I've got three kids and they're avid watchers of 116 00:06:26,200 --> 00:06:28,400 Speaker 4: the Despicable Me franchise and the Minions, and I had 117 00:06:28,400 --> 00:06:32,960 Speaker 4: a legitimate work reason to rewatch those movies and to 118 00:06:33,120 --> 00:06:36,160 Speaker 4: go deep into like internet research on all the various 119 00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:38,599 Speaker 4: like spy tech and the Minions. The thing that I 120 00:06:38,600 --> 00:06:41,240 Speaker 4: think has been most fun on the podcast is finding 121 00:06:41,279 --> 00:06:45,360 Speaker 4: stories that do have a legitimate spy story at the 122 00:06:45,360 --> 00:06:48,280 Speaker 4: heart of the of whatever the tale is, but are 123 00:06:48,320 --> 00:06:51,360 Speaker 4: also sort of darkly comedic at the same time. And 124 00:06:51,800 --> 00:06:54,520 Speaker 4: any it seems like anytime you're dealing with like Russian 125 00:06:54,640 --> 00:06:58,760 Speaker 4: espionage in Europe, you we hit that kind of like 126 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:04,120 Speaker 4: nexus of there's bizarre characters and they're doing things that 127 00:07:04,160 --> 00:07:08,560 Speaker 4: are also if they succeed, potentially very damaging or lethal 128 00:07:08,640 --> 00:07:11,200 Speaker 4: and awful and murderous and all this kind of stuff. 129 00:07:11,520 --> 00:07:14,000 Speaker 4: So it's this weird package that I think make makes 130 00:07:14,040 --> 00:07:17,040 Speaker 4: those stories really fun for me to research and they're 131 00:07:17,040 --> 00:07:18,760 Speaker 4: really I mean, they can be sad too, but it's 132 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:21,440 Speaker 4: it's it's the kind of mixture of all of that 133 00:07:21,440 --> 00:07:22,280 Speaker 4: that mix them appealing. 134 00:07:22,520 --> 00:07:25,360 Speaker 2: Well, I found it very disappointing in your research on 135 00:07:25,440 --> 00:07:28,440 Speaker 2: the minions that you didn't include me in it. You 136 00:07:28,600 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 2: missed that part. Yeah, I see by the gobsnaked gobs 137 00:07:33,400 --> 00:07:36,040 Speaker 2: an uncaring look is what that? The look of gob 138 00:07:36,120 --> 00:07:37,559 Speaker 2: snakedness on your face? 139 00:07:37,600 --> 00:07:39,480 Speaker 4: I am gobsback because I have no idea where this 140 00:07:39,520 --> 00:07:39,880 Speaker 4: is going. 141 00:07:40,880 --> 00:07:44,240 Speaker 2: So our world, the world of di I folks and 142 00:07:44,280 --> 00:07:47,440 Speaker 2: DO folks is pretty limited sometimes right, we keep bumping 143 00:07:47,440 --> 00:07:50,800 Speaker 2: into each other. But after I retired, one of the 144 00:07:50,840 --> 00:07:53,480 Speaker 2: first sort of job offers I got, and I won't 145 00:07:53,480 --> 00:07:56,520 Speaker 2: go into detail here, but I was brought out to London. 146 00:07:56,560 --> 00:07:59,800 Speaker 2: This is after I'd retired and someone tried to hire 147 00:07:59,840 --> 00:08:03,640 Speaker 2: me to use my operator skills, which of course we 148 00:08:03,680 --> 00:08:06,960 Speaker 2: don't really want really security guys, but to basically investigate 149 00:08:07,000 --> 00:08:11,320 Speaker 2: the ft because the guy was saying that the ft 150 00:08:11,360 --> 00:08:12,720 Speaker 2: is a bad actor. 151 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:14,240 Speaker 1: The Financial Times, the. 152 00:08:14,200 --> 00:08:17,360 Speaker 2: Financial Times, and that what the what I was supposed 153 00:08:17,360 --> 00:08:19,560 Speaker 2: to investigate them for, and the journals I was supposed 154 00:08:19,560 --> 00:08:22,920 Speaker 2: to go after were the ones who were looking into 155 00:08:22,960 --> 00:08:27,720 Speaker 2: Wirecard and uh In macellk right, the Austrian guy, and 156 00:08:27,760 --> 00:08:31,200 Speaker 2: so I was supposed to come save them, and it 157 00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:33,920 Speaker 2: was outlined to me, you know that the journalists are 158 00:08:34,000 --> 00:08:36,880 Speaker 2: up to know good, they're being hired by a bad 159 00:08:36,920 --> 00:08:40,080 Speaker 2: actor to wreck investments. And they went through all this 160 00:08:40,160 --> 00:08:44,280 Speaker 2: and I thought, sounds like the Financial Times is onto this, right, 161 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:47,920 Speaker 2: I'm Marcelic. It's like he sounds like a bad guy. 162 00:08:48,120 --> 00:08:49,760 Speaker 2: And then of course he runs off to Moscow and 163 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:52,720 Speaker 2: he hires the minions, right, right, I have a small 164 00:08:52,960 --> 00:08:54,959 Speaker 2: little ten slices. 165 00:08:55,040 --> 00:08:56,560 Speaker 1: But if you had done it, you could have become 166 00:08:56,640 --> 00:08:58,560 Speaker 1: rich and then you would be part of the ministry. 167 00:08:58,600 --> 00:09:02,480 Speaker 2: Probably I was someone tried to hire me to basically 168 00:09:02,520 --> 00:09:07,400 Speaker 2: do opposition research to undermine stories that were undermining Workard. 169 00:09:07,520 --> 00:09:09,280 Speaker 2: And the other part you didn't have in there, which 170 00:09:09,280 --> 00:09:12,640 Speaker 2: I really love, was that it wasn't really your focus. 171 00:09:12,720 --> 00:09:16,600 Speaker 2: Your focus was on the minions. But Wirecard, the German 172 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 2: B and D was using this to pay their agents, 173 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:24,520 Speaker 2: and they're yeah, so the Russians were controlling the payment 174 00:09:24,600 --> 00:09:29,200 Speaker 2: mechanism to Germany's most secret you know, their version of Knox. 175 00:09:29,440 --> 00:09:32,200 Speaker 2: How they financed them and all their agents around the world. 176 00:09:32,559 --> 00:09:34,439 Speaker 2: So when you're you know, when you're chief of station 177 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:36,240 Speaker 2: in Berlin and you want the Germans are like, hey, 178 00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:37,520 Speaker 2: let's work together, You're like. 179 00:09:38,160 --> 00:09:42,280 Speaker 1: So you're saying that Germans screwed up IRAQ WMD and 180 00:09:42,320 --> 00:09:44,800 Speaker 1: then later screwed up everything else the. 181 00:09:44,760 --> 00:09:47,240 Speaker 2: Next one and they lost two World Wars. Yeah, I'm 182 00:09:47,280 --> 00:09:48,000 Speaker 2: just saying, you know. 183 00:09:48,480 --> 00:09:49,800 Speaker 4: It all leads back to Berlin. 184 00:09:50,360 --> 00:09:50,720 Speaker 2: It all. 185 00:09:51,320 --> 00:09:52,760 Speaker 4: That's bad. That's bad. 186 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:54,839 Speaker 2: Yeah, it was a small world. It is. 187 00:09:54,920 --> 00:09:57,840 Speaker 4: And that's why that that Marsalid character is like a 188 00:09:57,880 --> 00:10:00,480 Speaker 4: great I mean, he's just it's like when you read 189 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:03,360 Speaker 4: it out last but he actually did, it's yeah, it's insane. 190 00:10:03,440 --> 00:10:05,560 Speaker 4: I mean, it's the kind of character. If I had 191 00:10:05,559 --> 00:10:07,679 Speaker 4: written that in a novel, my editor would have been like, 192 00:10:07,880 --> 00:10:11,520 Speaker 4: this is ridiculous, this isn't realistic. And you know it's. 193 00:10:11,320 --> 00:10:13,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, you seem like you've got it. Seems like you've 194 00:10:13,679 --> 00:10:16,520 Speaker 2: got some decent sort of self confidence. So I don't 195 00:10:16,520 --> 00:10:17,280 Speaker 2: want to deflate it. 196 00:10:17,400 --> 00:10:19,000 Speaker 1: Oh, who knows where he's going with this? 197 00:10:19,080 --> 00:10:22,400 Speaker 2: There goes but I got to say your German accent 198 00:10:22,480 --> 00:10:24,920 Speaker 2: and your podcast and people have said it was really 199 00:10:24,920 --> 00:10:26,480 Speaker 2: more Colonel Clink than no. 200 00:10:26,600 --> 00:10:29,679 Speaker 4: I know, I know, because that's I loved it. 201 00:10:29,720 --> 00:10:30,280 Speaker 2: It was great. 202 00:10:30,520 --> 00:10:34,240 Speaker 4: I'm so bad at the accents, I can't. 203 00:10:33,960 --> 00:10:35,440 Speaker 2: Yah, it was it was excellent. 204 00:10:36,360 --> 00:10:38,720 Speaker 1: When Jerry does his German accent, like he speaks almost 205 00:10:38,800 --> 00:10:41,880 Speaker 1: like native German, it's obnoxious, sort of like you know 206 00:10:41,880 --> 00:10:43,960 Speaker 1: when people had to head the Latin accent and they 207 00:10:43,960 --> 00:10:46,600 Speaker 1: go like Venezuela. He does the same kind of thing 208 00:10:46,640 --> 00:10:48,599 Speaker 1: with with the German and then makes you want to 209 00:10:48,600 --> 00:10:49,079 Speaker 1: punch him. 210 00:10:51,360 --> 00:10:54,280 Speaker 4: You're saying, Colonel Clink, isn't isn't authentic? 211 00:10:54,480 --> 00:10:56,480 Speaker 2: Sort of he was authentic. He was a German Jew. 212 00:10:56,600 --> 00:10:58,160 Speaker 1: Yeah, he might be too young to You have watched 213 00:10:58,200 --> 00:10:58,880 Speaker 1: Hogan's Hero. 214 00:10:58,840 --> 00:10:59,840 Speaker 4: Oh I watched Hogan zero. 215 00:11:00,240 --> 00:11:03,200 Speaker 2: Yeah, his father it was a conductor Klemner. Yeah, it 216 00:11:03,280 --> 00:11:06,360 Speaker 2: was like it was a famous, famous orchestra conductor. 217 00:11:06,760 --> 00:11:09,400 Speaker 4: Well you need to improve. Yeah, the accents will, they'll 218 00:11:09,400 --> 00:11:10,360 Speaker 4: come with time. 219 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:15,199 Speaker 1: More of this exciting fainter after a quick breaking. 220 00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:31,520 Speaker 2: So what is your favorite conspiracy theory on CIA that 221 00:11:31,559 --> 00:11:33,920 Speaker 2: it gets either get thrown at you you find yourself 222 00:11:33,920 --> 00:11:37,920 Speaker 2: defending or you're wondering yourself, like you know, whiskey tango foxtrot. 223 00:11:38,360 --> 00:11:44,120 Speaker 4: So the one that I get pretty frequently nowadays. It's 224 00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:46,559 Speaker 4: a mixture of some of the people who bring this 225 00:11:46,679 --> 00:11:51,320 Speaker 4: forward or hostile, and then others are just curious. But 226 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:54,880 Speaker 4: it is the deep state, and it's a fun one 227 00:11:54,960 --> 00:11:59,120 Speaker 4: because it's kind of a it's extremely vague, and so 228 00:11:59,480 --> 00:12:03,959 Speaker 4: it kind of becomes anything that the holder of this 229 00:12:04,000 --> 00:12:07,720 Speaker 4: worldview wants it to become. And I I really try 230 00:12:07,800 --> 00:12:11,440 Speaker 4: to understand every time what they're talking about, like what 231 00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:17,559 Speaker 4: the allegation is, but it comes down to some unspecified 232 00:12:17,600 --> 00:12:21,120 Speaker 4: cabal of senior CIA officials who are working with the 233 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:28,559 Speaker 4: FBI to undermine American right. Yeah, exactly, like stop you 234 00:12:28,720 --> 00:12:31,760 Speaker 4: right there, This doesn't doesn't It's not gonna work like that. 235 00:12:31,960 --> 00:12:34,360 Speaker 4: They hate each other. That's probably the most frequent one 236 00:12:34,360 --> 00:12:36,640 Speaker 4: that I get in some way, shape or form. The 237 00:12:36,679 --> 00:12:39,800 Speaker 4: other one that comes up a lot are someone will 238 00:12:39,840 --> 00:12:43,880 Speaker 4: just say Hunter Biden laptop and and you know, and 239 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:46,040 Speaker 4: and the letter and all of that. That's another one 240 00:12:46,040 --> 00:12:48,839 Speaker 4: that'll come up. And uh, and again it's a it's 241 00:12:48,960 --> 00:12:51,760 Speaker 4: very hard to sort of usually walk the person through 242 00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:54,600 Speaker 4: to like what they're what's really going on. But that's 243 00:12:54,640 --> 00:12:55,600 Speaker 4: that's another one that comes up. 244 00:12:55,640 --> 00:12:59,160 Speaker 1: But I'm the state thing. I often wonder like if 245 00:12:59,160 --> 00:13:01,559 Speaker 1: you had time to walk people through this like, don't 246 00:13:01,600 --> 00:13:04,080 Speaker 1: you want a deep state in a certain sense, you're 247 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:06,600 Speaker 1: what you're saying is you have a professional group of 248 00:13:06,640 --> 00:13:10,240 Speaker 1: experts in an area who don't always agree with what 249 00:13:10,360 --> 00:13:13,480 Speaker 1: the politicians tell them. So I think these people are saying, Hey, 250 00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:16,920 Speaker 1: the first time President Trump was in power, all of 251 00:13:16,960 --> 00:13:21,960 Speaker 1: these bureaucrats didn't just automatically agree and support everything he said. Instead, 252 00:13:22,040 --> 00:13:24,200 Speaker 1: they were doing what they supposed to do. They would 253 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:26,240 Speaker 1: come and say, sir, that actually is against the law, 254 00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:28,679 Speaker 1: or if you do that, China's going to retaliate. You 255 00:13:28,760 --> 00:13:31,680 Speaker 1: might not want to And so yes, it probably for 256 00:13:31,720 --> 00:13:35,200 Speaker 1: a president who didn't understand how power works, it probably 257 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:38,000 Speaker 1: was frustrating to him. But if you get rid of 258 00:13:38,040 --> 00:13:40,280 Speaker 1: that and don't have expertise or people who actually try 259 00:13:40,280 --> 00:13:42,319 Speaker 1: to tell you what really is going on, a far 260 00:13:42,400 --> 00:13:45,480 Speaker 1: bigger problem for that president, it's going to then walk 261 00:13:45,559 --> 00:13:46,520 Speaker 1: right into the busk. 262 00:13:46,320 --> 00:13:49,120 Speaker 2: Because coming full circle, you know, with Rock w D, 263 00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:52,160 Speaker 2: if we had a better deep state, they would have said, sir, 264 00:13:52,480 --> 00:13:57,160 Speaker 2: we don't have absolute evidence, we don't have proof of WND. Yeah, 265 00:13:57,200 --> 00:13:59,959 Speaker 2: conjecture and hypothesis. Go to war on that if you want, 266 00:14:00,080 --> 00:14:02,800 Speaker 2: But you can't go saying it is. You can only 267 00:14:02,840 --> 00:14:03,800 Speaker 2: say maybe. 268 00:14:03,480 --> 00:14:05,800 Speaker 4: Right, because I think all of that is true. To me, 269 00:14:06,160 --> 00:14:09,080 Speaker 4: that conspiracy theory is more symptomatic and just the general 270 00:14:09,160 --> 00:14:13,920 Speaker 4: sort of collapse of trust in the institutions of our 271 00:14:14,040 --> 00:14:17,360 Speaker 4: state and our media and our civic life. And so 272 00:14:18,120 --> 00:14:20,960 Speaker 4: the CIA is like not immune to that. And so 273 00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:24,480 Speaker 4: it's like, it's weird because irack WMD has in some 274 00:14:25,440 --> 00:14:27,760 Speaker 4: way contributed to that, because people go back and say, oh, 275 00:14:27,800 --> 00:14:30,200 Speaker 4: you know, you guys, you screwed this up, and we 276 00:14:30,240 --> 00:14:33,600 Speaker 4: went to war and we spent a trillion dollars and 277 00:14:34,000 --> 00:14:35,280 Speaker 4: you know, a whole bunch of people died, so we 278 00:14:35,320 --> 00:14:38,320 Speaker 4: got nothing. But the solution to that would be to 279 00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:41,520 Speaker 4: have a better intelligence service, not to just undermine the 280 00:14:41,520 --> 00:14:45,000 Speaker 4: one that we have now even further. And don't I 281 00:14:45,000 --> 00:14:48,000 Speaker 4: don't think that circle gets squared. I also just think 282 00:14:48,000 --> 00:14:51,720 Speaker 4: that the immense secrecy makes it a lot harder to 283 00:14:52,160 --> 00:14:54,880 Speaker 4: I mean, there is and this is not a super 284 00:14:54,960 --> 00:14:57,640 Speaker 4: aha moment, but it's you know, obviously in an open 285 00:14:57,720 --> 00:15:01,080 Speaker 4: society and in a democracy, there's an incredible amount of 286 00:15:01,120 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 4: tension with that, the secrecy that the CIA needs to operate, 287 00:15:04,520 --> 00:15:09,440 Speaker 4: and we're inherently distrustful of anything that happens in secret 288 00:15:09,560 --> 00:15:10,680 Speaker 4: in this country. 289 00:15:10,400 --> 00:15:13,320 Speaker 2: Which you say trust has collapsed, you know, sort of 290 00:15:13,360 --> 00:15:16,160 Speaker 2: it's fallen out of a window like a Russian oligarch. 291 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:19,600 Speaker 2: But did it fall or was it pushed? Because I mean, 292 00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:22,960 Speaker 2: you've got people at the typical, at the at the 293 00:15:23,000 --> 00:15:26,960 Speaker 2: epicenter center or at the very acme of US power 294 00:15:27,040 --> 00:15:29,000 Speaker 2: who are still talking about the deep state. They are 295 00:15:29,080 --> 00:15:31,320 Speaker 2: the deep state, right, So it seems to me that 296 00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:34,200 Speaker 2: there is isn't a conspiracy in some way, shape or form, 297 00:15:34,240 --> 00:15:37,560 Speaker 2: depending on the definition to actually push the narrative that 298 00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:39,600 Speaker 2: there is a deep state. But I'm not sure that 299 00:15:39,640 --> 00:15:42,880 Speaker 2: it's just it's collapsed. I think that it's been monetized 300 00:15:42,960 --> 00:15:44,280 Speaker 2: and there's a there's a. 301 00:15:44,840 --> 00:15:46,120 Speaker 1: How long can you be in charge of it? And 302 00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:47,960 Speaker 1: keep saying that it exists, Like. 303 00:15:48,320 --> 00:15:50,600 Speaker 4: Yeah, it's very trumpy in to kind of have the 304 00:15:51,360 --> 00:15:53,080 Speaker 4: he taught because he does kind of talk out of 305 00:15:53,120 --> 00:15:56,880 Speaker 4: both sides of his mouth on the intelligence community, right. 306 00:15:56,920 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 4: I mean, for one of the episodes that we did 307 00:15:59,280 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 4: on kind of in tell in Politics, and we did 308 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:05,000 Speaker 4: the Halloween massacre story as part of that. When Stan 309 00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:08,400 Speaker 4: Turner did a bunch of cuts back in the late seventies, 310 00:16:08,760 --> 00:16:11,480 Speaker 4: primarily in the doo and the director of Operations. And 311 00:16:12,360 --> 00:16:15,200 Speaker 4: when you go back and you really read what Trump 312 00:16:15,200 --> 00:16:18,200 Speaker 4: has said about the IC, you get a lot of 313 00:16:18,200 --> 00:16:20,800 Speaker 4: stuff where he is like, man, you guys are the best, 314 00:16:20,920 --> 00:16:22,680 Speaker 4: and I love you and I love what you're doing. 315 00:16:22,720 --> 00:16:24,280 Speaker 4: And then you get a lot of other stuff that's like, 316 00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:27,720 Speaker 4: at the same time, there's this deep state that exists 317 00:16:27,760 --> 00:16:30,760 Speaker 4: inside the FBI and the CIA, and we need to 318 00:16:30,920 --> 00:16:33,440 Speaker 4: root it out. And he'll kind of talk about both 319 00:16:33,480 --> 00:16:36,520 Speaker 4: of those things in the same conversations, in the same 320 00:16:36,560 --> 00:16:40,120 Speaker 4: press conferences, right And when he went out to Langley 321 00:16:40,200 --> 00:16:43,280 Speaker 4: on day one of his first administration, you read the 322 00:16:43,320 --> 00:16:46,840 Speaker 4: transcript of that speech, which is insane, and he says 323 00:16:46,880 --> 00:16:49,880 Speaker 4: all of that stuff multiple times. It's kind of contradictory. 324 00:16:49,920 --> 00:16:52,400 Speaker 4: I think he's very instinctive, and I think he realizes 325 00:16:52,440 --> 00:16:56,560 Speaker 4: that at maybe some basic level, there's some capabilities and 326 00:16:56,600 --> 00:17:00,560 Speaker 4: some cool shit inside the intelligence community that could be 327 00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:03,440 Speaker 4: really beneficial to him, and probably some people in there 328 00:17:03,440 --> 00:17:05,399 Speaker 4: that want to help him. And then at the same time, 329 00:17:05,920 --> 00:17:10,439 Speaker 4: you know, you get irritating things like when Russia House 330 00:17:10,720 --> 00:17:14,560 Speaker 4: and the Russia analysts are putting stuff out that says, hey, 331 00:17:14,640 --> 00:17:17,600 Speaker 4: you know, we're not saying that the Russians got you elected. 332 00:17:17,720 --> 00:17:22,840 Speaker 4: We're saying the Russians wanted you to win. And you know, 333 00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:26,639 Speaker 4: there's no difference, there's no distinction in his mind between 334 00:17:26,680 --> 00:17:28,720 Speaker 4: those things. But that, more than anything else, I think 335 00:17:29,040 --> 00:17:31,399 Speaker 4: in his mind was like, oh, there's like there's like 336 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:36,159 Speaker 4: enemies or people who wish me ill inside CIA who 337 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:38,719 Speaker 4: are putting these assessments together, letting them get out, like 338 00:17:39,040 --> 00:17:43,080 Speaker 4: I don't want that. And the relationship I think from 339 00:17:43,080 --> 00:17:45,800 Speaker 4: there really has been rocky, hasn't it. 340 00:17:45,920 --> 00:17:48,840 Speaker 2: The internal contradiction Just today that came out as you've 341 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:53,720 Speaker 2: got RFK Junior apparently yesterday said that he's asked about 342 00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:57,760 Speaker 2: kem trails, right, the US government secretly putting out poisons 343 00:17:57,800 --> 00:17:59,960 Speaker 2: into the air to whatever it is, to make people 344 00:18:00,160 --> 00:18:04,840 Speaker 2: infertile or to kill specific nationalities. And instead of saying 345 00:18:04,840 --> 00:18:08,040 Speaker 2: it's not true because he's in charge now, he said, well, 346 00:18:08,240 --> 00:18:11,800 Speaker 2: my department doesn't do that, and then he can't basically 347 00:18:11,880 --> 00:18:15,320 Speaker 2: said you have to talk to Pete Hegsith about that, right. 348 00:18:15,359 --> 00:18:18,119 Speaker 2: He blamed darb book and said, well that's the real 349 00:18:18,280 --> 00:18:21,440 Speaker 2: deep state that's doing this. Right, So they even when 350 00:18:21,440 --> 00:18:25,040 Speaker 2: they're in charge, they still are like the tweed ring 351 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:25,959 Speaker 2: pointing at each other. 352 00:18:26,040 --> 00:18:28,760 Speaker 1: They can't just say, yeah, the CIA killed my father, 353 00:18:29,000 --> 00:18:30,600 Speaker 1: and so they get in they say, well, put out 354 00:18:30,600 --> 00:18:32,560 Speaker 1: all the materials. So they put all all the material 355 00:18:32,640 --> 00:18:34,480 Speaker 1: and then it's just like okay, let's move on to 356 00:18:34,520 --> 00:18:34,920 Speaker 1: the next thing. 357 00:18:35,080 --> 00:18:37,080 Speaker 2: Ye yeah, like yeah. 358 00:18:37,240 --> 00:18:39,040 Speaker 4: The thing for me that is just kind of a 359 00:18:39,080 --> 00:18:42,720 Speaker 4: basic starting point is like, we would we want the 360 00:18:42,800 --> 00:18:45,520 Speaker 4: people in our country who are making the decisions to 361 00:18:45,600 --> 00:18:49,560 Speaker 4: have better information about other countries than those countries do 362 00:18:49,640 --> 00:18:50,160 Speaker 4: about us. 363 00:18:50,640 --> 00:18:51,760 Speaker 2: And so if you. 364 00:18:51,720 --> 00:18:54,840 Speaker 4: Start from that premise, which I think most people would 365 00:18:54,880 --> 00:18:58,879 Speaker 4: agree with, you need an effective foreign intelligence service to 366 00:18:58,920 --> 00:19:02,000 Speaker 4: do that. You need one that you could argue about 367 00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:03,760 Speaker 4: what form it takes, You could argue about how the 368 00:19:03,760 --> 00:19:07,880 Speaker 4: whole thing's organize. We should be collecting information on other 369 00:19:07,960 --> 00:19:11,560 Speaker 4: big countries like Russia and China and Iran and North 370 00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:15,520 Speaker 4: Korea that potentially wishes ill and you'd want the president 371 00:19:15,560 --> 00:19:18,399 Speaker 4: to have the best possible information about what those countries 372 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:21,840 Speaker 4: are up to. And that's what the CIA does, you know. 373 00:19:22,080 --> 00:19:25,000 Speaker 4: So if someone someone can't walk to that point in 374 00:19:25,040 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 4: the conversation, it's like we're not we're not living on 375 00:19:28,640 --> 00:19:29,360 Speaker 4: the same planet. 376 00:19:29,680 --> 00:19:31,600 Speaker 2: So David, let me ask you about yourself. So when 377 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:34,639 Speaker 2: you supposedly left CIA. You know, of course none of it. 378 00:19:35,160 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 2: We're all still in yes, still in the deep state, 379 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:42,679 Speaker 2: joining Operation Mockingberg to write these novels to like to 380 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:46,600 Speaker 2: influence people. Yeah, so did you enjoy your time in 381 00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:48,920 Speaker 2: the agency and why'd you decide to leave? And how 382 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:53,399 Speaker 2: are you? How you how does Hollywood compare to like 383 00:19:53,960 --> 00:19:56,600 Speaker 2: the intelligence community? Because we're finding Hollywood to be like, 384 00:19:56,720 --> 00:19:58,560 Speaker 2: way more screwed up than we ever worked. 385 00:19:59,359 --> 00:20:01,119 Speaker 4: Well, the agency was great because I got to be 386 00:20:01,160 --> 00:20:03,040 Speaker 4: at briefings with guys like you and tell me how 387 00:20:03,080 --> 00:20:06,440 Speaker 4: smart I was and how badly my you know, analytic 388 00:20:06,560 --> 00:20:11,040 Speaker 4: judgments were needed to support this critical operation. I really 389 00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:13,840 Speaker 4: enjoyed my time at the CIA, you know, as someone 390 00:20:13,840 --> 00:20:16,719 Speaker 4: who joined really young and who wanted to learn how 391 00:20:16,720 --> 00:20:21,960 Speaker 4: the world worked and get the opportunity to travel and see, 392 00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:27,359 Speaker 4: I don't know, see the world outside of Minnesota. I 393 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:29,760 Speaker 4: really enjoyed it. And I found the problems I was 394 00:20:29,760 --> 00:20:34,000 Speaker 4: working on there to be really endlessly fascinating, and it 395 00:20:34,040 --> 00:20:36,159 Speaker 4: felt even though there were plenty of times where I 396 00:20:36,200 --> 00:20:39,560 Speaker 4: feel like we would write things and basically you'd get 397 00:20:39,560 --> 00:20:42,400 Speaker 4: the feedback of like read with interest, which generally meant 398 00:20:42,480 --> 00:20:44,080 Speaker 4: they looked at the piece of paper that it was 399 00:20:44,119 --> 00:20:46,120 Speaker 4: on that was a classic one, like it was read 400 00:20:46,160 --> 00:20:48,479 Speaker 4: with interest, and then you'd write that up in your 401 00:20:48,480 --> 00:20:51,399 Speaker 4: annual assessment. You'd be like, I wrote ten pdbs that 402 00:20:51,440 --> 00:20:55,080 Speaker 4: were read with interest this year. You know, it did 403 00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:57,680 Speaker 4: feel in some way, like I felt like I could 404 00:20:57,760 --> 00:21:01,119 Speaker 4: connect some line from like I'm working on this topic 405 00:21:01,160 --> 00:21:03,080 Speaker 4: to like, then it's getting to people who are actually 406 00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:05,840 Speaker 4: making decisions, and you hope, in some way, shape or form, 407 00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:10,720 Speaker 4: something you've written somewhere has made some difference in the 408 00:21:10,760 --> 00:21:13,800 Speaker 4: way policy is made. And so I really loved it, 409 00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:17,080 Speaker 4: And I honestly maybe kind of cheesy to say, but 410 00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:20,639 Speaker 4: you know, working with a bunch of really smart people 411 00:21:20,640 --> 00:21:23,840 Speaker 4: who are also dedicated to the mission of the CIA 412 00:21:24,119 --> 00:21:27,840 Speaker 4: was an experience I would wouldn't trade for anything. I 413 00:21:27,880 --> 00:21:30,440 Speaker 4: would say that I have a little bit more creative 414 00:21:30,440 --> 00:21:34,040 Speaker 4: freedom now when I'm writing novels, so I'm not sending 415 00:21:34,080 --> 00:21:37,760 Speaker 4: things through nine layers of review. And you know, there's 416 00:21:37,840 --> 00:21:41,040 Speaker 4: definitely a part of me that is grateful, given how 417 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:43,919 Speaker 4: chaotic things seem in DC these days, to not be 418 00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:46,600 Speaker 4: in one of those chairs at this point. 419 00:21:46,680 --> 00:21:49,040 Speaker 2: But you know, I still go through the PRB. 420 00:21:49,240 --> 00:21:51,720 Speaker 4: Yes, so go through everything still goes through the prbing 421 00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:56,480 Speaker 4: publication review board. Yeah yeah, And I honestly have probably 422 00:21:56,560 --> 00:22:01,439 Speaker 4: learned more about the actual CIA it'sself self now that 423 00:22:01,480 --> 00:22:04,880 Speaker 4: I'm outside and like writing stories about it and having 424 00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:08,760 Speaker 4: conversations with guys like you about you know, not the 425 00:22:08,800 --> 00:22:10,840 Speaker 4: substance of this or that thing it's serious, but about 426 00:22:10,880 --> 00:22:13,560 Speaker 4: like what's the job, like what's the place like all that. 427 00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:16,959 Speaker 4: So I've gotten a kind of newfound appreciation for the place. 428 00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:19,720 Speaker 4: And I mean, obviously it's got a lot of wards too, 429 00:22:19,840 --> 00:22:23,160 Speaker 4: but I think it's a really important institution and really 430 00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:25,320 Speaker 4: fascinating one, and so it's been interesting to write about 431 00:22:25,320 --> 00:22:26,200 Speaker 4: it from the outside. 432 00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:28,879 Speaker 1: So that leads me to perhaps our last question. We're 433 00:22:28,880 --> 00:22:30,560 Speaker 1: going to keep you too long? Can you tell us 434 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:32,159 Speaker 1: about your next book? And are we in it? 435 00:22:32,800 --> 00:22:38,080 Speaker 4: We got it? Figure Central Central Figures and John, Yeah, 436 00:22:38,280 --> 00:22:41,280 Speaker 4: John and Jerry. I made you both analysts r and John. 437 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:43,080 Speaker 4: You're both You're a team of You're a team of 438 00:22:43,119 --> 00:22:46,480 Speaker 4: analysts who get in the first pages, get a call 439 00:22:46,640 --> 00:22:49,800 Speaker 4: horribly wrong and her and are you know? The rest 440 00:22:49,800 --> 00:22:52,040 Speaker 4: of the story is the rest of the story is 441 00:22:52,040 --> 00:22:56,680 Speaker 4: an intrepid case officer David, who really solves the problem 442 00:22:57,040 --> 00:22:59,840 Speaker 4: I have I have I have enjoyed interestingly because I 443 00:22:59,840 --> 00:23:03,200 Speaker 4: mean most of the protagonists of the book are case officers, 444 00:23:03,200 --> 00:23:05,960 Speaker 4: because if you wrote an analyst protagonist, it would actually 445 00:23:06,040 --> 00:23:09,320 Speaker 4: be very hard to make that book work. I've taken 446 00:23:09,359 --> 00:23:11,080 Speaker 4: a lot of potshots at the analyst, and I think 447 00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:15,400 Speaker 4: I need to start taking more at the case officers. Frankly, Yeah, 448 00:23:15,440 --> 00:23:18,520 Speaker 4: that's right, that's right. Yeah, it really is, it really is. 449 00:23:18,720 --> 00:23:22,480 Speaker 4: So the next one, which is out here in the 450 00:23:22,520 --> 00:23:26,959 Speaker 4: States in September thirtieth, is called The Persian and it 451 00:23:27,040 --> 00:23:31,520 Speaker 4: is an Israel Iran story. I basically took the looked 452 00:23:31,560 --> 00:23:34,399 Speaker 4: at all the different crazy things that the Israelis have 453 00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:38,000 Speaker 4: done in Iran over the past fifteen plus years, and 454 00:23:38,480 --> 00:23:41,240 Speaker 4: tried to imagine what it might look like if the 455 00:23:41,240 --> 00:23:44,800 Speaker 4: Iranians built a similar capability, not at the same level, 456 00:23:44,800 --> 00:23:48,040 Speaker 4: but built a similar capability in Israel and started to 457 00:23:48,920 --> 00:23:53,439 Speaker 4: started to kill Israeli security officials and intelligence officers, and 458 00:23:53,560 --> 00:23:55,880 Speaker 4: the Israelis kind of going back at them to try 459 00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:57,600 Speaker 4: to figure out what's going on. So it's a war 460 00:23:57,640 --> 00:24:01,879 Speaker 4: of assassinations between both the Israelis and the Iranians. And 461 00:24:02,040 --> 00:24:06,280 Speaker 4: it was a very interesting book to write because of 462 00:24:06,600 --> 00:24:09,840 Speaker 4: so much of the kind of israel Aron shadow Ward 463 00:24:09,880 --> 00:24:12,000 Speaker 4: of bleeding out into the open while Iye was actually 464 00:24:12,200 --> 00:24:15,600 Speaker 4: writing it, and another one of those stories where so 465 00:24:15,720 --> 00:24:19,320 Speaker 4: many of the Israeli operations were so insane that it 466 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:22,119 Speaker 4: was oftentimes just the best scenario to sort of change 467 00:24:22,119 --> 00:24:24,280 Speaker 4: a few things and basically use what the Israelis had 468 00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:26,760 Speaker 4: already done as plot points because so much of the 469 00:24:26,800 --> 00:24:28,400 Speaker 4: stuff was soa bonkers. 470 00:24:28,280 --> 00:24:32,600 Speaker 2: You made like a satellite operated AI enabled machine guy. 471 00:24:33,000 --> 00:24:39,359 Speaker 4: Right right right, or or kidnapping the head of the 472 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:43,199 Speaker 4: Goods Forces like external kind of lethal operations unit and 473 00:24:43,280 --> 00:24:47,920 Speaker 4: interrogating him in Iran before dumping him back out on 474 00:24:47,960 --> 00:24:50,159 Speaker 4: the street and then taking all the footage and leaking 475 00:24:50,200 --> 00:24:54,040 Speaker 4: it to journalists. So, I mean, it's just like crazy stuff. 476 00:24:54,119 --> 00:24:56,440 Speaker 4: I mean. The other great story, which has been well 477 00:24:56,480 --> 00:25:00,000 Speaker 4: documented is when they broke into the archive where the 478 00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:03,040 Speaker 4: audience had kept all of their files on the Duke program, 479 00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:05,640 Speaker 4: and they basically broke into all these safes and put 480 00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:07,560 Speaker 4: everything on trucks and then just drove it out of 481 00:25:07,560 --> 00:25:11,160 Speaker 4: the country. So yeah, that's pretty pretty wild stuff. 482 00:25:11,520 --> 00:25:14,400 Speaker 1: Well, I'm looking forward to reading that. You can sign 483 00:25:14,440 --> 00:25:16,040 Speaker 1: our books when the time comes in, we'll have you 484 00:25:16,080 --> 00:25:17,719 Speaker 1: on to talk about the book itself. 485 00:25:17,760 --> 00:25:18,320 Speaker 4: That'd be great. 486 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:21,800 Speaker 1: Yeah, David, thanks for meeting us. Anybody who is listening 487 00:25:21,880 --> 00:25:25,399 Speaker 1: to this should definitely be listening to The rest is Classified. Again, 488 00:25:25,480 --> 00:25:27,879 Speaker 1: thank you for your time. You're one of our favorite 489 00:25:27,920 --> 00:25:29,399 Speaker 1: guys to read and listen to, so. 490 00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:31,760 Speaker 4: Thanks thanks for having me on. Guys, I appreciate you 491 00:25:31,760 --> 00:25:34,320 Speaker 4: inviting an analyst to come on this program, so. 492 00:25:34,440 --> 00:25:38,280 Speaker 2: Run out of guests. 493 00:25:40,080 --> 00:25:45,080 Speaker 5: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry Osha, John Cipher, 494 00:25:45,440 --> 00:25:46,720 Speaker 5: and Jonathan Stern. 495 00:25:46,880 --> 00:25:49,240 Speaker 3: The associate producer is Rachel Harner. 496 00:25:49,520 --> 00:25:53,320 Speaker 5: Mission Implausible It's a production of honorable mention and abominable 497 00:25:53,320 --> 00:25:55,280 Speaker 5: pictures for iHeart Podcasts. 498 00:26:00,920 --> 00:26:01,120 Speaker 2: Don'